Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Added1. Emphasises the need to integrate UAS and C-UAS at the tactical and operational levels, recognising that for armed forces to operate effectively on the rapidly evolving modern battlefield, soldiers must be capable of creating real-time ‘drone walls’ that integrate radar, acoustic sensors, radio frequency sensors, cameras, electro-optical and infra-red sensors and laser-based ‘hard-kill’ solutions to ensure their survivability, mobility, lethality, situational awareness and kinetic operation capacities;

Removed3. Recognises the challenge posed by the high cost of drone interceptions and calls for joint programmes to promote the development of cost-effective C-UAS capabilities such as EW, laser, and AI-guided interception to lower the per-intercept cost;

Added2. Underlines the need to ensure technological adaptability, regular modernisation and upgrade cycles to prevent obsolescence, and to promote continuous integration of innovative systems across all operational domains, including land, air, sea and underwater;

Removed4. Encourages armed forces to integrate and align drones into all combat doctrines as a layer in operational planning;

Added3. Stresses that the development and deployment of such technologies necessitates investment in research and development (R&D), the facilitation of civil-military research partnerships, and support for start-ups and SMEs working in the high-tech defence industrial sector;

Removed5. Encourages the Member States and Ukraine to jointly train and certify drone pilots with standards equivalent to artillery or unmanned aerial vehicle operators, invest in counter-drone systems – hard-kill and soft-kill alike – at all echelons, reassess armour survivability, ensure tanks and armoured personnel carriers are modified for counter unmanned aerial vehicles expand EW units to ensure all battalions have jamming capabilities and establish drone defence zones around critical infrastructure;

Added4. Calls on Member States and the Commission to integrate multirole and transport aircraft (such as A400M and AEW&C platforms) as airborne command, control and communications (C3) relay, battle management and drone-carrier nodes to sustain connectivity and operational reach; encourages cooperation between the European Defence Agency (EDA) and European industry to develop interoperable, open-architecture C3 ecosystems linking high-altitude and tactical unmanned assets;

Removed6. Underlines the growing use of drones in hybrid and terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure; recalls Operation ‘Spider web’, the 2023 sabotage attempt on Moldova’s energy grid, and repeated Houthi drone strikes disrupting Red Sea shipping; stresses that such cases illustrate how low-cost systems enable disruption; urges the Member States to integrate drone-specific response protocols into national resilience plans;

Added5. Stresses the need for a robust, sovereign military airlift chain to transport, deploy and support modular drone systems, ensuring rapid force projection, resilient logistics, and full European control over data, networks and mission autonomy;

Removed7. Recommends the development of comprehensive national civil defence strategies against drone attacks, ensuring preparedness at the national, regional, municipal, community, and household levels that emphasises early warning systems for local populations, clear instructions regarding response behaviour, and protected spaces (sheltering) for the population and infrastructures;

Added6. Encourages Member States to assess the long-term implications of this shift for force structure and training, and ethical standards in warfare;

AddedFront-line challenges and equipment needs

Added7. Recognises the challenge of drone recognition faced by front-line soldiers and recommends the integration of anti-drone rifles, missiles, interceptor drones, drone catchers, gun-based close-in weapon systems, anti-drone jamming rifles and signal intelligence, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and resilient C2 into infantry forces via training and attachment of EW units so infantry forces can operate effectively on the front line, maximising their protection and repair capability, and ensuring the correct identification and interception of enemy drones;

Added8. Warns that the absence of unit-level UAS creates a time-critical capability gap in the initial phase of combat that adversaries could exploit, leading to higher casualties and reduced operational freedom, and calls for urgent measures to close this gap through training and doctrinal adaptation;

AddedNeed for low-cost C-UAS capabilities

Added9. Stresses the challenge posed by the current unsustainably high cost of drone interceptions and calls for joint programmes and market-driven initiatives to promote the development of cost-effective C-UAS capabilities such as EW, laser, acoustic detection systems and AI-guided interception to lower the per-intercept cost and calls on the Commission to study the feasibility of using current defence industrial tools to support the goal of lowering the per-intercept cost of drones;

Added10. Calls for the enhanced production and technological development of existing anti-aircraft systems, following the example of Ukraine, where they have so far proven to be the most effective, mobile and cost-efficient counter-UAS measure;

Added11. Calls for emphasis on the development of simple, low-cost counter-UAS systems that can be rapidly produced and deployed to ensure immediate operational readiness;

AddedAdapting combat doctrine to drones

Added12. Encourages armed forces to integrate and align drones in all combat doctrines as a layer in operational planning with a focus on hybrid warfare scenarios, ensuring interoperability with NATO C2 systems, civil air traffic management systems, and the EU’s U-Space framework for drone integration;

