Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Added35. Expresses deep concern that the EU still maintains its reliance on Russian gas and, moreover, has recently seen an increase, with imports rising by 18 % in 2024 and continuing to grow in 2025; notes that in 2024 alone, Member States purchased an estimated EUR 7 billion worth of Russian LNG, and since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has imported EUR 200 billion worth of Russian oil and gas – totally fuelling Russia’s war machine;

Removed20. Agrees that an adequate assessment of the level of Russian energy imports is a prerequisite for phasing out this dependence; welcomes the proposals for transparency and traceability mechanisms, as the effective implementation of sanctions depends on compatible control mechanisms in all Member States;

Added36. Welcomes the publication of a roadmap for phasing out Russian energy imports, which must pave the way for their definitive end as soon as possible;

Removed21. Calls on the Commission to develop a legislative mechanism to ensure the transparency and traceability of natural gas originating in Russia and exported to the EU as liquefied natural gas and by pipeline, and eventually to cover oil imports; considers that the mechanism would require cooperation between various services, including EU competition services and national customs authorities with enhanced criminal investigation powers; stresses the need for dissuasive penalties for sanctions evasion;

Added37. Welcomes the stepwise prohibition of Russian gas imports proposed by the Commission; stresses the need to introduce an EU-wide ban on all Russian natural gas imports by 2027 at the latest, and on new contracts and existing spot contracts by the end of 2025; insists that the Member States, including those currently benefiting from targeted derogations for Russian oil imports, should ultimately phase out these imports by 2027 at the latest; welcomes the upcoming legislative proposals in this regard and calls on the Commission to explore the use of all available transitional instruments that could lead to the end of Russian fossil fuel imports by 2027, such as the introduction of a regular quota system for Russian gas imports into the EU and the introduction of a ceiling price for Russian LNG, following an assessment of market and price impacts; calls on the Commission to provide EU companies with effective and legally sound toolkits to facilitate their efforts to get out of long-term contracts with Russian suppliers without incurring penalties;

Added38. Calls on the Member States to include gas deliveries to the EU from the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 terminals in the scope of EU sanctions and the respective sanctioning of the singular fleet of ice-class LNG carriers linked to the Yamal LNG project; notes that sanctioning LNG carriers would be highly effective, as there is a limited number of ice-class LNG carriers in the world; stresses that the above actions would require adequate assessments of the legal and economic impacts on the European companies concerned and to ensure their ability to exit contracts;

Added39. Commends the inclusion of the nuclear supply chain in the roadmap; notes, with concern, that Russian nuclear fuel remains present in the EU market, including through indirect supply chains, and that in 2023, 23.5 % of the uranium consumed in the EU came from Russia and 30.1 % of the uranium used in the EU’s nuclear fleet was enriched by Russia; notes that while domestic providers are ramping up capacity in their European facilities to meet increased demand, as utilities proactively move away from Russian supply, clear policy decisions are urgently required at EU and national level to address the above vulnerabilities in the nuclear supply chain; calls therefore for support for projects within the Union that contribute to greater autonomy and security of nuclear fuel supply;

Added40. Expresses concern that official data does not provide a complete picture of Russian energy imports and their final destination, as relabelled Russian oil and gas continue to enter the EU market; notes with regret that this, in some cases, occurs with the acquiescence of the state actors involved;

Added41. Agrees that an adequate assessment of the amount of Russian energy imports is a prerequisite for phasing out this dependence; regrets the continued whitewashing of Russian energy imports and stresses the need for greater transparency in the EU energy market; calls on the Member States to publish data on the origin of imported, exported and consumed Russian gas, and urges the application of all measures against the whitewashing of Russian energy imports; notes that relevant reporting obligations laid down under Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector can contribute to achieving this goal;

Added42. Welcomes the upcoming proposals for transparency, monitoring and traceability mechanisms, as the effective implementation of sanctions depends on compatible control mechanisms in all Member States; underscores the urgent need to develop a legal mechanism to ensure the transparency and traceability of natural gas originating in Russia and exported to the EU as liquefied natural gas and by pipeline, and eventually to cover oil imports; stresses that this mechanism should be extended to energy imports from other destinations in the future; considers that the mechanism would require cooperation between various services, including EU competition services, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and national customs authorities; asks the Member States to consider strengthening the criminal investigation powers of national customs authorities to ensure the effectiveness of the above mechanism and introducing sufficient deterrent measures and fines, such as adequate financial penalties for sanctions evasion;

