Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Removed12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;

Added41. Welcomes the adoption of the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive10 and the NIS2 Directive11 as important steps towards strengthening resilience against hybrid attacks, but stresses that implementation delays across the Member States represent a shared urgent vulnerability and calls for their full and timely implementation; urges the Commission to make full use of its monitoring and enforcement powers; calls on the Member States to embed resilience by design as a standard requirement in all new and revised legislation;

Removed13. Stresses that a range of Russia’s hybrid activities against the EU amounts to state-sponsored terrorism; encourages the Member States to use all available legal tools to counter them, including the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU); regrets that while the solidarity clause has been operationalised, it has never been invoked, despite major terrorist attacks within the EU that could have warranted its activation;

Added42. Expresses concern over foreign ownership of critical infrastructure in the EU, in particular by Russia and China, which greatly increases the risk of espionage and interference and strategic dependence; welcomes the political agreement reached between Parliament and the Council on a strengthened EU foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism; calls on the Member States to rapidly implement this regulation, complemented by a ‘Buy European’ approach, where possible, for critical infrastructure and defence equipment with a view to strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy;

Removed14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles;

Added43. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; stresses that, where private infrastructure supports essential services and sensitive data, public authorities must ensure effective regulatory and operational control; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and funding; insists that EU-funded infrastructure must comply with defence-relevant resilience standards as a condition for EU support; calls furthermore for defence technology developers and security providers to be systematically involved in the early phases of critical infrastructure threat assessment and contingency planning, ensuring that available technological capabilities are reflected in national and EU resilience frameworks; recognises the contribution of SMEs, start-ups and innovative technology providers to the resilience and protection of critical infrastructure and calls for their increased participation in relevant EU programmes, procurement schemes and public-private partnerships;

Removed15. Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors, thereby reducing its deterrent effect; calls for the immediate establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework, specifically designed for hybrid threats; calls for the EU FIMI Toolbox to be strengthened;

Added44. Calls on the Member States to conduct regular preparedness and resilience exercises for critical infrastructure, including joint exercises, and urgently deliver the priority capabilities identified in the White Paper for European Defence, in particular air and missile defence, drones and counter-drone systems, military mobility, cyber, and electronic warfare and maritime capabilities;

Removed16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;

Added45. Is concerned about the EU’s structural dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software assets, such as solar inverters, wind turbines, connected vehicles, and consumer digital devices, that can access, transmit or control systems remotely and therefore form a significant vulnerability; calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce strategic dependencies; calls on the Member States to follow up on these assessments, diversify supply chains and prioritise European and like-minded suppliers in strategic sectors whenever security considerations so require; welcomes the fact that the proposed revision of the Cybersecurity Act aims to provide a framework to ban network-connected components from high-risk suppliers, and that the Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in the Energy Sector – as part of the European Technological Sovereignty Package – provides for a review of the energy security-of-supply framework; calls for these measures to be adopted swiftly;

Removed17. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of a new global EU security strategy and calls for hybrid warfare to be included in its scope;

Added46. Stresses the importance of diversifying supply routes through secure and resilient transport networks with trusted partners in order to reduce strategic dependencies and strengthen the EU’s economic security and supply chain resilience;

Added47. Stresses that critical and emerging technologies – including AI, cloud infrastructure, advanced semiconductors, quantum technologies, cyber, space, autonomous systems and secure communications – are part of the EU’s critical security infrastructure given their essential role in defence readiness, economic resilience and operational continuity; considers a resilient, competitive EU digital infrastructure – including secure local data centres, sovereign EU cloud, edge computing, and gigabit networks – an important pillar of European security; stresses that the EU’s ability to detect, withstand and respond to hybrid campaigns depends on its capacity to develop, secure and scale these technologies within a resilient European industrial and technological base supported by sufficient EU investment, including investment in secure, interoperable and resilient information-sharing systems and local data centres not subject to extraterritorial legislation;

AddedSituational awareness

Added48. Stresses that effective countering of hybrid threats requires prevention, early threat anticipation, and continuous monitoring of strategic vulnerabilities to neutralise hostile actions before they have systemic effects and a shared threat picture, as targeted sectors cannot respond effectively on the basis of isolated incident reports; highlights in this regard the EU’s potential unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own, as well as in coordinating the development of procedures for joint situational awareness and attribution, common frameworks, methodologies, taxonomies and interoperability protocols between EU and national relevant bodies and structures that would support operational cooperation between the Member States; calls for these functions to be formally recognised as EU coordination and support competences;