Added13. Calls for updating capability targets and planning between Member State armed forces to ensure the lessons learned in Ukraine are integrated into combat doctrine;

Added14. Stresses that anti-drone capabilities must be integrated not only within infantry units but also across all major military platforms, including naval vessels, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and logistics vehicles; calls on the Member States and the EDA to ensure that future procurement and modernisation programmes systematically include C-UAS modules adapted to the operational environment of each platform; underlines that such integration will enhance force protection, improve survivability of high-value assets, and strengthen interoperability between land, air and maritime domains;

Added15. Recommends that all drone corridors and supporting infrastructure co-financed by the EU include built-in cyber-resilience and redundancy layers, in line with the recommendation of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) to strengthen Pillar III (‘Resilience and Preparedness’) of the Military Mobility Action Plan 2.0;

Added16. Calls for sustained funding within EU instruments and national programmes to retrofit existing fleets and ensure permanent readiness through training and maintenance cycles;

Added17. Encourages the establishment of mobile drone maintenance and data-link relay stations along upgraded military mobility corridors to ensure sustained C2 and repair capabilities even in degraded communication environments;

Added18. Recommends the integration of aerial surveillance drones into existing European transport infrastructure monitoring systems (for bridges, tunnels and airfields), enhancing both civil protection and the rapid defence response; calls for prioritisation of dual use funding models for drone systems that align with competitiveness targets;

Added19. Urges the Commission and the Member States to swiftly implement a phased plan for interoperable UAS units, with clear milestones, deliverables and accountability and recommends that all drone corridors and supporting infrastructure co-financed by the EU include built-in cyber-resilience and redundancy layers;

Added20. Calls for the establishment of pilot corridors under the EU Drone Defence Initiative, focusing on the protection of port and energy infrastructure, which would serve to validate C-UAS operational playbooks and to provide small and medium-sized enterprises with real-world deployment opportunities;

Added21. Recognises that the rules of engagement for drones are unclear and encourages Member States in coordination with NATO, to review the rules of engagement for all types of drone-related threats to ensure they are adequate to respond to the most innovative threats;

AddedTraining and certifying drone pilots

Added22. Encourages the Member States and Ukraine to jointly train and certify drone pilots with standards equivalent to artillery or unmanned aerial vehicle operators, invest in counter-drone systems – hard-kill and soft-kill alike – at all echelons, reassess armour survivability, ensure tanks and armoured personnel carriers are modified to counter unmanned aerial vehicles; expand EW units to ensure all battalions have hardening of jamming capabilities and establish drone defence zones around critical infrastructure;

Added23. Stresses the need for iterative development and testing of drone systems to ensure their adaptability and responsiveness to emerging threats, given the rapid pace of technological advancements in this field; underlines the importance of software-defined systems that can be quickly modified and updated to address the evolving needs of the battlefield, thereby enabling armed forces to stay ahead of potential adversaries and maintain a competitive edge in this domain;

AddedGrowing threat of mass deep strike drone swarms

Added24. Underlines the growing use of drones in hybrid and terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and the asymmetric advantages such attacks can generate;

Added25. Recalls the incursions by drones of unknown origin disrupting critical infrastructure in Denmark, Norway, Germany and Belgium, including international airports and military bases and Operation ‘Spider web’, the 2023 sabotage attempt on Moldova’s energy grid, and repeated Houthi drone strikes disrupting Red Sea shipping; stresses that such cases illustrate how low-cost systems enable disruption; urges the Member States to integrate drone-specific response protocols into national resilience plans;

Added26. Strongly condemns the recent series of Russian drone incursions and suspected hostile overflights in several EU Member States, including Poland, Romania and the Baltic States, targeting border areas, energy facilities and logistics hubs;

Added27. Warns that these incidents demonstrate the increasing capability of state and non-state actors to employ low-cost unmanned systems to threaten public safety, disrupt supply chains and test EU and NATO defensive readiness;

Added28. Stresses that such cases illustrate how low-cost systems enable disruption;

Added29. Highlights that drones may pose not only military but also broader public safety risks, including their potential misuse in contexts affecting public health, environmental protection and civil infrastructure; urges the Member States and the Commission to integrate these aspects into national and EU-level risk assessments and preparedness strategies and to include drone-specific response protocols in national resilience plans;

Added30. Recognises that ‘Operation Spider Web’, ‘Operation Rising Lion’ and the use of the Russian shadow fleet have demonstrated the capacity for deep strike capability from within an adversarial state against strategic assets and encourages the civil defence planners of Member States to protect against such scenarios in emergency planning doctrine;

Added31. Recognises that drones have reshaped the strategic and operational environment of modern warfare, from tactical reconnaissance and battlefield targeting to strategic deep strikes and cyber-enabled operations, and that they introduce asymmetries that can both strengthen and destabilise EU defence postures;

Added32. Highlights the risk of ‘grey-zone’ saturation attacks on EU infrastructure.