Added43. Stresses the need to adopt a legal framework for diversification, requiring each Member State to prepare, in a coordinated manner and through the appropriate competent authorities, an exit plan for Russian energy sources and to support and oversee the preparation and implementation of specialised exit plans at the level of undertakings active in their respective energy sectors; considers that these plans should include domestic production and demand reduction dimensions;

Added44. Strongly condemns the calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of the peace settlement in Ukraine; firmly rejects the idea of the possible certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and insists on the complete decommissioning of Nord Stream pipelines; warns against the EU falling back into dependency on an unreliable supplier and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop safeguards against this, such as a countersignature by the Commission on any potential contracts with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase;

Added45. Recalls that energy is a fundamental necessity; emphasises that the phase out of Russian energy imports must be a collective effort, ensuring that no Member State, company or household is left behind; emphasises that Member States are not equally positioned to phase out Russian energy imports in the same manner, and therefore urges strong solidarity among them, alongside appropriate support measures from the Commission to ensure a fair and coordinated transition;

Added46. Notes that, in the near-term, there is the need to replace phased out Russian energy imports with reliable non-EU sources and urges the Commission therefore to propose measures that ensure their sufficient substitution from trusted partners; stresses, however, that Russian energy supplies should not be replaced by new dependencies in supplies, and therefore that, in the long term, energy imports should be progressively reduced through effective measures to support decarbonisation, electrification and energy efficiency and savings in the sectors where it is possible and cost-efficient, as well as through the development of domestic energy production in line with the REPowerEU plan;

Added47. Emphasises that energy dependence on Russia also should not be replaced by new dependencies on individual suppliers of energy technologies, components or critical raw materials;

Revision of security of supply framework

Change 4

Changed22.48. ConsidersWelcomes the upcoming revision of the Security of Supply architecture including the Gas Security of Supply Regulation and the Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation, and other relevant legislation; considers that the new EU security of supply architecture should reflect thesuch fundamental shifts as increasing cross-sectoral integration of the energy system, the new geopolitical landscape andlandscape, the profound changes in supply routes;routes, the impact of climate change, as well as changes in the maturity of energy technologies reflected in shifts of levelised costs of energy and the opportunities this presents for the energy transition;

Change 5

Removed23. Calls on the Commission to include in the security of supply architecture a framework for diversification, requiring each Member State to prepare an exit plan for Russian energy sources, and to monitor the preparation of exit plans at the level of their national companies;

Added49. Highlights that energy efficiency plays a critical role in enhancing the security of energy supply by reducing overall energy demand, lowering dependency on energy imports and increasing system resilience; considers that the new security of supply framework should be broadened to reflect a new way of looking at the security of energy supply, based not only on energy sources, but also on the energy efficiency first principle, energy savings, cost efficiency, as well as the ability to produce different types of energy domestically; notes that, in the near-term, the Union should concentrate on effective and solid weaning of Russian energy imports without loopholes, including through securing alternatives supplies from reliable partners and better use of existing infrastructure, while in parallel continuing to develop domestic alternatives to imported energy products, where possible; stresses, nevertheless, the imperative to develop a future-proof security of supply architecture that systematically reduces dependence on external actors, notably by advancing energy efficiency, promoting energy savings, enhancing circularity and ensuring the sustained growth of home-grown clean energy production and well-protected decentralised energy infrastructure;

Removed24. Condemns the calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of the peace settlement in Ukraine; warns against the EU falling back into dependency on an unreliable supplier and calls on the Commission to develop safeguards against this, such as a countersignature by the Commission on any potential contracts with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase;

Added50. Emphasises the need to prioritise the resilience of energy infrastructure, drawing on the lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the targeted attacks on its energy systems and the benefits of decentralised energy systems; considers that new energy assets should be ‘resilient by design’, including to possible military threats and extreme weather events;

Removed25. Stresses the need for greater cooperation on the resilience of energy infrastructure to both climate impacts and human-caused threats; considers that new energy assets should be ‘resilient by design’, including to possible military threats;

