Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

AddedCT. whereas effective civilian and defence preparedness requires a comprehensive, whole-of-society, whole-of-government and all-hazards approach that facilitates the cooperation and integration of the national authorities of the Member States with the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, as well as businesses, academia, civil society and individual citizens; whereas the European Democracy Shield is a unique opportunity to establish this approach; whereas this effort needs to be accompanied by long-term investment that realistically matches the scale of the challenge, as well as effective coordinated deployment of funds, strategic foresight and the embedding of resilience into policymaking, infrastructure development, education systems and supply chains; whereas EU defence and preparedness initiatives should be aligned and work in synergy;

RemovedBK. whereas technological sovereignty and secure digital ecosystems, including projects such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communication System, are key to maintaining control over essential communication channels and strengthening critical infrastructure;

AddedCU. whereas empowering citizens through knowledge, education, media and digital literacy, critical thinking and access to reliable information is key to societal resilience, ensuring that all citizens can anticipate risks, recognise manipulation, respond appropriately during emergencies and actively contribute to the collective resilience of democratic societies; whereas terrestrial broadcast radio is present across the EU and provides a reliable and stable means to inform citizens in the event of human-induced or natural disasters, particularly outages of the internet and other communication tools; whereas preparedness must include practical tools such as an EU-wide crisis alert app, a household preparedness booklet, and wide-reaching awareness campaigns promoting self-sufficiency and crisis readiness for people of all ages and social backgrounds;

RemovedBL. whereas preparedness depends on seamless cooperation between EU institutions, agencies, Member States and international partners, supported by joint exercises and training, shared situational awareness platforms and rapid information exchange;

AddedCV. whereas civil-military cooperation, dual-use capabilities and the integration of preparedness into educational programmes, along with practical skills and knowledge in the field of civil defence, are essential for enhancing defence readiness through targeted training not only for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers and public servants, but also civil society actors and the public at large; whereas there is a need to promote civic responsibility, threat awareness and an understanding of the role of citizens in ensuring security;

RemovedBM. whereas building credible resilience and achieving a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness requires massive investment, boosting Europe’s technological and industrial base and reducing strategic dependencies; whereas this effort requires the exploration of new targeted funding mechanisms;

AddedCW. whereas technological sovereignty and secure digital ecosystems, including projects such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communication System, are key to maintaining control over essential communication channels and strengthening critical infrastructure; whereas European telecommunications companies have been targets of cyberespionage, as confirmed by the recent examples attributed to China-linked group Salt Typhoon; whereas the telecommunications sector, as a cornerstone of these ecosystems, requires robust cybersecurity and resilience measures to remain secure and operational;

AddedCX. whereas preparedness depends on seamless cooperation between the EU institutions, agencies, Member States and like-minded international partners, supported by joint exercises and training, shared situational awareness platforms and rapid information exchange; whereas Taiwan, a leading partner in terms of situational awareness, has been organising extensive civil defence and resilience exercises aiming to combat China’s increasing grey-zone warfare tactics, complementing its military drills; whereas Taiwan’s whole-of-society approach and best practice can contribute to developing the concept of preparedness in the EU, and strengthening shared situational awareness, early-warning capacities and the overall effectiveness of the European Democracy Shield;

AddedCY. whereas building credible resilience and achieving a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness requires massive investment, boosting Europe’s technological and industrial base and reducing strategic dependencies, particularly in the digital field; whereas this effort requires the exploration of new targeted funding mechanisms;

Introduction

Change 6

Changed1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy fromamid externalan threats,ever-evolving threat landscape and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the Europeanvalues wayenshrined in Article 2 TEU; takes the view that the measures set out in the communication do not fully reflect the level of life,ambition, foresight and capacity required and should be further developed and progressively strengthened over time, with a view to ensuring the ruleeffective establishment of lawrobust and binding actions to protect democracy, in line with the scale of the challenges identified, while respecting the EU’s Treaty-based division of powers; stresses that soft policy measures are often insufficient where democratic values enshrinedare deliberately undermined and that the fight against foreign interference, hybrid threats and disinformation requires ambition and strong action; takes the position that the credibility of the European Democracy Shield also depends on the will and determination to enforce existing EU legislation of relevance to the defence of democracy; recalls, furthermore, that the fragmentation of the EU remains a vulnerability in Articlethe 2defence TEU;of democracy;

