Changes from plenary report to adopted text

Change 9

Added7. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

Change 10

Added11. Underlines that, while we are strengthening our own defence, our alliance and cooperation with the United States remains extremely important, as does coordination with NATO, in both the development of capabilities and the exchange of classified information; recognises that the United States’ security priorities have changed owing to challenges in other regions, requiring Europe to take full responsibility for its own defence;

Change 11

Changed9.13. Welcomes the objective of the Commission President to usher in a new era for European defence and security, by building a true European defence union; welcomes the appointment of Andrius Kubilius, the first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space, tasked with working jointly with the VP/HRVP/HR; onwelcomes athe publication of the white paper on the future of European defence within the first hundred days of their mandate;defence; stresses the need for the EU and its Member States, acting to define the European defence union, to take priority measures and prepare future actions in order to ensure the defence readiness of the EU, notably with regard to the threat posed by Russia, and to bolster deterrence and enhance operational capabilities as a tool of defence in wartime, while meeting civilian and humanitarian needs, and thus leveraging the concept of ‘dual-use’;

Change 12

Removed10. Calls for the EU and its Member States to accelerate their commitments made in the Versailles Declaration and to assume greater responsibility for their defence and security, including by achieving greater strategic autonomy and bolstering defence and deterrence capabilities, in particular on its eastern borders; stresses that NATO and the transatlantic partnership with the United States remain the cornerstones of European collective defence and that the EU and NATO play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security; stresses the need for EU Member States and the EU as a whole to step up their efforts through increased and targeted joint investments, joint procurement of defence products that are, for the most part, designed and manufactured in the EU, and the development of more joint capabilities, via, inter alia, pooling and sharing, thereby strengthening their armed forces whether for national, NATO or EU operational purposes;

Added14. Welcomes the five-point ReArm Europe plan proposed by the Commission President on 4 March 2025;

Added15. Welcomes the outcomes of the special European Council meeting of 6 March 2025 and the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 20 March 2025;

Added16. Welcomes the fact that the white paper took on board Parliament’s demands regarding the need to ensure the protection of the EU’s land, air and maritime borders against military and hybrid threats; applauds the endorsement of an Eastern Border Shield and reiterates its support for the Baltic Defence Line;

Added17. Welcomes the publication of the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and emphasises that the EU’s actions must be holistic, addressing all dimensions of security – external, internal, social and economic; firmly believes that only such a comprehensive approach will ensure sustained public support in the long term; underlines that the measures outlined in the White Paper and the Preparedness Union Strategy must be complementary and reinforce each other;

Added18. Calls for the EU and its Member States to accelerate their commitments made in the Versailles Declaration and to assume greater responsibility for their defence and security, including by achieving greater strategic autonomy and bolstering defence and deterrence capabilities, in particular on its eastern borders; stresses that NATO and the transatlantic partnership with the United States remain the cornerstones of European collective defence and that the EU and NATO play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security; recalls that a stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO; stresses the need for EU Member States and the EU as a whole to step up their efforts through increased and targeted joint investments, joint procurement of defence products that are, for the most part, designed and manufactured in the EU, and the development of more joint capabilities, via, inter alia, pooling and sharing, thereby strengthening their armed forces whether for national, NATO or EU operational purposes; stresses that the EU and its Member States need to ensure that a substantial and increased part of their military equipment is not subject to restrictive third-country regulations;

Change 13

Removed13. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the EU and its Member States to stand in solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s war of aggression and to provide Ukraine with the necessary military means and in the time it needs to defend itself, repel the Russian Armed Forces and their proxies, end the conflict, protect its sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; welcomes the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine, and the bilateral security agreements concluded by Ukraine with several Member States; underlines that such commitments and agreements are part of a wider internationally coordinated package of security guarantees for Ukraine, including the G7’s launch of a multilateral framework for the negotiation of bilateral security commitments and arrangements for Ukraine; believes that without decisive EU military support, Ukraine will not be able to achieve victory against Russia; strongly reiterates its call for EU Member States to urgently meet their commitments and deliver weapons, fighter aircrafts, drones, air defence, weapon systems and ammunition to Ukraine, including air-launched cruise missiles and surface-to-surface systems, and to significantly increase the relevant quantities; notes the successful delivery of 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition to Ukraine as agreed in March 2023 by the Council, despite the regrettable nine-month delay; acknowledges the notable advancements in the EU’s artillery ammunition production capacity, which contribute to the EU’s preparedness and ability to support Ukraine; stresses the importance of enhancing Ukraine’s anti-drone capabilities as a critical element in countering aerial threats and maintaining operational security; calls for the provision of specialised equipment and expertise to enable Ukrainian forces to swiftly identify, track and respond to hostile drone activities, ensuring robust protection for both military and civilian infrastructure; calls for the Member States to lift all restrictions hindering Ukraine from using Western weapons systems against legitimate military targets within Russia, in accordance with international law; calls on the Council to commit to transferring all confiscated military equipment or ammunition from EU operations and missions within and outside the EU to Ukraine; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily with no less than 0.25 % of their GDP annually;

