Text · Adopted text
Protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States ***I
Document TA-8-2019-0038 · P8_TA(2019)0038 · PE628.374
- Kind
- Adopted text TA-8-2019-0038
- Date
- 17 January 2019
- Dossier
- 2018-0136
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In short
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Parliament's amended version of a proposed regulation on protecting the Union's budget where a member state has generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law. It defines such deficiencies, lists the situations that count, and sets out measures including suspension of payments and commitments. The Commission would decide on the measures by implementing act, after notifying the member state, which may reply within one to three months. A panel of independent experts would assist and assess all member states annually. Measures would enter into force only after Parliament and the Council approve a transfer to a budgetary reserve of an amount equal to their value, and would be lifted when the deficiency is remedied. Final recipients and beneficiaries would be protected: the Commission would publish information and tools online and could recover payments or make financial corrections to ensure amounts due are paid to them.
Key points
- The rule of law is defined by reference to the Union values in Article 2 TEU and the membership criteria in Article 49 TEU, including legality, legal certainty, access to justice and equality before the law.
- A generalised deficiency means a widespread or recurrent practice, omission or measure by public authorities that affects or risks affecting sound financial management or the Union's financial interests.
- Generalised deficiencies include endangering judicial independence, failing to prevent or sanction unlawful decisions, limiting legal remedies, and endangering administrative capacity to meet membership obligations.
- A deficiency may be established where it affects the functioning of authorities implementing the budget, financial control and audit bodies, prosecution services, judicial review, or prevention of fraud, tax fraud, corruption, tax evasion and tax competition.
- Cooperation with the European Anti-fraud Office and, subject to the member state's participation, the European Public Prosecutor's Office is required, as is proper budget implementation after a systemic violation of fundamental rights.
- A panel of independent experts in constitutional law and financial and budgetary matters would be set up, with one expert appointed by each national parliament and five by Parliament, ensuring gender balance.
- Measures may include suspension of payments and commitments, reduction of funding under existing commitments, and a ban on new commitments with recipients; they must be proportionate to the nature, gravity, duration and scope of the deficiency.
- The Commission would provide information and guidance for final recipients and beneficiaries online, with tools to report breaches, and could recover payments or make financial corrections to ensure amounts due are paid.
- Before adopting measures, the Commission would notify the member state and inform Parliament and the Council; the member state may reply within one to three months and propose remedial measures.
- The Commission would adopt measures by implementing act, taking into account the panel's opinions, and would simultaneously propose a transfer to a budgetary reserve equal to the value of the measures.
- Parliament and the Council would deliberate on the transfer within four weeks; it is approved unless amended or rejected, and the measures enter into force only if neither institution rejects it.
- The member state may at any time notify evidence that the deficiency is remedied; the Commission would then lift measures in full or in part and propose lifting the budgetary reserve, and would report on the regulation's application after five years.
Who is affected
- Member states with generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law, which may face suspended payments and commitments.
- Final recipients and beneficiaries of Union funds, who would get information, reporting tools and protection of amounts due.
- National parliaments, which would each appoint one expert to the panel of independent experts.
- The Commission, which would assess deficiencies, adopt measures and manage the budgetary reserve.
- Parliament and the Council, which would approve transfers to the budgetary reserve.
Figures and deadlines
- Tax evasion and avoidance estimated by the Commission at up to EUR 1 trillion a year.
- Member state observations within not less than one month nor more than three months from notification.
- Commission follow-up on information received within an indicative time limit of one month.
- Parliament and Council deliberate on the transfer proposal within four weeks of receipt.
- Commission report on the regulation's application at the latest five years after entry into force.
- Regulation enters into force on the twentieth day following publication in the Official Journal.
