Text · Amendment list
Establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast)
Full title
Establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast)
Document LIBE-AM-601040 · COM(2016)0272 – C8-0179/2016 – 2016/0132(COD)
- Kind
- Amendment list LIBE-AM-601040
- Date
- 3 March 2017
- Committee
- Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
- Dossier
- 2016-0132
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- COM(2016)0272 – C8-0179/2016 – 2016/0132(COD)
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| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 78 (2)(e), 79(2)(c), 87(2)(a) and 88(2)(a) thereof, | Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 78 (2)(d) and (e), 79(2)(c), 87(2)(a) and 88(2)(a) thereof, |
Recast: This is the legal basis applicable to the proposal for a regulation establishing a Union Resettlement Framework. It needs to be added because the proposal is for persons for whom Member States are considering resettlement under Article 10(2) of the proposal establishing an EU Resettlement Framework to be included within the scope of the Eurodac Regulation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) A common policy on asylum, including a Common European Asylum System, is a constituent part of the European Union's objective of progressively establishing an area of freedom, security and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, seek international protection in the Union. | (2) A common policy on asylum, including a Common European Asylum System, is a constituent part of the European Union's objective of progressively establishing an area of freedom, security and justice open to those whose personal situation makes them eligible to seek international protection in the Union. |
The term 'forced by circumstances' is too broad and implies that any (unspecified) circumstances could be cited as grounds for international protection. However, the rate of refusal of applications for international protection (over 66% in France in 2016) show that the international protection route often serves for illegal immigration purposes, which is something we have to combat more effectively. It should therefore be stated that it is ultimately only on the grounds of the personal situation of the applicant (or his/her family) that a valid application for international protection can be made.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (4) For the purposes of applying Regulation (EU) No […/…] establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person24 , it is necessary to establish the identity of applicants for international protection and of persons apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union. It is also desirable, in order effectively to apply Regulation (EU) No […/…], and in particular Articles[..] and [..]) thereof, to allow each Member State to check whether a third-country national or stateless person found illegally staying on its territory has applied for international protection in another Member State. | (4) For the purposes of applying Regulation (EU) No […/…] establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and of Regulation XXX/XXX establishing a Union Resettlement Framework, it is necessary to establish the identity of applicants for international protection, of persons for whom Member States intend to launch a resettlement procedure and of persons apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union24 . It is also desirable, in order effectively to apply Regulation (EU) No […/…], and in particular Articles[..] and [..]) thereof, to allow each Member State to check whether a third-country national or stateless person found illegally staying on its territory has applied for international protection in another Member State. |
| 24 See page 31 of this Official Journal. | 24 See page 31 of this Official Journal. |
Recast: It is necessary to include implementation of the future Regulation establishing a Union Resettlement Framework among the purposes of Eurodac so as to allow for the registration of persons for whom the Member States intend to launch a resettlement procedure under Article 10(2) of that regulation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (4a) It is necessary, for the purposes of the implementation of Regulation XXX/XXX establishing a Union Resettlement Framework, for all Member States to register in Eurodac information on third-country nationals and stateless persons for whom they intend to conduct a resettlement procedure, in accordance with Article 10(2) of that Regulation. |
Recast: l’article 10 de la proposition de règlement relatif à la réinstallation prévoit que les États membres enregistrent les données des personnes qu’ils entendent réinstaller et les stockent ensuite. Il n’est pas précisé dans quelle base de données celles-ci sont enregistrées. Il est donc proposé de les enregistrer directement dans Eurodac afin qu’elles puissent bénéficier des garanties offertes par le présent règlement et qu’elles soient soumises au même régime que les données des autres bénéficiaires de protection internationale. Cet enregistrement permettra aussi de pouvoir déterminer l’État membre de réinstallation et ce, afin de contrôler les mouvements secondaires comme cela est avancé par la Commission dans sa proposition.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (4b) The registration in Eurodac is designed to ensure that persons for whom a Member State intends to conduct a resettlement procedure enjoy the same level of protection and the same rights applicable to other applicants for, and beneficiaries of, international protection as regards the processing of their data. This should also enable Member States to verify whether or not a third-country national or stateless person has already been resettled in another Member State by virtue of Regulation XXX/XXX. If they have, then the Member State of resettlement can be established and any secondary movements monitored; |
Recast: Amendment seeking to explain why the data on persons resettled by virtue of Regulation XXX/XXX should be registered in Eurodac.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) Biometrics constitute an important element in establishing the exact identity of such persons. It is necessary to set up a system for the comparison of their fingerprint and facial image data. | (5) To ensure high accuracy in the identification of such persons, it is necessary to set up a system for the comparison of their fingerprint and facial image data. |
The main goal of Eurodac is registration and to allow for high accuracy (re)identification of persons that fall under the three categories of this regulation. It should therefore be stated clearly as one of the principle recitals in the text.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) Biometrics constitute an important element in establishing the exact identity of such persons. It is necessary to set up a system for the comparison of their fingerprint and facial image data. | (5) Biometrics constitute an important element in establishing the exact identity of such persons. It is necessary to set up a system for the comparison of their fingerprint data, facial image data or both. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (6) To that end, it is necessary to set up a system known as 'Eurodac', consisting of a Central System, which will operate a computerised central database of fingerprint and facial image data, as well as of the electronic means of transmission between the Member States and the Central System, hereinafter the "Communication Infrastructure". | (6) To that end, it is necessary to set up a system known as 'Eurodac', consisting of a Central System, which will operate a computerised central database of fingerprint data, facial image data or both, as well as of the electronic means of transmission between the Member States and the Central System, hereinafter the "Communication Infrastructure". |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (6a) The European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA) should conduct a study to ascertain whether the combinations of biometric identifiers in the EU’s various justice and home affairs databases need to be harmonised and, more specifically, whether Eurodac should limit its identification data to four fingerprints and a facial image, like the entry/exit system provided for in Regulation (EU) .../... of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
Recast: The combinations of biometric identifiers in the EU's various JHA databanks should be harmonised.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9) In 2015, the refugee and migration crisis brought to the fore challenges faced by some Member States with taking fingerprints of illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons who attempted to avoid the procedures for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection. The Communication of the Commission of 13 May 2015, titled "A European Agenda on Migration"25 noted that "Member States must also implement fully the rules on taking migrants' fingerprints at the borders" and further proposed that "The Commission will also explore how more biometric identifiers can be used through the Eurodac system (such as using facial recognition techniques through digital photos)". | (9) The Communication of the Commission of 13 May 2015, titled "A European Agenda on Migration"25 noted that "Member States must also implement fully the rules on taking migrants' fingerprints at the borders" and further proposed that "The Commission will also explore how more biometric identifiers can be used through the Eurodac system (such as using facial recognition techniques through digital photos)". |
| 25 COM(2015) 240 final, 13.5.2015 | 25 COM(2015) 240 final, 13.5.2015 |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (10) To assist Member States overcome challenges relating to non-compliance with the fingerprinting process, this Regulation also permits the comparison of a facial image without fingerprints as a last resort, where it is impossible to take the fingerprints of the third-country national or stateless person because his or her fingertips are damaged, either intentionally or not, or amputated. Member States should exhaust all attempts to ensure that fingerprints can be taken from the data-subject before a comparison using a facial image only can be carried out where non-compliance based on reasons not relating to the conditions of the individual's fingertips are given. Where facial images are used in combination with fingerprint data, it allows for the reduction of fingerprints registered while enabling the same result in terms of accuracy of the identification. | (10) To assist Member States overcome challenges relating to non-compliance with the fingerprinting process, this Regulation should be implemented in accordance with the guidelines established by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in its Focus Paper "Fundamental rights implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints for Eurodac" of May 2015.1a |
| 1a http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2015-fingerprinting-focus-paper_en.pdf |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (10) To assist Member States overcome challenges relating to non-compliance with the fingerprinting process, this Regulation also permits the comparison of a facial image without fingerprints as a last resort, where it is impossible to take the fingerprints of the third-country national or stateless person because his or her fingertips are damaged, either intentionally or not, or amputated. Member States should exhaust all attempts to ensure that fingerprints can be taken from the data-subject before a comparison using a facial image only can be carried out where non-compliance based on reasons not relating to the conditions of the individual's fingertips are given. Where facial images are used in combination with fingerprint data, it allows for the reduction of fingerprints registered while enabling the same result in terms of accuracy of the identification. | (10) For the purposes of obtaining high accuracy identification, fingerprints should always be prefered over facial images. To assist Member States in overcoming challenges, where it is impossible to take the fingerprints of the third-country national or stateless person because his or her fingertips are damaged, either intentionally or not, or amputated, this Regulation should also permit the registration and comparison of a facial image without fingerprints. Member States should exhaust all attempts to ensure that fingerprints can be taken from the data-subject before a comparison using a facial image only can be carried out. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (10) To assist Member States overcome challenges relating to non-compliance with the fingerprinting process, this Regulation also permits the comparison of a facial image without fingerprints as a last resort, where it is impossible to take the fingerprints of the third-country national or stateless person because his or her fingertips are damaged, either intentionally or not, or amputated. Member States should exhaust all attempts to ensure that fingerprints can be taken from the data-subject before a comparison using a facial image only can be carried out where non-compliance based on reasons not relating to the conditions of the individual's fingertips are given. Where facial images are used in combination with fingerprint data, it allows for the reduction of fingerprints registered while enabling the same result in terms of accuracy of the identification. | (10) To assist Member States overcome challenges relating to non-compliance with the fingerprinting process, this Regulation also permits the comparison of a facial image without fingerprints as a last resort, where it is impossible to take the fingerprints of the third-country national or stateless person because his or her fingertips are damaged, either intentionally or not, or amputated. If the physical impossibility to give fingerprints is of a temporary nature, it should be recorded and the fingerprinting process should be carried out at a later stage when the physical integrity of the fingertips is restored. Member States should exhaust all attempts to ensure that fingerprints can be taken from the data-subject before a comparison using a facial image only can be carried out where non-compliance based on reasons not relating to the conditions of the individual's fingertips are given. Where facial images with sufficient image resolution and quality to be used in automated biometric matching are used in combination with fingerprint data, it should be possible to consider reducing the number of fingerprints registered, provided that this enables the same result in terms of accuracy of the identification. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) The return of third-country nationals who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26 , is an essential part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. To increase the effectiveness of the Union system to return illegally staying third-country nationals is needed in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and should go hand in hand with the efforts to protect those in need of protection. | deleted |
| 26 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24,12,2008, p. 98. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) The return of third-country nationals who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26 , is an essential part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. To increase the effectiveness of the Union system to return illegally staying third-country nationals is needed in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and should go hand in hand with the efforts to protect those in need of protection. | (11) The return of third-country nationals who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26 is an essential cornerstone of a fair and efficient Common European Asylum System, also with the purpose of reducing and deterring irregular migration. It is necessary to increase the effectiveness of the Union system for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals in order to maintain public trust in the Common European Asylum System, which is fundamental in order to uphold the obligation to protect those in need of protection. |
| 26 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24,12,2008, p. 98. | 26 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24,12,2008, p. 98. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) The return of third-country nationals who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26 , is an essential part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. To increase the effectiveness of the Union system to return illegally staying third-country nationals is needed in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and should go hand in hand with the efforts to protect those in need of protection. | (11) The return of third-country nationals who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26, is an essential part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. It is essential to increase the effectiveness of the Union system to systematically return illegally staying third-country nationals in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and must be tied in with the efforts made to protect those in need of protection, who are among the first to suffer the effects of illegal immigration. |
| 26 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24,12,2008, p. 98. | 26 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24,12,2008, p. 98. |
Le taux d'exécution des retours des ressortissants de pays tiers est incroyablement faible (pour la France, de 1% selon la Cour des Comptes à 10% selon la CIMADE). La politique d'asile doit par conséquent être mieux équilibrée et reposer sur deux piliers indissociables : accueil des ressortissants éligibles à la protection internationale mais retour systématique et rapide de ceux qui ne le sont pas. La faiblesse structurelle de ce second pilier est l'un des moteurs qui nourrissent la défiance des peuples européens vis-à-vis de l'immigration. Parmi les premières personnes à pâtir de cette défiance généralisée, on compte les ressortissants éligibles à une protection internationale. Il convient donc de mieux aborder la question de la systématicité des retours et leur caractère indissociable des efforts fournis pour l'accueil.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) The return of third-country nationals who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26 , is an essential part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. To increase the effectiveness of the Union system to return illegally staying third-country nationals is needed in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and should go hand in hand with the efforts to protect those in need of protection. | (11) The return of third-country nationals who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including non-refoulement, refugee protection and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26 , is an essential part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. To increase the effectiveness of the Union system to return illegally staying third-country nationals is needed in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and should go hand in hand with the efforts to protect those in need of protection. |
| 26 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24,12,2008, p. 98. | 26 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24,12,2008, p. 98. |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) The return of third-country nationals who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26 , is an essential part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. To increase the effectiveness of the Union system to return illegally staying third-country nationals is needed in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and should go hand in hand with the efforts to protect those in need of protection. | (11) The return of third-country nationals who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26 , is a part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. To increase the effectiveness of the Union system to return illegally staying third-country nationals is needed in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and should go hand in hand with the efforts to protect those in need of protection. |
| 26 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24,12,2008, p. 98. | 26 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24,12,2008, p. 98. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11a) With a view to stepping up cooperation between Member States in managing irregular migration, illegally staying nationals should give the name of the removal measure taken by the Member State which entered the data in Eurodac instead of the asylum request number. |