Added21. Insists that the EU must engage in security commitments towards Ukraine, as recommended in the Kyiv Security Compact, in order to deter further Russian aggression;

Added22. Highlights the fact that the financial support provided by the EU and its Member States to Ukraine exceeds that provided by any other country, reflecting the EU’s unparalleled commitment to Ukraine; underscores that the EU’s role in any negotiations impacting the security of Europe must be commensurate with its political and economic weight; reaffirms that there can be no negotiations touching on European security without the EU being at the table;

Added23. Reiterates the European Council conclusion of 20 March 2025 that endorses the principle of ‘peace through strength’ and underlines that Ukraine must be in the strongest possible position in order to eventually negotiate with Russia;

Added24. Stresses that a comprehensive peace agreement, which respects Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, needs to be accompanied by robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter future Russian aggression; welcomes the efforts that have been started in this regard with like-minded and NATO partners; welcomes the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025 that underline that the EU and its Member States are ready to contribute to security guarantees, in particular by supporting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself effectively;

Added25. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the EU and its Member States to stand in solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s war of aggression and to provide Ukraine with the necessary military means and in the time it needs to defend itself, repel the Russian Armed Forces and their proxies, end the conflict, protect its sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; fully endorses, therefore, the ‘porcupine strategy’ for Ukraine, as laid out in the white paper; welcomes the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine, and the bilateral security agreements concluded by Ukraine with several Member States; underlines that such commitments and agreements are part of a wider internationally coordinated package of security guarantees for Ukraine, including the G7’s launch of a multilateral framework for the negotiation of bilateral security commitments and arrangements for Ukraine; believes that without decisive EU military support, Ukraine will not be able to achieve victory against Russia; strongly reiterates its call for EU Member States to urgently meet their commitments and deliver weapons, fighter aircrafts, drones, air defence, weapon systems and ammunition to Ukraine, including air-launched cruise missiles and surface-to-surface systems, and to significantly increase the relevant quantities; notes the successful delivery of 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition to Ukraine as agreed in March 2023 by the Council, despite the regrettable nine-month delay; acknowledges the notable advancements in the EU’s artillery ammunition production capacity, which contribute to the EU’s preparedness and ability to support Ukraine; stresses the importance of enhancing Ukraine’s anti-drone capabilities as a critical element in countering aerial threats and maintaining operational security; calls for the provision of specialised equipment and expertise to enable Ukrainian forces to swiftly identify, track and respond to hostile drone activities, ensuring robust protection for both military and civilian infrastructure; calls for the Member States to lift all restrictions hindering Ukraine from using Western weapons systems against legitimate military targets within Russia, in accordance with international law; calls on the Council to commit to transferring all confiscated military equipment or ammunition from EU operations and missions within and outside the EU to Ukraine; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily with no less than 0,25 % of their GDP annually;

Change 14

Changed15.29. Calls on the VP/HR to mobilise more diplomatic support for Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia, using the full spectrum of the diplomatic toolbox, and encouraging EU Member States to consider imposing secondary sanctions; deplores the fact that some components of Western origin have been found in weapons and weapon systems used by Russia against Ukraine, and calls for the EU and its Member States to implement sanctions more rigorously; calls for further action from and cooperation between the Member States to stop the Russian shadow fleet;