Change 7

Changed2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape facedundermining bydemocratic processes and institutions in the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors;actors and their proxies in the EU; stresses that thesehybrid arewarfare hostilegoes actionsbeyond thatcyber undermineor information attacks alone, and encompasses the democraticeconomic, foundationstechnological and societal dimensions of thestrategic EUconfrontation; byunderlines fomentingthat division,this diminishingreality publicis trustshared inby institutionsmany andof exploitingthe societalEU’s vulnerabilities,like-minded frequentlypartners leveragingin advancedits digitalneighbourhood technologies;and worldwide;

Change 8

Removed3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy;

Added3. Emphasises that social cohesion and trust in public institutions constitute cornerstones of democratic resilience; stresses that weaknesses in the rule of law, notably in areas such as judicial independence, media pluralism and the effectiveness of anti-corruption frameworks, risk undermining public confidence and being instrumentalised by both internal and external actors with a view to weakening democratic consensus and exacerbating societal polarisation; highlights the need for a comprehensive approach aimed at addressing concerns relating to the rule of law and reinforcing social cohesion, democratic legitimacy and societal trust across the EU and its Member States; further recalls that strengthening the rule of law in candidate countries is key to supporting their alignment with EU values and enhancing overall European democratic resilience;

Removed4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF;

Added4. Considers Russia to be the primary external threat to Europe’s security and democratic integrity and reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the need for a comprehensive and forward-looking strategy to safeguard European democracy;

Added5. Insists that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent media and investigative journalism – must be sufficiently funded in the upcoming MFF; underscores that investment in democratic resilience is crucial for EU security, sovereignty and prosperity; expresses its support for the Commission’s commitment to mainstreaming democratic resilience across EU funding programmes; underlines, in that context, the need for various aspects of hybrid defence to be integrated into EU defence initiatives; stresses, however, that clear goals with measurable actions and outcomes are needed to use EU and national resources effectively and avoid waste or fragmented funding;

European Centre for Democratic Resilience

Change 9

Changed5.6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is fully operational in the course of 2026; notes, however, the lack of clarity regarding the timeline and concrete milestones for the progressive roll-out of the Centre, as the reference to a ‘gradual’ implementation based on the voluntary participation of Member States does not provide sufficient predictability, accountability or operational certainty; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly updateupdating and involveinvolving Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre;

Change 10

Changed6.7. RecallsRegrets, however, that the proposalCentre, lacksas sufficientset operationalout detail,in the proposal, lacks a clear budgetarymandate allocations,and empowerment through a specificlegal governanceact, structure,as well as dedicated budgetary resources and personnel, a concretespecific mandategovernance structure and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centreCentre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concernstresses that if the Centre remainsshould onlyadd value beyond existing structures and not become another hub, network, platform or framework among others thisothers, couldthus further reducereducing the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present,present andby addduplicating towork, theincreasing shortcomingsinstitutional identifiedambiguity, inexacerbating fragmentation and stretching budgets; firmly believes that the jointCentre communication,should includingserve reducedas reactiveness,an fragmentationaggregator and stretchedconsolidator budgets;of existing EU-level action by assisting, extending, complementing and, whenever feasible, coordinating national actions;

Change 11

Changed7.8. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions whichthat the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with the end of 2026 to be set as the deadline for suchthis integration; calls for thisthe integration to include relevantoperational DSAresponsibility supervisoryfor andan enforcementenhanced mechanisms,Rapid especiallyAlert System with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating effortscapacity to counteraddress information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert Systemin (RAS)real andtime, the maintenancedeployment and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, andthus further developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, theincluding by mapping platforms used to spread FIMI and disinformation, ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre has the capacity to assess coordinated attacks on information integrity; emphasises that the Centre must be equipped to trace, monitor and respond to foreign interference and hybrid threats, while ensuring all affiliated organisations remain independent, particularly of big tech;

Change 12

Changed8.9. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process bypropose proposing,as bya Q1next 2027,step a legal basisact for establishingthe establishment of the Centre as ana structurally autonomous EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; considers that the establishment of the Centre as a permanent structure by a legal act would represent a qualitative shift from fragmented coordination towards a more integrated, operational and strategic EU-level capacity; stresses that, to ensure coherent and timely action across the EU in view of rapidly changing realities, there should be an ambitious timeline for the establishment of the Centre by a legal act;

Change 13

Removed9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns;

Added10. Calls for the governance of the Centre to include representatives of each Member State; notes that the voluntary nature of Member State participation, as proposed in the Commission’s communication, risks perpetuating an inefficient and fragmented architecture with different levels of protection and responses to common threats faced across the EU; notes that a lack of governance with representation from all Member States risks an architecture that operates on the basis of a lowest common denominator;

Removed10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU;

