Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Removed25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users;

Added31. Urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support EU tech start-ups and value-driven European alternatives, based on fair remuneration, such as those emerging in the Netherlands, to reduce strategic dependencies; welcomes the Commission’s EU Open Source strategy; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, fundamental rights, freedom of expression and democratic accountability;

Removed26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space;

Added32. Underlines that advertising and revenue-sharing practices may incentivise the spread of manipulative or harmful content, undermine electoral integrity and lead to the emergence of new disinformation actors and networks; recalls that disinformation cannot be demonetised without existing monetisation practices being sufficiently transparent; calls on the Commission, the EU digital regulators, the national competent authorities and online platforms to work together to detect and prevent illicit financing and ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes, advertising policies and other monetisation services that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctioned entities to earn income or other benefits; calls on platforms to publicly disclose renumeration flows and their beneficiaries, at least once a year; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; considers the monetisation of content from sanctioned entities to be a systemic risk, requiring swift corrective action such as suspending revenue-sharing; underlines that genuine creators and media outlets should be compensated for their losses in cases of erroneous or unfair demonetisation; is concerned by the gradual rollback of corporate commitments to internet freedom initiatives;

Added33. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority, which are indicative of wider concerns across the EU, indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the AI Office to investigate whether such practices breach applicable law, especially the AI Act, and to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the application of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI;

AddedFreedom of expression

Added34. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights the fact that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU and attract European customers share a responsibility to respect and safeguard those protections; therefore underlines that VLOPs and VLOSEs must acknowledge and effectively address the broader societal and democratic consequences of their services, including through robust systemic risk assessment and mitigation measures, in accordance with Union law; notes, in this regard, that the amplification of certain content or opinions, and the silencing of others, may constitute a systemic risk to civic discourse and electoral processes or a breach of freedom of expression, in particular the freedom to freely receive and impart information and ideas; calls on the Commission to ensure that platforms are held accountable in this regard under the DSA; underlines, in this context, that the EU must continue to actively counter false narratives that claim that its digital and democratic legislation undermines freedom of expression; stresses that freedom of expression and information has been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibits inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagement, and automated software programs performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; further emphasises that the commitment to freedom of expression must not be used as a pretext for tolerating illegal content or the hybrid operations of authoritarian regimes that aim to destabilise the EU and its democratic processes;

Added35. Recalls that online platforms play an essential role in enabling open public debate, journalistic activity and political pluralism; recognises, therefore, the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge the content moderation and monetisation decisions of platforms, including before administrative and judicial authorities, and to enforce the obligations of online platforms to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; underlines, in this context, the importance of ensuring access to high-quality content moderation in all EU languages; recalls the obligation under the DSA for online platforms to provide full transparency and a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose and to ensure that notice, reporting and the possibility of redress remain easy to access and user-friendly; notes that not all online platforms have implemented such mechanisms in accordance with the provisions of the DSA and urges the Commission and the Member States to complete enforcement actions; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space;

Media and information integrity

Change 16

Changed27.36. Takes the view that measures to promote freeand support free, credible and editorially independent media, including media at local and regional level, are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes,further stresses that safeguarding the media sector from political, economic or structural capture is a precondition for ensuring democratic resilience; notes that protecting independent media is vital for countering hybrid threats from hostile actors; further observes, in this regard,context, that the ground-breakingcurrent digital information environment often disadvantages media actors that assume editorial responsibility and public-interest obligations in favour of intermediaries that do not bear comparable duties; welcomes the groundbreaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; reminds Member States of the obligations in the regulation to protect media from undue media market concentrations; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance of the EMFA can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practicepractice; andcalls thereforeon stressesthe Member States to swiftly implement the importanceEMFA and on the Commission to ensure robust enforcement of strictits enforcement;provisions, including taking action when obligations, in particular those of VLOPs aimed at protecting editorial content from undue removal or restriction of visibility, are not respected; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programmeprogramme and calls onfor matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; further highlights that the financing crisis facing European media points to the need to explore new funding solutions;

