Text · Opinion parliamentary committee draft
On the Institutional Framework of the European Union and its interaction with national authorities in the application of Union law, with particular reference to Article 19 TEU
Document JURI-PA-792146 · 2025/2263(INI)
- Kind
- Opinion parliamentary committee draft JURI-PA-792146
- Date
- 11 September 2026
- Committee
- Committee on Legal Affairs
- Rapporteur
- Ilhan Kyuchyuk
- Dossier
- 2025-2263
More facts (2)
- Formats
- Official page PDF Word
- Reference
- 2025/2263(INI)
Text
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Back matter, 2
Parts that accompany the text rather than belong to it: explanatory statement, annexes, opinions appended by other committees. Collapsed.
Amendments 166 blocks
The Committee on Legal Affairs submits the following to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible :
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| – having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 2, 4, 5 and 19 thereof, | – having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 2, 4, 5, 13 and 19 thereof, |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| -A. whereas Article 13(2) TEU provides that each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them, and that the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| C. whereas the authority and influence of the Court have grown continuously as a consequence of its rulings and the progressive consolidation of power by the Union; | C. whereas the principle of the separation of powers and an independent judiciary are corner stones of any modern democracy; whereas in recent years the judiciary has come under attack and should be protected, including by respecting the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 13(2) TFEU; whereas, through its authority, the Court is the ultimate guardian of the rule of law in the Union and the proper functioning of the internal market; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| P. whereas the Court of Justice has progressively assumed functions that entail responsibilities in the areas of fundamental rights, judicial independence and the rule of law; | P. whereas the supremacy and primacy of EU law are established fundamental legal principles and have become cornerstones of the Union’s legal order; whereas the Court has progressively evolved in parallel with successive Treaty reforms and the development of the Union’s competences conferred by the Member States, and has also assumed new judicial functions and responsibilities, particularly in safeguarding fundamental rights, judicial independence and the rule of law; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| R. whereas Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 introduced a partial transfer of jurisdiction in preliminary ruling proceedings to the General Court; whereas requests for preliminary rulings continue to be lodged before the Court of Justice, requiring an initial determination as to whether a case remains before the Court of Justice or is transferred to the General Court; | R. whereas Article 256(3) TFEU provides that the General Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, in specific areas laid down by the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Statute); whereas the first six of such specific areas were laid down in the Statute by way of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 281 TFEU for amending the Statute; whereas the Rules of Procedure of the Court lay down a clear procedure for lodging requests for preliminary rulings and for determining whether a case should be transferred to the General Court, thus ensuring necessary legal certainty for referring courts; whereas the Rules of Procedure were approved by the Council, in accordance with Article 253 TFEU; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| S. whereas this reform has increased the significance of internal decisions concerning the treatment and allocation of preliminary references and has consequently increased the importance of transparent, objective and foreseeable procedural safeguards; | S. whereas this reform has increased the significance of internal decisions concerning the treatment and allocation of preliminary references and has consequently increased the importance of transparent, objective and foreseeable procedural safeguards, which are ensured through the Rules of Procedure of both the Court of Justice and the General Court; whereas the system for allocating cases and the secrecy of judicial deliberations preserve the values of judicial independence, collegiality and consistency, thus protecting the Court from undue external influence and politicisation; whereas, in accordance with Article 35 of the Statute, the deliberations of the Court of Justice shall be and shall remain secret; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| T. whereas the President of the Court exercises significant procedural and organisational powers, including powers relating to the designation of reporting judges, the management of judicial formations and the administration of proceedings; whereas public confidence in judicial impartiality depends not only upon actual independence but also upon the appearance of institutional neutrality; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| U. whereas the principle of the ‘lawful judge’ as reflected in Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 ECHR, requires that the allocation of cases and the composition of judicial formations be governed by objective, predetermined and transparent rules; whereas concerns have been raised regarding the degree of discretion involved in the allocation of cases, the designation of reporting judges and the constitution of chambers within the Court; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| V. whereas legal certainty, foreseeability and effective judicial dialogue require judicial decisions to be based upon clearly identifiable legal reasoning and coherent doctrinal standards; whereas legal