Text · Opinion parliamentary committee draft
On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 as regards driving competitiveness and cost-effective decarbonisation
Full title
On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 as regards driving competitiveness and cost-effective decarbonisation
Document ITRE-PA-792091 · COM(2026)0616 – C100188/2026 – 2026/0212(COD)
- Kind
- Opinion parliamentary committee draft ITRE-PA-792091
- Date
- 18 September 2026
- Committee
- Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
- Rapporteur
- Jüri Ratas
- Dossier
- 2026-0212
More facts (2)
- Formats
- Official page PDF Word
- Reference
- COM(2026)0616 – C100188/2026 – 2026/0212(COD)
In short
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The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy's draft opinion responds to the Commission's proposal to amend the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) directive and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 on competitiveness and cost-effective decarbonisation. It proposes removing strict conditionality for free allocation, keeping only an anti-relocation rule, and a two-stage linear reduction factor of 3.2% for 2031–2035 and 2.2% from 2036. It introduces sector-specific indicators to monitor whether the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the Temporary Decarbonisation Fund protect against carbon leakage, with the phase-out of free allocation to be paused or reversed if they do not. It also amends rules on permanent carbon removals, municipal waste incineration, revenue use, the CBAM factor and national carbon taxes.
Position. The rapporteur proposes to amend the Commission proposal by removing strict conditionality for free allocation, introducing a two-stage linear reduction factor, and adding safeguards for CBAM sectors, among other changes.
Key points
- The rapporteur proposes removing strict conditionality rules for the phase-out of free allocation (the '80/20' provision), keeping only a targeted anti-relocation rule.
- Companies receiving free allowances must keep production capacity in Europe; if they relocate outside the EU, they must repay those allowances.
- The rapporteur advocates a two-stage linear reduction factor: 3.2% for 2031–2035, followed by 2.2% from 2036 onwards.
- Sector-specific Key Performance Indicators would monitor production relocation, output drops and import market shares; if the phase-out of free allowances impairs EU production or export competitiveness, it must be paused or reversed.
- The Commission would assess every two years from 30 November 2028 whether CBAM and the phase-out of free allocation continue to protect against carbon leakage, including for EU exports.
- The CBAM factor would be adjusted, including to 70% in 2030, 58% in 2031, 40% in 2032, 27% in 2033 and 15% from 2034 to 2037, with 0% from 2038.
- The EU ETS would be extended to municipal waste incineration in a way that avoids double burden and accounting of emissions.
- The Union-wide quantity of allowances would be increased by 250 million, auctioned from 2028 to 2040 to fund domestic permanent carbon removals, with biochar limited to up to 20%.
- The Commission would give priority to international credits from projects using technologies with a high share of value from EU production or research and development.
- Member States would use at least 75% of auction revenues to support decarbonisation of ETS sectors, including measures to reduce emissions in buildings.
- Installations below the average of the 10% most efficient installations in 2026 and 2027 would receive an additional 10% of free allocation.
- A share of allowances would be reserved for projects in CBAM sectors corresponding to their share of emissions in 2027, to address carbon leakage in third-country markets.
Who is affected
- Energy-intensive industries receiving free allowances, which would face less conditionality but must not relocate outside the EU.
- EU exporters in CBAM sectors, for whom export volume and carbon cost gap indicators would be monitored.
- Operators of municipal waste incineration installations, which would be included in the EU ETS.
- Member States, which would have to use at least 75% of auction revenues for decarbonisation.
- Installations below the average of the 10% most efficient, which would receive an additional 10% of free allocation.
Figures and deadlines
- 3.2% linear reduction factor from 2031 to 2035.
- 2.2% linear reduction factor from 2036.
- 260 million allowances for the purchase of 260 Mt of international credits from 2036 to 2040.
- 250 million allowances auctioned from 2028 to 2040 for permanent carbon removals.
- Up to 20% of those allowances limited to biochar activities.
- At least 75% of auction revenues to support decarbonisation of ETS sectors.
- CBAM factor of 70% in 2030, 58% in 2031, 40% in 2032, 27% in 2033, 15% from 2034 to 2037 and 0% from 2038.
- Additional 10% of free allocation for installations below the average of the 10% most efficient in 2026 and 2027.
Text
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Short justification
The reform of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) comes at a critical juncture for European industry and energy sectors. While the commitment to achieving climate neutrality remains firm, the decarbonisation pathway must be pragmatic, realistic, and economically viable.
As the ITRE Committee, our role is to ensure that climate policy acts as a driver for modernising European industry, rather than an incentive for industrial flight. European businesses face unprecedented challenges: high energy prices, fierce global competition, prolonged permitting processes, and strict investment conditions. If climate rules tighten beyond the pace of technological and commercial availability, we risk severe carbon leakage and job losses without any global environmental benefit.
This Draft Opinion focuses on providing industry with the predictability, flexibility, and investment room needed to successfully transition while keeping energy affordable.
Imposing strict, rigid conditionality requirements on free allowances - such as forcing immediate reinvestment under tight deadlines - poses a fatal risk to several energy-intensive sectors. For many companies, especially in foundation industries, forced compliance under current market conditions could lead to immediate downsizing or closure rather than decarbonisation. That cannot be the goal of EU policy. The rapporteur proposes removing strict conditionality rules for the phase-out of free allocation (the '80/20' provision), maintaining only a targeted anti-relocation rule. Companies receiving free allowances must keep their production capacity within Europe; if they relocate outside the EU, they must repay those allowances. This approach ensures that free allocation remains what it was designed to be: a vital shield against carbon leakage and an effective guarantee for European industrial jobs.
