Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Added67. Reiterates its call for the establishment of European maritime security hubs in the Black Sea, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and underlines that such hubs should enhance maritime situational awareness, enable real-time monitoring from space to seabed and strengthen early warning capacities and reactions to the increased threats from the Russian shadow fleet, while also taking environmental perspectives into account and ensuring the security of commercial routes; calls on the Commission and the Member States to prevent the shadow fleet from entering European waters and to perform frequent and thorough inspections to make sure the shadow fleet is not violating any laws and does not pose any danger;

Added68. Strongly emphasises that existing structural dependencies, through market concentration and foreign control, including the dominance of US big tech companies, in the EU’s digital infrastructure and in operating systems, data centres, semiconductor manufacturing, AI, data-driven decision making tools, payment infrastructure, cybersecurity, cloud computing and various online platforms and services pose a high risk to democracy, freedom, security and competitiveness within the EU; regrets the recent incidents, in which Microsoft, Visa and Mastercard suspended services and halted the transactions of US-sanctioned staff members of the International Criminal Court; highlights, in this respect, the EU’s vulnerability to similar external decisions that could disrupt public services and economic activities; calls on the Commission to systematically integrate dependency reduction and European industrial capacity-building objectives into the implementation of the European Democracy Shield;

Added69. Considers a resilient, competitive EU digital infrastructure – including secure local data centres, an EU sovereign cloud, edge computing capacities and gigabit networks – to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring openness, competition and global interoperability; stresses that such infrastructure should help protect the sensitive data of EU citizens from risks linked to storage abroad and exposure to non-EU laws, and address complexities around foreign ownership and investment in essential infrastructures, including through digital autonomy stress tests to map dependencies on large commercial tech companies for essential public services; regrets that, after six years of drafting, the European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services (EUCS) still lacks a certification assurance level enabling European cloud providers to guarantee the highest protection of strategic data against non-European jurisdictions, and underlines that robust cybersecurity certification is essential for the integrity and resilience of digital services underpinning democratic processes; stresses that, with the Cloud and AI Development Act and the revised CSA, the work on the EUCS should be resumed; welcomes the introduction of graduated EU assurance levels in the proposal for the Cloud and AI Development Act, and calls for the highest assurance level to provide effective protection of the most sensitive and strategic data against access under non-EU jurisdictions, while avoiding unnecessary barriers to innovation and investment;

Added70. Stresses the need to address risks related to strategic and sensitive network-connected hardware and software components and services capable of remote access, data transmission or system control sourced from high-risk third countries, including China; notes with concern the risks associated with the dominance of Chinese solar inverters and other components, in certain cases placed on the EU market at artificially low prices through state-backed non-market practices; welcomes, in this context, the fact that the revised CSA, as proposed, aims to provide a framework to ban network-connected components capable of remote access, such as inverters, from high-risk suppliers, and that the strategic roadmap for digitalisation and AI in the energy sector provides for a risk assessment of solar installations and a review of the energy security-of-supply framework; calls for the swift adoption of these measures to protect critical energy infrastructure from remote manipulation, blackouts and supply-chain risks; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote secure, EU-based and EU-produced alternatives, review current procurement rules to assess whether they hinder digital sovereignty, and pursue a comprehensive EU tech sovereignty agenda with clear resilience standards and criteria for developing or procuring technology or digital infrastructure, ensuring that regulatory frameworks, trade and competition policies effectively prevent unfair market practices and reduce dependencies on non-EU providers; stresses that digital success is driven by competition, openness and technological excellence, and that the EU should have a strategy to attract, maintain and retain critical technologies, while taking due account of factors related to foreign acquisitions; reiterates the need to be guided by a ‘buy European’ policy for critical infrastructure, which should be designed and implemented in a well-balanced and proportionate manner; supports a sovereign EU digital infrastructure with privacy-enhancing technologies and an EU application programming interface (API) ecosystem, leveraging fossil-free energy for data centres and cloud infrastructure, including through market-driven and public-private initiatives, such as joint ventures or federated networks in areas like AI, gigafactories and cloud services;

