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Text · Comparison of two versions

Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

INTA-PR-784156 → A-10-2026-0122

From
INTA-PR-784156 report parliamentary committee draft of 3 Feb 2026
To
A-10-2026-0122 Plenary report of 27 Apr 2026
Changes
13 changes to the text
Paragraphs
+27 added · −11 removed · 14 changed
More facts (3)
Title (from)
on opportunities and challenges presented by a comprehensive artificial intelligence strategy for EU trade
Title (to)
on opportunities and challenges presented by a comprehensive artificial intelligence strategy for EU trade
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

The report adds new recitals and paragraphs on open-source AI, WTO cooperation, and AI's role in customs and security.1235 It strengthens calls for SME access to AI, open-source solutions, and investment in AI infrastructure.4679 It adds provisions on promoting the EU's AI model internationally, including a WTO working group and global minimum standards.1011 It expands on strategic autonomy, including concerns about China's rare earth exports and calls for revising the Dual-Use Regulation.1213

The notes class 13 changes as substance, 0 as formal, 0 as wording only.

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Part 2 of 3: Paragraphs 61–74

Added14. Recalls the EU’s commitment to a rules-based multilateral trading system; underlines that the WTO should meaningfully contribute to the development of a robust, safe, inclusive and trusted AI governance framework for trade, including through the establishment of a dedicated WTO Working Group on Artificial Intelligence to facilitate dialogue, knowledge-sharing, and cooperation among members on AI regulations and policies; stresses that balanced rules on electronic commerce are vital to unlock AI-enabled trade; calls on the Commission to ensure that any WTO text on electronic commerce ensures policy space for democratic AI governance, including enforceable safeguards for workers and consumers; calls on the Commission to drive forward discussions on AI and trade within the WTO framework and promote global cooperation that facilitates trusted data flows and digital trade, as well as access to AI-enabled services and tools, particularly in developing countries;

Added15. Warns that diverging AI compliance regimes risk fragmenting markets and raising trade costs; stresses the role of international cooperation in preventing regulatory fragmentation; calls on the Commission to use international standards and WTO technical barriers to trade (TBT) and transparency disciplines as tools to prevent regulatory divergence from becoming an unjustified trade barrier, while preserving and leveraging the EU’s AI governance framework to facilitate trusted digital trade and foster a global level playing field for trustworthy AI;

Economic security and strategic dependencies in the AI value chain

Change 12

Changed12.16. Stresses that secure access to advanced semiconductors and affordable computing power is fundamental to the EU’s technological sovereignty and competitiveness; notes that the Chips Act and the AI factories agenda risk falling short due to fragmented delivery and limited scale; calls on the Commission to accelerate their implementationimplementation, to pursue its raw-material diplomacy and to leverage trade agreements, framework and partnership agreements with trusted partners to diversify supply;supply chains and reduce strategic dependencies; in this context, recognises the critical role of advanced chip manufacturing ecosystems in like-minded partner economies in underpinning global AI computing capacity, and encourages deepening cooperation with such partners on semiconductor supply chain resilience; highlights, furthermore, the urgency of strengthening European production of advanced semiconductors, in particular by supporting European initiatives such as the proposed revision of the Chips Act (Chips Act 2.0); calls on the Commission to have a clearer strategy on how the EU could develop as a key player in the AI ecosystem and to integrate strong provisions into trade agreements to ensure fair access to critical technologies and raw materials;

Change 13

Removed13. Warns that cloud infrastructure concentration in non-EU countries exposes the EU to external jurisdictional vulnerabilities; calls on the Commission, through the Cloud and AI Development Act and the Industrial Accelerator Act, to establish graduated sovereignty frameworks prioritising EU-based providers for critical services through public procurement, while ensuring open strategic autonomy by maintaining non-discriminatory access for like-minded providers meeting EU certification and interoperability requirements;

Added17. Considers strategic partnerships on critical minerals supply chain resilience as potentially meaningful instruments to further coordination with allies on access to AI-critical inputs, including rare earth elements and advanced semiconductor materials; insists that EU engagement must be conditional on coherence with the Critical Raw Materials Act benchmarks and the EU’s open strategic autonomy objectives, reducing vulnerabilities rather than shifting dependencies; calls on the Commission to ensure that any plurilateral trade instruments emerging from such partnerships, including price floors or offtake mechanisms, are compatible with WTO commitments and serve EU interests; calls for strengthened dialogue and cooperation among trusted partners to safeguard international trade flows and reinforce the integrity and resilience of AI-related industrial ecosystems;

Removed14. Calls on the Commission to ensure its economic security doctrine coordinates foreign direct investment screening, export controls, the Anti-Coercion Instrument and trade defence as a coherent system preventing the weaponisation of AI dependencies; warns that export restrictions on critical raw materials and growing geopolitical volatility require strengthened coordination and enforcement to protect Europe’s AI ecosystem;

Added18. Warns that cloud infrastructure concentration in non-EU countries exposes the EU to external jurisdictional vulnerabilities; calls on the Commission, through the proposed Cloud and AI Development Act and Industrial Accelerator Act (COM(2026)0100), to establish graduated sovereignty frameworks prioritising EU-based providers for critical services through public procurement, while ensuring open strategic autonomy by maintaining non-discriminatory access for like-minded providers meeting EU certification and interoperability requirements;

Added19. Calls on the Commission to ensure its economic security doctrine coordinates foreign direct investment screening, paying specific attention to strategic digital sectors such as AI platforms, cloud services, and data centres, export controls, the Anti-Coercion Instrument and trade defence as a coherent system preventing the weaponisation of AI dependencies; warns that export restrictions on critical raw materials and growing geopolitical volatility require strengthened coordination and enforcement to protect Europe’s AI ecosystem; calls on the Commission to propose a targeted revision of the Dual-Use Regulation to more comprehensively address advanced artificial intelligence in view of its potential use by third countries in security, surveillance or defence applications;

Added20. Expresses concern over China’s repetitive export restrictions on rare earth elements (REEs), which significantly disrupt supply chains vital for semiconductor companies as well as the broader AI value chain; considers that China’s action is unjustified and calls on the Commission to closely monitor the situation and respond appropriately in order to ensure that the global economy and resilience of international trade are not affected;

Added21. Underlines the need for the EU to accelerate the implementation of the CRMA and diversify supply chains to strengthen economic resilience; stresses the urgent need to secure investments in the strategic projects approved under the CRMA and in other projects to boost extraction, refining, processing and recycling that contribute to de-risking from China;

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22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
26 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2026). “Changes between INTA-PR-784156 and A-10-2026-0122”. Text, 27 April 2026. from INTA-PR-784156, to A-10-2026-0122, reference 2025/2112(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/INTA-PR-784156/compare/A-10-2026-0122?all=1&part=2 (retrieved 26 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2026-04-27,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between INTA-PR-784156 and A-10-2026-0122}},
  year = {2026},
  date = {2026-04-27},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/INTA-PR-784156/compare/A-10-2026-0122?all=1&part=2}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/INTA-PR-784156/compare/A-10-2026-0122?all=1&part=2},
  urldate = {2026-09-26},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from INTA-PR-784156, to A-10-2026-0122, reference 2025/2112(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}