There are many kinds of removal measures taken against illegally residing persons. For example: voluntary returns, orders to leave the territory, deportation, repatriation or expulsion. Each measure entails different procedures and deadlines. It is therefore important for Member States to be aware of what expulsion measures have been taken against illegally residing persons by other Member States, for the purposes of enhanced cooperation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (12) National authorities in the Member States experience difficulties in identifying illegally staying third-country nationals who use deceptive means to avoid their identification and to frustrate the procedures for re-documentation in view of their return and readmission. It is therefore essential to ensure that information on third-country nationals or stateless persons who are found to be staying illegally in the EU are collected and transmitted to Eurodac and are compared also with those collected and transmitted for the purpose of establishing the identity of applicants for international protection and of third-country nationals apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union, in order to facilitate their identification and re-documentation and to ensure their return and readmission, and to reduce identity fraud. It should also contribute to reducing the length of the administrative procedures necessary for ensuring return and readmission of illegally staying third-country nationals, including the period during which they may be kept in administrative detention awaiting removal. It should also allow identifying third countries of transit, where the illegally staytng third-country national may be readmitted. | deleted |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (12) National authorities in the Member States experience difficulties in identifying illegally staying third-country nationals who use deceptive means to avoid their identification and to frustrate the procedures for re-documentation in view of their return and readmission. It is therefore essential to ensure that information on third-country nationals or stateless persons who are found to be staying illegally in the EU are collected and transmitted to Eurodac and are compared also with those collected and transmitted for the purpose of establishing the identity of applicants for international protection and of third-country nationals apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union, in order to facilitate their identification and re-documentation and to ensure their return and readmission, and to reduce identity fraud. It should also contribute to reducing the length of the administrative procedures necessary for ensuring return and readmission of illegally staying third-country nationals, including the period during which they may be kept in administrative detention awaiting removal. It should also allow identifying third countries of transit, where the illegally staytng third-country national may be readmitted. | (12) It is essential to ensure that information on third-country nationals or stateless persons who are found to be staying illegally in the EU are collected and transmitted to Eurodac and are compared also with those collected and transmitted for the purpose of establishing the identity of applicants for international protection and of third-country nationals apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union, in order to facilitate their identification and re-documentation and to ensure their return and readmission, and to reduce identity fraud. It should also contribute to reducing the length of the administrative procedures necessary for ensuring return and readmission of illegally staying third-country nationals, including the period during which they may be kept in administrative detention awaiting removal. It should also allow identifying third countries of transit, where the illegally staytng third-country national may be readmitted. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (12) National authorities in the Member States experience difficulties in identifying illegally staying third-country nationals who use deceptive means to avoid their identification and to frustrate the procedures for re-documentation in view of their return and readmission. It is therefore essential to ensure that information on third-country nationals or stateless persons who are found to be staying illegally in the EU are collected and transmitted to Eurodac and are compared also with those collected and transmitted for the purpose of establishing the identity of applicants for international protection and of third-country nationals apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union, in order to facilitate their identification and re-documentation and to ensure their return and readmission, and to reduce identity fraud. It should also contribute to reducing the length of the administrative procedures necessary for ensuring return and readmission of illegally staying third-country nationals, including the period during which they may be kept in administrative detention awaiting removal. It should also allow identifying third countries of transit, where the illegally staytng third-country national may be readmitted. | (12) National authorities in the Member States experience difficulties in identifying illegally staying third-country nationals who use deceptive means to avoid their identification and to frustrate the procedures for re-documentation in view of their return and readmission. It is therefore essential to ensure that information on third-country nationals or stateless persons who are found to be staying illegally in the EU are collected and transmitted to Eurodac and are compared also with those collected and transmitted for the purpose of establishing the identity of applicants for international protection and of third-country nationals apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union, in order to facilitate their identification and re-documentation and to ensure their return and readmission, and to reduce identity fraud. It should also contribute to reducing the length of the administrative procedures necessary for ensuring return and readmission of illegally staying third-country nationals, including the period during which they may be kept in administrative detention awaiting removal. It should also allow identifying third countries of transit, where the illegally staytng third-country national may be readmitted. This is without prejudice to the Schengen Information System (SIS), which remains the fundamental system to ensure cooperation and information exchange on return. |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (12 a) Member States should have a reasonable deadline of 15 days after the end of authorised stays for fulfilling their obligations under this Regulation in respect of comparing, collecting and transmitting fingerprint and facial image data of illegally staying third-country nationals who entered by irregularly crossing the external border of the Schengen area. |
This amendment is directly linked to the Article 14 in the Commission proposal. The extension of the scope in order to include "third-country nationals or stateless persons found illegally staying in a Member State" must be accompanied by safeguards if a person has entered legally the EU and overstays his visit for some days due to reasons that could be unintentional.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (12a) Member States could allow a reasonable deadline of 15 days after the end of authorised stays for fulfilling their obligations under Article 14 in respect of illegally staying third-country nationals who entered by legally crossing the external border of the Schengen area. |
Les données de ressortissant de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier seront enregistrées pour une période de 5 ans dans Eurodac. C'est pourquoi, les personnes qui sont entrée légalement sur le territoire de l'UE et qui font l'objet d'un dépassement très court de la durée de séjour autorisée et pour lesquels soit un retour volontaire est imminent soit une procédure de régularisation est cours et qu'ils ne présentent aucun risque de fuite, les Etats membres devrait disposer d'une marge d'appréciation et leur octroyer un délai raisonnable pour quitter le territoire ou se régulariser avant d'enregistrer leur données pour une si longue durée. Il convient donc que pour les personnes entré illégalement sur le territoire d'un Etat membre, ces données soient directement enregistrées dans Eurodac mais que pour celles entré légalement un délai raisonnable de 15 jours leur soit laissé.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13) In its Conclusions of 8 October 2015 on the future of return policy, the Council endorsed the initiative announced by the Commission to explore an extension of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to enable the use of data for return purposes27 . Member States should have the necessary tools at their disposal to be able to detect illegal migration to and secondary movements of illegally staying third-country nationals in the Union. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of the Member States. | deleted |
| 27 EU Action Plan on return, COM(2015) 453 final. |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13) In its Conclusions of 8 October 2015 on the future of return policy, the Council endorsed the initiative announced by the Commission to explore an extension of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to enable the use of data for return purposes27 . Member States should have the necessary tools at their disposal to be able to detect illegal migration to and secondary movements of illegally staying third-country nationals in the Union. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of the Member States. | (13) In its Conclusions of 8 October 2015 on the future of return policy, the Council endorsed the initiative announced by the Commission to explore an extension of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to enable the use of data for return purposes27 . Member States should have the necessary tools at their disposal to be able to detect illegal migration. |
| 27 EU Action Plan on return, COM(2015) 453 final. | 27 EU Action Plan on return, COM(2015) 453 final. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13) In its Conclusions of 8 October 2015 on the future of return policy, the Council endorsed the initiative announced by the Commission to explore an extension of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to enable the use of data for return purposes27 . Member States should have the necessary tools at their disposal to be able to detect illegal migration to and secondary movements of illegally staying third-country nationals in the Union. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of the Member States. | (13) In its Conclusions of 8 October 2015 on the future of return policy, the Council endorsed the initiative announced by the Commission to explore an extension of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to enable the use of data for return purposes27 . Member States should have the necessary tools at their disposal to be able to detect illegal migration and secondary movements by the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals in the Union. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of the Member States. |
| 27 EU Action Plan on return, COM(2015) 453 final. | 27 EU Action Plan on return, COM(2015) 453 final. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13) In its Conclusions of 8 October 2015 on the future of return policy, the Council endorsed the initiative announced by the Commission to explore an extension of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to enable the use of data for return purposes27 . Member States should have the necessary tools at their disposal to be able to detect illegal migration to and secondary movements of illegally staying third-country nationals in the Union. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of the Member States. | (13) In its Conclusions of 8 October 2015 on the future of return policy, the Council endorsed the initiative announced by the Commission to explore an extension of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to enable the use of data for return purposes27 . Member States should have the necessary tools at their disposal to be able to detect illegal migration to and secondary movements of illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons in the Union. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of the Member States. |
| 27 EU Action Plan on return, COM(2015) 453 final. | 27 EU Action Plan on return, COM(2015) 453 final. |
Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, Damiano Zoffoli, Barbara Matera, Petras Auštrevičius, Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea, Hilde Vautmans
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14) The Commission’s Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28 highlights the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council. The Communication proposes to set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems for borders and security. This group should assess the necessity and proportionality of establishing interoperability with the Schengen Information Systems (SIS) and the Visa Information Systems (VIS), and examine if there is a need to revise the legal framework for law enforcement access to EURODAC. | (14) The Commission’s Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28 highlights the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council. The Communication proposes to set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems and examine if there is a need to revise the legal framework for law enforcement access to Eurodac. Technological solutions should be developed to ensure the interoperability of Eurodac with the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), Europol and the Entry-Exit-System (EES) in order to enhance effective cooperation amongst Member States in managing external borders and combatting serious crime. Should additional data of minors be included in a future version of Eurodac, Member States should also record family links in order to facilitate family reunification and trace missing children. |
| 28 COM(2016) 205 final | 28 COM(2016) 205 final |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13 a) The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, as established by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council1a , plays a key role in the Union efforts for a better management of external borders, the prevention of irregular immigration and secondary movement. Consequently, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency should be provided with access to Eurodac data in order to be able to undertake risk analyses to the highest possible standards and assisting Member States with return-related tasks. The processing of those data shall be carried out in compliance with the data protection safeguards provided for in Regulation (EU) 2016/1624. | |
| 1a Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (OJ L 251, 16.9.2016, p.1). |
This amendment corresponds with the new role that Eurodac is taking over, which can be seen by the new paragraph (b) of Article (1). Eurodac shall now assist with the control of illegal immigration and secondary movement. Within its new mandate, the newly created European Border and Coast Guard Agency also has this task. Giving the European Border and Coast Guard access shall make sure that the new potential of Eurodac is exploited to the fullest.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13 b) As one of the main tasks of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the future European Union Agency for Asylum, laid down in this Regulation, is the taking and transmitting of biometric data. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the European Union Agency for Asylum should be provided with an own interface in order to not be reliant on national infrastructures anymore. In the long run, these interfaces could be used as a single search interface, as described in the Commission Communication of 6 April 2016 entitled "Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security"1a . | |
| 1a COM(2016) 205 final |
This amendment shall reduce the Agencys’ dependence on national infrastructure which can be a real burden to the daily work of the agencies as not every national infrastructure is on the highest standards.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14) The Commission’s Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28 highlights the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council. The Communication proposes to set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems for borders and security. This group should assess the necessity and proportionality of establishing interoperability with the Schengen Information Systems (SIS) and the Visa Information Systems (VIS), and examine if there is a need to revise the legal framework for law enforcement access to EURODAC. | (14) In line with the Commission’s Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28 that highlighted the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council, the Commission set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems for borders and security with the main goal of improving the quality of service that Union databases provide to their users, such as better, simpler and quicker access to all relevant information therein and guaranteeing high quality data. Therefore, this group should assess the necessity and proportionality of establishing interoperability between Union information systems such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), Eurodac and new relevant information systems that are currently being developed. |
| 28 COM(2016) 205 final | 28 COM(2016) 205 final |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14) The Commission’s Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28 highlights the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council. The Communication proposes to set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems for borders and security. This group should assess the necessity and proportionality of establishing interoperability with the Schengen Information Systems (SIS) and the Visa Information Systems (VIS), and examine if there is a need to revise the legal framework for law enforcement access to EURODAC. | (14) The Commission’s Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28 highlights the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council. The Communication proposes to set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems and examine if there is a need to revise the legal framework for law enforcement access to Eurodac. Technological solutions should be developed to ensure the interoperability of Eurodac with the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), Europol and the Entry-Exit System (EES) in order to enhance effective cooperation amongst Member States in managing external borders and combatting serious crime. |
| 28 COM(2016) 205 final | 28 COM(2016) 205 final |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14) The Commission’s Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28 highlights the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council. The Communication proposes to set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems for borders and security. This group should assess the necessity and proportionality of establishing interoperability with the Schengen Information Systems (SIS) and the Visa Information Systems (VIS), and examine if there is a need to revise the legal framework for law enforcement access to EURODAC. | (14) The Commission’s Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28 highlights the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council. The Communication proposes to set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems for borders and security. This group should assess the necessity and proportionality of establishing interoperability with the Schengen Information Systems (SIS), the Entry/Exit System and the Visa Information Systems (VIS), and examine if there is a need to revise the legal framework for law enforcement access to EURODAC. |
| 28 COM(2016) 205 final | 28 COM(2016) 205 final |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14a) eu-LISA will establish a secure communication channel between the EES central system and the Eurodac central system to enable interoperability between them. The two systems need to be connected in order for the biometric data of a third-country national registered in the EES to be transferred to Eurodac where registration of that biometric data is laid down in this Regulation. |
The purpose of the EES will be to register the date of entry and exit of non-EU nationals entering the Schengen area for a short stay and report any unauthorised overstays. Third-country nationals outstaying their authorised period of stay are therefore residing illegally and their data should therefore be recorded in Eurodac, in accordance with Article 14. Interoperability between the two systems will serve to prevent the Member State having to look for such persons on their territory and avoid duplication.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14 a) The Commission proposal1a amending SIS in the field of border checks opens the possibility for using the search with fingerprints in SIS to make immediately available the identity and the status of third-country nationals subject to return decisions. Member States should establish as closely as possible the contact points handling Eurodac comparisons and the national contact points handling supplementary information to SIS. | |
| 1a COM 2016(882) final |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14 a) The High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability is expected to present its results in spring 2017. Those results might be relevant for the development of Eurodac. Where this is the case, the best possible legal and technical prerequisites should be laid down for a potential interoperability of Eurodac with other information systems for borders and security. |
This amendment corresponds with the new recital nr. 14 of the recast and expresses the will of the author to lay down the legal and technical ground work of a potential interoperability of Eurodac with other databases.
Monika Hohlmeier, Heinz K. Becker, Jeroen Lenaers, Rachida Dati, Brice Hortefeux, Mariya Gabriel, Artis Pabriks
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (15) It is essential in the fight against terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences for the law enforcement authorities to have the fullest and most up-to-date information if they are to perform their tasks. The information contained in Eurodac is necessary for the purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences as referred to in Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA29 or of other serious criminal offences as referred to in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA30 . Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of Member States and the European Police Office (Europol). | (15) It is essential in the fight against terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences for the law enforcement authorities to have the fullest and most up-to-date information if they are to perform their tasks. The information contained in Eurodac is necessary for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences as referred to in Directive (EU) 2017/... of the European Parliament and of the Council [combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA] or of other serious criminal offences as referred to in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of Member States and the European Police Office (Europol). |
| 29 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3). | |
| 30 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1). |
Provisions of the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA were integrated in the new directive on combating terrorism, voted in the European Parliament on the 16th of February 2017.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) Requests for comparison of Eurodac data by Europol should be allowed only in specific cases, under specific circumstances and under strict conditions. | (19) Requests for comparison of Eurodac data by Europol should be allowed only in specific cases, under specific circumstances and under strict conditions, in line with the the principles of necessity and proportionality enshrined in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and as interpreted by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union1a . |
| 1a CJEU, Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Seitlinger and Others, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014. CJEU, Joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and Others, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016. |
In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary because it is inextricably linked to other admissible amendments related to the purposes of Eurodac (Article 1), introducing references to compliance with the principles of necessity and proportionality under Article 52 (1) of the Charter and the relevant CJEU case law.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) Since Eurodac was originally established to facilitate the application of the Dublin Convention, access to Eurodac for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences constitutes a change of the original purpose of Eurodac, which interferes with the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac. In line with the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, any such interference must be in accordance with the law, which must be formulated with sufficient precision to allow individuals to adjust their conduct and it must protect individuals against arbitrariness and indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise. Any interference must be necessary to genuinely meet an objective of general interest and proportionate to the legitimate objective it aims to achieve. | (20) Since Eurodac was originally established to facilitate the application of the Dublin Convention, access to Eurodac for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences constitutes a change of the original purpose of Eurodac, which interferes with the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac. In line with the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, any such interference must be in accordance with the law, which must be formulated with sufficient precision to allow individuals to adjust their conduct and it must protect individuals against arbitrariness and indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise. Any interference must be necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate and proportionate interest and proportionate to the legitimate objective it aims to achieve. |
The Commission deleted the standard language from Article 8 ECHR in its proposal. This amendment keeps that language, as enshrined in the ECHR and as interpreted in the CJEU case-law.