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Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 January 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States (COM(2018)0324 – C8-0178/2018 – 2018/0136(COD))
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) The rule of law is one of the essential values upon which the Union is founded. As recalled by Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, these values are common to the Member States. | (1) The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in the criteria for Union membership. As recalled by Article 2 TEU, those values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (1a) Member States should uphold their obligations and set an example by genuinely fulfilling them and move towards a shared culture of the rule of law as a universal value to be applied by all concerned even-handedly. Full respect for and promotion of those principles is an essential prerequisite for the legitimacy of the European project as a whole and a basic condition for building citizens' trust in the Union and ensuring the effective implementation of its policies. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (1b) In accordance with Article 2, Article 3(1) and Article 7 TEU, the Union has the possibility to act in order to protect its constitutional core and the common values on which it was founded, including its budgetary principles. Member States, Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and candidate countries are obliged to respect, protect and promote those principles and values, and they have a duty of sincere cooperation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (2) The rule of law requires that all public powers act within the constraints set out by law, in accordance with the values of democracy and fundamental rights, and under the control of independent and impartial courts. It requires, in particular, that the principles of legality7 , legal certainty8 , prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers9 , separation of powers10 , and effective judicial protection by independent courts11 are respected12 . | (2) The rule of law requires that all public powers act within the constraints set out by law, in accordance with the values of democracy and respect for fundamental rights, and under the control of independent and impartial courts. It requires, in particular, that the principles of legality7, including a transparent, accountable and democratic process for enacting law, legal certainty8, prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers9, separation of powers10, access to justice and effective judicial protection before independent and impartial courts11 are respected12. Those principles are reflected inter alia at the level of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and also on the basis of the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights12a. |
| 7 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, CAS Succhi di Frutta, C-496/99 PECLI:EU:C:2004:236, paragraph 63. | 7 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, CAS Succhi di Frutta, C-496/99 PECLI:EU:C:2004:236, paragraph 63. |
| 8 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 November 1981, Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Srl Meridionale Industria Salumi and others Ditta Italo Orlandi & Figlio and Ditta Vincenzo Divella v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato. Joined cases 212 to 217/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:270, paragraph 10. | 8 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 November 1981, Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Srl Meridionale Industria Salumi and others Ditta Italo Orlandi & Figlio and Ditta Vincenzo Divella v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato. Joined cases 212 to 217/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:270, paragraph 10. |
| 9 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 September 1989, Hoechst, Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337, paragraph 19. | 9 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 September 1989, Hoechst, Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337, paragraph 19. |
| 10 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 November 2016, Kovalkovas, C-477/16, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861, paragraph 36; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 November 2016, PPU Poltorak, C-452/16, ECLI:EU:C:2016:858, paragraph 35; and Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 December 2010, DEB,C-279/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:811, paragraph 58. | 10 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 November 2016, Kovalkovas, C-477/16, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861, paragraph 36; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 November 2016, PPU Poltorak, C-452/16, ECLI:EU:C:2016:858, paragraph 35; and Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 December 2010, DEB,C-279/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:811, paragraph 58. |
| 11 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas C-64/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 31, 40-41. | 11 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas C-64/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 31, 40-41; judgment of the Court of Justice of 25 July 2018, LM, C-216/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, paragraphs 63-67. |
| 12 Communication from the Commission "A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law", COM(2014)0158, Annex I. | 12 Communication from the Commission "A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law", COM(2014)0158, Annex I. |
| 12a Report of the Venice Commission of 4 April 2011 Study No. 512/2009 (CDL-AD(2011)003rev). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2a) The accession criteria, or Copenhagen criteria, established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995, are the essential conditions that all candidate countries must satisfy to become a Member State. Those criteria include the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; and the ability to meet the obligations of Union membership. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2b) The failure of a candidate country to meet the required standards, values and democratic principles results in that country’s accession to the Union being delayed until it fully meets those standards. The obligations incumbent on candidate countries under the Copenhagen criteria continue to apply to Member States after joining the Union by virtue of Article 2 TEU and the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4 TEU. Member States should therefore be assessed on a regular basis in order to verify that their laws and practices continue to comply with those criteria and the common values on which the Union is founded, thereby providing a sound legal and administrative framework for the implementation of Union policies. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) The rule of law is a prerequisite for the protection of the other fundamental values on which the Union is founded, such as freedom, democracy, equality and respect for human rights. Respect for the rule of law is intrinsically linked to respect for democracy and for fundamental rights: there can be no democracy and respect for fundamental rights without respect for the rule of law and vice versa. | (3) While there is no hierarchy among Union values, respect for the rule of law is essential for the protection of the other fundamental values on which the Union is founded, such as freedom, democracy, equality and respect for human rights. Respect for the rule of law is intrinsically linked to respect for democracy and for fundamental rights: there can be no democracy and respect for fundamental rights without respect for the rule of law and vice versa. Coherence and consistency of internal and external democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights policy is key to the credibility of the Union. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (6) Judicial bodies should act independently and impartially and investigation and prosecution services should be able to properly execute their function. They should be endowed with sufficient resources and procedures to act effectively and in full respect of the right to a fair trial. These conditions are required as a minimum guarantee against unlawful and arbitrary decisions by public authorities that could harm the financial interests of the Union. | (6) Independence and impartiality of the judiciary should always be guaranteed and investigation and prosecution services should be able to properly execute their function. They should be endowed with sufficient resources and procedures to act effectively and in full respect of the right to a fair trial. These conditions are required as a minimum guarantee against unlawful and arbitrary decisions by public authorities that could impair these fundamental principles and harm the financial interests of the Union. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (7a) The independence of the prosecution and the judiciary comprises both the formal (de jure) and actual (de facto) independence of the prosecution and the judiciary and the individual prosecutors and judges. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (8) Respect for the rule of law is not only important for citizens of the Union, but also for business initiatives, innovation, investment and the proper functioning of the internal market, which will flourish most where a solid legal and institutional framework is in place. | (8) Respect for the rule of law is not only essential for citizens of the Union, but also for business initiatives, innovation, investment, economic, social and territorial cohesion and the proper functioning of the internal market, which will flourish sustainably only where a solid legal and institutional framework is in place. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (8a) Integrating existing Union monitoring mechanisms, such as the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, the Justice Scoreboard and the Anti-Corruption reports, into a broader rule of law monitoring framework could provide more efficient and effective control mechanisms for the protection of the financial interest of the Union. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (8b) Lack of transparency, arbitrary discrimination, distortion of competition and an uneven playing field within and outside the internal market, impact on the integrity of the single market and on the fairness, stability and legitimacy of the tax system, increased economic inequalities, unfair competition between states, social dissatisfaction, mistrust and democratic deficit are some of the negative effects of harmful tax practices. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (10a) The Union has at its disposal a multitude of instruments and processes for ensuring full and proper application of the principles and values laid down in the TEU, but there is currently no swift, effective response coming from the Union institutions, in particular to ensure sound financial management. The existing instruments should be enforced, evaluated and complemented in the framework of a rule of law mechanism to be adequate and effective. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) Generalised deficiencies in the Member States as regards the rule of law which affect in particular the proper functioning of public authorities and effective judicial review, can seriously harm the financial interests of the Union. | (11) Generalised deficiencies in the Member States as regards the rule of law which affect in particular the proper functioning of public authorities and effective judicial review, can seriously harm the financial interests of the Union. Efficient investigations into such deficiencies, and the application of effective and proportionate measures when a generalised deficiency is established, are needed not only to secure the financial interests of the Union, including the effective collection of revenue, but also to ensure public trust in the Union and its institutions. Only an independent judiciary that upholds the rule of law and legal certainty in all Member States can ultimately guarantee that money from the Union budget is sufficiently protected. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (11a) The scale of tax evasion and avoidance is estimated by the Commission to be up to EUR 1 trillion a year. The negative impacts of such practices on the Member States' and Union budgets and on citizens are evident and could undermine trust in democracy. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (11b) Corporate tax avoidance has a direct impact on Member States’ and Union budgets and on the breakdown of the tax effort between categories of tax payers as well as between economic factors. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (11c) Member States should fully apply the principle of sincere cooperation in matters of tax competition. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (11d) The Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, should ensure that Union law and the principle of sincere cooperation between Member States are fully complied with. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (11e) Assessing and monitoring Member States' tax policies at Union level would ensure that no new harmful tax measures are implemented in Member States. Monitoring compliance of Member States, their jurisdictions, regions or other administrative structures with the common Union list of non-cooperative jurisdictions would safeguard the single market and ensure its proper and coherent functioning. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (12) The identification of a generalised deficiency requires a qualitative assessment by the Commission. That assessment could be based on the information from all available sources and recognized institutions, including judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union, reports of the Court of Auditors, and conclusions and recommendations of relevant international organisations and networks, such as the bodies of the Council of Europe and the European networks of supreme courts and councils for the judiciary. | (12) The identification of a generalised deficiency requires a thorough qualitative assessment by the Commission. That assessment should be objective, impartial and transparent and be based on information from all relevant sources, taking into account the criteria used in the context of Union accession negotiations, in particular the chapters of the acquis on judiciary and fundamental rights, on justice, freedom and security, on financial control and on taxation, as well as the guidelines used in the context of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism to track the progress of a Member State, and from recognised institutions, including judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, resolutions of the European Parliament, reports of the Court of Auditors, and conclusions and recommendations of relevant international organisations, such as the bodies of the Council of Europe, including in particular the Venice Commission’s Rule of Law Checklist, and of relevant international networks, such as the European networks of supreme courts and councils for the judiciary. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (12a) An advisory panel of independent experts in constitutional law and financial and budgetary matters should be established with the objective to assist the Commission in its assessment of generalised deficiencies. That panel should undertake an independent annual assessment of the issues as regards the rule of law in all Member States that affect or risk affecting the sound financial management or the protection of the financial interests of the Union, taking into account information from all relevant sources and recognised institutions. The Commission, when taking a decision about adopting or lifting of possible measures, should take relevant opinions expressed by that panel into account. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (13) The possible measures to be adopted in the event of generalised deficiencies and the procedure to be followed to adopt them should be determined. Those measures should include the suspension of payments and of commitments, a reduction of funding under existing commitments, and a prohibition to conclude new commitments with recipients. | (13) The measures to be adopted in the event of generalised deficiencies and the procedure to be followed to adopt them should be determined. Those measures should include the suspension of payments and of commitments, a reduction of funding under existing commitments, and a prohibition to conclude new commitments with recipients. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (14a) It is essential that the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries are properly safeguarded when measures are adopted in the event of generalised deficiencies. When considering the adoption of measures, the Commission should take into account their potential impact on final recipients and beneficiaries. To strengthen the protection of the final recipients or beneficiaries, the Commission should provide information and guidance via a website or internet portal, together with adequate tools to inform the Commission about any breach of the legal obligation of government entities and Member States to continue making payments after measures on the basis of this Regulation are adopted. Where necessary, in order to ensure that any amount due by government entities or Member States is effectively paid to final recipients or beneficiaries, the Commission should be able to recover payments made to those entities, or, as appropriate, to make a financial correction by reducing support to a programme, and to transfer an equivalent amount to the Union reserve to be used for the benefit of final recipients or beneficiaries. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (15) In order to ensure uniform implementation of this Regulation and in view of the importance of the financial effects of measures being imposed pursuant to this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Council which should act on the basis of a Commission proposal. To facilitate the adoption of decisions which are required to protect the financial interests of the Union, reversed qualified majority voting should be used. | (15) In order to ensure uniform implementation of this Regulation and in view of the importance of the financial effects of measures being imposed pursuant to this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (15a) In view of their effect on the Union budget, measures imposed pursuant to this Regulation should only enter into force after the European Parliament and the Council have approved a transfer to a budgetary reserve of an amount equivalent to the value of the measures adopted. To facilitate the adoption of decisions which are required to protect the financial interests of the Union, such transfers should be considered to be approved unless, within a set period, the European Parliament or the Council, the latter acting by qualified majority, amend or reject them. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (16) Before proposing the adoption of any measure pursuant to this Regulation, the Commission should inform the Member State concerned why it considers that a generalised deficiency regarding the rule of law might exist in that Member State. The Member State should be allowed to submit its observations. The Commission and the Council should take those observations into account. | (16) Before proposing the adoption of any measure pursuant to this Regulation, the Commission should inform the Member State concerned why it considers that a generalised deficiency regarding the rule of law might exist in that Member State. The Commission should without delay inform the European Parliament and the Council about any such notification and its contents. The Member State concerned should be allowed to submit its observations. The Commission should take those observations into account. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (17) The Council should lift measures with suspensive effect on a proposal from the Commission, if the situation leading to the imposition of those measures has been sufficiently remedied. | (17) The Commission should lift measures with suspensive effect and propose to the European Parliament and the Council to lift in full or in part the budgetary reserve of the measures in question, if the situation leading to the imposition of those measures has been sufficiently remedied. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (18) The Commission should keep the European Parliament informed of any measures proposed and adopted pursuant to this Regulation, | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (a) 'the rule of law' refers to the Union value enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union which includes the principles of legality, implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; effective judicial protection by independent courts, including of fundamental rights; separation of powers and equality before the law; | (a) 'the rule of law' shall be understood having regard to the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and in the criteria for Union membership referred to in Article 49 TEU; it includes the principles of legality, implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting law; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; access to justice and effective judicial protection before independent and impartial courts, including of fundamental rights as stipulated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in international human rights treaties; separation of powers; non-discrimination and equality before the law; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (b) 'generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law' means a widespread or recurrent practice or omission, or measure by public authorities which affects the rule of law; | (b) 'generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law' means a widespread or recurrent practice or omission, or measure by public authorities which affects the rule of law, where it affects or risks affecting the principles of sound financial management or the protection of the financial interests of the Union; a generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law may also be the consequence of a systemic threat to the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU that affects or risks affecting the principles of sound financial management or the protection of the financial interests of the Union; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (c) 'government entity' means all public authorities at all levels of government, including national, regional and local authorities, as well as Member State organisations within the meaning of [point 42 of Article 2] of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No […] (the ‘Financial Regulation’). | (c) 'government entity' means any public authority at all levels of government, including national, regional and local authorities, as well as Member State organisations within the meaning of point 42 of Article 2 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council1a (the ‘Financial Regulation’). |
| 1a Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| Article 2 a | |
| Generalised deficiencies | |
| The following shall, in particular, be considered generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law where they affect or risk affecting the principles of sound financial management or the protection of the financial interests of the Union: | |
| (a) endangering the independence of judiciary, including setting any limitations on the ability to exercise judicial functions autonomously by externally intervening in guarantees of independence, by constraining judgement under external order, by arbitrarily revising rules on the appointment or terms of service of judicial personnel, by influencing judicial staff in any way that jeopardises their impartiality or by interfering with the independence of attorneyship; | |
| (b) failing to prevent, correct and sanction arbitrary or unlawful decisions by public authorities, including by law enforcement authorities, withholding financial and human resources affecting their proper functioning or failing to ensure the absence of conflicts of interests; | |
| (c) limiting the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, including through restrictive procedural rules, lack of implementation of judgments, or limiting the effective investigation, prosecution or sanctioning of breaches of law; | |
| (d) endangering the administrative capacity of a Member State to respect the obligations of Union membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of Union law; (e) measures that weaken the protection of the confidential communication between lawyer and client. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| Measures | Risks for the financial interests of the Union |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| 1. Appropriate measures shall be taken where a generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law in a Member State affects or risks affecting the principles of sound financial management or the protection of the financial interests of the Union, in particular: | 1. A generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law in a Member State may be established when one or more of the following, in particular, are affected or risk being affected: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (a) the proper functioning of the authorities of that Member State implementing the Union budget, in particular in the context of public procurement or grant procedures, and when carrying out monitoring and controls; | (a) the proper functioning of the authorities of that Member State implementing the Union budget, in particular in the context of public procurement or grant procedures; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (aa) the proper functioning of the market economy, thereby respecting competition and market forces in the Union as well as implementing effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aim of political, economic and monetary union; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (ab) the proper functioning of the authorities carrying out financial control, monitoring and internal and external audits, and the proper functioning of effective and transparent financial management and accountability systems; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (b) the proper functioning of investigation and public prosecution services in relation to the prosecution of fraud, corruption or other breaches of Union law relating to the implementation of the Union budget; | (b) the proper functioning of investigation and public prosecution services in relation to the prosecution of fraud, including