Change 17

Changed28.37. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislationinitiatives on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding themedia sustainabilitypluralism and viabilityto the sustainability of media companies’ business models; calls for evidence-based impact assessments and the appropriate consultation of media stakeholders ahead of initiatives that may affect the viability of European media companies; stresses, in this context, the importance of monitoring developments affecting media freedom and pluralism across the EU, and considers the annual rule of law report, with its chapter on media freedom and media pluralism, as a central tool in this endeavour; calls on the Commission to further develop this pillar of the report to better capture emerging challenges;

Change 18

Changed29.38. Underlines, in the context of media companies sellingoffering subscriptions via apps, the importance of the full implementation and effective enforcement of the DMA; notes in this regard the Commission’s non-compliance decision of 23 April 2025 with regard to Apple and Meta;Meta, notesas thewell Commission’sas ongoing investigations into a potential breach of the DMA by Google in demoting media publishers’ content in search results; stresses that robust and timely enforcement of the DMA is essential to ensure fairness, contestability and pluralism in the EU’s digital environment and to address structural dependencies and market concentration, including in the context of AI-driven services;

Change 19

Changed30.39. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication includes new support actions on promoting digital and media literacy, such as the Media Resilience Programme,programme, the Basicbasic Skillsskills Supportsupport Schemescheme for schools, and the strengthening of the media literacy expert group, including the setting up of a new expert network for media literacy, and updated guidelines for teachers and educators; points out that current media literacy initiatives remain fragmented across the EU; calls for more coherent, EU-wide approaches and for complementary measures to be explored, including the creation of digital tools and platforms at EU level; encourages the systematic exchange of best practice between national authorities, including through the reinforced media literacy expert group and EDMO; further highlights the role of cultural education in strengthening democratic literacy and resilience to disinformation; underlines that the upcoming revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive should strengthen the provisions on minimum requirements for Member States’ work on media literacy; stresses the importance of fostering a critical understanding of AI-generated content, as part of broader media and digital literacy efforts;

Change 20

Removed31. Welcomes the announced update of the Commission recommendation on the safety of journalists52 and the forthcoming review of the Anti-SLAPP recommendation53; underlines that these updates and reviews must take into account how threats, violence, sabotage and other actions aimed at hindering journalistic work impact the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the EU;

Added40. Welcomes the announced update of the Commission recommendation on the safety of journalists and the forthcoming review of the Anti-SLAPP Recommendation; underlines that these updates and reviews must take into account the evolving and recurring nature of threats, violence, sabotage and other actions aimed at hindering journalistic work, including emerging challenges, for example, identity thefts and coordinated deepfake campaigns, which may undermine journalists’ safety and independence; stresses that particular attention should be paid to the chilling effects created by sustained climates of fear, political pressure or undue interference by public or private actors; calls on the Member States, in accordance with their national legal frameworks and established practices, to consider introducing specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities; further notes the potential relevance of developing support measures to assist journalists in dealing with emerging issues such as AI-driven impersonation and deepfake content;

Change 21

Changed32.41. Stresses the importance of protecting journalists from abusive lawsuits; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the Anti-SLAPP Directive54Directive and the announced update of the mandate and composition of the expert group against SLAPPs; calls on the Member States to be ambitious in the ongoing implementation process and on the Commission to keepcontinue providing support;support to ensure full and timely implementation of the directive as a matter of priority; calls on the Commission to draft a comprehensive evaluation report on the effectiveness of the implementation; further invites the EU and the Member States to consider additional measures to complement the directive in order to protect journalists engaged in investigative work, especially in cross-border or sensitive contexts; underlines, in this context, the ongoing discussion on the establishment of a European protection status for investigative journalists as a possible avenue to explore;

Change 22

Removed33. Welcomes the provisional agreement on the Foreign Direct Investment Regulation55, in particular the provisions that include the media sector as a factor to be considered when determining whether an investment is likely to negatively affect security or public order; regrets, however, that the media sector is not listed within the mandatory scope in the Annex to the Regulation;

