Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Added124. Calls on the Commission to clarify what constitutes a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the principles of the rule of law and the EU’s financial interest, as well as to establish clear, objective and predictable criteria for assessing the effectiveness of budgetary and remedial measures, as requested by the European Court of Auditors; invites the Commission to indicate in its rule of law report whether serious risks or violations identified in the Member States warrant the application of the Conditionality Regulation and to translate country-specific recommendations addressing the most persistent violations in the Member States into concrete milestones to be acted upon by the Member States and, where appropriate, to serve as evidence to justify the activation of the Conditionality Regulation;

Added125. Urges the Commission and the Council to act expeditiously and in full transparency where a link is established between breaches of the principles of the rule of law, or serious risks thereof, and risks to the EU budget, and where the Member State concerned fails to address the situation effectively, sustainably and in a timely manner;

Added126. Urges the Commission to take further action under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in the case of Hungary as regards other breaches of the rule of law, such as those related to the judiciary; highlights that the weakening of the judicial system and of the independence and impartiality of public administration and undue supplier concentration in procurement procedures represent systemic rule of law risks that threaten sound financial management; stresses that violations of rules, manipulation of, or undue favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients or beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds as well as procurement, audit bodies, anti-corruption safeguards or control systems constitute direct risks to the EU budget and require consistent and stringent application of conditionality;

Added127. Recalls that the final recipients or beneficiaries of EU funding which are not government entities should not suffer negative consequences as a result of problems caused by the national authorities in cases where budgetary measures are taken; reiterates its call on the Commission to ensure that the final recipients or beneficiaries of EU funds are not deprived of these funds, as set out in the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; recalls the obligation of the Member States subject to measures under the Conditionality Regulation to continue honouring all commitments towards final recipients or beneficiaries; calls on the Commission to explore ways to ensure that EU funds reach local governments and civil society organisations if the government concerned does not cooperate regarding the deficiencies; indicates that a possible solution is to make available the appropriations corresponding to decommitments under conditionality regimes for use under other EU instruments or programmes implemented under direct or indirect management, in particular those contributing to supporting democracy, civil society, the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU or the fight against corruption; underlines that such reallocation must fully respect the principles of sound financial management and equal treatment;

Added128. Highlights that verifiable adherence by Member States to both the rule of law and the Charter must be regarded as an essential precondition to receiving any EU funds; underlines that full compliance with these conditionalities must precede the approval of all EU-funded programmes and projects submitted by public authorities; calls on the Commission to ensure that any decision to suspend, reduce or block all or part of payments is based on clearly defined, transparent and predictable assessment moments during the implementation of EU funds, in accordance with the principle of proportionality and taking into account the nature, duration, gravity and scope of the infringement identified; stresses that continuous monitoring must be complemented by at least regular and formally established periodic reviews, including an annual compliance assessment explicitly linked to the findings of the Commission’s rule of law reports, in order to guarantee legal certainty, accountability and effective responsibility for corrective action;

Added129. Welcomes the suggestion in the Commission’s proposal for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework to make nearly half of funds conditional upon compliance with the rule of law and the Charter before their approval, as it strengthens the EU’s capacity to ensure that EU funding supports policies grounded in fundamental rights and democratic principles; notes that the proposal maintains and introduces horizontal conditions on respecting the principles of the rule of law and the Charter across relevant programmes; believes that such an approach to conditionality may address concerns regarding the protection of final recipients or beneficiaries, in particular by allowing funds to be made available again under direct or indirect management, in particular the instruments and programmes that contribute to supporting democracy, civil society, the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU or the fight against corruption primarily in the Member State where the violations occurred; notes with concern the potential overlaps between the newly proposed conditionality in the upcoming multiannual financial framework and the existing Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; believes, however, that the horizontal conditions should cover all values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and that the decision-making procedure should be identical, culminating in the Commission’s decisions; calls for a unified, coherent and comprehensive framework across all EU programmes, and requests that the Commission ensure clear, objective and transparent criteria for the application of rule-of-law conditionality, as well as effective coordination between the different instruments;

Added130. Requests that funds suspended or frozen due to breaches of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU must not be made available again to the Member State authorities concerned;