Added49. Notes that the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell within the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) remains the EU’s central body of exclusive expertise on all-sources analysis of hybrid threats providing intelligence-based situational awareness; reiterates that SIAC should be the single hub for intelligence in the EU institutions and underlines its special status within the EU security architecture; endorses the Hybrid Trend Analysis as a key tool for analysing hybrid threats and detecting patterns, and its proper involvement in the policymaking processes;

Added50. Recalls the lack of progress in fulfilling the goal set out in the Strategic Compass and the Joint Paper by the High Representative and the Member States on Strengthening the EU Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (EEAS(2024)2014), to strengthen SIAC by providing additional resources to compile, analyse and integrate relevant information in order to produce and facilitate efficient provision of intelligence in the areas of cyber and hybrid threats posed to the EU; calls on the Commission, the High Representative and the Member States to make a firm commitment to the effective strengthening of SIAC;

Added51. Urges the Member States to increase intelligence sharing, including with EU INTCEN and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) Intelligence Directorate, while respecting the sovereignty of the Member States, the need-to-know principle, and the protection of national classified information; stresses that data-driven, intelligence-based assessments must be systematically incorporated into EU planning, crisis management and policymaking;

Added52. Calls on the EU institutions, in cooperation with the Member States and the EEAS, to explore a secure – need-to-know and need-to-share – information-sharing system, whereby the EU would act as a facilitator connecting public authorities, relevant EU, national and international bodies, critical infrastructure operators, private companies, and trusted threat-information sources, in order to strengthen collective situational awareness while ensuring the utmost protection of sensitive information; believes that such a system would incentivise participating bodies to share information by enabling them to benefit from a more complete threat picture and higher-quality intelligence products, while progressively building the trust required for meaningful information sharing;

Added53. Calls for the establishment of a ‘Black Book of Hybrid Aggression by Russia, China and others’ in order to publicly document every hybrid operation against the EU and its Member States from the past 10 years; insists that the ‘Black Book’ be discussed in the Council and presented to Parliament annually in order to impose further costs on the states in question;

AddedFrom fragmentation to a coordinated and decisive European response

Added54. Underlines that only through deeper integration, coordination, increased European defence readiness and capabilities, including through further developing the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, can the EU respond effectively to escalating hybrid and conventional threats;

Added55. Considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy, which includes using its capabilities to disrupt, deter and respond to hybrid threats and credibly raise the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of the Member States’ sovereignty must be met with effective, proportionate and coordinated retaliation measures;

Added56. Stresses that to effectively counter and deter hybrid threats a shared and comprehensive threat picture is required, which depends on common frameworks, methodologies, taxonomies and operational standards; highlights the need to combine diplomatic, legal, economic and restrictive measures to prevent, detect, identify, attribute and respond to hybrid operations including through asymmetric measures across all relevant domains; calls on the Commission, the High Representative and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including strengthened civil-military cooperation, operational playbooks, collaborative and efficient response protocols, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains that are interoperable with and complement those of NATO, while preserving the capacity of the EU and the Member States to act independently if necessary; calls for the designation of a single point of coordination between the Commission and the EEAS in order to establish a genuine whole-of-EU approach to hybrid threats;

Added57. Welcomes the ongoing initiatives to strengthen operational capacity, including EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams and the launch of the EU’s Eastern Flank Watch and the European Drone Defence Initiative; calls for swift progress in their deployment; stresses the strategic importance of regional defence and security clusters and calls for dedicated EU funding lines to integrate their know-how and capabilities into cross-border projects that increase European resilience;

Added58. Welcomes the Commission’s and the High Representative’s announcement of a new global EU security strategy and calls for it to comprehensively address the full spectrum of hybrid threats;

Added59. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, as a stronger European pillar of NATO, separable but not separate, enabling the EU and its Member States to act independently when necessary; calls for the mutual defence clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in armed aggression and severe hybrid scenarios; calls further for an Article 42.7 playbook – a concise but comprehensive operational guide for national governments and EU institutions, explaining what happens before, during and after a Member State invokes the Article; suggests that the playbook be tested regularly in severe hybrid crisis scenarios and through comprehensive cross-sectoral exercises;

