Text · Amendment list
Safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the Union
Document ITRE-AM-786873 · COM(2025)0335 – 2025/0335(COD)
- Kind
- Amendment list ITRE-AM-786873
- Date
- 14 April 2026
- Committee
- Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
- Dossier
- 2025-0335
More facts (2)
- Formats
- Official page PDF Word
- Reference
- COM(2025)0335 – 2025/0335(COD)
Text
The text as parsed from the official Word file. Every paragraph has a link (¶) and can be saved to a project as a passage.
Jump to an amendment (268)
- Amendment 678
- Amendment 679
- Amendment 680
- Amendment 681
- Amendment 682
- Amendment 683
- Amendment 684
- Amendment 685
- Amendment 686
- Amendment 687
- Amendment 688
- Amendment 689
- Amendment 690
- Amendment 691
- Amendment 692
- Amendment 693
- Amendment 694
- Amendment 695
- Amendment 696
- Amendment 697
- Amendment 698
- Amendment 699
- Amendment 700
- Amendment 701
- Amendment 702
- Amendment 703
- Amendment 704
- Amendment 705
- Amendment 706
- Amendment 707
- Amendment 708
- Amendment 709
- Amendment 710
- Amendment 711
- Amendment 712
- Amendment 713
- Amendment 714
- Amendment 715
- Amendment 716
- Amendment 717
- Amendment 718
- Amendment 719
- Amendment 720
- Amendment 721
- Amendment 722
- Amendment 723
- Amendment 724
- Amendment 725
- Amendment 726
- Amendment 727
- Amendment 728
- Amendment 729
- Amendment 730
- Amendment 731
- Amendment 732
- Amendment 733
- Amendment 734
- Amendment 735
- Amendment 736
- Amendment 737
- Amendment 738
- Amendment 739
- Amendment 740
- Amendment 741
- Amendment 742
- Amendment 743
- Amendment 744
- Amendment 745
- Amendment 746
- Amendment 747
- Amendment 748
- Amendment 749
- Amendment 750
- Amendment 751
- Amendment 752
- Amendment 753
- Amendment 754
- Amendment 755
- Amendment 756
- Amendment 757
- Amendment 758
- Amendment 759
- Amendment 760
- Amendment 761
- Amendment 762
- Amendment 763
- Amendment 764
- Amendment 765
- Amendment 766
- Amendment 767
- Amendment 768
- Amendment 769
- Amendment 770
- Amendment 771
- Amendment 772
- Amendment 773
- Amendment 774
- Amendment 775
- Amendment 776
- Amendment 777
- Amendment 778
- Amendment 779
- Amendment 780
- Amendment 781
- Amendment 782
- Amendment 783
- Amendment 784
- Amendment 785
- Amendment 786
- Amendment 787
- Amendment 788
- Amendment 789
- Amendment 790
- Amendment 791
- Amendment 792
- Amendment 793
- Amendment 794
- Amendment 795
- Amendment 796
- Amendment 797
- Amendment 798
- Amendment 799
- Amendment 800
- Amendment 801
- Amendment 802
- Amendment 803
- Amendment 804
- Amendment 805
- Amendment 806
- Amendment 807
- Amendment 808
- Amendment 809
- Amendment 810
- Amendment 811
- Amendment 812
- Amendment 813
- Amendment 814
- Amendment 815
- Amendment 816
- Amendment 817
- Amendment 818
- Amendment 819
- Amendment 820
- Amendment 821
- Amendment 822
- Amendment 823
- Amendment 824
- Amendment 825
- Amendment 826
- Amendment 827
- Amendment 828
- Amendment 829
- Amendment 830
- Amendment 831
- Amendment 832
- Amendment 833
- Amendment 834
- Amendment 835
- Amendment 836
- Amendment 837
- Amendment 838
- Amendment 839
- Amendment 840
- Amendment 841
- Amendment 842
- Amendment 843
- Amendment 844
- Amendment 845
- Amendment 846
- Amendment 847
- Amendment 848
- Amendment 849
- Amendment 850
- Amendment 851
- Amendment 852
- Amendment 853
- Amendment 854
- Amendment 855
- Amendment 856
- Amendment 857
- Amendment 858
- Amendment 859
- Amendment 860
- Amendment 861
- Amendment 862
- Amendment 863
- Amendment 864
- Amendment 865
- Amendment 866
- Amendment 867
- Amendment 868
- Amendment 869
- Amendment 870
- Amendment 871
- Amendment 872
- Amendment 873
- Amendment 874
- Amendment 875
- Amendment 876
- Amendment 877
- Amendment 878
- Amendment 879
- Amendment 880
- Amendment 881
- Amendment 882
- Amendment 883
- Amendment 884
- Amendment 885
- Amendment 886
- Amendment 887
- Amendment 888
- Amendment 889
- Amendment 890
- Amendment 891
- Amendment 892
- Amendment 893
- Amendment 894
- Amendment 895
- Amendment 896
- Amendment 897
- Amendment 898
- Amendment 899
- Amendment 900
- Amendment 901
- Amendment 902
- Amendment 903
- Amendment 904
- Amendment 905
- Amendment 906
- Amendment 907
- Amendment 908
- Amendment 909
- Amendment 910
- Amendment 911
- Amendment 912
- Amendment 913
- Amendment 914
- Amendment 915
- Amendment 916
- Amendment 917
- Amendment 918
- Amendment 919
- Amendment 920
- Amendment 921
- Amendment 922
- Amendment 923
- Amendment 924
- Amendment 925
- Amendment 926
- Amendment 927
- Amendment 928
- Amendment 929
- Amendment 930
- Amendment 931
- Amendment 932
- Amendment 933
- Amendment 934
- Amendment 935
- Amendment 936
- Amendment 937
- Amendment 938
- Amendment 939
- Amendment 940
- Amendment 941
- Amendment 942
- Amendment 943
- Amendment 944
- Amendment 945
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof, | Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 and 189(2) thereof, |
Adding Article 189(2) TFEU alongside Article 114 provides the complementary legal basis for the Union to take the formal steps needed for EU accession to the UN space liability and registration conventions (Article 107a). The dual basis follows established CJEU case law on measures serving a dual objective and insulates the Regulation against legal challenge on competence grounds.
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) Space-based data and space services have become an important part of the Union’s economy and the daily life of citizens. They are used in sectors which are key for the functioning of the internal market, including those covered by Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 on the resilience of critical entities and Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council4 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union. | deleted |
| 3 (3)Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (CER Directive) (OJ L 333 164, 27.12.2022. p.164, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj). | |
| 4 (4)Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj). |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) Space-based data and space services have become an important part of the Union’s economy and the daily life of citizens. They are used in sectors which are key for the functioning of the internal market, including those covered by Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 on the resilience of critical entities and Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council4 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union. | deleted |
| 3 (3)Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (CER Directive) (OJ L 333 164, 27.12.2022. p.164, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj). | |
| 4 (4)Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) Space-based data and space services provide invaluable contributions to a vast range of domains, such as internet connectivity, satellite television, navigation management and environmental monitoring. They enable applications for scientific purposes or security and defence operations, like search and rescue missions, communications for command-and-control purposes and reconnaissance capabilities. Space-based data and space services increasingly support the implementation of public policies of Member States and advance the Union’s political agenda and its path to the digital and green transitions. | (2) Space-based data and space services provide invaluable contributions to a vast range of domains, such as internet connectivity, satellite television, navigation management and environmental monitoring, and have demonstrated their increasing importance in supporting the Union’s strategic autonomy, economic competitiveness and innovation capacity. They enable applications for scientific purposes or security and defence operations, like search and rescue missions, communications for command-and-control purposes and reconnaissance capabilities. Space-based data and space services increasingly support the implementation of public policies of Member States and advance the Union’s political agenda and its path to the digital and green transitions. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) Space-based data and space services provide invaluable contributions to a vast range of domains, such as internet connectivity, satellite television, navigation management and environmental monitoring. They enable applications for scientific purposes or security and defence operations, like search and rescue missions, communications for command-and-control purposes and reconnaissance capabilities. Space-based data and space services increasingly support the implementation of public policies of Member States and advance the Union’s political agenda and its path to the digital and green transitions. | (2) Space-based data and space services provide invaluable contributions to a vast range of domains, such as internet connectivity, satellite television, navigation management and environmental monitoring. They enable applications for scientific purposes, like search and rescue missions and communications for command-and-control purposes Space-based data and space services increasingly support the implementation of public policies of Member States and advance the Union’s political agenda and its path to the digital and green transitions. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) Space-based data and space services provide invaluable contributions to a vast range of domains, such as internet connectivity, satellite television, navigation management and environmental monitoring. They enable applications for scientific purposes or security and defence operations, like search and rescue missions, communications for command-and-control purposes and reconnaissance capabilities. Space-based data and space services increasingly support the implementation of public policies of Member States and advance the Union’s political agenda and its path to the digital and green transitions. | (2) Space-based data and space services provide invaluable contributions to a vast range of domains, such as internet connectivity, satellite television, navigation management and environmental monitoring. They enable applications for scientific purposes or security and defence operations, like search and rescue missions, communications for command-and-control purposes and reconnaissance capabilities. Space-based data and space services are increasingly supporting the implementation of Member States’ public policies and driving the Union’s political agenda, as well as its path towards strategic and economic objectives in the digital sphere. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) Space-based data and space services provide invaluable contributions to a vast range of domains, such as internet connectivity, satellite television, navigation management and environmental monitoring. They enable applications for scientific purposes or security and defence operations, like search and rescue missions, communications for command-and-control purposes and reconnaissance capabilities. Space-based data and space services increasingly support the implementation of public policies of Member States and advance the Union’s political agenda and its path to the digital and green transitions. | (2) Space-based data and space services provide invaluable contributions to a vast range of domains, such as internet connectivity, satellite television, navigation management and environmental monitoring. They enable applications for scientific purposes or security and defence operations, like search and rescue missions, communications for command-and-control purposes and reconnaissance capabilities. Space-based data and space services increasingly support the implementation of public policies of Member States and advance the Union’s political agenda, its digital objectives and its strategic autonomy in space. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová, Tomáš Kubín
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) Space-based data and space services provide invaluable contributions to a vast range of domains, such as internet connectivity, satellite television, navigation management and environmental monitoring. They enable applications for scientific purposes or security and defence operations, like search and rescue missions, communications for command-and-control purposes and reconnaissance capabilities. Space-based data and space services increasingly support the implementation of public policies of Member States and advance the Union’s political agenda and its path to the digital and green transitions. | (2) Space-based data and space services provide invaluable contributions to a vast range of domains, such as internet connectivity, satellite television, navigation management. They enable applications for scientific purposes or security and defence operations, like search and rescue missions, communications for command-and-control purposes and reconnaissance capabilities. Space-based data and space services increasingly support the implementation of public policies of Member States and advance the digital transition while constituting a key economic security interest for the Union and its Member States |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2a) Space activities are essential for carrying out a wide range of activities necessary for the proper functioning of European societies. It is crucial to ensure that space remains a common good in the service of the public interest. European space activities must not contribute to the individualistic appropriation of space or its monopolisation for commercial purposes. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) The space sector of the Union has been witnessing structural changes over the past decade. These were partly triggered by an increased demand for space services and access to space becoming more accessible due to technological advancements and reduction of costs. Space activities, previously concentrated in few Member States and dominated by large established industrial players, have gradually opened towards new market entrants. The emergence, across most Member States, of the so-called ‘New Space’ market actors, most of which private companies, has allowed an expansion of the Union space market, while revealing at the same time the inherently cross-border nature of space activities. | (3) The space sector of the Union has been witnessing structural changes over the past decade. These were partly triggered by an increased demand for space services and access to space becoming more accessible due to technological advancements and reduction of costs. Space activities, previously concentrated in few Member States and dominated by large established industrial players, have gradually opened towards new market entrants, but this also entails a need for an appropriate, safe and sustainable regulatory framework. The emergence, across most Member States, of the so-called ‘New Space’ market actors, most of which private companies, has allowed an expansion of the Union space market, while revealing at the same time the inherently cross-border nature of space activities. |
It is important to have an appropriate EU-level framework for action for all the actors concerned in order to enable all such actors to become involved and develop projects.
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová, Tomáš Kubín
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3 a) The emergence of the European New Space requires proportionate administrative burdens, particularly for SMEs and mid-caps. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) The structural changes witnessed by the Union space sector, the growth of the space activities and the increased role of private actors in carrying out space activities have in turn expanded the national regulatory interventions. 13 Member States have already enacted legislations regulating the space activities while several others carry out preparations to enact similar legislations. | (5) The structural changes witnessed by the Union space sector, the growth of the space activities and the increased role of private actors in carrying out space activities have in turn expanded the national regulatory interventions. Several Member States have already enacted legislations regulating the space activities while others carry out preparations to enact similar legislations. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7) However, neither the OST nor any other international treaty of the UN regulatory framework for space provide for specific and detailed rules to address the emerging risks associated with the increase of space activities. The Long-term Sustainability Guidelines adopted by the UN provide a framework of actions for national and regional entities to ensure the future protection of orbits. However, other than these non-binding guidelines, the congestion of orbits, the risk of collision, the risk of disruption of space services due to cyberattacks perpetrated on space infrastructure as well as the environmental impact of space activities constitute a growing reason for concern for the safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities, for which there is no legislation at international level thus leaving a regulatory gap. | (7) However, neither the OST nor any other international treaty of the UN regulatory framework for space provide for specific and detailed rules to address the emerging risks and the growing environmental impacts associated with the increase of space activities. The Long-term Sustainability Guidelines adopted by the UN provide a framework of actions for national and regional entities to ensure the future protection of orbits. However, these non-binding guidelines are not sufficient to mitigate growing concerns for the safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities, associated with, the congestion of orbits, the risk of collision, the risk of disruption of space services due to cyberattacks perpetrated on space infrastructure as well as the growing environmental impact of space activities that constitute a major concern for the safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities. Moreover, the OST liability regime does not cover environmental liability, nor does it place liability directly on space operators. This leaves a regulatory gap. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7) However, neither the OST nor any other international treaty of the UN regulatory framework for space provide for specific and detailed rules to address the emerging risks associated with the increase of space activities. The Long-term Sustainability Guidelines adopted by the UN provide a framework of actions for national and regional entities to ensure the future protection of orbits. However, other than these non-binding guidelines, the congestion of orbits, the risk of collision, the risk of disruption of space services due to cyberattacks perpetrated on space infrastructure as well as the environmental impact of space activities constitute a growing reason for concern for the safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities, for which there is no legislation at international level thus leaving a regulatory gap. | (7) However, neither the OST nor any other international treaty of the UN regulatory framework for space provide for specific and detailed rules to address the emerging risks associated with the increase of space activities. An extensive review of the OST is needed. The Long-term Sustainability Guidelines adopted by the UN provide a framework of actions for national and regional entities to ensure the future protection of orbits. However, other than these non-binding guidelines, the congestion of orbits, the risk of collision, the risk of disruption of space services due to cyberattacks perpetrated on space infrastructure as well as the environmental impact of space activities constitute a growing reason for concern for the safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities, for which there is no legislation at international level thus leaving a regulatory gap. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7) However, neither the OST nor any other international treaty of the UN regulatory framework for space provide for specific and detailed rules to address the emerging risks associated with the increase of space activities. The Long-term Sustainability Guidelines adopted by the UN provide a framework of actions for national and regional entities to ensure the future protection of orbits. However, other than these non-binding guidelines, the congestion of orbits, the risk of collision, the risk of disruption of space services due to cyberattacks perpetrated on space infrastructure as well as the environmental impact of space activities constitute a growing reason for concern for the safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities, for which there is no legislation at international level thus leaving a regulatory gap. | (7) However, neither the OST nor any other international treaty of the UN regulatory framework for space provide for specific and detailed rules to address the emerging risks associated with the increase of space activities. The Long-term Sustainability Guidelines adopted by the UN provide a framework of actions for national and regional entities to ensure the future protection of orbits. However, other than these non-binding guidelines, the congestion of orbits, the risk of collision and deliberate collision, the risk of disruption of space services due to cyberattacks perpetrated on space infrastructure as well as the environmental impact of space activities constitute a growing reason for concern for the safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities, for which there is no legislation at international level thus leaving a regulatory gap. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7) However, neither the OST nor any other international treaty of the UN regulatory framework for space provide for specific and detailed rules to address the emerging risks associated with the increase of space activities. The Long-term Sustainability Guidelines adopted by the UN provide a framework of actions for national and regional entities to ensure the future protection of orbits. However, other than these non-binding guidelines, the congestion of orbits, the risk of collision, the risk of disruption of space services due to cyberattacks perpetrated on space infrastructure as well as the environmental impact of space activities constitute a growing reason for concern for the safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities, for which there is no legislation at international level thus leaving a regulatory gap. | (7) However, neither the OST nor any other international treaty of the UN regulatory framework for space provide for specific and detailed rules to address the emerging risks associated with the increase of space activities. The Long-term Sustainability Guidelines adopted by the UN provide a framework of actions for national and regional entities to ensure the future protection of orbits. Apart from these non-binding guidelines, however, orbital congestion, the risk of collision, the risk of disruption to space services caused by cyberattacks on space infrastructure, and the impact of space activities on orbits are increasingly giving rise to concerns regarding the safety, resilience and the safe and efficient use of orbits, for which there is no international legislation, leaving a regulatory gap. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7) However, neither the OST nor any other international treaty of the UN regulatory framework for space provide for specific and detailed rules to address the emerging risks associated with the increase of space activities. The Long-term Sustainability Guidelines adopted by the UN provide a framework of actions for national and regional entities to ensure the future protection of orbits. However, other than these non-binding guidelines, the congestion of orbits, the risk of collision, the risk of disruption of space services due to cyberattacks perpetrated on space infrastructure as well as the environmental impact of space activities constitute a growing reason for concern for the safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities, for which there is no legislation at international level thus leaving a regulatory gap. | (7) However, neither the OST nor any other international treaty of the UN regulatory framework for space provide for specific and detailed rules to address the emerging risks associated with the increase of space activities. The Long-term Sustainability Guidelines adopted by the UN provide a framework of actions for national and regional entities to ensure the future protection of orbits. However, other than these non-binding guidelines, the congestion of orbits, the risk of collision, and the risk of disruption of space services due to cyberattacks perpetrated on space infrastructure constitute a growing reason for concern for the safety and resilience of space activities and for the safe and efficient use of the orbital environment, for which there is no legislation at international level thus leaving a regulatory gap. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7 a) The expansion of space activities carried out within the Union and the establishment of a harmonised regulatory framework governing such activities at Union level increase the need for coherent representation of the Union’s interests in international fora. While international space law, in particular the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space and the related United Nations conventions on international liability and registration of space objects, is primarily addressed to States, the progressive integration of space activities within the Union’s internal market justifies an enhanced role for the Union in the development and implementation of those international rules. In order to ensure consistency between the Union regulatory framework and the international legal regime applicable to space activities, and to avoid fragmentation in the external representation of space-related interests, the Union should, in accordance with its competences under the Treaties, be able to engage with and contribute to relevant international agreements and processes governing space activities, including those relating to international liability and the registration of space objects. |
International space law assigns State responsibility for space activities, but EU commercial operators now operate under Union rules rather than 27 divergent national frameworks. Fragmented representation in international fora — the UN COPUOS, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention — weakens Europe's negotiating position and creates legal uncertainty. As the Union harmonises its internal space market, a coherent Union role in the international legal framework is the logical extension and the political rationale for Article 107a.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7a) The aim of this Regulation is to position the Union as a leader in the setting of high standards for the resilience, sustainability and safety of space activities. Against a backdrop of an ever-growing number of stakeholders making ever-greater use of outer space, it is essential that the Union establishes an exemplary regulatory framework, ensuring the protection of space infrastructure, the preservation of the space environment and the safety of operations. To that end, the Union and its Member States should take the lead in drafting and promoting international treaties grounded in the principles and requirements laid down in this Regulation, with a view to fostering global regulatory convergence and ensuring the peaceful, safe and sustainable use of outer space. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7b) The international legal frameworks governing outer space, which were developed in a profoundly different historical and technological context, are no longer able to adequately address the contemporary challenges arising from the intensification of space activities and the diversification of stakeholders. It would therefore appear necessary to call for them to be revised and updated to incorporate principles aimed at limiting the militarisation of outer space to a strict minimum, promoting the prudent use of orbital resources and preventing the uncontrolled proliferation of space activities. To this end, the Union and its Member States should lend active support to international initiatives aimed at strengthening global space governance, building on the requirements and objectives set out in this Regulation, in order to ensure the peaceful, sustainable and responsible use of space for the benefit of present and future generations. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (8) Moreover, the international space treaties date back to a time when space law was in its infancy and lay the foundation for a general framework of general principles and obligations. In the absence of updated and detailed technical norms to address emerging safety, resilience and sustainability risks, Member States have pursued their own regulatory and authorisation approaches, with different rules covering satellite operations, launch sites and operations, launchers and satellites onboard. | (8) Moreover, the international space treaties date back to a time when space law was in its infancy and lay the foundation for a general framework of general principles and obligations. This framework must be upheld and kept in mind to ensure that the space is used peacefully and in the public interest. In the absence of updated and detailed technical norms to address emerging safety, resilience and sustainability risks, Member States have pursued their own regulatory and authorisation approaches, with different rules covering satellite operations, launch sites and operations, launchers and satellites onboard. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (8) Moreover, the international space treaties date back to a time when space law was in its infancy and lay the foundation for a general framework of general principles and obligations. In the absence of updated and detailed technical norms to address emerging safety, resilience and sustainability risks, Member States have pursued their own regulatory and authorisation approaches, with different rules covering satellite operations, launch sites and operations, launchers and satellites onboard. | (8) Moreover, the international space treaties date back to a time when space law was in its infancy and lay the foundation for a general framework of general principles and obligations. In the absence of updated and detailed technical norms to address emerging safety, resilience and sustainability risks, Member States have pursued their own regulatory and authorisation approaches, with different rules covering satellite operations, launch vehicles, launchers and satellites onboard. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (8) Moreover, the international space treaties date back to a time when space law was in its infancy and lay the foundation for a general framework of general principles and obligations. In the absence of updated and detailed technical norms to address emerging safety, resilience and sustainability risks, Member States have pursued their own regulatory and authorisation approaches, with different rules covering satellite operations, launch sites and operations, launchers and satellites onboard. | (8) Moreover, the international space treaties date back to a time when space law was in its infancy and lay the foundation for a general framework of general principles and obligations. In the absence of updated and detailed technical norms to address emerging safety and resilience risks, Member States have pursued their own regulatory and authorisation approaches, with different rules covering satellite operations, launch sites and operations, launchers and satellites onboard. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (8a) With a view to preserving space as a common good serving the public interest, any form of space tourism – whether individual or collective – not in line with the European vision of shared management and common use of space should be ruled out. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (8b) Against a backdrop of the surge in space activities around the world, this Regulation must safeguard Europe’s space identity, grounded in uses that serve the public interest and public service. To that end, space activities complying with these principles must be afforded priority over and above those of a commercial nature or which serve private interests. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9) These approaches share a common objective, namely setting out the authorisation conditions to address the risks mentioned above. Member States are thereby acknowledging the importance of preserving the safety of orbits and the resilience of space infrastructure, with due regard to the optimal and sustainable use of outer space. Such national space legislations however vary as to the extent and depth of the specific requirements to address the risks to the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities. In this regard Member States approaches vary from minimalist to detailed normative stances. Diverging national requirements may lead to the fragmentation of the internal market and decrease legal certainty needed by Union space operators. | (9) These approaches share a common objective, namely setting out the authorisation conditions to address the risks mentioned above. Member States are thereby acknowledging the importance of preserving the safety of orbits and the resilience of space infrastructure, with due regard to the optimal and sustainable use of outer space. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9) These approaches share a common objective, namely setting out the authorisation conditions to address the risks mentioned above. Member States are thereby acknowledging the importance of preserving the safety of orbits and the resilience of space infrastructure, with due regard to the optimal and sustainable use of outer space. Such national space legislations however vary as to the extent and depth of the specific requirements to address the risks to the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities. In this regard Member States approaches vary from minimalist to detailed normative stances. Diverging national requirements may lead to the fragmentation of the internal market and decrease legal certainty needed by Union space operators. | (9) These approaches share a common objective, namely setting out the authorisation conditions to address the risks mentioned above. Member States are thereby acknowledging the importance of preserving the safety of orbits and the resilience of space infrastructure, with due regard to the optimal and sustainable use of outer space. Such national space legislations however vary as to the extent and depth of the specific requirements to address the risks to the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities. In this regard Member States approaches vary from minimalist to detailed normative stances. Diverging national requirements may decrease legal certainty needed by Union space operators. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (10) As a result, various fragmented space activities frameworks emerge across the Union, triggered by a variety of norms with discrepancies in their level of detail also resulting in a lack of coordination among Member States. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (10) As a result, various fragmented space activities frameworks emerge across the Union, triggered by a variety of norms with discrepancies in their level of detail also resulting in a lack of coordination among Member States. | (10) As a result, various fragmented space activities frameworks emerge across the Union, triggered by a variety of norms with discrepancies in their level of detail also resulting in a lack of coordination among Member States. As such, national regulatory measures reflect, on the one hand, the sovereign prerogatives of Member States, but also their international obligations, given the objective of ensuring the compliance of space activities with the rules of international law and the principles established by the relevant treaties. |
Space activities transcend the boundaries of individual states and it is therefore necessary to ensure cooperation at European and international level in line with the existing treaties.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (10 a) The competitiveness of the Union space industry, and in particular the strategic importance of European prime contractors and their supply chains, constitutes an objective of this Regulation. The regulatory framework established by this Regulation shall not place Union space operators at a structural disadvantage vis-à-vis third-country competitors that are not subject to equivalent obligations. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) Fragmentation in the conditions of authorisation in relation to key elements of space infrastructure, such as spacecraft, or to cyber risk management rules when providing space services, or to the environmental impact of space activities, can adversely impact the freedom to provide space-based data generated by space infrastructure and the provision and deployment of space services in the Union. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) Fragmentation in the conditions of authorisation in relation to key elements of space infrastructure, such as spacecraft, or to cyber risk management rules when providing space services, or to the environmental impact of space activities, can adversely impact the freedom to provide space-based data generated by space infrastructure and the provision and deployment of space services in the Union. | (11) Fragmentation in the conditions of authorisation in relation to key elements of space infrastructure, such as spacecraft, or to cyber risk management rules when providing space services, or to the environmental impact of space activities, can adversely impact the freedom to provide space-based data generated by space infrastructure and the provision and deployment of space services in the Union. Close cooperation between the public and private sectors is needed in order to support a robust space ecosystem capable of responding to current and future challenges. |
Current technological developments call for cooperation between all the actors involved in this field with a view to developing and implementing large-scale projects.