Added131. Notes that the proposed National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRP Plans) would consolidate major EU funds into a single strategic framework per Member State and make disbursements increasingly performance-based; further calls on the Commission to provide clear, transparent and verifiable criteria for assessing the existence and effectiveness of the ‘adequate mechanisms’ required for the approval of national and regional plans, as a prerequisite for their effective application, with a view to ensuring legal certainty and compliance with the rule of law and the Charter when implementing EU funds;

Added132. Stresses that the effective protection of the EU budget also depends on robust financial management and control systems; calls on the Commission to take into account assessments from relevant EU bodies, offices and agencies, and national audit authorities in its annual rule of law reports, in order to assess rule of law-related risks to EU funds; underlines that systemic deficiencies identified by these oversight bodies should be duly reflected in the Commission’s use of budget-protection tools;

The rule of law and the single market dimension

Change 16

Changed33.133. AcknowledgesWelcomes the fact that a single market dimension has been included in the rule of law reportreport, toas addressit ruleunderlines ofthe lawlink issuesbetween affectingrule-of-law standards and the overall health of the EU’s economic environment,environment; companiesemphasises andthat this approach helps identify structural obstacles affecting companies, workers, and cross-border economic activity, contributing to a predictable, transparent and fair market environment, with the aim of ensuring that rights are defended, corruption is punished, and contracts are enforced; notes that legal uncertainty, arbitrary administrative decision-making and inconsistent judicial protection undermine economic predictability and affect the ability of economic actors to operate within the internal market, as highlighted by the relevant stakeholders consulted for the 2025 Rule of Law Report; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and adequateeffective checks and balances all have an economic impactare andindispensable influencefor the smooth functioning of the single market; proposesunderlines that inlegal itscertainty, assessmentfair theand Commissiontransparent engagesprocurement evenrules, moreeffective withanti-corruption stakeholdersmeasures, media freedom, balanced democratic powers and civilstrong societylabour organisations,and includingsocial tradeprotections unions;are key drivers of sustainable competitiveness, social cohesion and a well-functioning single market;

Change 17

Removed34. Believes that integrating the single market dimension should complement rather than overshadow fundamental areas such as civic space, compliance with fundamental rights and media freedom, which should be recognised as key pillars in the report;

Added134. Proposes that the Commission continues to foster the single market dimension, as it is essential to ensure both a well-functioning single market and a resilient democratic system, and to deepen engagement with stakeholders and civil society organisations, including trade unions, judicial associations, journalists’ organisations, bar associations and other professional groups whose expertise is essential for the early identification of systemic rule-of-law risks in future assessments; emphasises that the Commission should undertake targeted efforts to raise awareness of the rule of law reports and encourage contributions from these actors in all Member States;

Added135. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition that respect for the rule of law is a prerequisite for a stable and trustworthy investment environment; underlines that predictable legal frameworks, impartial courts and effective enforcement mechanisms enhance investor confidence and contribute to sustainable economic growth across the single market;

Added136. Is concerned about the shortcomings identified in several Member States, including as regards equality and fairness in public procurement and direct awards; calls on the Commission to ensure that deficiencies identified under this dimension are adequately reflected in concrete and targeted recommendations in its rule of law report;

Added137. Calls on the Commission, when it assesses the single market dimension in the rule of law report, and on the Member States, to tackle structural distortions in public procurement and in the use of EU and national funds; underlines that consistent enforcement of EU competition, State aid and public procurement rules, together with support for more diversified local economies and fair access to funding, is necessary to create a virtuous circle in which open and competitive markets underpin the rule of law;

Added138. Highlights the need to strengthen the Commission’s use of data-driven analysis when assessing the impact of rule-of-law conditions on the single market; notes that robust and comparable indicators on judicial efficiency, corruption risks, administrative performance and regulatory stability are essential for identifying structural weaknesses that hinder economic activity; encourages the Commission to further develop evidence-based methodologies and expand the availability of high-quality datasets to enhance the analytical depth and policy relevance of future rule of law reports;

Added139. Calls on the Commission to identify, in its country chapters, those Member States where judicial delays, weak enforcement of contracts, or systemic corruption create effective non-tariff barriers for companies from other Member States, and to benchmark progress against established performance indicators; stresses that such identification must be based on transparent data and methodologies and should explicitly link rule-of-law shortcomings to lost investment, higher transaction costs and reduced participation of small and medium-size enterprises in the single market;

Added140. Believes that the single market dimension underpins the Commission’s rule of law report, while the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism and media freedom, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances, are recognised as key pillars in the report; highlights, in this context, the importance of addressing the impact of economic inequality and social exclusion on democratic participation and the functioning of the rule of law;