Added42. Recognises the essential role of public service media in ensuring that all citizens, including those in remote and minority communities and candidate countries, have access to reliable, impartial and diverse news across multiple platforms, formats and languages, thereby contributing to the fight against news desertification; further stresses that access to quality and reliable information is essential in the fight against misinformation and disinformation; reaffirms that safeguarding public service media from political interference and capture is fundamental to preserving democratic accountability and the rule of law, stresses that the credibility of public service media depends on full editorial and organisational autonomy in accordance with Article 5 EMFA, and invites the Commission to actively monitor threats to the independence of public service media and to take effective measures against practices that compromise media freedom; notes, in this context, that attempts to undermine the independence of public service media can be early indicators of democratic backsliding;

Removed34. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to carefully analyse the consequences of the US administration’s shift in aid policy in the context of media pluralism and independent journalism and, if necessary, to act to fill the void left in media markets both within the EU and in the bordering regions; welcomes the EU emergency funding provided to RFE/RL; calls for the development of a solution to provide RFE/RL with stable, long-term funding;

Added43. Strongly emphasises the need to guarantee the highest level of protection for journalists and other media actors from illegal spyware, intrusive surveillance technologies and other forms of digital threats; recalls that the EMFA strictly prohibits the Member States from deploying intrusive surveillance software on any material, digital device, machine or tool used by media service providers or their editorial staff, with the exception of national security cases; further stresses that the surveillance of journalists constitutes interference with the rights guaranteed under Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; notes that the use of spyware undermines journalists’ work by eroding their sources’ trust in them, and that the failure to effectively enforce EU legislation poses a serious threat to freedom of information;

Removed35. Underlines that society-based fact-checking networks can play a role in detecting and combating disinformation campaigns and provide valuable insights for DSA risk assessments; notes that independent fact-checking organisations need stable conditions in which to operate; considers that the European Network of Fact-Checkers, announced by the Commission in 2025, could be a tool for achieving this; stresses that, to be credible and effective, fact-checking organisations must uphold strict standards of political neutrality, independence and methodological objectivity;

Added44. Reaffirms the importance of transparency, fair competition and the sustainability of European editorial media within the existing legal framework, including the DSA, the DMA, the EMFA and the TTPA; notes that these instruments address manipulation, foreign interference and anticompetitive practices while safeguarding editorial responsibility and free expression; calls on the Commission to assess how these instruments can best be used for these purposes; urges VLOPs and VLOSEs not to unjustifiably delist, demote or otherwise interfere with the visibility and fair ranking of lawful European editorial media content, and to ensure transparent and non-discriminatory ranking systems;

RemovedCivil society

Added45. Calls on the Commission to further study and, where relevant, consider measures to improve competitiveness, accessibility and fairness in online advertising for all value chain players, including editorial media; notes that editorially independent, high-quality and fact-based journalism faces challenges from engagement-driven recommender systems and AI-based search features of VLOPs, which reduce the visibility of high-quality content and limit traffic to media websites; notes, with concern, that traffic numbers correlating with the roll-out of Google AI-summaries have declined – up to 70 % in one measured case; encourages incentives for advertisers to support trusted European media, the use of contextual advertising instead of behavioural targeting, and stronger traceability and transparency in the online advertising supply chain to address market distortions and prevent malicious actors monetising disinformation content and purposefully destabilising society in the EU; calls on the Commission, in this context, to assess possible measures to boost the development and uptake of European infrastructure for contextual online advertising;

Removed36. Stresses the crucial role that civil society plays in defending our democracy, not only in acting as a watchdog by exposing and actively combating foreign attempts to interfere with democratic processes, but also in serving as a fundamental force in the long-term effort to build stronger and more resilient societies; underlines, in particular, the important role of civil society in upholding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

Added46. Welcomes the recently adopted Foreign Direct Investment Regulation, in particular the provisions that include the media sector as a factor to be considered when determining whether an investment is likely to negatively affect security or public order; regrets, however, that the media sector is not listed within the mandatory scope in the annex to the regulation; stresses, in this context, the need for more transparency of investment in European news outlets; further points out that EU-based audiovisual media are subject to stricter requirements than media based outside the EU that are available to EU audiences through other means of distribution; stresses the importance of ensuring that media that are accessible to EU audiences respect fair and pluralistic information standards;

Removed37. Welcomes the Commission’s EU Strategy for Civil Society, published alongside the communication on the European Democracy Shield; welcomes the Commission’s approach of linking this strategy to its work on the Shield, as a tool to further bolster civic engagement;