Added71. Welcomes the objectives set out in the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) for extracting, processing, recycling and mitigating the consumption of critical raw materials and emphasises that, in times of sudden crisis, dependency on Chinese rare earths may prove to be just as damaging as dependency on Russian carbon resources; reiterates the need to fully implement the CRMA, to stockpile, recycle and substitute critical raw materials, to accelerate the diversification of critical raw materials from China to more reliable partners, to increase the EU’s own extraction and processing and to make resource use more efficient;

Added72. Calls for the formal recognition of hack-for-hire operations as a distinct threat to democratic institutions and processes, which could be better addressed by updating criminal law definitions; encourages the Commission and the Member States to launch a coordinated international initiative to counter so-called bulletproof hosting providers that knowingly lease infrastructure to cybercriminals, including through the blocking and filtering of abusive autonomous system numbers, with a view to effectively limiting the jurisdictions from which such providers are able to operate; highlights the continued risk of trading corporate vulnerabilities on the darknet, which exposes digital communication systems and devices to foreign interference;

Added73. Highlights the need to ensure greater integration and strategic coordination between digital infrastructure deployment, counter-FIMI and disinformation measures, and cybersecurity and defence policy, in order to advance the strategic autonomy of the EU; underlines the need to leverage dual-use infrastructure, such as resilient data centres scattered across the EU, to ensure operational continuity in the face of natural disasters and hybrid or wartime threats; highlights, furthermore, the need to increase investments in military mobility and secure communications, including the urgent and prioritised deployment of gigabit networks and space-based capabilities such as IRIS², in order to provide encrypted communication services for public and defence use; calls for these critical communications capabilities to be made available to Ukraine and Taiwan;

Added74. Stresses the need to increase investment in secure, interoperable and resilient information-sharing systems and local data centres, which are not subject to extraterritorial legislation; underlines that such investment is essential to ensure faster and more reliable communication between competent authorities at national and EU level, to strengthen protection against cyberattacks and data breaches, and to guarantee the integrity, availability and confidentiality of sensitive data, including through enhanced cybersecurity capabilities and modern EU digital infrastructure; underlines that redundancies are key to ensure operational security and communications security, such as ground-based secure communication systems or inertial navigation systems;

Added75. Stresses that cybersecurity frameworks such as the NIS 2 Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act and the Cyber Solidarity Act must work in alignment to support secure-by-design standards and avoid regulatory fragmentation; takes note, in this context, of the targeted revision of the NIS 2 Directive; welcomes the Commission’s proposal to significantly strengthen and expand ENISA’s operational mandate and resources through the revised CSA; calls for the revision to explicitly include FIMI experts among the stakeholders represented in the ENISA Advisory Group; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient funding in the 2028-2034 MFF to ensure that undertakings, especially those in the ICT sector, can afford the additional investments arising from the revised CSA; underlines further that small and medium-sized enterprises need support with compliance, in addition to exemptions that should ensure that their security and, as a consequence, the collective cybersecurity, is not weakened;

Added76. Recalls the low level of transposition of the NIS 2 Directive; regrets that, following the deadline of 17 October 2024, the Commission had to send letters of formal notice to as many as 23 Member States for failing to fully transpose the directive; urgently calls on the Member States to finalise the transposition of the directive as soon as possible, given that, at the end of 2025, more than one year after the deadline, the directive had yet to be transposed by 10 Member States; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s pledge to work closely with the Member States to ensure the swift and coherent implementation of the horizontal cybersecurity framework set out in the NIS 2 Directive, as well as the Cyber Resilience Act and the Cyber Solidarity Act, as stipulated in the ProtectEU internal security strategy; calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the gaps in situational awareness, risk mitigation and coordinated action across cyberthreats and hybrid and information threats;

Cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs

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Changed51.77. Takes the view that all criminal law tools available at Member State and EU level should be applied and, where appropriate, further developed to prevent and counter illegal conduct aimed at undermining democratic institutions and processes; stresses the need for competent national authorities to be equipped with adequate tools and cooperation channels to prevent, investigate, detect and prosecute criminal offences related to foreign interference; considers that the corruption and intimidation of elected and public officials by criminal networks should be addressed as part of the EU’s response to hybrid threats via strengthened cooperation between specialised anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement authorities and relevant Union bodies; asks the Commission to assess the added value of establishing in Union law minimum rules on the definition of and sanctions for the criminal offence of knowingly participating in organised activities of interference on behalf of foreign powers; notes that the forthcoming revision of the mandates of a number of EU bodies in the area of justice and home affairs could provide an opportunity to strengthen the operational dimension of the European Democracy Shield; supports, in particular, the Commission’s commitment to an ambitious overhaul of Europol’s mandate, with a view to turning it into a truly operational police agency that better supports the Member States;

Change 27

Changed52.78. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication acknowledges the positive contribution of criminal justice and law enforcement cooperation to countering FIMI and disinformation activities; calls on the Commission, when preparing the planned revision of the mandates of Europol and Eurojust, to carefully assess the legal gaps whichand limitations that currently prevent those agencies from providing their full assistance to the Member States confronted with hybrid threats, and to explore ways to overcome them;those limitations while respecting fundamental rights and Treaty-based competences; considers that the addition of hybrid threats in Annex I to the Europol Regulation would clarify the legal framework and facilitate Europol’s work in this area; underlines, moreover, the need to ensure that Europol and Eurojust are provided with adequate financial and human resources to effectively implement the upcoming strengthening of their mandates;

Change 28

Changed53.79. NotesConsiders transnational repression to be a growing and serious threat to democracy and internal security in the EU; underlines that transnational repression can be perpetrated online, via hate and defamation campaigns and the spreading of illegal content, but can also lead to physical assaults and murder; notes, with concernconcern, the increasing examples of how malicious non-EU-country actors use crime as a service and criminal organisations as proxies within the EU to target individuals and entities identified as political adversaries, posing a grave threat to the EU’s internal security;adversaries; stresses that such practices constitute an intolerable act of foreign interference, with potentially destabilising effects on our societies; underlines, in this context, the need to close remaining loopholes in Union law and further reinforce EU-level coordination in the field of criminal justice and law enforcement;enforcement through a police and judicial cooperation framework dedicated to transnational repression as part of the European Democracy Shield, while involving individuals and groups that are targeted and ensuring their protection; draws attention to the urgency of addressing the abuse of Interpol red notices for politically motivated purposes;

Change 29

Changed54.80. Strongly condemns the weaponisation and instrumentalisation of migration againstby third countries or hostile non-state actors with the aim of destabilising a Member State or the EU; takes the position that this phenomenon representsconstitutes an unacceptable attempt by malign non-EU countries to exerciseexert political pressure on frontlinefront-line Member States and on the EU; welcomesunderlines that such practices also represent a grave abuse of vulnerable persons who may be entitled to international protection and should not adversely affect the right to seek asylum; notes the specific provisions on the instrumentalisation of migration recently included in key pieces of EU legislation onlegislation; borderfurther managementwelcomes andthe migration;recent stressesrevision thatof the MemberEU Stateslegal affectedframework byto suchinclude hybrid threats shouldamong bethe ablegrounds totriggering relythe onEU supportvisa fromsuspension specialisedmechanism; EUunderlines agencies;that callsa forcredible Frontex’sand mandateeffective toEU beresponse strengthenedmust soalso thatbe thebased agencyon hasclose thecoordination legaland basissincere andcooperation thebetween human,neighbouring financialMember States, and technicalbetween resourcesthem itand needsEU toinstitutions, properlyin assista thespirit Memberof Statesloyalty inand dealingmutual withsolidarity, suchand hybridon threats;enhanced stresses,technological inand thisoperational context,capabilities thein needborder tomanagement, furtherwhile enhancepreserving the EU’sintegrity capacityof tothe contributeSchengen toarea Memberand States’ensuring borderfull protectionrespect effortsfor throughthe sufficientfundamental investmentvalues underof the 2028-2034 MFF;EU;