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) Fragmentation in the conditions of authorisation in relation to key elements of space infrastructure, such as spacecraft, or to cyber risk management rules when providing space services, or to the environmental impact of space activities, can adversely impact the freedom to provide space-based data generated by space infrastructure and the provision and deployment of space services in the Union. | (11) Fragmentation in the conditions of authorisation can adversely impact the freedom to provide space-based data generated by space infrastructure and the provision and deployment of space services in the Union. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (11) Fragmentation in the conditions of authorisation in relation to key elements of space infrastructure, such as spacecraft, or to cyber risk management rules when providing space services, or to the environmental impact of space activities, can adversely impact the freedom to provide space-based data generated by space infrastructure and the provision and deployment of space services in the Union. | (11) Fragmentation in the conditions of authorisation in relation to key elements of space infrastructure, such as spacecraft, or to cyber risk management rules when providing space services, or to space debris mitigation of space activities, can adversely impact the freedom to provide space-based data generated by space infrastructure and the provision and deployment of space services in the Union. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (12) Typical assets of space infrastructure, such as spacecraft, which do not fulfil the specific requirements laid down in some legislations may be prevented from being used in the internal market of space services. Some Member States have for instance chosen to impose for safety reasons more stringent requirements on the design of satellites, in respect to satellites authorised for launch according to the legislation of other Member States. This divergence may not only render more difficult the cross-border trade for a company supplying satellites but Member States taking a strict stance on safety authorisation requirements may choose to not allow launches from their territory of satellites authorised for operation in Member States subject to less stringent safety requirements. In a similar vein, where surveillance and tracking requirements before and after the launch of satellites, or where specific cyber risk management rules were put in place only in some Member States, the provision of space services, such as the operation and launch services across the internal market might be adversely impacted. | (12) Typical assets of space infrastructure, such as spacecraft, which do not fulfil the specific requirements laid down in some legislations may be prevented from being used in the internal market of space services. The divergence in national requirements may not only render more difficult the cross-border trade for a company supplying satellites but Member States taking a strict stance on safety authorisation requirements may choose to not allow launches or operation from their territory of spacecraft authorised for operation in Member States subject to less stringent safety requirements. In a similar vein, only some Member States have put in place surveillance and tracking requirements or specific cyber risk management rules, the provision of space services, such as the operation and launch services across the internal market might be adversely impacted. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (12) Typical assets of space infrastructure, such as spacecraft, which do not fulfil the specific requirements laid down in some legislations may be prevented from being used in the internal market of space services. Some Member States have for instance chosen to impose for safety reasons more stringent requirements on the design of satellites, in respect to satellites authorised for launch according to the legislation of other Member States. This divergence may not only render more difficult the cross-border trade for a company supplying satellites but Member States taking a strict stance on safety authorisation requirements may choose to not allow launches from their territory of satellites authorised for operation in Member States subject to less stringent safety requirements. In a similar vein, where surveillance and tracking requirements before and after the launch of satellites, or where specific cyber risk management rules were put in place only in some Member States, the provision of space services, such as the operation and launch services across the internal market might be adversely impacted. | (12) Typical assets of space infrastructure, such as spacecraft, which do not fulfil the specific requirements laid down in some legislations may be prevented from being used in the internal market of space services. Some Member States have for instance chosen to impose for safety reasons more stringent authorisation requirements on the design of spacecraft than the legislation of other Member States. This divergence may not only render more difficult the cross-border trade for a company supplying spacecraft but Member States taking a strict stance on safety authorisation requirements may choose to not allow launches or operation from their territory of spacecraft authorised for operation in Member States subject to less stringent safety requirements. In a similar vein, where only some Member States have put in place surveillance and tracking requirements, the provision of space services, such as the operation and launch services across the internal market might be adversely impacted. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13) Ultimately, such barriers may adversely impact the provision of space-based data and space services across the Union. Since space services rely on space-based data generated through, and using, the assets of space infrastructure, the provision of space services depends on the levels of safety and resilience of the assets of space infrastructure. | (13) Ultimately, such barriers may adversely impact the provision of space-based data and space services across the Union. Since space services rely on space-based data generated through, and using, the assets of space infrastructure, the provision of space services depends on the levels of safety and resilience of the assets of space infrastructure. As such, it is essential that Member States and the relevant actors take coordinated measures to strengthen the security, interoperability and resilience of that infrastructure. In this respect, the development of common standards, efficient exchange of information and investment in innovative technologies can help reduce vulnerabilities and ensure the continuity of space services in the Union. |
The security of space infrastructure is essential for all the actors involved, which is why common standards for investment in innovative technologies are needed.
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13) Ultimately, such barriers may adversely impact the provision of space-based data and space services across the Union. Since space services rely on space-based data generated through, and using, the assets of space infrastructure, the provision of space services depends on the levels of safety and resilience of the assets of space infrastructure. | (13) Since space services rely on space-based data generated through, and using, the assets of space infrastructure, the provision of space services depends on the levels of safety and resilience of the assets of space infrastructure. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14) Requirements entailing higher costs, such as design requirements to avoid proliferation of space debris, or risk assessments aimed at ensuring the cybersecurity on the various segments of space infrastructure, may prompt Union space operators to seek establishment in jurisdictions with less stringent authorisation requirements. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (14) Requirements entailing higher costs, such as design requirements to avoid proliferation of space debris, or risk assessments aimed at ensuring the cybersecurity on the various segments of space infrastructure, may prompt Union space operators to seek establishment in jurisdictions with less stringent authorisation requirements. | (14) A fragmented legal framework may prompt Union space operators to seek establishment in other jurisdictions. The introduction of ambitious EU requirements will help EU companies compete in a global market with increasing demand for safe, secure and sustainable space standards. EU environmental footprint standards will drive innovation in sustainable space technologies, facilitate access to sustainable finance and ultimately increase competitiveness and build market confidence. The fact that the measures established in this Regulation also apply for non-European companies that want to operate in the single market will also level the playing field between European and non-European companies. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (15) The cross-border nature of space activities in the Union is likely to intensify considering the growing number of Union space operators as well as the rising number of companies developing launcher solutions and of Member States planning to develop launch capabilities. Against this background, diverging conditions across the national authorisation regimes are likely to create more barriers in the space sector, with impact on the continuity of the supply of space-based data and provision of space services which in turn support many areas of activity in the internal market, including critical sectors and infrastructure. | (15) The cross-border nature of space activities in the Union is likely to intensify considering the growing number of Union space operators as well as the rising number of companies developing launcher solutions and of Member States planning to develop launch capabilities. Against this background, diverging conditions across the national authorisation regimes are likely to create more barriers in the space sector, with impact on the continuity of the supply of space-based data and provision of space services which in turn support many areas of activity in the internal market, including critical sectors and infrastructure. Improved cooperation between the public and private sectors is essential for the development of a robust space ecosystem that can respond to current and future challenges. |
Current technological developments call for cooperation between all the actors involved in this field with a view to developing and implementing large-scale projects.
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (15) The cross-border nature of space activities in the Union is likely to intensify considering the growing number of Union space operators as well as the rising number of companies developing launcher solutions and of Member States planning to develop launch capabilities. Against this background, diverging conditions across the national authorisation regimes are likely to create more barriers in the space sector, with impact on the continuity of the supply of space-based data and provision of space services which in turn support many areas of activity in the internal market, including critical sectors and infrastructure. | (15) The cross-border nature of space activities in the Union is likely to intensify considering the growing number of Union space operators as well as the rising number of companies developing launcher solutions and of Member States planning to develop launch capabilities. Against this background, diverging conditions across the national authorisation regimes may create more barriers in the space sector, with impact on the continuity of the supply of space-based data and provision of space services which in turn support many areas of activity in the internal market, including critical sectors and infrastructure. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (16) Therefore, to safeguard and improve the functioning of the internal market, a set of uniform, effective and proportionate mandatory rules which harmonise key aspects for space services in the context of authorisation of space activities should be established at Union level, to ensure unhindered provision of space-based data and space services across the internal market. | (16) Therefore, to safeguard and improve the functioning of the internal market, a set of uniform, effective and proportionate mandatory rules which harmonise key aspects for space services in the context of authorisation of space activities should be established at Union level, to ensure unhindered provision of space-based data and space services across the internal market. These common European rules should also set clear requirements for the safety, security and sustainability of space activities, reduce unnecessary administrative burdens and prevent regulatory fragmentation among Member States. |
Space activities are large-scale activities that require cooperation among all the actors involved and appropriate rules to ensure the security and sustainability of those activities.
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (16) Therefore, to safeguard and improve the functioning of the internal market, a set of uniform, effective and proportionate mandatory rules which harmonise key aspects for space services in the context of authorisation of space activities should be established at Union level, to ensure unhindered provision of space-based data and space services across the internal market. | (16) Therefore, to safeguard and improve the functioning of the internal market, a set of uniform, effective and proportionate rules which harmonise key aspects of authorisation of space activities should be established at Union level, to ensure unhindered provision of space-based data and space services across the internal market. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (16 a) The requirements laid down in this Regulation should be applied in a proportionate manner, taking into account the risks associated with each space activity and the size and capacities of the operator. Disproportionate regulatory burdens could undermine the competitiveness of the European space industry and hinder the Union’s strategic autonomy in space. The implementation of this Regulation should therefore avoid placing Union space operators at a structural disadvantage vis-àvis global competitors, while ensuring the achievement of its safety, resilience and environmental sustainability objectives. |
Paolo Borchia, András Gyürk, Silvia Sardone, Jorge Martín Frías, Raffaele Stancanelli, Aleksandar Nikolic, Isabella Tovaglieri, Mélanie Disdier, Julie Rechagneux, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová, Tomáš Kubín, Barbara Bonte, Pascale Piera
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (16 a) The requirements laid down in this Regulation should be applied in a proportionate manner, taking into account the risks associated with each space activity and the size and capacities of the operator. Disproportionate regulatory burdens could undermine the competitiveness of the European space industry and hinder the Union’s strategic autonomy in space. The implementation of this Regulation should therefore avoid placing Union space operators at a structural disadvantage vis-à-vis global competitors, while ensuring the achievement of its safety, resilience and sustainability. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17) By laying down technology neutral key requirements, innovation should be stimulated by offering to the space services providers access to current and potential new markets, resulting in an increased choice for end users. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17) By laying down technology neutral key requirements, innovation should be stimulated by offering to the space services providers access to current and potential new markets, resulting in an increased choice for end users. | (17) By laying down technology neutral key requirements, innovation should be stimulated by offering to the space services providers access to current and potential new markets, resulting in an increased choice for end users. Small and medium-sized enterprises, mid-cap enterprises as well as research and education institutions should be enabled to participate through simplified and reduced administrative burden, special support by the Union institutions and acess to Union funding. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová, Tomáš Kubín
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17) By laying down technology neutral key requirements, innovation should be stimulated by offering to the space services providers access to current and potential new markets, resulting in an increased choice for end users. | (17) By laying down technology neutral key requirements, innovation should be stimulated by offering to the space services providers access to current and potential new markets, resulting in an increased choice for end users while ensuring enhanced participation of small mid-caps, small and medium sized enterprises and research and education institutions through reducing administrative burden, improved access to finance, and fair opportunities within European space value chains. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17) By laying down technology neutral key requirements, innovation should be stimulated by offering to the space services providers access to current and potential new markets, resulting in an increased choice for end users. | (17) By laying down technology neutral key requirements, innovation and the competitiveness of the European space sector should be stimulated by offering to the space services providers access to current and potential new markets, resulting in an increased choice for end users and striking the right balance between the freedom of operators to operate and the need to protect public interests. |
In a world without borders, a sustainable and fair balance needs to be struck between the freedom of the various operators and actors in the field to operate and the need to protect public interests.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17 a) In order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market and to maintain a high level of safety, resilience, and environmental sustainability of space infrastructure, the harmonised regulatory framework for space activities must also guarantee a level playing field and prevent distortions of competition. Therefore the rules laid down in this Regulation should apply in a non-discriminatory manner to all space service providers offering space-based data or services within the Union. This includes providers established in the Union, who are subject to authorisation and supervision, as well as space service providers established in third countries and international organisations. Where the latter provide services or data in the Union, they should be subject to equivalent requirements regarding registration and supervision to ensure that all actors, regardless of their place of establishment or legal status, adhere to the same standards of safety and sustainability. Such a uniform application of rules is essential to ensure the integrity of the internal market and the long-term viability of space activities for the benefit of all humankind. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17 a) In order to create equal conditions for operating in the internal market, this Regulation should apply to Union space operators as well as to third-country space services providers where they provide space-based data and space services to the Union. The mere availability or resale in the Union of space-based data landing outside the Union, without any operational, technical, or supervisory link to the Union, may not in itself be considered as demonstrating a substantial connection to the internal market for the purposes of this Regulation. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17 b) In order to preserve the competences of the Member States, this Regulation should not apply to space objects that are exclusively used to enable defence or national security objectives, irrespective of the entity carrying out such space activities. Space objects that are only partially used for defence purposes should be excluded from the scope of this Regulation when they need to be placed under a Member State operation and control, for defence purposes, only for the duration of the respective space mission carried out by the military forces. In such cases, it is for each Member State to determine, owing to the circumstances of the case, whether such space object would fall under that exclusion. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17 c) This Regulation should be thus without prejudice to the competences of Member States as regards all matters pertaining to national security, which also extends to cases where Member States need, for the purposes and the exercise of such national security competence, to execute specific space operations, for instance by taking control of a space object under their jurisdiction. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (18) Only in limited cases, considering the strategic importance for the Union or Member States to have access to certain space services, the Commission should grant a derogation from the requirements laid down in this Regulation for launch services where this is justified by a public interest. Implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to grant a derogation to the respective third-country launch operator where the public interest condition is met. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová, Tomáš Kubín
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (18) Only in limited cases, considering the strategic importance for the Union or Member States to have access to certain space services, the Commission should grant a derogation from the requirements laid down in this Regulation for launch services where this is justified by a public interest. Implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to grant a derogation to the respective third-country launch operator where the public interest condition is met. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (18) Only in limited cases, considering the strategic importance for the Union or Member States to have access to certain space services, the Commission should grant a derogation from the requirements laid down in this Regulation for launch services where this is justified by a public interest. Implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to grant a derogation to the respective third-country launch operator where the public interest condition is met. | (18) Today, Europe’s launch capabilities are insufficient. The Union is too dependent on third parties in this area. For this reason, the Union should invest in European launch capabilities and significantly expand its access to space. Only in limited cases, considering the strategic importance for the Union or Member States to have access to certain space services, the Commission should grant a derogation from the requirements laid down in this Regulation for launch services where this is justified by a public interest. The Commission should adopt a decision to grant a derogation to the respective third-country launch operator where the public interest condition is met. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (18) Only in limited cases, considering the strategic importance for the Union or Member States to have access to certain space services, the Commission should grant a derogation from the requirements laid down in this Regulation for launch services where this is justified by a public interest. Implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to grant a derogation to the respective third-country launch operator where the public interest condition is met. | (18) Only in justified and exceptional cases, considering the strategic importance for the Union or Member States to have access to certain space services, the Commission should grant a derogation from the requirements laid down in this Regulation for launch services. Implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to grant a derogation to the respective third-country launch operator. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) At the same time, swift action in cases of emergency or crisis might be necessary, exceptionally and on a temporary basis, to make use of space-based data or space services provided by space service providers which have not been registered in the Union. | (19) At the same time, swift action in cases of emergency or crisis might be necessary, exceptionally and on a temporary basis, to make use of space-based data or space services provided by space service providers which have not been registered in the Union, on condition that clear and transparent mechanisms are established to enable prompt access to these resources while respecting the essential requirements of security, confidentiality and data protection. Such measures should be strictly limited to the duration and scope needed for the management of the emergency situation, and should be subject to appropriate safeguards and control, so as to prevent their misuse and ensure a swift return to the standard system. |
While it is impossible to predict when emergencies will arise, there is a need for clear and transparent mechanisms to ensure security, privacy and data protection.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) Space services providers established in the Union should be subject to an authorisation regime, to address key safety and resilience aspects of typical space services which relate for instance to the operation of spacecraft, the provision of launch services and the operation and maintenance of launch sites. Union space operators of Union-owned assets should be authorised by the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (‘the Agency’) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 , while Union space operators operating assets other than Union-owned assets should be authorised by Member States. | (20) Space services providers established in the Union should be subject to an authorisation regime, to address key safety and resilience aspects of typical space services which relate for instance to the operation of spacecraft, the provision of launch services and the operation and maintenance of launch sites. Union space operators of Union-owned assets should be authorised by the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (‘the Agency’) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5, while space operators operating assets other than Union- owned assets should be authorised by Member States. In the long run, to reduce the risk of gold-plating and fragmentation of the Union market, the Agency should become a fully-fledged space agency, tasked with the design, development and management of EU space assets, and with the authorisation regime related to the operation of spacecrafts, the provision of launch services and the operation and maintenance of launch sites. |
| 5 (5)Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU (OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 69 ELI: ttp://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj) | 5 (5)Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU (OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 69 ELI: ttp://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj) |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) Space services providers established in the Union should be subject to an authorisation regime, to address key safety and resilience aspects of typical space services which relate for instance to the operation of spacecraft, the provision of launch services and the operation and maintenance of launch sites. Union space operators of Union-owned assets should be authorised by the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (‘the Agency’) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 , while Union space operators operating assets other than Union-owned assets should be authorised by Member States. | (20) Space operators established in the Union should be subject to an authorisation regime, to address key safety and resilience aspects of typical space services which relate for instance to the operation of spacecraft, the provision of launch services and the operation and maintenance of launch sites. Union space operators of Union-owned assets should be authorised by the Commission, with the technical assessment of the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (‘the Agency’) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 , while Union space operators operating assets other than Union-owned assets should be authorised by Member States. |
| 5 (5)Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU (OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 69 ELI: ttp://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj) | 5 (5)Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU (OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 69 ELI: ttp://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj) |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20 a) Where the disruption, degradation, denial, manipulation or loss of effective control of certain space activities would be liable to seriously affect public security, public safety, civil protection, governmental continuity, critical infrastructure, essential services, Union space programmes or the resilience of the Union economy, the Agency should verify, as part of the authorisation or registration procedure, that the operator retains effective control within the Union over the functions essential to the conduct, continuity, security and recovery of the relevant space activity. |
The authorisation system does not currently address the risk of critical operational control over EU-registered space assets being exercised from outside the Union. Parallel to the EU's foreign investment screening logic, it is important that authorisation of security-sensitive space activities must verify genuine operational control within the Union, closing the regulatory arbitrage risk created by shell structures.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (21) Space services providers established in the Union providing advanced space services such as collision avoidance (CA) space services or in space services and operations (ISOS) support the typical space services and play a role in the protection and long-term sustainability of assets of space infrastructure. Therefore it is appropriate to subject this category of emerging space services providers to a limited set of rules. This would enable the development of new applications and markets in the space sector (in-space economy). | (21) Space services providers established in the Union providing advanced space services such as collision avoidance (CA) space services or in space services and operations (ISOS) support the typical space services and play a role in the protection and long-term sustainability of assets of space infrastructure. Therefore it is appropriate to subject this category of emerging space services providers to a limited set of rules. This would enable the development of new applications and markets in the space sector (in-space economy). In the future, a system of certification could be envisaged in order to ensure a trusted ecosystem for CA space services. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (21) Space services providers established in the Union providing advanced space services such as collision avoidance (CA) space services or in space services and operations (ISOS) support the typical space services and play a role in the protection and long-term sustainability of assets of space infrastructure. Therefore it is appropriate to subject this category of emerging space services providers to a limited set of rules. This would enable the development of new applications and markets in the space sector (in-space economy). | (21) Space services providers established in the Union providing advanced space services such as in space services and operations (ISOS) support the typical space services and play a role in the protection and long-term sustainability of assets of space infrastructure. Therefore it is appropriate to subject this category of emerging space services providers to a set of rules. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (21) Space services providers established in the Union providing advanced space services such as collision avoidance (CA) space services or in space services and operations (ISOS) support the typical space services and play a role in the protection and long-term sustainability of assets of space infrastructure. Therefore it is appropriate to subject this category of emerging space services providers to a limited set of rules. This would enable the development of new applications and markets in the space sector (in-space economy). | (21) Space services providers established in the Union providing advanced space services such as collision avoidance (CA) space services or in space services and operations (ISOS) support the typical space services and play a role in the protection and long-term sustainability of assets of space infrastructure. Therefore it is appropriate to subject this category of emerging space services providers to a limited set of rules. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (21a) Given the vital importance of space collision avoidance services in ensuring the safety, sustainability and accessibility of space, it should be ensured that they cannot be entrusted to entities pursuing commercial interests. Such services should therefore be provided uniquely by a single public operator designated by the Union, which shall be solely authorised to act on behalf of space operators falling within its jurisdiction. Operators from third countries and international organisations falling within the scope of this Regulation should also be required to register with that operator. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22) Primary providers of space-based data play a key role as intermediaries between the upstream and downstream sectors as they channel space-based data from space operators towards the various subsequent uses of such space-based data, for the benefit of the entire economy and citizens. In that respect, although the substantive rules which apply to space operators should not apply to them, they still play an important role in the space sector, by ascertaining that the space-based data which they pass down in the value chain originates from space operators that are compliant with this Regulation. Therefore, the Agency should draw-up a list of such primary providers of space-based data in the Union. In light of their role of intermediary, primary providers of space-based data are best placed to receive alerts or complaints about potential irregularities in respect to the use in the Union of space-based data, to directly alert their suppliers or bring to the knowledge of the Agency or the relevant competent authority in the Member State where they are established, any allegations about space-based data potentially originating from unregistered or non-compliant space operators, which may be in use in the internal market. | (22) Primary providers of space-based data play a key role as intermediaries between the upstream and downstream sectors as they channel space-based data from space operators towards the various subsequent uses of such space-based data, for the benefit of the entire economy and citizens. In that respect, although the substantive rules which apply to space operators should not apply to them, they still play an important role in the space sector, by ascertaining that the space-based data which they pass down in the value chain originates from space operators that are compliant with this Regulation. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22) Primary providers of space-based data play a key role as intermediaries between the upstream and downstream sectors as they channel space-based data from space operators towards the various subsequent uses of such space-based data, for the benefit of the entire economy and citizens. In that respect, although the substantive rules which apply to space operators should not apply to them, they still play an important role in the space sector, by ascertaining that the space-based data which they pass down in the value chain originates from space operators that are compliant with this Regulation. Therefore, the Agency should draw-up a list of such primary providers of space-based data in the Union. In light of their role of intermediary, primary providers of space-based data are best placed to receive alerts or complaints about potential irregularities in respect to the use in the Union of space-based data, to directly alert their suppliers or bring to the knowledge of the Agency or the relevant competent authority in the Member State where they are established, any allegations about space-based data potentially originating from unregistered or non-compliant space operators, which may be in use in the internal market. | (22) Primary providers of space-based data play a key role as intermediaries between the upstream and downstream sectors as they channel space-based data from space operators towards the various subsequent uses of such space-based data, for the benefit of the entire economy and citizens. In that respect, although the substantive rules which apply to space operators should not apply to them, they still play an important role in the space sector, by ascertaining that the space-based data which they pass down in the value chain originates from space operators that are compliant with this Regulation. Primary providers of space-based data should take all necessary steps to ensure that the data they provide in the Union comply with the requirements of this Regulation, inlcuding registration in URSA and obtaining an e-certificate. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22 a) In order to ensure that this Regulation does not lead to distortions of competition to the detriment of Union operators, equivalence decisions and derogations should only be granted under strict, transparent and verifiable conditions. Operators from third countries should not receive market advantages if they operate under less stringent legal or technical conditions than operators within the Union. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22 b) Union SSA service providers, including European industrial actors, play a strategic role in ensuring the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities. Their capabilities in orbital tracking, collision avoidance and risk mitigation are essential to the functioning of the Union's space ecosystem. To foster innovation, operational reliability and European autonomy in space traffic management, these providers should be actively involved in the development of technical standards and implementing acts under this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (23) In order to create equal conditions for operating in the internal market, the rules for all space services providers within scope of this Regulation, including Union space operators, should apply to the extent space-based data and space services are provided in the Union. | (23) In order to create equal conditions for operating in the internal market, the rules for all space services providers within scope of this Regulation, including space operators, should only apply to them to the extent space-based data and space services are provided in the Union, regardless of the place of establishment of the space operators and service providers. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (24) Therefore, to ensure that no space operator is given an advantage by not being subject to the rules laid down by this Regulation, it is appropriate to ensure a uniform treatment of all space operators, including third-country space services providers, such as third- country spacecraft operators, third-country launch providers, third-country primary providers of space-based data, if they are providing space-based data or space services in the Union. | (24) Therefore, to ensure that no space operator is given an advantage by not being subject to the rules laid down by this Regulation, it is appropriate to ensure a uniform treatment of all space operators, including third-country space services providers, such as third- country spacecraft operators, third-country launch providers, third-country primary providers of space-based data, if they are providing space-based data or space services in the Union. This regulation shall ensure a level playing field between Union space operators and third country operators. Derogations and equivalence decisions should only be granted under fair and balanced conditions. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (24) Therefore, to ensure that no space operator is given an advantage by not being subject to the rules laid down by this Regulation, it is appropriate to ensure a uniform treatment of all space operators, including third-country space services providers, such as third- country spacecraft operators, third-country launch providers, third-country primary providers of space-based data, if they are providing space-based data or space services in the Union. | (24) Therefore, to ensure that no space operator is given an advantage by not being subject to the rules laid down by this Regulation, it is appropriate to ensure a uniform treatment of all space operators, including international organisations, third-country space services providers, such as third- country spacecraft operators, third-country launch providers, third-country primary providers of space-based data, if they are providing space-based data or space services in the Union. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25) This Regulation should thus apply to space services providers, irrespective of their place of establishment, if the space-based data or space services are provided in the Union, thereby demonstrating a substantial connection to the internal market, preventing the risk of circumvention of rules to the disadvantage of Union consumers and businesses, and safeguarding the efficiency of the objectives pursued by this Regulation. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25) This Regulation should thus apply to space services providers, irrespective of their place of establishment, if the space-based data or space services are provided in the Union, thereby demonstrating a substantial connection to the internal market, preventing the risk of circumvention of rules to the disadvantage of Union consumers and businesses, and safeguarding the efficiency of the objectives pursued by this Regulation. | (25) This Regulation should thus apply to space services providers, irrespective of their place of establishment, if the space-based data or space services are provided in the Union, thereby demonstrating a substantial connection to the internal market, preventing the risk of circumvention of rules to the disadvantage of Union consumers and businesses, and safeguarding the efficiency of the objectives pursued by this Regulation, while also striking the right balance between the freedom of space services operators and suppliers to operate and the need to protect public interests. |
In a world without borders, a sustainable and fair balance needs to be struck between the freedom of the various operators and actors in the field to operate and the need to protect public interests.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26) All space services providers established in a third country should designate in writing one or more legal representative(s) in the Union, depending on their commercial needs and organisational requirements. Such legal representatives in the Union should be endowed with all necessary powers and resources to cooperate with the relevant authorities, the Commission and the Agency, on all aspects that are needed for the receipt of information and of decisions related to the compliance with, and enforcement, of this Regulation. | (26) All space services providers established in a third country should designate in writing one or more legal representative(s) in the Union, in order of to ensure an efficient exchange of information. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26) All space services providers established in a third country should designate in writing one or more legal representative(s) in the Union, depending on their commercial needs and organisational requirements. Such legal representatives in the Union should be endowed with all necessary powers and resources to cooperate with the relevant authorities, the Commission and the Agency, on all aspects that are needed for the receipt of information and of decisions related to the compliance with, and enforcement, of this Regulation. | (26) All space services providers established in a third country should designate in writing one or more legal representative(s) in the Union, depending on their commercial needs and organisational requirements. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (27) Certain third-country jurisdictions may adhere to high levels of safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities and as such apply safety, resilience and environmental sustainability requirements similar to those laid down in this Regulation. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (27) Certain third-country jurisdictions may adhere to high levels of safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities and as such apply safety, resilience and environmental sustainability requirements similar to those laid down in this Regulation. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (27) Certain third-country jurisdictions may adhere to high levels of safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities and as such apply safety, resilience and environmental sustainability requirements similar to those laid down in this Regulation. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (27) Certain third-country jurisdictions may adhere to high levels of safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities and as such apply safety, resilience and environmental sustainability requirements similar to those laid down in this Regulation. | (27) Certain third-country jurisdictions may adhere to high levels of safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities and as such apply safety, resilience and environmental sustainability requirements similar to those laid down in this Regulation. This levels of protection should avoid using environmental or resilience-related criteria as disguised restrictions on trade. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (28) In these cases, a mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of a level of protection comparable to what is required under this Regulation. Thus, where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, in relation to the applicable legal framework of a third country and the legally binding rules applicable in that third country, deemed to be equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the compliance of the space services providers established in that third country should be established on that basis. Such space services providers should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (28) In these cases, a mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of a level of protection comparable to what is required under this Regulation. Thus, where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, in relation to the applicable legal framework of a third country and the legally binding rules applicable in that third country, deemed to be equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the compliance of the space services providers established in that third country should be established on that basis. Such space services providers should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (28) In these cases, a mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of a level of protection comparable to what is required under this Regulation. Thus, where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, in relation to the applicable legal framework of a third country and the legally binding rules applicable in that third country, deemed to be equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the compliance of the space services providers established in that third country should be established on that basis. Such space services providers should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission | (28) Certain third-country jurisdictions may adhere to high levels of safety, resilience and environmental sustainability of space activities and as such apply safety, resilience and environmental sustainability requirements similar to those laid down in this Regulation. A mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of a level of protection comparable to what is required under this Regulation. Thus, where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, in relation to the applicable legal framework of a third country and the legally binding rules applicable in that third country, deemed to be equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the compliance of the space services providers established in that third country should be established on the basis of equivalence. Such space services providers should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission |
Julie Rechagneux, Aleksandar Nikolic, Mélanie Disdier, Pascale Piera, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová, Tomáš Kubín, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Christophe Bay, Marion Maréchal
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (28) In these cases, a mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of a level of protection comparable to what is required under this Regulation. Thus, where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, in relation to the applicable legal framework of a third country and the legally binding rules applicable in that third country, deemed to be equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the compliance of the space services providers established in that third country should be established on that basis. Such space services providers should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission | (28) In these cases, a mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of a level of protection comparable to what is required under this Regulation. Thus, where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, in relation to the applicable legal framework of a third country and the legally binding rules applicable in that third country, deemed to be equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the compliance of the space services providers established in that third country should be established on that basis. Such space services providers should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission. The objective of equivalence decisions should be to ensure fair competition, avoid regulatory arbitrage and strengthen the Union space industrial base, including by promoting partnerships with Union-based operators. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (28) In these cases, a mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of a level of protection comparable to what is required under this Regulation. Thus, where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, in relation to the applicable legal framework of a third country and the legally binding rules applicable in that third country, deemed to be equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the compliance of the space services providers established in that third country should be established on that basis. Such space services providers should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission | (28) In these cases, a mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of a level of protection comparable to what is required under this Regulation. Thus, where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, in relation to the applicable legal framework of a third country and the legally binding rules applicable in that third country, deemed to be equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the compliance of the space services providers established in that third country should be established on that basis. Such space services providers should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission. The mechanism of equivalence should be applied in a non-discriminatory, transparent and proportionate manner, focusing strictly on safety, resilience and clearly defined technical requirements |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (28) In these cases, a mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of a level of protection comparable to what is required under this Regulation. Thus, where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, in relation to the applicable legal framework of a third country and the legally binding rules applicable in that third country, deemed to be equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the compliance of the space services providers established in that third country should be established on that basis. Such space services providers should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission | (28) In these cases, a mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of outcomes equivalent to those pursued by this Regulation, assessed on results rather than on identical provisions. Equivalence decisions may be partial, covering specific Titles of this Regulation. The Commission shall prioritise countries with existing bilateral space cooperation frameworks and shall adopt decisions within 18 months of a formal request. The mechanism shall apply symmetrically: Union space operators shall benefit from equivalent market access in the third country concerned. Equivalence decisions should aim to ensure a level playing field, prevent regulatory arbitrage, and reinforce the Union’s space industrial base, including through the promotion of partnerships with operators established within the Union. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (28) In these cases, a mechanism of equivalence is to ensure the recognition of a level of protection comparable to what is required under this Regulation. Thus, where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, in relation to the applicable legal framework of a third country and the legally binding rules applicable in that third country, deemed to be equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the compliance of the space services providers established in that third country should be established on that basis. Such space services providers should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission | (28) Certain like-minded third countries may adhere to high levels of safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities similar to those laid down in this Regulation. A mechanism of equivalence is to ensure an equivalence of the requirements of the legal and supervisory framework of a third country that achieve similar results as the requirements laid down in this Regulation. Where an assessment has been carried out by the Commission, the compliance of the space operators established in that third country should be established on the basis of equivalence. Such space operators should be able to provide space-based data and space services in the Union based on an equivalence decision to be adopted by the Commission. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (29) Space services providers established in a third country for which an equivalence decision has not been adopted should be required to undergo checks to establish compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. To promote convergence of supervisory approaches, the Agency should carry out the technical assessments needed for the Commission to establish compliance and allowing the Commission to decide, based on technical assessments, on the registration of space service providers in the Union and on any supervisory measures. For this purpose, a Register should be set-up at Union level. | (29) Space services providers established in a third country for which an equivalence decision has not been adopted should be required to undergo a technical assessment to establish compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (29) Space services providers established in a third country for which an equivalence decision has not been adopted should be required to undergo checks to establish compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. To promote convergence of supervisory approaches, the Agency should carry out the technical assessments needed for the Commission to establish compliance and allowing the Commission to decide, based on technical assessments, on the registration of space service providers in the Union and on any supervisory measures. For this purpose, a Register should be set-up at Union level. | (29) Space services providers established in a third country for which an equivalence decision has not been adopted should be required to undergo checks to establish compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. Access to the Union market by third-country space services providers shall not result in competitive conditions more favourable than those applicable to Union space operators. Where a third country does not grant Union space operators effective and non-discriminatory market access, registration in URSO shall be refused. The burden of proof of reciprocity shall lie with the third-country operator seeking registration. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (29) Space services providers established in a third country for which an equivalence decision has not been adopted should be required to undergo checks to establish compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. To promote convergence of supervisory approaches, the Agency should carry out the technical assessments needed for the Commission to establish compliance and allowing the Commission to decide, based on technical assessments, on the registration of space service providers in the Union and on any supervisory measures. For this purpose, a Register should be set-up at Union level. | (29) Space services providers established in a third country must be required to undergo checks to establish compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. To promote convergence of supervisory approaches, the Agency should carry out the technical assessments needed for the Commission to establish compliance and allowing the Commission to decide, based on technical assessments, on the registration of space service providers in the Union and on any supervisory measures. For this purpose, a Register should be set-up at Union level. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (29) Space services providers established in a third country for which an equivalence decision has not been adopted should be required to undergo checks to establish compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. To promote convergence of supervisory approaches, the Agency should carry out the technical assessments needed for the Commission to establish compliance and allowing the Commission to decide, based on technical assessments, on the registration of space service providers in the Union and on any supervisory measures. For this purpose, a Register should be set-up at Union level. | (29) Space services providers established in a third country should be required to undergo checks to establish compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. To promote convergence of supervisory approaches, the Agency should carry out the technical assessments needed for the Commission to establish compliance and allowing the Commission to decide, based on technical assessments, on the registration of space service providers in the Union and on any supervisory measures. For this purpose, a Register should be set-up at Union level. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (29) Space services providers established in a third country for which an equivalence decision has not been adopted should be required to undergo checks to establish compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. To promote convergence of supervisory approaches, the Agency should carry out the technical assessments needed for the Commission to establish compliance and allowing the Commission to decide, based on technical assessments, on the registration of space service providers in the Union and on any supervisory measures. For this purpose, a Register should be set-up at Union level. | (29) Space services providers established in a third country for which an equivalence decision has not been adopted should be required to undergo technical assessments to establish compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. To promote convergence of supervisory approaches, the Agency should carry out the technical assessments needed for the Commission to establish compliance and allowing the Commission to decide, based on technical assessments, on the registration of space service providers in the Union and on any supervisory measures. For this purpose, a Register should be set-up at Union level. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) The Union should seek gradually to conclude mutual recognition agreements with third countries. | (30) The Union shall actively pursue mutual recognition agreements with strategic partner countries in the space domain. Such agreements shall be designed so as not to place Union space operators at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis third-country operators accessing the Union market. Where a mutual recognition agreement would result in third-country operators benefiting from more favourable conditions than those applicable to Union operators, the Commission shall not conclude or shall suspend such agreement. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) The Union should seek gradually to conclude mutual recognition agreements with third countries. | (30) The Union should seek gradually to conclude mutual recognition agreements with third countries, including clear and transparent mechanisms that enable access to space services in the Union, while respecting the essential requirements of security, confidentiality and data protection, and also that prevent their misuse. |
In a world without borders, a sustainable and fair balance needs to be struck between the freedom of the various operators and actors in the field to operate and the security of activities and data.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) The Union should seek gradually to conclude mutual recognition agreements with third countries. | (30) In order to safeguard the Union's independence and ensure the ongoing implementation of this Regulation, any concept of equivalence with space services providers established in third countries should be included in cooperation and mutual recognition agreements between the Union and third countries. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) The Union should seek gradually to conclude mutual recognition agreements with third countries. | (30) The Union should seek to conclude mutual recognition agreements on reciprocital terms with third countries to strengthen the approach of mutual equivalence. Already existing institutional and economic partnerships should be considered. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) The Union should seek gradually to conclude mutual recognition agreements with third countries. | (30) The Union should seek gradually to conclude mutual recognition agreements with third countries granting reciprocal market access based on quintessentially ambitious requirements. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (30) The Union should seek gradually to conclude mutual recognition agreements with third countries. | (30) The Union should seek gradually to conclude mutual recognition agreements with third countries considering existing international partnerships and business relations. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (31) In order to comprehensively cover all assets of space infrastructure and avoid gaps, this Regulation should also apply to assets operated by international organisations engaging in space activities, such as the European Space Agency (ESA) or the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT). Such international organisations, considering their extensive technical, scientific and operational expertise, as well as their dedicated infrastructure and capabilities in the space domain, are key partners to the Commission, the Agency and the Member States, in particular in the context of implementing components of the Union Space Programme, conducting joint procurement or programmes of Members States. | (31) International organisations engaging in space activities, such as the European Space Agency (ESA) or the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) have extensive technical, scientific and operational expertise, as well as dedicated infrastructure and capabilities in the space domain. They are key partners to the Commission, the Agency and the Member States, in particular in the context of implementing components of the Union Space Programme, conducting joint procurement or programmes of Members States. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (31) In order to comprehensively cover all assets of space infrastructure and avoid gaps, this Regulation should also apply to assets operated by international organisations engaging in space activities, such as the European Space Agency (ESA) or the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT). Such international organisations, considering their extensive technical, scientific and operational expertise, as well as their dedicated infrastructure and capabilities in the space domain, are key partners to the Commission, the Agency and the Member States, in particular in the context of implementing components of the Union Space Programme, conducting joint procurement or programmes of Members States. | (31) International organisations engaging in space activities, such as the European Space Agency (ESA) or the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) have extensive technical, scientific and operational expertise, as well as dedicated infrastructure and capabilities in the space domain. They are key partners to the Commission, the Agency and the Member States, in particular in the context of implementing components of the Union Space Programme, conducting joint procurement or programmes of Members States. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (31) In order to comprehensively cover all assets of space infrastructure and avoid gaps, this Regulation should also apply to assets operated by international organisations engaging in space activities, such as the European Space Agency (ESA) or the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT). Such international organisations, considering their extensive technical, scientific and operational expertise, as well as their dedicated infrastructure and capabilities in the space domain, are key partners to the Commission, the Agency and the Member States, in particular in the context of implementing components of the Union Space Programme, conducting joint procurement or programmes of Members States. | (31) International organisations engaging in space activities, such as the European Space Agency (ESA) or the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) have extensive technical, scientific and operational expertise, as well as dedicated infrastructure and capabilities in the space domain. They are key partners to the Commission, the Agency and the Member States, in particular in the context of implementing components of the Union Space Programme, conducting joint procurement or programmes of Members States. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) To achieve regulatory coherence in the context of the harmonisation entailed by this Regulation, such international organisations, when operating their own assets, should be subjected to Union law, upon appropriate conditions regarding the means of application and enforcement of Union law to them, which should be laid down in international agreements concluded between the Union and respectively each of such international organisations. Where such international organisations operate Member States assets, enforcement of the rules laid down by this Regulation should be ensured by the competent authorities. Where such international organisations operate Union-owned assets, enforcement should be ensured in accordance with the provisions of the contribution agreements concluded by the Commission to that effect. | (32) To achieve regulatory coherence, it would be important for such international organisations and the Union to conclude international agreements that could advance the objectives set out in this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) To achieve regulatory coherence in the context of the harmonisation entailed by this Regulation, such international organisations, when operating their own assets, should be subjected to Union law, upon appropriate conditions regarding the means of application and enforcement of Union law to them, which should be laid down in international agreements concluded between the Union and respectively each of such international organisations. Where such international organisations operate Member States assets, enforcement of the rules laid down by this Regulation should be ensured by the competent authorities. Where such international organisations operate Union-owned assets, enforcement should be ensured in accordance with the provisions of the contribution agreements concluded by the Commission to that effect. | (32) To achieve regulatory coherence, it would be important for such international organisations, and the Union, to conclude international agreements that could advance the objectives set out in this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) To achieve regulatory coherence in the context of the harmonisation entailed by this Regulation, such international organisations, when operating their own assets, should be subjected to Union law, upon appropriate conditions regarding the means of application and enforcement of Union law to them, which should be laid down in international agreements concluded between the Union and respectively each of such international organisations. Where such international organisations operate Member States assets, enforcement of the rules laid down by this Regulation should be ensured by the competent authorities. Where such international organisations operate Union-owned assets, enforcement should be ensured in accordance with the provisions of the contribution agreements concluded by the Commission to that effect. | (32) To achieve regulatory coherence, it is important for such international organisations and the Union to conclude international agreements that could advance the objectives set out in this Regulation. Where such international organisations operate Member States assets, enforcement of the rules laid down by this Regulation should be ensured by the competent authorities. Where such international organisations operate Union-owned assets, enforcement should be ensured in accordance with the provisions of the contribution agreements concluded by the Commission to that effect. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (32) To achieve regulatory coherence in the context of the harmonisation entailed by this Regulation, such international organisations, when operating their own assets, should be subjected to Union law, upon appropriate conditions regarding the means of application and enforcement of Union law to them, which should be laid down in international agreements concluded between the Union and respectively each of such international organisations. Where such international organisations operate Member States assets, enforcement of the rules laid down by this Regulation should be ensured by the competent authorities. Where such international organisations operate Union-owned assets, enforcement should be ensured in accordance with the provisions of the contribution agreements concluded by the Commission to that effect. | (32) To achieve regulatory coherence it would be important for such international organisations and the Union, to conclude international agreements that could advance the objectives set out in this Regulation. Where such international organisations operate Member States assets, enforcement of the rules laid down by this Regulation should be ensured by the competent authorities. Where such international organisations operate Union-owned assets, enforcement should be ensured in accordance with the provisions of the contribution agreements concluded by the Commission to that effect. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) ESA is an international organisation with extensive expertise in the space domain and an important partner in the implementation of the Union Space Programme. ESA develops and operates, in accordance with dedicated agreements, assets of space infrastructure for the Union Space Programme and the Union Secure Connectivity Programme. ESA also develops space missions on behalf of Member States within its mandatory activities and optional programmes, and provides, at the request of one or more Member States, assistance to national projects in the space domain. ESA is also a central driver for developing technical standards for space activities. The conditions for the implementation of this Regulation to ESA should be further defined in an agreement with due regard to ESA’s status and institutional framework. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) ESA is an international organisation with extensive expertise in the space domain and an important partner in the implementation of the Union Space Programme. ESA develops and operates, in accordance with dedicated agreements, assets of space infrastructure for the Union Space Programme and the Union Secure Connectivity Programme. ESA also develops space missions on behalf of Member States within its mandatory activities and optional programmes, and provides, at the request of one or more Member States, assistance to national projects in the space domain. ESA is also a central driver for developing technical standards for space activities. The conditions for the implementation of this Regulation to ESA should be further defined in an agreement with due regard to ESA’s status and institutional framework. | (33) ESA is an international organisation with extensive expertise in the space domain and an important partner in the implementation of the Union Space Programme. ESA develops and operates, in accordance with dedicated agreements, assets of space infrastructure for the Union Space Programme and the Union Secure Connectivity Programme. ESA also develops space missions on behalf of Member States within its mandatory activities and optional programmes, and provides, at the request of one or more Member States, assistance to national projects in the space domain. ESA is also a central driver for developing technical standards for space activities based on the Framework Agreement with the European Community in 2004 as well as in the context of the European Cooperation for Space Standardisation (ECSS). The conditions for the implementation of this Regulation to ESA should be defined in an agreement with due regard to ESA’s status and institutional framework and based on Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The agreement should establish an appropriate relation between the Union and ESA. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) ESA is an international organisation with extensive expertise in the space domain and an important partner in the implementation of the Union Space Programme. ESA develops and operates, in accordance with dedicated agreements, assets of space infrastructure for the Union Space Programme and the Union Secure Connectivity Programme. ESA also develops space missions on behalf of Member States within its mandatory activities and optional programmes, and provides, at the request of one or more Member States, assistance to national projects in the space domain. ESA is also a central driver for developing technical standards for space activities. The conditions for the implementation of this Regulation to ESA should be further defined in an agreement with due regard to ESA’s status and institutional framework. | (33) ESA is an international organisation with extensive expertise in the space domain and an important partner in the implementation of the Union Space Programme. ESA develops and operates, in accordance with dedicated agreements, assets of space infrastructure for the Union Space Programme and the Union Secure Connectivity Programme. ESA also develops space missions on behalf of Member States within its mandatory activities and optional programmes, and provides, at the request of one or more Member States, assistance to national projects in the space domain. ESA is also a central driver for developing technical standards for space activities. Given its unique and extensive technical capabilities, ESA should be systematically involved in all technical considerations, assessments, and the preparatory work for any delegated and implementing acts under this Regulation. The conditions for the implementation of this Regulation to ESA should be further defined in an agreement with due regard to ESA’s status and institutional framework. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) ESA is an international organisation with extensive expertise in the space domain and an important partner in the implementation of the Union Space Programme. ESA develops and operates, in accordance with dedicated agreements, assets of space infrastructure for the Union Space Programme and the Union Secure Connectivity Programme. ESA also develops space missions on behalf of Member States within its mandatory activities and optional programmes, and provides, at the request of one or more Member States, assistance to national projects in the space domain. ESA is also a central driver for developing technical standards for space activities. The conditions for the implementation of this Regulation to ESA should be further defined in an agreement with due regard to ESA’s status and institutional framework. | (33) ESA is an international organisation with which an appropriate relation should be established. It has extensive expertise in the space domain and an important partner in the implementation of the Union Space Programme. ESA develops and operates, as appropriate, in accordance with dedicated agreements, assets of space infrastructure for the Union Space Programme and the Union Secure Connectivity Programme. ESA is a central driver for developing technical standards for space activities and concluded a Framework Agreement with the European Community in 2004. However, as ESA is not subject to Union law, the conditions for the implementation of this Regulation to ESA should be defined in an agreement based on Article 218 TFEU, with due regard to ESA’s status and institutional framework. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (34) The rules laid down in this Regulation should cover both Union-owned assets, as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2021/696 and Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council6 , and assets of Member States, whether owned or operated by governmental or commercial operators, including dual-use assets placed under civil control and when used for civil purposes. | (34) The rules laid down in this Regulation should cover both Union-owned assets, as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2021/696 and Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6, and assets of commercial operators. Assets owned by the Member States that are not in scope may be voluntarily brought into compliance in order to advance the objectives of this Regulation. |
| 6 (6)Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 OJ L 79, 17.3.2023, p. 1-39 (ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/588/oj). | 6 (6)Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 OJ L 79, 17.3.2023, p. 1-39 (ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/588/oj). |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (35) As regards Union-owned assets, space services providers should obtain authorisation from the Agency to operate such Union-owned assets that comply with the requirements on safety, resilience, and environmental sustainability. | (35) As regards Union-owned assets, space services providers should obtain authorisation from the Agency to operate such Union-owned assets that comply with the requirements on safety, resilience, and sustainability. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (36) In order to preserve the competences of the Member States, this Regulation should not apply to space objects that are exclusively used to enable defence or national security objectives, irrespective of the entity carrying out such space activities. Space objects that are only partially used for defence purposes should be excluded from the scope of this Regulation when they need to be placed under a Member State operation and control, for defence purposes, only for the duration of the respective space mission carried out by the military forces. In such cases, it is for each Member State to determine, owing to the circumstances of the case, whether such space object would fall under the above mentioned exclusion. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (36) In order to preserve the competences of the Member States, this Regulation should not apply to space objects that are exclusively used to enable defence or national security objectives, irrespective of the entity carrying out such space activities. Space objects that are only partially used for defence purposes should be excluded from the scope of this Regulation when they need to be placed under a Member State operation and control, for defence purposes, only for the duration of the respective space mission carried out by the military forces. In such cases, it is for each Member State to determine, owing to the circumstances of the case, whether such space object would fall under the above mentioned exclusion. | (36) In order to preserve the competences of the Member States, this Regulation should not apply to space objects that are exclusively used to enable defence or national security objectives, irrespective of the entity carrying out such space activities. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (36) In order to preserve the competences of the Member States, this Regulation should not apply to space objects that are exclusively used to enable defence or national security objectives, irrespective of the entity carrying out such space activities. Space objects that are only partially used for defence purposes should be excluded from the scope of this Regulation when they need to be placed under a Member State operation and control, for defence purposes, only for the duration of the respective space mission carried out by the military forces. In such cases, it is for each Member State to determine, owing to the circumstances of the case, whether such space object would fall under the above mentioned exclusion. | (36) In order to preserve the competences of the Member States, this Regulation should not apply to space objects that are exclusively used to enable defence or national security objectives, irrespective of the entity carrying out such space activities. Space objects that are only temporarily used for defence purposes should be excluded from the scope of this Regulation when they need to be placed under a Member State operation and control, for the durations of those operations. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (37) This Regulation should be thus without prejudice to the competences of Member States as regards all matters pertaining to national security, which also extends to cases where Member States need, for the purposes and the exercise of such national security competence, to execute specific space operations, for instance by taking control of a space object under their jurisdiction. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (38) Considering the existing regulation of radio spectrum under International Telecommunications rules, and of national and EU law in compliance therewith, and in particular Decision 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council7 , Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council8 , and Decision no 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council9 , this Regulation should not cover aspects related to the allocation or the authorisation of radio spectrum. Moreover, where an entity which is an electronic communications network and services provider only acts as a mere user of a facility offered by a space operator, it should only qualify as a primary provider of space-based data under this Regulation. If an electronic communications network and services provider also operates or controls a satellite, a launch or a launch infrastructure, it should qualify as a space operator under this Regulation. | (38) Considering the existing regulation of radio spectrum under International Telecommunications rules, and of Union and national law in compliance with Union law, and in particular Decision 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council7, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council8, and Decision no 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council9, this Regulation should not cover aspects related to the allocation or the authorisation of radio spectrum. Moreover, where an entity which is an electronic communications network and services provider only acts as a mere user of a facility offered by a space operator, it should only qualify as a primary provider of space-based data under this Regulation. If an electronic communications network and services provider also operates or controls a satellite, or performs launch operations, it should qualify as a space operator under this Regulation. |
| 7 (7)Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) (OJ L 108, 24.04.2002, p. 1–6, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2002/676(1)/oj) | 7 (7)Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) (OJ L 108, 24.04.2002, p. 1–6, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2002/676(1)/oj) |
| 8 (8)Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code, (OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36–214, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1972/oj) | 8 (8)Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code, (OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36–214, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1972/oj) |
| 9 (9)Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing a multiannual radio spectrum policy programme (OJ L 81, 21/03/2012, p. 7–17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2012/243(2)/oj) | 9 (9)Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing a multiannual radio spectrum policy programme (OJ L 81, 21/03/2012, p. 7–17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2012/243(2)/oj) |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (40) The minimum key harmonised rules on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities laid down in this Regulation should integrate the authorisations issued by competent authorities or, as appropriate, the regimes laid down by Member States for governmental entities carrying out a national space programme. The specific character of certain entities, should be acknowledged, such as governmental space agencies which carry out national space programmes, which may not necessarily be subject to authorisations in the same way as other space services providers. Consequently, Member States should ensure, as regards these entities, an appropriate supervision that respects and implements the principles of separation of roles and absence of conflict of interest. | (40) The minimum key harmonised rules on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities laid down in this Regulation should integrate the authorisations issued by competent authorities or, as appropriate, the regimes laid down by Member States for governmental entities carrying out a national space programme. The specific character of certain entities, should be acknowledged, such as governmental space agencies which carry out national space programmes, which may not necessarily be subject to authorisations in the same way as other space services providers. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (41) To enable seamless authorisation processes across the internal market and create equal treatment of all Union space operators the overall duration of authorisations should be 12 months, with the possibility to suspend the deadlines applicable in the authorisation process, with a view to take into account the need for further clarifications and assessments. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (41) To enable seamless authorisation processes across the internal market and create equal treatment of all Union space operators the overall duration of authorisations should be 12 months, with the possibility to suspend the deadlines applicable in the authorisation process, with a view to take into account the need for further clarifications and assessments. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (41) To enable seamless authorisation processes across the internal market and create equal treatment of all Union space operators the overall duration of authorisations should be 12 months, with the possibility to suspend the deadlines applicable in the authorisation process, with a view to take into account the need for further clarifications and assessments. | (41) To enable seamless authorisation processes across the internal market and create equal treatment of all Union space operators the overall duration of the authorisation process should be no longer than 12 months, considering the complexity of the space activity involved, with a view to enable the applicant to get the response quickly and with the possibility to suspend the deadlines applicable in the authorisation process, with a view to take into account the need for further clarifications and assessments. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (41 a) In light of the technical complexity and the length of the preparation of a space mission, applicants should have sufficient time to provide any required information or clarification. Thereby a suspension of the deadlines applicable, in the processes for authorisations, to the national competent authorities, should be also foreseen. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42) Member States should remain free to carry out any exchanges with potential applicants in advance of their formal authorisation processes, according to national rules. Such preliminary and informal exchanges would enable applicants to better understand and ensure compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation and in national legislation, as applicable, including any relevant legislation of other Member States, where, for instance, multiple authorisations are required across the internal market, considering the criteria of nationality or establishment, the place of operation and of launching. | (42) Member States are free to carry out any exchanges with potential applicants in advance of their formal authorisation processes, according to national rules. Such preliminary and informal exchanges would enable applicants to better understand and ensure compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation and in national legislation. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42) Member States should remain free to carry out any exchanges with potential applicants in advance of their formal authorisation processes, according to national rules. Such preliminary and informal exchanges would enable applicants to better understand and ensure compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation and in national legislation, as applicable, including any relevant legislation of other Member States, where, for instance, multiple authorisations are required across the internal market, considering the criteria of nationality or establishment, the place of operation and of launching. | (42) Member States should remain free to carry out any exchanges with potential applicants in advance of their formal authorisation processes, according to national rules. Such preliminary and informal exchanges would enable applicants to better understand and ensure compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation and in national legislation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (43) The competent authorities of a Member State should accept and recognise the authorisations issued by the competent authorities of other Member States, as regards the matters which are covered by this Regulation. At the same time, full transparency of national requirements that may be laid down by Member States should be ensured, including for stricter requirements that may be necessary to safeguarding the safety, resilience or environmental sustainability of an operation or a launch carried out on their territories in respect to a space mission carried out by space operators authorised in their own Member State of establishment. Such information should be provided through a common Information Portal. | (43) The competent authorities of a Member State should accept and recognise the authorisations issued by the competent authorities of other Member States, as regards the matters which are covered by this Regulation. At the same time, full transparency of national requirements that may be laid down by Member States should be ensured, including for stricter requirements that may be necessary to safeguarding the safety, resilience or environmental sustainability of an operation or a launch carried out on their territories in respect to a space mission carried out by space operators authorised in their own Member State of establishment. Such information should be provided through a common Information Portal, while respecting security and data protection measures. |
In a world without borders in terms of space activities, there need to transparent procedures and a sustainable and fair balance between the freedom of the various operators and actors in the field to operate and protection of the interests of all the parties concerned.
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (43) The competent authorities of a Member State should accept and recognise the authorisations issued by the competent authorities of other Member States, as regards the matters which are covered by this Regulation. At the same time, full transparency of national requirements that may be laid down by Member States should be ensured, including for stricter requirements that may be necessary to safeguarding the safety, resilience or environmental sustainability of an operation or a launch carried out on their territories in respect to a space mission carried out by space operators authorised in their own Member State of establishment. Such information should be provided through a common Information Portal. | (43) The competent authorities of a Member State should accept and recognise the authorisations issued by the competent authorities of other Member States, as regards the matters which are covered by this Regulation. At the same time, full transparency of national requirements that may be laid down by Member States should be ensured, including for stricter requirements that may be necessary to safeguarding the safety, resilience or environmental sustainability of a space activity carried out on their territories by space operators authorised in their own Member State. Such information should be provided through a common Information Portal. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (43) The competent authorities of a Member State should accept and recognise the authorisations issued by the competent authorities of other Member States, as regards the matters which are covered by this Regulation. At the same time, full transparency of national requirements that may be laid down by Member States should be ensured, including for stricter requirements that may be necessary to safeguarding the safety, resilience or environmental sustainability of an operation or a launch carried out on their territories in respect to a space mission carried out by space operators authorised in their own Member State of establishment. Such information should be provided through a common Information Portal. | (43) The competent authorities of a Member State should accept and recognise the authorisations issued by the competent authorities of other Member States. At the same time, full transparency of national requirements that may be laid down by Member States should be ensured, including for stricter requirements that may be necessary to safeguarding the safety, resilience or environmental sustainability of an operation or a launch carried out on their territories in respect to a space mission carried out by space operators authorised in their own Member State of establishment. Such information should be provided through a common Information Portal. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (43) The competent authorities of a Member State should accept and recognise the authorisations issued by the competent authorities of other Member States, as regards the matters which are covered by this Regulation. At the same time, full transparency of national requirements that may be laid down by Member States should be ensured, including for stricter requirements that may be necessary to safeguarding the safety, resilience or environmental sustainability of an operation or a launch carried out on their territories in respect to a space mission carried out by space operators authorised in their own Member State of establishment. Such information should be provided through a common Information Portal. | (43) The competent authorities of a Member State should accept and recognise the authorisations issued by the competent authorities of other Member States, as regards the matters which are covered by this Regulation. At the same time, full transparency of national requirements that may be laid down by Member States should be ensured, including for stricter requirements that may be necessary to safeguarding the safety, resilience or environmental sustainability of an operation or a launch carried out on their territories in respect to a space activity carried out by space operators authorised in their own Member State of establishment. Such information should be provided through a common Information Portal. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (43 a) The Information Portal is intended as an auxiliary tool and shall not serve as a platform for authorisation. It shall be configured is such a way as to be compatible with national portals, with due regard for the autonomy of the Member States. Use of the Portal shall be voluntary. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (44) In light of the technical complexity and the length of the preparation of a space mission, applicants should have sufficient time to provide any required information or clarification. Thereby a suspension of the deadlines applicable, in the processes for authorisations, to the competent authorities, should be also foreseen. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (44) In light of the technical complexity and the length of the preparation of a space mission, applicants should have sufficient time to provide any required information or clarification. Thereby a suspension of the deadlines applicable, in the processes for authorisations, to the competent authorities, should be also foreseen. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (44) In light of the technical complexity and the length of the preparation of a space mission, applicants should have sufficient time to provide any required information or clarification. Thereby a suspension of the deadlines applicable, in the processes for authorisations, to the competent authorities, should be also foreseen. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (44) In light of the technical complexity and the length of the preparation of a space mission, applicants should have sufficient time to provide any required information or clarification. Thereby a suspension of the deadlines applicable, in the processes for authorisations, to the competent authorities, should be also foreseen. | (44) In light of the technical complexity and the length of the preparation of a space mission, applicants should have sufficient time to provide any required information or clarification. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (45) Conformity of space objects with the requirements of this Regulation should be presumed both for space services providers established in the Union, since such conformity has been verified by the national competent authorities when issuing the authorisation, and for space service providers established in a third country for which a decision of equivalence has been granted by the Commission. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (45) Conformity of space objects with the requirements of this Regulation should be presumed both for space services providers established in the Union, since such conformity has been verified by the national competent authorities when issuing the authorisation, and for space service providers established in a third country for which a decision of equivalence has been granted by the Commission. | (45) Conformity of space objects with the requirements of this Regulation should be presumed both for space services providers established in the Union, since such conformity has been verified by the national competent authorities when issuing the authorisation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (45) Conformity of space objects with the requirements of this Regulation should be presumed both for space services providers established in the Union, since such conformity has been verified by the national competent authorities when issuing the authorisation, and for space service providers established in a third country for which a decision of equivalence has been granted by the Commission. | (45) Conformity of space objects with the requirements of this Regulation should be presumed both for space services providers established in the Union, since such conformity has been verified by the national competent authorities when issuing the authorisation, and for space service providers established in a third country with which a cooperation and mutual recognition agreement has been concluded. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (46) Once compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation has been established, the registration in the Union Register of Space Objects (URSO) and the issuing of an electronic certificate (e-certificate) - proving that the space-based data has been generated by space objects which are compliant with this Regulation and respectively that the space services are based on the use and operation of space objects compliant with this Regulation - should enable the free provision of the space-based data and space services across the Union. The Agency should issue to registered space services providers the individual e-certificates. | (46) Once compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation has been established, the registration in the Union Repository of Space Activities (URSA) and the issuing of an electronic certificate (e-certificate) - proving that the space-based data has been generated by space objects which are compliant with this Regulation and respectively that the space activities are based on the use and operation of space objects compliant with this Regulation - should enable the free provision of the space-based data and space services across the Union. The Agency should issue to registered space services providers the individual e-certificates. |
The amendment on changing 'Union Register of Space Objects (URSO)' to 'Union Repository of Space Activities (URSA)' shall be repetitive and apply to the whole text.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (46) Once compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation has been established, the registration in the Union Register of Space Objects (URSO) and the issuing of an electronic certificate (e-certificate) - proving that the space-based data has been generated by space objects which are compliant with this Regulation and respectively that the space services are based on the use and operation of space objects compliant with this Regulation - should enable the free provision of the space-based data and space services across the Union. The Agency should issue to registered space services providers the individual e-certificates. | (46) Once compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation has been established, the registration in the Union Register of Space Activities (URSA) and the issuing of an electronic certificate (e-certificate) - proving that the space-based data has been generated by space objects which are compliant with this Regulation and respectively that the space services are based on the use and operation of space objects compliant with this Regulation - should enable the free provision of the space-based data and space services across the Union. The Agency should issue to registered space services providers the individual e-certificates. |
Renaming the register from 'Union Register of Space Objects' (URSO) to 'Union Register of Space Activities' (URSA) eliminates direct terminological overlap with the national registers Member States maintain under the 1975 UN Registration Convention. 'Objects' describes what States report to the UN; 'activities' is what this Regulation governs. The change prevents legal ambiguity for operators and for Member States about which registration obligation belongs to which instrument, as clarified in new Recital 47a.