Added47. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to carefully analyse the consequences of the US administration’s shift in aid policy in the context of media pluralism and independent journalism and, if necessary, to act to fill the void left in media markets both within the EU and in the bordering regions, including via the use of Global Europe; welcomes the EU emergency funding provided to RFE/RL; calls for the development of a solution to provide RFE/RL with stable, long-term funding; invites the Commission to explore new ways of supporting free and editorially independent media in the EU neighbourhood, particularly in regions disproportionately affected by Russian disinformation and propaganda such as the Western Balkans;

Removed38. Calls on the Commission to strengthen its work on civil dialogue and to establish new tools for this purpose; welcomes, in this context, the Commission’s commitment to establishing an operational Civil Society Platform by 2026 to support a more systematic approach that will be used to strengthen dialogue in line with the EU’s values; considers that the announced online Knowledge Hub on Civic Space may contribute to the coordination of the activities of civil society organisations in the area of protecting democracy and countering hybrid threats and FIMI, and improve situational awareness;

Added48. Underlines that society-based independent fact-checking networks can play a role in detecting and combating disinformation campaigns and provide valuable insights for DSA risk assessments and mitigation; notes that independent fact-checking organisations need technical support and stable conditions in which to operate; considers that the European Network of Fact-Checkers, announced by the Commission in 2025, could serve as a valuable tool to achieve this; stresses that, to be credible and effective, fact-checking organisations must uphold strict standards of political neutrality, independence from online platform providers, and methodological objectivity; emphasises the importance of collaboration between fact-checkers, OSINT researchers, journalists, communicators and policymakers; further underlines the importance of supporting networks of fact-checkers in candidate and potential candidate countries;

Removed39. Stresses the importance of concrete funding programmes such as the CERV programme; welcomes the Commission’s idea of maintaining the CERV programme and incorporating it into the new AgoraEU programme for 2028-2034; calls on the Commission to ensure that the funding for this strand of AgoraEU meets the needs of civil society organisations and is implemented under the direct management of the Commission;

AddedCivil society, academia, culture and civic participation

Removed40. Underlines the need for increased financial transparency regarding the funding of civil society organisations in general, and in the context of support from non-EU countries in particular; recalls that civil society organisations can be, and have been, used as tools by malicious non-EU-country actors to illegitimately influence democratic processes in the EU and its Member States; stresses that as an institution Parliament has a special responsibility to contribute to reforms in this area, in the light of the so-called Qatargate scandal; highlights, however, that measures to address this issue should be designed in a way that prevents them from being misused to stigmatise the legitimate activities of civil society as such;

Added49. Stresses the crucial role that active, vibrant and independent civil society plays as one of the core pillars in defending our democracy, not only in acting as a watchdog by exposing and actively combating malicious interference in democratic processes, but also in serving as a fundamental force in the long-term effort to build stronger and more resilient societies; underlines, in particular, the important role of civil society in upholding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

Removed41. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed directive on interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries as an important part of the Defence of Democracy package, aiming to lay down harmonised requirements for economic activities relating to interest representation carried out on behalf of a third-country entity; stresses that common rules in this regard would constitute an important building block in terms of transparency regarding non-EU-country influence; calls on the co-legislators to finalise the legislative process without delay;

Added50. Welcomes the Commission’s EU Strategy for Civil Society, published alongside the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield; welcomes the Commission’s approach of linking this strategy to its work on the European Democracy Shield, as a tool to further bolster civic engagement; considers the strategy an important first step, as it represents the EU’s first comprehensive approach to civil society, while noting the need for the next steps to include a more ambitious approach, encompassing measures to effectively safeguard the role of civil society in democratic processes; highlights that future initiatives in this area should address the shrinking of civic space, while also recognising that civil society organisations and human rights defenders are particularly vulnerable, and emphasises that this is especially true for organisations working on specific topics, such as LGBTIQ+, gender equality and anti-racism issues;

Removed42. Underlines the importance of citizens’ engagement in democratic processes; urges the Commission to ensure, in cooperation with the Member States, the clear and effective communication of the initiatives it develops to promote and enhance the use of its citizen engagement tools; welcomes the Commission’s strengthening of such tools, notably the European Citizens’ Initiative, the European Citizens’ Panels and the Citizens’ Engagement Platform, and the proposal to strengthen the network of national authorities on citizen participation;