Rule of law at the core of the enlargement process and the EU’s external action

Change 18

Changed35.141. Reiterates that the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU must be fully and unequivocally respected not only by current Member States but also by futurecandidate EUand memberspotential duringcandidate countries throughout the entire accession process;process, encouragesand on a closecontinuous evaluationbasis thereafter; stresses that the EU’s credibility and legitimacy in the enlargement process depends on ensuring that both the EU Member States and the candidate and potential candidate countries are held to the same high standards of democracy, human rights and the rule of lawlaw, and underlines that such credibility, legitimacy and trust in allthe countriesEU’s commitments can be harmed by double standards in anthese accessionareas; process;stresses encouragesthat the Commissionaccession tophase provideis concretea recommendationsdecisive and non-negotiable moment in which to accessionestablish countriessolid, onirreversible and sustainable foundations for the stateprotection of the rule of law, fundamental rights and todemocratic ensurestandards, alignmentwhich withconstitute the enlargementcore report;fundamentals for EU accession; notes that significant issues persist regarding the monitoring of the fundamental rights of national minorities in candidate countries;

Change 19

Added142. Calls for a rigorous, continuous and in-depth evaluation of the rule-of-law in all countries undergoing an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide clear, concrete and measurable recommendations addressing rule of law shortcomings and progress, and insists on full consistency, complementarity and mutual reinforcement of the rule of law report and the Enlargement Report in order to avoid divergent assessments and ensure a coherent and credible enlargement policy;

Added143. Welcomes the fact that the rule of law report includes specific chapters on Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; calls on the Commission to extend the geographical scope of future reports to cover all candidate and potential candidate countries and provide concrete, measurable recommendations to support reforms and ensure that high standards are upheld after accession;

Added144. Calls for the EU and its Member States to provide robust support to candidate and potential candidate countries for advancing reforms in democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

Added145. Stresses that the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU must also be respected when EU funds are allocated to non-EU countries participating in EU programmes and throughout any follow-up monitoring of fund use; recalls that safeguarding these values is essential to ensure coherent and sound financial management of all EU spending, both within the EU and in collaborations with non-EU countries;

Added146. Calls for the rule of law principle to be applied consistently across all EU spending, including external action in general, and pre-accession assistance for candidate and potential candidate countries in particular, under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; stresses that such spending must be transparent, evidence- and performance-based and accompanied by effective monitoring and judicial safeguards, in line with the EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; calls for disbursements under IPA III to be tied to concrete results, and for funding to be reallocated, suspended or reduced in cases of persistent backsliding on judicial independence, anti-corruption efforts and fundamental rights;

Added147. Stresses the importance of maintaining a rules-based international order to uphold the universal values on which the EU is founded; warns that growing threats to multilateral institutions, including attempts to delegitimise the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the broader disregard for international law pose a serious threat to the rules-based global order; deplores the unprecedented threats faced by the ICC, including sanctions imposed on its judges and other officials; calls for the activation of the EU Blocking Statute to shield the ICC and those cooperating with and supporting the ICC, including civil society organisations and human rights defenders; calls for the EU and its Member States, and candidate and potential candidate countries, to continue supporting the ICC and to use all available instruments to strengthen the fight against impunity worldwide;

Added148. Reiterates the EU’s strong support for the ICJ and the ICC as essential independent and impartial institutions; recalls that full compliance with ICC decisions, including the execution of arrest warrants, is an obligation on EU Member States; calls on the Commission to indicate cases of non-execution of ICC arrest warrants in its rule of law reports; urges Member States to fully comply with rulings of international courts and to apply universal jurisdiction to combat impunity; calls on the EU to encourage non-EU countries, including major partners and candidate and potential candidate countries, to become parties to the Rome Statute;

Improving the Commission’s reporting process

Change 20

Removed36. Calls on the Commission to be more transparent about the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities, and other stakeholders in the reporting process; notes that the consultation process could be strengthened by ensuring appropriate follow-up with civil society actors on the input they provide, and insists that the reporting process be evidence-based, transparent and non-partisan;

Added149. Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to improve its methodology in the rule of law report; calls on the Commission, in future editions, to define and publish clear and operational benchmarks and indicators under each pillar, and to apply them consistently and transparently across all Member States, in a way that allows for meaningful comparison and provides clarity about the standards being applied;