Change 15

Changed17.31. Stresses the importance of the EPF, which has been instrumental in supporting the provision of military capabilities and training to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while facilitating coordination for all stakeholders through the clearing house mechanism within the EU Military Staff; welcomes the establishment of the dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund under the EPF and calls for an increase in financial resources for military assistance to Ukraine through this instrument, while also providing a medium-term financial perspective; urges the Hungarian Government to immediately cease its efforts to hinder the EU’s actions in support of Ukraine and to lift its veto on the extension of the EU’s sanctions renewal period and the EPF military support to Ukraine, including the agreed reimbursement to EU Member States for the military aid they have delivered; expresses its deep concern that the veto by the Hungarian Government has blocked the opening of a new tranche of expenditure to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces and has prevented the release of EUR 6.66,6 billion in partial reimbursement to the EU Member States providing military support to Ukraine; urges the Council and the VP/HR to find innovative solutions capable of lifting these blockages and offsetting these funding cuts; encourages the Member States to develop scenario-based and predictable inventories of military capabilities that can be provided under the EPF to ensure that the short-term provision of capabilities is rapidly sourced from Member States and delivered without delay, and that the long-term provision of capabilities that assist Ukraine in restoring deterrence is provided in a foreseeable time frame, in coordination with non-EU countries, when necessary; appreciates that all military assistance and weapon deliveries under the EPF have been in full compliance with the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, while ensuring adequate transparency and accountability;

Change 16

Added32. Disagrees with the Hungarian Government’s policy towards Russia, its use of vetoes against EU sanctions and its blocking of EU financial and defence aid for Ukraine; believes that the actions of the Hungarian Government undermine unity and solidarity in Europe; recalls that, under the EPF, countries are entitled to financial compensation for equipment deliveries to Ukraine and underlines, in the light of this, that the current blocks on reimbursements to 25 Member States, from which Poland stands out with a total of EUR 450 million in unpaid compensation, need to be removed immediately;

Change 17

Changed30.45. Stresses the need to ensure the coherence of output between respective EU and NATO capability development planning processes; calls for the interoperability of military equipment from EU Member States and NATO Allies to be improved and for industrial cooperation to be fostered by ensuring that future EU legal standards for defence products components and ammunition are based on the NATO standards; stresses that European defence projects of common interest, as defined in the EDIP proposal, should be implemented in close coordination with NATO;

Change 18

Added46. Welcomes the proposal for European defence projects of common interest regarding the development of common capabilities that go beyond the financial means of a single Member State; believes that these projects should be used to support the industrial and technological capacities that underpin the major common priorities of several Member States, and in fields such as external border protection and defence, particularly in the land domain, and to provide support to strategic enablers, particularly in space and European air defence, in acting on the whole spectrum of threats, to enhance military mobility, specifically strategic and tactical air transport, DeepStrikes, drone and anti-drone technologies, missiles and munitions, and artificial intelligence, in order to develop sovereign infrastructure and critical enablers; emphasises that pragmatism must prevail due to the sheer number of priorities and the need to mobilise new resources; considers, in that regard, that the EU should focus, where possible, on rapidly available and proven European technologies that gradually reduce the EU’s dependencies and improve its security; highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by incorporating companies throughout the EU and to boost competitiveness in the sector by various means, such as mergers and champions; considers, furthermore, that instead of focusing on fair return, the EU’s defence policies should encourage the growth of EU centres of excellence;

Change 19

Changed36.52. Supports a significant increase in investments in defence R&D, with a particular emphasis on collaborative initiatives, thereby strengthening the EU’s technological leadership and competitiveness in defence and ensuring a spillover effect in the civilian marketplace; notes, in this regard, that in 2022, the Member States invested approximately EUR 10.710,7 billion in defence R&D; underlines that technological advancement in critical domains – air, land, maritime, space and cyber – requires stable long-term investment across the Member States to keep pace with rapid global innovation;

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Added57. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drone package, which focuses on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, contains plans and funds for stimulating research and development, draws on lessons learnt from the Ukrainian experience, and is open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drone and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;

Change 21

Changed42.59. Highlights the importance of developing, maintaining and protecting the infrastructure necessary to ensure the rapid and efficient military mobility of our armed forces across the Member States; underlines the need to ensure the resilience of critical infrastructure that allows military mobility and the provision of essential services; recognises that military logistics can contribute to deterrence by signalling the EU’s overall military preparedness; anticipates that these points will be clearly reflected in the announced June 2025 joint communication on Military Mobility;