Monika Hohlmeier, Heinz K. Becker, Jeroen Lenaers, Rachida Dati, Brice Hortefeux, Mariya Gabriel, Artis Pabriks
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) Since Eurodac was originally established to facilitate the application of the Dublin Convention, access to Eurodac for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences constitutes a change of the original purpose of Eurodac, which interferes with the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac. In line with the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, any such interference must be in accordance with the law, which must be formulated with sufficient precision to allow individuals to adjust their conduct and it must protect individuals against arbitrariness and indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise. Any interference must be necessary to genuinely meet an objective of general interest and proportionate to the legitimate objective it aims to achieve. | (20) Since Eurodac was originally established to facilitate the application of the Dublin Convention, access to Eurodac for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences constitutes a further development of the original purpose of Eurodac. In line with the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, any interference with the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac must be in accordance with the law, which must be formulated with sufficient precision to allow individuals to adjust their conduct and it must protect individuals against arbitrariness and indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise. Any interference must be necessary to genuinely meet an objective of general interest and proportionate to the legitimate objective it aims to achieve. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22) This Regulation also lays down the conditions under which requests for comparison of fingerprint data with Eurodac data for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences should be allowed and the necessary safeguards to ensure the protection of the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac. The strictness of those conditions reflects the fact that the Eurodac database registers fingerprint data of persons who are not presumed to have committed a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. | (22) This Regulation also lays down the conditions under which requests for comparison of fingerprint, facial image and alphanumeric data with Eurodac data for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences should be allowed and the necessary safeguards to ensure the protection of the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac. The strictness of those conditions reflects the fact that the Eurodac database registers fingerprint, facial image and alphanumeric data of persons who are not presumed to have committed a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. Although comparisons based on fingerprint and facial image data result in search results of greater accuracy, it is acknowledged that law enforcement authorities and Europol do not always possess the fingerprint and facial image data of suspects or victims whose case they are investigating, which could hamper their ability to match fingerprints and facial images in databases such as Eurodac. In order to contribute further to the investigations of those authorities and Europol, searches based on alphanumeric data should be allowed in Eurodac in such cases, in particular where those authorities and Europol possess evidence of the criminal suspect or victim's personal details or identity documents. |
Under the proposal, national law enforcementauthorities and Europol cannot request comparison with specific alphanumeric data, which ishighly detrimental to investigations, especially in the counter-terrorismfield, trying to establish the places and dates of entry in the EU of suspectsfor which a used identity is known, but no fingerprint is available. In thiscontext, and given that Art.1.1(c) of the proposal, extends its scope ofEurodac to law enforcement purposes, it would be essential for national law enforcementauthorities and Europol to have access to all data contained in Eurodac inorder to properly carry out their tasks.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (23) With a view to ensuring equal treatment for all applicants and beneficiaries of international protection, as well as in order to ensure consistency with the current Union asylum acquis, in particular with Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council32 and Regulation (EU) No […/…], this Regulation includes applicants for subsidiary protection and persons eligible for subsidiary protection in its scope . | (23) With a view to ensuring equal treatment for all applicants and beneficiaries of international protection, as well as in order to ensure consistency with the current Union asylum acquis, in particular with Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council32 and with Regulation XXX/XXX establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and Regulation (EU) No […/…], this Regulation includes in its scope applicants for subsidiary protection and persons eligible for subsidiary protection, as well as persons granted international protection on the basis of resettlement under Regulation XXX/XXX. |
| 32 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ L 337, 20.12.2011, p. 9). | 32 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ L 337, 20.12.2011, p. 9). |
Recast: This amendment introduces a reference to the future Regulation establishing a Union Resettlement Framework since it is being proposed that persons for whom Member States intend to conduct a resettlement procedure under that Regulation should be included within the scope of Eurodac.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (24) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take and transmit the fingerprint data of every applicant for international protection and of every third-country national or stateless person who is apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member State or is found to be staying illegally in a Member State , if they are at least six years of age. | (24) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take and transmit the biometric data of every applicant for international protection, of every third-country national or stateless person for whom they intend to conduct a resettlement procedure under Regulation XXX/XXX and of every third-country national or stateless person who is apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member State or is found to be staying illegally in a Member State, if they are at least six years of age. |
Recast: This amendment introduces a reference to persons for whom the Member States intend to conduct a resettlement procedure since it is being proposed that such persons should be included within the scope of this Regulation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (24) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take and transmit the fingerprint data of every applicant for international protection and of every third-country national or stateless person who is apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member State or is found to be staying illegally in a Member State , if they are at least six years of age. | (24) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take and transmit the fingerprint data of every applicant for international protection and of every third-country national or stateless person who is apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member State, if they are at least six years of age. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (24) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take and transmit the fingerprint data of every applicant for international protection and of every third-country national or stateless person who is apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member State or is found to be staying illegally in a Member State , if they are at least six years of age. | (24) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take and transmit the fingerprints and facial image data of every applicant for international protection and of every third-country national or stateless person who is apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member State or is found to be staying illegally in a Member State, if they are at least six years of age. |
Correction of the commission's proposal that doesn't insert in all the required places both 'fingerprints' and 'facial image', which is in line with the general obligation as mentioned in article 2 to take fingerprints and a facial image.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25) In view of strengthening the protection of unaccompanied minors who have not applied for international protection and those children who may become separated from their families, it is also necessary to take fingerprints and a facial image for storage in the Central System to help establish the identity of a child and assist a Member State to trace any family or links they may have with another Member State. Establishing family links is a key element in restoring family unity and must be is closely linked to the determination of the best interests of the child and eventually, the determination of a durable solution. | (25) In view of strengthening the protection of all migrant and refugee children, including unaccompanied minors who have not applied for international protection and those children who may become separated from their families, it is also necessary to take fingerprints and a facial image for storage in the Central System until they reach the age of 18 to help establish their identity and assist a Member State to trace any family or links they may have with another Member State. Fingerprint and facial image data should be taken for this explicit purpose, and should be processed and used accordingly. Establishing family links is a key element in restoring family unity and must be closely linked to the determination of the best interests of the child and eventually, the determination of a durable solution. Improved identification procedures for missing children will assist Member States in guaranteeing that adequate protection of children is ensured. To this end, Member States, upon identification of a missing child or of a child who is the victim of crime, should promptly contact the competent national child protection authorities and undertake a needs assessment with a view to finding a durable solution for the child in accordance with his or her best interests. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25) In view of strengthening the protection of unaccompanied minors who have not applied for international protection and those children who may become separated from their families, it is also necessary to take fingerprints and a facial image for storage in the Central System to help establish the identity of a child and assist a Member State to trace any family or links they may have with another Member State. Establishing family links is a key element in restoring family unity and must be is closely linked to the determination of the best interests of the child and eventually, the determination of a durable solution. | (25) In view of strengthening the protection of unaccompanied minors who have not applied for international protection and those children who may become separated from their families, it is also necessary to take fingerprints and a facial image for storage in the Central System to help establish the identity of a child and assist a Member State to trace any family or links they may have with another Member State. Establishing family links is a key element in restoring family unity and must be is closely linked to the determination of the best interests of the child and eventually, the determination of a durable solution. In performing all these operations, Member States should adhere to the principles laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25) In view of strengthening the protection of unaccompanied minors who have not applied for international protection and those children who may become separated from their families, it is also necessary to take fingerprints and a facial image for storage in the Central System to help establish the identity of a child and assist a Member State to trace any family or links they may have with another Member State. Establishing family links is a key element in restoring family unity and must be is closely linked to the determination of the best interests of the child and eventually, the determination of a durable solution. | (25) In order to protect and identify children who are the victims of human trafficking, who have gone missing or who have been kidnapped, and with a view to strengthening the protection of unaccompanied minors who have not applied for international protection and those children who may become separated from their families, it is also necessary to take fingerprints and a facial image for storage in the Central System to help establish the identity of a child and assist a Member State to trace any family or links they may have with another Member State. Establishing family links is a key element in restoring family unity and must be is closely linked to the determination of the best interests of the child and eventually, the determination of a durable solution. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26) The best interests of the minor should be a primary consideration for Member States when applying this Regulation. Where the requesting Member State establishes that Eurodac data pertain to a child, these data may only be used for law enforcement purposes by the requesting Member State in accordance with that State's laws applicable to minors and in accordance with the obligation to give primary consideration to the best interests of the child. | (26) The best interests of the child should be a primary consideration for Member States when applying this Regulation. Where the requesting Member State establishes that Eurodac data pertain to a child, these data may only be used for purposes relating to the prevention, detection and investigation of child trafficking and for the protection of missing children. |
The correct terminology of Article 3.1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child shall be used: Article 3.1 of the UN CRC reads as follows: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”.
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26) The best interests of the minor should be a primary consideration for Member States when applying this Regulation. Where the requesting Member State establishes that Eurodac data pertain to a child, these data may only be used for law enforcement purposes by the requesting Member State in accordance with that State's laws applicable to minors and in accordance with the obligation to give primary consideration to the best interests of the child. | (26) The best interests of the minor should be a primary consideration for Member States when applying this Regulation. Where the requesting Member State establishes that Eurodac data pertain to a child, these data may only be used for law enforcement purposes relating to the prevention, detection and investigation of child trafficking and for the protection of missing children and for taking measures for family tracing and reunification. |
Barbara Matera, Petras Auštrevičius, Barbara Matera, Petras Auštrevičius, Carlos Coelho, Hilde Vautmans
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26) The best interests of the minor should be a primary consideration for Member States when applying this Regulation. Where the requesting Member State establishes that Eurodac data pertain to a child, these data may only be used for law enforcement purposes by the requesting Member State in accordance with that State's laws applicable to minors and in accordance with the obligation to give primary consideration to the best interests of the child. | (26) The best interests of the minor should be a primary consideration for Member States when applying this Regulation. Where the requesting Member State establishes that Eurodac data pertain to a child, these data may only be used for law enforcement purposes, to ensure access to protection systems and to trace missing children in accordance with that State's laws applicable to minors and with the obligation to give primary consideration to the best interests of the child. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (27) It is necessary to lay down precise rules for the transmission of such fingerprint and facial image data to the Central System, the recording of such fingerprint and facial image data and of other relevant personal data in the Central System, their storage, their comparison with other fingerprint and facial image data, the transmission of the results of such comparison and the marking and erasure of the recorded data. Such rules may be different for, and should be specifically adapted to, the situation of different categories of third-country nationals or stateless persons. | (27) It is necessary to lay down precise rules for the transmission of such fingerprint data, facial image data or both to the Central System, the recording of such fingerprint and facial image data and of other relevant personal data in the Central System, their storage, their comparison with other fingerprint data, facial image data or both, the transmission of the results of such comparison and the marking and erasure of the recorded data. Such rules may be different for, and should be specifically adapted to, the situation of different categories of third-country nationals or stateless persons. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (28) Member States should ensure the transmission of fingerprint and facial image data of an appropriate quality for the purpose of comparison by means of the computerised fingerprint and facial recognition system. All authorities with a right of access to Eurodac should invest in adequate training and in the necessary technological equipment. The authorities with a right of access to Eurodac should inform the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice established by Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 ( "eu-LISA" ) of specific difficulties encountered with regard to the quality of data, in order to resolve them. | (28) Member States should ensure the transmission of fingerprint data, facial image data or both of an appropriate quality for the purpose of comparison by means of the computerised fingerprint and facial recognition system. All authorities with a right of access to Eurodac should invest in adequate training and in the necessary technological equipment. The authorities with a right of access to Eurodac should inform the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice established by Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 ( "eu-LISA" ) of specific difficulties encountered with regard to the quality of data, in order to resolve them. |
| 33 Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (OJ L 286, 1.11.2011, p. 1). | 33 Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (OJ L 286, 1.11.2011, p. 1). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (28) Member States should ensure the transmission of fingerprint and facial image data of an appropriate quality for the purpose of comparison by means of the computerised fingerprint and facial recognition system. All authorities with a right of access to Eurodac should invest in adequate training and in the necessary technological equipment. The authorities with a right of access to Eurodac should inform the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice established by Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 ( "eu-LISA" ) of specific difficulties encountered with regard to the quality of data, in order to resolve them. | (28) Member States should ensure the transmission of fingerprint and facial image data of an appropriate quality for the purpose of comparison by means of the computerised fingerprint and facial recognition system. All authorities with a right of access to Eurodac should invest in adequate training and in the necessary technological equipment. The authorities with a right of access to Eurodac should inform the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice established by Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 ( "eu-LISA" ) of specific difficulties encountered with regard to the quality of data, in order to resolve these and to foster common standards. |
| 33 Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (OJ L 286, 1.11.2011, p. 1). | 33 Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (OJ L 286, 1.11.2011, p. 1). |
The generation and transmission of data by Member States must be harmonised if it is to be effective. The information fed back should provide eu-LISA with the opportunity to establish and foster common standards.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (29) The fact that it is temporarily or permanently impossible to take and/or to transmit fingerprint and facial image data, due to reasons such as insufficient quality of the data for appropriate comparison, technical problems, reasons linked to the protection of health or due to the data subject being unfit or unable to have his or her fingerprints or facial image taken owing to circumstances beyond his or her control, should not adversely affect the examination of or the decision on the application for international protection lodged by that person. | (29) The fact that it is temporarily or permanently impossible to take and/or to transmit fingerprint data, facial image data or both, due to reasons such as insufficient quality of the data for appropriate comparison, technical problems, reasons linked to the protection of health or due to the data subject being unfit or unable to have his or her fingerprints or facial image taken owing to circumstances beyond his or her control, should not adversely affect the examination of or the decision on the application for international protection lodged by that person. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534 , which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals. Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image, except in duly justified circumstances that are permitted under national law. | (30) Member States should apply the guidelines to be established and monitored, jointly, by the European Union Agency for Asylum and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) for a common practice taking fingerprints and facial images of irregular third-country nationals in compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, building upon the FRA's 2015 Checklist1a . Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image. |