Added51. Calls on the Commission to strengthen its work on civil dialogue and to establish new tools for this purpose; welcomes, in this context, the Commission’s commitment to establishing an operational Civil Society Platform by 2026 to support a more systematic approach that will be used to strengthen dialogue in line with the EU’s values; considers that the announced online Knowledge Hub on Civic Space may contribute to the coordination of the activities of civil society organisations in the area of protecting democracy and countering hybrid threats, FIMI and transnational repression as well as improving situational awareness; underlines, in this context, the importance of diaspora-focused civic engagement; recalls, furthermore, that parts of civil society have extensive experience with foreign interference and should, within the context of civil dialogue, be involved in shaping policy to address it;

Added52. Highlights the role and responsibility that civil society has shouldered in democratic processes in candidate countries; calls on the Commission to liaise, where possible, with civil society organisations from candidate and potential candidate countries on current and future initiatives of the EU Strategy for Civil Society, particularly those organisations consistently engaged in fostering digital alignment, information integrity, election integrity and democratic resilience;

Added53. Calls on the Member States to ensure sustainable and diversified funding, including stable operating support and capacity-building measures, for civil society organisations, recognising their essential role in upholding democratic values and enabling them to operate effectively and independently; stresses the importance of concrete EU funding programmes to complement these efforts, such as the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme; and welcomes the Commission’s intention to maintain the CERV programme by incorporating it into the new AgoraEU programme for 2028-2034; calls on the co-legislators to ensure ambitious and predictable funding for this strand of AgoraEU, which meets the needs of civil society organisations and is implemented under the direct management of the Commission;

Added54. Emphasises that culture constitutes a strategic pillar of the European project, as cultural freedom, heritage and creativity foster democratic participation, critical thinking and trust in institutions; highlights the fact that programmes such as AgoraEU can play a key role in translating these values into tangible support; notes, with concern, that attacks on liberal democracy are increasingly targeting cultural actors and institutions, in particular through various forms of political pressure; underlines, therefore, that safeguarding artistic freedom and cultural institutions is essential to the defence of democracy in the EU;

Added55. Emphasises the importance of preserving Europe’s cultural history and collective memory and of countering the manipulation and falsification of historical facts, in order to strengthen democratic resilience; underlines, in this regard, the need to reinforce a common European culture of remembrance and reiterates its support for a pan-European memorial to the victims of 20th-century totalitarian regimes, as well as for a Commission report on European remembrance by early 2027; condemns the Russian regime’s historical revisionism and its use of distorted narratives to deny the sovereignty of formerly subjugated nations and to justify external interference;

Added56. Recalls that different interest representative actors, including civil society organisations, think tanks and umbrella organisations can be, and have been, used as tools by malicious non-EU-country actors to illegitimately influence democratic processes in the EU and its Member States; emphasises that financial transparency measures, if appropriately designed and with safeguards taking into account the size of organisations, can help mitigate the risk of future undue influence from authoritarian states; stresses that, as an institution, Parliament bears particular responsibility for strengthening integrity, transparency and accountability standards in the light of lessons learned from past cases of corruption and foreign interference; highlights, however, that measures to address this issue should be designed in a way that prevents them from being misused to stigmatise the legitimate activities of civil society and their decisive role in strengthening our democracies;

Added57. Highlights the importance of the Commission’s proposed directive on interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries as a central part of the Defence of Democracy package, aiming to lay down harmonised requirements for economic activities relating to interest representation carried out on behalf of third-country entities; stresses that common rules in this regard can contribute to accountability and trust in EU decision-making by introducing transparency with regard to the influence of non-EU countries; calls on the co-legislators to finalise the legislative process without delay; underlines that the Member States should ensure that compliance with this directive should not lead to any restriction of fundamental rights;

