Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Changed– having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency, the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA), and the Key Strategic Activities (KSA) methodology,

Removed– having regard to Articles 42(7) and 222 of the Treaty on European Union,

Added– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (Critical Raw Materials Act),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A[100000/2025]),

Change 1

RemovedA. whereas the mass proliferation of precision strike capability has permanently changed the modern battlefield, EU defence needs and resilience requirements for the Member States;

AddedDrone warfare

RemovedB. whereas procurement and financing of drones must be considered as a service, requiring trained personnel, smart investments, simplified procedures, access to public and private financing, regional manufacturing hubs and strong cooperation with small and medium-sized enterprises, tech firms and academia;

AddedA. whereas the mass proliferation of precision-strike capability has permanently changed the modern battlefield, EU defence needs and resilience requirements for the Member States;

RemovedC. whereas the Member States must work to align doctrines, training facilities, certification procedures, assembly lines, battlefield coordination, real-time targeting, training, resilient C2s and full integration;

AddedB. whereas recent hostile drone incidents and incursions targeting EU Member States, notably on the Union’s Eastern flank, have demonstrated the urgent need to field multilayered defences integrating kinetic and non-kinetic C-UAS to protect critical infrastructure and enhance resilience; whereas drones now serve multiple purposes including reconnaissance, decoy operations, target acquisition and precision strikes, while their widespread, war-proven use in Ukraine and other active theatres has reshaped air-defence requirements and operational doctrines;

RemovedD. whereas strategic partnerships are essential to achieving the mass and qualitative edge required to reach operational thresholds and access to expertise and raw materials;

AddedC. whereas they have become a defining feature of modern warfare and hybrid conflicts, acting as force-multipliers that deliver real-time intelligence and accelerate decision-making; whereas related unmanned domains (UGS, USV and UUV) are expanding and must be reflected in future defence planning; whereas Europe must adapt its air- and joint-operations concepts and ensure that all military use of drones fully complies with international law, including human rights law;

RemovedE. whereas the Member States must utilise various new EU defence spending initiatives to devise cost-effective solutions to drone warfare;

AddedD. whereas adversaries’ rapid development of drone manufacturing capacity, supported by external partners, together with the dominance of certain third-country suppliers of key components such as sensors, batteries, semiconductors and rare-earth materials, heightens strategic dependencies and underlines the urgency of strengthening Europe’s dual-use innovation base and secure supply chains; whereas Russia continues to scale up drone output, producing several million annually, outproducing the United States and Europe combined, with the emergence of Russian-developed loitering munitions and prototypes of heavier systems; whereas Russia’s drone industry’s capabilities are being supported by Iran and China and have led to a mass proliferation of increasingly lethal and sophisticated drones with precision strike capability;

AddedImpact the continuously evolving nature of drone warfare is having on Member State armed forces and on the European Union’s security and defence framework

AddedE. whereas drones have become a defining feature of modern warfare, exemplified in Ukraine where they have inflicted more casualties than any other weapon; whereas their use has now spread to multiple conflicts worldwide, including those in Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Myanmar, and Azerbaijan’s war against Armenia, as well as in attacks on international vessels in the Red Sea;

AddedF. whereas the European drone ecosystem is composed largely of SMEs and start-ups that drive technological innovation, flexibility, and competitiveness while the strategic deployment of UAS can significantly enhance situational awareness in remote, fragile, or conflict-prone border zones, collect real-time data and significantly aid detection and deterrence against a range of threats;

AddedG. whereas the extensive use of UAS in Ukraine has demonstrated their decisive role not only as reconnaissance and strike tools but also as a means of maintaining defensive lines, medical evacuation and supply delivery, electronic warfare and signals intelligence, communication relay, detection and neutralisation of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), real-time mapping and surveillance, search and rescue operations, protection of convoys, loitering munitions and precision strikes, decoy and deception missions, CBRN monitoring, and the documentation of war crimes; whereas UAS are evolving beyond support tools into core combat enablers, capable of functioning under intensive ‘barrage jamming’; whereas marine drones have created a new paradigm for maritime security, spanning mine detection to attacks on military targets, as demonstrated in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, and they will pose a new challenge to the security of the European Union in large naval theatres such as the Mediterranean Sea;