Removed37. Stresses that Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG) has sent several ad hoc delegations to some Member States in recent years, and that the state of the rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights has been assessed as exhibiting greater deficiencies than those highlighted in the Commission’s reports; believes that the DRFMG monitoring exercise should be duly considered within the framework of the consultation procedure and in the subsequent drafting of the report;

Added150. Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s resolutions, including recommendations, addressed to the Commission and the Council in the context of rule of law reporting have not been fully taken into account; calls on the Commission and the Council to address these recommendations;

Removed38. Reiterates the need for an independent monitoring body, composed of independent legal, academic and human rights experts, to be involved in the drafting of the report; calls on the Commission to enhance cooperation with EU and international bodies;

Added151. Calls on the Commission to be more transparent about the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities, and other stakeholders in the reporting process; stresses the importance of ensuring consistency and clarity in how this information is assessed and reflected in the final country chapters; notes that, within the limits of the resources available, appropriate feedback and follow-up should be provided to all contributors regarding the use of their input, and insists that the reporting process be evidence-based, transparent and non-partisan;

Removed39. Believes that the Commission should be clearer in identifying and articulating the trajectory each Member State is on, including early warning signs and the identification of serious and systemic issues, and stresses that the Commission should ensure coherence between the issues identified and the recommendations issued;

Added152. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the methodology for selecting issues in the rule of law report is transparent by clearly defining key criteria, including what constitutes a ‘significant development’, and ensuring that newly emerging challenges are systematically considered; encourages the Commission to use clearer language when assessing compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

Removed40. Calls on the Commission to issue recommendations that are more operational, distinguishing those relating to serious and systemic issues, and setting out concrete measures, timelines and benchmarks for their implementation by the Member States;

Added153. Calls on the Commission, in the process of drafting the rule of law report, to seek stronger collaboration and to carry out prior consultation with Parliament;

Removed41. Asks the Commission to strengthen the follow-up mechanism for non-implemented recommendations by linking them more directly to existing enforcement tools, including infringement proceedings and budget conditionality;

Added154. Stresses that Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG) has conducted several ad hoc delegations in recent years, and that, in several cases, the state of the rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights has been assessed as exhibiting greater deficiencies than those highlighted in the Commission’s reports; believes that the DRFMG monitoring exercise should be duly considered within the framework of the consultation procedure and in the subsequent drafting of the report; calls for a stronger and more structured interinstitutional relationship between Parliament and the Commission, including through regular exchanges, transparent feedback mechanisms and timely integration of parliamentary assessments;

Added155. Reiterates the need for a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU;

Added156. Believes that the Commission should be clearer in identifying and articulating the trajectory each Member State and candidate country is on, including early warning signs and the identification of serious and systemic issues, and stresses that the Commission should ensure coherence between the issues identified and the recommendations issued as well as greater clarity and transparency on how these assessments are reached; calls on the Commission to clarify that systemic, deliberate and grave breaches of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU over a sustained period undermine the structural conditions of membership in a Union founded on the rule of law; stresses that, in such circumstances, Member States risk failing to fulfil the commitments inherent in their status under the Treaties; recalls that the institutions are required to activate the mechanisms provided for by the Treaties;

Added157. Underlines that it is key not to limit the assessment to previously identified shortcomings, but to systematically update the analysis to reflect new developments, emerging risks and evolving forms of backsliding; emphasises that this is precisely where greater methodological precision and clarity are essential, in order to ensure that the recommendations remain relevant, responsive and aligned with the actual trajectory of the rule of law in each Member State;

Added158. Calls on the Commission to issue recommendations that are more operational, clearly distinguishing those relating to serious and systemic issues and those relating to less significant issues, in order to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law and setting out concrete measures, timelines and benchmarks for their implementation by the Member States and candidate countries; emphasises that recommendations should not refer to all Member States equally, but should be proportionate to the specific rule of law situation in each country; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying solely on legislative changes but also on verifiable evidence of their implementation in practice;

Added159. Calls on the Commission to ensure that all pillars of the rule of law report receive equal attention when issuing recommendations, in order to address persistent and well-documented challenges and safeguard structural aspects that are essential for the proper functioning of democratic systems, including civic space and fundamental rights;

Added160. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the concerns identified in the rule of law report are consistently translated into recommendations; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to ensure that similar issues are treated in the same way across Member States, so that no Member State facing comparable or more serious shortcomings is left without appropriate recommendations;