Added60. Stresses that some of Russia’s hybrid attacks against the EU and its Member States may amount to state-sponsored terrorism; encourages the Member States to use all available legal tools to counter them, including the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU), making full use of the cooperation and coordination mechanisms made available when the clause is activated;

Added61. Welcomes the work done under existing sanctions regimes targeting hybrid activities, in particular the sanctions regime established in October 2024 targeting Russia’s destabilising activities and the horizontal cyber sanctions regime established in 2019; deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is complex and fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors; calls for further strengthening the EU’s restrictive measures in response to hybrid threats, including the immediate establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework – specifically designed for hybrid threats in order to fill the gaps in existing regimes and increase the deterrent effect – which would exist alongside the Russia hybrid sanctions regime to underscore Russia’s active engagement in hybrid operations globally while enabling faster and more systematic sanctioning of entities responsible for hybrid campaigns; calls for the EU Hybrid, FIMI and Cyber Diplomacy Toolboxes to be further strengthened and used more effectively;

Added62. Reiterates the need to ensure accountability for hybrid operations and for those responsible, including proxies acting on behalf of state actors, by making full use of existing and dedicated tools; calls on the EU and the Member States to take urgent action to halt and disrupt the financial flows that fund attacks on democracy, including by mobilising banking regulators, criminal investigators and sanctions authorities to trace and examine illicit sources of financing, including cryptocurrency; calls on the EU and the Member States to break the financial and algorithmic incentives that allow disinformation to thrive, including by addressing the links between illicit funding, advertising revenues, attention-driven platform business models and manipulative content;

Added63. Takes the view that all criminal law tools available at Member State and EU level should be applied and, where appropriate, further developed to prevent and counter illegal conduct aimed at undermining democratic institutions and processes; stresses the need for competent national authorities to be equipped with adequate tools and cooperation channels to prevent, investigate, detect and prosecute criminal offences related to foreign interference; considers that corruption and intimidation of elected and public officials by criminal networks should be addressed as part of the EU’s response to hybrid threats via strengthened cooperation between specialised anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement authorities and relevant EU bodies; asks the Commission to assess the added value of establishing minimum rules in EU law on the definition of and sanctions for the criminal offence of knowingly participating in organised activities of interference on behalf of foreign powers; notes that the forthcoming revision of the mandates for EU justice and home affairs agencies provides an opportunity to strengthen the EU’s operational response capacity; calls on the Commission to explore the idea of convening a platform or task force for the Member States to voluntarily coordinate national legislative responses and share best practices;

AddedGeographical considerations

Added64. Strongly condemns the instrumentalisation of migration by third countries or hostile non-state actors in order to destabilise a Member State or put pressure on the EU; notes the specific provisions on the instrumentalisation of migration recently included in key pieces of EU legislation; notes the Commission’s announced revision of the mandate for Frontex; underlines that this revision should provide for the legal basis, analytical capabilities, and adequate human, financial and technical resources required, which would also help strengthen the EU’s response to hybrid threats;

Added65. Condemns Russia’s systematic drone incursions and cross-border provocations targeting the Member States along the EU’s eastern flank as a calculated campaign of intimidation against civilian populations; welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework, including dedicated funding to enhance integrated border protection capabilities, modernise physical and digital border surveillance infrastructure – in line with NATO standards – at the EU’s external land borders; underlines that focus should be placed on advanced detection, monitoring and countermeasure systems against unmanned aerial systems to protect critical infrastructure such as airports, energy facilities, and transport hubs and support the Member States in deploying interoperable airspace awareness systems, electronic protection measures, and rapid incident response capacities; stresses that measures must be proportionate, defensive, and civilian-protection-oriented, ensuring continuity of essential services and freedom of movement within the Schengen area;