A single, overly aggressive reduction trajectory risks creating sudden capacity shortages and severe cost shocks before alternative clean technologies are mature. The rapporteur advocates for a two-stage LRF approach with a lower initial rate: 3.2% for 2031–2035, followed by 2.2% from 2036 onwards. For many key industrial sectors, key technologies such as industrial-scale hydrogen, carbon capture and storage (CCS/CCUS), and electrified high-heat processes are simply not yet commercially viable or widely accessible today. An overly steep LRF at the start of the decade would penalise companies for lacking technologies that do not yet exist at scale. A smoother initial trajectory gives industry crucial breathing space to deploy capital efficiently, increasing the likelihood that advanced decarbonisation solutions can be adopted successfully and cost-effectively in the second half of the decade.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the Temporary Decarbonisation Fund remain untested tools. To protect our industrial exporters who face full domestic carbon costs without protection in third-country markets, a dynamic safeguard is required. The rapporteur introduces a system of sector-specific Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) - monitoring production relocation, output drops, and import market shares. If these indicators reveal that the phase-out of free allowances impairs EU production or export competitiveness, the phase-out must be immediately paused or reversed.
The rapporteur commends the European Commission for bringing forward a constructive proposal for reform. The ETS remains one of the most effective market-based instruments for driving emission reductions globally. However, as we adjust its trajectory to align with our 2040 targets, we must never lose sight of a fundamental principle: reaching climate neutrality cannot come at the expense of European production, industrial competitiveness, or jobs.
Achieving our climate goals requires an open, pragmatic, and inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders. We must listen carefully to our industries—from energy-intensive manufacturing to energy producers—and address the practical realities they face on the ground. A rigid or overly punitive framework risks pushing manufacturing outside the Union, replacing European production with higher-emission imports.
The ambition of this Draft Opinion is to deliver a balanced and predictable pathway forward. By providing European industry with the necessary breathing space, targeted safeguards, and support for clean investments, we can ensure that the Green Deal strengthens Europe’s industrial base rather than weakening it. The rapporteur calls on all political groups and Member States to approach the upcoming negotiations with constructive pragmatism, ensuring that climate policy makes Europe cleaner, more resilient, and economically stronger.
The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy submits the following to the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, as the committee responsible:
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) The integration in the EU ETS rests on the basic principle that the cancellation of a removal unit replaces the surrendering of an emission allowance, which represents the payment of the price for having emitted a tonne of CO2. As a consequence, only permanent removals can be integrated in the EU ETS. In addition, it is preferrable to integrate only those removals for which reversals are subject to monitoring and the surrendering of allowances in the EU ETS. | (32) The integration in the EU ETS rests on the basic principle that the cancellation of a removal unit replaces the surrendering of an emission allowance, which represents the payment of the price for having emitted a tonne of CO2. As a consequence, only permanent removals can be integrated in the EU ETS such as DACCS and BioCCS. The Commission may also purchase a limited number of removal credits from biochar activities (BCR) which are certified as permanent carbon removal units in accordance with the methodologies for the certification of domestic permanent removals established under Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council. In case additional methodologies are needed for the integration of permanent biochar removals, the Commission may adopt additional technical criteria. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) The current price-difference between permanent carbon removals and allowances means that permanent removals will need to be supported in a predictable manner, to ensure that their generation in line with the additional emission space that is created in the ETS through the issuance of allowances. In addition, because they are novel instruments, their integration must protect the EU ETS from uncertainty and must guarantee the environmental integrity of the units that are used to compensate an emission in the EU ETS. Therefore, removals should be integrated in the EU ETS by the Commission. To that end, the total quantity of allowances in the EU ETS should be increased by a number of allowances that should be allocated to the Commission for the purchase of an equivalent amount of permanent carbon removals to offset the newly created allowances. The linear reduction factor should not apply to this quantity of allowances, at it is equivalent to the amount of removals that should be purchased. In addition to these newly created allowances, further allowances should be assigned to the Commission to generate revenues through their auctioning for the purchase of the permanent carbon removals, in view of the expected cost differential between allowances and carbon removals. Where fewer allowances are required for financing carbon removals than expected, the unused allowances should be integrated back in the Union-wide quantity of allowances referred to in Article 9 of Directive 2003/87/EC. The net target of the EU ETS is the equivalent of the gross emissions minus the permanent carbon removals that are subject to integration. | (33) The current price-difference between permanent carbon removals and allowances means that permanent removals will need to be supported in a predictable manner, to ensure that their generation in line with the additional emission space that is created in the ETS through the issuance of allowances. In addition, because they are novel instruments, their integration must protect the EU ETS from uncertainty and must guarantee the environmental integrity of the units that are used to compensate an emission in the EU ETS. Therefore, removals should be integrated in the EU ETS by the Commission. To that end, the total quantity of allowances in the EU ETS should be increased by a number of allowances that should be allocated to the Commission for the purchase of an equivalent amount of permanent carbon removals to offset the newly created allowances. The linear reduction factor should not apply to this quantity of allowances, at it is equivalent to the amount of removals that should be purchased. In addition to these newly created allowances, further allowances should be assigned to the Commission from the Union-wide quantity of allowances to generate revenues through their auctioning for the purchase of the required amount of permanent carbon removals, in view of the expected cost differential between allowances and carbon removals. Where fewer allowances are required for financing carbon removals than expected, the unused allowances should be integrated back in the Union-wide quantity of allowances referred to in Article 9 of Directive 2003/87/EC. The net target of the EU ETS is the equivalent of the gross emissions minus the permanent carbon removals that are subject to integration. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) To facilitate the use of permanent carbon removals by operators, shipping companies and aircraft operators, these should be allowed to compensate their own fossil emissions with their biogenic CO2 emissions captured and permanently stored, which are certified as permanent carbon removal units in accordance with the methodologies for the certification of domestic permanent biogenic emissions capture with carbon storage (BioCCS) removals established under Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council18 . To avoid double counting, carbon removals units used for the purpose of compensating own emissions should be cancelled from the Union Registry provided for in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council19 . This compensation mechanism cannot entail the generation of negative emissions or the of obtaining allowances. It should lead to an adjustment of the allowances assigned for the purchase of carbon removals and to the carbon removals that are to be purchased, to prevent the total emission space from increasing beyond the limit implied by the integration through the purchasing programme. | (34) To facilitate the use of permanent carbon removals by operators, shipping companies and aircraft operators, these should be allowed to compensate their own fossil emissions with their biogenic CO2 emissions captured and permanently stored, and DACCS activities, which are certified as permanent carbon removal units in accordance with the methodologies for the certification of domestic permanent biogenic emissions capture with carbon storage (BioCCS) removals established under Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council18 . To avoid double counting, carbon removals units used for the purpose of compensating own emissions should be cancelled from the Union Registry provided for in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council19 . This compensation mechanism cannot entail the generation of negative emissions or the of obtaining allowances. It should lead to an adjustment of the allowances assigned for the purchase of carbon removals and to the carbon removals that are to be purchased, to prevent the total emission space from increasing beyond the limit implied by the integration through the purchasing programme. |
| 18 Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a Union certification framework for permanent carbon removals, carbon farming and carbon storage in products (OJ L, 2024/3012, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3012/oj). | 18 Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a Union certification framework for permanent carbon removals, carbon farming and carbon storage in products (OJ L, 2024/3012, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3012/oj). |
| 19 Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a Union certification framework for permanent carbon removals, carbon farming and carbon storage in products (ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3012/oj). | 19 Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a Union certification framework for permanent carbon removals, carbon farming and carbon storage in products (ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3012/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (43) Directive (EU) 2023/959 effected the revision of the EU ETS legislative framework by introducing conditionalities for free allocation linked to the implementation of energy efficiency recommendations from energy audits, and obligations to establish climate-neutrality plans for district heating and for the 20% least efficient installations under each ETS product benchmark. Building on the experience of conditionalities relating to district heating, and in view of aligning with the climate neutrality ambition of the EU, starting from the five-year period for free allocation beginning on 1 January 2031, free allocation in the EU ETS should, as a principle, become conditional on establishing a plan to invest in decarbonisation in the EU (‘Invest in EU decarbonisation plan’) and to implementing decarbonisation investments that lead to increased homegrown production of decarbonised and low carbon products as well as to significant reductions in overall climate impacts, including emissions reduction. Therefore, it is appropriate to replace other specific conditionality regimes for free allocation, from 2031 onwards, by the decarbonisation investment in the EU conditionality which is being introduced for free allocation. | (43) Directive (EU) 2023/959 effected the revision of the EU ETS legislative framework by introducing conditionalities for free allocation linked to the implementation of energy efficiency recommendations from energy audits, and obligations to establish climate-neutrality plans for district heating and for the 20% least efficient installations under each ETS product benchmark. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (44) The Invest in EU decarbonisation plan should be simple and provide a structured and transparent pathway, together with intermediate targets, for installations to align with Union-wide climate-neutrality by 2050 as provided for in Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, and should consider the impact of the measures and investments it includes on achieving significant emissions reduction. The Invest in EU decarbonisation plan and its content, should be verified in accordance with existing and well-established rules under Article 15 and be made publicly available. In addition, in order to ensure that emissions and impacts reduction occur in the EU, operators of installations applying for free allocation should be required to invest in the EU an amount equivalent to the financial value of 100% of their free allocation in the relevant five-year period into decarbonisation of their activities covered by this Directive, effectively leading to significant verified reductions in emissions, within the same period. What constitutes ‘significant emission reductions’ should be defined by the Commission by means of delegated acts in a science-based manner and aligned with the climate neutrality objective as set out in Regulation (EU) 2021/1192. Consequently, allowances allocated for free become decarbonisation investment allowances in the EU. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (45) To minimise administrative burden and ensure alignment with the procedures leading up to the determination of free allocation to installations, it is appropriate to make full use of synergies with the well-established, highly efficient and mature process. Therefore, the Invest in EU decarbonisation plan, as a one-off exercise for five or more years, is to be submitted together with the data included in the national implementation measures pursuant to Article 11 of Directive 2003/87/EC concerning incumbent installations and together with the application for free allocation concerning new entrants. With a view to ensuring the content of measures and investments included in the Invest in EU decarbonisation plan reflects genuine emissions reduction strategy, it is appropriate to provide flexibility for their submission at a later stage together with activity-level change reports referred to in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/184223 . Where appropriate, the detailed timeline for the submission of the Invest in EU decarbonisation plans should be clarified by the Commission by means of delegated acts. | deleted |