Change 22

Changed43.60. Underlines the urgent need to substantially enhance and invest in military mobility, prioritising investments and removing bottlenecks and missing links; stresses, in this regard, the importance of swiftly implementing projects and regulatory measures in accordance with the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0; supports new strategic investments in civil and military infrastructure, such as ports, airports and highways, which will also allow the smooth transfer of military units and supplies, including rapid reaction forces, heavy equipment, goods and humanitarian aid; calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations from the 2025 ECA Special Report on Military Mobility and to give greater importance to the military assessment in the selection process for dual-use projects;

Change 23

Added62. Appreciates the efforts of countries bordering Ukraine to provide military assistance to Ukraine securely and efficiently; notes that Poland’s military mobility experience and potential, including the planned Central Communication Port, are essential for the security of the entire eastern flank;

Change 24

Added72. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next MFF; insists that innovative solutions for finding additional funding must be explored without delay, such as investing in the defence sector, making it easier and faster to repurpose funds from one project to another, and exploring the possibility of adjusting EU funding criteria to give new prominence to security criteria in allocating spending;

Change 25

Added75. Welcomes the new financial instrument Security Action for Europe (SAFE), and urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that increased investment in Europe’s defence capabilities respect the notion of ‘buy more, buy better, buy together, buy European’; regrets the use of Article 122 and the consequent lack of involvement of Parliament in the approval of this instrument;

Added76. Welcomes the savings and investments union strategy, and expresses its expectation that it will make it easier to mobilise private savings towards more efficient capital markets and channel investment into the defence sector;

Added77. Urges the Member States to support the establishment of a defence, security and resilience bank to serve as a multilateral lending institution designed to provide low-interest, long-term loans that can support key national security priorities such as rearmament, defence modernisation, rebuilding efforts in Ukraine and the buying back of critical infrastructure currently controlled by hostile non-EU countries;

Change 26

Added80. Calls on the Commission to raise common debt to provide the Union with the fiscal capacity to borrow in exceptional and crisis situations, present and future, taking into account the experience and lessons learnt from NextGenerationEU, as we are now experiencing a pressing need to boost security and defence for protecting EU citizens, restoring deterrence and supporting the EU’s allies, first and foremost Ukraine; emphasises that the burden of such action must be shared fairly;

Added81. Calls for the next MFF to provide increased financial support to ensure the timely supply of defence products through joint procurement, industrial coordination, stockpiling, support for SMEs and expansion of production capacities; emphasises that this funding should particularly prioritise Member States bordering Ukraine to enhance its protection, as well as Member States faced with a high risk of conventional military threats, such as those bordering Russia and Belarus;

Change 27

Changed66.90. Unequivocally condemns the Iranian Government for aiding and abetting internationally recognised terrorist organisationsorganisations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and networks that have perpetrated or attempted attacks within the EU, posing a direct threat to European security, sovereignty and stability; recalls, in this respect, that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has been involved in planning and carrying out dozens of assassinations and terrorist attacks, including on EU soil, over the past 30 years and, more recently, in attacks against Jewish synagogues and individuals, as well as against Israeli embassies in several Member States; urges the EU and the Member States to enhance intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism measures to prevent any future attacks; reiterates its long-standing call to add the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to the EU list of terrorist organisations and supports the initiatives taken by some Member States in this regard;

Change 28

Changed68.92. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest terms, of the despicable terrorist attacks perpetrated by the terrorist organisation Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023, which contributed to further destabilisation in the Middle East, intensified by aggressions against Israel by Iranian proxies (such as terrorist organisations including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen) and the Iranian regime itself; reiterates that Israel has the right to defend itself, as enshrined in and constrained by international law; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all remaining hostages held by Hamas; calls for all parties to put an immediate end to all hostilities and fully abide by international law, including international humanitarian law; welcomesexpresses severe concern over the recent collapse of the ceasefire in Gaza and the progress madecalls towardsfor thean phasedimmediate releasereturn ofto hostages;it; emphasisingemphasises that this representswould represent a significant step in relieving the immense suffering endured by civilians on both sides over the past months; praises the commitment of mediators, including the United States, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving this breakthrough; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring thefirst releaseceasefire; ofurges all hostages, establishing a lasting cessation of violence and allowing unrestrained access of humanitarianEuropean and medical assistance to the Gaza Strip; calls for all parties to fullyinternational commitactors to their obligationsactively andcontribute to prioritise the protectionachievement of civilians; urges all European anda internationalnew actorsbreakthrough, to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply with it;

