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Changes from plenary report to adopted text

A-10-2025-0011 → TA-10-2025-0058

From
A-10-2025-0011 Plenary report of 10 Feb 2025
To
TA-10-2025-0058 Adopted text of 2 Apr 2025
Changes
54 changes to the text
Paragraphs
+53 added · −11 removed · 30 changed
More facts (3)
Title (from)
on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024
Title (to)
Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

The report adds extensive new content on the US shift and the need for Europe to strengthen defence, including calls for security commitments to Ukraine and welcoming new initiatives like the White Paper and ReArm Europe.1278 It updates positions on the Middle East, including the ceasefire in Gaza and the Arab Recovery Plan, and on the Great Lakes region, condemning M23 and calling for suspension of military cooperation with Rwanda.282935 It adds calls for action against the Russian shadow fleet, for an EU drone package, and for increased defence funding, including common debt and a defence bank.14202425 It strengthens language on border protection, including physical barriers, and on military mobility, and updates the EU's partnership with North America and Indo-Pacific countries.39404546 The other changes are formal: renumbering, decimal separators, and updated citations.351519

The notes class 45 changes as substance, 9 as formal, 0 as wording only.

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The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.

Part 2 of 7: Paragraphs 61–120

6 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to its resolution of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine,

– having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union,

– having regard to its position of 22 October 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine,

– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan,

– having regard to Ukraine’s victory plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the European Council on 17 October 2024,

Added– having regard to the ReArm Europe proposal of 4 March 2025,

Added– having regard to the Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, as presented on 19 March 2025 (JOIN(2025)0120),

Added– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),

Added– having regard to Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Accommodating increased defence expenditure within the Stability and Growth Path’ (C(2025)2000),

Added– having regard to the speeches and statements made at the Munich Security Conference of 14-16 February 2025,

Added– having regard to the leaders meeting of 2 March 2025 in London,

Added– having regard to the Commission’s plans for a European Military Sales Mechanism,

Added– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025,

4 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0011/2025),

A. whereas this past year has been marked by a decline in global peace and security, resulting, inter alia, from conflict, geopolitical rivalry, growing militarisation, terrorism and hybrid threats, as assessed by the Normandy Index 2024;

B. whereas Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, continued armament efforts and armaments cooperation with other authoritarian powers far surpassing European stocks and production capacities, and the Russian regime’s choice to undermine the rules-based international order and the security architecture of Europe and to wage war on European countries or seek to destabilise them in order to realise its imperialist vision of the world, poses the most serious and unprecedented threat to world peace, as well as to the security and territory of the EU and its Member States; whereas Russia currently produces three million artillery shells per year, while the EU’s declared ambition within its first European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) aims for a production capacity of 2 million shells per year by the end of 2025; whereas the Russian regime is strengthening its ties with the autocratic leadership of China, Iran and North Korea to achieve its objectives;

Change 1

AddedC. whereas recent statements by members of the US administration, accompanied by the heavy pressure exerted on Ukraine by the US leadership, reflect a shift in US foreign policy, as the Trump administration is proposing the normalisation of ties with Russia and it is becoming increasingly clear that Europe needs to strengthen its security and defence to be able to help Ukraine and to defend itself;

D. whereas the EU is also facing the most diverse and complex range of non-military threats since its creation, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including, inter alia, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), cyberattacks, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, instrumentalisation of migration and subversive political influence;

E. whereas Russia illegally invaded and annexed Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine; whereas Ukraine needs to be provided with the necessary military capabilities for as long as it takes for Ukraine to achieve a decisive military victory, end Russia’s illegal war of aggression, restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and deter any future aggression; whereas Ukraine, in defending itself, is also protecting and fighting for European values and core security interests; whereas Russia is still illegally occupying the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia and the Transnistria region of Moldova;

Change 2

AddedF. whereas the new US administration has been actively trying to get Russia to agree to a peace deal but, despite two telephone calls between Presidents Trump and Putin, on 12 February and 18 March 2025, as well as several rounds of direct negotiations between the United States and Russia in Saudi Arabia, Russia has so far avoided responding clearly to any ceasefire proposal and has consistently set conditions on a ceasefire; whereas despite its repeated criticism, the EU has, so far, not been adequately represented at the negotiations on a ceasefire and peace in Ukraine;

G. whereas, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, China is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods employed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European interests; whereas China is also heavily arming itself militarily, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide, and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security;