AddedH. whereas the integration of space-based assets into drone-collected imagery can provide continuous, cross-validated and secure situational awareness for early warning, crisis management, and hybrid threat detection, monitoring terrorist movements, trafficking routes and border areas;

AddedSupply chain vulnerabilities

AddedI. whereas 60 % of the components of drones originate in the United States and China, creating a critical vulnerability for the EU’s Defence Readiness 2030; whereas Chinese companies manufacture most of the components needed to assemble drones, such as semiconductors, power transistors, magnets, batteries and navigation chips; whereas strategic cooperation should also address emerging technological competition from Russia and China and safeguard European access to innovation and materials required for sustainable drone and counter-drone capabilities;

AddedJ. whereas China has emerged as a leader in the field of drones, producing a wide range of combat and reconnaissance systems, while also investing in naval drones and swarms of autonomous mini-drones; whereas its armed drones have been exported on a large scale and employed by third countries in various theatres;

AddedK. whereas the Chinese company DJI commands an estimated 74 % share of the commercial drone market, and Chinese companies manufacture most of the components needed to assemble them, such as semiconductors, power transistors, magnets, batteries and navigation chips; whereas 9 out of 10 sensors or optical systems needed to identify and strike targets are made in China; whereas Beijing controls 85 % of global lithium battery capacity and 98 % of rare earth refining, the backbone of both consumer electronics and modern weapons, resulting in Europe’s dependency on China’s supply; whereas China has started restricting exports of drone components and materials for Ukraine and Western buyers; whereas China, by effectively controlling access to the necessary materials – ranging from raw materials to batteries and software – and increasing its deliveries to Russia, decisively impacts the nature of drone warfare;

AddedL. whereas on 9 October 2025 China introduced sweeping export controls on rare-earth elements and related processing technologies, citing national security concerns;

AddedM. whereas these new rules cover virtually all rare-earth elements essential to drone manufacture and anti-drone capabilities and require Chinese suppliers to obtain export licences from the Ministry of Commerce, effectively subjecting the entire EU drone industry to Chinese export approval, demonstrating the strategic imperative of building a resilient and autonomous downstream supply chain for the drone industry;

AddedN. whereas the new Chinese export restrictions announced and partially implemented on 9 October 2025 require export licences for products containing even trace amounts (above 0.1 %) of rare earth metals mined or processed in China, with Beijing explicitly stating that licences will not be granted to foreign defence sector entities;

AddedO. whereas the EU must urgently develop alternative sources, recycling capacity and sovereign extraction of critical raw materials to reduce the vulnerabilities created by Chinese export restrictions and global supply-chain concentration;

AddedProcurement and financing

AddedP. whereas the production, procurement and financing of drones and C-UAS capabilities can be considered a service, requiring qualified personnel, smart investments, simplified procedures, access to public and private financing, regional production centres and close cooperation with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), technology companies and academia;

AddedAlign doctrine

AddedQ. whereas the Member States must work to align doctrines, training facilities, certification procedures, assembly lines, battlefield coordination, real-time targeting, training, resilient C2 and full integration of all of the above;

AddedR. whereas this alignment should also include relevant laws and regulations on drone use and production, ensure full compatibility with NATO doctrines and STANAG standards; and promote joint training with Ukraine to accelerate operational readiness;

AddedS. whereas the EU and its Member States should aim to take the lead in the drone domain by deepening cooperation on training, certification, industrial assembly and operational coordination, while fully respecting national sovereignty as reaffirmed in Articles 4(2) and 42(2) TEU;

AddedStrategic partnerships

AddedT. whereas strategic partnerships are essential to achieving the mass and qualitative edge required to reach operational thresholds and access to expertise and raw materials; U. whereas such partnerships must reinforce European security and defence capabilities, remain reciprocal, transparent and consistent while avoiding critical dependencies on third countries in defence technologies, components, software and raw materials;

AddedV. whereas cooperation with key partners such as Ukraine is of particular importance, given its unparalleled battlefield experience, rapid innovation and adaptation cycles, integration of civilian and military innovation ecosystems and large-scale drone-production capacity, which provide unique insights for strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB);

AddedW. whereas sharing lessons learned with partners experienced in C-UAS developing advanced drone-defence systems, are critical for Europe’s resilience;

AddedX. whereas partnerships in the Western Balkans and in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood are also essential for regional stability and resilience;