Change 29

Removed69. Expresses its deep concern regarding the military escalation in the Middle East, which contributes to further destabilisation in the region; deplores the unacceptable number of civilian casualties, the forced displacement caused by the escalating violence and the persistent use of military force; expresses serious concern, furthermore, about the ongoing military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank; condemns the Israeli Defence Forces firing on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is a grave violation of international law; reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL, to which 16 Member States contribute, in southern Lebanon; calls for immediate ceasefires in both Gaza and Lebanon, an end to the hostilities, the full and symmetrical implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701(2006) and the protection of the civilian populations; stresses the need for the EU and other international actors to assume greater responsibility and assist governments and civil society organisations in the Middle East with reaching durable and sustainable peace, in particular by continuing to support a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine, as well as by countering terrorism and radicalisation in the region; underscores that the evolution of conflicts in the region has repercussions on neighbouring regions and on Europe and poses security challenges for the EU with regard to the future of deterrence, humanitarian law and crisis management;

Added93. Welcomes the redeployment of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Rafah on 31 January 2025 to support the Palestinian Authority in facilitating safe passage for medical evacuations during Phase I of the ceasefire; stands ready to engage in discussions on future concrete contributions to supporting a ceasefire;

Removed70. Urges the Council and the Member States to designate Hezbollah, in its entirety, as a terrorist organisation and to push for its full disarmament in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701(2006); highlights recent decisions taken by several states, including the United States and Canada, to list Samidoun as a terrorist organisation acting as proxy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; stresses that Samidoun was banned in Germany in 2023 and calls on other EU Member States to take similar measures by banning the organisation within their territory;

Added94. Expresses its deep concern regarding the military escalation in the Middle East, which contributes to further destabilisation in the region; deplores the unacceptable number of civilian casualties, the forced displacement caused by the escalating violence and the persistent use of military force; expresses serious concern, furthermore, about the ongoing military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank; condemns the Israeli Defence Forces firing on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is a grave violation of international law; reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL, to which 16 Member States contribute, in southern Lebanon; calls for immediate ceasefires in both Gaza and Lebanon, an end to the hostilities, the full and symmetrical implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) and the protection of the civilian populations; stresses the need for the EU and other international actors to assume greater responsibility and assist governments and civil society organisations in the Middle East with reaching durable and sustainable peace, in particular by continuing to support a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine, as well as by countering terrorism and radicalisation in the region; underscores that the evolution of conflicts in the region has repercussions on neighbouring regions and on Europe and poses security challenges for the EU with regard to the future of deterrence, humanitarian law and crisis management;

Added95. Welcomes the Arab Recovery and Reconstruction Plan presented at the Cairo Summit on 4 March 2025, which represents a serious basis for discussions on the future of the Gaza Strip; encourages the VP/HR and the Commissioner for the Mediterranean to engage constructively with Arab partners to provide credible solutions for the reconstruction, governance and security of Gaza; rejects, on the other hand, the ‘Trump Gaza’ proposal, which disregards the volatile security conditions across the Middle East; is of the opinion that the extent of the destruction and human suffering in Gaza requires comprehensive international engagement, with the United States, the EU, the UN, Arab states and other international partners complementing each other’s efforts in order for negotiations to resume and be constructive; is committed to future normalisation efforts between Israel and Arab states in the region;

Added96. Urges the Council and the Member States to designate Hezbollah, in its entirety, as a terrorist organisation and to push for its full disarmament in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006); highlights recent decisions taken by several states, including the United States and Canada, to list Samidoun as a terrorist organisation acting as proxy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; stresses that Samidoun was banned in Germany in 2023 and calls on other EU Member States to take similar measures by banning the organisation within their territory;