| 1a FRA Checklist to act in compliance with fundamental rights when obtaining fingerprints for Eurodac, 2015 http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/fundamental-rights-implications-obligation-provide-fingerprints-eurodac#checklist | |
| 34 COM(2015) 150 final, 27.5.2015 |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534 , which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals. Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image, except in duly justified circumstances that are permitted under national law. | (30) Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534 , which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals. Furthermore, Member States should refer to the guidelines established by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in its Focus Paper "Fundamental rights implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints for Eurodac" of May 2015.34a Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image. |
| 34 COM(2015) 150 final, 27.5.2015 | 34 COM(2015) 150 final, 27.5.2015 |
| 34a http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2015-fingerprinting-focus-paper_en.pdf |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534 , which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals. Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image, except in duly justified circumstances that are permitted under national law. | (30) Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534 , which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights' (FRA) checklist to act in compliance with fundamental rights when obtaining fingerprints for Eurodac.34a Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals and stateless persons who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image. |
| 34 COM(2015) 150 final, 27.5.2015 | 34 COM(2015) 150 final, 27.5.2015 |
| 34a FRA(2015) Fundamental rights implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints for Eurodac, 22.10.2015 |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534 , which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals. Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image, except in duly justified circumstances that are permitted under national law. | (30) Member States should abide by the Commission’s Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534 – annexed hereto – which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals. Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image, except in duly justified circumstances that are permitted under national law. |
| 34 COM(2015) 150 final, 27.5.2015 | 34 COM(2015) 150 final, 27.5.2015 |
Recast: The results of a survey show that some Member States authorise the use of detention to ensure that migrants provide their fingerprints, some authorise the use of a proportionate level of coercion, while others use neither detention or coercion. It is therefore necessary to harmonise current practices to ensure they fulfil their obligations under the Eurodac Regulation and all provide the same level of guarantees. Common approach developed by the Commission in SWD (2015) 150 final.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534 , which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals. Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image, except in duly justified circumstances that are permitted under national law. | (30) It is of the utmost importance for the well-functioning of the Common European Asylum System that a registration rate of 100% is achieved as regards applications for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, persons apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union and third-country nationals or stateless persons found illegally staying on its territory. In order to achieve this registration rate, Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534 , which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals or stateless persons. Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals or stateless persons who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image, except in duly justified circumstances that are permitted under national law. |
| 34 COM(2015) 150 final, 27.5.2015 | 34 COM(2015) 150 final, 27.5.2015 |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (31) Hits obtained from Eurodac should be verified by a trained fingerprint expert in order to ensure the accurate determination of responsibility under Regulation (EU) No […/…] ; the exact identification of the third-country national or stateless person and the exact identification of the criminal suspect or victim of crime whose data might be stored in Eurodac. Hits obtained from Eurodac based on facial images should also be verified where there is doubt that the result relates to the same person. | (31) Hits obtained from Eurodac should be verified by a trained fingerprint and facial identification expert in order to ensure the accurate determination of responsibility under Regulation (EU) No […/…] ; the exact identification of the third-country national or stateless person and the exact identification of the criminal suspect or victim of crime whose data might be stored in Eurodac. |
In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary because it is inextricably linked to other admissible amendments related to the purposes of Eurodac (Article 1), introducing safeguards on identification.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) Third-country nationals or stateless persons who have requested international protection in one Member State may try to request international protection in another Member State for many years to come. Therefore, the maximum period during which fingerprint and facial image data should be kept by the Central System should be of considerable length. Given that most third-country nationals or stateless persons who have stayed in the Union for several years will have obtained a settled status or even citizenship of a Member State after that period, a period of ten years should be considered a reasonable period for the storage of fingerprint and facial image data. | (32) In order to effectively assist in the control of illegal immigration and with the identification of illegally staying third-county nationals or stateless persons, the maximum period during which fingerprint and facial image data should be kept by the Central System should be of considerable length in order to deter third-country nationals or stateless persons who have requested international protection in one Member State from trying to request international protection in another Member State. Given that most third-country nationals or stateless persons who have stayed in the Union for several years will have obtained a settled status or even citizenship of a Member State after that period, a period of ten years should be considered a reasonable period for the storage of fingerprint and facial image data. |
For purposes of clarity the explanation of why data should be retained for the period of ten years is adjusted slightly with this amendment.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) Third-country nationals or stateless persons who have requested international protection in one Member State may try to request international protection in another Member State for many years to come. Therefore, the maximum period during which fingerprint and facial image data should be kept by the Central System should be of considerable length. Given that most third-country nationals or stateless persons who have stayed in the Union for several years will have obtained a settled status or even citizenship of a Member State after that period, a period of ten years should be considered a reasonable period for the storage of fingerprint and facial image data. | (32) The maximum period during which fingerprint and facial image data of third-country nationals or stateless persons who have requested international protection should be kept by the Central System should be limited to what is strictly necessary and proportionate, in line with the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 52(1) of the Charter and as interpreted by the case law of the CJEU. Given that most third-country nationals or stateless persons who have stayed in the Union for several years will have obtained a settled status or even citizenship of a Member State after that period, a period of five years should be considered a reasonable period for the storage of fingerprint and facial image data. |
In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary because it is inextricably linked to other admissible amendments related to the purposes of Eurodac (Article 1), introducing references to compliance with the principles of necessity and proportionality under Article 52 (1) of the Charter and the relevant CJEU case law.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) Third-country nationals or stateless persons who have requested international protection in one Member State may try to request international protection in another Member State for many years to come. Therefore, the maximum period during which fingerprint and facial image data should be kept by the Central System should be of considerable length. Given that most third-country nationals or stateless persons who have stayed in the Union for several years will have obtained a settled status or even citizenship of a Member State after that period, a period of ten years should be considered a reasonable period for the storage of fingerprint and facial image data. | (32) Third-country nationals or stateless persons who have requested international protection in one Member State may try to request international protection in another Member State for many years to come. Therefore, the maximum period during which biometric and alphanumeric data should be kept by the Central System should be of considerable length. Given that most third-country nationals or stateless persons who have stayed in the Union for several years will have obtained a settled status or even citizenship of a Member State after that period, a period of ten years should be considered a reasonable period for the storage of biometric and alphanumeric data. |
National law enforcement authorities and Europol cannot request comparison with specific alphanumeric data; in some cases national law enforcement authorities do not have fingerprints at their disposal but have alphanumeric data.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) Third-country nationals or stateless persons who have requested international protection in one Member State may try to request international protection in another Member State for many years to come. Therefore, the maximum period during which fingerprint and facial image data should be kept by the Central System should be of considerable length. Given that most third-country nationals or stateless persons who have stayed in the Union for several years will have obtained a settled status or even citizenship of a Member State after that period, a period of ten years should be considered a reasonable period for the storage of fingerprint and facial image data. | (32) Third-country nationals or stateless persons who have requested international protection in one Member State may request international protection in another Member State for many years to come. Therefore, the maximum period during which fingerprint and facial image data should be kept by the Central System should be of considerable length. Given that most third-country nationals or stateless persons who have stayed in the Union for several years will have obtained a settled status or even citizenship of a Member State after that period, a period of ten years should be considered a reasonable period for the storage of fingerprint data, facial image data or both. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32a) The data on third country nationals and stateless persons resettled in a Member State by virtue of Regulation XXX/XXX should be kept for a period of 10 years. This is the period already applicable in the case of other applicants and beneficiaries of international protection. |
Recast: Recital specifying the period for which data on persons resettled within a Member States under Regulation XXX/XXX should be kept. A duration of 10 years is being proposed in order to align the processing of data on persons who have been resettled with that for other persons granted international protection.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32 a) In its conclusions on Statelessness of 4 December 2015, the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States recalled the Union's pledge of September 2012 that all Member States will accede to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and will consider acceding to the 1961 Convention. In its resolution of 25 October 2016 on human rights and migration in third countries, the European Parliament recalled the importance of identifying stateless persons in order to afford them the protections available under international law. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) In view of successfully preventing and monitoring unauthorised movements of third-country nationals or stateless persons who have no right to stay in the Union, and of taking the necessary measures for successfully enforcing effective return and readmission to third countries in accordance with Directive 2008/115/EC35 and the right to protection of personal data, a period of five years should be considered a necessary period for the storage of fingerprint and facial data. | deleted |
| 35 OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p.98 |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) In view of successfully preventing and monitoring unauthorised movements of third-country nationals or stateless persons who have no right to stay in the Union, and of taking the necessary measures for successfully enforcing effective return and readmission to third countries in accordance with Directive 2008/115/EC35 and the right to protection of personal data, a period of five years should be considered a necessary period for the storage of fingerprint and facial data. | (33) In view of successfully preventing and monitoring unauthorised movements of third-country nationals or stateless persons who have no right to stay in the Union, and of taking the necessary measures for successfully enforcing effective return and readmission to third countries in accordance with Directive 2008/115/EC35 and the right to protection of personal data, a period of ten years should be considered a necessary period for the storage of biometric and alphanumeric data. |
| 35 OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p.98 | 35 OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p.98 |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) In view of successfully preventing and monitoring unauthorised movements of third-country nationals or stateless persons who have no right to stay in the Union, and of taking the necessary measures for successfully enforcing effective return and readmission to third countries in accordance with Directive 2008/115/EC35 and the right to protection of personal data, a period of five years should be considered a necessary period for the storage of fingerprint and facial data. | (33) In view of successfully preventing and monitoring unauthorised movements of third-country nationals or stateless persons who have no right to stay in the Union, and of taking the necessary measures for successfully enforcing effective return and readmission to third countries in accordance with Directive 2008/115/EC35 and the right to protection of personal data, a period of ten years should be considered a necessary period for the storage of fingerprint and facial data. |
| 35 OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p.98 | 35 OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p.98 |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) The storage period should be shorter in certain special situations where there is no need to keep fingerprint and facial data and all other personal data for that length of time. Fingerprint and facial image data and all other personal data belonging to a third-country national should be erased immediately once third-country nationals or stateless persons obtain citizenship of a Member State. | (34) The storage period should be shorter in certain special situations where there is no need to keep fingerprint data, facial data or both and all other personal data for that length of time. Fingerprint data, facial image data or both and all other personal data belonging to a third-country national should be erased immediately once third-country nationals or stateless persons obtain citizenship of a Member State or, in the case of children, as soon as they turn 18. |
This amendment is needed to maintain the logic of the text as it should serve to protect child victims of trafficking and support the identification and protection of unaccompanied children who go missing, disappear or abscond, as the European Commission highlighted in its explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed recast Eurodac Regulation. In order to comply with Article 7, Article 8 and Article 24 of the Charter, the processing of children's biometric data as young as six years of age can only be justified if it expressly pursues a child protection objective.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) The storage period should be shorter in certain special situations where there is no need to keep fingerprint and facial data and all other personal data for that length of time. Fingerprint and facial image data and all other personal data belonging to a third-country national should be erased immediately once third-country nationals or stateless persons obtain citizenship of a Member State. | (34) The storage period should be shorter in certain special situations where there is no need to keep fingerprint and facial data and all other personal data for that length of time. Fingerprint and facial image data and all other personal data belonging to a third-country national should be erased immediately and permanently once third-country nationals or stateless persons obtain citizenship of a Member State. |
In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary because it is inextricably linked to other admissible amendments related to the purposes of Eurodac (Article 1), introducing references to compliance with the principles of necessity and proportionality under Article 52 (1) of the Charter and the relevant CJEU case law.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) The storage period should be shorter in certain special situations where there is no need to keep fingerprint and facial data and all other personal data for that length of time. Fingerprint and facial image data and all other personal data belonging to a third-country national should be erased immediately once third-country nationals or stateless persons obtain citizenship of a Member State. | (34) The storage period should be shorter in certain special situations where there is no need to keep fingerprint and facial image data and all other personal data for that length of time. Fingerprint and facial image data and all other personal data belonging to a third-country national or stateless person should be erased immediately once third-country nationals or stateless persons obtain citizenship of a Member State. |
Correction of the commission'sproposal that doesn't insert in all the required places the wording 'and stateless persons', which is in line with the purpose of Eurodac as mentioned in article 1(a)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (37) It is necessary to lay down clearly the respective responsibilities of the Commission and eu-LISA , in respect of the Central System and the Communication Infrastructure, and of the Member States, as regards data processing, data security, access to, and correction of recorded data. | (37) It is necessary to lay down clearly the respective responsibilities of the Commission and eu-LISA, in respect of the Central System, the Communication Infrastructure and interoperability with other information systems, and of the Member States, as regards data processing, data security, access to, and correction of recorded data. |
The responsibilities incumbent on eu-Lisa in respect of the future development of the system and its interoperability with other information systems should be clearly established.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (41) For the purposes of protection of personal data, and to exclude systematic comparisons which should be forbidden, the processing of Eurodac data should only take place in specific cases and when it is necessary for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences. A specific case exists in particular when the request for comparison is connected to a specific and concrete situation or to a specific and concrete danger associated with a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence, or to specific persons in respect of whom there are serious grounds for believing that they will commit or have committed any such offence. A specific case also exists when the request for comparison is connected to a person who is the victim of a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. The designated authorities and Europol should thus only request a comparison with Eurodac when they have reasonable grounds to believe that such a comparison will provide information that will substantially assist them in preventing, detecting or investigating a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. | (41) The processing of Eurodac data should only take place in specific cases, in accordance with Union law on the protection of personal data, when it is necessary for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences. A specific case exists in particular when the request for comparison is connected to a specific and concrete situation or to a specific and concrete danger associated with a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence, or to specific persons in respect of whom there are serious grounds for believing that they will commit or have committed any such offence. A specific case also exists when the request for comparison is connected to a person who is the victim of a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. The designated authorities and Europol should thus only request a comparison with Eurodac when they have reasonable grounds to believe that such a comparison will provide information that will substantially assist them in preventing, detecting or investigating a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. |