Change 3

ChangedFH. whereas China has, for many years, promoted an alternative narrative, challenging human rights, democratic values and open markets in multilateral and international forums; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in these organisations;

17 unchanged paragraphs

I. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated not only in Eastern Europe, but also in its southern neighbourhood and beyond;

J. whereas the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel, the ongoing war in Gaza and the military operations against the Hezbollah on Lebanese territory have significantly increased the danger of a regional military confrontation in the Middle East, and the risk of escalation in the region is at its highest in decades; whereas the ongoing attacks in the Red Sea launched from the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, with the support of Iran, and the hijackings of commercial vessels by Somali pirates, from the Red Sea to the northwestern Indian Ocean, pose a significant threat to freedom of navigation, maritime security and international trade; whereas additional attacks by various Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria are further increasing the risk of regional escalation; whereas the EU has launched its own military operation, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, to improve the security situation in the area;

K. whereas the eastern neighbourhood and Western Balkan countries face increasingly diverse threats to their security and are being negatively affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the increased assertiveness of regional and global actors, such as China; whereas Kosovo and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue face, in particular, threats of destabilisation;

L. whereas the disastrous impact of past or ongoing wars, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, northeast Africa and Libya, poses serious risks to EU security and its economic and trade interests; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with and remain an ongoing challenge for EU external border management; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo, fighting illicit weapons and human trafficking, and training the Libyan coastguard;

M. whereas a part of Cyprus, an EU Member State, still remains under illegal occupation by Türkiye;

N. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while, at the same time, it is facing challenges linked to climate change, militarisation and migration;

O. whereas past underinvestment in defence by EU Member States has led to an investment gap; whereas the Member States have agreed on more, better and smarter defence spending; whereas in 2024, 16 EU Member States that are also NATO allies, compared to 9 in 2023, were expected to exceed the NATO guidelines to spend at least 2 % of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence; whereas an increasing number of experts consider defence investments of 3 % of GDP to be a necessary objective in the light of the direct threat that Russia poses to the EU and its Member States;

P. whereas in 2023, Parliament and the Council concluded agreements on the European defence industry reinforcement through a common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which, as short-term and emergency measures, aim to encourage the joint procurement of defence products, ramp up the European defence industry’s production capacity, replenish depleted stocks and reduce fragmentation in the defence-procurement sector;

Q. whereas in 2024, the Commission issued proposals for establishing a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and a European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), addressing, in particular, the upgrade of EU security and defence capabilities;

R. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture, shared threat perception and solutions to be developed and combined in doctrine and concepts;

S. whereas the exception to the EU budget funding principle set out in Article 41(2) TEU applies to expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications only; whereas in all other cases, the VP/HR, together with the Commission, where necessary, should propose that CFSP- or CSDP-related expenditure be financed through the EU budget; whereas Articles 14(1) and 16(1) TEU establish a balance between Parliament and the Council as regards their budgetary functions; whereas the current practice does not reflect this balance;

T. whereas the Draghi report highlights a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence spending and limited access to financing; whereas the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) lending policy excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military and police use;

U. whereas the report by Mr Niinistö underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios, especially given the further deteriorating external environment; whereas the report states that many threats are already taking place continuously; whereas it insists that preparedness is needed to signal to potential adversaries that they will not be able to outlast the EU; whereas it deplores the fact that the Union lacks a common plan in the event of armed aggression and underlines that the EU needs to rethink the way it defines its security; whereas it underlines the importance of the EU being ready to act in support of a Member State in the event of external armed aggression and of further unlocking the EU’s potential for enhanced civil-military cooperation and dual-use infrastructure and technologies, through optimising the use of scarce resources and strengthening coordination mechanisms for the most severe crisis situations;

V. whereas the integration of artificial intelligence into the security and defence domain, including weapon technologies, impacts military operations by enabling autonomous systems, predictive analytics and enhanced decision-making capabilities to play a significant role in battlefields; whereas this development presents both unprecedented opportunities and profound risks;