| 23 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1842 of 31 October 2019 laying down rules for the application of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards further arrangements for the adjustments to free allocation of emission allowances due to activity level changes (OJ L 282, 4.11.2019, pp. 20–24). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (46) 80 % of the amount of free allocation for the relevant five-year period for which the application for free allocation is submitted should be allocated in annual tranches with a regular transfer of free allocation after the approval of an Invest in EU decarbonisation plan. The remaining 20 % of the amount of allowances to be allocated for free in that five-year period should only be allocated to the installation upon verification that the decarbonisation investments, which can include both captial expenditure (‘CAPEX’) and operating expenditure (‘OPEX’), corresponding to the economic value of 100% of the amount of free allocation for that period, were implemented and that, based on the relevant existing and well-established annual emissions reports, those investments led to significant emissions reduction by the end of the five-year period. To further incentivise the long-term investment in the Union, operators should be required to return the allowances received under Article 10a(3c) first sub-paragraph, if the operator relocates or otherwise transfers its relevant activities outside of the Union. In order to further design the processes as simple and efficient as possible and reflect well-established industrial practices, while also guaranteeing the strategic investments in modernising European industries, it is appropriate for the Commission to further operationalise those rules by clearly establishing, by means of delegated acts and, in close consultation and transparently with the relevant stakeholders, the list of requirements and eligible costs to qualify as decarbonisation investments as well as the methodology for determining the economic value of the quantity of free allowances received. In order to further reduce administrative burden, maximise synergies with existing industrial practices and to fully reflect the specific circumsances of the industrial sectors covered by the EU ETS, these delegated acts should be developed in close cooperation with the industry. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (47) To minimise administrative burden and ensure robust compliance, the implementation of the decarbonisation investments in the EU and the achievement of significant emissions reduction should be verified, no later than two years after the end of the relevant five-year period, on the basis of the already-required annual emissions and activity level reports submitted in the context of the existing solid monitoring, reporting and verification processes. Any unallocated or returned allowances from the amount of free allocation under the relevant five-year period should be used in the context of free allocation in the next period. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (48) To ensure synergies with the new Investment Booster (‘IB’) and Industrial Decarbonisation Bank (‘IDB’) and the Innovation Fund, derogations to the newly established investment conditionality rules for free allocation should apply to installations selected for support under those funds. In view of simplifying procedures and avoiding additional administrative burden, it is appropriate to exempt the operators of installations from the establishment an Invest in EU decarbonisation plan, where a project in their installation was selected for the award of support under the IDB or the Innovation Fund is being implemented during the relevant five-year period for free allocation. The first 80 % of the amount of free allocation for the relevant five-year period should be allocated to the installation following the decision to award support to the project under those funds. In addition, for those installations, the investments and emissions reduction requirements conditioning the remaining 20 % of free allocation for the period should be deemed fulfilled upon the double condition that the support under the Innovation Fund starts being disbursed or physical construction concerning projects supported by the IDB or IB starts, and that it has been verified that eligible costs correspond to a volume at least equivalent to the economic value of 100% of the amount of free allocation under the relevant five-year period were invested. Given the number of operators expected to benefit from the support made available under the Innovation Fund, IDB and IB, this will automatically lead to these operators being exempt from the conditionality and, hence, further simplify their access to free allocation. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (49) To recognise their efforts and reduce administrative and compliance burdens for the 10 % most efficient installations setting the revised benchmark values in a sector or subsector in accordance with Article 10a(2), third subparagraph of Directive 2003/87/EC, for zero and low emitting installations, and for small installations remaining voluntarily under the ETS, it is appropriate to exempt them from the investment conditionality rules for free allocation. | (49) To recognise their efforts and reduce administrative and compliance burdens for the 10 % most efficient installations setting the revised benchmark values in a sector or subsector in accordance with Article 10a(2), third subparagraph of Directive 2003/87/EC, for zero and low emitting installations, and for small installations remaining voluntarily under the ETS, it is appropriate to exempt them from the investment conditionality rules for free allocation. Those installations should also receive an additional 10% of free allocation to reward those early decarbonisation efforts. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58) In accordance with the commitment set out in Article 4(5), point (m) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, and considering a slower phase-out pathway for free allocation of allowances from 2028 onwards to support decarbonisation, investment and employment in the Union, while minimising the risk of carbon leakage, additional conditional free allocation should be provided for CBAM sectors. To provide for this in a manner that is compliant with international trade rules and takes into account the decarbonisation of installations in the Union, while minimising additional administrative burden, it is appropriate to reduce the phase-out of free allocation in those sectors, with free allocation being phased out fully by the end of 2037. In view of ensuring an achievable phase-in of CBAM factor in free allocation to CBAM goods that will be newly included as a result of future revisions of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, it is appropriate to provide for specific phase-out rates for those new CBAM goods, applying as of the five-year period for free allocation that starts after their inclusion in the scope of Annex I to that Regulation. In line with this Directive introducing investment conditionality rules for free allocation in the EU ETS from 2031 onwards, those conditionality rules should apply from 2031 onwards also for free allocation to installations to which the CBAM factor is applied. | (58) In accordance with the commitment set out in Article 4(5), point (m) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, and considering a slower phase-out pathway for free allocation of allowances from 2028 onwards to support decarbonisation, investment and employment in the Union, while minimising the risk of carbon leakage, additional conditional free allocation should be provided for CBAM sectors. To provide for this in a manner that is compliant with international trade rules and takes into account the decarbonisation of installations in the Union, while minimising additional administrative burden, it is appropriate to reduce the phase-out of free allocation in those sectors, with free allocation being phased out fully by the end of 2037. In view of ensuring an achievable phase-in of CBAM factor in free allocation to CBAM goods that will be newly included as a result of future revisions of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, it is appropriate to provide for specific phase-out rates for those new CBAM goods, applying as of the five-year period for free allocation that starts after their inclusion in the scope of Annex I to that Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58a) Since the carbon border adjustment mechanism established by Regulation (EU) 2023/956 (‘CBAM’) and the Temporary Decarbonisation Fund are recently introduced and untested instruments, it is necessary to monitor, on a sector-by-sector basis, whether they provide adequate protection against the risk of carbon leakage as free allocation to CBAM sectors is phased out. To that end, the Commission should regularly assess defined indicators capturing the relocation of production capacity outside the Union, significant reductions in Union production, increases in the market share held by imports from third countries, and a deterioration in the competitiveness of Union production exported to such third countries. Since a sector may already be experiencing such developments for reasons unrelated to the Union emissions trading system, in particular while it still benefits from a CBAM factor of 100%, those indicators should capture only deterioration that exceeds the trend already observed during that reference period, so that the assessment reflects the effect of the phase-out of free allocation rather than pre-existing structural trends. Where the assessment identifies, for a given sector or subsector, that those instruments do not provide sufficient protection against a deterioration, the phase-out of free allocation for that sector or subsector should be halted and, where the situation persists, partially reversed, until the situation improves. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58b) Article 30(5) and Article 30(6), point (a)(i), of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 require the Commission to assess whether Union goods exported to third countries without a comparable carbon price remain exposed to carbon leakage that the carbon border adjustment mechanism, being limited to imports, does not address, and, where appropriate, to propose a solution consistent with World Trade Organization law; the Temporary Decarbonisation Fund addresses this only for 2028 and 2029. This Directive gives permanent effect to that mandate by including, among other indicators related to imports, an export volume indicator and a carbon cost gap indicator specific to the share of a sector's production exported to such third countries. Any resulting increase in free allocation for that export exposure share should, at all times, be capped at the free allocation that would have been available for the corresponding production had the CBAM factor never been reduced, therefore being in line with World Trade Organization´s Agreements. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (70) Emissions from municipal waste incineration installations are substantial and have been subject to a monitoring, reporting and verification obligation since 2024, with a requirement to assess by 31 July 2026 the feasibility of its full inclusion in the EU ETS. On the basis of this assessment, it is considered appropriate and feasible to amend Directive 2003/87/EC to include emissions from municipal waste incineration installations in the EU ETS. The extension of the EU ETS to municipal waste incineration, as part of a comprehensive approach with strengthened circular economy policies under Regulation (EU) […./..] of the European Parliament and of the Council Circular Economy Act26 and complemented with enabling conditions, incentivises economy-wide decarbonisation, circularity of materials and carbon, and a level playing field within and between sectors. As such, the inclusion of municipal waste incineration in the EU ETS contributes to the ambitions set out in the Competitiveness Compass and the Clean Industrial Deal to decarbonise the economy, accelerate the transition to more circularity, and establish a clear link between incentives for decarbonisation and circularity, increasing the EU’s economic security, resilience and competitiveness. The carbon price signal complements circular economy policies by financially incentivising and supporting the business case for carbon capture as a main decarbonisation pathway for the sector towards the 2050 economy-wide climate neutrality objective, reducing fossil emissions from incineration while fostering permanent carbon removals from biogenic emissions, supporting economy-wide decarbonisation. The carbon price signal on incineration further reinforces the business case for more circularity of materials, reducing GHG emissions from waste disposal and generating recycled materials displacing more carbon-intensive virgin materials. Furthermore, an extension of the EU ETS levels the playing field for industrial installations and clean energy production by harmonising the carbon price signal with co-incineration, power generation and district heating production already covered under the EU ETS. | (70) Emissions from municipal waste incineration installations are substantial and have been subject to a monitoring, reporting and verification obligation since 2024, with a requirement to assess by 31 July 2026 the feasibility of its full inclusion in the EU ETS. On the basis of this assessment, it is considered appropriate and feasible to amend Directive 2003/87/EC to include emissions from municipal waste incineration installations in the EU ETS in a way that avoids double burden and accounting of emissions. The extension of the EU ETS to municipal waste incineration, as part of a comprehensive approach with strengthened circular economy policies under Regulation (EU) […./..] of the European Parliament and of the Council Circular Economy Act26 and complemented with enabling conditions, incentivises economy-wide decarbonisation, circularity of materials and carbon, and a level playing field within and between sectors. As such, the inclusion of municipal waste incineration in the EU ETS contributes to the ambitions set out in the Competitiveness Compass and the Clean Industrial Deal to decarbonise the economy, accelerate the transition to more circularity, and establish a clear link between incentives for decarbonisation and circularity, increasing the EU’s economic security, resilience and competitiveness. The carbon price signal complements circular economy policies by financially incentivising and supporting the business case for carbon capture as a main decarbonisation pathway for the sector towards the 2050 economy-wide climate neutrality objective, reducing fossil emissions from incineration while fostering permanent carbon removals from biogenic emissions, supporting economy-wide decarbonisation. The carbon price signal on incineration further reinforces the business case for more circularity of materials, reducing GHG emissions from waste disposal and generating recycled materials displacing more carbon-intensive virgin materials. Furthermore, an extension of the EU ETS levels the playing field for industrial installations and clean energy production by harmonising the carbon price signal with co-incineration, power generation and district heating production already covered under the EU ETS. |
| 26 [OJ reference to be added once adopted]. | 26 [OJ reference to be added once adopted]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The linear factor shall be 3.7% from 2031 to 2035 and 1.7% from 2036. | The linear factor shall be 3.2% from 2031 to 2035 and 2.2% from 2036. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Up to 260 million allowances from the Union-wide quantity of allowances referred to in Article 9 shall be made available to the facility for the purchase of up to 260 Mt of high quality and high integrity international credits, out of the international credits provided in Regulation 2021/1119/EU, to contribute to the climate ambition of the activities listed in Annex I from 2036 to 2040. All purchases shall be subject to the criteria of Regulation 2021/1119/EU being fulfilled. | 1. 260 million allowances from the Union-wide quantity of allowances referred to in Article 9 shall be made available to the facility for the purchase of 260 Mt of high quality and high integrity international credits, out of the international credits provided in Regulation 2021/1119/EU, to contribute to the climate ambition of the activities listed in Annex I from 2036 to 2040. All purchases shall be subject to the criteria of Regulation 2021/1119/EU being fulfilled. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2a. The Commission shall, to the extent possible and when available, give priority to credits stemming from projects using technologies with a high share of value stemming from production or research and development from the Union. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Subject to the report in paragraph 3, by way of derogation from Article 9, in the event that high-quality and high-integrity, cost-effective international credits referred to in paragraph 1, are not available, the linear factor shall revert to 2.7% from 2036. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Union-wide quantity of allowances referred to in Article 9 shall be increased by 250 million allowances. Those allowances shall be made available to the Commission to auction them from 2031 to 2040 to generate revenues for the purchase of an equivalent amount of domestic permanent carbon removal units generated by BioCCS and DACCS activities under Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council*. The Commission shall purchase those removals units prioritising a portfolio of cost-effective, high-integrity projects with payment upon delivery of the certified units. | 1. The Union-wide quantity of allowances referred to in Article 9 shall be increased by 250 million allowances. Those allowances shall be made available to the Commission to auction them from 2028 to 2040 to generate revenues for the purchase of an equivalent amount of domestic permanent carbon removal units generated by BioCCS, BCR, and DACCS activities under Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council*. The share of removal units that are generated by BCR activities of those allowances shall be limited to up to 20 % of those allowances. The Commission shall purchase those removals units prioritising a portfolio of cost-effective, high-integrity projects with payment upon delivery of the certified units. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. An additional 10 million allowances from the Union-wide quantity of allowances referred to in Article 9 between 2031 and 2040 shall be made available to the Commission to auction them to generate revenues for the purchase of those permanent carbon removals units, in the event the revenues generated from the allowances under paragraph 1 would be insufficient for the purchase of the total amount of domestic permanent carbon removals units. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2a. In the event the revenues generated from the allowances under paragraph 1 would be insufficient for the purchase of the total amount of domestic permanent carbon removal units, additional allowances from the Union-wide quantity of allowances referred to in Article 9 between [one year after the entry into force of this Directive] and 2040 shall be made available to the Commission to auction them to generate sufficient revenues for the purchase of those permanent carbon removal units. These shall be withdrawn in a uniform manner from the Member States auctioning shares. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Proceeds from the auctioning of allowances under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall constitute external assigned revenue in accordance with Article 21(5) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council**. The auctioning of allowances for the purchase of domestic permanent carbon removal units referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the principles and modalities referred to in Article 10(4) of this Directive. The allowances set aside under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be returned to the Union-wide quantity of allowances referred to in Article 9 of this Directive in the event they are not auctioned for the purposes in paragraph 1 of this Article before 2041. | 3. Proceeds from the auctioning of allowances under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall constitute external assigned revenue in accordance with Article 21(5) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council**. The auctioning of allowances for the purchase of domestic permanent carbon removal units referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the principles and modalities referred to in Article 10(4) of this Directive. The allowances set aside under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be cancelled in the event they are not auctioned for the purposes in paragraph 1 of this Article before 2041. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. The quantity of domestic permanent carbon removals to be purchased shall be reduced by the amount of BioCCS domestic carbon removals that operators, aircraft operators and shipping companies use in accordance with Article 14(1a), and a corresponding amount of allowances shall be cancelled from the 250 million allowances referred to in paragraph 1. | 5. By 1 January 2029, the Commission shall adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 23 to supplement this Directive by establishing additional technical criteria and enforceable long-term monitoring, reporting, verification, permanence and liability requirements, including for reversals, for the eligibility of BCR activities under this Article, based on the methodologies approved under Regulation (EU) 2024/3012. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall determine the use of revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, except for the revenues established as own resources in accordance with Article 311, third paragraph, TFEU and entered in the Union budget. Member States shall use at least 50% of those revenues, with the exception of the revenues used for the compensation of indirect carbon costs referred to in Article 10a(6) of this Directive, or the equivalent in financial value of those revenues, to support the decarbonisation of ETS sectors, for one or more of the following priority purposes: | Member States shall determine the use of revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, except for the revenues established as own resources in accordance with Article 311, third paragraph, TFEU and entered in the Union budget. Member States shall use at least 75% of those revenues, with the exception of the revenues used for the compensation of indirect carbon costs referred to in Article 10a(6) of this Directive, or the equivalent in financial value of those revenues, to support the decarbonisation of ETS sectors, for one or more of the following priority purposes: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (ka) measures intended to reduce emissions in buildings, by improving energy efficiency, district heating systems and insulation, to support efficient and renewable heating and cooling systems, or to support the deep and staged deep renovation of buildings in accordance with Directive 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council, starting with the renovation of the worst performing buildings. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| By way of derogation from the first subparagraph of this paragraph, for the first years of application of Regulation (EU) 2023/956, the production of goods listed in Annex I to that Regulation shall benefit from free allocation, in accordance with paragraphs 3a to 3d, in reduced amounts. A factor reducing the free allocation for the production of those goods shall be applied (CBAM factor). The CBAM factor shall be equal to 100 % for the period between the entry into force of that Regulation and the end of 2025 and, subject to the application of provisions referred to in Article 36(2), point (b), of that Regulation, shall be equal to 97,5 % in 2026, 95 % in 2027, 91.5 % in 2028, 81 % in 2029, 59% in 2030, 48% in 2031, 37,5% in 2032 and 27% in 2033, 15% from 2034 to 2037. From 2038, a CBAM factor of 0 % shall apply.; | By way of derogation from the first subparagraph of this paragraph, for the first years of application of Regulation (EU) 2023/956, the production of goods listed in Annex I to that Regulation shall benefit from free allocation, in accordance with paragraphs 3a to 3d, in reduced amounts. A factor reducing the free allocation for the production of those goods shall be applied (CBAM factor). The CBAM factor shall be equal to 100 % for the period between the entry into force of that Regulation and the end of 2025 and, subject to the application of provisions referred to in Article 36(2), point (b), of that Regulation, shall be equal to 97,5 % in 2026, 95 % in 2027, 91.5 % in 2028, 81 % in 2029, 70% in 2030, 58% in 2031, 40% in 2032 and 27% in 2033, 15% from 2034 to 2037. From 2038, a CBAM factor of 0 % shall apply.; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ba) the following paragraph 1aa is added: | |