Processing of Eurodac data should be done only on the basis of specific cases and in line with EU legislation that govern the use of personal data.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42) In addition, access should be allowed only on condition that comparisons with the national fingerprint databases of the Member State and with the automated fingerprinting identification systems of all other Member States under Council Decision 2008/615/JHA36 did not lead to the establishment of the identity of the data subject. That condition requires the requesting Member State to conduct comparisons with the automated fingerprinting identification systems of all other Member States under Decision 2008/615/JHA which are technically available, unless that Member State can justify that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it would not lead to the establishment of the identity of the data subject. Such reasonable grounds exist in particular where the specific case does not present any operational or investigative link to a given Member State. That condition requires prior legal and technical implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA by the requesting Member State in the area of fingerprint data, as it should not be permitted to conduct a Eurodac check for law enforcement purposes where those above steps have not been first taken. | (42) In addition, access should be allowed only on condition that a prior search in the national fingerprint and facial image databases of the Member State and in the automated fingerprinting identification systems of all other Member States under Council Decision 2008/615/JHA36 has been conducted. That condition requires the requesting Member State to conduct comparisons with the automated fingerprinting identification systems of all other Member States under Decision 2008/615/JHA which are technically available, unless that Member State can justify that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it would not lead to the establishment of the identity of the data subject. Such reasonable grounds exist in particular where the specific case does not present any operational or investigative link to a given Member State. That condition requires prior legal and technical implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA by the requesting Member State in the area of fingerprint data, as it should not be permitted to conduct a Eurodac check for law enforcement purposes where those above steps have not been first taken. |
| 36 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1). | 36 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1). |
In line with the purpose extention inArticle1(1)(c) of proposal(non-codified) which provides that Eurodac will serve not only the purposeof implementation of the DublinRegulation, but also law enforcement purposes. In order to fullfill theobligation of Member States designated authorities and Europol the procedurefor access to Eurodac should be quick and effective, but should still take intoconsideration that the main purpose of Eurodac is to support the Member Statesin applying the Dublin regulation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (43) Prior to searching Eurodac, designated authorities should also, provided that the conditions for a comparison are met, consult the Visa Information System under Council Decision 2008/633/JHA37 . | deleted |
| 37 Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 129). |
In line with the purpose extention in Article1(1)(c) of proposal (non-codified) which provides thatEurodac will serve not only the purpose of implementation of the Dublin Regulation, but also law enforcementpurposes. In order to fullfill the obligation of Member States designated authorities and Europol the law enforcement set under this regulation the access procedure to Eurodac should be quick and effective, but should still take into consideration that the main purpose of Eurodac is to support the Member States in applying the Dublin regulation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (46) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the creation of a system for the comparison of fingerprint and facial image data to assist the implementation of Union asylum and migration policy, cannot, by its very nature, be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. | (46) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the creation of a system for the comparison of fingerprint data, facial image data or both to assist the implementation of Union asylum and migration policy, cannot, by its very nature, be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (50) Transfers of personal data obtained by a Member State or Europol pursuant to this Regulation from the Central System to any third country or international organisation or private entity established in or outside the Union should be prohibited, in order to ensure the right to asylum and to safeguard applicants for international protection from having their data disclosed to a third country. This implies that Member States should not transfer information obtained from the Central System concerning: the name(s); date of birth; nationality; the Member State(s) of origin or Member State of allocation; the details of the identity or travel document; ; the place and date of application for international protection; the reference number used by the Member State of origin; the date on which the fingerprints were taken as well as the date on which the Member State(s) transmitted the data to Eurodac; the operator user ID; and any information relating to any transfer of the data subject under [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013]. That prohibition should be without prejudice to the right of Member States to transfer such data to third countries to which [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013] applies [ in accordance with Regulation (EU) No […/2016]respectively with the national rules adopted pursuant to Directive [2016/…/EU] ], in order to ensure that Member States have the possibility of cooperating with such third countries for the purposes of this Regulation. | (50) Transfers of personal data obtained by a Member State or Europol pursuant to this Regulation from the Central System to any third country or international organisation or private entity established in or outside the Union should be prohibited, in order to ensure the right to asylum and to safeguard applicants for international protection and third-country nationals and stateless persons for whom Member States intend to conduct a resettlement procedure under Regulation XXX/XXX from having their data disclosed to a third country. This implies that Member States should not transfer information obtained from the Central System concerning: the name(s); date of birth; nationality; the Member State(s) of origin or Member State of allocation or the Member State of resettlement; the details of the identity or travel document; the place and date of application for international protection or resettlement; the reference number used by the Member State of origin; the date on which the fingerprints were taken as well as the date on which the Member State(s) transmitted the data to Eurodac; the operator user ID; and any information relating to any transfer of the data subject under [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013]. That prohibition should be without prejudice to the right of Member States to transfer such data to third countries to which [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013] applies [ in accordance with Regulation (EU) No […/2016]respectively with the national rules adopted pursuant to Directive [2016/…/EU] ], in order to ensure that Member States have the possibility of cooperating with such third countries for the purposes of this Regulation. |
Recast: Amendment seeking to ensure that equivalent safeguards apply to the personal data of third-country nationals and stateless persons for whom Member States intend to conduct a resettlement procedure under the Regulation establishing a Union Resettlement Framework.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (50) Transfers of personal data obtained by a Member State or Europol pursuant to this Regulation from the Central System to any third country or international organisation or private entity established in or outside the Union should be prohibited, in order to ensure the right to asylum and to safeguard applicants for international protection from having their data disclosed to a third country. This implies that Member States should not transfer information obtained from the Central System concerning: the name(s); date of birth; nationality; the Member State(s) of origin or Member State of allocation; the details of the identity or travel document; ; the place and date of application for international protection; the reference number used by the Member State of origin; the date on which the fingerprints were taken as well as the date on which the Member State(s) transmitted the data to Eurodac; the operator user ID; and any information relating to any transfer of the data subject under [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013]. That prohibition should be without prejudice to the right of Member States to transfer such data to third countries to which [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013] applies [ in accordance with Regulation (EU) No […/2016]respectively with the national rules adopted pursuant to Directive [2016/…/EU] ], in order to ensure that Member States have the possibility of cooperating with such third countries for the purposes of this Regulation. | (50) Transfers of personal data obtained by a Member State or Europol pursuant to this Regulation from the Central System to any third country or international organisation or private entity established in or outside the Union should be prohibited, in order to ensure the right to asylum and to safeguard applicants for international protection from having their data disclosed to a third country. This implies that Member States should not transfer information obtained from the Central System concerning: the name(s); date of birth; nationality; the Member State(s) of origin or Member State of allocation; the details of the identity or travel document; ; the place and date of application for international protection; the reference number used by the Member State of origin; the date on which the fingerprints and facial image were taken as well as the date on which the Member State(s) transmitted the data to Eurodac; the operator user ID; and any information relating to any transfer of the data subject under [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013]. That prohibition should be without prejudice to the right of Member States to transfer such data to third countries to which [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013] applies [ in accordance with Regulation (EU) No […/2016]respectively with the national rules adopted pursuant to Directive [2016/…/EU] ], in order to ensure that Member States have the possibility of cooperating with such third countries for the purposes of this Regulation. |
Correction of the commission'sproposal that doesn't insert in all the required places both 'fingerprints' and'facial image', which is in line with the obligation as mentioned in article 2.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (51) In individual cases, information obtained from the Central System may be shared with a third-country in order to assist with the identification of a third-country national in relation to his/her return. Sharing of any personal data must be subject to strict conditions. Where such information is shared, no information shall be disclosed to a third-country relating to the fact that an application for international protection has been made by a third-country national where the country the individual is being readmitted to, is also the individual's country of origin or another third-country where they will be readmitted. Any transfer of data to a third-country for the identification of a third-country national must be in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of Regulation (EU) No. […2016]. | (51) Information obtained from the Central System should not be shared with a third-country in order to assist with the identification of a third-country national in relation to his/her return. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (69) It is appropriate to restrict the territorial scope of this Regulation so as to align it on the territorial scope of Regulation (EU) No […/…] , | (69) It is appropriate to restrict the territorial scope of this Regulation so as to align it on the territorial scope of Regulation (EU) No […/…], without prejudice to the provisions relating to the application of Regulation XXX/XXX; |
Recast: There is a need for a reference to the future scope of the Regulation establishing a Union Resettlement Framework to establish the extent to which this Regulation will apply to it.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (aa) facilitate the implementation of Regulation XXX/XXX in accordance with the relevant provisions of that Regulation. |
Recast: Amendment adding an objective to the Regulation since it is being proposed that its scope now include the data on persons for whom a Member State intends to conduct a resettlement procedure under Regulation XXX/XXX.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. | deleted |
| (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.) |
The enlargement of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to irregular migration and to enable the use of data for return purpose clearly runs contrary to the principle of purpose limitation, protected under Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the EU Data Protection Directive, and the new Data Protection Regulation. There are also three other databases (Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS) and Entry/Exit System (EES)) that already covers irregular entry and stay.
As long as necessity and proportionality have not been proven, the Regulation risks violating the Charter and could be challenged before the CJEU. As recommended by the EDPS, such an expansion should not be done before a careful assessment of the suitability of Eurodac to meet these objectives.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. | deleted |
| (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.) |
Eurodac was primarily designed to serve the implementation of the Dublin Regulation. With this new proposal, the scope of Eurodac is radically modified for immigration purposes, including removal and repatriation of persons. I do not agree with this extension of the scope. It also raises many issues regarding data protection. The purpose limitation principle should be respected - cf articles 8(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU and 5(b) of the Convention of the Council of Europe for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.Indeed, data shall be used in accordance with the original purpose for which they have been collected. Eurodac was designed as a database for implementing the Dublin Regulation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. | (b) assist with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. | (b) establish an instrument helping to combat illegal immigration to, and secondary movements within, the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. | (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless persons for determining which Member State is responsible for carrying out the appropriate measures to be taken, including removal and return of third-country nationals and stateless persons staying illegally. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. | (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation, in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality provided for in Article 52(1) of the Charter and the relevant case law of the CJEU. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. | (b) assist with the control of irregular immigration to, and secondary movements within, the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals in respect of whom an expulsion order has already been issued, for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Josef Weidenholzer, Péter Niedermüller, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation. | (b) assist with the identification of irregularly staying third-country nationals and stateless persons for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, if applicable, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation or granting permanent resident status. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprint and facial image data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences . | (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprint and facial image data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes. |
This mention is unnecessary and draw a dangerous parallel between migration and terrorist and criminal persons.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprint and facial image data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences . | deleted |
| (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it necessities corresponding changes throughout.) |
In its original form, the Eurodac Regulation was conceived to assist in the detection of multiple asylum applications. As such, access to data was restricted to immigration and asylum authorities. In 2013, the Eurodac Regulation was amended to introduce the possibility for Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol to access Eurodac for the purposes of prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences.The proposal to add a secondary objective not envisaged in the original architecture of the system raised considerable concerns. In its opinion, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) argued that the necessity and proportionality of law enforcement access were not sufficiently demonstrated and applicable data protection law aspects had not been sufficiently considered. In particular, it argued that the additional purpose of Eurodac was hard to reconcile with the principle of purpose limitation, and that the access to a database of vulnerable persons was potentially discriminatory.The rapporteur has opened up this part of the regulation in order to give Europol direct access to the Eurodac database.However, the concerns raised in 2013 against the enlargement of the scope remains, and there has yet not been a assessment of necessity or proportionality. As long as necessity and proportionality have not been proven for each of these elements, the Regulation risks violating the Charter and could be challenged before the CJEU. As recommended by the EDPS, such an expansion should not be done before a careful assessment of the suitability of Eurodac to meet these objectives.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprint and facial image data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences . | (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprint and facial image data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences, in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality provided for in Article 52(1) of the Charter and the relevant case law of the CJEU. |
In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary because it is inextricably linked to other admissible amendments related to the purposes of Eurodac (Article 1), introducing references to compliance with the principles of necessity and proportionality under Article 52 (1) of the Charter and the relevant CJEU case law.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprint and facial image data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences . | (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprints, facial image and alphanumeric data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences . |
Under the proposal, national law enforcementauthorities and Europol cannot request comparison with specific alphanumeric data, which ishighly detrimental to investigations, especially in the counter-terrorismfield, trying to establish the places and dates of entry in the EU of suspectsfor which a used identity is known, but no fingerprint is available. In thiscontext, and given that Art.1.1(c) of the proposal, extends its scope ofEurodac to law enforcement purposes, it would be essential for national law enforcementauthorities and Europol to have access to all data contained in Eurodac inorder to properly carry out their tasks.
Monika Hohlmeier, Heinz K. Becker, Jeroen Lenaers, Rachida Dati, Brice Hortefeux, Mariya Gabriel, Artis Pabriks
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprint and facial image data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences . | (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprint and facial image data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences . |
| (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.) |
This amendment will apply to the whole text and is in line with adding new paragraph (c) of Article (1).
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprint and facial image data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences . | (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of fingerprint data, facial image data or both with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences . |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ca) protect and identify children who are the victims of human trafficking or abuse, who have gone missing or have been kidnapped, and to establish children's identity and help Member States locate their family members or identify links that they may have with Member States in the best interests of such children. |
Lowering the age at which fingerprints can be taken from 14 to 6 is designed to better protect children against human trafficking and kidnapping. This should be clearly specified.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c a) facilitate family reunification and identify and protect child victims of trafficking in human beings. The personal data obtained from minors shall be exempted from the purposes set out in points (b) and (c). Special attention shall be given to the rights of unaccompanied minors. |
In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary because it is inextricably linked to other admissible amendments related to further purposes of Eurodac (Article 1), related to family reunification and the identification and protection of minors. While lowering the age of taking fingerprints and facial images to six years (Article 10, 13 and 14), the purpose of Eurodac should also be facilitating family reunification and identify and protect child victims of human trafficking. This purpose will positively contribute to the protection of the rights of the child, including the rights of unaccompanied minors.