W. whereas CSDP has 13 civilian missions, 8 military operations and 1 civilian-military mission under way, with around 5 000 personnel deployed on three continents; whereas reviews by the European External Action Service (EEAS) state that these missions and operations persistently suffer from Member States not delivering on their pledges to provide sufficient military or civilian personnel; whereas they also lack rapid decision-making and suffer from a lack of flexibility and adaptation to the specific local needs on the ground; whereas such obstacles limit the overall effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; whereas one of the objectives of the Strategic Compass is to reinforce EU civilian and military CSDP missions and operations by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates, promoting rapid and more flexible decision-making processes and ensuring greater financial solidarity; whereas EU missions and operations are often targeted by hybrid threats, including disinformation, jeopardising their effectiveness in stabilising the countries in which they are deployed and, instead, reinforcing pre-existing instability, often benefiting malicious non-state actors;

X. whereas CSDP missions and operations greatly strengthen the resilience and stability of the European neighbourhood, including in the Mediterranean, the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership countries, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, by providing services such as military, police, coastguard, border management training and capacity building;

Y. whereas the EU assistance to the Libyan coastguard is provided through the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) and EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI; whereas the main goal of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI is to support the implementation of the UN Security Council’s arms embargo on Libya; whereas the Council of the EU extended the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI until 31 March 2025, including the task of training the Libyan coastguard and navy;

Change 4

ChangedX.Z. whereas the EUFOR Althea operation sets a path towards peace, stabilisation and the European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and still plays a pivotal role in ensuring the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region; whereas in early March 2025, an additional 400 soldiers were deployed to support EUFOR Althea amid increased uncertainty in the country following the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025;

AA. whereas on 17 May 2024, the EU ended the mandate of the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM); whereas on 30 June 2024, it ended the mandate of the European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM) and on 30 September 2024, it ended the ground mission of personnel from the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger);

Change 5

ChangedZ.AB. whereas the EU will allocate EUR 1.51,5 billion for the 2021-2027 period to support conflict prevention, peace and security initiatives at national and regional level in sub-Saharan Africa; whereas additional support is also provided in Africa under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which enables the EU to provide all kinds of equipment and infrastructure to the armed forces of EU partners;

4 unchanged paragraphs

AC. whereas the EU and its Member States are facing increasing hybrid attacks on their soil, including FIMI, political infiltration and sabotage, aimed at undermining sound political debate and the trust of EU citizens in democratic institutions, as well as creating divisions in European societies and between nations; whereas in the years to come, hybrid threats will involve increased use of the systematic combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvre, mass cyberwarfare and emerging and disruptive technologies, from seabed to space, with the deployment of advanced space-based surveillance and strike systems, all of which will be enabled by advanced AI, quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems and nanotech- and bio-warfare; whereas Russia and China have demonstrated increased use of hybrid tools to undermine the security and stability of the EU;

AD. whereas the Russian Federation makes use of private military companies (PMCs), such as Africa Corps and the Wagner Group, as part of a hybrid warfare toolbox to maintain plausible deniability while exerting influence in various regions and gaining access to natural resources and critical infrastructure; whereas Africa Corps and the Wagner Group have reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the Central African Republic; whereas the Russian Federation has reinforced anti-European sentiments, especially in countries with a strong European presence or hosting CSDP missions;

AE. whereas on 7 March 2024, Sweden joined NATO as a new member, following Finland which joined in 2023; whereas security and defence cooperation with partners and allies is crucial to the EU’s ambition of becoming an international security provider and constitutes an integral pillar of the CSDP; whereas cooperation with the UN, NATO, the African Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as numerous allies and like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkan countries, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and certain Latin American countries, among others, is crucial to the successful implementation of the CSDP;

The consequences of a changing geopolitical paradigm for European security

Change 6

Changed1. Stresses the seriousness of the threats to the security of the European continent, which have reached a level unprecedented since the Second World War; expresses deep concern at the rise of geopolitical fractures, new and renewed imperialist ambitions for domination by authoritarian powers, systemic rivalry of great powers, nationalist unilateralism, the spread of terrorism, including jihadist terrorism, forced displacement of civilians and deliberate targeting of civilian persons and infrastructure, and the primary and growing use of force and violence by certain malicious actors to promote their political and economic objectives and interests or to resolve disputes;

