Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

AddedE. whereas the EU is at risk of failing to meet its digital decade targets and objectives, including the adoption of cloud, big data and AI;

RemovedF. whereas fibre optic networks only cover approximately 64 % of households, and ‘high quality’ 5G network coverage extends to merely 50 % of EU territory;

AddedF. whereas European firms contribute a minor share to global research and development (R&D) in software, internet technologies and electronics, while the United States and China lead in these sectors;

RemovedG. whereas one in eight businesses were affected by cyberattacks in 2020; whereas in 2023, according to the Hiscox report, this figure reached 58 % in Germany and 53 % in France;

AddedG. whereas the Commission’s Digital Compass, Digital Decade Policy Programme, and Competitiveness Compass are essential frameworks for strengthening Europe’s digital ecosystem, securing technological leadership and ensuring long-term economic resilience;

RemovedH. whereas high energy costs for the operation of digital infrastructure are penalising European companies;

AddedH. whereas digital infrastructure is composed of hardware elements related to connectivity, including fibre, 5G and 6G, submarine cables, satellites and spectrum, and computing, including semiconductors, data centres, HPC and quantum technologies, and of software elements including identity solutions, the Internet of Things, and cloud and AI systems, as well as the intermediary layer including advertising, search engines, payments and communication systems;

RemovedI. whereas public procurement is a strategic tool for supporting research and development (R&D) and European stakeholders in key sectors such as cloud infrastructure, cybersecurity, AI, semiconductors and communication infrastructure;

AddedI. whereas the EU’s competitiveness will increasingly depend on the digitalisation of all sectors, supported by resilient, safe and trustworthy digital infrastructure; notes, in this context, that the digital single market is a vital asset as it can enable companies to grow and scale up;

RemovedJ. whereas, in a fragmented market, many European businesses struggle to offer solutions that are globally competitive with the international giants;

AddedJ. whereas the full potential of the digital single market remains untapped, with intra-EU trade in digital services representing just 8 % of GDP, which is significantly lower than the 25 % for trade in digital goods;

RemovedK. whereas by scattering small public subsidies among too many different projects, the EU does not enable any of them to reach a genuine critical mass;

AddedK. whereas the availability of eID schemes and digital public services and access to e-Health records are increasing, but there are still significant gaps in the provision of privacy preserving, fully user-centric, accessible and sovereign digital public services among Member States due to differences in the adoption of eID;

RemovedL. whereas financial and tax incentives encourage private investment;

AddedL. whereas eID is currently available to 93 % of the EU’s population, but achieving 100 % of digital public services for citizens and businesses by 2030 remains challenging;

Removed1. Recalls that technological sovereignty is a fundamental pillar for the EU’s competitiveness, security and strategic independence;

AddedM. whereas interoperability and interconnectedness would enhance the competitiveness of the European economy and might benefit from policies such as open-source first and public money, public code, and the implementation of common and open standards;

Removed2. Notes that heavy reliance on foreign technologies exposes Europe to major risks, in particular legal, economic and security risks;

AddedN. whereas digital infrastructure is of key importance for EU industry, including the automotive industry and the possible development of connected and autonomous vehicles; whereas robust data and communications infrastructure is needed to support a secure ecosystem for connected and autonomous vehicles;

Removed3. Expresses its concern that European businesses struggle to compete with US and Chinese companies in strategic sectors such as the cloud, cybersecurity, AI, semiconductors and communication infrastructure;

AddedO. whereas fibre-optic networks form one of the backbones of the EU’s digital infrastructure, enabling high-speed internet, 5G networks and future technological improvements;

Removed4. Regrets the fact that European regulations increase the administrative burden and costs for local businesses without effectively counteracting the domination of the foreign giants;

AddedP. whereas the EU is behind on the roll-out of 5G to meet its 2030 targets, with still limited fibre coverage of only about 64 % of European households being included;

Removed5. Reiterates that sensitive data should be hosted in sovereign infrastructure, protected from foreign extraterritorial laws;

AddedQ. whereas investment needs in state-of-the-art connectivity in the EU are immense;

Removed6. Stresses the urgency of reforming European public procurement to allow Member States to restrict their strategic procurement procedures to European companies that meet sovereignty criteria;

AddedR. whereas resolving challenges related to access to land and grids is key to the successful deployment of digital infrastructure;

Removed7. Calls on the Commission to align the ‘high’ level of the European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services (EUCS), still under discussion, with the SecNumCloud certification requirements to ensure hosting providers are not subject to extra-European legislation;

AddedS. whereas the EU GOVSATCOM initiative aims to ensure the long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

Removed8. Urges the Commission to facilitate the roll-out of 5G by relaxing the conditions on the concentration of firms, in order to encourage the sharing of infrastructure;

AddedT. whereas chips play a crucial role in increasing the technological competitiveness and resilience of Europe;

