Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Decommissioning of the Ignalina nuclear power plant (INPP) is a first-of-a-kind, highly technically complex challenge for the European nuclear safety. It is also about the EU delivering on its commitment to solidarity with Lithuania.

Change 2

ChangedUnder Protocol No. 4 of Lithuania’s EU Accession Treaty, the country was required to prematurely close the Ignalina nuclear power plant due to serious safety concerns in Europe. The graphite-moderated Chernobyl-type reactors, although significantly more powerful, lacked full containment, and were inherently unsafe due to a fundamentally flawed design. Politically, closing the plant was a very difficult decision for Lithuania, where nuclear power, at its peak in 1993, covered some 88% of domestic electricity demand. However, the decision was taken in the interest of safety of Europe and based on a clear promise enshrined in the Accession Treaty: that the European Union would provide “adequate” financial assistance for the decommissioning of the Soviet-era plant. The Rapporteur welcomes the proposed Regulation which sets the amount and conditions for the next MFF 2028-2034. Discontinuing the Programme would have undermined the credibility of the Union. However, the Rapporteur aims to further strengthen the proposal, especially taking the account current geopolitical challenges, through a series of targeted amendments:

Change 3

RemovedThe Rapporteur welcomes the proposed Regulation which sets the amount and conditions for the next MFF 2028-2034. Discontinuing the Programme would have undermined the credibility of the Union.

RemovedHowever, the Rapporteur aims to further strengthen the proposal, especially taking the account current geopolitical challenges, through a series of targeted amendments:

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

1. Predictable and stable funding

The Rapporteur welcomes the Commission’s proposal to set the Programme’s funding in the next MFF at EUR 678 000 000 in current prices. However, both in the recitals and in the main text, this amount is referred to as “indicative” (“indicative financial envelope “), potentially implying that this amount is negotiable and can be reduced. This is disconcerting, particularly as this was not the case in the previous periods. The rapporteur considers the term “indicative” as misleading: it could reduce confidence that the Programme will be funded adequately. During the next MFF, the dismantling of the reactor cores will begin, and once started, this work cannot be interrupted to prevent risks and radiological hazards. Any funding uncertainty therefore raises serious nuclear safety concerns.

2. Anti-drone systems

The physical protection of the plant currently falls outside of the Ignalina Programme’s scope and remains the responsibility of the Lithuanian state. However, in recent years, nuclear power plants have become target of military strikes - for instance in February 2025, when a drone has caused nearly irreparable damage to the sarcophagus of the Chernobyl reactor, resulting in significant economic cost. Therefore, the Rapporteur proposes to include the anti-drone protection of the site within the scope of the Programme, to safeguard the population and prevent environmental and economic losses. This would also serve to protect the investments the Union has made over the years into the decommissioning of this object.

3. Strengthening the Union’s technological sovereignty

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ChangedIt is the view of the Rapporteur that Union funding under the Ignalina Programme should be limited to legal entities established in a Member State or in a country associated to relevant Union programmes, unless otherwise justified by duly substantiated security or technical necessity. Limiting eligibility would strengthen the protection of sensitive technologies, critical infrastructure and strategic know-how. It would also support the Union’s objective of reinforcing technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Exceptions can be made only by substantial security or technical necessity.necessity.In order to strengthen the Union’s technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy in the nuclear decommissioning sector, knowledge generated under the Programme should primarily reinforce Union industrial and technological capacities, while dissemination beyond the Union should be conducted in a manner that safeguards the Union’s security interests, intellectual property, and technological leadership.Sharing the knowledge indiscriminately risks empowering Europe’s competitors, including geopolitical rivals at the expense of the Union’s interest.

Change 5

RemovedIn order to strengthen the Union’s technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy in the nuclear decommissioning sector, knowledge generated under the Programme should primarily reinforce Union industrial and technological capacities, while dissemination beyond the Union should be conducted in a manner that safeguards the Union’s security interests, intellectual property, and technological leadership.

RemovedSharing the knowledge indiscriminately risks empowering Europe’s competitors, including geopolitical rivals at the expense of the Union’s interest.

4. Geological repository

Change 6

RemovedThe Commission’s proposal excludes the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste in deep geological repository, while the Rapporteur calls for keeping it in the Programme.

AddedThe Commission’s proposal excludes the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste in deep geological repository, while the Rapporteur calls for keeping it in the Programme. Due to the premature shutdown, INPP was unable to generate financial resources for the final disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste generated during its operation and fulfil its responsibility as a radioactive waste generator as provided for in the Article 9 of the Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom and national legal acts.Although Lithuania should take due responsibility for spent fuel and radioactive waste management, including final disposal, the magnitude of the financial burden placed on Lithuania (to co-finance INPP decommissioning and simultaneously fund the implementation of the deep geological repository) puts Lithuania in an exceptionally problematic situation. The cost of the final disposal is estimated at staggering 6.5 billion Euros. EU solidarity therefore must be also reflected in financial support for Lithuania‘s effort to implement final disposal solutions and avoid undue burden for future generations.

RemovedDue to the premature shutdown, INPP was unable to generate financial resources for the final disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste generated during its operation and fulfil its responsibility as a radioactive waste generator as provided for in the Article 9 of the Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom and national legal acts.