Added66. Stresses that hybrid threats increasingly affect the EU as a whole, while taking different forms across regions; underlines, in this regard, the exposure of the Baltic, Nordic-Baltic and Black Sea regions to threats against maritime and airspace security, as well as instrumentalised migration, the vulnerability of Mediterranean and southern border regions to threats targeting maritime infrastructure, energy networks, logistics corridors, strategic transport routes, disinformation campaigns and the instrumentalisation of migration flows, the exposure of south-eastern Europe to economic coercion, energy dependencies and coordinated information manipulation linked to neighbouring theatres, the specific vulnerability of major urban and digital information spaces across the EU to cognitive warfare, polarisation and foreign interference; underlines the growing strategic significance of the Arctic region for European security, including the protection of critical infrastructure, freedom of navigation, satellite communications and emerging transport corridors; calls on the EU and NATO to reflect the geography of hybrid threats in their strategies, including the upcoming EU security strategy, while maintaining a 360º security approach to resilience, preparedness and response; stresses that funding to counter hybrid threats should be based on strategic exposure, operational needs and demonstrated vulnerabilities, while ensuring support for all regions facing hybrid threats;

EU and NATO coordination and cooperation

Change 10

Changed18.67. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defencepreparedness, resilience and deterrence;deterrence against hybrid threats; highlights in this regard the importance of critical infrastructure protection, military mobility, cyber resilience and preparedness; highlights the need for a more systematic exchange of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine in the hybrid domain;

Change 11

Removed19. Welcomes NATO’s Hybrid Tracking Mechanism, an intelligence aggregation tool updated monthly via NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division, which provides allies with a consolidated threat picture, drawing on national intelligence services;

Added68. Stresses that EU and NATO action in the hybrid domain must be complementary, mutually reinforcing and operationally coordinated, while ensuring the EU’s capacity to act when required, against the backdrop of the alignment of EU minimum preparedness requirements with NATO baseline requirements;

Removed20. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security7 to be accelerated and for its systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States;

Added69. Notes that NATO’s 2025 revised hybrid strategy marks a shift from resilience to active deterrence; welcomes the pre-agreed Military Response Options and expanded authorities of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to enable faster action at the start of a hybrid attack, reducing delays between threat detection and response while preserving political oversight;

Removed21. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and NATO to develop a common definition of hybrid warfare covering sabotage and related activities;

Added70. Welcomes NATO’s Hybrid Tracking Mechanism, an intelligence aggregation tool via NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division, which provides allies with a consolidated threat picture, drawing on national intelligence services; recognises the ongoing cooperation between NATO and the EU in the intelligence domain, and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to establish a structured interface within the Hybrid Fusion Cell with this mechanism so that EU situational awareness and NATO’s hybrid threat picture are regularly and systematically aligned;

Added71. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Arctic Sentry, Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry as agile instruments in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant time frames, especially regarding the protection of maritime critical infrastructure and supply routes, and the monitoring of hybrid activities in those regions; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of counter-drone regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security to be accelerated, including the provision of dedicated funding for layered defence capabilities in front-line Member States to combat meteorological balloons and drones kinetically and electronically, and for the action plan’s systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States; further supports greater cooperation in the development and deployment of cost-effective counter-drone technologies across the EU;

Added72. Welcomes the EU–NATO Parallel and Coordinated Exercises (PACE) framework as a valuable instrument for testing and improving joint response capacity, scale, and scope and for the systematic integration of lessons learned into EU policy, planning and institutional arrangements; calls for regular EU and NATO exercises simulating hybrid attack scenarios, including sabotage against military mobility infrastructure, coordinated cyberattacks, large-scale FIMI campaigns, airspace violations and attacks on critical infrastructure;

Added73. Calls on the Commission, the EEAS, in close coordination with NATO and the Member States, to develop a common understanding of hybrid threats and to establish a coherent response mechanism for the EU and NATO;

Added74. Recognises the valuable role played by specialised centres of excellence, including the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, in strengthening preparedness, resilience, cyber defence and counter-hybrid capabilities across Europe; further welcomes the work of the EU-NATO Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, particularly in strengthening cooperation on energy, transport, digital infrastructure and undersea connectivity;

Added75. Calls on the Member States to harmonise their laws in closing the legal gaps preventing allied personnel from participating in below-threshold hybrid response operations; welcomes Estonia’s recently adopted amendments to its Defence Forces Organisation Act as a concrete step in this direction;

Partner countries: cooperation and support

Change 12

Removed22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;

Added76. Underlines that Russian hybrid operations beyond the EU aim to shift the foreign policies of third countries in line with Moscow’s interests, undermine the EU’s relationships with its partners and weaken international support for Ukraine; reiterates, therefore, the importance of close cooperation with international partners and organisations to enhance situational awareness and to prevent, deter and respond more effectively to hybrid threats; acknowledges the value of deepening bilateral sectoral dialogues and consultations with like-minded partners on hybrid threats, especially within the framework of security and defence partnerships;