scholarship has repeatedly criticised the Court’s reliance on broad teleological reasoning, flexible Treaty interpretations, the absence of a clearly articulated hierarchy of interpretative methods and the limited doctrinal elaboration of judgments with significant constitutional consequences for Member States; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| W. whereas the absence of dissenting and concurring opinions, the secrecy of deliberations and the increasing practice of dispensing with opinions of Advocates General limit transparency and make it more difficult for citizens, national courts, legal practitioners and academia to understand the full range of legal arguments considered in constitutionally sensitive cases; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| X. whereas opinions of Advocates General frequently constitute the only publicly accessible alternative legal assessment within proceedings before the Court and therefore represent an important source of doctrinal transparency, legal pluralism and methodological development; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Y. whereas the internal deliberations of the Court are conducted exclusively in French despite the absence of any explicit Treaty provision establishing French as the Court’s sole internal working language; whereas concerns have been raised regarding linguistic equality and the equal participation of judges from different legal and linguistic traditions; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Z. whereas several constitutional and supreme courts of the Member States have emphasised the importance of maintaining a constructive judicial dialogue concerning constitutional identity, the limits of Union competences and the relationship between Union law and national constitutional law; whereas several such courts have reserved the right to review whether Union institutions have acted within the limits of the competences conferred upon the Union by the Member States; | Z. whereas the Court, together with several constitutional and supreme courts of the Member States, has continuously emphasised the importance of maintaining a constructive judicial dialogue throughout the Union in order to strengthen the relationship between Union law and national constitutional law; whereas several such courts have reserved the right to review whether Union institutions have acted within the limits of the competences conferred upon the Union by the Member States; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| AA. whereas Article 267 TFEU was conceived as a mechanism of judicial dialogue between the Court of Justice and national courts rather than as an instrument of judicial reform; whereas the Court does not possess the institutional means necessary to replace national judicial structures where deficiencies have been identified; | AA. whereas Article 267 TFEU was conceived as a mechanism of judicial dialogue between the Court of Justice and national courts; whereas the Court does not possess the institutional means necessary to replace national judicial structures where deficiencies have been identified; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| AB. whereas the growing significance of disputes concerning constitutional identity, fundamental constitutional structures and the allocation of competences has prompted discussion concerning more reciprocal forms of constitutional dialogue between the Court of Justice and the constitutional or supreme courts of the Member States; | AB. whereas constitutional friction can be a healthy and productive dynamic, and has prompted the Court’s commitment to fostering constitutional dialogue with the constitutional or supreme courts of the Member States through the Judicial Network of the EU; whereas the network was created in March 2017, the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties, and brings together the Court, the constitutional and supreme courts of the Member States and some non-EU countries, and observer courts such as the European Court of Human Rights; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| AC. whereas the legitimacy and authority of the Court depends on the confidence of the Member States and their national courts, legal practitioners, academia and citizens alike; | AC. whereas the legitimacy and authority of the Court is deeply rooted in the Treaties and enjoys wide support and confidence from the Member States and their national courts, legal practitioners, academia and citizens alike; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Considers that the Court’s very role in shaping the foundations of the Union and interacting with the Member States in matters of constitutional significance has increased the importance of ensuring the highest standards of transparency, methodological consistency, procedural legitimacy and institutional accountability; | 2. Considers that the Court has played an essential role in shaping the foundations of the Union, including through its interaction with the highest courts of the Member States in matters of constitutional significance; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Notes that constitutional and supreme courts in several Member States have expressed concerns regarding the limits of Union competences and the scope of judicial authority, including, but not limited to, the Danish Supreme Court in Ajos (15/2014, U.2017.824H), the German Federal Constitutional Court in PSPP(BVerfGE 154, 17), the Conseil d’État in Ministre de l’intérieur c. Cohn-Bendit (n° 11604) and French Data Network (n° 393099), the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in case K 3/21 and the Czech Constitutional Court in Holubec (Pl. ÚS 5/12); | 3. Notes that constitutional and supreme courts in several Member States have in some cases developed reflections regarding the limits of Union competences and the scope of judicial authority, including, but not limited to, the Danish Supreme Court in Ajos (15/2014, U.2017.824H), the German Federal Constitutional Court