Change 30

Changed73.99. Deplores the fact that despite de-escalation efforts, Türkiye continues to retain the threat of casus belli against Greece and to illegally occupy the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus; strongly condemns Türkiye’s illegal activities in Cyprus, including its violation of the status of the buffer zone, its increasing militarisation of the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus and its efforts to upgrade the secessionist entity in the occupied area of Cyprus in violation of international law, noting that these activities that are not conducive to the resumption of the UN-led negotiations; condemns Türkiye’s continuous violations of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984)550 (1984) and 789(1992),789 (1992), which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN by supporting the opening of the town of Varosha to the public; strongly urges Türkiye, once more, to reverse its illegal and unilateral actions in Varosha; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus;

Change 31

Added101. Welcomes the informal extended meeting convened by the UN Secretary-General on 18 March 2025 in Geneva in the aim of paving the way for the resumption of negotiations on the Cyprus problem firmly within the agreed UN framework, the only framework accepted by the EU and the international community, and in line with EU law, values and principles; recalls that the reunification of Cyprus is a priority for the EU, which stands ready to step up and assume an active role in supporting the UN-led process with all the tools at its disposal; calls on Türkiye to engage constructively in negotiations and return to the negotiating table in good faith;

Change 32

Changed76.103. Notes with concern the violations of migrants’ fundamental rights in Libya, as highlighted in UN Security Council Resolution 2755(2024);2755 (2024); stresses the need to examine the role of CSDP missions and operations – EUBAM Libya and EUNAVFOR IRINI – in effectively fighting against the smuggling and trafficking of human beings, and their activities in relation to the need to protect migrants’ fundamental rights;

Change 33

Added111. Welcomes the recent news of the successful conclusion of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the full text of the draft Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations, commends Armenia for paving the way for the finalisation of the text and urges the Azerbaijani leadership to sign and implement, in good faith, the peace agreement as concluded in the negotiations;

Change 34

Changed85.113. Recalls that a year has passed since Azerbaijan’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the forced displacement of more than 140 000 Armenians from the region; condemns the military support and the supply of arms provided by non-EU countries to Azerbaijan; points out that Azerbaijan has been guilty of serious breaches of human rights in Nagorno-Karabakh; condemns the destruction of the Armenian cultural heritage in the region by Azerbaijan; calls for the release of all 23 Armenian hostages detained in Azerbaijan, including former de facto officials of Nagorno-Karabakh and prisoners of war from the 2020 war; calls on the Council to consider imposing targeted and individual sanctions against those responsible for ceasefire violations and human rights abuses in Nagorno-Karabakh;

Change 35

Changed88.116. Expresses its concern about the lack of coherence in the EU response to the Great Lakes region’s crises and calls on the Council to reassess its renewed EU Great Lakes Strategy adopted on 20 February 2023; recognises the importance of a genuine commitment by the EU to peace in the region; notes with concern the role that Rwanda has played in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and calls on the EU to impose conditions on any military support to Rwanda; strongly condemns M23’s seizure of territories in eastern DRC, including the regional capital cities of Goma and Bukavu, directly leading to the death of an estimated 3 000 civilians; condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of eastern DRC by M23 rebels; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of thousandsmillions of displaced persons in the area;area and about the use of rape as a strategic weapon of war; urges the VP/HR to engage in clear actions in line with the EU Great Lakes Strategy in order to restore stability and to cooperate with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to protect civilians in eastern DRC; urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory and cease cooperation with the M23 rebels;rebels, urgesincluding the VP/HRsupply of weapons and thetroops Memberand Stateslogistical support; calls for the EU to urgentlysuspend reviewboth its Memorandum of Understanding on raw materials and all military assistancecooperation towith Rwanda, including through the RwandanEPF and any other mechanisms, until Rwanda ends its illegal support for armed forcesgroups throughand fully respects the Europeansovereignty Peaceand Facilityterritorial integrity of the DRC; equally calls on the DRC to stop its cooperation with rebel groups in the region; supports the Luanda and considerNairobi suspendingpeace itprocess to achieve a political solution to the conflict by diplomatic means and urges the VP/HR to continue diplomatic outreach to the parties to the conflict and other parties in the eventregion thatand to increase pressure on the Rwandanparties Governmentto doesreengage notin complypeaceful negotiations, including by postponing the EU Security and Defence Consultations with urgentRwanda callsand foradopting itssanctions, withdrawaldepending fromon DRCthe bysituation on the UNground and the EU;progress made in ongoing regional mediation processes;