AddedY. whereas the Western Balkans, which share over 2 500 km of land borders with the European Union and form its closest neighbouring region, are of direct strategic importance for the Union’s security, stability and prosperity;

AddedDrone wars throughout the periphery

AddedZ. whereas the EU’s immediate neighbourhood sees multiple drone intensive conflicts, with multiple Member States facing hostile drone incursions into their airspace; whereas the reflection on drones must take into account the protection of all European flanks;

AddedAA. whereas regions bordering Member States, whether by land or sea, play a crucial role in the development and testing of drones and defence technologies, given the specific requirements arising from their geography and geopolitical position within the European security landscape; recognises that the Western Balkans, Mediterranean and Black Sea regions are all exposed to malign foreign influence, hybrid threats, disinformation and political interference seeking to undermine European security; whereas these regions are vulnerable to hostile drone activity and that partners in these regions are essential as a first line of defence in safeguarding collective security;

AddedAB. whereas drone technology is being used by terrorist organisations to carry out attacks on political figures, penetrate EU penitentiary facilities, and to transport explosives and weapons;

AddedAC. whereas naval drones represent a significant threat for both commercial and military vessels, and important trade routes, making the development of defence capabilities a necessity;

AddedAD. whereas Ukraine produces over 4.5 million drones annually while under daily attack from increasingly sophisticated Russian drone swarms and has demonstrated, since the brutal aggression by Russia launched in February 2022, that the drone industry can be rapidly upgraded and modernised, thereby democratising access to key technologies and enabling effective self-defence;

AddedScaling to meet the Russian threat

AddedAE. whereas Ukraine’s battlefield innovation and growing production capacity should be progressively integrated into the EDTIB;

AddedAF. whereas Russia and China lead the mass development and proliferation of drone technology, operating on a three-to-six-month innovation cycle;

AddedAG. whereas European states’ dependence on third countries in this sector is an unacceptable strategic vulnerability; whereas it is therefore essential that all European defence spending acts as a lever towards making European states fully autonomous in defence matters;

AddedCost-effective solutions

AddedAH. whereas the Member States must utilise various new EU defence spending initiatives and instruments to devise cost-effective solutions to drone warfare; whereas these solutions should prioritise industrial resilience in Europe, reduce our dependencies on third countries, support SMEs in the defence sector, and ensure that investments translate into concrete capabilities that are rapidly deployable to support Ukraine and the EU’s defence;

AddedAI. whereas UAS are inherently dual-use, having brought a major transformation to mobility, logistics and emergency management while the effectiveness of drone deployment and counter-drone operations relies on resilient cross-border infrastructure enabling rapid transport of mobile launch systems, command vehicles, and maintenance units; whereas there is a need for harmonised transportation infrastructure standards allowing drones used for logistics, surveillance and intelligence to operate safely in shared airspace and transport corridors;

AddedDual use for resilience

AddedAJ. whereas the dual-use potential of drones for civil protection, disaster response, and border management is of growing importance across the EU, where ongoing security and migration crises, as well as hybrid threats, highlight the urgent need for situational awareness and rapid-response capabilities; whereas many critical drone technologies for defence originate in the civilian domain and use critical components of a dual-use nature, and the drone sector as a whole can make an important contribution to Europe’s operational capabilities;

AddedAK. whereas the development of drones and counter-drone systems should be accompanied by robust safeguards for civilian protection, social resilience, and the responsible dual-use of technology, ensuring that investments in defence also strengthen health, humanitarian logistics and civil protection capacities; whereas there is strategic value in cross-domain and dual-use innovation, particularly in integrating aerial, maritime and land-based unmanned systems with civilian technologies;

Drone warfare in the modern battlefield

Change 2

Removed1. Recognises that for armed forces to operate in the modern battlefield, soldiers must create real-time ‘drone walls’ that integrate radar, acoustic sensors and laser-based ‘hard-kill’ solutions to sustain their survivability, mobility, lethality and situational awareness;

AddedAdapting operations to drone warfare

Removed2. Recognises the challenge of drone recognition faced by frontline soldiers and recommends the integration of anti-drone rifles, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and resilient C2s into infantry forces via training and attachment of EW units so infantry forces can effectively operate on the frontline, maximising their protection and repair capability, and ensuring the correct identification and interception of enemy drones;