Added161. Asks the Commission to strengthen the follow-up mechanism for non-implemented recommendations by introducing measurable benchmarks, noting that 93 % of recommendations are repeated from previous years and only 6 % were fully implemented in 2025; calls for the use of all available enforcement tools to be strengthened, where appropriate, including infringement proceedings and budget conditionality, as provided for by the Financial Regulation, Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases, and to trigger actions regarding the non-implementation of the CJEU’s judgments; notes with concern that in the most recent report only two Member States received an additional recommendation compared with the previous reporting cycle, despite the fact that the rule-of-law situation in several Member States warrants urgent action and in others Member States requires recommendations to be implemented urgently;

Added162. Regrets the fact that Hungary has consistently failed to address the Commission’s recommendations, with six recommendations remaining completely unaddressed since 2022;

Added163. Stresses that the policy outlined in the Commission’s 2022 communication on enforcing EU law, which clarifies that infringement proceedings are not intended to serve as mechanisms for individual redress, limits access to effective remedies in situations of persistent or systemic non-compliance by Member States with EU law, including CJEU judgments; calls on the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the instruments available to address breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the Member States; recalls the recent opinion of Advocate General Ćapeta in Case C-769/22 confirming that Article 2 TEU can serve as a separate legal basis for infringement proceedings in cases where the negation of a value is the root cause of other breaches of EU law; underlines that the forthcoming judgment in this case could offer an important opportunity that the Commission should seize to engage in more systematic and robust infringement action, subject to the CJEU’s final determination;

Added164. Stresses that issuing the rule of law report is not enough to reinforce the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, but that the report should lead to concrete action; stresses that the findings of the annual rule of law report should be systematically followed up, where appropriate, through the use of available enforcement instruments, in line with the Commission’s prerogatives; calls for the transparent monitoring of Member States’ compliance with judgments of the CJEU and, where relevant, judgments of the ECtHR, including by taking instances of persistent non-compliance into account in the application of such instruments;

Added165. Considers that the benchmarks of the rule of law report should also cover the independence and effective functioning of key independent and regulatory authorities; stresses that those authorities should ensure transparent, open and merit-based procedures for the appointment and dismissal of their leadership;

Added166. Recalls the Commission Communications of 3 April 2019 entitled 'Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union – State of play and possible next steps' and of 7 August 2019 entitled 'Strengthening the rule of law within the Union – A blueprint for action'; calls for their update to reflect current challenges and ensure full operationalisation;

Added167. Underlines the need to assess human resources and capacity requirements, given the call for more proactive monitoring of the rule of law; stresses the importance of interdepartmental coordination across the relevant competent directorates-general in the Commission;

Horizontal recommendations

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Changed42.168. Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement;agreement, underlining the added value of a structured and predictable framework; stresses that the argument that such an agreement would be excessively rigid cannot justify inaction; calls for pragmatic solutions to already improve cooperation; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting representatives of other institutions such as the Venice Commission and Parliament; emphasises that the effectiveness of the expanded EU toolbox depends on coherent and consistent application across institutions;

Change 22

Removed43. Reiterates its call on the Commission to expand the scope of the report to cover all aspects of Article 2 TEU, and to include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections, and the functioning of democratic institutions;

Added169. Proposes that, until an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights is established through an interinstitutional agreement, the EU institutions further develop mechanisms for cooperation in this context by introducing an annual cycle on the rule of law that is structured in different phases, enhancing continuity, coordination and impact across institutions, and designed in a way that allows it to be progressively extended to cover all the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, ensuring a comprehensive and coherent approach to their protection;

Removed44. Strongly believes that EU institutions must fulfil their obligations regarding the rule of law, and underlines that assessing the adherence of EU institutions to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, including the Union’s internal consistency in upholding these values across its policies and external actions, is essential in order to safeguard the EU’s credibility and legitimacy;

Added170. Recalls that recommendations should be proportionate to the challenges identified, sufficiently specific to enable concrete and actionable follow-up by Member States and systematically assessed in subsequent editions; calls for a more balanced, transparent and credible approach to ensure equal treatment and effective follow-up; underlines that a more consistent application of the Commission’s approach, particularly by signalling recommendations that remain unresolved over several cycles, would enhance transparency, accuracy and the credibility of the monitoring framework;