Added51. Stresses the need for greater cooperation among all actors on the resilience of energy infrastructure to both climate impacts and human-caused threats; insists that the protection of this infrastructure requires greater involvement of governments, including through public-private partnerships; welcomes, in this regard, the Niinistö report recommendation to engage with the private sector in institutionalising de-risking efforts, cross-sector stress tests and proactive security measures; asks the Commission to ensure that such cooperation is reflected in plans covering incident management and recovery, and is subject to regular exercises; notes that the Union’s preparedness strategy includes actions to strengthen public-private partnerships and calls on the Commission to further develop relevant specific measures for the energy sector in the review of the security of supply architecture;

Removed26. Notes the need to accommodate the integration of renewable and low-carbon gases, such as biomethane and hydrogen;

Added52. Notes the need to accommodate in the security of supply architecture the integration of renewable and low-carbon gases, such as biomethane and hydrogen; recalls that the Hydrogen Strategy already recognised the role that renewable and low-carbon hydrogen production can play in providing flexibility and storage in an integrated energy system with a high share of renewables; calls on the Commission to recognise the complementarities between hydrogen and electricity in the future Electrification Action Plan, in line with energy sector integration, and to set clear conditions for the ramp-up of hydrogen to contribute to the energy transition, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors;

Removed27. Considers that the new security of supply framework could be broadened to reflect a new way of looking at the security of energy supply, based not only on energy sources, but also on the ability to produce different types of energy domestically;

Added53. Stresses the need to include affordability risks in national risk assessments; calls for transparency on the implementation of national risk-preparedness measures to increase trust between the Member States; notes the advantages of greater coherence on protected consumer categories (consistent categories and gradation of disconnection priority for grid users) to allow coordinated consumer load-shedding plans to be defined, including plans to support vulnerable households affected by, or at risk of, energy poverty during an energy crisis;

Removed28. Stresses the need to include affordability risks in national risk assessments;

Added54. Highlights the need for a unified, resilient and strategically coordinated energy policy; emphasises that as the EU energy markets become more integrated, energy security is increasingly becoming a shared responsibility of the Member States, thus requiring solidarity and coordination in order to prevent unilateral actions that could undermine the security of the entire EU; warns that a unilateral decision by a single actor to enter into a harmful energy agreement with a non-EU country could expose the whole EU to renewed energy crises, price volatility and geopolitical pressure;

Change 6

Changed29. Emphasises that energy security is increasingly becoming a shared responsibility of the Member States;55. notesNotes the need for stronger coordination, includingcoordination onbetween the withdrawal of generationMember capacityStates fromon the system, as this affectsdecommissioning theof availabilityageing andgeneration affordabilityunits ofwith energycross-border inimpact, neighbouringas countries;well callsas foron transparencywithdrawal onfrom the implementationsystem of national risk-preparednessgeneration measurescapacity toin increaseorder trustto betweenensure thethat Memberalternative States;installations noteshave thebeen needcompleted forand greaterare alignmentin onoperation, protectedas consumerthis categoriesaffects tothe allowavailability coordinatedand consumeraffordability load-sheddingof plansenergy toin beneighbouring defined;countries;

Change 7

Added56. Underlines that data-driven technologies should positively impact energy security management; recognises the importance of comprehensive energy information and data in identifying and responding to evolving energy security threats and in infrastructure planning, and calls for improved coordination in the collection of such information and data;

Added57. Calls on the Commission to include in the security of supply proposal technical provisions for the standardisation and interoperability of critical components of the EU’s energy system, particularly electrical transformers, to ensure that a lack of standardisation does not hinder European solidarity;

Added58. Welcomes the establishment by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) of a new Task Force on the Security of Critical Infrastructure, aimed at analysing and proposing recommendations on the topic of security of critical infrastructure; stresses the importance of incorporating lessons learned from Ukraine’s experience, including the valuable expertise of the dedicated unit within the Ukrainian Transmission System Operator (TSO) tasked with identifying and mitigating threats to critical infrastructure; calls on the Commission to collaborate closely with ENTSO-E in delivering a comprehensive and systemic assessment of threats to the EU electricity grid, to be completed by 2026;

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59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.