Change 36

Added117. Expresses its disappointment about the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and underlines that this significantly increases security and defence challenges, as critical investments in resilience, adaptation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding have now been curtailed, and therefore calls for the EU and its international partners to ensure that the vacuum left behind will not be used by our adversaries by strategically reflecting on how to take over certain programmes left unfunded as result of the US Government’s actions;

Change 37

Changed90.119. Recognises that the Arctic region has significant strategic and geopolitical importance owing to its emerging maritime routes, wealth of natural resources and opportunities for economic development unlocked by global warming, while being increasingly contested; is alarmed by the intensifying militarisation and resource competition driven by Russian and Chinese activities in the region; strongly condemns the repeated statements by the US President concerning his goal of a US takeover of Greenland;

Change 38

Changed102.131. Welcomes the UN Security Council’s extension of the mandate of the European Union Force (EUFOR) Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) beyond 2025, as an established and proven peacekeeping mission that has significantly contributed to the stability of both the country and the region; further welcomes the mission’s positive response to the request from the BiH Ministry of Security’s Civil Protection Agency, offering assistance to national authorities on addressing the impact of the recent flooding; takes the view that this extension reflects the shared commitment across the political spectrum in BiH to uphold peace and security in cooperation with the EU; welcomes the arrival of EUFOR Althea reserve forces in BiH in mid-March and reiterates its call on all actors in BiH to refrain from any political threats and other potentially harmful actions, respect the country’s constitution and work towards ensuring BiH’s EU integration path; welcomes the continued presence of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo and commends the role it plays in strengthening security and stability; calls on all parties involved to adhere to the requirements of international law, restrain and prevent any disruptive actions from destabilising the northern region of Kosovo; urges them to engage in the structured dialogue mediated by the EU; condemns in the strongest possible terms the terrorist attack by Serbian paramilitaries against Kosovo’s police and the hideous terrorist attack on critical infrastructure near Zubin Potok in northern Kosovo; stresses that the perpetrators of these deplorable terrorist attacks must be held accountable and face justice without delay; calls for the strengthening of both EUFOR’s Operation Althea and KFOR with additional resources;

Change 39

Changed118.147. Condemns the continued malicious actions by Russia and Belarus aimed at destabilising the EU by pushing migrants to forcibly enter EU countries, constituting a hybrid attack; calls on the EU to review and update its policies concerning the strengthening of its external bordersborders, including through the funding of physical barriers , in order to bolster the security of the Union as a whole;

Change 40

Changed125.154. Stresses that, given the growing geopolitical maritime tensions, the EU must step up its activities at sea, by leading in maritime domain awareness, protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring that its external maritime borders are monitored effectively in order to preventfight against the criminal organisations profiting from smuggling illegal activities,immigrants inside EU Member States, in particular in the Mediterranean sea and the Atlantic Ocean, and contributing to ensuring freedom of navigation, the safety of maritime lines of communication and of vessels and crews, and to countering illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing;

Change 41

Added157. Calls for the EU and the Member States’ authorities to take urgent and decisive measures against the Russian shadow fleet in the Baltic and Black Seas, and therefore welcomes the news that, on 21 March 2025, Germany took over ownership of the ship Eventin, which had been used to circumvent EU sanctions on Russian oil exports;

Change 42

Added160. Notes that, as a result of the unprecedented threat of a Russian aggression against EU territory, Member States, especially those in geographical proximity to Russia and its ally Belarus, are faced with difficult decisions regarding their armament policy, including the revision of previous policies and participation in international treaties; reiterates its condemnation of the Russian threats that have led some Member States to consider withdrawing from the Ottawa Treaty and notes that, while this does not entail a general shift in EU policy, this reconsideration underlines the seriousness of the Russian threat and the need to adequately protect our citizens;

Change 43

Changed131.162. Calls on the Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment as amended by Council Decision (CFSP)2019/1560,(CFSP) 2019/1560, and to strictly implement criterion 4 on regional stability;

Change 44

Added173. Believes that every effort must be made to maintain and, if possible, foster transatlantic cooperation in every area of the military and defence sector, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop greater sovereignty;

Change 45

Changed147.179. Welcomes the appointment of NATO’s Special Representative for the Southern Neighbourhood and NATO’s focus on this region; considers it appropriate to strengthen coordination and consultation between EU officials in charge of policy for the Southern Neighbourhood and the Sahel and their NATO counterparts, in order to avoid publicityduplication and fragmentation of efforts and resources;