Change 30

Added81. Notes the Commission’s announced revision of the mandate of Frontex; underlines that the revision should provide for the necessary legal basis, analytical capabilities and adequate human, financial and technical resources to enable effective assistance for Member States in the management and protection of the external borders in compliance with relevant Union law, including fundamental rights; stresses, in this context, the need to further strengthen the EU’s capacity to support Member States in matters related to home affairs under the 2028-2034 MFF, including in responding to threats of a hybrid nature;

External dimension

Change 31

Changed55.82. Underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield to have a robuststrong external dimension; welcomes the inclusion in the joint communicationdimension ofand specificwelcomes actions aimed atthat supportingsupport countries beyond EUthe borders,EU, in particular by facilitatingthrough capacity-building to improvestrengthen candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI andFIMI, hybrid interference,interference and bytransnational supportingrepression, support for independent media and journalism, and increasing theirimproved ability to monitor disinformationdetect onand socialcounter mediadisinformation before and during elections; underlines the need for adequate funding, including core funding via the Global Europe instrument, for independent media in neighbouring countries; notes that capacities and commitments among candidate countries vary, which calls for a differentiated, context-sensitive implementation of the European Democracy Shield in full respect of EU values; underlines that strengthening democratic resilience is key both for the credibility of enlargement and for the EU’s security and stability; calls for the systematic involvement of candidate countries in relevant actions, support mechanisms and expert networks under the external dimension;

Change 32

Removed56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts;

Added83. Calls for the European Democracy Shield to serve as a two-way mechanism for expertise, where the EU integrates the successful rapid-response models, civil-military cooperation frameworks and real-time detection techniques, and recalls the expertise of front-line partners who are experiencing Russian aggression and interference; emphasises that the EU has a significant amount to learn from the resilience of Moldova and Ukraine;

Removed57. Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy whereby EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations – with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators – are of vital importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include disinformation monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all mission staff, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence;

Added84. Notes Taiwan’s leading role in high-tech development, and its extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks and FIMI; calls for regular exchanges on relevant security issues, as well as for stronger cooperation on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables with like-minded partners in East Asia, including Taiwan, Japan and South Korea;

Removed58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal;

Added85. Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy, in priority regions, whereby EU Delegations and common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, are mobilised to enhance the understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference and to deliver a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations, with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators, are of vital importance; is therefore concerned by the reports regarding the risks of possible downsizing of EU Delegations and their staffing, in particular in the context of the growing international challenges and geopolitical tensions;

Removed59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership;

Added86. Highlights that EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; calls for the visibility and strategic communication of the benefits, presence and role of CSDP missions and operations around the world to be enhanced, especially in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and in candidate and potential candidate countries; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include FIMI monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all relevant current and future missions and operations, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence;

Removed60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions;

Added87. Stresses the importance of joint exercises, capacity building and technical assistance for partner countries facing persistent hybrid pressure; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the mandates of individual missions and operations, to increase the preparedness of partner countries; welcomes the deployment of EU hybrid rapid response teams and of cyber rapid response teams as useful instruments in building capacity and resilience in countries targeted by cyberattacks and hybrid and FIMI attacks, as illustrated by the recent example of Moldova; notes, in this context, the presence of Frontex in several relevant third countries and the potential added value of its capacities in this regard;

Removed61. Calls for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo;