| 1aa. By 30 November 2028, and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall assess, for each sector or subsector listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2023/956, whether the carbon border adjustment mechanism established by that Regulation, together with the phase-out of free allocation set out in paragraph 1a of this Article, continues to provide effective protection against the risk of carbon leakage, including as regards Union production exported to third countries that have not effectively applied a carbon price to the production of those goods, within the meaning of Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 (the ‘CBAM Effectiveness Assessment’). The CBAM Effectiveness Assessment shall examine, in respect of the two-year period preceding the assessment, the below indicators for each sector or subsector concerned. Each indicator in points (a) to (e) shall be measured as the excess, over the period assessed, above the corresponding average annual rate of change recorded during the reference period referred to in paragraph 1a, first subparagraph (the ‘reference period’). An indicator shall not be considered triggered where the change observed during the period assessed does not exceed the rate already occurring during the reference period. The CBAM Effectiveness Assessment shall examine on that basis the following indicators for each sector or subsector concerned: the investment-relocation indicator: whether the average annual increase in production capacity for the goods concerned established outside the Union by economic operators active in the sector in the Union, or by undertakings belonging to the same group as such operators or as authorised CBAM declarants, exceeds, by more than 2 percentage points of the Union production capacity in operation at the beginning of the period assessed, the average annual increase in such extra-Union capacity recorded during the reference period; the Union production indicator: whether the average annual rate of decline in the volume of Union production of the goods concerned, exceeds, by more than 2 percentage points, the average annual rate of decline in Union production, similarly adjusted, recorded during the reference period, both adjusted for consumption pattern changes of the goods concerned; the import penetration indicator: whether the average annual increase in the share of apparent Union consumption of the goods concerned held by imports originating in third countries exceeds, by more than 2 percentage points, the average annual increase in that import share recorded during the reference period. the export volume indicator: whether the average annual rate of decline in the volume, or in the share of Union production, of the goods concerned exported to third countries that have not effectively applied a carbon price to the production of those goods, within the meaning of Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 (the ‘export exposure share’), exceeds, by more than 2 percentage points, the average annual rate of such decline, if any, recorded during the reference period; the carbon cost gap indicator: whether the difference between the average annual carbon cost per tonne of the goods concerned borne by Union producers, by reference to the average annual price of allowances under this Directive, and the average annual carbon cost per tonne borne by producers of those goods in the third countries referred to in paragraph 1e, has widened by more than 15% over the period assessed. The Commission shall base the CBAM Effectiveness Assessment on data recorded in the CBAM registry established pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956, on Eurostat production, trade, customs export and foreign direct investment statistics, and on any other relevant and publicly verifiable source, and shall consult the Member States and representatives of the sectors and subsectors concerned. Where the reference period includes a year materially distorted by an exceptional and non-recurring event, the Commission shall adjust the calculation of the reference-period rate under points (a) to (e) accordingly, in accordance with the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 1e. The Commission shall publish the outcome of each CBAM Effectiveness Assessment, including a determination for each sector or subsector as to whether any of the indicators in points (a) to (e) has been triggered, and shall without delay transmit that assessment to the European Parliament and to the Council. 1c. Where a CBAM Effectiveness Assessment referred to in paragraph 1b establishes that one or more of the indicators listed in points (a) to (e) of that paragraph has been triggered for a given sector or subsector, the following shall apply, by way of derogation from paragraph 1a: the reduction of the CBAM factor otherwise scheduled to apply to that sector or subsector for each of the two calendar years following the assessment shall not take place, and the CBAM factor applicable in the year of the assessment shall continue to apply for those two years; where only the indicators in points (d) or (e) of paragraph 1b are triggered, this point shall apply only to the free allocation corresponding to the export exposure share of that sector or subsector; where an indicator that triggered point (a) remains triggered in the immediately following CBAM Effectiveness Assessment, the Commission shall, within one month, adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 23 increasing the CBAM factor, or, where only the indicators in points (d) or (e) of paragraph 1b are triggered, the CBAM factor applicable to the free allocation corresponding to the export exposure share, applicable to the sector or subsector concerned to a level not exceeding the CBAM factor that was applicable in the calendar year preceding the first of those two assessments; the suspension or increase of the CBAM factor pursuant to points (a) and (b) shall apply until a subsequent CBAM Effectiveness Assessment establishes that none of the indicators that triggered it remains triggered for the sector or subsector concerned, from which point the schedule set out in paragraph 1a shall resume, for the remaining years of that schedule, from the CBAM factor value applicable immediately before the suspension; the Commission shall, by means of implementing acts adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 22a(2), confirm the sectors and subsectors affected by points (a) to (c) and the resulting CBAM factor applicable to each of them. Notwithstanding points (a) and (b), the application of this paragraph in response to the indicators in points (d) or (e) of paragraph 1b shall at no point result in free allocation for the export exposure share of a sector or subsector exceeding the free allocation that would have been available for the corresponding production in the absence of any reduction of the CBAM factor pursuant to paragraph 1a. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| [...] | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) the following paragraphs are inserted after paragraph 2: | (d) the following paragraph is inserted after paragraph 2: |