Added58. Underlines the importance of citizens’ engagement in democratic processes; urges the Commission to ensure, in cooperation with the Member States, the clear and effective communication of the initiatives it develops to promote and enhance the use of citizen engagement tools that are accessible, user-friendly, multilingual and capable of reaching citizens at scale; welcomes the Commission’s strengthening of such tools, notably the European Citizens’ Initiative, the European Citizens’ Panels and the Citizens’ Engagement Platform, and the proposal to strengthen the network of national authorities on citizen participation; highlights, in this context, the importance of actively engaging young people in democratic life, recognising that they are key actors in strengthening civic and political participation, including through the development of participatory digital platforms and youth councils to ensure meaningful involvement in decision-making processes at local, national and EU levels;

Added59. Stresses that academic freedom, including the freedom of research, teaching and scholarly expression, constitutes a fundamental pillar of democratic societies; condemns attacks on academic freedom and stresses the need to strengthen Europe’s research independence and resilience to foreign interference; warns, in particular, against the manipulation of history by external actors; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal protecting the fundamental freedom of scientific research, including minimum standards for researchers’ rights, ethical conduct, integrity and institutional independence, and supported by effective monitoring mechanisms;

Protecting critical infrastructure

Change 23

Changed43.60. Takes the position that protecting the EU and its Member States from both physical and digitalcyber acts of sabotage targeting critical infrastructure is a vital element in safeguarding democratic resilience; calls for a proactive strategy to deter threats, the adoption of robust preventive measures, strengthened cross-border cooperation and enhanced EU capacity to detect, deter and respond to such hostile activities; emphasises that foreign state-linked ownership of critical infrastructure increases exposure to security risks and warrants enhanced scrutiny, particularly in communications infrastructure, digital infrastructure, undersea cables, energy infrastructure, transport hubs, hospitals and public service infrastructure;

Change 24

Changed44.61. Strongly condemns escalatory drone and other airborne incursions targeting and interfering with critical infrastructure, including civil airports, ports, military basesbases, industrial hubs, border management infrastructure and energy facilities across the EU, in particular as perpetrated by Russia and Belarus; calls on the Member States to respond in a coordinated, unified and appropriate manner to any breach of their airspace, including throughby shooting down aircraft, drones and other airborne threats; urges the Commission and the Member States to work on knowledge transfer programmes with Ukraine and on the joint training and certification of drone pilots in the light of the knowledge acquired in Ukraine about the conduct of modern warfare;

Change 25

Removed45. Stresses that a range of hybrid activities which Russia has undertaken against the EU amount to state-sponsored terrorism, even if they fall under the threshold of an armed attack; underlines, therefore, the need to apply all available legal frameworks for combating terrorism to Russia’s hostile activities, which violate EU Member States’ territorial sovereignty, undermine the integrity of their institutions and directly threaten the safety of the civilian population; underlines that the EU must urgently transition from defence mode to active deterrence; urges the Member States to evaluate the legal and operational frameworks for proportionate offensive measures targeting the logistical and digital infrastructure behind Moscow’s destabilisation activities;

Added62. Emphasises the strategic role of EU agencies in ensuring the protection of cross-border critical infrastructure in the EU and its Member States, as well as the need to strengthen cooperation on seaports, airports and land border crossings, including through joint vulnerability assessments; draws particular attention to the threats of GPS jamming and spoofing conducted by Russia and Belarus and their potential to disrupt critical infrastructure operations, compromise navigational safety and undermine the continuity and resilience of essential cross-border services;

Removed46. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish a joint EU interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in order to ensure coordinated action against hybrid activities and sabotage in the EU’s maritime areas, notably in the Baltic Sea; considers that cross-border coordination can be further improved both at the operational and the financial level; stresses the need for the EU to step up its response to hybrid threats in maritime areas, including those posed by the Russian ‘shadow fleet’; underlines that addressing these challenges requires dedicated and sufficient EU funding;

Added63. Stresses that a range of hybrid activities that Russia has undertaken against the EU amount to state-sponsored terrorism, even if they fall under the threshold of an armed attack; underlines, therefore, the need to apply all available legal frameworks for combating terrorism to Russia’s hostile activities, which violate EU Member States’ territorial sovereignty, undermine the integrity of their institutions and directly threaten the safety of the civilian population; underlines that the EU must urgently transition from defence mode to active deterrence; urges the Member States to evaluate the legal and operational frameworks for proportionate offensive measures targeting the logistical and digital infrastructure behind Moscow’s destabilisation activities; notes that Russia is vulnerable to cyber operations, as the breach of Russia’s Aeroflot by Cyber Partisans has demonstrated; underlines Ukraine’s extensive experience in inflicting damage on Russian capabilities and the need to accelerate support for Ukraine in strengthening its offensive cyber capabilities;