Added88. Stresses that repeated attempts to normalise relations with Russia, without addressing the underlying nature of the Russian state and its imperial strategic objectives, have contributed to increased instability, have weakened deterrence and have undermined European and global security; underlines that future EU and Member States’ policies must be based on a realistic assessment of this historical continuity, prioritising deterrence, resilience and the security of countries in Russia’s neighbourhood over short-term economic or political considerations; welcomes the efforts in recent years to decouple the EU economy from dependence on Russian fossil fuels; further stresses that the complete and irreversible phase-out of such dependence should be a strategic priority for the EU and its Member States;

Removed62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS);

Added89. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing capacities for offensive information operations; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive and reinforced information measures to counter destabilising efforts as well as other hostile state and state-sponsored coordinated information manipulation, cognitive warfare operations and hostile influence campaigns by authoritarian or malign actors; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia and Belarus, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace, not only in neighbouring countries but primarily in their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal;

Removed63. Welcomes the deployment of EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams, as illustrated by the recent example of Moldova, as a useful instrument in building capacity and resilience in countries targeted by hybrid, cyber and FIMI attacks, on the basis of the specific know-how and expertise of the EU and its Member States;

Added90. Notes with grave concern that, in certain Member States, government actions and strategic decisions have repeatedly served Russian interests; recalls the case of the former Fidesz government in Hungary as a particularly clear example, including, among others, the failure to duly report and investigate intrusions by Russian state-linked cyber actors, the conclusion of long-term gas contracts with Russia at prices above market levels, the systematic obstruction of EU assistance for Ukraine, and alignment with Russian positions in key EU foreign and security policy decisions; calls for the proper reporting and investigation of activities and campaigns that may be linked to foreign influence and interference; calls for increased vigilance, enhanced monitoring and the full use of EU instruments to protect the EU against internal vectors of foreign influence and interference;

Removed64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; welcomes the steps already taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI;

Added91. Notes that candidate and potential candidate countries and countries in the EU’s neighbourhood, in particular the Western Balkans, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia, have been a clear focal point of Russian FIMI operations, with one of the aims being to discredit the EU and diminish the perceived value of EU integration; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to deepen cooperation with relevant actors in these countries on information resilience, cybersecurity and hybrid threats, and to move from ad hoc support to systematic, long-term assistance aimed at building institutional, legal and civic resilience; calls for EU funding for regional coordination hubs for countering threats to online information integrity and FIMI in relevant parts of the EU’s neighbourhood, and for support for investigative journalism and media regulators to be boosted; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in candidate or potential candidate countries, including in the context of the USAID funding withdrawal, affecting, in particular, the Western Balkans;

Removed65. Welcomes the establishment of a Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and the UK in May 2025; welcomes its focus on, among other things, cooperation in countering cyber issues, hybrid threats and FIMI, and on protecting critical infrastructure;

Added92. Underlines that efforts by the EU to support candidate countries in strengthening their resilience against foreign interference should be accompanied by the proven implementation of relevant reforms and tangible results on their part; calls on the Commission to continue applying a rigorous approach in its examination of candidate countries’ progress under accession chapters; stresses that shortcomings in addressing key issues such as corruption, lack of independent media, violations of human rights and weaknesses in democratic processes undermine citizens’ trust in national and EU institutions, thereby creating anti-EU narratives that may be exploited by third countries and actors engaged in FIMI;

Added93. Calls on the Commission to establish regional EDMO hubs covering relevant EU candidate, potential candidate and neighbourhood countries, following the model of the existing hub for Moldova;

Added94. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument; stresses that cultural cooperation should be an integral component of these instruments, strengthening societal cohesion, shared values and people-to-people engagement in candidate and neighbouring countries; highlights that the removal of the thematic programmes and related financial allocations for human rights and democracy, and for civil society organisations, as provided for by the Commission proposal on the 2028-2034 MFF and by the proposal for a new Global Europe programme, leave significant uncertainty over how these EU Treaty-based obligations will be effectively mainstreamed, operationalised and monitored; reiterates its call on the Commission to strengthen the programmes aimed at meaningfully engaging and supporting civil society, human rights defenders, journalists and investigative media in third countries; insists that the new MFF provide predictable funding that allows rapid responses to threats against fundamental freedoms and supports local initiatives;