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (46) Once compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation has been established, the registration in the Union Register of Space Objects (URSO) and the issuing of an electronic certificate (e-certificate) - proving that the space-based data has been generated by space objects which are compliant with this Regulation and respectively that the space services are based on the use and operation of space objects compliant with this Regulation - should enable the free provision of the space-based data and space services across the Union. The Agency should issue to registered space services providers the individual e-certificates. | (46) Once compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation has been established, the registration in the Union Register of Space Objects (URSO) and the issuing of an electronic certificate (e-certificate) - proving that the space-based data has been generated by space objects which are compliant with this Regulation and respectively that the space activities are based on the use and operation of space objects compliant with this Regulation - should enable the free provision of the space-based data and space services across the Union. The Agency should issue to registered space operators the individual e-certificates. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (47) Consolidated lists of all space services providers registered in URSO, established in the Union and in third countries, should be made accessible to the public, through the URSO website, thereby ensuring transparency on all space services providers registered in the Union. Any person could verify the source of the space-based data with a view to ascertain, at any given moment, that the space services provided in the Union make use of data that has been generated by space objects compliant with the requirements of Union law. | (47) Consolidated lists of all space services providers registered in URSO, established in the Union and in third countries, should be made accessible to the public, through the URSO website, thereby ensuring transparency on all space operators and their activities registered in the Union. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (47) Consolidated lists of all space services providers registered in URSO, established in the Union and in third countries, should be made accessible to the public, through the URSO website, thereby ensuring transparency on all space services providers registered in the Union. Any person could verify the source of the space-based data with a view to ascertain, at any given moment, that the space services provided in the Union make use of data that has been generated by space objects compliant with the requirements of Union law. | (47) Consolidated lists of all space services providers registered in URSA, established in the Union and in third countries, should be made accessible to the public, through the URSO website, thereby ensuring transparency on all space operators and their activities registered in the Union. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (47) Consolidated lists of all space services providers registered in URSO, established in the Union and in third countries, should be made accessible to the public, through the URSO website, thereby ensuring transparency on all space services providers registered in the Union. Any person could verify the source of the space-based data with a view to ascertain, at any given moment, that the space services provided in the Union make use of data that has been generated by space objects compliant with the requirements of Union law. | (47) Consolidated lists of all space services providers registered in URSO, established in the Union and in third countries, should be made accessible to the public, through the URSO website, based on open source technologies and APIs and using and open data policy thereby ensuring transparency on all space services providers registered in the Union. Any person could verify the source of the space-based data with a view to ascertain, at any given moment, that the space services provided in the Union make use of data that has been generated by space objects compliant with the requirements of Union law. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (47) Consolidated lists of all space services providers registered in URSO, established in the Union and in third countries, should be made accessible to the public, through the URSO website, thereby ensuring transparency on all space services providers registered in the Union. Any person could verify the source of the space-based data with a view to ascertain, at any given moment, that the space services provided in the Union make use of data that has been generated by space objects compliant with the requirements of Union law. | (47) Consolidated lists of all space services providers registered in URSO, established in the Union and in third countries, should be made accessible to the public, through the URSO website, with a translation into all the official EU languages, thereby ensuring transparency on all space services providers registered in the Union. Any person could verify the source of the space-based data with a view to ascertain, at any given moment, that the space services provided in the Union make use of data that has been generated by space objects compliant with the requirements of Union law. |
The transparency of measures and decisions can be assured by providing access to information, which must be published in all the official languages so that it can be consulted by all the parties concerned.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (47) Consolidated lists of all space services providers registered in URSO, established in the Union and in third countries, should be made accessible to the public, through the URSO website, thereby ensuring transparency on all space services providers registered in the Union. Any person could verify the source of the space-based data with a view to ascertain, at any given moment, that the space services provided in the Union make use of data that has been generated by space objects compliant with the requirements of Union law. | (47) Consolidated lists of all space services providers registered in URSA, established in the Union and in third countries, should be made accessible to the public, through the URSA website, thereby ensuring transparency on all space services providers registered in the Union. Any person could verify the source of the space-based data with a view to ascertain, at any given moment, that the space services provided in the Union make use of data that has been generated by space objects compliant with the requirements of Union law. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (47 a) The establishment of the Union Register of Space Activities (URSA) reflects the need to ensure a comprehensive, transparent and centralised framework for the registration and supervision of space activities carried out within the Union. Under international space law, in particular the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Member States remain responsible for the registration of space objects for which they qualify as launching States and for the transmission of the relevant information to the United Nations. URSA should therefore be designed in a manner that supports and facilitates the fulfilment of those international obligations, including by ensuring the availability, consistency and traceability of relevant information at Union level, while avoiding duplication of registration procedures. The establishment and operation of URSA should not affect the allocation of international responsibilities between Member States under international law, but should contribute to enhanced coordination, legal certainty and consistency in the registration and supervision of space activities within the Union. |
Without an explicit bridge between URSA and national UN registration obligations, European operators could face duplicative and inconsistent registration requirements. This recital clarifies that URSA complements rather than replaces Member States' obligations as launching States under international law, delivering simplification through coordination: one Union-level data layer that feeds rather than duplicates the international framework.
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (48) A specific standard for the e-certificate should be developed, at the request of the Commission, and should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation. The e-certificate would establish the link between a given space object and the space-based data that has been generated through its use, guaranteeing the integrity of such space-based data. | (48) An e-certificate should be issued upon completion of the registration in URSA. The e-certificate would establish the link between a given space object and the space-based data that has been generated through its use, guaranteeing the integrity of such space-based data. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová, Tomáš Kubín
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (48) A specific standard for the e-certificate should be developed, at the request of the Commission, and should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation. The e-certificate would establish the link between a given space object and the space-based data that has been generated through its use, guaranteeing the integrity of such space-based data. | (48) An e-certificate should be issued upon the completion if the registration in URSO. The e-certificate would establish the link between a given space object and the space-based data that has been generated through its use, guaranteeing the integrity of such space-based data. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (48) A specific standard for the e-certificate should be developed, at the request of the Commission, and should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation. The e-certificate would establish the link between a given space object and the space-based data that has been generated through its use, guaranteeing the integrity of such space-based data. | (48) A specific standard European model for the e-certificate should be developed, at the request of the Commission, and should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation. The e-certificate would establish the link between a given space object and the space-based data that has been generated through its use, guaranteeing the integrity of such space-based data. |
Having a specific standard European model for the electronic certificate will benefit all parties in that it will facilitate procedures.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (49) In order to match increased customer demand for satellite offerings, reap the benefits of technological advances and associated cost reductions, and secure better access to capital, the authorisation processes for the launch of satellite constellations should be streamlined. Under certain conditions, and subject to a set of safeguards, a simplified authorisation procedure should be available, leading to the issuing of a single authorisation valid for the entire satellite constellation. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (49) In order to match increased customer demand for satellite offerings, reap the benefits of technological advances and associated cost reductions, and secure better access to capital, the authorisation processes for the launch of satellite constellations should be streamlined. Under certain conditions, and subject to a set of safeguards, a simplified authorisation procedure should be available, leading to the issuing of a single authorisation valid for the entire satellite constellation. | (49) In order to match increased customer demand for satellite offerings, the authorisation processes for the launch of satellite constellations should be streamlined. Therefore under certain conditions, and subject to a set of safeguards, a simplified authorisation procedure should be available, leading to the issuing of a single authorisation valid for the entire satellite constellation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (49) In order to match increased customer demand for satellite offerings, reap the benefits of technological advances and associated cost reductions, and secure better access to capital, the authorisation processes for the launch of satellite constellations should be streamlined. Under certain conditions, and subject to a set of safeguards, a simplified authorisation procedure should be available, leading to the issuing of a single authorisation valid for the entire satellite constellation. | (49) In order to match increased customer demand for satellite offerings, reap the benefits of technological advances and associated cost reductions, and secure better access to capital, the authorisation processes for the launch of satellite constellations should be streamlined. Under certain conditions, and subject to a set of safeguards, a simplified authorisation procedure may be available, leading to the issuing of a single authorisation valid for several satellites in a constellation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (50) Recognising the specific nature and objectives of research spacecraft, which remain instrumental in advancing scientific knowledge and technological capabilities, this Regulation should establish certain exemptions for such categories, with a view to accommodating their specific needs and characteristics, while at the same time ensuring the safety and sustainability of the orbits. | (50) Recognising the specific nature and objectives of research spacecraft, which remain instrumental in advancing scientific knowledge and technological capabilities, close cooperation between the public and private sectors will benefit the development of a robust space ecosystem able to respond to current and future challenges, which is why this Regulation should establish certain exemptions for such categories, with a view to accommodating their specific needs and characteristics, while at the same time ensuring the safety and sustainability of the orbits. |
In a strong sector able to constantly and rapidly evolve in response to developments in new technologies, cooperation between the public and private sectors will also be beneficial when responding to current and future challenges.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (50) Recognising the specific nature and objectives of research spacecraft, which remain instrumental in advancing scientific knowledge and technological capabilities, this Regulation should establish certain exemptions for such categories, with a view to accommodating their specific needs and characteristics, while at the same time ensuring the safety and sustainability of the orbits. | (50) Recognising the specific nature and objectives of research establishments, which remain instrumental in advancing scientific knowledge and technological capabilities, this Regulation should establish technical and financial support capacities for such categories, with a view to accommodating their specific needs and characteristics, while at the same time ensuring the safety and sustainability of the orbits. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (51) Space operators should benefit from dedicated exemptions from the rules laid down in the different areas covered by this Regulation. When carrying out research space missions, they should be exempted from certain rules on safety. Similarly, space operators that qualify as small-sized enterprises or are research or education institutions should apply a simplified risk management focusing on critical assets and addressing main risks. In-Orbit Demonstration and Validation (IOD/IOV) space missions should also be exempted from the calculation of the environmental footprint (EF) of space activities. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (51) Space operators should benefit from dedicated exemptions from the rules laid down in the different areas covered by this Regulation. When carrying out research space missions, they should be exempted from certain rules on safety. Similarly, space operators that qualify as small-sized enterprises or are research or education institutions should apply a simplified risk management focusing on critical assets and addressing main risks. In-Orbit Demonstration and Validation (IOD/IOV) space missions should also be exempted from the calculation of the environmental footprint (EF) of space activities. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (51) Space operators should benefit from dedicated exemptions from the rules laid down in the different areas covered by this Regulation. When carrying out research space missions, they should be exempted from certain rules on safety. Similarly, space operators that qualify as small-sized enterprises or are research or education institutions should apply a simplified risk management focusing on critical assets and addressing main risks. In-Orbit Demonstration and Validation (IOD/IOV) space missions should also be exempted from the calculation of the environmental footprint (EF) of space activities. | (51) Space operators should benefit from dedicated exemptions from the rules laid down in the different areas covered by this Regulation. When carrying out research space missions, they should be exempted from certain rules on safety. Similarly, space operators that qualify as small and medium-sized enterprises, as mid-cap enterprises or are research or education institutions should apply a simplified risk management focusing on critical assets and addressing main risks. In-Orbit Demonstration and Validation (IOD/IOV) and ISOS space missions should also be exempted from the estimation of the environmental footprint (EF) of space activities. Longer transition periods should be granted to mid-cap enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and research and education institutions in the estimation of EF. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (51) Space operators should benefit from dedicated exemptions from the rules laid down in the different areas covered by this Regulation. When carrying out research space missions, they should be exempted from certain rules on safety. Similarly, space operators that qualify as small-sized enterprises or are research or education institutions should apply a simplified risk management focusing on critical assets and addressing main risks. In-Orbit Demonstration and Validation (IOD/IOV) space missions should also be exempted from the calculation of the environmental footprint (EF) of space activities. | (51) Space operators should benefit from dedicated exemptions from the rules laid down in the different areas covered by this Regulation. When carrying out research space missions, they should be exempted from certain rules on safety. Similarly, space operators that qualify as small-and medium-sized enterprises, small mid caps or are research or education institutions should apply a simplified risk management focusing on critical assets and addressing main risks and longer transition periods shall be granted for these entities in the estimation of the environmental footprint (EF). In-Orbit Demonstration and Validation (IOD/IOV) and ISOS space missions should also be exempted from the calculation of the EF of space activities. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (52) Ensuring safe, resilient, sustainable and cost-efficient access to space is key to obtaining a variety of services and supporting the scientific research, while aligned with key principles and rights enshrined in the OST. At the same time, launch operators may also require time adapt to the new launch safety measures. This Regulation should provide for an appropriate mechanism to ensure access to space while the industry adapts to the new safety baseline put in place at Union level. | (52) Ensuring safe, resilient, sustainable and cost-efficient access to space is key to obtaining a variety of services and supporting the scientific research, while aligned with key principles and rights enshrined in the OST. At the same time, launch operators may also require time adapt to the new launch safety measures. This Regulation should provide for an appropriate mechanism to ensure access to space while the industry adapts to the new safety baseline put in place at Union level. That mechanism should take into account the stage of design maturity of space assets already under development at the time of entry into force of this Regulation, so as to avoid imposing disproportionate obligations on operators that have already made irreversible system-level design commitments. The completion of the System Requirements Review, as the earliest formal milestone at which the functional and performance requirements of a space asset are baselined, should serve as the reference point for eligibility for the transitional regime established under Article 118. |
The System Requirements Review (SRR) is the formal milestone at which spacecraft architecture becomes irreversibly fixed. Using SRR as the eligibility threshold for the transitional regime under Article 118 is basic proportionality: operators who have already committed to a design cannot reasonably redesign to comply with requirements adopted after that point. New requirements apply to the next generation of spacecraft, not to systems whose design is frozen.
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (52) Ensuring safe, resilient, sustainable and cost-efficient access to space is key to obtaining a variety of services and supporting the scientific research, while aligned with key principles and rights enshrined in the OST. At the same time, launch operators may also require time adapt to the new launch safety measures. This Regulation should provide for an appropriate mechanism to ensure access to space while the industry adapts to the new safety baseline put in place at Union level. | (52) Ensuring safe, resilient, sustainable and cost-efficient access to space is key to obtaining a variety of services and supporting the scientific research, while aligned with key principles and rights enshrined in the OST. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (52) Ensuring safe, resilient, sustainable and cost-efficient access to space is key to obtaining a variety of services and supporting the scientific research, while aligned with key principles and rights enshrined in the OST. At the same time, launch operators may also require time adapt to the new launch safety measures. This Regulation should provide for an appropriate mechanism to ensure access to space while the industry adapts to the new safety baseline put in place at Union level. | (52) Ensuring safe, resilient, sustainable and cost-efficient access to space is key to obtaining a variety of services and supporting scientific research and competitiveness, while aligned with key principles and rights enshrined in the OST. At the same time, launch operators may also require time adapt to the new launch safety measures. This Regulation should provide for an appropriate mechanism to ensure access to space while the industry adapts to the new safety baseline put in place at Union level, while striking the right balance between the freedom of operators to operate and the need to protect public interests. |
In a world that is rapidly evolving, including in the field of space activities, there is a need to link research and the development of new products and services, while also protecting the interests of all the parties concerned.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (52) Ensuring safe, resilient, sustainable and cost-efficient access to space is key to obtaining a variety of services and supporting the scientific research, while aligned with key principles and rights enshrined in the OST. At the same time, launch operators may also require time adapt to the new launch safety measures. This Regulation should provide for an appropriate mechanism to ensure access to space while the industry adapts to the new safety baseline put in place at Union level. | (52) Ensuring safe, resilient and sustainable access to space is key to obtaining a variety of services and supporting the scientific research, while aligned with key principles and rights enshrined in the OST. At the same time, launch operators may also require time adapt to the new launch safety measures. This Regulation should provide for an appropriate mechanism to ensure access to space while the industry adapts to the new safety baseline put in place at Union level. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (53) The congestion of certain orbits, triggering an enhanced risk of collision of satellites and proliferation of space debris, as well as the geopolitical threat-landscape featuring an enhanced risk to the cybersecurity of space infrastructure, along with the risk of physical contact in space, such as proximity and disturbances, constitute challenges of a global nature which many space-faring nations have started to address. | (53) The congestion of certain orbits, triggering an enhanced risk of collision of satellites and proliferation of space debris, as well as the geopolitical threat-landscape featuring an enhanced risk to the cybersecurity of space infrastructure, along with the risk of physical contact in space, such as proximity and disturbances, constitute challenges of a global nature which many space-faring nations have started to address. In tackling these cross-border challenges, only an approach based on international cooperation will enable us to establish common standards capable of ensuring the safety and sustainability of space activities in the public interest. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (53) The congestion of certain orbits, triggering an enhanced risk of collision of satellites and proliferation of space debris, as well as the geopolitical threat-landscape featuring an enhanced risk to the cybersecurity of space infrastructure, along with the risk of physical contact in space, such as proximity and disturbances, constitute challenges of a global nature which many space-faring nations have started to address. | (53) The congestion of certain orbits, the growing magnitude of satellites’ launches and constellations, triggering an enhanced risk of collision of satellites and proliferation of space debris, as well as the geopolitical threat-landscape featuring an enhanced risk to the cybersecurity of space infrastructure, along with the risk of physical contact in space, such as proximity and disturbances, constitute challenges of a global nature which many space-faring nations have started to address. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (53a) The rapid increase in the number of objects in Earth orbit, including space debris, poses a growing risk to the safety, sustainability and accessibility of space activities; given their inherently transnational nature, these risks cannot be effectively addressed through unilateral action; an international programme dedicated to the prevention and reduction of orbital pollution, based on enhanced cooperation between States and international organisations, thus needs to be set up to safeguard outer space as a common resource for the benefit of present and future generations. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (54) From micro to heavy launchers, the launcher market has evolved. New capabilities are developed, such as re-usability of, for example, the first stage and boosters of the launch vehicles. More Member States are developing launch capabilities and thus intensifying access to space. | (54) From micro to heavy launchers, the launcher market has evolved. New capabilities are developed, such as re-usability of, for example, the first stage and boosters of the launch vehicles. The recovery of reusable launch vehicle stages following atmospheric re-entry and separation from the payload constitutes a distinct operational phase — the recovery phase — during which specific safety risks arise, including the risk of debris impact in the event of a recovery failure, and which requires coordination with maritime authorities and civil aviation authorities in the designated recovery zone. Furthermore, the requirement to design launch vehicle stages for atmospheric demise upon re-entry is structurally incompatible with stages specifically designed to survive re-entry for the purpose of recovery. The safety requirements applicable to reusable launch vehicles should take into account their technical specificities, including, where appropriate, targeted derogations from design-for-demise requirements, provided that an equivalent level of safety is demonstrated. |
A rocket stage engineered to survive atmospheric re-entry for recovery cannot also be designed to demise on re-entry: the two objectives are physically incompatible. Without addressing this, the demise obligation would effectively prohibit reusable launch technology in which European industry is investing most heavily. The recovery phase is established as a distinct operational category with its own safety logic, preserving European competitiveness in the most commercially dynamic segment of the launch market.
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (54) From micro to heavy launchers, the launcher market has evolved. New capabilities are developed, such as re-usability of, for example, the first stage and boosters of the launch vehicles. More Member States are developing launch capabilities and thus intensifying access to space. | (54) From micro to heavy launch vehicles, the launcher market has evolved. New capabilities are developed, such as re-usability of, for example, the first stage and boosters of the launch vehicles. More Member States are developing launch capabilities and thus intensifying access to space. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (55) Access to space is crucial for EU's strategic autonomy. However, an increased launch traffic also has consequences for the safety for the launch and re-entry and for safety in the air and on ground. The increased space launch traffic might also generate a negative impact on the economic, environmental and efficient performance of the Single European Sky. The risk of disruption of the air and maritime traffic should be minimised in agreement with the relevant authorities and air traffic service providers. Coordination between the relevant authorities and the competent air traffic service providers at national level contributes to limit the impacts of traffic disruption and the risk of collision. When space launches affect more than one Member State, timely coordination between space operators and the European Network Manager is needed. This coordination should include an assessment of the European airspace closure size, duration and impacted air routes. Only at a later stage adequate cost sharing mechanisms for the use of the airspace should be established. This will incentivise the safe and sustainable use of airspace for all users. Furthermore, the stages of launch and re-entry may also create a risk for on-ground casualty which needs to be limited through close coordination with the impacted relevant authorities and traffic service providers. The increasing risk of collision with aircraft during the transition phase of space launch and re-entry can be support by well-established aviation safety methodologies and best practices on risk assessment. | (55) Access to space is crucial for EU's strategic autonomy. However, an increased launch traffic also results in additional challenges for the safety for the launch and re-entry and for safety in the air and on ground. The impact of increased space launch traffic might also generate a negative impact on the air and maritime traffic; therefore it should be minimised in agreement with the relevant authorities and air traffic service providers. When space launches affect more than one Member State, timely coordination between space operators and the European Network Manager is needed. This coordination should include an assessment of the European airspace closure size, duration and impacted air routes. This will incentivise the safe and sustainable use of airspace for all users. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (55) Access to space is crucial for EU's strategic autonomy. However, an increased launch traffic also has consequences for the safety for the launch and re-entry and for safety in the air and on ground. The increased space launch traffic might also generate a negative impact on the economic, environmental and efficient performance of the Single European Sky. The risk of disruption of the air and maritime traffic should be minimised in agreement with the relevant authorities and air traffic service providers. Coordination between the relevant authorities and the competent air traffic service providers at national level contributes to limit the impacts of traffic disruption and the risk of collision. When space launches affect more than one Member State, timely coordination between space operators and the European Network Manager is needed. This coordination should include an assessment of the European airspace closure size, duration and impacted air routes. Only at a later stage adequate cost sharing mechanisms for the use of the airspace should be established. This will incentivise the safe and sustainable use of airspace for all users. Furthermore, the stages of launch and re-entry may also create a risk for on-ground casualty which needs to be limited through close coordination with the impacted relevant authorities and traffic service providers. The increasing risk of collision with aircraft during the transition phase of space launch and re-entry can be support by well-established aviation safety methodologies and best practices on risk assessment. | (55) Access to space is crucial for EU's strategic autonomy. However, an increased launch traffic also has consequences for the safety for the launch and re-entry and for safety in the air and on ground. The increased space launch traffic might also generate a negative impact on the economic, environmental and efficient performance of the Single European Sky. The risk of disruption of the air and maritime traffic should be minimised in agreement with the relevant authorities and air traffic service providers. Coordination between the relevant authorities and the competent air traffic service providers at national level contributes to limit the impacts of traffic disruption and the risk of collision. When space launches affect more than one Member State, timely coordination between space operators and the European Network Manager is needed. This coordination should include an assessment of the European airspace closure size, duration and impacted air routes. Only at a later stage adequate cost sharing mechanisms for the use of the airspace should be established. This will incentivise the safe and sustainable use of airspace for all users. Furthermore, the stages of launch and re-entry may also create a risk for on-ground casualty which needs to be limited through close coordination with the impacted relevant authorities and traffic service providers. The increasing risk of collision with aircraft during the transition phase of space launch and re-entry can be support by well-established aviation safety methodologies and best practices on risk assessment. In order to provide a harmonised, quantifiable and verifiable safety standard, a casualty risk threshold reflecting the best practicies should apply as the common safety baseline for all launch and re-entry activities. |
Each Member State with launch infrastructure today applies its own national methodology to calculate acceptable ground casualty risk, with divergent thresholds that distort competition between European launch sites. A common Union threshold gives operators one standard to design to regardless of launch site, replaces 27 national approaches with a single auditable benchmark, and delivers the level playing field the internal market requires.
