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Changes from plenary report to adopted text

A-10-2025-0106 → TA-10-2025-0155

From
A-10-2025-0106 Plenary report of 10 Jun 2025
To
TA-10-2025-0155 Adopted text of 9 Jul 2025
Changes
9 changes to the text
Paragraphs
+11 added · −10 removed · 6 changed
More facts (3)
Title (from)
on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania
Title (to)
2023 and 2024 reports on Albania
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Updates the accession timeline, noting the opening of two additional clusters in 2025.12 Adds new paragraphs on religious freedom, minority rights, and communist-era restitution.45 Changes the census reference from 2024 to 2023 and adds calls for data publication.6 Adds concerns about judicial challenges, organised crime, and Russian influence.789 Adds a note on the upcoming OSCE/ODIHR final report on the May 2025 elections.3

The notes class 9 changes as substance, 0 as formal, 0 as wording only.

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The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.

Part 1 of 3: MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

RemovedMOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

AddedP10_TA(2025)0155

Changedon the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania

Removed(2025/2017(INI))

AddedCommittee on Foreign Affairs

AddedPE769.914

AddedEuropean Parliament resolution of 9 July 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania (2025/2017(INI))

29 unchanged paragraphs

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part,

– having regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, submitted on 24 April 2009,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0690),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania’ (SWD(2024)0828),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0690),

– having regard to the Reform Agenda of Albania submitted under the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, as approved by the Commission on 23 October 2024,

– having regard to the final report of 29 September 2023 by the Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Albania’s local elections of 14 May 2023,

– having regard to the final report of 26 July 2021 by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR on Albania’s parliamentary elections of 25 April 2021,

– having regard to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 11 December 2020 on the amendments to the Albanian constitution of 30 July 2020 and the amendments to Albania’s electoral code of 5 October 2020,

– having regard to the Sofia Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018, and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

– having regard to the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Brussels on 13 December 2023 and 18 December 2024,

– having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 World Press Freedom Index,

– having regard to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index,

– having regard to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Albania,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2025),

A. whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability and security throughout the continent;

B. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be by far Albania’s biggest trade and investment partner and its largest provider of financial assistance;

C. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas Albania’s EU accession depends on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions;

D. whereas Albania has been an EU candidate country since 2014, began accession negotiations in July 2022 and successfully completed the screening process in November 2023;

Change 1

ChangedE. whereas Albania opened negotiations on ‘Cluster 1: Fundamentals’ on 15 October 2024 and2024, on ‘Cluster 6: External Relations’ on 17 December 2024;2024, on ‘Cluster 2: Internal market’ on 14 April 2025 and on ‘Cluster 3: Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth’ on 22 May 2025;

7 unchanged paragraphs

F. whereas Albania is a reliable foreign policy partner and is fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

G. whereas Albania has been a target of foreign malign influence campaigns aiming to sow discord, provoke tensions and violence and destabilise the whole region, including Russian disinformation and election meddling, as well as questionable investments from non-EU actors such as China; whereas Russian and Iranian cyber attacks against Albania in 2022 and 2023 disrupted critical government functions, illustrating the hybrid threat environment Albania faces as it progresses toward EU integration;

H. whereas electoral shortcomings and serious vulnerabilities persist in Albania’s electoral system; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to further improve the conduct of elections in Albania have not yet been fully addressed;

I. whereas Albania participates in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, including in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

J. whereas protection of national and ethnic minorities is crucial for aspiring EU Member States; whereas the implementing legislation on free self-identification and the use of minority languages has been adopted in Albania;

K. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the critical importance of EU enlargement for ensuring security and stability on our continent;

1. Welcomes Albania’s unwavering commitment to EU integration, reflecting consensus among all political parties, both governmental and opposition, and overwhelming support among citizens, and commends its consistent full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and promotion of the rules-based international order, including its categorical response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through its alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; acknowledges the country’s active role in the region and in regional initiatives;

Change 2

Changed2. Welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations by the end of 2027 and the swift progress made in recent years, notably the opening of two clusters of negotiating chapters in 2024;2024 and two further clusters so far in 2025; recalls that candidate countries undergo in-depth transformations to fulfil membership criteria during accession negotiations, which last as long as it takes to implement the necessary reforms; stresses the need to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the accession process, including its parliamentary dimension; cautions against any actions that could undermine the system of checks and balances;

10 unchanged paragraphs

3. Notes that the pace of EU accession is determined by the candidate country’s progress on aligning with the EU acquis, its track record on implementing it and the due functioning of all the country’s institutions, and is grounded in the rule of law, good governance and fundamental rights; urges Albania to accelerate reforms to strengthen the rule of law and economic growth, counter corruption and organised crime, prevent human trafficking, ensure the protection of fundamental rights and make progress in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of information and media pluralism and independence;

4. Welcomes the EU’s new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which will provide EUR 922 million in grants and loans to Albania when it meets the conditions set out in its ambitious Reform Agenda;

5. Takes note of Albania’s adoption of the National Plan for European Integration 2024-2026; welcomes the fact that Albania has established the bodies in charge of the integration process; calls for greater efforts to increase transparency and engage in public communication on EU integration;

6. Welcomes the decision to open the European Parliament’s antenna office for the Western Balkans in Tirana; notes that the office will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society and local partners from across the Western Balkans region;

7. Welcomes the involvement of 18 Albanian participants in the Enlargement Candidate Members initiative launched by the European Economic and Social Committee, which aims to foster closer ties with candidate countries and facilitate their gradual integration into the EU;