in PSPP (BVerfGE 154, 17), the Conseil d’État in Ministre de l’intérieur c. Cohn-Bendit (n° 11604) and French Data Network (n° 393099), the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in case K 3/21 and the Czech Constitutional Court in Holubec (Pl. ÚS 5/12); |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4a. Welcomes, in that regard, the contacts and discussions within the Judicial Network of the EU, which complement the formal dialogue of the preliminary ruling procedure; is of the opinion that this cooperation promotes mutual understanding and respect and enhances the quality of judicial decisions both at national and EU level; notes that, to this end, the Court, through the network, provides information to the highest national courts about its most important rulings; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4b. Encourages the Court and the constitutional and supreme courts of the Member States to invest even more to further develop and deepen the dialogue through the Judicial Network and to intensify the contacts and activities within it, such as contributing to a number of training courses on EU law for national constitutional and supreme courts, in collaboration with the European Judicial Training Network, or engaging in activities similar to the already established working groups on topics such as legal research, terminology and innovation; encourages the Judicial Network to further develop the private platform where member courts can exchange information in order to facilitate collaboration, in the interest of improving the speedy administration of justice; believes that such informal exchanges may help dissipate doubts in some cases before a request for a preliminary ruling is brought, including through exchanges fostering the application of the acte clair doctrine; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. Underlines that interpretations of Union law should not result in an effective extension of Union competences beyond those conferred by the Member States in the Treaties; | 5. Underlines that interpretations of Union law should not result in an effective extension of Union competences beyond those conferred by the Member States in the Treaties, while bearing in mind that the Treaties have evolved significantly and that new competences and areas of action need to be reviewed by the Court; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 12. Notes with concern that the current framework governing the allocation of cases, the designation of reporting judges and the constitution of judicial formations does not always provide a level of transparency comparable to standards associated with the principle of the lawful judge in several Member States; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 14. Calls for a review of the concentration of procedural and organisational powers within the office of the President of the Court with a view to strengthening institutional neutrality, transparency and public confidence in the administration of justice; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Notes that the 2024 reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice has increased the institutional significance of internal decisions concerning preliminary references; stresses that decisions determining whether a reference is examined by the Court of Justice or by the General Court should be based upon transparent, objective and foreseeable criteria consistent with the principle of a tribunal established by law; | 15. Notes that the 2024 reform of the Statute was necessary due to the constant increase in the number and complexity of requests for a preliminary ruling and the average time taken to deal with them, which had started to hamper the Court’s ability to properly administer justice; appreciates the fact that decisions determining whether a reference is examined by the Court of Justice or by the General Court are made in accordance with detailed rules set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice; notes, however, that despite the transfer of part of the Court of Justice’s competence to hear and determine requests for preliminary rulings, the backlog of cases and the duration of proceedings have not decreased significantly, owing to increasingly complex legislation that generates more questions from national courts; calls on the Court to further reflect on innovative solutions that could potentially be developed in the future in order to ensure more speedy proceedings and timely access to justice; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Requests that any future evaluation of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 includes a specific assessment of its effects on the allocation of preliminary references, legal certainty, the role of the President of the Court and the principle of a tribunal established by law; | 16. Recalls that the Court is to present a report on the implementation of the reform of the Statute by 2 September 2028, in accordance with Article 3 of amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019; notes that this report must provide detailed information to allow the effects of the reform on the allocation of preliminary references to be thoroughly assessed; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17. Regrets that the Court’s reasoning is often characterised by a high degree of abstraction and by limited methodological transparency; encourages the Court to identify more explicitly the interpretative methods relied upon in its judgments and to explain how competing methodological considerations have been weighed; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes that legal scholarship has repeatedly criticised the Court’s reliance on broad teleological reasoning, the absence of a clearly articulated hierarchy of interpretative methods and the limited doctrinal elaboration of judgments with significant constitutional consequences; takes the view that purposive reasoning, while remaining a feature of Union law, should complement rather