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (55) Access to space is crucial for EU's strategic autonomy. However, an increased launch traffic also has consequences for the safety for the launch and re-entry and for safety in the air and on ground. The increased space launch traffic might also generate a negative impact on the economic, environmental and efficient performance of the Single European Sky. The risk of disruption of the air and maritime traffic should be minimised in agreement with the relevant authorities and air traffic service providers. Coordination between the relevant authorities and the competent air traffic service providers at national level contributes to limit the impacts of traffic disruption and the risk of collision. When space launches affect more than one Member State, timely coordination between space operators and the European Network Manager is needed. This coordination should include an assessment of the European airspace closure size, duration and impacted air routes. Only at a later stage adequate cost sharing mechanisms for the use of the airspace should be established. This will incentivise the safe and sustainable use of airspace for all users. Furthermore, the stages of launch and re-entry may also create a risk for on-ground casualty which needs to be limited through close coordination with the impacted relevant authorities and traffic service providers. The increasing risk of collision with aircraft during the transition phase of space launch and re-entry can be support by well-established aviation safety methodologies and best practices on risk assessment. | (55) Access to space is crucial for EU's strategic autonomy. However, an increased launch traffic also has consequences for the safety for the launch and re-entry and for safety in the air and on ground. The increased space launch traffic might also generate a negative impact on the economic, environmental and efficient performance of the Single European Sky. The risk of disruption of the air and maritime traffic should be minimised in agreement with the relevant authorities and air traffic service providers. Coordination between the relevant authorities and the competent air traffic service providers at national level contributes to limit the impacts of traffic disruption and the risk of collision. When space launches affect more than one Member State, timely coordination between space operators and the European Network Manager is needed. This coordination should include an assessment of the European airspace closure size, duration and impacted air routes. This will incentivise the safe and sustainable use of airspace for all users. Furthermore, the stages of launch and re-entry may also create a risk for on-ground casualty which needs to be limited through close coordination with the impacted relevant authorities and traffic service providers. The increasing risk of collision with aircraft during the transition phase of space launch and re-entry can be support by well-established aviation safety methodologies and best practices on risk assessment. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (55) Access to space is crucial for EU's strategic autonomy. However, an increased launch traffic also has consequences for the safety for the launch and re-entry and for safety in the air and on ground. The increased space launch traffic might also generate a negative impact on the economic, environmental and efficient performance of the Single European Sky. The risk of disruption of the air and maritime traffic should be minimised in agreement with the relevant authorities and air traffic service providers. Coordination between the relevant authorities and the competent air traffic service providers at national level contributes to limit the impacts of traffic disruption and the risk of collision. When space launches affect more than one Member State, timely coordination between space operators and the European Network Manager is needed. This coordination should include an assessment of the European airspace closure size, duration and impacted air routes. Only at a later stage adequate cost sharing mechanisms for the use of the airspace should be established. This will incentivise the safe and sustainable use of airspace for all users. Furthermore, the stages of launch and re-entry may also create a risk for on-ground casualty which needs to be limited through close coordination with the impacted relevant authorities and traffic service providers. The increasing risk of collision with aircraft during the transition phase of space launch and re-entry can be support by well-established aviation safety methodologies and best practices on risk assessment. | (55) Access to space is crucial for EU's strategic autonomy. However, an increased launch traffic also has consequences for the safety for the launch and re-entry and for safety in the air and on ground. The increased space launch traffic might also generate a negative impact on economic and environmental performance. The risk of disruption of the air and maritime traffic should be minimised in agreement with the relevant authorities and air traffic service providers. Coordination between the relevant authorities and the competent air traffic service providers at national level contributes to limit the impacts of traffic disruption and the risk of collision. When space launches affect more than one Member State, timely coordination between space operators and the European Network Manager is needed. This coordination should include an assessment of the European airspace closure size, duration and impacted air routes. Only at a later stage adequate cost sharing mechanisms for the use of the airspace should be established. This will incentivise the safe and sustainable use of airspace for all users. Furthermore, the stages of launch and re-entry may also create a risk for on-ground casualty which needs to be limited through close coordination with the impacted relevant authorities and traffic service providers. The increasing risk of collision with aircraft during the transition phase of space launch and re-entry can be support by well-established aviation safety methodologies and best practices on risk assessment. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (56) Launch activities are inherently risky and can cause irreversible damage if not managed properly. Rules should consequently be laid down to ensure that launchers are trackable and undergo a risk assessment which identifies and sets-up several measures to mitigate, to the extent possible, the associated risks. | (56) Launch activities are inherently risky and can cause irreversible damage if not managed properly. Rules should consequently be laid down to ensure that launchers are trackable and undergo a risk assessment which identifies and sets-up several measures to mitigate, to the extent possible, the associated risks. Where the safety of persons or property requires immediate intervention during the launch phase that cannot await ordinary administrative procedures, the competent authority should be empowered to issue binding real-time operational instructions to the launch operator, including the authority to activate on-board neutralisation systems in order to prevent imminent harm to persons or property. That real-time safety authority is an essential operational safeguard that complements pre-launch risk assessment and should be exercised in coordination with air navigation service providers and the Union collision avoidance space services provider. The modalities for the exercise of such real-time authority, including decision chains, coordination mechanisms and safeguards, should be specified in this Regulation and, where necessary, further detailed by delegated acts. |
A launch vehicle departing from its nominal trajectory poses an immediate, time-critical risk that ordinary administrative channels cannot address. Every responsible launch authority exercises a real-time neutralisation power de facto today; encoding it explicitly in Union law with clear coordination chains involving air navigation service providers and the Union collision avoidance provider transforms an informal national practice into a legally certain, coordinated Union standard.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (56) Launch activities are inherently risky and can cause irreversible damage if not managed properly. Rules should consequently be laid down to ensure that launchers are trackable and undergo a risk assessment which identifies and sets-up several measures to mitigate, to the extent possible, the associated risks. | (56) Launch activities are inherently risky and can cause irreversible damage if not managed properly. Rules should consequently be laid down to ensure that launchers are trackable and undergo a risk assessment which identifies and sets-up several measures to mitigate, to the extent possible, the associated risks. To this extent, space operators should bear liability for all aspects of their space activities and throughout the whole lifecycle of their space missions. Such liability should cover safety, resilience, and sustainability and should apply both to space and to Earth. Space operators should also bear financial and organisational responsibility for managing the end-of-life stage of their objects and services. As space activities expand exponentially, driven by rising launch rates and growing satellite constellations, the associated environmental pressure is intensifying. While this expansion has generated new revenues for space operators, it has not been matched by a proportional increase in operators’ financial responsibility for mitigating the environmental impact of their activities. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (56) Launch activities are inherently risky and can cause irreversible damage if not managed properly. Rules should consequently be laid down to ensure that launchers are trackable and undergo a risk assessment which identifies and sets-up several measures to mitigate, to the extent possible, the associated risks. | (56) Launch activities are inherently risky and can cause irreversible damage if not managed and monitored properly and if there is no proper communication among Member States on such launches. Rules should consequently be laid down to ensure that launchers are trackable and undergo a risk assessment which identifies and sets-up several measures to mitigate, to the extent possible, the associated risks. |
Communication from and to Member States on a range of activities in the field of space is essential in order to avoid possible accidents and technical incidents.
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (56) Launch activities are inherently risky and can cause irreversible damage if not managed properly. Rules should consequently be laid down to ensure that launchers are trackable and undergo a risk assessment which identifies and sets-up several measures to mitigate, to the extent possible, the associated risks. | (56) Launch activities require appropriate rules to ensure that launchers are trackable and undergo a risk assessment which identifies and sets-up several measures to mitigate, to the extent possible, the associated risks. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (56) Launch activities are inherently risky and can cause irreversible damage if not managed properly. Rules should consequently be laid down to ensure that launchers are trackable and undergo a risk assessment which identifies and sets-up several measures to mitigate, to the extent possible, the associated risks. | (56) Launch activities are inherently risky. Rules should consequently be laid down to ensure that launch vehicles are trackable and undergo a risk assessment which identifies and sets-up several measures to mitigate, to the extent possible, the associated risks. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (56 a) Launch operations involve a risk of causing damage to third parties on the surface of the Earth, in airspace and, where applicable, in outer space. Space operators conducting launch operations and launch site operators should therefore be required to hold insurance or another approved financial guarantee covering potential damage caused to third parties during the launch phase. The level of that insurance or financial guarantee should be proportionate to the specific risks of each launch operation, taking into account, in particular, the nature and scale of the launch and the characteristics of the launch site. In order to ensure that victims are effectively compensated where the liable operator is unable to meet its obligations in full, Member States should provide a State guarantee, under the conditions laid down in national law, for the part of compensation exceeding the threshold established in the authorisation, in the cases provided for by this Regulation. The Commission should issue guidelines on minimum requirements for national State guarantee systems. Minimum requirements for insurance and financial guarantees should be established by delegated acts. This framework should be consistent with Member States’ obligations under international space law, including the Liability Convention. |
Launch operations create residual risks of third-party damage that cannot be fully eliminated through technical mitigation alone. Clear rules on insurance, financial guarantees and State support are therefore necessary to protect potential victims, strengthen legal certainty and ensure a more coherent framework for launch activities in the Union.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (56 a) As the environmental impacts of space activities increase, and given the limited possibilities to mitigate those impacts, the Union should take a cautious approach towards missions that do not have scientific research or societal purposes. Missions such as space tourism should not be authorised within the Union. Moreover, financial disincentives in the form of proportionately higher Agency fees should apply to operators that conduct such missions outside of the Union while also performing other authorised activities within the Union. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (57) Projections show that, even without any new launches, collision between space objects already in space will become a big source of debris. The risk of collision between space objects would ultimately put an already congested Low Earth Orbit (LEO) under pressure, which creates a risk for the future access to space. In terms of mass, most space debris come from parts of launch vehicles (rocket bodies). Meanwhile, the number of spacecraft in orbit is rapidly growing due to the developments of satellite constellations. | (57) Projections show that, even without any new launches, collision between space objects already in space will become a big source of debris. The risk of collision between space objects would ultimately put an already congested Low Earth Orbit (LEO) under pressure, which creates a risk for the future access to space. This proliferation of debris increases the risk of a chain reaction, known as Kessler syndrome, in which each collision generates new fragments that are likely to cause further collisions, rendering certain orbits unusable. It also jeopardises the safety not only of operational satellites that are essential for communications, navigation and Earth observation, but also of manned missions. Moreover, the costs incurred by protecting against, tracking and avoiding debris are rising significantly for operators, whilst space surveillance capabilities are coming under severe strain. In terms of mass, most space debris come from parts of launch vehicles (rocket bodies). Meanwhile, the number of spacecraft in orbit is rapidly growing due to the developments of satellite constellations. This is a critical state of affairs, and a comprehensive response must be supported by a broad consensus. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (57) Projections show that, even without any new launches, collision between space objects already in space will become a big source of debris. The risk of collision between space objects would ultimately put an already congested Low Earth Orbit (LEO) under pressure, which creates a risk for the future access to space. In terms of mass, most space debris come from parts of launch vehicles (rocket bodies). Meanwhile, the number of spacecraft in orbit is rapidly growing due to the developments of satellite constellations. | (57) Projections show that, even without any new launches, collision between space objects already in space will become a big source of debris, which is why clear end-of-life disposal obligations should be imposed. For example, Low Orbit (LEO) satellites should either be subject to controlled deorbits or transferred to 'cemetery' orbits within a limited timeframe (typically 25 years or less). The risk of collision between space objects would ultimately put an already congested Low Earth Orbit (LEO) under pressure, which creates a risk for the future access to space. In terms of mass, most space debris come from parts of launch vehicles (rocket bodies). Meanwhile, the number of spacecraft in orbit is rapidly growing due to the developments of satellite constellations. |
The development of the space sector has resulted in an increasing number of objects being launched into space, which is why it is essential to establish clear and viable measures for the disposal of these space objects of varying dimensions at the end of their operational life
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (57) Projections show that, even without any new launches, collision between space objects already in space will become a big source of debris. The risk of collision between space objects would ultimately put an already congested Low Earth Orbit (LEO) under pressure, which creates a risk for the future access to space. In terms of mass, most space debris come from parts of launch vehicles (rocket bodies). Meanwhile, the number of spacecraft in orbit is rapidly growing due to the developments of satellite constellations. | (57) Projections show that, even without any new launches, collision between space objects already in space will become a big source of debris. The risk of collision between space objects would ultimately put an already congested Low Earth Orbit (LEO) under pressure, which creates a risk for the future access to space. In terms of mass, most space debris come from parts of launch vehicles (rocket bodies). Meanwhile, the number of spacecraft in orbit is rapidly growing due to the developments of satellite constellations. Therefore, RDI research should be invested in order to prevent the creation of new space debris and to develop mechanisms for recovering existing space debris, and to ensure that innovations resulting from aforementioned research can be brought to the market in a tangible way. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (57) Projections show that, even without any new launches, collision between space objects already in space will become a big source of debris. The risk of collision between space objects would ultimately put an already congested Low Earth Orbit (LEO) under pressure, which creates a risk for the future access to space. In terms of mass, most space debris come from parts of launch vehicles (rocket bodies). Meanwhile, the number of spacecraft in orbit is rapidly growing due to the developments of satellite constellations. | (57) Projections show that, even without any new launches, collision between space objects already in space may become a big source of debris. The risk of collision between space objects would ultimately put an already congested Low Earth Orbit (LEO) under pressure, which creates a risk for the future access to space. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (57) Projections show that, even without any new launches, collision between space objects already in space will become a big source of debris. The risk of collision between space objects would ultimately put an already congested Low Earth Orbit (LEO) under pressure, which creates a risk for the future access to space. In terms of mass, most space debris come from parts of launch vehicles (rocket bodies). Meanwhile, the number of spacecraft in orbit is rapidly growing due to the developments of satellite constellations. | (57) Projections show that, even without any new launches, collision between space objects already in space will become a big source of debris. The risk of collision between space objects would ultimately put an already congested Low Earth Orbit (LEO) under pressure, which creates a risk for the future access to space. In terms of mass, most space debris used to come from parts of launch vehicles (rocket bodies). Meanwhile, the number of spacecraft in orbit is rapidly growing due to the developments of satellite constellations, thereby increasing the aggregated risk of collision. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58) To protect the space environment, there is a need to ensure that launch vehicles and spacecraft produce the least amount of debris. Prevention of debris is also in line with the prevention approach as a first stage in the waste hierarchy established by the Waste Framework Directive10 . Consequently, obligations at the design phase, as well as during the orbital lifetime, should be provided for. This necessity is also recognised at international level, where several standards have been adopted by the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO). Therefore, the authorisation to carry out space activities should be linked to the submission by space operators of specific space debris plans to demonstrate how the launch vehicles and spacecraft would limit debris creation. | deleted |
| 10 (10)Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312 22.11.2008, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/2024-02-18) |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58) To protect the space environment, there is a need to ensure that launch vehicles and spacecraft produce the least amount of debris. Prevention of debris is also in line with the prevention approach as a first stage in the waste hierarchy established by the Waste Framework Directive10 . Consequently, obligations at the design phase, as well as during the orbital lifetime, should be provided for. This necessity is also recognised at international level, where several standards have been adopted by the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO). Therefore, the authorisation to carry out space activities should be linked to the submission by space operators of specific space debris plans to demonstrate how the launch vehicles and spacecraft would limit debris creation. | (58) To protect the space environment, it must be ensured that launch vehicles and spacecraft have as little debris impact as possible on the orbit and atmosphere. Therefore, the authorisation to carry out space activities should be linked to the submission by space operators of specific space debris plans to demonstrate how the launch vehicles and spacecraft would limit debris creation. |
| 10 (10)Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312 22.11.2008, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/2024-02-18) |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58) To protect the space environment, there is a need to ensure that launch vehicles and spacecraft produce the least amount of debris. Prevention of debris is also in line with the prevention approach as a first stage in the waste hierarchy established by the Waste Framework Directive10 . Consequently, obligations at the design phase, as well as during the orbital lifetime, should be provided for. This necessity is also recognised at international level, where several standards have been adopted by the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO). Therefore, the authorisation to carry out space activities should be linked to the submission by space operators of specific space debris plans to demonstrate how the launch vehicles and spacecraft would limit debris creation. | (58) To protect the space environment, there is a need to ensure that launch vehicles and spacecraft produce the least amount of debris. Prevention of debris is also in line with the prevention approach as a first stage in the waste hierarchy established by the Waste Framework Directive10 . Consequently, obligations at the design phase, as well as during the orbital lifetime, should be provided for. This necessity is also recognised at international level, where several standards have been adopted by the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO). The Union should recognise ISO 24113, ISO 20893 and ECSS-U-AS-10C Rev. 2 as binding technical reference standards for space debris mitigation. Annex II and Annex V should apply only where they provide more advanced requirements or contain material not covered by ISO/ECSS. Therefore, the authorisation to carry out space activities should be linked to the submission by space operators of specific space debris plans to demonstrate how the launch vehicles and spacecraft would limit debris creation. |
| 10 (10)Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312 22.11.2008, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/2024-02-18) | 10 (10)Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312 22.11.2008, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/2024-02-18) |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58 a) The increasing use of reusable launch vehicles, which incorporate stages designed to be recovered on land or at sea following separation from the payload, gives rise to specific safety risks during the recovery phase that are not fully addressed by the safety requirements applicable to the ascent phase. Those risks include the risk of debris impact in the event of a recovery failure, the need to coordinate temporary closures of sea lanes and controlled airspace in the recovery area, and the definition of contingency procedures for uncontrolled landings. Launch safety plans submitted pursuant to Article 58 should therefore explicitly address the recovery phase, including the designation of recovery exclusion zones and the coordination procedures with the relevant maritime and civil aviation authorities. The risk assessment carried out pursuant to Article 60(3) should encompass the recovery phase as an integral part of the overall launch and re-entry operation. |
Recovery operations — retrieving reusable launch vehicle stages at sea or on land — involve specific hazards that existing launch safety rules were written before reusability became the market norm. This recital provides the political basis for dedicated recovery-phase safety requirements in Annex I, ensuring that the regulation keeps pace with the technological shift towards reusability without creating a regulatory vacuum for the recovery phase.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58a) Protection against space debris should be reinforced through the establishment of mandatory requirements on the prevention of new debris, including through the appropriate design of spacecraft and the avoidance of their fragmentation, along with the application of effective end-of-mission passivation measures. In addition to this, continuous European and international monitoring of space objects and coordination of collision avoidance manoeuvres should be assured, on the basis of reliable surveillance and tracking systems. Operators should also be required to provide for appropriate measures to remove spacecraft at the end of their operational lifetime, including through their controlled deorbiting or transfer to safe orbits. |
The development of the space sector and the launch of an increasing number of satellites calls for effective measures to be taken on the disposal of these space objects at the end of their operational lifetime.