tax fraud, corruption or other breaches of Union law relating to the implementation of the Union budget; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) the effective judicial review by independent courts of actions or omissions by the authorities referred to in points (a) and b); | (c) the effective judicial review by independent courts of actions or omissions by the authorities referred to in points (a), (a b) and (b); |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (d) the prevention and sanctioning of fraud, corruption or other breaches of Union law relating to the implementation of the Union budget, and the imposition of effective and dissuasive penalties on recipients by national courts or by administrative authorities; | (d) the prevention and sanctioning of fraud, including tax fraud, corruption or other breaches of Union law relating to the implementation of the Union budget, and the imposition of effective and dissuasive penalties on recipients by national courts or by administrative authorities; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (ea) the prevention and sanctioning of tax evasion and tax competition and the proper functioning of authorities contributing to administrative cooperation in tax matters; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (f) the effective and timely cooperation with the European Anti-fraud Office and with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in their investigations or prosecutions pursuant to their respective legal acts and to the principle of loyal cooperation. | (f) the effective and timely cooperation with the European Anti-fraud Office and, subject to the participation of the Member State concerned, with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in their investigations or prosecutions pursuant to their respective legal acts and to the principle of loyal cooperation; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (fa) the proper implementation of the Union budget following a systemic violation of fundamental rights. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| 2. The following may, in particular, be considered generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law, | deleted |
| (a) endangering the independence of judiciary; | |
| (b) failing to prevent, correct and sanction arbitrary or unlawful decisions by public authorities, including by law enforcement authorities, withholding financial and human resources affecting their proper functioning or failing to ensure the absence of conflicts of interests; | |
| (c) limiting the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, including through restrictive procedural rules, lack of implementation of judgments, or limiting the effective investigation, prosecution or sanctioning of breaches of law. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article 3 a | |
| Panel of independent experts | |
| 1. The Commission shall establish a panel of independent experts (‘the Panel’). | |
| The Panel shall be composed of independent experts in constitutional law and financial and budgetary matters. One expert shall be appointed by the national parliament of each Member State and five experts shall be appointed by the European Parliament. The composition of the Panel shall ensure gender balance. | |
| Whenever appropriate, representatives of relevant organisations and networks, such as the European Federation of Academies of Sciences and Humanities, the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions, the bodies of the Council of Europe, the European Commission for the efficiency of justice, the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, the Tax Justice Network, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, may be invited as observers to the Panel in accordance with the rules of procedures referred to in paragraph 6. | |
| 2. The advisory tasks of the Panel shall have as their objective to assist the Commission in identifying generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in a Member State that affect or risk affecting the principles of sound financial management or the protection of the financial interests of the Union. | |
| The Panel shall assess the situation in all Member States annually on the basis of quantitative and qualitative criteria and information, having due regard to the information and guidance referred to in Article 5(2). | |
| 3. Each year the Panel shall make public a summary of its findings. | |
| 4. As part of its advisory task and taking into account the outcome of the considerations under paragraph 2, the Panel may express an opinion about a generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law in a Member State. | |
| When expressing an opinion the Panel shall endeavour to reach a consensus. If no such consensus can be reached, the Panel shall express its opinion by a simple majority of its members. | |
| 5. When adopting implementing acts pursuant to Article 5(6) and Article 6(2), the Commission shall take into account any relevant opinion expressed by the Panel in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article. | |
| 6. The Panel shall elect its chairperson from among its members. The Panel shall establish its rules of procedure. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Content of measures | Measures for the protection of the Union budget |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. One or more of the following appropriate measures may be adopted | 1. When the conditions of Article 3 are fulfilled, one or more of the following measures may be adopted: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. The measures taken shall be proportionate to the nature, gravity and scope of the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law. They shall, insofar as possible, target the Union actions affected or potentially affected by that deficiency. | 3. The measures taken shall be proportionate to the nature, gravity, duration and scope of the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law. They shall, insofar as possible, target the Union actions affected or potentially affected by that deficiency. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3a. The Commission shall provide information and guidance for the benefit of final recipients or beneficiaries on the obligations by Member States referred to in paragraph 2 via a website or internet portal. | |