Added11. Stresses that enhanced EU-level action to protect democracy must be accompanied by strong democratic oversight; calls on the Commission to report regularly to Parliament on the activities of the Centre, including its budgetary, operational and strategic dimensions; stresses that the Centre’s governance should include representatives of the European Parliament, strengthening its democratic legitimacy;

Removed11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap for Member State capacity development;

Added12. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate, decision-making mechanisms and competence to act, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting, analysing and combating FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform contributing to the establishment of common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone translating threat analysis and early warning into concrete, timely and evidence-based operational output and providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns, in close cooperation with national authorities and the relevant EU bodies; stresses the need for the Centre to have the capacity to act swiftly in crisis situations, particularly in the run-up to and during elections, in order to translate situational awareness into effective action; notes that the interference tactics of malign actors will evolve over time alongside technological progress and the Centre’s mandate should provide flexibility to enable it to address new challenges; stresses that the Centre must have a stable, multidisciplinary staff that includes FIMI analysts, open-source intelligence (OSINT) experts, and cybersecurity and financial tracking specialists, and must be authorised to coordinate cross-border task forces with the competent authorities of the Member States;

Removed12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity;

Added13. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre’s analytical and monitoring capacity is formally structured as a source of independent expert input into the systemic risk assessment processes established under the DSA, including with Digital Services Coordinators in each Member State, and under the EMFA, the TTPA and the Artificial Intelligence Act, by cooperating on the collection, preservation and analysis of evidence related to FIMI and disinformation, feeding directly into enforcement actions and by providing timely threat-intelligence reports, FIMI-pattern analyses and democracy-risk indicators, among others; stresses that the Centre’s role in these processes must remain advisory and analytical, so as to preserve the independence of regulatory decision-making; stresses that, where FIMI and disinformation activities undermine EU law, the Centre’s coordination role should ensure a direct link to bodies that have the power to initiate investigations and judicial proceedings; calls for relevant findings on systemic shortcomings or recurring vulnerabilities to be duly considered and reflected in the Commission’s annual rule of law report in dedicated subsections addressing disinformation and media integrity under the media pluralism and freedom pillar, and addressing electoral integrity and safeguards against undue influence under the checks and balances pillar; notes that the Centre could also contribute to the training of Digital Services Coordinators and the staff of national media regulators on the topic of FIMI and disinformation;

Removed13. Calls on the Commission to provide a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF;

Added14. Welcomes the concept of a stakeholder platform; notes, however, that its purpose, structure and added value remain insufficiently defined, including in relation to existing networks and initiatives; acknowledges the added value of input from civil society in the development of the Centre’s mandate; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre’s coordination encompasses existing efforts by civil society and academia through the proposed platform; insists that the Centre must also provide opportunities for connections and learning between governments and diverse stakeholders across borders;

Removed14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem;

Added15. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre’s mandate includes responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation and strengthening electoral integrity; notes that coordinated information manipulation campaigns often target the EU’s information space as a whole, thereby justifying a dedicated EU-level operational capacity to protect democratic processes beyond purely national contexts; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; stresses that working methods and data use must be fully interoperable between existing EU and national structures; underlines, in this respect, the need for common open-source methodologies, and effective collaboration across networks of actors including OSINT researchers, journalists, communicators and policymakers;

Added16. Calls on those Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions, with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap and evaluation process for Member State capacity development; underlines that such a process would provide a basis for gradually raising the level of ambition of the Centre;

Added17. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer dedicated EU funding under the present and upcoming MFFs and relevant EU programmes whenever they relate to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; calls on the Commission to avoid programming that disperses and fragments efforts, or that creates unsustainable, temporary, small-scale initiatives, but to focus on coordinated, strategic, scalable efforts that are sustainable for all actors involved;

Added18. Calls on the Commission to provide sufficient and predictable funding for the Centre and its activities, including sufficient staff and financial resources under the next MFF and a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; furthermore, calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF;

Added19. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations; takes the position that such a mechanism should include within its contributors large information society service providers whose activities represent a systemic risk to democratic integrity; stresses that any such mechanism must be accompanied by the strongest possible guarantees of independence and the total absence of conflicts of interest;