Added95. Urgently calls for EU efforts to support partner countries in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, to build resilience to FIMI, strengthen democratic processes and ensure electoral integrity, including through dedicated funding under the next MFF; emphasises, in particular, that transformations unfolding in North Africa and the Sahel region have a direct impact on the EU’s security and democratic resilience, and notes that these regions are particularly vulnerable to FIMIs, notably due to political instability and fragile information ecosystems; underlines that Russia and China increasingly cooperate in amplifying revisionist narratives about alleged Western decline and ‘neo-colonialism’ in these regions, revealing a strategic communication gap that undermines the EU’s credibility and influence; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing targeted FIMI resilience measures for these regions, including support for independent media, civil society, digital and AI literacy, strategic communication in local languages, and enhanced monitoring and response mechanisms, such as the flagship EUvsDisinfo project, in addition to financial support mechanisms;

Added96. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against cyberthreats and hybrid and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or for the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; considers that such agreements should be prioritised with countries whose internal instability directly affects the security of the EU; takes note of the parliamentary elections held in Moldova on 28 September 2025, as well as the presidential election on 3 November 2024, and of the strong victory of pro-European forces, despite significant efforts and resources deployed by Russia to destabilise the situation in Moldova and divert it from its European and Euro-Atlantic path;

Added97. Notes, with concern, that Armenia faced an intensification of Russian-linked hybrid threats aimed at influencing the outcome of its June 2026 elections and undermining its democratic processes, social cohesion and peacebuilding efforts, including malign cyber activities, coordinated information manipulation, electoral interference, economic coercion, and overt and covert threats by senior Russian officials, as well as the activation of influence networks; recalls that the Armenian Foreign Intelligence Service has reported the use of overt and covert information operations, distortive narratives and efforts to manipulate public discourse in ways that are detrimental to Armenia’s national interests, and stresses that such hybrid pressure may involve both state and non-state actors, including domestic amplifiers such as certain religious actors and oligarchic networks connected to broader Russian influence strategies in the region; welcomes the establishment of EUPM Armenia to provide strategic advice and capacity building to Armenian institutions on countering FIMI, cyberattacks and illicit financial flows; encourages the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to strengthen its outreach to local democratic actors, community organisations and independent media as part of its contribution to democratic resilience; recalls that Armenia is still a member of the Russian-run Collective Security Treaty Organisation and calls on Armenia to fully leave it;

Added98. Deeply regrets the decision of 7 January 2026 by the US President to withdraw from, suspend participation in, or terminate engagement with a significant number of international organisations, including numerous UN bodies; expresses its serious concern that such a move will undermine the financial sustainability of the UN system, weaken multilateral cooperation at a time when it is most needed and embolden authoritarian and revisionist actors, who have historically sought to exploit any withdrawal or disengagement by Western powers from international organisations; stresses, therefore, the need for the EU to reinforce its leadership in supporting and strengthening multilateral organisations, and to uphold democratic institutions; encourages the US administration to reflect on its decision and to reaffirm its commitment to the UN and multilateral cooperation;

Added99. Expresses its strong disagreement with the recent US National Security Strategy, in particular its negative characterisation of the EU and its challenges and risks, and the vision of international relations that is based on spheres of influence; condemns any attempts to influence or undermine democratic processes in the EU; stresses the importance of safeguarding the integrity of EU institutions and EU decision-making; expresses concerns about the fact that certain elements of the strategy fall significantly short in adequately addressing the threat posed by Russia, notably for European and hence also for American security; regrets, furthermore, the strategy’s flawed assessment of the EU as a political system and its groundless adversarial stance towards the EU; considers that the strategy further reinforces the imperative for the EU to advance its strategic autonomy, reduce dependencies and diversify partnerships;

