Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

The rapporteur supports targeted amendments to Horizon Europe to enable controlled support for dual-use research, particularly through the EIC Accelerator. Many disruptive defence-relevant technologies emerge in the civilian innovation space but struggle to attract sufficient investment due to the complexity of dual-use markets and heightened security sensitivities. Supporting SMEs and start-ups working on such technologies helps bridge the innovation-commercialisation gap while securing European leadership in strategically sensitive sectors. In parallel, the rapporteur introduces necessary safeguards, allowing the Commission to restrict participation to entities established in the Union or in trusted NATO and EEA partners, with security screening where justified. This ensures that EU research funding does not inadvertently strengthen the technological capabilities of potential adversaries.

Allowing Voluntary Use of Unspent RRF Resources for Defence Industry Investments

The rapporteur proposes to allow Member States to voluntarily reallocate unused Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) resources towards EDIP. The scale of industrial ramp-up required to meet both Ukrainian needs and Europe’s defence production capacities far exceeds current allocations. Given that new RRF commitments are only possible until the end of 2026, this measure would enable Member States to make full use of remaining uncommitted resources within the current timeframe. Voluntary reallocations provide additional flexibility to support large-scale joint procurement, production capacity expansion, and technological upgrades, while respecting national recovery plans, fiscal governance frameworks, and Member State budgetary sovereignty. The rapporteur underlines that this option maintains national control while contributing to collective defence industrial strengthening.

Clarifications in CEF: Military Mobility, Energy, and Counter-Mobility Infrastructure

The rapporteur introduces clarifications to ensure that CEF funding reflects military operational needs, particularly along the external borders where large-scale military movements and reinforcement scenarios depend on robust dual-use transport corridors, secure fuel logistics, protected energy grids, and grid protection measures. In addition, the rapporteur highlights the essential role of counter-mobility and territorial defence infrastructure, including dual-use obstacles, fortifications, and rapid deployment systems, which are critical for denying hostile access and supporting border and territorial defence. These upgrades not only support NATO reinforcement plans but also strengthen Union resilience, crisis response and civil protection capacities.

Participation Restrictions for Security Reasons

The rapporteur recognises that security-sensitive projects, especially those involving dual-use technologies, require differentiated eligibility rules. The amendments introduced clarify that while in some programs participation is or may be further limited to EU-based entities, trusted partners from associated countries, established in NATO and EEA countries may continue to participate subject to Commission risk-based security screening. This approach maintains coherence with existing practices under Digital Europe and Horizon Europe, while allowing necessary safeguards to be applied in proportion to security risks.

Strengthening Transparency, Financial Vetting and Beneficial Ownership Requirements

The rapporteur underlines that public funding in the defence sector carries elevated security risks if funds are channelled to entities with opaque ownership or malign foreign control. The introduction of mandatory beneficial ownership verification, AML screening, and a Defence Transparency Register ensures full traceability, transparency, and integrity of EU defence funding.

Reinforcing NATO-EU Coherence

The rapporteur reiterates that NATO remains the cornerstone of Europe’s collective defence architecture, providing essential deterrence and security guarantees. At the same time, the Union has a responsibility to strengthen its own defence technological and industrial base, build operational resilience, enhance its capacity to respond to complex hybrid threats, and safeguard the security of its Member States. The amendments strengthen the Union’s ability to act, while contributing to NATO coherence, interoperability, and transatlantic security unity as a complementary benefit.

Conclusion

The rapporteur stresses that the geopolitical environment the Union faces today leaves no room for strategic hesitation. The Russian threat and malign influence operations originating from China will remain central security challenges for Europe for years to come. Hybrid operations, cyber sabotage, and military intimidation demand that Europe reinforce its own defence technological and industrial base as a matter of sovereignty and survival.

The rapporteur supports the Commission’s approach to adapt existing Union programmes to allow defence-related projects to benefit from Union funding. The amendments introduced build on this approach by proposing complementary, targeted modifications that further strengthen operational relevance, address identified capability gaps and enhance financial integrity and security safeguards.

The Union must assume greater responsibility in securing its territory, safeguarding its populations, and contributing fully to the joint defence effort alongside NATO Allies. These amendments strengthen the Union’s readiness, resilience, and credibility in a time where geopolitical competition is intensifying, threats are becoming more complex, and security can no longer be outsourced.