Digital resilience

Change 14

Changed15.20. Calls for the full implementation ofand keyeffective legislationenforcement inof the digitalentire space,digital-related EU acquis, including key legislation such as the DSA, the regulation on transparencyDMA, andthe targetingTTPA, ofthe politicalAI advertisingAct and the AI Act,EMFA, across all Member States;States takesand thein positionfull thatrespect theof continuedfundamental implementationrights; ofstresses digitalthat legislationrigorous, shouldconsistent, havesystematic aand strengthenedtimely focusenforcement onis counteringan onlineessential disinformation,pillar ensuringof informationEuropean integritydigital sovereignty and protectingdeterrence, democraticand discoursemust inbe electiona periods;precondition expressesfor concern,operating in this regard, thatthe delayedsingle guidelinesmarket; andurges technicalthe standardsCommission poseto anreport obstacleregularly toon the timelyenforcement implementationand ofapplication theof AIEU Act;law, welcomesnotably the factDSA, thatavoid excessive delays in itsinvestigations, proposedand Digitalimpose Omnibusstrong tosanctions simplifyfor AIpersistent legislationbreaches theby CommissionVLOPs seeksand toVLOSEs; addresstakes thisthe byposition linkingthat the continued implementation timelineof fordigital ruleslegislation should have a strengthened focus on high-riskcountering AIFIMI systemsand toonline thedisinformation, availabilityensuring ofinformation standardsintegrity orand otherprotecting supportdemocratic tools;discourse during and outside election periods;

Change 15

Removed16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it;

Added21. Expresses serious concern that the engagement-based recommendation systems of certain VLOPs often cause systemic risk to civic discourse and electoral processes, as they amplify divisive, polarising or misleading content, often fuelling disinformation from foreign and domestic actors, while disproportionately favouring sensationalist material over fact-based content; recalls that Articles 34 and 35 DSA oblige VLOPs to assess and mitigate such risks; maintains that effective risk mitigation measures should also ensure that synthetic or manipulated content, such as deepfakes, can be clearly distinguished from authentic material, and that editorially independent and pluralistic media and verified sources have due prominence; calls on the Commission to investigate compliance with DSA obligations in this regard and take appropriate measures, including imposing interim measures; suggests that such interim measures include the limitation of engagement-based recommender systems that pose systemic risk, where necessary; further calls on the Commission to promote greater transparency and accountability in the design of algorithmic recommendation and advertising systems, especially together with other algorithmic systems, in order to enhance user choice and ensure non-manipulative default settings, all while promoting freedom of expression and information; reminds VLOPs, in this context, of their obligation to mitigate systemic risks, which may include testing and adapting their algorithmic systems, including their recommender systems, and of their obligation to provide at least one option for each of their recommender systems which is not based on profiling, in line with Articles 35(1)(d) and 38 DSA; further calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Digital Services Coordinators and with the involvement of independent third parties through public consultations, to ensure that there are up-to-date guidelines for systemic risk mitigation, and to ensure consistent enforcement and a high level of protection against large-scale manipulation;

Removed17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse;

Added22. Condemns the targeted sanctions and attempts at coercion by the US administration against EU actors involved in shaping and enforcing the DSA and other digital regulations, in particular against a former commissioner; calls for the immediate lifting of these measures; urges the Commission and the Member States to resist such pressure, uphold EU legislation, and defend the right to self-governance and digital sovereignty; underlines that freedom of expression is a fundamental right in the EU and a core value shared with the United States and like-minded partners across the democratic world; stresses that political and trade considerations, as well as pressure from third countries or large technology companies, should not unduly influence the enforcement of EU digital legislation; stresses that decisions concerning the application of EU digital rules must be guided solely by EU law and the protection of democratic interests, and that the EU, as an open and rules-based single market, retains the sovereign right to regulate its economic activity in line with democratic values and international commitments; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the protective and redress mechanisms of EU digital legislation are shielded from any interference that could compromise their independence or effectiveness, and to establish robust safeguards against such risks;

Removed18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes;

Added23. Calls on the Commission to increase efforts to promote and align the DSA and other key EU digital legislative acts in candidate and potential candidate countries and ensure that these countries have the support, tools and guidance needed for the implementation of such laws, enabling gradual integration into relevant EU enforcement and cooperation mechanisms, where appropriate; stresses that efforts to demonetise disinformation should explicitly include candidate and potential candidate countries, in order to prevent regulatory loopholes and cross-border spillover effects; stresses the need to take particular note of trends observed in candidate and potential candidate countries when conducting election-related work under the Code of Conduct on Disinformation;

Removed19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources;