Change 46

ChangedPartnership with the UnitedNorth StatesAmerica

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Changed149.181. Considers it essential to further develop the EU’s close relationship with the United States, which is based on mutual respect, the shared values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law, as well as a broad range of common or converging interests; values the United States’ commitment to and involvement in the territorial defence of Europe, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and its Article 5, especially in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; encourages mutual security and defence initiatives, and cooperation in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation, the impact of disruptive technologies, climate change, hybrid threats, cyber defence, military mobility, crisis management and the relationship with strategic competitors; calls for further strengthening of the EU-US security and defence dialogue as an important instrument in closer transatlantic cooperation;

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Added182. Notes that the recent actions and statements by the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the United States vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression; calls for the Commission to make efforts to re-strengthen the EU-US security and defence dialogue as an important instrument in closer transatlantic cooperation;

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Added184. Underlines that cooperation with Canada is fundamental for EU security and welcomes the active role that Canada has played in providing support to Ukraine; believes that the bilateral security and defence dialogue and the upcoming security and defence partnership provide the basis for enhanced security and defence cooperation, including on respective initiatives to boost defence industry production;

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Changed153.187. Believes that the EU’s security is closely interlinked with the security of its immediate European neighbours and that the EU has an interest in giving priority to its enlargement policy and strengthening the stability of its South-Eastern and Eastern European neighbours, in particular candidate countries; calls for stronger military-security cooperation, including civilian and military as well as policy and military security, cooperation with candidate countries and partners, particularly in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, border management, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation; reiterates the need for close cooperation with NATO in this regard; welcomes the signing of Security and Defence Partnerships on 19 November and 18 December 2024 between the EU and North Macedonia and Albania, respectively;

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Changed158.192. Underscores the imperative for the EU of establishing more enduring collective security through a network of regional allies and partners, forming the conventional foundation of its engagement in the region; strongly welcomes the recent conclusionsigning of the EU-Japan Security and Defence Partnership;Partnerships on 1 and 4 November 2024 between the EU and Japan and South Korea, respectively; believes that a further deepening of the strategic and defence partnershippartnerships of the EU with Japan,Japan and South Korea, and the development of regular dialogue, cooperation, and capacity building with other like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, New Zealand, South KoreaZealand and Taiwan, are fundamental to advancing common security; reiterates its call on the EU for further engagement with emerging strategic partners in the region, such as Indonesia and Viet Nam;

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Added193. Underlines the importance of the EU-India partnership and believes that the momentous visit of the President of the Commission and the College of Commissioners to India on 27 and 28 February 2025 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of EU-India relations and reaffirmed the strategic link and its untapped potential; underlines the potential of deepening our partnership, including through enhanced security and defence consultations;

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Changed161.196. Deplores that the lack of access to information means Parliament is not in a situation to properly scrutinise PESCO projects; reiterates its call to the Member States to submit an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year; further reiterates its call on the EEAS to regularly and comprehensively report on the implementation of the Strategic Compass and other security and defence initiatives and programmes to the Subcommittee on Security and Defence; further reiterates its call on the EEAS to regularly and comprehensively report on the implementation of the Strategic Compass, other security and defence initiatives and programmes and their assessment to Parliament’s SubcommitteeCommittee on Security and Defence; stresses the need to improve the scrutiny of the implementation of defence industrial regulations by the introduction of the procedure for delegated acts;

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Removed* * *

RemovedDuring the last years, and particularly since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has had to face multiple and unprecedented threats to its security and new crises in its close geographical environment, including the consequences of the Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel in October, 2023.

RemovedThe EU has reacted to these negative developments by involving more deeply in European security and defence, exploring new directions and launching new initiatives to strengthen and develop its defence capabilities in a collective and cooperative manner.

RemovedThis first annual report on the implementation of the EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) under the tenth parliamentary term aims to present the assessment of the European Parliament on CSDP progress in the current geopolitical and security context and thus responds to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy, published on 20 June 2024 and entitled “Common Foreign and Security Policy Report - Our Priorities in 2024”. It also provides recommendations on the main avenues for strengthening policies and actions for the future along several dimensions, including institutional decision-making progress, the joint development of military and armament capabilities and the means of financing them.