than obscure textual, systematic and historical interpretation; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19. Regrets that the absence of dissenting and concurring opinions, the secrecy of deliberations and the non-publication of voting results limit transparency and make it more difficult for citizens, courts and legal practitioners to understand the full range of legal arguments considered in legal cases; | 19. Observes that the absence of dissenting and concurring opinions, the secrecy of deliberations and the non-publication of voting results are the very measures that preserve the independence of the Court’s judges and protect them from external pressure and unjustified sanctions; stresses the key constitutional balance to be struck: transparency is a fundamental value, but it is not absolute and must be reconciled with safeguards protecting the independence and integrity of judicial decision-making; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 20. Invites reflection on possible reforms capable of strengthening the openness and intelligibility of judicial reasoning, including the publication of concurring or dissenting opinions; | 20. Invites reflection on possible reforms capable of strengthening the intelligibility of judicial reasoning, in particular through the Judicial Network; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21. Notes with concern the increasing practice of dispensing with opinions of Advocates General pursuant to Article 20(5) of the Statute of the Court of Justice; stresses that such opinions frequently constitute the only publicly accessible, fully reasoned and independent alternative legal assessment within proceedings before the Court; encourages the Court to ensure that opinions of Advocates General remain available in cases raising novel, constitutionally sensitive or methodologically complex questions; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22. Notes that the exclusive use of French as the Court’s internal working language, despite the absence of any explicit Treaty basis, raises concerns regarding linguistic equality, the equal participation of judges from different legal traditions and the potential privileging of particular modes of legal reasoning; stresses that multilingualism is an expression of the equality of Member States, legal cultures and constitutional traditions; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23. Encourages consideration of a structured reciprocal constitutional dialogue mechanism under which the Court of Justice could invite the constitutional or supreme courts of the Member States to provide observations prior to delivering its judgment, in particular in cases concerning constitutional identity, fundamental constitutional structures or unresolved questions concerning the distribution of competences within the Union; takes the view that such a mechanism would strengthen mutual trust and constitutional dialogue; | 23. Notes that while it might be interesting to consider a structured reciprocal constitutional dialogue mechanism under which the Court of Justice could invite the constitutional or supreme courts of the Member States to provide observations prior to delivering its judgment, in particular in cases concerning constitutional identity, fundamental constitutional structures or unresolved questions concerning the distribution of competences within the Union, such a mechanism would represent an additional phase which could further delay the judicial procedure and, consequently, hinder speedy access to justice; acknowledges that such a mechanism would require a Treaty revision; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24. Calls on the Council and the Commission to ensure that future reforms concerning the Court of Justice remain fully consistent with the principle of conferral and the institutional balance established by the Treaties; emphasises that future developments of the Court should neither contribute to a de facto centralisation of judicial authority at Union level nor facilitate an expansion of Union competences through excessively broad interpretations of the Treaties; | 24. Emphasises that any future reforms concerning the Court should remain fully consistent with the principle of conferral of powers, judicial independence and the institutional balance established by the Treaties; stresses that the evolution of the Court’s role has never been to centralise judicial authority in the Union or facilitate an expansion of Union competences, but has always been to ensure, in accordance with Article 19 TEU, that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, the law is observed; |
Annex: declaration of input 1 block
The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not include in his report input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.
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European Parliament (2026). “DRAFT OPINION on the Institutional Framework of the European Union and its interaction with national authorities in the application of Union law, with particular reference to Article 19 TEU”. Text, 11 September 2026. docId JURI-PA-792146. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/JURI-PA-792146 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: EP Open Data API: document record, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/api/v2/documents/JURI-PA-792146 (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-juri-pa-792146,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{DRAFT OPINION on the Institutional Framework of the European Union and its interaction with national authorities in the application of Union law, with particular reference to Article 19 TEU}},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-09-11},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/JURI-PA-792146}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/JURI-PA-792146},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. docId JURI-PA-792146. Data: EP Open Data API: document record (CC BY 4.0)}
}