Julie Rechagneux, Aleksandar Nikolic, Mélanie Disdier, Pascale Piera, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová, Tomáš Kubín, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Christophe Bay, Marion Maréchal
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58 a) The Union Space Label should serve as an incentive-based tool to enhance competitiveness and reward best-performing operators, without creating additional regulatory burdens. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58 b) The increasing density of satellite constellations raises the risk of collisions within and between constellations, which, if not adequately mitigated, may lead to cascading fragmentation events and thereby seriously affect the long-term safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities. In order to address this risk in a proportionate manner, this Regulation should establish a graduated set of obligations applicable to satellite constellations. Those obligations should be determined not solely by the number of satellites composing a constellation, but also by its overall risk profile, taking into account, in particular, the orbital regime concerned, the manoeuvrability of the satellites, and the reliability and sophistication of collision avoidance capabilities, including automated systems where relevant. Such a risk-based and proportionate approach should ensure that the most stringent requirements relating to transparency, collision avoidance, mitigation of space debris and end-of-life disposal apply to constellations presenting the highest systemic risk, while avoiding unnecessary burdens for smaller or less risky systems. |
High-density satellite constellations create systemic collision risks qualitatively different from those of individual satellites: a single fragmentation event in a densely populated orbit can trigger cascading debris generation with permanent consequences for all orbital users. This recital establishes the political rationale for the differentiated constellation requirements in Article 73, calibrated not merely by satellite count but by systemic orbital risk profile.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58 c) The debris mitigation requirements applicable to spacecraft operators under this Regulation address the design of new spacecraft and their disposal at end of mission. They do not, however, impose an obligation to remove spacecraft that have become non-operational and can no longer be disposed of using on-board systems. Active debris removal technology is currently at an early stage of commercial development. Once such technology is commercially available at proportionate cost, spacecraft operators should be required to procure active debris removal services for non-operational spacecraft operated under an authorisation granted pursuant to this Regulation. The conditions determining when that obligation becomes effective should be assessed by the Agency and determined by the Commission by means of a delegated act, so as to ensure that the obligation is not triggered prematurely or disproportionately. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (59) Spacecraft CA space services require the capacity of the spacecraft to precisely transmit its position. Trackability requirements should be developed to enhance the public services provided by the Union Space Surveillance and Tracking Partnership (EU-SST) and to save time and money used by such tracking services to determine the orbital position precisely. The ability to track spacecraft should be ensured both at spacecraft and at ground segment level. | (59) Spacecraft CA space services require the capacity of the spacecraft to precisely transmit its position. Trackability requirements should be developed to enhance the public services provided by the Union Space Surveillance and Tracking Partnership (EU-SST). The ability to track spacecraft should be ensured both at spacecraft and at ground segment level. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (60) Due to increased debris and traffic in orbit, the use of a CA space service is a must-have for all spacecraft. Such requirement is necessary for ensuring the day-to-day station keeping of the spacecraft. A mandatory subscription to a CA space service should be at the very core of the space safety requirements. As a result, the entity in charge of delivering the CA space service would need to demonstrate certain capabilities. | (60) Due to increased debris and traffic in orbit, the use of a CA space service is a requirement for all spacecraft as it is necessary for ensuring the day-to-day positioning of the spacecraft. A mandatory subscription to a CA space service should be at the very core of the space safety requirements. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (60) Due to increased debris and traffic in orbit, the use of a CA space service is a must-have for all spacecraft. Such requirement is necessary for ensuring the day-to-day station keeping of the spacecraft. A mandatory subscription to a CA space service should be at the very core of the space safety requirements. As a result, the entity in charge of delivering the CA space service would need to demonstrate certain capabilities. | (60) Due to increased debris and traffic in orbit, the use of a CA space service is a must-have for all spacecraft. Such requirement is necessary for ensuring the day-to-day station keeping of the spacecraft. A mandatory subscription to a CA space service should be at the very core of the space safety requirements. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (60) Due to increased debris and traffic in orbit, the use of a CA space service is a must-have for all spacecraft. Such requirement is necessary for ensuring the day-to-day station keeping of the spacecraft. A mandatory subscription to a CA space service should be at the very core of the space safety requirements. As a result, the entity in charge of delivering the CA space service would need to demonstrate certain capabilities. | (60) Due to increased debris and traffic in orbit, the use of a CA space service is a must-have for all spacecraft. Such requirement is necessary for ensuring the day-to-day station keeping of the spacecraft. A mandatory subscription to a Union CA space service should be at the very core of the space safety requirements. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (61) Furthermore, having an entity in charge of the CA service for all spacecraft in the Union should improve the coordination of responses to a High Interest Event Alert (‘HIE alert’), also limiting the risk that such an alert triggers different reaction strategies, which in themselves could potentially lead to a collision. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (62) Developed as part of the SSA component, under Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and the Council, the EU-SST Partnership, or any successor entity, using their sensors and well-developed know-how, has demonstrated its ability to manage a high number of spacecraft and therefore suitability to be the Union CA space services provider entity, in charge of the CA space service. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (62 a) The emergence of commercial tracking and collision avoidance services provides opportunities to enhance the safety and resilience of space infrastructure through high-revisit rates and specialized data analytics. These commercial offerings should be considered as providing additional value that complements, rather than replaces, the public services provided by Member States or Union entities. To ensure a robust and redundant safety architecture for the Union, interoperability, standardisation, cooperation and the exchange of information between public authorities and commercial providers should be encouraged and potential standardisation and certification paths be explored. Such cooperation should aim to optimize the use of all available data sources, ensuring that the Union’s space traffic management remains at the forefront of technological development. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (63) Generation of debris should be best avoided through requiring capacities to perform CA manoeuvres and to move satellites to graveyard orbits. As a result, all spacecraft should be endowed with a recurrent manoeuvrability capability, except for spacecraft placed below 400 km, since the atmospheric drag would, in such case, ensure in a natural manner, a short orbit lifetime of that spacecraft. | (63) Generation of debris should be best avoided through requiring capacities to perform collision avoidance manoeuvres and to move satellites to graveyard or disposal orbits. Rather than applying a fixed altitude threshold to determine which spacecraft must be equipped with manoeuvring capability, all spacecraft subject to this Regulation should be required to be capable of performing collision avoidance manoeuvres where necessary to maintain their long-term probability of collision with other space objects below a defined threshold. The manoeuvring capability required should be commensurate with the orbital lifetime of the spacecraft and the cumulative collision risk associated with its operational orbit, ensuring that spacecraft in higher and more congested orbits are subject to a more demanding performance standard than those in rapidly decaying low Earth orbits. In addition, in order to provide legal certainty and enable objective verification of compliance, this Regulation establishes minimum quantified performance thresholds for the key debris mitigation parameters: a probability of successful passivation of at least 0,95 at end of operational life; and a maximum residual orbital lifetime of five years for spacecraft in low Earth orbit. Those thresholds represent minimum standards and should be updated by delegated acts as technology evolves and as the orbital environment changes. |
A fixed altitude threshold for manoeuvrability requirements is arbitrary and technologically outdated. A probabilistic, risk-based approach — calibrated to whether a spacecraft can demonstrate adequate collision risk reduction regardless of altitude — is both more protective and more proportionate. This recital provides the political rationale for the performance-based manoeuvrability requirements introduced in Article 66.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (63) Generation of debris should be best avoided through requiring capacities to perform CA manoeuvres and to move satellites to graveyard orbits. As a result, all spacecraft should be endowed with a recurrent manoeuvrability capability, except for spacecraft placed below 400 km, since the atmospheric drag would, in such case, ensure in a natural manner, a short orbit lifetime of that spacecraft. | (63) Generation of debris should be best avoided through requiring capacities to perform CA manoeuvres and to move satellites to graveyard orbits. As a result, all spacecraft above 600 km should be endowed with a recurrent manoeuvrability capability. For spacecraft placed between 400 and 600 km, the atmospheric drag would, in such case, ensure in a natural manner, a short orbit lifetime of that spacecraft, and manoeuvrability shall therefore not be required where the orbital lifetime does not exceed 25 years. Manoeuvrability requirements shall be differentiated by spacecraft class and orbit regime in implementing acts, and shall include a definition of 'manoeuvrability' requirements by spacecraft class and orbit regime. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (63) Generation of debris should be best avoided through requiring capacities to perform CA manoeuvres and to move satellites to graveyard orbits. As a result, all spacecraft should be endowed with a recurrent manoeuvrability capability, except for spacecraft placed below 400 km, since the atmospheric drag would, in such case, ensure in a natural manner, a short orbit lifetime of that spacecraft. | (63) The best way to avoid creating space debris is to limit the number of satellites in space by implementing a strategy of restraint based on a careful assessment of the essential services provided by satellites. For these applications, deemed to be essential, capacities to perform CA manoeuvres and to move satellites to graveyard orbits need to be made mandatory. As a result, all spacecraft should be endowed with a recurrent manoeuvrability capability, except for spacecraft placed below 400 km, since the atmospheric drag would, in such case, ensure in a natural manner, a short orbit lifetime of that spacecraft. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (63) Generation of debris should be best avoided through requiring capacities to perform CA manoeuvres and to move satellites to graveyard orbits. As a result, all spacecraft should be endowed with a recurrent manoeuvrability capability, except for spacecraft placed below 400 km, since the atmospheric drag would, in such case, ensure in a natural manner, a short orbit lifetime of that spacecraft. | (63) Generation of debris should be best avoided through requiring capacities to perform CA manoeuvres and to move satellites to graveyard orbits. As a result, all spacecraft should be endowed with a recurrent manoeuvrability capability, however taking into account the potential risk scenarios arising from the use of evasive and steering manoeuvers of a spacecraft, such as the possibility of a deliberate collision; except for spacecraft placed below 400 km, since the atmospheric drag would, in such case, ensure in a natural manner, a short orbit lifetime of that spacecraft. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (63) Generation of debris should be best avoided through requiring capacities to perform CA manoeuvres and to move satellites to graveyard orbits. As a result, all spacecraft should be endowed with a recurrent manoeuvrability capability, except for spacecraft placed below 400 km, since the atmospheric drag would, in such case, ensure in a natural manner, a short orbit lifetime of that spacecraft. | (63) Generation of debris should be best avoided through requiring capacities to perform CA manoeuvres and to move spacecraft to graveyard orbits. As a result, all spacecraft should be endowed with a recurrent manoeuvrability capability, except for spacecraft placed below 400 km, since the atmospheric drag would, in such case, ensure in a natural manner, a short orbit lifetime of that spacecraft. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (64) It is common practice that spacecraft operators be granted authorisation to extend a space mission. However, when applying for an extension, Union spacecraft operators should be required to submit revised space debris mitigation plans, to ensure that the enhanced mission duration does not risk creating debris. | (64) It is common practice that spacecraft operators be granted authorisation to extend a space mission. However, when applying for an extension, Union spacecraft operators should be required to submit revised space debris mitigation plans, to ensure that the enhanced mission duration does not risk creating debris. In this context, the development and use of technologies for the active removal of space debris should be encouraged, as should the promotion of common EU standards, in order to reduce the risks of collision and guarantee the sustainable use of outer space. |
The development of the space sector and the launch of an increasing number of satellites calls for effective measures to be taken on the disposal of these space objects at the end of their operational lifetime.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (64) It is common practice that spacecraft operators be granted authorisation to extend a space mission. However, when applying for an extension, Union spacecraft operators should be required to submit revised space debris mitigation plans, to ensure that the enhanced mission duration does not risk creating debris. | (64) It is common practice that spacecraft operators be granted authorisation to extend a space mission. However, when applying for an extension, Union spacecraft operators should be required to submit revised space debris mitigation plans, to ensure that the enhanced mission duration does not risk creating debris, as well as a reasoned justification for the request for an extension. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (65) Due to increased orbital traffic, astronomers encounter light and radio frequency disruptions in their astronomical campaigns. Such disruptions have a direct impact on research and planetary defence capabilities. As a result, mitigation measures should be developed to protect the dark and quiet sky. | (65) The rapid expansion of satellite constellations poses significant challenges to the preservation of a dark and quiet skies, which constitutes a common heritage of humankind and a vital resource for scientific discovery and Earth safety. Increased orbital traffic and the resulting sunlight reflections, as well as electromagnetic interference, increasingly obstruct ground-based astronomical observations, thereby threatening the integrity of fundamental research and the effectiveness of planetary defence systems. In line with the recommendations of the International Astronomical Union (IAU), the United Nations COPUOS ‘Dark and Quiet Skies’ reports, and the internationally recognised spectrum emission limits established by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), it is necessary to implement mitigation measures. Such measures should promote ‘sustainability-by-design’, including the reduction of satellite reflectivity and strict compliance with the ITU Radio Regulations regarding unwanted emissions. This is essential to ensure the protection of radio-quiet zones and the Radio Astronomy Service from interference caused by aggregate satellite transmissions. The Union should set compliance measures and lead in fostering international coordination to ensure that the deployment of space infrastructure does not irreversibly impair our ability to observe the universe or protect the Earth. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (65) Due to increased orbital traffic, astronomers encounter light and radio frequency disruptions in their astronomical campaigns. Such disruptions have a direct impact on research and planetary defence capabilities. As a result, mitigation measures should be developed to protect the dark and quiet sky. | (65) Due to increased orbital traffic, astronomers encounter light and radio frequency disruptions in their astronomical campaigns. Such disruptions have a direct impact on research and planetary defence capabilities. As a result, mitigation measures should be developed, at European and international level and as soon as possible, to protect the dark and quiet sky. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (65) Due to increased orbital traffic, astronomers encounter light and radio frequency disruptions in their astronomical campaigns. Such disruptions have a direct impact on research and planetary defence capabilities. As a result, mitigation measures should be developed to protect the dark and quiet sky. | (65) Due to increased orbital traffic, astronomers encounter light and radio frequency disruptions in their astronomical campaigns. Such disruptions have a direct impact on research and planetary defence capabilities. Therefore, mitigation measures should be developed. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (65) Due to increased orbital traffic, astronomers encounter light and radio frequency disruptions in their astronomical campaigns. Such disruptions have a direct impact on research and planetary defence capabilities. As a result, mitigation measures should be developed to protect the dark and quiet sky. | (65) Due to increased orbital traffic, astronomers encounter light and radio frequency disruptions in their astronomical campaigns. Such disruptions have a direct impact on research and planetary defence capabilities. As a result, mitigation measures should be developed. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (66) Constellations are an asset for the efficient deployment of space services, to the benefit of citizens and companies. However, due to their large number, their effect on the space environment is more significant than the impact of a single spacecraft. In addition, any catastrophic event occurring in the intra-constellation could trigger the Kessler event, rendering access to space impossible in the future. As a result, specific obligations should be imposed to constellations varying according to the size of a constellation. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (66) Constellations are an asset for the efficient deployment of space services, to the benefit of citizens and companies. However, due to their large number, their effect on the space environment is more significant than the impact of a single spacecraft. In addition, any catastrophic event occurring in the intra-constellation could trigger the Kessler event, rendering access to space impossible in the future. As a result, specific obligations should be imposed to constellations varying according to the size of a constellation. | (66) Constellations are an asset for the efficient deployment of space services, to the benefit of citizens and companies. However, due to their large number, their effect on the space environment is more significant than the impact of a single spacecraft. In addition, any catastrophic event occurring in the intra-constellation could trigger the Kessler event, rendering access to space impossible in the future. As a result, specific obligations should be imposed to constellations varying according to the size of a constellation. Those requirements should apply to all operators of constellations subject to authorisation under this Regulation, irrespective of their place of establishment, since the cumulative collision risk generated by a constellation is indifferent to the nationality of the operator. Safety assessments for constellations should address the aggregate collision risk probability over the operational lifetime of the entire constellation, taking into account the combined effect of all spacecraft in the deployment plan. The specific technical parameters for such assessments, including applicable probability thresholds and modelling methodologies, should be established and updated by delegated acts in order to reflect developments in orbital debris modelling and the evolution of the orbital environment. |
Constellations of 2 or more satellites already interact as a system in terms of orbital population and collision risk. The correction of the artificial lower threshold above which constellation-specific obligations apply ensures that the regulatory framework captures all satellite systems operating interdependently, rather than only those above an arbitrary numerical cutoff that the Commission proposed without operational justification.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (66) Constellations are an asset for the efficient deployment of space services, to the benefit of citizens and companies. However, due to their large number, their effect on the space environment is more significant than the impact of a single spacecraft. In addition, any catastrophic event occurring in the intra-constellation could trigger the Kessler event, rendering access to space impossible in the future. As a result, specific obligations should be imposed to constellations varying according to the size of a constellation. | (66) Constellations are an asset for the efficient deployment of space services, to the benefit of citizens and companies. However, due to their large number, their effect on the space environment is more significant than the impact of a single spacecraft. The high density of these systems increases the probability of intra-constellation collisions which, if left unmitigated, could trigger the Kessler event, rendering access to space impossible in the future. Consequently, and in line with the differentiated regulatory approach adopted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) regarding the deployment milestones for large-scale systems, this Regulation should impose a tiered system of obligations. These obligations should be calibrated not merely by the numerical size of a constellation, but by its overall risk profile, including orbital altitude, maneuverability capabilities, and the sophistication of its automated collision avoidance systems. Such a graduated framework ensures that while all operators contribute to space sustainability, the principle of proportionality is used and the most stringent requirements for transparency, debris mitigation, and end-of-life disposal are placed upon those systems that pose the greatest systemic risk to the long-term viability of space activities. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (66) Constellations are an asset for the efficient deployment of space services, to the benefit of citizens and companies. However, due to their large number, their effect on the space environment is more significant than the impact of a single spacecraft. In addition, any catastrophic event occurring in the intra-constellation could trigger the Kessler event, rendering access to space impossible in the future. As a result, specific obligations should be imposed to constellations varying according to the size of a constellation. | (66) Constellations are an asset for the efficient deployment of space services, to the benefit of citizens and companies. However, due to their large number, their effect on the situation in space is more significant than the impact of a single spacecraft. In addition, any catastrophic event occurring in the intra-constellation could trigger the Kessler event, rendering access to space impossible in the future. As a result, specific obligations should be imposed to constellations. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (66) Constellations are an asset for the efficient deployment of space services, to the benefit of citizens and companies. However, due to their large number, their effect on the space environment is more significant than the impact of a single spacecraft. In addition, any catastrophic event occurring in the intra-constellation could trigger the Kessler event, rendering access to space impossible in the future. As a result, specific obligations should be imposed to constellations varying according to the size of a constellation. | (66) Constellations are an asset for the deployment of space services, to the benefit of citizens and companies. However, due to their large number, their effect on the space environment is more significant than the impact of a single spacecraft. In addition, any catastrophic event occurring in the intra-constellation could trigger the Kessler event, rendering access to space impossible in the future. As a result, specific obligations should be imposed to constellations varying according to the size of a constellation. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (67) To ensure the efficiency of the key requirements laid down for the safety and sustainability in space, further technical elements should be specified in order to guarantee legal certainty for space operators. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (67) To ensure the efficiency of the key requirements laid down for the safety and sustainability in space, further technical elements should be specified in order to guarantee legal certainty for space operators. | (67) To ensure the efficiency of the key requirements laid down for the safety and sustainability in space, further technical elements should be specified in order to guarantee legal certainty for space operators, and there is a need to strengthen the international and European regulatory framework, including through common standards, compliance mechanisms and incentives for operators to comply with best practices. |
A European and international regulatory framework that includes common standards and compliance mechanisms would benefit operators who comply with good practices.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (67) To ensure the efficiency of the key requirements laid down for the safety and sustainability in space, further technical elements should be specified in order to guarantee legal certainty for space operators. | (67) To ensure the efficiency of the key requirements laid down for the safety and sustainability in space, further technical elements should be specified in order to guarantee legal certainty for space operators. As the sector is fast in innovating and deploying, the use of implementing and delegated acts should complement the framework fixed in the Regulation. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (68) To date, the cybersecurity of the space sector has been only partly addressed at Union level through a general applicable framework as laid down by Directive (EU) 2022/2555. The current cybersecurity regime does not comprehensively cover all types of actors and services which are relevant for the space sector. Therefore, cybersecurity requirements should be established as regards the providers of non-public electronic communications networks and services, the entities falling below the size-cap of medium-sized enterprises under Article 2 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC11 and research and education institutions and should equally cover observation data and launches using launchers outside the Union. | deleted |
| 11 (11)Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2003/361/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (68) To date, the cybersecurity of the space sector has been only partly addressed at Union level through a general applicable framework as laid down by Directive (EU) 2022/2555. The current cybersecurity regime does not comprehensively cover all types of actors and services which are relevant for the space sector. Therefore, cybersecurity requirements should be established as regards the providers of non-public electronic communications networks and services, the entities falling below the size-cap of medium-sized enterprises under Article 2 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC11 and research and education institutions and should equally cover observation data and launches using launchers outside the Union. | deleted |
| 11 (11)Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2003/361/oj). |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (68) To date, the cybersecurity of the space sector has been only partly addressed at Union level through a general applicable framework as laid down by Directive (EU) 2022/2555. The current cybersecurity regime does not comprehensively cover all types of actors and services which are relevant for the space sector. Therefore, cybersecurity requirements should be established as regards the providers of non-public electronic communications networks and services, the entities falling below the size-cap of medium-sized enterprises under Article 2 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC11 and research and education institutions and should equally cover observation data and launches using launchers outside the Union. | (68) The Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive) establishes a common, solid legal framework for cybersecurity in the Union. It sets clear obligations for Member States and introduces a set of cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations for entities. The NIS 2 Directive ensures high clarity for public and private stakeholders as regards their legal obligations and there is no technical justification for introducing a ‘lex specialis’ for the space in terms of cybersecurity through this Regulation. In order to ensure that the legal obligations of the NIS 2 Directive are applicable to the entire space sector, it is necessary to extend the current scope of, and amend the NIS 2 Directive in order to include space activities and services and Union-owned assets as defined in this Regulation. Such amendment ensures that stakeholders of the entire space sector will need to comply with a single legal act, the NIS 2 Directive, as regards resilience. |
| 11 (11)Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2003/361/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (69) At the same time, the cybersecurity baseline across the whole space sector seen in its entirety lacks alignment and coherence. While the resilience of Union-owned assets has been achieved under the components of the Union Space Programme, lower levels of protection may apply to part of the assets from national space infrastructure. Such divergence would only continue to grow and generate asymmetries. In addition, the Union Space Programme operates in an increasingly intertwined architecture integrating national commercial satellites payloads. Thus, the space infrastructure of Member States should adequately level-up to higher levels of resilience to also avoid endangering the security of Union-owned assets and the functioning of the Union Space Programme and ultimately avoid adversely impacting the delivery of space-based data and space services supporting activities as well as critical entities and sectors across the internal market. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (69) At the same time, the cybersecurity baseline across the whole space sector seen in its entirety lacks alignment and coherence. While the resilience of Union-owned assets has been achieved under the components of the Union Space Programme, lower levels of protection may apply to part of the assets from national space infrastructure. Such divergence would only continue to grow and generate asymmetries. In addition, the Union Space Programme operates in an increasingly intertwined architecture integrating national commercial satellites payloads. Thus, the space infrastructure of Member States should adequately level-up to higher levels of resilience to also avoid endangering the security of Union-owned assets and the functioning of the Union Space Programme and ultimately avoid adversely impacting the delivery of space-based data and space services supporting activities as well as critical entities and sectors across the internal market. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (69) At the same time, the cybersecurity baseline across the whole space sector seen in its entirety lacks alignment and coherence. While the resilience of Union-owned assets has been achieved under the components of the Union Space Programme, lower levels of protection may apply to part of the assets from national space infrastructure. Such divergence would only continue to grow and generate asymmetries. In addition, the Union Space Programme operates in an increasingly intertwined architecture integrating national commercial satellites payloads. Thus, the space infrastructure of Member States should adequately level-up to higher levels of resilience to also avoid endangering the security of Union-owned assets and the functioning of the Union Space Programme and ultimately avoid adversely impacting the delivery of space-based data and space services supporting activities as well as critical entities and sectors across the internal market. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (69 a) The NIS2 Directive establishes a common, solid legal framework for cybersecurity in the Union. It sets clear obligations for Member States and introduces a set of cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations for entities. The NIS2 Directive ensures high clarity for public and private stakeholders as regards their legal obligations and there is no technical justification for introducing a ‘lex specialis’ for the space in terms of cybersecurity through this Regulation. In order to ensure that the legal obligations of the NIS2 Directive are applicable to the entire space sector, it is necessary to extend the current scope of, and amend the NIS2 Directive in order to include space activities and services and Union-owned assets as defined in this Regulation. Such amendment ensures that stakeholders of the entire space sector will need to comply with a single legal act, the NIS2 Directive, as regards resilience. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (70) The current imbalance is not only caused by the fact that space programmes have been developed under parallel tracks (Union and Member State levels). It is also linked to the absence of a common baseline for cybersecurity and risk management tailored to the specific needs of space infrastructure. While only some Member States adopted a normative approach, the level or depth of such requirements varies across the internal market. The resilience of the space infrastructure depends in many cases on the financial capabilities and ultimately on the willingness of companies to adhere to good risk management practices and integrate cybersecurity into their design and operation of space missions. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (70) The current imbalance is not only caused by the fact that space programmes have been developed under parallel tracks (Union and Member State levels). It is also linked to the absence of a common baseline for cybersecurity and risk management tailored to the specific needs of space infrastructure. While only some Member States adopted a normative approach, the level or depth of such requirements varies across the internal market. The resilience of the space infrastructure depends in many cases on the financial capabilities and ultimately on the willingness of companies to adhere to good risk management practices and integrate cybersecurity into their design and operation of space missions. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (70) The current imbalance is not only caused by the fact that space programmes have been developed under parallel tracks (Union and Member State levels). It is also linked to the absence of a common baseline for cybersecurity and risk management tailored to the specific needs of space infrastructure. While only some Member States adopted a normative approach, the level or depth of such requirements varies across the internal market. The resilience of the space infrastructure depends in many cases on the financial capabilities and ultimately on the willingness of companies to adhere to good risk management practices and integrate cybersecurity into their design and operation of space missions. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (70) The current imbalance is not only caused by the fact that space programmes have been developed under parallel tracks (Union and Member State levels). It is also linked to the absence of a common baseline for cybersecurity and risk management tailored to the specific needs of space infrastructure. While only some Member States adopted a normative approach, the level or depth of such requirements varies across the internal market. The resilience of the space infrastructure depends in many cases on the financial capabilities and ultimately on the willingness of companies to adhere to good risk management practices and integrate cybersecurity into their design and operation of space missions. | (70) The current imbalance is not only caused by the fact that space programmes have been developed under parallel tracks (Union and Member State levels). It is also linked to the absence of a common baseline for cybersecurity and risk management tailored to the specific needs of space infrastructure. While only some Member States adopted a normative approach, the level or depth of such requirements varies across the internal market. The resilience of the space infrastructure depends in many cases on the financial capabilities and ultimately on the willingness of companies to adhere to good risk management practices and integrate cybersecurity into their design and operation of space missions. These practices should also promote innovation and the competitiveness of the European space sector, striking the right balance between the freedom of operators to operate and the need to protect public interests. |
In a world without borders, a sustainable and fair balance needs to be struck between the freedom of the various operators and actors in the field to operate and the need to protect public interests.