Added100. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, including the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; encourages the further development of shared open-source standards, frontier AI safety frameworks, data models, methodologies and taxonomies among like-minded partners to enable more effective collaboration; affirms NATO’s key role in countering hybrid warfare targeting democratic institutions and recalls its dedicated instruments and strategies in this regard, notably through its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence; highlights the fact that, following the accession of Finland and Sweden, 23 of the 27 EU Member States are also NATO allies, and underlines the need for strong synergy between EU and NATO strategies; welcomes the steps already taken in bilateral and multilateral frameworks, including the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitments made in the Council of Europe Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and the establishment of security and defence partnerships, especially those focusing on countering cyberattacks, hybrid threats and FIMI, and on protecting critical infrastructure; reiterates, in this context, its sincere appreciation of the United Kingdom’s continued engagement in European security;

Election systems and electoral resilience

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Changed66.101. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels;levels and in candidate countries; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity,subsidiarity and within the scope as defined by the Treaties, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; notes that attacks on election integrity are multifaceted, integrated and long-term, as part of an ecosystem of threats that need to be tackled through a whole-of-society approach; proposes that the European Democracy Shield initiative should support the coordination of efforts, both online and offline, to maintain the integrity of European elections, including efforts addressing hybrid threats, cyberthreats, the financing of interference and information manipulation;

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Changed67.102. Calls on the Member States to step up efforts to implement the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive, robust and resilient electoral processes within the EU; underlines, in particular, the importance of establishing national election networks to help national authorities and expert bodies to work in synergy; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards the systematic development and expansion of election-focused stress-testing exercises at both national and cross-border levels, drawing on practical experience and lessons learned from previous electoral cycles, in order to better anticipate, simulate and mitigate risks linked to information manipulation, cyber interference and platform-driven amplification;

Change 35

Changed68.103. Calls on the Member States to ensure that election authorities or equivalent bodies in charge of well-functioning, free and fair elections are sufficiently funded and equipped with the proper tools to allow them to carry out their functions, be thiswhether in terms of providing personnel training and the necessary digital tools,tools or in terms of ensuring sufficient investment in electoral bodies and election infrastructure;

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Changed69.104. Considers that hate campaignscampaigns, intimidation and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters, constitute a threat to democracy; underlines that such threats can be fuelled by non-EU countries’ attempts to destabilise the EU;EU, including through disinformation tactics such as deepfakes falsely depicting real political candidates and deliberately designed to mislead voters; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s commitment to presenting recommendations on safety in politics; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives;

Change 37

Removed70. Underlines the key role of the ECNE in ensuring the exchange of best practices with regard to electoral resilience in the EU and its Member States; notes, however, the current limitations of its activities; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to strengthening the ECNE, including reforms such as putting in place a repository of common references and standards for electoral processes;

Added105. Stresses that the safety and security of women in political life are prerequisites for equal representation and resilient democracy; condemns disinformation campaigns, including via deepfakes and non-consensual sexual content, used to harass, threaten and intimidate female candidates, frequently relying on narratives challenging their competence, credibility and moral integrity, thereby discouraging women’s political participation and undermining trust in democratic institutions; welcomes the AI Act’s targeted ban on ‘nudification’ applications and recalls that the DSA identifies gender-based violence and the protection of minors as a systemic risk; calls on the Commission to include in the forthcoming recommendations on safety in politics specific provisions regarding the monitoring, prevention and countering of disinformation campaigns specifically targeting female candidates;

Removed71. Calls on the Commission to raise its level of ambition with regard to reforming the ECNE, including by reviewing its resources and permanent staff and by further developing the joint mechanism for electoral resilience; stresses the importance of implementing concrete measures to strengthen the involvement of candidate countries in the ECNE’s operations; calls on the Commission, within the framework of the ECNE, to establish a permanent monitoring group responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the EU, and the forthcoming recommendations on the safety of political actors; considers that such a monitoring group should also be mandated to develop proposals for future updates of these recommendations;