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c a) assist the Member States in protecting and identifying child victims of trafficking in human beings and in protecting and identifying missing children and taking measures for family tracing and reunification |
As the European Commission highlighted in its explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed Eurodac recast, the lowering of the minimum age from 14 years to 6 years in Article 10(1) et al. should serve in order to protect child victims of trafficking and support the identification and protection of unaccompanied children. In order to comply with Article 7, 8 and 24 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights the processing of childrens' biometric data could be only justified by a child protection purpose. Therefore this amendment is directly linked to the changes which the Commission proposed.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c a) assist the Member States in protecting and identifying child victims of trafficking in human beings and in protecting and identifying missing children. |
This amendment is needed to maintain the logic of the text as it should serve to protect child victims of trafficking and support the identification and protection of unaccompanied children who go missing, disappear or abscond, as the European Commission highlighted in its explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed recast Eurodac Regulation. In order to comply with Article 7, Article 8 and Article 24 of the Charter, the processing of children's biometric data as young as six years of age can only be justified if it expressly pursues a child protection objective.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Without prejudice to the processing of data intended for Eurodac by the Member State of origin in databases set up under the latter's national law, fingerprint data and other personal data may be processed in Eurodac only for the purposes set out in this Regulation and [Article 34(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013]. | 2. Without prejudice to the processing of data intended for Eurodac by the Member State of origin in databases set up under the latter's national law, fingerprints and facial image data and other personal data may be processed in Eurodac only for the purposes set out in this Regulation and [Article 34(1) of Regulation (EU) ....]. |
Correction of the commission'sproposal that doesn't insert in all the required places both 'fingerprints' and'facial image', which is in line with the obligation as mentioned in article 2.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Obligation to take fingerprints and a facial image | Procedural safeguards for the protection of children and vulnerable persons |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Obligation to take fingerprints and a facial image | Obligation to take fingerprints |
| (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.) |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States are obliged to take the fingerprints and facial image of persons referred to in Article 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of this Regulation and shall impose on the data-subject the requirement to provide his or her fingerprints and a facial image and inform them as such in accordance with Article 30 of this Regulation. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States are obliged to take the fingerprints and facial image of persons referred to in Article 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of this Regulation and shall impose on the data-subject the requirement to provide his or her fingerprints and a facial image and inform them as such in accordance with Article 30 of this Regulation. | 1. The person referred to in Articles 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) shall be registered. Therefore, Member States are obliged to take their fingerprints and facial images for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of this Regulation and shall impose on the data-subject the requirement to provide his or her fingerprints and facial image and inform them as such in accordance with Article 30 of this Regulation. |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States are obliged to take the fingerprints and facial image of persons referred to in Article 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of this Regulation and shall impose on the data-subject the requirement to provide his or her fingerprints and a facial image and inform them as such in accordance with Article 30 of this Regulation. | 1. Member States are obliged to take the fingerprints and facial image of persons referred to in Article 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a), (b) and (ca) of this Regulation and shall impose on the data-subject the requirement to provide his or her fingerprints and a facial image and inform them as such in accordance with Article 30 of this Regulation. Member States shall, at all times, respect the dignity and physical integrity of the person during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing his or her facial image. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States are obliged to take the fingerprints and facial image of persons referred to in Article 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of this Regulation and shall impose on the data-subject the requirement to provide his or her fingerprints and a facial image and inform them as such in accordance with Article 30 of this Regulation. | 1. Member States are obliged to take the fingerprints and facial image of persons referred to in Articles 10(1), 12(a), 13(1) and 14(1) for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of this Regulation and shall impose on the data-subject the requirement to provide his or her fingerprints and a facial image and inform them as such in accordance with Article 30 of this Regulation and in accordance with the provisions and guarantees laid down in the Annex to this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States are obliged to take the fingerprints and facial image of persons referred to in Article 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of this Regulation and shall impose on the data-subject the requirement to provide his or her fingerprints and a facial image and inform them as such in accordance with Article 30 of this Regulation. | 1. Member States are obliged to take the fingerprints of persons referred to in Article 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of this Regulation and shall impose on the data-subject the requirement to provide his or her fingerprints and inform them as such in accordance with Article 30 of this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1 a. Member States shall record children who have gone missing from reception facilities as missing persons in the SIS. Missing children identified by Member State authorities based on a hit pursuant to Article 26 shall be promptly referred to the competent national child protection authorities, which shall undertake a needs assessment with a view to finding a durable solution for the child in accordance with his or her best interests. |
This amendment is needed to maintain the logic of the text as it should serve to protect child victims of trafficking and support the identification and protection of unaccompanied children who go missing, disappear or abscond, as the European Commission highlighted in its explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed recast Eurodac Regulation. In order to comply with Article 7, Article 8 and Article 24 of the Charter, the processing of children’s biometric data as young as six years of age can only be justified if it expressly pursues a child protection objective.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1 a. The taking of fingerprints and the capturing of facial images of women and girls shall be carried out in a gender-sensitive manner by trained officials. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. | 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and infographics and demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a legal guardian throughout the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. | 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images especially for the purpose laid down in point (ca) of Article 1(1). The minor shall be informed in written and oral form in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors in a language they can understand and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. Mental or physical coercion in order to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image from minors or vulnerable persons shall not be allowed. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. | 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall only be carried out in the best interests of the child and in accordance with the other principles enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner and by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors, and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical and psychological integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. | 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images and only for the purpose of points (a) and (ca) of Article 1(1). The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. | 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly, child-sensitive and gender-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed orally, in a language he/she understands, in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. |
Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, Damiano Zoffoli, Barbara Matera, Petras Auštrevičius, Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea, Carlos Coelho, Hilde Vautmans
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. | 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors in a language they can understand and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. | 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in written form, in oral form or both, in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. | 2. Taking fingerprints and facial images of minors from the age of 14 shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or representative at the time their fingerprints and facial image are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. |
The lowering of age from 14 to 6 years is not justified and not proportionate. It is questionable to consider that a 6-years child is in a position to fully understand such a process as well as the consequences on his/her private life. If some member states already collect data from minors (younger than 14years old),it does not make it more acceptable in an EU regulation. The Commission considers it would help with the identification of unaccompanied minors and with the establishment of family links but it does not clearly explain why and how. Moreover,the guarantees to protect the interest of the child are insufficient.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States may introduce administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law, for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. These sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention should only be used as a means of last resort in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity. | 3. In cases of non-compliance with the fingerprinting process in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, Member States shall offer further counselling and information regarding the fingerprinting procedure, the rights of the person concerned and the possible implications of non-compliance. |
Deprivation of liberty and the use of physical or psychological force to obtain fingerprints for Eurodac should be avoided because it entails a high risk of violating fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, namely the right to human dignity (Article 1) and the right to the integrity of the person (Article 3), the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 4) and the right to liberty and security (Article 6).Asylum seekers must provide fingerprints for Eurodac. As FRA pointed out in its 2015 Focus paper on ‘Fundamental rights implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints for Eurodac’, compliance with this obligation should primarily be secured through effective information and counselling. This can either be provided individually and/or through outreach actions targeting migrant communities, such as focus group discussions, information sessions and similar initiatives.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States may introduce administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law, for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. These sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention should only be used as a means of last resort in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity. | 3. Member States shall not introduce administrative sanctions for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States may introduce administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law, for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. These sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention should only be used as a means of last resort in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity. | 3. For the purposes of achieving full registration of all the persons in accordance with paragraph 1, Member States shall introduce administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law, for non-compliance with the process of taking biometric data. Member States shall make sure that an opportunity for counseling has been provided to the person in order to convince that person to cooperate with the procedure. Sanctions, including the possibility to use means of coercion, shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention should only be used as a means of last resort in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity. |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States may introduce administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law, for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. These sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention should only be used as a means of last resort in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity. | 3. Member States may introduce, where appropriate, well justified administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law and with full respect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. These sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention, for as short a time as possible and necessary, should only be used as a means of last resort after effective counselling if there is no other way to determine or verify a third-country national's or stateless person's identity and there is a risk of absconding. Detention of minors shall be prohibited. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States may introduce administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law, for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. These sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention should only be used as a means of last resort in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity. | 3. Member States may introduce administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law, for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. These sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention should be used in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States may introduce administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law, for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. These sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention should only be used as a means of last resort in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity. | 3. Member States may introduce administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law, for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. These sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention should only be used as a means of last resort in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity. In each individual case an assessment shall be made in order to determine whether all pre-conditions required to prevent arbitrary detention are fulfilled. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a minor or vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor, refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities, the national referral mechanisms or both. A specific needs assessment with a view to finding a durable solution for the child in accordance with his or her best interests shall be undertaken by the national child protection authorities, the other relevant national referral mechanisms or both. |
This amendment is needed to maintain the logic of the text as it should serve to protect child victims of trafficking and support the identification and protection of unaccompanied children who go missing, disappear or abscond, as the European Commission highlighted in its explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed recast Eurodac Regulation. In order to comply with Article 7, Article 8 and Article 24 of the Charter, the processing of children’s biometric data as young as six years of age can only be justified if it expressly pursues a child protection objective.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a minor or vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. | 4. Member States shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints of a person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so, and it shall be done in an age-appropriate manner as provided for in Article 2(2). Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, as assessed by an official trained specifically to deal with minors, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. |
Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, Damiano Zoffoli, Barbara Matera, Petras Auštrevičius, Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea, Carlos Coelho, Hilde Vautmans
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a minor or vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a minor or vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a minor or vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals or stateless persons who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image nor mental or physical coercion. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a minor or vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a minor or vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals or stateless persons who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a minor or vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or facial image and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions to coerce the taking of fingerprints or a facial image. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a minor or vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and from a minor due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State may apply sanctions if the person concerned refuses to allow the taking of their fingerprints or facial image. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a minor or vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor refuses to give their fingerprints or a facial image and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, the minor shall be referred to the national child protection authorities and /or national referral mechanisms. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. The procedure for taking fingerprints and a facial image shall be determined and applied in accordance with the national practice of the Member State concerned and in accordance with the safeguards laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. | 5. The procedure for taking fingerprints and a facial image shall be established and monitored, jointly, by the European Union Agency for Asylum and FRA, building upon the FRA's 2015 Checklist1a and applied by the Member State concerned in full respect of human dignity and in accordance with the safeguards laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. |
| 1a FRA Checklist to act in compliance with fundamental rights when obtaining fingerprints for Eurodac, 2015 http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/fundamental-rights-implications-obligation-provide-fingerprints-eurodac#checklist |
In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary because it is inextricably linked to other admissible amendments related to further purposes of Eurodac (Article 1), related to a common procedure established and monitored by the European Union Agency for Asylum and FRA - see recital 30.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. The procedure for taking fingerprints and a facial image shall be determined and applied in accordance with the national practice of the Member State concerned and in accordance with the safeguards laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. | 5. The taking of fingerprints or a facial image shall be performed with full respect for human dignity. The procedure for taking fingerprints and a facial image shall be determined and applied in accordance with the national practice of the Member State concerned, follow the common approach set out in Annex 1a to this Regulation and be conducted in accordance with the safeguards laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. |
Recast: The results of a survey show that some Member States authorise the use of detention to ensure that migrants provide their fingerprints, some authorise the use of a proportionate level of coercion, while others use neither detention or coercion. It is therefore necessary to harmonise current practices to ensure they fulfil their obligations under the Eurodac Regulation and all provide the same level of guarantees. Common approach developed by the Commission in SWD (2015) 150 final.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (aa) 'third-country national or stateless person for whom a Member State intends to conduct a resettlement procedure' means a third-country national or stateless person in respect of whom a Member State has initiated a resettlement procedure under Article 10(2) of Regulation XXX/XXX |
Recast: Amendment adding the definition of the new category of persons whose data it is being proposed should be registered in Eurodac. A reference to Regulation XXX/XXX must therefore be included.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ia) in relation to a person covered by Article 12a, the Member State which transmits the personal data to the Central System and receives the results of the comparison; |
Recast: Amendment relating to the proposal to add a new category of persons (new Chapter IIa) which seeks to ensure consistency in the text as regards that addition.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) 'illegal stay' means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfill, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State; | (d) 'irregular stay' means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfill, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) 'illegal stay' means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfill, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State; | (d) 'irregular stay' means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfill, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State; |
| (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.) |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) 'illegal stay' means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfill, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State; | (d) 'illegal stay' means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national or stateless person who does not fulfill, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) 'hit' means the existence of a match or matches established by the Central System by comparison between fingerprint data recorded in the computerised central database and those transmitted by a Member State with regard to a person, without prejudice to the requirement that Member States shall immediately check the results of the comparison pursuant to Article 26(4); | (f) 'hit' means the existence of a match or matches established by the Central System by comparison between fingerprints and facial image data recorded in the computerised central database and those transmitted by a Member State with regard to a person, without prejudice to the requirement that Member States shall immediately check the results of the comparison pursuant to Article 26(4); |
Correction of the commission'sproposal that doesn't insert in all the required places both 'fingerprints' and'facial image', which is in line with the obligation as mentioned in article 2.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (i) 'Europol' means the European Police Office established by Decision 2009/371/JHA; | deleted |
In its original form, the Eurodac Regulation was conceived to assist in the detection of multiple asylum applications. As such, access to data was restricted to immigration and asylum authorities. In 2013, the Eurodac Regulation was amended to introduce the possibility for Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol to access Eurodac for the purposes of prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences.The proposal to add a secondary objective not envisaged in the original architecture of the system raised considerable concerns. In its opinion, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) argued that the necessity and proportionality of law enforcement access were not sufficiently demonstrated and applicable data protection law aspects had not been sufficiently considered. In particular, it argued that the additional purpose of Eurodac was hard to reconcile with the principle of purpose limitation, and that the access to a database of vulnerable persons was potentially discriminatory.The rapporteur has opened up this part of the regulation in order to give Europol direct access to the Eurodac database.However, the concerns raised in 2013 against the enlargement of the scope remains, and there has yet not been a assessment of necessity or proportionality. As long as necessity and proportionality have not been proven for each of these elements, the Regulation risks violating the Charter and could be challenged before the CJEU. As recommended by the EDPS, such an expansion should not be done before a careful assessment of the suitability of Eurodac to meet these objectives.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (j) 'Eurodac data' means all data stored in the Central System in accordance with Article 12, Article 13(2) and Article 14(2) ; | (j) 'Eurodac data' means all data stored in the Central System in accordance with Article 12, Article 12a, Article 13(2) and Article 14(2); |
Recast: Amendement relating to the proposal to add a new category of persons (new Chapter IIa) which seeks to ensure consistency in the text as regards that addition.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (j) 'Eurodac data' means all data stored in the Central System in accordance with Article 12, Article 13(2) and Article 14(2) ; | (j) 'Eurodac data' means all data stored in the Central System in accordance with Article 12 and Article 13(2); |
This amendment is admissible as inextricably linked to the admissible amendments deleting Article 14(1), Article 14(2), Article 14(4), Article 14(5) and Article 14(6)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (k) 'law enforcement' means the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences; | deleted |
In its original form, the Eurodac Regulation was conceived to assist in the detection of multiple asylum applications. As such, access to data was restricted to immigration and asylum authorities. In 2013, the Eurodac Regulation was amended to introduce the possibility for Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol to access Eurodac for the purposes of prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences.The proposal to add a secondary objective not envisaged in the original architecture of the system raised considerable concerns. In its opinion, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) argued that the necessity and proportionality of law enforcement access were not sufficiently demonstrated and applicable data protection law aspects had not been sufficiently considered. In particular, it argued that the additional purpose of Eurodac was hard to reconcile with the principle of purpose limitation, and that the access to a database of vulnerable persons was potentially discriminatory.The rapporteur has opened up this part of the regulation in order to give Europol direct access to the Eurodac database.However, the concerns raised in 2013 against the enlargement of the scope remains, and there has yet not been a assessment of necessity or proportionality. As long as necessity and proportionality have not been proven for each of these elements, the Regulation risks violating the Charter and could be challenged before the CJEU. As recommended by the EDPS, such an expansion should not be done before a careful assessment of the suitability of Eurodac to meet these objectives.
Monika Hohlmeier, Heinz K. Becker, Jeroen Lenaers, Rachida Dati, Brice Hortefeux, Mariya Gabriel, Artis Pabriks
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (k) 'law enforcement' means the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences; | (k) 'law enforcement' means the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences; |
This amendment will apply to the whole text and is in line with adding new paragraph (c) of Article (1).
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (l) 'terrorist offences' means the offences under national law which correspond or are equivalent to those referred to in Articles 1 to 4 of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA; | deleted |
In its original form, the Eurodac Regulation was conceived to assist in the detection of multiple asylum applications. As such, access to data was restricted to immigration and asylum authorities. In 2013, the Eurodac Regulation was amended to introduce the possibility for Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol to access Eurodac for the purposes of prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences.The proposal to add a secondary objective not envisaged in the original architecture of the system raised considerable concerns. In its opinion, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) argued that the necessity and proportionality of law enforcement access were not sufficiently demonstrated and applicable data protection law aspects had not been sufficiently considered. In particular, it argued that the additional purpose of Eurodac was hard to reconcile with the principle of purpose limitation, and that the access to a database of vulnerable persons was potentially discriminatory.The rapporteur has opened up this part of the regulation in order to give Europol direct access to the Eurodac database.However, the concerns raised in 2013 against the enlargement of the scope remains, and there has yet not been a assessment of necessity or proportionality. As long as necessity and proportionality have not been proven for each of these elements, the Regulation risks violating the Charter and could be challenged before the CJEU. As recommended by the EDPS, such an expansion should not be done before a careful assessment of the suitability of Eurodac to meet these objectives.
Monika Hohlmeier, Heinz K. Becker, Jeroen Lenaers, Rachida Dati, Brice Hortefeux, Mariya Gabriel, Artis Pabriks
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (l) 'terrorist offences' means the offences under national law which correspond or are equivalent to those referred to in Articles 1 to 4 of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA; | (l) 'terrorist offences' means the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 of Directive (EU) 2017/... of the European Parliament and of the Council [on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA]. |
Provisions of the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA were integrated in the new directive on combating terrorism, voted in the European Parliament on the 16th of February 2017.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (n) 'fingerprint data' means the data relating to plain and rolled impressions of the fingerprints of all ten fingers, where present , or a latent fingerprint; | (n) 'fingerprint data' means the data relating to plain and rolled impressions of the fingerprints of all ten fingers, where present, or at least the index fingers, or a latent fingerprint; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (o) facial image means digital images of the face with sufficient image resolution and quality to be used in automatic biometric matching. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (oa) 'stateless person' means a person who is not considered to be a national of any state under the operation of its law. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (o a) 'alphanumeric data' means data represented by letters, digits, special characters, spaces and punctuation marks; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Data on persons covered by Articles 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) which are processed in the Central System shall be processed on behalf of the Member State of origin under the conditions set out in this Regulation and separated by appropriate technical means. | 4. Data on persons covered by Articles 10(1), 12a, 13(1) and 14(1) which are processed in the Central System shall be processed on behalf of the Member State of origin under the conditions set out in this Regulation and separated by appropriate technical means. |
Recast: Amendment relating to the proposal to add a new category of persons (new Chapter IIa) which seeks to ensure consistency in the text as regards that addition.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Eu-LISA shall be permitted to use real personal data of the Eurodac production system for testing purposes in the following circumstances: | deleted |
| (a) for diagnostics and repair when faults are discovered with the Central System; and | |
| (b) for testing new technologies and techniques relevant to enhance the performance of the Central System or transmission of data to it. | |
| In such cases, the security measures, access control and logging activities at the testing environment shall be equal to the ones for the Eurodac production system. Real personal data adopted for testing shall be rendered anonymous in such a way that the data-subject is no longer identifiable. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Eu-LISA shall be permitted to use real personal data of the Eurodac production system for testing purposes in the following circumstances: | deleted |
| (a) for diagnostics and repair when faults are discovered with the Central System; and | |
| (b) for testing new technologies and techniques relevant to enhance the performance of the Central System or transmission of data to it. | |
| In such cases, the security measures, access control and logging activities at the testing environment shall be equal to the ones for the Eurodac production system. Real personal data adopted for testing shall be rendered anonymous in such a way that the data-subject is no longer identifiable. |
In line with the comments by the European Data Protection Supervisor: given the risks of using real data for testing purposes and the absence of added value of the use of such data, the EDPS recommends deleting Article 5(2) of the recast proposal allowing using real data for testing purposes.