Change 7

Added2. Expresses, in this context, deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence; strongly deplores any attempts at blackmailing Ukraine’s leadership into surrendering to the Russian aggressor for the sole purpose of announcing a ‘peace deal’ and considers that the current attempt by the US administration to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement without the involvement of the EU, which will ultimately have to deal with the outcome, is counterproductive as it empowers the belligerent, thus showing that aggressive policy is not punished but rewarded; is cautiously optimistic about the proposal for a 30-day ceasefire agreement; recalls that a ceasefire can only be an effective tool for the suspension of hostilities if the aggressor fully adheres to it; expects Russia, therefore, to agree to it and follow it by ceasing all attacks on Ukraine, its military positions, civilian population, infrastructure and territory; concludes nevertheless, taking into account Russia’s history of violations of previous agreements, that peace can only be reached by empowering Ukraine through robust security guarantees; is of the opinion, conversely, that any settlement that undermines Ukraine’s legitimate aspirations, such as its right to choose its own security arrangements, or that lacks credible security guarantees will risk subjecting Ukraine and other European countries to renewed Russian attacks; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions on the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

3. Believes that the geopolitical theatres in Ukraine, the Middle East and the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific are increasingly interconnected as Russia and China, in particular, are deepening their ties, and pose significant challenges to global peace and security and the rules-based international order that must be addressed by the international community; highlights the increase in attacks and hybrid threats aimed at undermining democratic values and structures, among other things, during elections, as well as the cohesion of and citizens’ adhesion to European values-based societies and the rule of law; believes that this trend amounts to a paradigm shift, as it reverses the logic of building international security on the basis of respect for international law, a rules-based international order and multilateralism;

4. Recognises the evolving nature of global security threats and emphasises the crucial role that diplomacy, development cooperation and arms control and disarmament play alongside military efforts in ensuring long-lasting international peace and security; notes, however, the limited impact of diplomatic efforts aimed at building peace and security in recent times; underscores that sustainable global peace and stability cannot be achieved through military measures alone, but require comprehensive strategies that address the key drivers of instability, such as poverty, inequality, governance failures and climate change; stresses that the EU’s Global Gateway initiative and other development programmes should be aligned with security objectives, fostering resilient societies by promoting inclusive economic growth, good governance and human rights;

The EU’s response: a new era of European security and defence

Change 8

Added5. Strongly welcomes the Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, which puts forward a strong and ambitious road map for enhancing Europe’s security; calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly implement the various ambitious elements without delay, as Europe needs to have the ability to deter aggressors and defend itself on all fronts, to take leadership and act rapidly on questions of security, and to produce defence equipment for its own needs;

6. Emphasises the absolute need for the EU to recognise and meet the challenges posed by the multiple and constantly evolving threats to its security, and, for this purpose, to engage in improved and new policies and actions that enable the EU and its Member States to collectively and coherently strengthen their defence in Europe, in order to ensure the security of all EU Member States and their citizens, as well as enhancing their ability to act at the global level;

Change 9

Added7. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

8. Recalls the importance of the EU achieving greater strategic autonomy and defence readiness, as outlined in the Strategic Compass, to ensure that its objectives are aligned with the collective and sovereign interests of its Member States and the broader vision of European security and defence; acknowledges, in this regard, that some Member States have long-standing policies of military neutrality, and respects the right of every Member State to determine its own security policy;

9. Emphasises the importance of continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) TEU on mutual assistance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, and regardless of whether they are NATO members; calls for concrete steps towards developing a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the practical arrangements in the event of a Member State activating Article 42(7) TEU and the coherence between Article 42(7) TEU and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

10. Notes the overall limited progress and underinvestment in the development of a common European defence capability, industrial capacity and defence readiness since the CSDP’s establishment 25 years ago; notes, with regret, that despite the ambition of framing a common Union defence policy, as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU, concrete steps are still missing;

Change 10

Added11. Underlines that, while we are strengthening our own defence, our alliance and cooperation with the United States remains extremely important, as does coordination with NATO, in both the development of capabilities and the exchange of classified information; recognises that the United States’ security priorities have changed owing to challenges in other regions, requiring Europe to take full responsibility for its own defence;

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
29 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2025). “Changes between A-10-2025-0011 and TA-10-2025-0058”. Text, 2 April 2025. from A-10-2025-0011, to TA-10-2025-0058, reference 2024/2082(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0011/compare/TA-10-2025-0058?all=1&part=2 (retrieved 29 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2025-04-02,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between A-10-2025-0011 and TA-10-2025-0058}},
  year = {2025},
  date = {2025-04-02},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0011/compare/TA-10-2025-0058?all=1&part=2}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0011/compare/TA-10-2025-0058?all=1&part=2},
  urldate = {2026-09-29},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from A-10-2025-0011, to TA-10-2025-0058, reference 2024/2082(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}