Democratic institutions, media and civil society

8. Insists on the importance of constructive political debate and orderly parliamentary conduct as key aspects of democratic governance; reaffirms the joint responsibility of Albania’s political forces to strengthen constructive and inclusive political dialogue and overcome ongoing high political polarisation in the country; deplores the continued confrontations and inflammatory rhetoric by politicians from all parties and the clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition; underlines the need to foster a political culture based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms, ensuring that political competition does not undermine institutional stability, and to demonstrate full respect for the role of parliamentarism, by putting an end to political attacks; calls for genuine dialogue to promote political stability and progress, emphasising the need for cross-party consensus on the EU integration agenda and the meaningful involvement of civil society; emphasises the need for more effective parliamentary oversight and improved functioning of institutions;

9. Recognises the growing threat of foreign malign influence and hybrid interference in Albania’s democratic institutions; highlights that Kremlin-aligned narratives have sought to erode public confidence in democratic institutions and promote anti-Western sentiment; calls on Albania to enhance institutional resilience against covert political funding, media manipulation and cyber threats that directly impact its EU accession process; calls for the EU institutions to closely monitor Albania’s exposure to foreign malign influence;

10. Welcomes Albania’s blocking of Russian disinformation domains but stresses the need for a coordinated EU-Albania disinformation response mechanism, modelled on the EUvsDisinfo platform, to rapidly debunk and counteract Kremlin narratives; advocates for increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; warns of the increasing footprint of Chinese state-backed media in Albania;

11. Emphasises the Albanian Parliament’s duty to respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court without delay; stresses the fundamental and irreplaceable role of parliament in safeguarding checks and balances; calls on Albania to ensure genuine democratic accountability and stronger, more transparent governance;

Change 3

Changed12. Takes note of the July 2024 amendments to Albania’s electoral code, which enable out-of-country voting by the Albanian diaspora and introduce partially open candidate lists; takes note of the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and underlines that, based on the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field; expresses concern that the ruling party benefited from the widespread use of administrative resources; notes that the publication of the OSCE/ODIHR final report, which will include the final assessment and recommendations to be implemented, is expected in the coming months; calls on all parties to demonstrate political will for a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform to implement all recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission fully and in a timely manner, including those on the electoral and party financing framework;

4 unchanged paragraphs

13. Regrets that the environment for free media and independent journalists has been declining in recent years; notes with concern that media independence and pluralism in Albania continue to be affected by high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, lack of transparency of funding and ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists; notes that, according to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, Albania ranks 99th, reflecting ongoing issues related to media ownership concentration, political interference and threats against journalists; highlights that the lack of transparency in media financing and ownership structures increases the risk of editorial bias and foreign propaganda penetration and undermines public trust in journalism; calls on the Albanian authorities to ensure media ownership transparency and enforce a policy of zero tolerance for the intimidation of journalists; calls on the Albanian Government to support independent fact-checking platforms as a means to ensure public access to accurate information and to uphold the integrity of the information space;

14. Recalls that any revision of media laws should be in line with the Venice Commission recommendations and should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner in consultation with media organisations, with the aim of improving media freedom and self-regulation; welcomes the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists launched by the Council of Europe, together with the EU and a network of prominent press freedom organisations; regrets that there has been no progress in aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis and EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act; recalls the need to strengthen investigative journalism, fact-checking and media literacy and to tackle hate speech, disinformation and fake news; expresses concern over enduring inflammatory anti-media rhetoric, including by high-level politicians, public officials and other public figures, which fuels the culture of intimidation; strongly condemns the increasing verbal attacks against journalists reporting on rule of law and corruption matters, as well as misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, smear campaigns, violence and rioting, and calls for the final convictions of the attackers to be ensured; regrets that the criminal code does not provide protection to journalists against threats and violence, calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that efficiently protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against the concerning increase of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), to decriminalise defamation and to respect the role of independent journalism as a crucial check on power and to engage with the media in a manner that upholds democratic principles;

15. Recalls the responsibility of national and local authorities to improve transparency, accountability and inclusiveness by conducting meaningful and regular public stakeholder consultations; notes with concern that the Albanian Parliament’s implementation of the legal framework for public consultations remains predominantly formal; stresses the need for greater transparency regarding public data and key legislative projects; insists that the financial resources, administrative capacity and fiscal autonomy of local authorities should be improved;

16. Welcomes Albania’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a crucial and positive role in the reform process; welcomes the improvement of electoral monitoring and the increasing participation of civil society in overseeing the democratic process; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; encourages the Albanian Government to bolster the role of civil society, including women’s rights organisations, in the EU accession process, from an early stage and in a transparent legislative process; regrets that civil society organisations operate in a challenging environment and receive limited public funding; insists that the groundwork for an effective VAT exemption system be laid in compliance with the commitments taken by Albania under the EU-Albania Cooperation Agreement and the IPA III; urges the authorities to speed up the drafting of the 2024-2027 roadmap for the government policy towards a more enabling environment for civil society development and to closely monitor the implementation of this roadmap;

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
26 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2025). “Changes between A-10-2025-0106 and TA-10-2025-0155”. Text, 9 July 2025. from A-10-2025-0106, to TA-10-2025-0155, reference 2025/2017(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0106/compare/TA-10-2025-0155?all=1 (retrieved 26 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2025-07-09,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between A-10-2025-0106 and TA-10-2025-0155}},
  year = {2025},
  date = {2025-07-09},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0106/compare/TA-10-2025-0155?all=1}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0106/compare/TA-10-2025-0155?all=1},
  urldate = {2026-09-26},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from A-10-2025-0106, to TA-10-2025-0155, reference 2025/2017(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}