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Eu-LISA shall be permitted to use real personal data of the Eurodac production system for testing purposes in the following circumstances: | Eu-LISA shall be permitted to use real personal data of the Eurodac production system for testing purposes and in strict compliance with Article 17 of the Staff Regulations on professional secrecy for every person involved in the testing only in the following circumstances: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Eu-LISA shall be permitted to use real personal data of the Eurodac production system for testing purposes in the following circumstances: | Eu-LISA shall be permitted to use real personal data of the Eurodac production system for testing purposes, in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (EU)2016/679, in the following circumstances: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Eu-LISA shall be permitted to use real personal data of the Eurodac production system for testing purposes in the following circumstances: | Eu-LISA shall be permitted to use real personal data of the Eurodac production system for testing and fine-tuning purposes in the following circumstances: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| In such cases, the security measures, access control and logging activities at the testing environment shall be equal to the ones for the Eurodac production system. Real personal data adopted for testing shall be rendered anonymous in such a way that the data-subject is no longer identifiable. | In such cases, the security measures, access control and logging activities at the testing environment shall be equal to the ones for the Eurodac production system. Real personal data adopted for testing shall be rendered anonymous in such a way that the data-subject is no longer identifiable. Eu-Lisa shall ensure that the relevant guarantees are provided in respect of the accessing of data by external contractors, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 24 and 28 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| In such cases, the security measures, access control and logging activities at the testing environment shall be equal to the ones for the Eurodac production system. Real personal data adopted for testing shall be rendered anonymous in such a way that the data-subject is no longer identifiable. | In such cases, the security measures, access control and logging activities at the testing environment shall be equal to the ones for the Eurodac production system. Real personal data adopted for testing shall be subject to stringent conditions and rendered anonymous in such a way that the data-subject is no longer identifiable. All personal data shall be directly and permanently erased from the testing environment after the testing purposes have been achieved or the tests have been completed. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| In such cases, the security measures, access control and logging activities at the testing environment shall be equal to the ones for the Eurodac production system. Real personal data adopted for testing shall be rendered anonymous in such a way that the data-subject is no longer identifiable. | In such cases, the security measures, access control and logging activities at the testing environment shall be equal to the ones for the Eurodac production system. Real personal data adopted for testing shall be rendered anonymous in such a way that the data-subject is no longer identifiable. After completion of the purposes referred to in the first subparagraph, the real personal data shall be permanently erased from the testing environment. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ca) interoperability with other information systems. |
Recast: Specifies that eu-Lisa will be responsible for the future development of secure communications channels between the Eurodac Central System and other systems.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Member States shall designate the authorities that are authorised to request comparisons with Eurodac data pursuant to this Regulation. Designated authorities shall be authorities of the Member States which are responsible for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences. Designated authorities shall not include agencies or units exclusively responsible for intelligence relating to national security. | 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Member States shall designate the authorities that are authorised to request comparisons with Eurodac data pursuant to this Regulation. Designated authorities shall be authorities of the Member States which are responsible for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences. |
It is unclear why a specific exclusion is inserted in the text for agencies or units exclusively responsible for intelligence relating to national security related to the purpose laid down in article 1(1)(c). The conditions under which Member States' designated authorities Europol may request the access to Eurodac data is regulated in this regulation. Which designated authority the Member State uses to implement their obligation to prevent, detect or investigate terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences is up to the Member State itself.
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Each Member State shall keep a list of the designated authorities. | 2. Each Member State shall keep a list of the designated authorities and communicate it without delay to the Commission and to eu-LISA. Eu-LISA shall publish the consolidated list in the Official Journal of the European Union. Where that list has been amended, eu-LISA shall publish once a year an updated consolidated list online. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article 7 | deleted |
| Member States' verifying authorities for law enforcement purposes | |
| 1. | |
| For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), each Member State shall designate a single national authority or a unit of such an authority to act as its verifying authority. The verifying authority shall be an authority of the Member State which is responsible for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences. | |
| The designated authority and the verifying authority may be part of the same organisation, if permitted under national law, but the verifying authority shall act independently when performing its tasks under this Regulation. The verifying authority shall be separate from the operating units referred to in Article 6(3) and shall not receive instructions from them as regards the outcome of the verification. | |
| Member States may designate more than one verifying authority to reflect their organisational and administrative structures, in accordance with their constitutional or legal requirements. | |
| 2. | |
| The verifying authority shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of fingerprints with Eurodac data are fulfilled. | |
| Only duly empowered staff of the verifying authority shall be authorised to receive and transmit a request for access to Eurodac in accordance with Article 20. | |
| Only the verifying authority shall be authorised to forward requests for comparison of fingerprints and facial images to the National Access Point. | |
| (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.) |
In its original form, the Eurodac Regulation was conceived to assist in the detection of multiple asylum applications. As such, access to data was restricted to immigration and asylum authorities. In 2013, the Eurodac Regulation was amended to introduce the possibility for Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol to access Eurodac for the purposes of prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences.The proposal to add a secondary objective not envisaged in the original architecture of the system raised considerable concerns. In its opinion, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) argued that the necessity and proportionality of law enforcement access were not sufficiently demonstrated and applicable data protection law aspects had not been sufficiently considered. In particular, it argued that the additional purpose of Eurodac presented a ‘function creep’ and was hard to reconcile with the principle of purpose limitation, and that the access to a database of vulnerable persons (international protection applicants) was potentially discriminatory.The rapporteur has opened up this part of the regulation in order to give Europol direct access to the Eurodac database.However, the concerns raised in 2013 against the enlargement of the scope remains, and there has yet not been a assessment of necessity or proportionality. As long as necessity and proportionality have not been proven for each of these elements, the Regulation risks violating the Charter and could be challenged before the CJEU. As recommended by the EDPS, such an expansion should not be done before a careful assessment of the suitability of Eurodac to meet these objectives.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The verifying authority shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of fingerprints with Eurodac data are fulfilled. | The verifying authority shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of fingerprints, facial image and alphanumeric data with Eurodac data are fulfilled. |
Correction of the commission'sproposal that doesn't insert in all the required places both 'fingerprints' and'facial image', which is in line with the obligation as mentioned in article 2. Regarding the search possibility alphanumeric data: Under the proposal,national law enforcement authorities and Europol cannot request comparison with specific alphanumeric data, which is highly detrimental to investigations, especially in the counter-terrorism field,trying to establish the places and dates of entry in the EU of suspects forwhich a used identity is known, but no fingerprint is available. In thiscontext, and given that Art.1.1(c) of the proposal, extends its scope ofEurodac to law enforcement purposes, it would be essential for national lawenforcement authorities and Europol to have access to all data contained inEurodac in order to properly carry out their tasks.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Only the verifying authority shall be authorised to forward requests for comparison of fingerprints and facial images to the National Access Point. | Only the verifying authority shall be authorised to forward requests for comparison of fingerprints, facial image and alphanumeric data to the National Access Point. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Only the verifying authority shall be authorised to forward requests for comparison of fingerprints and facial images to the National Access Point. | Only the verifying authority shall be authorised to forward requests for comparison of fingerprints, facial images or both to the National Access Point. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article 8 | deleted |
| Europol | |
| 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Europol shall designate a specialised unit with duly empowered Europol officials to act as its verifying authority, which shall act independently of the designated authority referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article when performing its tasks under this Regulation and shall not receive instructions from the designated authority as regards the outcome of the verification. The unit shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of fingerprints and facial images with Eurodac data are fulfilled. Europol shall designate in agreement with any Member State the National Access Point of that Member State which shall communicate its requests for comparison of fingerprint and facial image data to the Central System. | |
| 2. For the purposes laid down in Article 1 (1)(c), Europol shall designate an operating unit that is authorised to request comparisons with Eurodac data through its designated National Access Point. The designated authority shall be an operating unit of Europol which is competent to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information to support and strengthen action by Member States in preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences falling within Europol's mandate. | |
| (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.) |
In its original form, the Eurodac Regulation was conceived to assist in the detection of multiple asylum applications. As such, access to data was restricted to immigration and asylum authorities. In 2013, the Eurodac Regulation was amended to introduce the possibility for Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol to access Eurodac for the purposes of prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences.The proposal to add a secondary objective not envisaged in the original architecture of the system raised considerable concerns. In its opinion, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) argued that the necessity and proportionality of law enforcement access were not sufficiently demonstrated and applicable data protection law aspects had not been sufficiently considered. In particular, it argued that the additional purpose of Eurodac presented a ‘function creep’ and was hard to reconcile with the principle of purpose limitation, and that the access to a database of vulnerable persons (international protection applicants) was potentially discriminatory.The rapporteur has opened up this part of the regulation in order to give Europol direct access to the Eurodac database.However, the concerns raised in 2013 against the enlargement of the scope remains, and there has yet not been a assessment of necessity or proportionality. As long as necessity and proportionality have not been proven for each of these elements, the Regulation risks violating the Charter and could be challenged before the CJEU. As recommended by the EDPS, such an expansion should not be done before a careful assessment of the suitability of Eurodac to meet these objectives.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Europol shall designate a specialised unit with duly empowered Europol officials to act as its verifying authority, which shall act independently of the designated authority referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article when performing its tasks under this Regulation and shall not receive instructions from the designated authority as regards the outcome of the verification. The unit shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of fingerprints and facial images with Eurodac data are fulfilled. Europol shall designate in agreement with any Member State the National Access Point of that Member State which shall communicate its requests for comparison of fingerprint and facial image data to the Central System. | 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Europol shall designate an authority which shall be authorised to request access to Eurodac through its designated central access point in order to prevent, detect and investigate terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences. The designated authority shall act independently of the central access point referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article when performing its tasks under this Regulation and shall not receive instructions from the designated authority as regards the outcome of the verification. The designated authority shall be an operating unit of Europol. |
In line with the purpose extention in Article1(1)(c) of proposal (non-codified) which provides thatEurodac will serve not only the purpose of implementation of the Dublin Regulation, but also law enforcementpurposes. In order to fullfill the obligation of Member States designatedauthorities and Europol, the procedure for access to Eurodac should be quick and effective, but should stilltake into consideration that the main purpose of Eurodac is to support the MemberStates in applying the Dublin regulation. This amendment together with the next arranges the access of Europol to Eurodac similar to the mechanism in the Entry-Exit System.
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Europol shall designate a specialised unit with duly empowered Europol officials to act as its verifying authority, which shall act independently of the designated authority referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article when performing its tasks under this Regulation and shall not receive instructions from the designated authority as regards the outcome of the verification. The unit shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of fingerprints and facial images with Eurodac data are fulfilled. Europol shall designate in agreement with any Member State the National Access Point of that Member State which shall communicate its requests for comparison of fingerprint and facial image data to the Central System. | 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Europol shall designate a specialised unit with duly empowered Europol officials to act as its verifying authority, which shall act independently of the designated authority referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article when performing its tasks under this Regulation and shall not receive instructions from the designated authority as regards the outcome of the verification. The unit shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of fingerprints and facial images with Eurodac data are fulfilled. Where the conditions are fulfilled, Europol shall communicate its requests for comparison of fingerprint and facial image data to the Central System. |
This amendment is linked to article 1(1) c). Both due to technical and data protection reasons Europol is at the moment not capable to request a comparison via the national contact point, even though the legislator had allowed Europol to do so during the last recast-procedure in 2013. Therefore, Europol should be allowed to request a comparison without detours.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Europol shall designate a specialised unit with duly empowered Europol officials to act as its verifying authority, which shall act independently of the designated authority referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article when performing its tasks under this Regulation and shall not receive instructions from the designated authority as regards the outcome of the verification. The unit shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of fingerprints and facial images with Eurodac data are fulfilled. Europol shall designate in agreement with any Member State the National Access Point of that Member State which shall communicate its requests for comparison of fingerprint and facial image data to the Central System. | 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Europol shall designate a specialised unit with duly empowered Europol officials to act as its verifying authority, which shall act independently of the designated authority referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article when performing its tasks under this Regulation and shall not receive instructions from the designated authority as regards the outcome of the verification. The unit shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of fingerprints, facial images or both with Eurodac data are fulfilled. Europol shall designate in agreement with any Member State the National Access Point of that Member State which shall communicate its requests for comparison of fingerprint data, facial image data or both to the Central System. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. For the purposes laid down in Article 1 (1)(c), Europol shall designate an operating unit that is authorised to request comparisons with Eurodac data through its designated National Access Point. The designated authority shall be an operating unit of Europol which is competent to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information to support and strengthen action by Member States in preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences falling within Europol's mandate. | 2. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Europol shall designate a specialised unit with duly empowered Europol officials as the central access point. The central access point shall verify that the conditions to request access to Eurodac laid down in Article 22 are fulfilled. The central access point shall act independently when performing its tasks under this Regulation and shall not receive instructions from the designated authority referred to in paragraph 1 as regards the outcome of the verification. |
In line with the purpose extention in Article1(1)(c) of proposal (non-codified) which provides thatEurodac will serve not only the purpose of implementation of the Dublin Regulation, but also law enforcementpurposes. In order to fullfill the obligation of Member States designatedauthorities and Europol, the procedure for access to Eurodac should be quickand effective, but should still take into consideration that the main purposeof Eurodac is to support the Member States in applying the Dublin regulation.This amendment together with the previous arranges the access of Europol to Eurodacsimilar to the mechanism in the Entry-Exit System.