Added106. Condemns fraudulent advertisements that impersonate and misappropriate the identity of politicians, political candidates and other public figures; warns that, although the primary purpose of such scams is often financial gain, the unauthorised use of a public figure’s image and likeness manufactured to falsely suggest authenticity or endorsement may cause reputational harm, contributing to the erosion of the boundary between authentic information and fabricated content, and further undermines public trust in democratic processes and political actors; calls on the Commission and the Member States to investigate the compliance of online platforms as regards their processes for removing illegal advertisements;

Removed72. Calls on the Commission to include Parliament and the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (APPF) as permanent partners in all meetings of the ECNE;

Added107. Underlines the key role of ECNE in promoting the exchange of best practice in electoral resilience across the EU and its Member States, while noting ECNE’s current limitations and welcoming the Commission’s commitment to strengthening it; calls for an ambitious reform of ECNE, including a review of its resources and staffing, further development of the joint mechanism for electoral resilience and the stronger involvement of candidate countries; calls on the Commission, within the ECNE framework, to establish a permanent monitoring group responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the EU and the forthcoming recommendations on the safety of political actors; considers that such a monitoring group should also be mandated to develop proposals for future updates of these recommendations; further calls for Parliament and the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (APPF) to be included as permanent partners in all ECNE meetings;

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Changed73.108. WelcomesStresses that electoral infrastructure is a fundamental component of the EU’s democratic resilience and must be effectively protected against growing threats of a physical and cyber nature; welcomes the Commission’s objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; calls on the Commission to complement these efforts with a targeted revision of the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive, with a view to including electoral infrastructure in the Directive’sdirective’s list of essential public administration services; asks the Commission to ensure that this inclusion is then echoed in the NIS 2 Directive and ENISA guidelines;

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Changed74.109. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the issue of foreign actors’ involvement in the party political landscape in Europe; notesnotes, with concernconcern, various examples of non-EU-countrynon-EU fundingcountries offunding extremist movements within the EU; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; stresses,is concerned by continued deficiencies with the functioning registers of ultimate beneficial owners in particular,the Member States, including the needquality of data or risk of overly restricted access, for persons with legitimate interests such as journalists or civil society organisations; urges Member States to combatfully covertand faithfully transpose the Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which harmonises the rules on access to beneficial ownership registers; further stresses that political communication,advertising includingand opaquepolitical fundingcommunication structuresin the online environment must be fully transparent regarding the identity of the sponsor and hiddenthe sponsors,source of funding, in orderaccordance with EU transparency rules; calls for the rigorous enforcement of existing measures to safeguardprevent democraticthe integrityuse of proxy financing in politics; underlines the importance of effective EU-wide monitoring and cooperation among authorities to ensure compliance with transparency obligations; invites, in this sense, the Commission and the Member States to look into the options available for citizens;improving cooperation between the anti-corruption authorities and the independent election commissions in the Member States;

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Changed75.110. NotesNotes, with concernconcern, the growing evidence of foreign interference and espionage within Europe’stargeting political system;institutions welcomesand theprocesses investigativeat effortsboth acrossEU theand Member StatesState thatlevel; havewelcomes ledthe investigations in several Member States leading to convictions and ongoing proceedings relatedcases toinvolving bribery, espionage and the promotion of foreign stateinfluence interests;activities; underlines the serious risks posed by inadequateinsufficient safeguards in the recruitment of staff and associates with close links to authoritarian regimes; stresses that protecting the integrity and functioning of the EU institutions requires robust measures against espionage and infiltration; further highlights the need to investigate the serious and evolving allegations that Hungarian officials, acting under the previous Fidesz-led Hungarian Government, conducted espionage activities targeting the EU institutions, including reports that sensitive information from EU meetings was shared with Russian counterparts, raising concerns about breaches of confidentiality, intelligence leakage and the integrity of EU decision-making processes;