Removed9. Calls on the Commission and the competent committees of the European Parliament to promote public-private partnerships and make it easier for European technology companies to access private financing;

AddedU. whereas the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal and the 2025 Commission Work Programme make little to no mention of semiconductor technologies despite their critical importance for the EU’s industrial ambition;

Removed10. Calls on the Commission and the competent committees of the European Parliament to allow life insurance and pension funds to invest in strategic and emerging sectors such as the cloud, cybersecurity, AI and semiconductors; suggests reducing regulation that makes risky assets less attractive by imposing high capital requirements and a prudential principle that is too strict;

AddedV. whereas the Chips Act was an ad hoc adaptation mechanism aimed at addressing certain challenges regarding semiconductor shortages; whereas its areas of action are mostly limited to advanced semiconductors; whereas EU engagement on legacy semiconductors is insufficient; whereas the revision of the Chips Act is expected in September 2026;

Removed11. Requests the Commission and the competent committees of the European Parliament to review the legal framework of important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) to include exemptions for strategic mergers and acquisitions where a project responds to a sovereignty issue;

AddedW. whereas the existing European regional clusters in the semiconductor sector have a role to play and should be further strengthened;

Removed12. Calls on the Commission to remove two regulations for each new regulation created in strategic sectors, based on the model of the US ‘One-In, Two-Out’ Executive Order;

AddedX. whereas processors, memory technologies, graphics processing units (GPUs), and quantum chips are critical to Europe’s digital infrastructure and supply chain security;

Removed13. Calls on the Commission to reform the European electricity market by putting an end to the merit order mechanism, which aligns prices to the most expensive sources, and by re-establishing a context in which nuclear can supply competitive, stable electricity;

AddedY. whereas cloud services are fundamental to a wide range of computational activities and computing services that have become an essential enabler of competitiveness;

AddedZ. whereas federated models could enhance the competitiveness of the EU market by facilitating the emergence of significant European alternatives, building on local market expertise and presence;

AddedAA. whereas large-scale AI infrastructure, such as AI gigafactories, is essential for enabling open and collaborative development of the most complex AI models;

AddedAB. whereas the AI value chain is still under development and tackling the development of AI models is only part of it; whereas European AI solutions may be developed using Europe’s public and private computing infrastructure, driving innovation, and start-ups and small companies should be in particular beneficiaries of access to public computing infrastructure;

AddedAC. whereas AI models that can be run on widely available hardware at moderate costs allow a greater number of actors to shape how AI systems are created and used, providing more immediate value in applications and enabling a more democratic use of AI;

AddedAD. whereas at the moment, the roll-out, marketing and deployment of AI is often shaped by a small number of big tech companies; whereas some AI features are not being rolled out in the EU at the same time as in non-EU countries, creating a competitive disadvantage for European businesses and consumers;

AddedAE. whereas data centres are an essential part of an advanced digital society, as enablers of distributed processing and effective data storage;

AddedAF. whereas trusted capacity and availability of data storage is essential for European resilience and development; whereas most data centres in Europe are not owned by European companies;

AddedAG. whereas building and operating large-scale data centres requires substantial investment;

AddedAH. whereas around 9 % of global electricity consumption results from data centres, cloud services and connectivity;

AddedAI. whereas submarine cables are critical infrastructure for global connectivity, economic stability and security, carrying over 99 % of international communications through them, and they remain vulnerable to physical damage, cyberthreats and geopolitical risks;

AddedAJ. whereas secure and resilient digital infrastructure is crucial, particularly considering the increasing number of cyberattacks against the EU, its Member States and its industry and society;

AddedAK. whereas the EU toolbox for 5G security is important for preventing cyberespionage and strengthening the resilience of supply chains in the EU’s digital infrastructure;

AddedAL. whereas 21 % of businesses cite compliance and legal uncertainties as a barrier to digital investment;

AddedAM. whereas the ‘one in, one out’ approach ensures that all burdens introduced by Commission initiatives are considered and that administrative burdens are offset by removing burdens of equivalent value in the same policy area;

AddedAN. whereas the energy consumption challenges in AI, cloud and quantum computing, as well as data centres, require the integration of sustainability into digital infrastructure strategies;

AddedAO. whereas data centre power consumption is projected to nearly triple by the end of this decade, increasing from approximately 62 terawatt-hours (TWh) today to more than 150 TWh, thus escalating from 2 % to 5 % of total European power consumption;

AddedAP. whereas the digital skills gap remains a major concern, with only 54 % of European citizens possessing at least basic digital skills – well below the 80 % target set in the digital decade policy programme;

AddedAQ. whereas the shortage of ICT professionals in the EU is projected to reach 12 million by 2030, falling significantly short of the EU’s target of 20 million skilled workers;

AddedAR. whereas the 2024 State of the Digital Decade report and the Draghi report both stress the urgent need to invest in digital and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills to preserve Europe’s technological capabilities and global competitiveness;