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (71) To address such gaps and imbalances, a bespoke resilience baseline should be laid down for all the space sector. These rules should apply to the entirety of space infrastructure across the Union, covering Union-owned assets as well as national governmental and non-governmental assets. All ground, space and links segments of space infrastructure should be coherently covered, as well as the digital and physical, both space and ground-based systems and subsystems, with a view to cover all relevant risks, such as cyber and electronic interferences risks as well as physical risks. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (71) To address such gaps and imbalances, a bespoke resilience baseline should be laid down for all the space sector. These rules should apply to the entirety of space infrastructure across the Union, covering Union-owned assets as well as national governmental and non-governmental assets. All ground, space and links segments of space infrastructure should be coherently covered, as well as the digital and physical, both space and ground-based systems and subsystems, with a view to cover all relevant risks, such as cyber and electronic interferences risks as well as physical risks. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (71) To address such gaps and imbalances, a bespoke resilience baseline should be laid down for all the space sector. These rules should apply to the entirety of space infrastructure across the Union, covering Union-owned assets as well as national governmental and non-governmental assets. All ground, space and links segments of space infrastructure should be coherently covered, as well as the digital and physical, both space and ground-based systems and subsystems, with a view to cover all relevant risks, such as cyber and electronic interferences risks as well as physical risks. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (71 a) Cybersecurity requirements under the NIS 2 Directive and this Regulation should be synchronised and coordinated, to ensure the requirements are identical for all types of entities, hereby fostering legal certainty for operators and avoiding unnecessary administrative burden. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (71 a) Cybersecurity requirements under NIS2 and this Regulation should be synchronised and coordinated, to ensure the requirements are identical for all types of entities, thereby fostering legal certainty for operators. |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (72) As this Regulation increases the level of harmonisation of the risk management applicable to the space sector, this higher level constitutes an increased harmonisation also in comparison with the requirements laid down in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Consequently, this Regulation should constitute lex specialis in respect to Article 21 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555. At the same time, the space sector should preserve a strong relationship with the Union horizontal cybersecurity framework laid out in Directive (EU) 2022/2555, to ensure full consistency with the cybersecurity rules and strategies adopted by Member States and institutional set-up created by that Directive. The gap between the resilience baselines applicable to Union-owned assets and to assets of Member States assets should thus be closed. More stringent risk management requirements targeted to the space sector should thus be introduced for the space sector to achieve an increased harmonisation in comparison with the current requirements laid down in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (72) As this Regulation increases the level of harmonisation of the risk management applicable to the space sector, this higher level constitutes an increased harmonisation also in comparison with the requirements laid down in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Consequently, this Regulation should constitute lex specialis in respect to Article 21 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555. At the same time, the space sector should preserve a strong relationship with the Union horizontal cybersecurity framework laid out in Directive (EU) 2022/2555, to ensure full consistency with the cybersecurity rules and strategies adopted by Member States and institutional set-up created by that Directive. The gap between the resilience baselines applicable to Union-owned assets and to assets of Member States assets should thus be closed. More stringent risk management requirements targeted to the space sector should thus be introduced for the space sector to achieve an increased harmonisation in comparison with the current requirements laid down in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (72) As this Regulation increases the level of harmonisation of the risk management applicable to the space sector, this higher level constitutes an increased harmonisation also in comparison with the requirements laid down in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Consequently, this Regulation should constitute lex specialis in respect to Article 21 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555. At the same time, the space sector should preserve a strong relationship with the Union horizontal cybersecurity framework laid out in Directive (EU) 2022/2555, to ensure full consistency with the cybersecurity rules and strategies adopted by Member States and institutional set-up created by that Directive. The gap between the resilience baselines applicable to Union-owned assets and to assets of Member States assets should thus be closed. More stringent risk management requirements targeted to the space sector should thus be introduced for the space sector to achieve an increased harmonisation in comparison with the current requirements laid down in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (73) Ensuring the cybersecurity of space infrastructure is paramount throughout all phases of design, development and operation of space infrastructure. As a result robust risk management measures should be put in place throughout the lifecycle of space missions with due regard to all key phases. Adequate protection for all assets, systems and data, from design and manufacturing, throughout launch and operation and until the end-of-life stages should be achieved. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (73) Ensuring the cybersecurity of space infrastructure is paramount throughout all phases of design, development and operation of space infrastructure. As a result robust risk management measures should be put in place throughout the lifecycle of space missions with due regard to all key phases. Adequate protection for all assets, systems and data, from design and manufacturing, throughout launch and operation and until the end-of-life stages should be achieved. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (73) Ensuring the cybersecurity of space infrastructure is paramount throughout all phases of design, development and operation of space infrastructure. As a result robust risk management measures should be put in place throughout the lifecycle of space missions with due regard to all key phases. Adequate protection for all assets, systems and data, from design and manufacturing, throughout launch and operation and until the end-of-life stages should be achieved. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (74) The risk management carried out by Union space operators should revolve around risk assessments to be carried out at segment, system and component levels, based on risk scenarios, covering at least the critical assets, such as engineering systems, flight software, telemetry/telecommand unit, mission control centres, or spacecraft control centres. The list of categories of critical assets, operations and stages, throughout the lifecycle of space missions, for which such risk scenarios are to be developed by Union space operators, as well as the risk scenarios and threat modelling methods in support of such risk assessments, should be developed by the Commission. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová, Tomáš Kubín
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (74) The risk management carried out by Union space operators should revolve around risk assessments to be carried out at segment, system and component levels, based on risk scenarios, covering at least the critical assets, such as engineering systems, flight software, telemetry/telecommand unit, mission control centres, or spacecraft control centres. The list of categories of critical assets, operations and stages, throughout the lifecycle of space missions, for which such risk scenarios are to be developed by Union space operators, as well as the risk scenarios and threat modelling methods in support of such risk assessments, should be developed by the Commission. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (74) The risk management carried out by Union space operators should revolve around risk assessments to be carried out at segment, system and component levels, based on risk scenarios, covering at least the critical assets, such as engineering systems, flight software, telemetry/telecommand unit, mission control centres, or spacecraft control centres. The list of categories of critical assets, operations and stages, throughout the lifecycle of space missions, for which such risk scenarios are to be developed by Union space operators, as well as the risk scenarios and threat modelling methods in support of such risk assessments, should be developed by the Commission. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (75) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, this Regulation should acknowledge the specific position of space operators which are small-sized enterprises or research or education institutions. Such categories, by virtue of size, resources, and extent of activities, may have a lesser impact. The imperative objective in this case is to ensure the protection of critical functions and assets, and to address core risks, such as the risk of loss of control of assets with propulsion and capacity to emit interference. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (75) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, this Regulation should acknowledge the specific position of space operators which are small-sized enterprises or research or education institutions. Such categories, by virtue of size, resources, and extent of activities, may have a lesser impact. The imperative objective in this case is to ensure the protection of critical functions and assets, and to address core risks, such as the risk of loss of control of assets with propulsion and capacity to emit interference. | (75) This Regulation should acknowledge the specific position of space operators which are small-sized enterprises or research or education institutions. Such categories, by virtue of size, resources, and extent of activities, have less resources for compliance, while the objects they design, manufacture, launch or operate pose risks that are not proportional to the entity size. The imperative objective in this case is to ensure the protection of the entire space ecosystem, including the assets of other stakeholders, and to address related risks through support tools that will ensure full compliance and until such time that the entity size provides sufficient resources. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (75) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, this Regulation should acknowledge the specific position of space operators which are small-sized enterprises or research or education institutions. Such categories, by virtue of size, resources, and extent of activities, may have a lesser impact. The imperative objective in this case is to ensure the protection of critical functions and assets, and to address core risks, such as the risk of loss of control of assets with propulsion and capacity to emit interference. | (75) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, this Regulation should acknowledge the specific position of space operators which are small-sized enterprises or research or education institutions, and encourage partnerships and closer cooperation between those bodies, even though, by virtue of their size, resources and the extent of their activities, such categories may have a lesser impact. The imperative objective in this case is to ensure the protection of critical functions and assets, and to address core risks, such as the risk of loss of control of assets with propulsion and capacity to emit interference. |
Even though the space domain is complex and involves the participation of large actors, it is beneficial for small-sized enterprises and research institutions also to be able to participate,
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (75) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, this Regulation should acknowledge the specific position of space operators which are small-sized enterprises or research or education institutions. Such categories, by virtue of size, resources, and extent of activities, may have a lesser impact. The imperative objective in this case is to ensure the protection of critical functions and assets, and to address core risks, such as the risk of loss of control of assets with propulsion and capacity to emit interference. | (75) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, this Regulation should acknowledge the specific position of space operators which are small and medium-sized enterprises, mid-cap enterprises or research or education institutions. Such categories, by virtue of size, resources, and extent of activities, may have a lesser impact. The imperative objective in this case is to ensure the protection of critical functions and assets, and to address core risks, such as the risk of loss of control of assets with propulsion and capacity to emit interference. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová, Tomáš Kubín
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (75) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, this Regulation should acknowledge the specific position of space operators which are small-sized enterprises or research or education institutions. Such categories, by virtue of size, resources, and extent of activities, may have a lesser impact. The imperative objective in this case is to ensure the protection of critical functions and assets, and to address core risks, such as the risk of loss of control of assets with propulsion and capacity to emit interference. | (75) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, this Regulation should acknowledge the specific position of space operators which are small mid-caps, small-and medium-sized enterprises, or research or education institutions. Such categories, by virtue of size, resources, and extent of activities, may have a lesser impact. The imperative objective in this case is to ensure the protection of critical functions and assets, and to address core risks, such as the risk of loss of control of assets with propulsion and capacity to emit interference. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (76) To ensure a common approach for the operation of all space infrastructure, basic rules for the identification and management of assets and the management and control of access rights, should be laid down, to safeguard accesses at the ground segment and the control of the space segment. Key elements to safeguard the resilience of assets should be set out, in particular addressing the resilience of the network and information systems, taking into account the need to maintain an effective technical control of the space segment. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (76) To ensure a common approach for the operation of all space infrastructure, basic rules for the identification and management of assets and the management and control of access rights, should be laid down, to safeguard accesses at the ground segment and the control of the space segment. Key elements to safeguard the resilience of assets should be set out, in particular addressing the resilience of the network and information systems, taking into account the need to maintain an effective technical control of the space segment. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (76) To ensure a common approach for the operation of all space infrastructure, basic rules for the identification and management of assets and the management and control of access rights, should be laid down, to safeguard accesses at the ground segment and the control of the space segment. Key elements to safeguard the resilience of assets should be set out, in particular addressing the resilience of the network and information systems, taking into account the need to maintain an effective technical control of the space segment. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (77) Key minimum principles should be laid down on Union space operators to ensure sound encryption practices, through the definition of a cryptographic concept to address specific cybersecurity needs of the space missions, a bespoke policy for the management of cryptographic keys, as well as end-to-end authentication of links between satellite control centres and the space segment. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (77) Key minimum principles should be laid down on Union space operators to ensure sound encryption practices, through the definition of a cryptographic concept to address specific cybersecurity needs of the space missions, a bespoke policy for the management of cryptographic keys, as well as end-to-end authentication of links between satellite control centres and the space segment. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (77) Key minimum principles should be laid down on Union space operators to ensure sound encryption practices, through the definition of a cryptographic concept to address specific cybersecurity needs of the space missions, a bespoke policy for the management of cryptographic keys, as well as end-to-end authentication of links between satellite control centres and the space segment. | (77) Key minimum principles should be laid down on Union space operators to ensure sound encryption practices, through the definition of a cryptographic concept to address specific cybersecurity needs of the space missions, a bespoke policy for the management of cryptographic keys, as well as end-to-end authentication of links between satellite control centres and the space segment. Operators should also assure the protection of infrastructure and data against cyber and physical threats, establish clear communication and coordination procedures with the competent authorities and provide for appropriate measures to swiftly restore services following a disruption. |
Since space activities are not immune from cyber-attacks, there is a need for clear communication and coordination procedures with the competent authorities when these occur so that rapid solutions can be found.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (78) Union space operators should set-up key measures to enable swift and effective business continuity and response and recovery measures to ensure effective response to incidents and safeguard the continuity of critical operations of space missions. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (78) Union space operators should set-up key measures to enable swift and effective business continuity and response and recovery measures to ensure effective response to incidents and safeguard the continuity of critical operations of space missions. | (78) Union space operators should set-up key measures to enable swift and effective business continuity and response and recovery measures to ensure effective response to incidents and safeguard the continuity of critical operations of space missions. Those measures should include, in particular, the development and regular testing of business continuity and disaster recovery plans, the establishment of redundant systems and back-up capacities for critical functions, and the deployment of robust incident detection, reporting and management mechanisms. |
It is impossible to predict incidents of all kinds and technical nature, including in space, which is why clear procedures for communication and coordination with the competent authorities when such incidents occur are needed so that rapid solutions can be found.
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (79) To achieve a high level of resilience of the space infrastructure, and in line with current practices, Union space operators should be required to regularly test systems, considering the risk assessments which have been carried out. Such testing may include the performance of threat-led penetration testing upon safeguards regarding the conditions to carry out such testing and the criteria to be met by the testers. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (79) To achieve a high level of resilience of the space infrastructure, and in line with current practices, Union space operators should be required to regularly test systems, considering the risk assessments which have been carried out. Such testing may include the performance of threat-led penetration testing upon safeguards regarding the conditions to carry out such testing and the criteria to be met by the testers. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (79) To achieve a high level of resilience of the space infrastructure, and in line with current practices, Union space operators should be required to regularly test systems, considering the risk assessments which have been carried out. Such testing may include the performance of threat-led penetration testing upon safeguards regarding the conditions to carry out such testing and the criteria to be met by the testers. | deleted |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (80) The complexity of the supply chain in the space sector may pose specific cybersecurity risks, in light of the multiple sources that are used for the acquisition of components. The latter are often procured worldwide and may lack the needed integrity checks, especially when integrating or assembling components into various systems of space infrastructure. To address such risks, Union space operators should establish a supply chain risk management framework with dedicated strategies aimed at reducing risks in the supply chain, by deploying software integrity and authenticity controls, setting-out the criteria for choosing the software products, having due regard to the cybersecurity of the network and information systems temporarily interconnected, such as in the context of the provision of maintenance or support. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (80) The complexity of the supply chain in the space sector may pose specific cybersecurity risks, in light of the multiple sources that are used for the acquisition of components. The latter are often procured worldwide and may lack the needed integrity checks, especially when integrating or assembling components into various systems of space infrastructure. To address such risks, Union space operators should establish a supply chain risk management framework with dedicated strategies aimed at reducing risks in the supply chain, by deploying software integrity and authenticity controls, setting-out the criteria for choosing the software products, having due regard to the cybersecurity of the network and information systems temporarily interconnected, such as in the context of the provision of maintenance or support. | deleted |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (80) The complexity of the supply chain in the space sector may pose specific cybersecurity risks, in light of the multiple sources that are used for the acquisition of components. The latter are often procured worldwide and may lack the needed integrity checks, especially when integrating or assembling components into various systems of space infrastructure. To address such risks, Union space operators should establish a supply chain risk management framework with dedicated strategies aimed at reducing risks in the supply chain, by deploying software integrity and authenticity controls, setting-out the criteria for choosing the software products, having due regard to the cybersecurity of the network and information systems temporarily interconnected, such as in the context of the provision of maintenance or support. | (80) The complexity of the supply chain in the space sector may pose specific cybersecurity risks, in light of the multiple sources that are used for the acquisition of components. To address such risks, Union space operators may take into account the vulnerabilities specific to direct suppliers and service providers. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (81) This Regulation should be an integral part of the general Union framework for the resilience of critical entities. As regards the Union-owned assets, and in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/696, Member States were required, in the context of Council Directive 2008/114/EC12 , now succeeded by Directive 2022/2557, to ensure, for the protection of ground infrastructure located on their territory that is part of the Union Space Programme, measures which are at least equivalent to those laid down in the context of the transposition of that Directive. To ensure full coherence with the current Union rules on the resilience of critical entities and to preserve the full continuity in the relationship between the general updated resilience regime and the harmonised rules in the area of space, in the context of this Regulation, a similar approach should be taken as regards the relationship between Directive (EU) 2022/2557 and this Regulation. Thus, in respect of the physical resilience of the ground segment, all Union space operators should apply the measures laid down in this Regulation, ensuring they are at least equivalent to those measures taken pursuant to Directive (EU) 2022/2557. Moreover, it should be clarified that Union space operators, as defined and covered by this Regulation, may be identified as critical entities under Directive (EU) 2022/2557, when they are operators of the ground based infrastructure referred to in point (10) of the Annex to that Directive. That Directive hence covers space operators in scope of this Regulation insofar as they are identified by Member States as critical entities. On the other hand, this Regulation should cover all space operators, whether or not identified as critical entities under that Directive. Finally, it should be clarified that the ground segment as defined and covered by this Regulation is to be understood as covering the ground based infrastructure referred to in that Directive. | deleted |
| 12 (12) Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (OJ L 345, 23.12.2008, p. 75 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/114/oj ). |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (81) This Regulation should be an integral part of the general Union framework for the resilience of critical entities. As regards the Union-owned assets, and in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/696, Member States were required, in the context of Council Directive 2008/114/EC12 , now succeeded by Directive 2022/2557, to ensure, for the protection of ground infrastructure located on their territory that is part of the Union Space Programme, measures which are at least equivalent to those laid down in the context of the transposition of that Directive. To ensure full coherence with the current Union rules on the resilience of critical entities and to preserve the full continuity in the relationship between the general updated resilience regime and the harmonised rules in the area of space, in the context of this Regulation, a similar approach should be taken as regards the relationship between Directive (EU) 2022/2557 and this Regulation. Thus, in respect of the physical resilience of the ground segment, all Union space operators should apply the measures laid down in this Regulation, ensuring they are at least equivalent to those measures taken pursuant to Directive (EU) 2022/2557. Moreover, it should be clarified that Union space operators, as defined and covered by this Regulation, may be identified as critical entities under Directive (EU) 2022/2557, when they are operators of the ground based infrastructure referred to in point (10) of the Annex to that Directive. That Directive hence covers space operators in scope of this Regulation insofar as they are identified by Member States as critical entities. On the other hand, this Regulation should cover all space operators, whether or not identified as critical entities under that Directive. Finally, it should be clarified that the ground segment as defined and covered by this Regulation is to be understood as covering the ground based infrastructure referred to in that Directive. | deleted |
| 12 (12) Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (OJ L 345, 23.12.2008, p. 75 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/114/oj ). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (81) This Regulation should be an integral part of the general Union framework for the resilience of critical entities. As regards the Union-owned assets, and in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/696, Member States were required, in the context of Council Directive 2008/114/EC12 , now succeeded by Directive 2022/2557, to ensure, for the protection of ground infrastructure located on their territory that is part of the Union Space Programme, measures which are at least equivalent to those laid down in the context of the transposition of that Directive. To ensure full coherence with the current Union rules on the resilience of critical entities and to preserve the full continuity in the relationship between the general updated resilience regime and the harmonised rules in the area of space, in the context of this Regulation, a similar approach should be taken as regards the relationship between Directive (EU) 2022/2557 and this Regulation. Thus, in respect of the physical resilience of the ground segment, all Union space operators should apply the measures laid down in this Regulation, ensuring they are at least equivalent to those measures taken pursuant to Directive (EU) 2022/2557. Moreover, it should be clarified that Union space operators, as defined and covered by this Regulation, may be identified as critical entities under Directive (EU) 2022/2557, when they are operators of the ground based infrastructure referred to in point (10) of the Annex to that Directive. That Directive hence covers space operators in scope of this Regulation insofar as they are identified by Member States as critical entities. On the other hand, this Regulation should cover all space operators, whether or not identified as critical entities under that Directive. Finally, it should be clarified that the ground segment as defined and covered by this Regulation is to be understood as covering the ground based infrastructure referred to in that Directive. | deleted |
| 12 (12) Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (OJ L 345, 23.12.2008, p. 75 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/114/oj ). |
Angelika Niebler, Christian Ehler, Jens Gieseke, Aura Salla, Inese Vaidere, Wouter Beke, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jan Farský, Marion Walsmann, Oliver Schenk, Susana Solís Pérez, Massimiliano Salini, François-Xavier Bellamy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (82) Directive (EU) 2022/2557 sets out key minimum harmonisation rules aimed at enhancing the resilience of critical entities and improving the cross-border cooperation between competent authorities. Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should remain the foundation for the physical resilience of critical entities operating ground based infrastructure in scope of that Directive and covered by this Regulation. For these entities, this Regulation should apply without prejudice to and in complementarity with Directive (EU) 2022/2557. The resilience of the critical entities in scope of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should be ensured in accordance with that Directive. The critical infrastructure that these entities operate may comprise control centres, antennae, testing facilities, sites, including launch sites, physical equipment and components, hardware, systems and subsystems part of space infrastructure, engineering systems, power systems and propulsion systems. | (82) Directive (EU) 2022/2557 sets out key minimum harmonisation rules aimed at enhancing the resilience of critical entities and improving the cross-border cooperation between competent authorities. Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should remain the foundation for the physical resilience of critical entities operating ground based infrastructure in scope of that Directive and covered by this Regulation. For these entities, this Regulation should apply without prejudice to Directive (EU) 2022/2557. The resilience of the critical entities in scope of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should be ensured in accordance with that Directive. The critical infrastructure that these entities operate may comprise control centres, antennae, testing facilities, sites, including launch sites, physical equipment and components, hardware, systems and subsystems part of space infrastructure, engineering systems, power systems and propulsion systems. |
András Gyürk, Julie Rechagneux, Mélanie Disdier, Jorge Martín Frías, András László, Aleksandar Nikolic, Pascale Piera, Barbara Bonte
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (82) Directive (EU) 2022/2557 sets out key minimum harmonisation rules aimed at enhancing the resilience of critical entities and improving the cross-border cooperation between competent authorities. Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should remain the foundation for the physical resilience of critical entities operating ground based infrastructure in scope of that Directive and covered by this Regulation. For these entities, this Regulation should apply without prejudice to and in complementarity with Directive (EU) 2022/2557. The resilience of the critical entities in scope of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should be ensured in accordance with that Directive. The critical infrastructure that these entities operate may comprise control centres, antennae, testing facilities, sites, including launch sites, physical equipment and components, hardware, systems and subsystems part of space infrastructure, engineering systems, power systems and propulsion systems. | (82) Directive (EU) 2022/2557 sets out key minimum harmonisation rules aimed at enhancing the resilience of critical entities and improving the cross-border cooperation between competent authorities. Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should remain the foundation for the physical resilience of critical entities operating ground based infrastructure in scope of that Directive and covered by this Regulation. For these entities, this Regulation should apply without prejudice to Directive (EU) 2022/2557. The resilience of the critical entities in scope of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should be ensured in accordance with that Directive. The critical infrastructure that these entities operate may comprise control centres, antennae, testing facilities, sites, including launch sites, physical equipment and components, hardware, systems and subsystems part of space infrastructure, engineering systems, power systems and propulsion systems. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (82) Directive (EU) 2022/2557 sets out key minimum harmonisation rules aimed at enhancing the resilience of critical entities and improving the cross-border cooperation between competent authorities. Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should remain the foundation for the physical resilience of critical entities operating ground based infrastructure in scope of that Directive and covered by this Regulation. For these entities, this Regulation should apply without prejudice to and in complementarity with Directive (EU) 2022/2557. The resilience of the critical entities in scope of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should be ensured in accordance with that Directive. The critical infrastructure that these entities operate may comprise control centres, antennae, testing facilities, sites, including launch sites, physical equipment and components, hardware, systems and subsystems part of space infrastructure, engineering systems, power systems and propulsion systems. | (82) Directive (EU) 2022/2557 sets out key minimum harmonisation rules aimed at enhancing the resilience of critical entities and improving the cross-border cooperation between competent authorities. Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should remain the foundation for the physical resilience of critical entities operating ground based infrastructure in scope of that Directive and covered by this Regulation. For these entities, this Regulation should apply without prejudice to Directive (EU) 2022/2557. The resilience of the critical entities in scope of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should be ensured in accordance with that Directive. The critical infrastructure that these entities operate may comprise control centres, antennae, testing facilities, sites, including launch sites, physical equipment and components, hardware, systems and subsystems part of space infrastructure, engineering systems, power systems and propulsion systems. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (86) Further to setting key rules on incident handling and investigation, an incident reporting mechanism by Union space operators of Union-owned assets, in the context of the Union Space Programme, should be established, filling existing gaps in the incident reporting. The Agency should acquire access to information on significant incidents for all components of the Union Space Programme through the security monitoring centre structure established in the context of the Union Space Programme, providing support and around-the-clock monitoring of the relevant systems’ security. To achieve coherence with the general framework on cybersecurity, such mechanism should be aligned with the incident reporting laid down by Directive (EU) 2022/2555. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (87) Moreover, as regards the reporting of significant incidents affecting the space infrastructure of Member States, this Regulation should be without prejudice to any of the incident reporting requirements currently laid down by Directive (EU) 2022/2555 or Directive (EU) 2022/2557. Consequently, the reporting rules under these two Directives should continue to fully apply to Union space operators that are as essential or important entities, and respectively critical entities, under those Directives. | deleted |
Connections
The dossier, the decisions on this text and its other versions.
No connections found for this item.
Sources & citation
Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.
- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2026). “AMENDMENTS 678 - 945 - Draft report Safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the Union”. Text, 14 April 2026. docId ITRE-AM-786873. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ITRE-AM-786873 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: EP Open Data API: document record, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/api/v2/documents/ITRE-AM-786873 (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-itre-am-786873,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{AMENDMENTS 678 - 945 - Draft report Safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the Union}},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-04-14},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ITRE-AM-786873}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ITRE-AM-786873},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. docId ITRE-AM-786873. Data: EP Open Data API: document record (CC BY 4.0)}
}