Removed47. Notes with concern the existing structural dependencies, through market concentration and foreign control, in the EU’s digital infrastructure, including operating systems, data centres, semiconductors, AI, cybersecurity, cloud computing and various digital platforms and services, all of which pose a high risk to democracy, freedom and security within the EU, and to the EU’s competitiveness; calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish, as a foundational layer, a sovereign EU digital infrastructure with privacy-preserving technologies and an EU application programming interface (API) ecosystem through ambitious, targeted policies that enhance investment in and the market share of EU companies, leveraging the European supply of clean energy in the development of data centres and cloud infrastructure, including through market-driven initiatives such as joint ventures or federated networks in areas such as AI gigafactories or cloud services;

Added64. Emphasises that cross-border coordination in countering hybrid threats in maritime areas should be further strengthened, underpinned by dedicated and adequate EU funding, and that the EU must step up its operational response, particularly to threats linked to the Russian shadow fleet; calls, in this context, on the Commission and the Member States to establish a coordinated, EU-wide interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in order to ensure coherent action against hybrid activities, acts of sabotage, unreported illegal and unregulated fishing and violations of sovereign rights in the EU’s maritime areas, notably in the Baltic Sea, while recalling UNCLOS’s objective of ensuring the peaceful use of the seas; welcomes, furthermore, the Commission recommendation on secure and resilient submarine cable infrastructures and the EU action plan on cable security; urges the Commission and the Member States to accelerate the implementation of these initiatives by mapping cable infrastructure, developing coordinated risk assessments and stress tests, deploying mitigation measures, and strengthening incident response and repair capacity, including by supporting modular repair equipment and maintaining strategic stockpiles of essential spare parts;

Removed48. Highlights the need to ensure greater integration between digital infrastructure, cybersecurity and defence policy to advance the strategic autonomy of the EU, and the need to leverage dual-use infrastructure, such as resilient data centres scattered across the EU, to ensure operational continuity in the face of hybrid or wartime threats; highlights, further, the need to increase investments in military mobility and secure communications, including the urgent and prioritised deployment of space-based capabilities such as IRIS², to provide encrypted services for public and defence use;

Added65. Calls for the effective criminalisation and deterrence of hybrid activities and acts of sabotage, including attack on undersea cables and connectors; encourages the Commission and the Member States to learn from the Australian example of establishing ‘cable protection zones’, providing legal safeguards and criminalising damage to submarine cables beyond the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit, accompanied by active monitoring, surveillance and response in cooperation with relevant third-country partners;

Removed49. Stresses that cybersecurity frameworks such as the NIS2 Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act56 and the Cyber Solidarity Act57 must work in alignment to support secure-by-design standards and avoid regulatory fragmentation; calls, in this context, for a revision of relevant legislation in the field of cybersecurity, and underlines the need to strengthen existing structures, such as ENISA and the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre;

Added66. Encourages the Member States to explore the use of the mandate of the proliferation security initiative in order to board vessels linked to such shadow fleets, and calls on the Financial Action Task Force to play a more active role in scrutinising flag-registry governance within its mutual evaluation and greylisting processes;

Removed50. Recalls the low level of transposition of the NIS2 Directive; regrets that following the deadline of 17 October 2024, the Commission had to send letters of formal notice to as many as 23 Member States for failing to fully transpose the Directive; urgently calls on the Member States to finalise the transposition of the Directive as soon as possible, given that, at the end of 2025, more than one year after the deadline, the Directive was yet to be transposed by 10 Member States; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s pledge to work closely with the Member States to ensure the swift and coherent implementation of the horizontal cybersecurity framework set out in the NIS2 Directive, as well as the Cyber Resilience Act and the Cyber Solidarity Act, as stipulated in the ProtectEU internal security strategy;