Added33. Emphasises the need to protect Europe’s energy networks, roads, railways, transport hubs and digital infrastructure as priority targets of hybrid warfare and the necessary synergy between military, law enforcement, first responders, border control and civil society for effective implementation of emergency planning doctrine; recommends the establishment of a platform for sharing best practices among authorities managing strategic infrastructure;

Added34. Stresses the urgent need for enhanced maritime surveillance in the Baltic, North and Black Sea region where Russian drone activities pose particular threats; stresses the importance of addressing the Russian shadow fleet given the suspicions of its involvement in drone incursions into European airspace; believes that the new operational dimension of hybrid warfare requires the integration of maritime security and counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strategies; welcomes the launch of NATO-led operations, such as Baltic Sentry;

AddedResilience and protective spaces

Added35. Recommends the development of comprehensive national civil defence strategies to counter drone attacks, ensuring preparedness at the national, regional, municipal, community and household levels emphasising early warning systems for local populations, clear instructions on how to respond, and protected spaces (sheltering) for the population and infrastructure;

Added36. Underlines the need for common guidelines on how to shape national C-UAS strategies, in full respect of the sovereignty of the Member States and according to the specificities of the theatres in which these C-UAS strategies need to operate;

Added37. Calls for the regular update of the existing Joint Research Centre Handbooks on ‘Protection against Unmanned Aircraft Systems’ in order to ensure that counter measures against this constantly evolving threat remain efficient in terms of technology, doctrines and practice;

Added38. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the protection of critical EU infrastructures and entities against possible drone attacks, in line with Directive (EU) 2022/2557;

Added39. Encourages the Member States to conduct a comprehensive audit and assessment of existing shelter infrastructure and supports the creation of permanent no-fly and counter-UAS zones around critical EU infrastructure, coordinated by national authorities and Frontex, and supported by shared C2 platforms; recommends equipping these zones with layered detection and mitigation systems, funded by the Internal Security Fund, the EDF’s counter-UAS envelope, and other relevant EU instruments;

Added40. Stresses the urgent need to deploy a strengthened anti-drone protection plan around critical energy infrastructure and encourages the Member States to explore the potential of involving voluntary national defence actors as part of civil protection and resilience-building efforts; notes that such actors can play a crucial role in enhancing local preparedness, awareness and support capacity in hybrid and crisis situations;

Added41. Encourages the Member States to revise national doctrines and operational concepts for emergency management of UAS attacks to include risk analysis and threat mapping, the development of effective sheltering standards and protection of strategic infrastructure, training for emergency services, local authorities, and communities, technological integration, including C4I systems and AI-driven threat analysis, and the establishment of a national emergency management centre (NEMC) that establishes and implements multi-year training programmes;

Added42. Further recommends making stronger use of the voluntary national defence resources of EU Member States as part of civil protection frameworks, particularly to enhance local community preparedness and crisis management capabilities, and considers it essential for Member States to ensure effective early warning systems and clear communication protocols to maintain public trust, reduce panic and ensure compliance during emergencies; recommends that these strategies include provisions for psychological and social support services for affected populations and civil defence training for local communities to enhance overall resilience;

Added43. Calls for EU-funded programmes to foster collaboration between the defence, space, civil protection and transport sectors to accelerate the development of interoperable, multi-domain unmanned and counter-unmanned systems; considers that funding for research in the field of drones should also contribute to improving the civilian uses of drones, for instance in fighting forest fires or in search and rescue operations; encourages facilitating exchanges between the civilian and defence sectors, leading to suitable dual-use research, in line with the Commission’s Drone Strategy 2.0;

Added44. Stresses the importance of comprehensive public information campaigns and educational initiatives to raise societal awareness of drone security, complemented by enhanced measures to monitor and counter disinformation activities in the domain of unmanned systems, particularly those aimed at exerting psychological influence on civilian populations;

Added45. Considers the need for a comprehensive civil defence strategy as paramount; recommends that it include the following:

Addeda. defining the methodology for assessing threats and needs;

Addedb. designing and implementing an operational concept that ensures clear decision-making, inter-agency coordination, and real-time information flow at all levels;

Addedc. preparedness and early warning that establishes mechanisms for early preparedness, timely alerts, and clear instructions to the population;

Addedd. first response with clearly defined roles and coordination between first responders, medical services, civil defence, military forces and volunteers, supported by advanced communication systems;