| The Commission shall also provide, on the same website or portal, adequate tools for final recipients or beneficiaries to inform the Commission about any breach of these obligations that, in the view of these final recipients or beneficiaries, directly affects them. This paragraph shall be applied in a manner that ensures protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, in line with the principles set out in Directive XXX (Directive on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law). Information provided by final recipients or beneficiaries in accordance with this paragraph may only be taken into account by the Commission if accompanied by a proof that the concerned final recipient or beneficiary has lodged a formal complaint to the competent authority. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3b. Based on the information provided by the final recipients or beneficiaries in accordance with paragraph 3 a, the Commission shall ensure that any amount due by government entities or Member States in accordance with paragraph 2 is effectively paid to final recipients or beneficiaries. Where necessary: | |
| (a) with reference to funds from the Union budget managed in accordance with Article 62(1)(c) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall: | |
| (i) recover the payment made to any of the bodies referred to in points (v) to (vii) of Article 62(1)(c) of the Financial Regulation for an amount equivalent to the amount not paid to final recipients or beneficiaries, in breach of paragraph 2 of this Article; | |
| (ii) transfer an amount equivalent to the amount referred to in the previous point to the Union reserve referred to in Article 12 of Council Regulation XXX (MFF Regulation). Such amount shall be considered margin left available within the meaning of point (a) of Article 12(1) of Council Regulation XXX (MFF Regulation) and shall be mobilised in accordance with Article 12(2) of Council Regulation XXX (MFF Regulation), for the benefit, to the possible extent, of the final recipients or beneficiaries referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article; | |
| (b) with reference to funds from the Union budget managed in accordance with Article 62(1)(b) of the Financial Regulation: | |
| (i) the obligation of government authorities or of Member States referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be considered an obligation of Member States within the meaning of [Article 63] of Regulation XXX (CPR Regulation). Any breach of such obligation shall be treated in accordance with [Article 98] of Regulation XXX (CPR Regulation); | |
| (ii) The amount resulting from reduced support from the Funds to a programme, in application of [Article 98] of Regulation XXX (CPR Regulation) shall be transferred by the Commission to the Union reserve referred to in Article 12 of Council Regulation XXX (MFF Regulation). Such amount shall be considered margin left available within the meaning of point a) of Article 12(1) of Council Regulation XXX (MFF Regulation) and shall be mobilised in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 12 of Council Regulation XXC (MFF Regulation), for the benefit, to the possible extent, of the final recipients or beneficiaries referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Where the Commission finds that it has reasonable grounds to believe that the conditions of Article 3 are fulfilled, it shall send a written notification to that Member State, setting out the grounds on which it based its finding | 1. Where the Commission, taking into account any opinions of the Panel, finds that it has reasonable grounds to believe that the conditions of Article 3 are fulfilled, it shall send a written notification to that Member State, setting out the grounds on which it based its finding. The Commission shall without delay inform the European Parliament and the Council of such notification and its contents. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The Commission may take into account all relevant information, including decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union, reports of the Court of Auditors, and conclusions and recommendations of relevant international organisations. | 2. When assessing whether the conditions of Article 3 are fulfilled, the Commission shall take into account all relevant information, including opinions of the Panel, decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union, resolutions of the European Parliament, reports of the Court of Auditors, and conclusions and recommendations of relevant international organisations and networks. The Commission shall also take into account the criteria used in the context of Union accession negotiations, in particular the chapters of the acquis on judiciary and fundamental rights, justice, freedom and security, financial control and taxation, as well as the guidelines used in the context of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism to track the progress of a Member State. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. The Member State concerned shall provide all required information and may make observations within a time limit specified by the Commission, which shall not be less than 1 month from the date of notification of the finding. In its observations, the Member State may propose the adoption of remedial measures. | 4. The Member State concerned shall provide the required information and may make observations within a time limit specified by the Commission, which shall not be less than one month nor more than three months from the date of notification of the finding. In its observations, the Member State may propose the adoption of remedial measures. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. The Commission shall take into account the information received and any observations made by the Member State concerned, as well as the adequacy of any proposed remedial measures, when deciding whether or not to submit a proposal for a decision on the appropriate measures. | 5. The Commission shall take into account the information received and any observations made by the Member State concerned, as well as the adequacy of any proposed remedial measures, when deciding whether or not to adopt a decision on any measures referred to in Article 4. The Commission shall decide on the follow-up to be given to the information received within an indicative time limit of one month, and in any case within a reasonable timeframe from the date of receipt of that information. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5a. When assessing the proportionality of the measures to be imposed, the Commission shall have due regard to the information and guidance referred to in paragraph 2. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 6. Where the Commission considers that the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law is established, it shall submit a proposal for an implementing act on the appropriate measures to the Council. | 6. Where the Commission considers that the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law is established, it shall adopt a decision on the measures referred to in Article 4 by means of an implementing act. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 6a. At the same time as it adopts its decision, the Commission shall simultaneously submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a proposal to transfer to a budgetary reserve an amount equivalent to the value of the measures adopted. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 6b. By way of derogation from Article 31(4) and (6) of the Financial Regulation, the European Parliament and the Council shall deliberate upon the transfer proposal within four weeks of its receipt by both institutions. The transfer proposal shall be considered to be approved unless, within the four-week period, the European Parliament, acting by majority of the votes cast, or the Council, acting by qualified majority, amend or reject it. If the European Parliament or the Council amend the transfer proposal, Article 31(8) of the Financial Regulation shall apply. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 6c. The decision referred to in paragraph 6 shall enter into force if neither the European Parliament nor the Council reject the transfer proposal within the period referred to in paragraph 6b. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. The decision shall be deemed to have been adopted by the Council, unless it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the Commission proposal within one month of its adoption by the Commission. | Deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 8. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may amend the Commission’s proposal and adopt the amended text as a Council decision. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Member State concerned may, at any time, submit to the Commission evidence to show that the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law has been remedied or has ceased to exist. | 1. The Member State concerned may, at any time, submit to the Commission a formal notification including evidence to show that the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law has been remedied or has ceased to exist. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The Commission shall assess the situation in the Member State concerned. Once the generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law which on the grounds of which the appropriate measures were adopted cease to exist in full or in part, the Commission shall submit to the Council a proposal for a decision lifting those measures in full or in part. The procedure set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article 5 shall apply. | 2. At the request of the Member State concerned or on its own initiative, the Commission, taking into account any opinions of the Panel, shall assess the situation in the Member State concerned within an indicative time limit of one month, and in any case within a reasonable timeframe from the date of receipt of the formal notification. Once the generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law which on the grounds of which the measures referred to in Article 4 were adopted cease to exist in full or in part, the Commission shall, without delay, adopt a decision lifting those measures in full or in part. At the same time as it adopts its decision, the Commission shall simultaneously submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a proposal to lift, in full or in part, the budgetary reserve referred to in Article 5(6a). The procedure set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 6b and 6c of Article 5 shall apply. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Where measures concerning the suspension of the approval of one or more programmes or amendments thereof referred to in point (i) of Article 4(2)(b) or the suspension of commitments referred to in point (ii) of Article 4(2)(b) are lifted, amounts corresponding to the suspended commitments shall be entered in the budget subject to Article 7 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No XXXX (MFF Regulation). Suspended commitments of year n may not be entered in the budget beyond year n+2. | 3. Where measures concerning the suspension of the approval of one or more programmes or amendments thereof referred to in point (i) of Article 4(2)(b) or the suspension of commitments referred to in point (ii) of Article 4(2)(b) are lifted, amounts corresponding to the suspended commitments shall be entered in the budget subject to Article 7 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No XXXX (MFF Regulation). Suspended commitments of year n may not be entered in the budget beyond year n+2. As from year n+3, an amount equivalent to the suspended commitments shall be entered in the Union Reserve for Commitments provided for in Article 12 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No XXXX (MFF Regulation). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article 7 | deleted |
| Information of the European Parliament | |
| The Commission shall immediately inform the European Parliament of any measures proposed or adopted pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article 7a | |
| Reporting | |
| The Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Regulation, in particular on the effectiveness of the measures adopted, if any, at the latest five years after its entry into force. | |
| The report shall be accompanied where necessary by appropriate proposals. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. It shall apply from 1 January 2021. | This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
Connections
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Sources & citation
Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.
- Official source
- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2019). “Protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States ***I”. Text, 17 January 2019. docId TA-8-2019-0038, reference TA8-0038/2019. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/TA-8-2019-0038 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Official source: The text on the European Parliament’s website, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0038_EN.html. Data: EP Open Data API: document record, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/api/v2/documents/TA-8-2019-0038 (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-ta-8-2019-0038,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{Protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States ***I}},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-01-17},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/TA-8-2019-0038}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/TA-8-2019-0038},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. docId TA-8-2019-0038, reference TA8-0038/2019. Official source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0038\_EN.html. Data: EP Open Data API: document record (CC BY 4.0)}
}