| 2c. For installations whose greenhouse gas emission levels are below the average of the 10 % most efficient installations in a sector or subsector in the Union in the years 2026 and 2027 for the relevant product benchmarks pursuant to paragraph 2, the amount of free allocation determined in accordance with the rules referred to in paragraph 1 shall be increased by 10 %. This additional amount shall be allocated in addition to the amount of free allocation otherwise determined for the installation under this Article. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The allowances shall be available for projects in all Member States. In the first 18 months of operation, a share of allowances shall be reserved for projects in the group of Member States with a GDP per capita at market prices below 75 % of the Union average in the period 2022 to 2024, equal to 100 million allowances. After 18 months this reserved amount shall be reduced to 60 million. | The allowances shall be available for projects in all Member States. In the first 18 months of operation, a share of allowances shall be reserved for projects in the group of Member States with a GDP per capita at market prices below 75 % of the Union average in the period 2022 to 2024, equal to 100 million allowances. After 18 months this reserved amount shall be reduced to 60 million. |
| A share of allowances shall be reserved for projects involving the sectors covered by Regulation (EU) 2023/956 corresponding to their share of emissions under the system in 2027, in particular, to address the remaining risk of carbon leakage in third country markets. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances destined for the Modernisation Fund pursuant to Article 10d, for the Innovation Fund pursuant to Article 10cb and for the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank pursuant to Article 10cc of this Directive shall be used in line with the principle of ‘do no significant harm’ referred to in Article 33(2), point (d) of Regulation of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| ‘1a. The application of the principle of ‘do no significant harm’ referred to in Article 33(2), point (d) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 to revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances destined for the Modernisation Fund pursuant to Article 10d, for the Innovation Fund pursuant to Article 10cb and for the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank pursuant to Article 10cc of this Directive, shall be set out in this Article to ensure it is feasible and appropriate for the objectives and activities of these programmes. The principle shall be applied to the programmes as set out in this Article. No monitoring, verification or reporting obligation specific to the principles beyond that set out in this Article shall apply. | |
| 1b. Projects or investment proposals not subject to an environmental impact assessment pursuant to Directives 2011/92/EU or 92/43/EEC shall be presumed compliant with the principle referred to in Article 33(2), point (d) of Regulation [2024/2509]. No documentation or other evidence of compliance shall be required from applicants for such projects. | |
| 1c. Where a project or investment proposal is subject to an environmental impact assessment pursuant to Directive 2011/92/EU or to an appropriate assessment pursuant to Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43/EEC, the following shall apply: where the relevant permit, consent or decision has been completed or granted at the time of submission of the project or investment proposal, the entity submitting the proposal may demonstrate compliance with the principle referred to in paragraph 1 by providing the relevant permit, consent or decision and shall not be required to provide additional documentation relating to the environmental aspects covered by that assessment; where the relevant assessment procedure has been initiated but has not yet been completed at the time of submission of the project or investment proposal, the entity submitting the proposal shall provide evidence of the initiation of that procedure and any relevant documentation available to it. The project or investment shall be presumed to comply with the principle referred to in paragraph 1 in respect of the environmental aspects covered by that procedure for the duration of the assessment procedure, unless the competent granting authority determines, on the basis of the information available to it in the ordinary exercise of its functions, that there are manifest grounds to consider that the project would cause significant harm to one or more of the environmental objectives referred to in Article 33(2), point (d), of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. Once the relevant permit, consent or decision has been completed or granted, the entity submitting the proposal shall provide it to the granting authority, where required under the applicable rules governing the relevant funding instrument; where that procedure has not yet been initiated at the time of submission of the project or investment proposal, the entity submitting the proposal shall instead submit a declaration undertaking to initiate the procedure with the competent national authority no later than the signature of the grant or financing agreement, and shall provide evidence of such initiation at that stage. That declaration shall satisfy the requirements of this point at the application stage.’ |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) The Member State concerned has a national carbon tax in force for the emissions of the years 2031 to 2035, covering the activity referred to in in Annex I; the national law setting the tax rates applicable for the years 2031 to 2035 has, by the date of notification in accordance with 31July 2029, entered into force; for the reference year, the national carbon tax of the Member State concerned effectively paid by that regulated entity is higher than the average auction clearing price of the emissions trading system established under this Chapter, adjusted for the gradual phase-in for the sector in accordance with Article 12a; the Member State concerned shall notify the Commission of any subsequent change to the national carbon tax; | (a) The Member State concerned has a national carbon tax or any relevant national taxation measure, which contributes to the reduction of the CO2 in force for the emissions of the years 2031 to 2035, covering the activity referred to in in Annex I; the national law setting the tax rates applicable for the years 2031 to 2035 has, by the date of notification in accordance with 31July 2029, entered into force; for the reference year, the national carbon tax of the Member State concerned effectively paid by that regulated entity is higher than the average auction clearing price of the emissions trading system established under this Chapter, adjusted for the gradual phase-in for the sector in accordance with Article 12a; the Member State concerned shall notify the Commission of any subsequent change to the national carbon tax; |
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- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
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- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2026). “DRAFT OPINION on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 as regards driving competitiveness and cost-effective decarbonisation”. Text, 18 September 2026. docId ITRE-PA-792091. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ITRE-PA-792091 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: EP Open Data API: document record, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/api/v2/documents/ITRE-PA-792091 (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-itre-pa-792091,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{DRAFT OPINION on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 as regards driving competitiveness and cost-effective decarbonisation}},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-09-18},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ITRE-PA-792091}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ITRE-PA-792091},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. docId ITRE-PA-792091. Data: EP Open Data API: document record (CC BY 4.0)}
}