Changes from plenary report to adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the 2023 Annual Report of the European Central Bank (ECB),

– having regard to the ECB’s feedback of 18 April 2024 on the input provided by Parliament as part of its resolution on the ECB’s 2022 Annual Report,

– having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB, in particular Articles 2, 15 and 21 thereof,

– having regard to Articles 119, 123(1), 125, 127(1) and (2), 130, 282(2) and 284(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Articles 3 and 13 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area of 7 March 2024, 6 June 2024, 12 September 2024, and 12 December 2024,

– having regard to the decisions taken by the ECB Governing Council of 25 January 2024, 7 March 2024, 11 April 2024, 6 June 2024, 18 July 2024, 12 September 2024, 17 October 2024 and 12 December 2024,

– having regard to the monetary dialogues with the President of the ECB, Christine Lagarde, of 15 February 2024, 30 September 2024 and 4 December 2024,

– having regard to its decision of 1 June 2023 on the arrangements in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Parliament and the ECB on structuring the practices for interaction in the area of central banking,

– having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

– having regard to the approval of the transmission protection instrument (TPI) by the ECB Governing Council of 21 July 2022,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 28 June 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of the digital euro (COM(2023)0369),

– having regard to the ECB’s first progress report of 24 June 2024 and second progress report of 2 December 2024 on the digital euro preparation phase,

– having regard to the four ECB progress reports of 13 July 2023, 24 April 2023, 21 December 2022 and 29 September 2022 on the digital euro investigation phase,

– having regard to the ECB monetary policy strategy review launched on 23 January 2020 and concluded on 8 July 2021, and to the upcoming 2025 monetary policy strategy assessment,

– having regard to the ECB’s operational framework review published on 13 March 2024,

– having regard to the ECB annual report on the international role of the euro of June 2024,

– having regard to the results of the ECB’s first-ever cyber resilience stress test of 26 July 2024,

– having regard to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review published on 20 November 2024,

– having regard to the publication of the revised Capital Requirements Regulation (‘CRR III’) and Capital Requirements Directive (‘CRD VI’) in the Official Journal of the European Union on 19 June 2024,

– having regard to the results of the ECB’s climate risk stress test of 8 July 2022,

– having regard to the 2024 update of the ECB’s Environmental Statement,

– having regard to the ECB’s Climate and Nature Plan 2024-2025,

– having regard to Rule 142(1) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0003/2025),

C. whereas the ECB’s primary objective is to maintain price stability, which it has defined as a level of inflation of 2 % over the medium term;

D. whereas the ECB should support the general economic policies of the EU, thereby contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the EU as laid down in Article 3 TEU;

E. whereas the ECB is politically independent, which means that neither EU institutions and agencies nor Member State governments should seek to influence it;

F. whereas the ECB can take decisions to fulfil its primary objective of maintaining price stability without political interference other than being held accountable;

G. whereas political independence requires the ECB to refrain from taking political actions;

H. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB prohibit the direct monetary financing of governments; whereas the ECB may purchase debt securities on the secondary market if this is necessary to pursue its objectives;

I. whereas the Eurosystem has been built on the principle of monetary dominance;

J. whereas the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the asset purchase programme (APP) are no longer reinvested and the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) will no longer be reinvested from January 2025;

K. whereas bank reserves held by credit institutions at the ECB amounted to EUR 3 trillion in December 2024;

L. whereas the euro is the second most important currency globally;

M. whereas the ECB is accountable to Parliament as the EU institution representing EU citizens; whereas this accountability has been maintained at the highest level, with the regular organisation of the Monetary Dialogue, the ECB President’s regular appearances at Parliament plenary sittings and various visits and meetings between Members of Parliament and ECB board members;

General overview

1. Welcomes the role of the ECB in safeguarding monetary and financial stability, which is a necessary precondition for growth and economic stability; underlines that the ECB is the institution responsible for maintaining price stability in the euro area in this regard; notes that, ‘without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union’ as laid down in Article 127 TFEU;

2. Underlines that the statutory independence of the ECB, as laid down in the Treaties, is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate, which is to maintain price stability in the euro area and thereby contribute to economic growth, competitiveness and job creation;

3. Highlights the importance of the ECB’s political independence, which should remain untouched; stresses that this independence requires the ECB to in turn refrain from taking political actions; welcomes the institutional cooperation, thereby stressing the importance of the corresponding level of accountability to Parliament;

4. Invites the ECB and the European Parliament to make full use of the accountability and transparency arrangements and, where possible, further enhance these arrangements, without prejudice to the ECB’s independence;

5. Recognises the ECB’s efforts to bring inflation back down to levels commensurate with its target of 2 % over the medium term;

6. Stresses that both the ECB’s monetary policy, delivering on its mandate, and fiscal policies, should work in tandem to help European citizens and households, as well as small businesses;

7. Takes note of the disparities between Member States with regard to inflation levels above or below the ECB’s 2 % target; emphasises that inflation diminishes the purchasing power of fixed incomes, savings and pensions and that it distorts the signalling function of prices, that ensures an efficient allocation of resources, thereby having a negative impact on economic stability;