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. For the purposes laid down in Article 1 (1)(c), Europol shall designate an operating unit that is authorised to request comparisons with Eurodac data through its designated National Access Point. The designated authority shall be an operating unit of Europol which is competent to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information to support and strengthen action by Member States in preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences falling within Europol's mandate. | 2. For the purposes laid down in Article 1 (1)(c), Europol shall designate an operating unit that is authorised to request comparisons with Eurodac data The designated authority shall be an operating unit of Europol which is competent to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information to support and strengthen action by Member States in preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences falling within Europol's mandate. |
This amendment is linked to article 1(1) c). Both due to technical and data protection reasons Europol is at the moment not capable to request a comparison via the national contact point, even though the legislator had allowed Europol to do so during the last recast-procedure in 2013. Therefore, Europol should be allowed to request a comparison without detours.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2 a. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(ca), Europol shall designate an operating unit in charge of missing children and child victims of trafficking in human beings. The designated authority shall be an operating unit of Europol competent to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information to support and strengthen action by Member States in preventing, detecting or investigating child trafficking, labour or sexual exploitation. |
In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary because it is inextricably linked to other admissible amendments related to further purposes of Eurodac (Article 1), related to family reunification and the identification and protection of minors. While lowering the age of taking fingerprints and facial images to six years old (Article 10, 13 and 14), the purpose of Eurodac should also be facilitating family reunification and identify and protect child victims of human trafficking. This will positively contribute to the protection of the rights of the child, including the rights of unaccompanied minors. Introducing a Europol operating unit on missing children and child victims of trafficking in human beings will contribute to this purpose.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article 8 a | |
| European Border and Coast Guard | |
| In accordance with Article (40)(8) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, the members of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency or teams of staff involved in return-related tasks as well as the members of the migration management support teams shall, within their mandate, have the right to access and search data entered in Eurodac within their mandate. They shall do so by using the technical interface set up and maintained by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency as referred to in Article (10)(3a). |
This amendment corresponds with the new role that Eurodac is taking over, which can be seen by the new paragraph (b) of Article (1). Eurodac shall now assist with the control of illegal immigration and secondary movement. Within its new mandate, the newly created European Border and Coast Guard Agency also has this task. Giving the European Border and Coast Guard access shall make sure that the new potential of Eurodac is exploited to the fullest.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) the number of data sets transmitted on persons referred to in Articles 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1); | (a) the number of data sets transmitted on persons referred to in Articles 10(1), 12a, 13(1) and 14(1); |
Recast: Amendment relating to the proposal to add a new category of persons (new Chapter IIa) which seeks to ensure consistency in the text as regards that addition.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) the number of data sets transmitted on persons referred to in Articles 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1); | (a) the number of data sets transmitted on persons referred to in Articles 10(1) and 13(1); |
This amendment is admissible as inextricably linked to the admissible amendments deleting Article 14(1), Article 14(2), Article 14(4), Article 14(5) and Article 14(6)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 10(1) who have subsequently lodged an application for international protection in another Member State , who were apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border and who were found illegally staying in a Member State ; | (b) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 10(1) who have subsequently lodged an application for international protection in another Member State ; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 10(1) who have subsequently lodged an application for international protection in another Member State , who were apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border and who were found illegally staying in a Member State ; | (b) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 10(1) who have subsequently lodged an application for international protection in another Member State ; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 13(1) who have subsequently lodged an application for international protection who were apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border and who were found illegally staying in a Member State ; | (c) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 13(1) who have subsequently lodged an application for international protection; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 13(1) who have subsequently lodged an application for international protection who were apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border and who were found illegally staying in a Member State ; | (c) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 13(1) who have subsequently lodged an application for international protection ; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 14(1) who had previously lodged an application for international protection in another Member State , who were apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border and who were found illegally staying in a Member State ; | deleted |
This amendment is admissible as inextricably linked to the admissible amendments deleting Article 14(1), Article 14(2), Article 14(4), Article 14(5) and Article 14(6)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 14(1) who had previously lodged an application for international protection in another Member State , who were apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border and who were found illegally staying in a Member State ; | (d) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 14(1) who had previously lodged an application for international protection in another Member State ; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) the number of fingerprint data which the Central System had to request more than once from the Member States of origin because the fingerprint data originally transmitted did not lend themselves to comparison using the computerised fingerprint recognition system; | (e) the number of fingerprint data, disaggregated according to the data subject's year of birth, which the Central System had to request more than once from the Member States of origin because the fingerprint data originally transmitted did not lend themselves to comparison using the computerised fingerprint recognition system; |
This amendment is needed to maintain the logic of the text as it should serve to protect child victims of trafficking and support the identification and protection of unaccompanied children who go missing, disappear or abscond, as the European Commission highlighted in its explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed recast Eurodac Regulation. In order to comply with Article 7, Article 8 and Article 24 of the Charter, the processing of children’s biometric data as young as six years of age can only be justified if it expressly pursues a child protection objective. In particular, children’s statistics concerning the reliability of biometric matching should be broken down by year of birth.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) the number of fingerprint data which the Central System had to request more than once from the Member States of origin because the fingerprint data originally transmitted did not lend themselves to comparison using the computerised fingerprint recognition system; | (e) the number of fingerprint and facial image data which the Central System had to request more than once from the Member States of origin because the fingerprints and facial image data originally transmitted did not lend themselves to comparison using the computerised fingerprint and facial image recognition system; |
Correction of the commission'sproposal that doesn't insert in all the required places both 'fingerprints' and'facial image', which is in line with the obligation as mentioned in article 2.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (g) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 19(1) and (4) for whom hits have been recorded under points (b) , (c) and (d) of this Article; | (g) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 19(1) for whom hits have been recorded under points (b) , (c) of this Article; |
This amendment is admissible as inextricably linked to the admissible amendments deleting Article 14(1), Article 14(2), Article 14(4), Article 14(5) and Article 14(6)
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (j) the number of requests made for persons referred to in Article 31; | (j) the number and type of requests made for persons referred to in Article 31; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The monthly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by each month. At the end of each year, the yearly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by eu-LISA . The statistics shall contain a breakdown of data for each Member State. | 2. The monthly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by each month. Disaggregated data specifying the age and sex of persons referred to in paragraph1(a) to (h) shall be included in the monthly statistical data. At the end of each year, the yearly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by eu-LISA . The statistics shall contain a breakdown of data for each Member State. |
This amendment is needed to maintain the logic of the text as it should serve to protect child victims of trafficking and support the identification and protection of unaccompanied children who go missing, disappear or abscond, as the European Commission highlighted in its explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed recast Eurodac Regulation. In order to comply with Article 7, Article 8 and Article 24 of the Charter, the processing of children's biometric data as young as six years of age can only be justified if it expressly pursues a child protection objective. In particular, to better evaluate the impact of the Eurodac Regulation on children, monthly statistics provided by eu-LISA under Article 9 of the proposal should be broken down by age and sex to understand how many boys and girls under the age of 18 years are affected.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The monthly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by each month. At the end of each year, the yearly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by eu-LISA . The statistics shall contain a breakdown of data for each Member State. | 2. The monthly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph1(a) to (k) shall be broken down, where possible, by age and sex in order to understand how many minor boys and girls are affected and shall be published and made public by each month. At the end of each year, the yearly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by eu-LISA . The statistics shall contain a breakdown of data for each Member State. |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Dietmar Köster, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The monthly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by each month. At the end of each year, the yearly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by eu-LISA . The statistics shall contain a breakdown of data for each Member State. | 2. The monthly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by each month and shall contain a breakdown of the data subjects' year of birth and gender. At the end of each year, the yearly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by eu-LISA . The statistics shall contain a breakdown of data for each Member State. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3 a. The duly authorized staff of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency shall have access to the statistics drawn up by eu-LISA referred to in paragraph (1)(a) to (h) and to the relevant data referred to in Article (12) (d) to (s), Article (13) (d) to (m) and Article (14) (d) to (m), solely for the purposes laid down in Article (1)(b) and for the purposes laid down in Articles 11 and 37 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, without allowing for individual identification. The processing of those data shall be carried out in compliance with the data protection safeguards provided for in Regulation (EU) 2016/1624. |
This amendment corresponds with the new role that Eurodac is taking over, which can be seen by the new paragraph (b) of Article (1). Eurodac shall now assist with the control of illegal immigration and secondary movement. Within its new mandate, the newly created European Border and Coast Guard Agency also has this task. Giving the European Border and Coast Guard access shall make sure that the new potential of Eurodac is exploited to the fullest.
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Each Member State shall promptly take the fingerprints of all fingers and capture a facial image of every applicant for international protection of at least six years of age and shall, as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after the lodging of his or her application for international protection, as defined by Article [21(2)]of Regulation (EU) No , transmit them together with the data referred to in Article 12 (c) to (n) of this Regulation to the Central System. | Each Member State shall promptly take the fingerprints of all fingers and capture a facial image of every applicant for international protection of at least six years of age and shall, as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after the lodging of his or her application for international protection, as defined by Article [21(2)]of Regulation (EU) No , transmit them together with the data referred to in Article 12 (c) to (n) of this Regulation to the Central System. The taking of fingerprints and capturing of facial images of children is especially for the purpose laid down in Article 1(1)(ca). |
This amendment is directly linked to the change of age from 14 years to 6 years proposed by the Commission in this Article.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Each Member State shall promptly take the fingerprints of all fingers and capture a facial image of every applicant for international protection of at least six years of age and shall, as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after the lodging of his or her application for international protection, as defined by Article [21(2)]of Regulation (EU) No , transmit them together with the data referred to in Article 12 (c) to (n) of this Regulation to the Central System. | Each Member State shall promptly take the fingerprints of all fingers of every applicant for international protection of at least 14 years of age and shall, as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after the lodging of his or her application for international protection, as defined by Article [21(2)]of Regulation (EU) No , transmit them together with the data referred to in Article 12 (c) to (n) of this Regulation to the Central System. |
| (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.) |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Each Member State shall promptly take the fingerprints of all fingers and capture a facial image of every applicant for international protection of at least six years of age and shall, as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after the lodging of his or her application for international protection, as defined by Article [21(2)]of Regulation (EU) No , transmit them together with the data referred to in Article 12 (c) to (n) of this Regulation to the Central System. | Each Member State shall promptly take the fingerprints of all fingers of every applicant for international protection of at least 18 years of age and shall, as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after the lodging of his or her application for international protection, as defined by Article [21(2)]of Regulation (EU) No , transmit them together with the data referred to in Article 12 (c) to (n) of this Regulation to the Central System. |
This is linked to the introduction of a new paragraph 1Anew to this Article, aimed at better protecting child victims of trafficking and supporting the identification and protection of children who go missing.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| For the purpose of Article 1(1)(ca), each Member State shall promptly take the fingerprints of all fingers and capture a facial image of every child applicant for international protection of at least six years of age and shall, as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after the lodging of his or her application for international protection, as defined by Article [21(2)] of Regulation (EU) XX/XXXX, transmit them together with the data referred to in points (c) to (n) of Article 12 of this Regulation to the Central System. |
This amendment is needed to maintain the logic of the text as it should serve to protect child victims of trafficking and support the identification and protection of unaccompanied children who go missing, disappear or abscond, as the European Commission highlighted in its explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed recast Eurodac Regulation. In order to comply with Article 7, Article 8 and Article 24 of the Charter, the processing of children's biometric data as young as six years of age can only be justified if it expressly pursues a child protection objective.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Non-compliance with the 72-hour time-limit shall not relieve Member States of the obligation to take and transmit the fingerprints to the Central System. Where the condition of the fingertips does not allow the taking of the fingerprints of a quality ensuring appropriate comparison under Article 26, the Member State of origin shall retake the fingerprints of the applicant and resend them as soon as possible and no later than 48 hours after they have been successfully retaken. | Non-compliance with the 72-hour time-limit shall not relieve Member States of the obligation to take and transmit the fingerprints and facial image to the Central System. Where the condition of the fingertips does not allow the taking of the fingerprints of a quality ensuring appropriate comparison under Article 26, the Member State of origin shall retake the fingerprints of the applicant and resend them as soon as possible and no later than 48 hours after they have been successfully retaken. |
Correction of the commission'sproposal that doesn't insert in all the required places both 'fingerprints' and'facial image', which is in line with the obligation as mentioned in article 2.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| By way of derogation from paragraph 1, where it is not possible to take the fingerprints and facial image of an applicant for international protection on account of measures taken to ensure his or her health or the protection of public health, Member States shall take and send such fingerprints and facial image as soon as possible and no later than 48 hours after those health grounds no longer prevail. | By way of derogation from paragraph 1, where it is not possible to take the fingerprints, facial image or both of an applicant for international protection on account of measures taken to ensure his or her health or the protection of public health, Member States shall take and send such fingerprints, facial image or both as soon as possible and no later than 48 hours after those health grounds no longer prevail. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Fingerprint data may also be taken and transmitted by members of the European Border [and Coast] Guard Teams or by Member State asylum experts when performing tasks and exercising powers in accordance with [Regulation on the European Border [and Coast] Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC] and [Regulation (EU) No. 439/2010]. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Fingerprint data may also be taken and transmitted by members of the European Border [and Coast] Guard Teams or by Member State asylum experts when performing tasks and exercising powers in accordance with [Regulation on the European Border [and Coast] Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC] and [Regulation (EU) No. 439/2010]. | 3. Fingerprint data shall be taken and transmitted by Member State asylum experts who have received specific training on fundamental rights, the right to asylum and on how to address the special needs of vulnerable migrants, including children. |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Fingerprint data may also be taken and transmitted by members of the European Border [and Coast] Guard Teams or by Member State asylum experts when performing tasks and exercising powers in accordance with [Regulation on the European Border [and Coast] Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC] and [Regulation (EU) No. 439/2010]. | 3. Fingerprint and facial image data may also be taken and transmitted by members of the European Border [and Coast] Guard Teams or by Member State asylum experts when performing tasks and exercising powers in accordance with [Regulation on the European Border [and Coast] Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC] and [Regulation (EU) No. 439/2010]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3 a. For the purposes of paragraph 3, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the future European Union Agency for Asylum shall set up and maintain a technical interface which allows a direct connection to the Central System of Eurodac. |
This amendment shall reduce the Agencys’ dependence on national infrastructure which can be a real burden to the daily work of the agencies as not every national infrastructure is on the highest standards.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) a facial image; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) a facial image; | (b) a facial image where the data subject is a minor; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) surname(s) and forename(s), name(s) at birth and previously used names and any aliases, which may be entered separately; | (c) surname(s) and forename(s), name(s) at birth and previously used names; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) nationality(ies); | deleted |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) nationality(ies); | (d) nationality(ies) or presumed and declared nationality or status as stateless person in accordance with Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) place and date of birth; | deleted |
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Josef Weidenholzer, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Péter Niedermüller, Kati Piri, Maria Grapini, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Caterina Chinnici
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (g a) details of family links of minors, such as names of family members and accompanying persons or any other relevant information that could help with possible family tracing or reunification; |
As the European Commission highlighted in its explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed Eurodac recast, the lowering of the minimum age from 14 years to 6 years in Article 10(1) et al. should serve in order to protect child victims of trafficking and support the identification and protection of unaccompanied children. In order to comply with Article 7, 8 and 24 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights the processing of childrens' biometric data could be only justified by a child protection purpose. Therefore this amendment is directly linked to the changes which the Commission proposed.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) type and number of identity or travel document; three letter code of the issuing country and validity; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (s a) in the case of a minor, and in particular when unaccompanied, where applicable, data on family members, such as surname(s), forename(s), data of birth, sex, nationality(ies), place of birth, relation to the minor. |
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Sources & citation
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- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2017). “AMENDMENTS 61 - 271 - Draft report Establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast)”. Text, 3 March 2017. docId LIBE-AM-601040. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/LIBE-AM-601040 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: EP Open Data API: document record, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/api/v2/documents/LIBE-AM-601040 (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-libe-am-601040,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{AMENDMENTS 61 - 271 - Draft report Establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast)}},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-03-03},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/LIBE-AM-601040}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/LIBE-AM-601040},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. docId LIBE-AM-601040. Data: EP Open Data API: document record (CC BY 4.0)}
}