Added24. Notes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA as a Code of Conduct on Disinformation, becoming a relevant benchmark for determining DSA compliance regarding disinformation risks, to complement other effective mitigation measures by VLOPs and VLOSEs to address systemic risks to democratic processes; notes that the implications of potential non-compliance with the code vis-à-vis DSA compliance and enforcement could be further clarified; underlines that the code should remain a dynamic instrument that follows the latest trends and that the Commission should continue to oversee the effective implementation by the signatories; considers that the implementation of the DSA should address the coordinated inauthentic use of online platforms, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms, and artificial engagement and amplification creating the illusion of public support; considers these phenomena to be among the most serious risks to free, authentic and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; stresses that foreign authoritarian actors, in particular Russia, have developed disinformation playbooks whose effects have become increasingly visible during recent elections across Europe; calls urgently on all VLOPs and VLOSEs operating in the EU to fully adhere to the code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it;

Removed20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space;

Added25. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol, including clear processes for coordination between relevant authorities, to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should encourage the participation of online platforms and online search engines and should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; stresses the need for platforms to respond quickly and effectively through preventive and corrective measures against such interference, and for the authorities to react swiftly in cases of non-compliance, rather than relying on ex post measures and late enforcement; welcomes, in this context, Google’s proactive removal in 2025 of nearly 11 000 YouTube channels and accounts linked to state-backed propaganda from China, Russia, and other malicious actors, and urges all platforms to systematically address such threats;

Removed21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent;

Added26. Welcomes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million, as well as the Commission’s decision to start investigations of Grok AI’s integration into X and to expand existing investigations into X’s recommender systems; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations, including into Meta, particularly in the light of preliminary findings on breaches of transparency and user-protection obligations, and reports indicating persistent issues related to scam advertising and regulatory circumvention; stresses the need for enforcement action in cases of election interference, persistent algorithmic opacity and the large-scale proliferation of fake accounts and bot networks that distort public discourse; calls on the Commission, in this context, to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in relation to foreign interference in the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, which highlighted worrying possibilities of recommender systems and bot networks being exploited, and in relation to TikTok’s obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes and to ensure deterrence during electoral periods; further takes note of the Commission’s preliminary evaluation indicating that TikTok is in breach of the DSA for its addictive design;

Removed22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability;

Added27. Underlines the need for increased transparency regarding actors behind online content and accounts, particularly for advertising purposes; stresses that measures to combat coordinated inauthentic behaviour without abolishing anonymity online are essential to prevent FIMI, bot farms and covert political campaigning; invites the Commission to explore possible measures that would support online platforms in adopting proportionate steps to verify that a human is behind an account, thereby countering the activities of bot accounts; calls on platforms to prioritise the development of effective mechanisms to identify, scrutinise and, where necessary, suspend inauthentic accounts, especially those involved in coordinated influence operations; stresses that measures targeting inauthentic accounts must not undermine the ability to remain anonymous online, which is essential for protecting journalists, activists, marginalised communities and individuals in vulnerable situations (such as whistle-blowers, dissidents and political opponents of autocratic regimes), and should continue to allow space for satirical and humorous accounts;

Removed23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions‑listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA;

Added28. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to systematically investigate covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, included coordinated propaganda and narrative-laundering networks, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network and the explicit manipulation of Grok (xAI) and to expose these campaigns publicly in a way that does not promote their spread; highlights the importance of clarifying the exact obligations of providers and deployers in relation to the ‘AI-generated’ labelling requirements set out in Article 50 of the AI Act and the Code of Practice on Disinformation, and specifying to what extent end users and platforms are covered under this framework; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the AI Office to enhance its efforts to monitor the security landscape of AI models and help develop methodologies for AI, including LLMs, ensuring improved transparency and respect for personal integrity in the training of data sources;

Removed24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI;

Added29. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Belgian regulator, to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality, as was done with WhatsApp, with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA, and to take into consideration possible new evidence or changes in usage patterns; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation, extremism and terrorist content within the EU, as well as to clarify its possible links to Russian intelligence services and the security of its servers and data handling practices; stresses the need to take all available enforcement steps to ensure that Telegram fully complies with all applicable EU rules on transparency, content moderation and data access requirements, to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; strongly encourages Telegram, furthermore, to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation;

RemovedFreedom of speech

Added30. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to an assessment of the role of online influencers in the upcoming evaluation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive or as part of the forthcoming Digital Fairness Act; stresses, in this regard, the need for guidance and robust standards on transparency, including on platform-facilitated funding, remuneration and sponsorship arrangements, as well as on the distinction between advertised and organic content, and on information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and more transparent; suggests that ethical standards and obligations for journalists could serve as inspiration for preparing standards for influencers; calls further on the Commission to continue enforcing the TTPA, especially in relation to online platforms, and to facilitate compliance for influencers via the planned EU network of influencers;