Removed23. Commends Moldova’s whole-of-government response to Russian FIMI ahead of its 2025 elections as an operational model, including its use of law enforcement action against networks conducting hybrid operations on behalf of a foreign state power; calls on the Member States and the Commission to develop EU-level frameworks enabling comparable enforcement responses;

Added77. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and partners in the Western Balkan is a strategic necessity, as they face continuous attacks from Russia and form key testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics, combining FIMI, cyber operations, covert influence networks, energy coercion, and corruption-based leverage to undermine democratic institutions, societal cohesion, and EU and NATO integration prospects; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries and establish structured mechanisms for the systematic exchange of best practices and operational experience, including on Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services, continuity of government, protection of critical infrastructure, strategic communication and societal functioning and resilience under sustained attack; reiterates its strong support for Ukraine’s progressive accession to the EU and accession to NATO once the relevant conditions have been fulfilled;

Removed24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables;

Added78. Highlights the strategic importance of continuing and deepening hybrid resilience support to candidate, potential candidate and partner countries, who are often primary targets of Russian hybrid activities and whose resilience directly contributes to the security of the EU; welcomes the EU’s and the Member States’ active contribution to strengthening their resilience through the Foreign Policy Instrument, strategic communications, Hybrid Rapid Response Teams, the Hybrid Risk Survey and CSDP missions in partner countries including Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Montenegro; calls for the organisation of regular joint exercises, simulation scenarios and training programmes aimed at enhancing preparedness, improving rapid response capacities and fostering interoperability in addressing hybrid threats; notes with appreciation the coordinated EU-NATO response in Moldova, including the parallel deployment of an EU Hybrid Response Team and a NATO Counter Hybrid Support Team with complementary mandates; encourages candidate countries and potential candidates to fully align with the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including restrictive measures, as a key aspect of the EU integration process;

Added79. Commends Moldova’s and Armenia’s pro-European forces for their democratic resilience during and in the lead-up to their 2025 and 2026 parliamentary elections, demonstrating strong resistance to Russia’s sustained years-long FIMI campaigns; underlines the effectiveness of the whole-of-government approach as an operational model, including its use of law enforcement action against networks conducting hybrid operations on behalf of Russia; calls on the Member States and the Commission, in cooperation with the EEAS, to develop EU-level frameworks enabling comparable enforcement responses; notes the important role played by EU institutions, state institutions, civil society, and independent media in countering FIMI, including AI-enabled large-scale coordinated information manipulation campaigns contributing to the notably high level of public awareness of hybrid threats;

Added80. Calls for reinforced cooperation on hybrid threats with like-minded non-EU partners, in particular the United Kingdom and Norway, as key European security partners, as well as Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan and other like-minded partners, including where possible through security and defence partnerships, information sharing, cyber, maritime security, space and resilience cooperation; stresses that EEA/EFTA states and their defence industries should be fully included in EU hybrid resilience frameworks and capability development programmes, recognising their direct contribution to European security and their shared exposure to hybrid threats;

Added81. Regrets that the recent shift in US policy has weakened the common front of democracies at a time of intensifying hybrid threats; stresses that transatlantic unity remains essential to fighting them;

Added82. Highlights that Russian influence operations in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean are not peripheral to European security, as they seek to undermine the EU’s partnerships, weaken support for Ukraine and undermine European diplomacy, security assistance and development cooperation; notes that in Africa, these operations mostly rely on state media, and cultural and religious fronts, while in Latin America and the Caribbean, Russia has built a Spanish-language influence ecosystem that complements its anti-European messaging elsewhere; calls on the EU and the Member States to strengthen strategic communication, support independent and trusted local media, engage credible local voices and reinforce cooperation with partners in both regions to expose and counter hostile information operations;

Added83. Underlines the importance of the experience of Gulf States, Jordan, and other relevant partners in addressing hybrid influence networks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, including through governance, regulatory, and societal resilience approaches, and calls for structured exchange of best practices with these partners in order to strengthen the EU’s understanding of hybrid threats, improve policy responses, and step up cooperation in countering foreign interference while respecting fundamental rights and the diversity of legal and political systems;