Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

AddedAU. whereas funding for democratic resilience should be strengthened and used in a coordinated and effective manner aiming for maximum impact, while respecting the independence of the entities concerned; whereas the AgoraEU programme, proposed by the Commission for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), with a proposed budget of EUR 9 billion, constitutes an important step forward in strengthening EU support for culture, media and civil society;

RemovedAX. whereas the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union, published in December 2023, have yet to be fully implemented across all of the Member States, including the provisions aimed at strengthening cooperation between national authorities during and ahead of electoral processes through the establishment of national election networks;

AddedAV. whereas societies that invest effectively in human capital and education are among the most competitive, resilient and economically robust; whereas programmes such as Erasmus+ foster European values and strengthen youth democratic engagement and societal resilience across the EU;

RemovedAY. whereas the ECNE has played an increasingly important role in recent years, but currently lacks the resources and capacity needed to elevate its activities to the next level;

AddedAW. whereas malicious third-country actors have sought to interfere with and exert undue influence over Parliament, including through illicit lobbying and corrupt practices, as evidenced by cases such as the so-called ‘Qatargate’; whereas these developments underscore the need to further strengthen the resilience and integrity of the EU’s decision-making processes;

RemovedAZ. whereas candidate countries have been invited to participate in meetings of the ECNE; whereas in addition to such participation, there is still significant potential for further enhancing cooperation with these countries within the context of the network’s activities, to learn from each other’s experiences when encountering threats, and to exchange best practices in fighting these threats;

AddedAX. whereas the French Ministry of the Interior has published a report on the Muslim Brotherhood addressing concerns relating to covert influence activities and entryism; whereas similar concerns have also been raised regarding other religious actors, such as the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate);

RemovedBA. whereas there is a clear need to strengthen the protection of the electoral infrastructure and that of national political parties that have also been a target of cyberattacks, not least in light of the large-scale cyberattacks targeting the Romanian electoral authorities in autumn 2024;

AddedAY. whereas hybrid attacks targeting critical infrastructure in the EU have become more frequent than ever, with incidents linked to the same malicious third-country actors such as Russia, Belarus and China, but also Iran and North Korea; whereas in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment, the EU must also be prepared for hybrid threats originating from actors other than these; whereas these attacks often target essential systems, networks and facilities that are vital for society’s functioning, including in relation to public safety, security and economic stability; whereas such attacks take various shapes and forms, such as physical sabotage, arson attacks, espionage and signal jamming, as well as cyberattacks and other grey zone activities, all of which demonstrate a coordinated effort to test, disrupt and undermine the EU’s security and societal resilience; whereas such attacks demonstrate the need to urgently close vulnerabilities;

RemovedBB. whereas the covert funding of political parties and movements in the EU by non-EU countries poses a threat to the legitimacy of the democratic process;

AddedAZ. whereas attacks against railway infrastructure endanger the lives and safety of citizens and compromise strategic logistics networks, as in the unprecedented act of sabotage targeting Polish railway infrastructure on the strategic Warsaw-Lublin route, which was intended to cause a railway disaster and potentially result in multiple fatalities; whereas Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU) has directed a sustained campaign of physical sabotage operations across the EU Member States, including the 2014 explosion at ammunition depots in Vrbětice (Czechia) and the targeting of critical infrastructure in Lithuania by Cuban citizens who had recently been recruited for sabotage operations;

AddedBA. whereas the Baltic Sea has witnessed an unprecedented rise in the number of disruptions to submarine cables, which are vital for internet connectivity and power supply in the whole Baltic and Nordic region; whereas since 2023, at least 11 incidents of cable damage have been recorded, suggesting coordinated sabotage; whereas the proposed Digital Networks Act includes binding EU-level resilience obligations for submarine cable operators, including mandatory compliance with security requirements for information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains under the revised Cybersecurity Act (CSA), as proposed; whereas Finland is leading the establishment of a new Baltic Sea maritime surveillance centre, together with Baltic allies and the Commission, with the aim of protecting critical undersea infrastructure; whereas the presence of Russian ships in Irish waters has increased noticeably since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, raising concerns about the security of the important interconnector cables running between Ireland and the UK;

AddedBB. whereas the protection of key maritime choke points contributes to democratic resilience, as hybrid attacks against such nodes can result in severe economic, social and security disruption; whereas Chinese companies with strong ties to the Chinese Communist Party now hold stakes in more than 30 European naval port terminals, often in close proximity to European military naval bases; whereas in the joint White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy committed to reviewing existing EU legislation and introducing stricter rules on the ownership and control of critical transport infrastructure;

AddedBC. whereas in recent months, multiple airspace violations and unauthorised drone incursions have been reported over several EU Member States and neighbouring NATO allies, including Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Norway; whereas a number of these incidents have been clearly attributed to Russian military aircraft and drones, while other incidents, involving unidentified aerial objects, including ‘smuggling balloons’ used for cross-border illicit activities, remain under investigation but are widely suspected of forming part of the same pattern of hybrid intimidation and destabilisation directed at Europe;

AddedBD. whereas several European countries, including France, Estonia, Germany, Poland, Czechia and Norway, have recently faced major cyberattacks and sabotage, targeting government systems, critical infrastructure and private enterprises and attributed to hostile third countries, including Russia’s military intelligence services and Chinese state-linked actors; whereas these attacks underline the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s collective cyber resilience and cyber attribution capabilities;

AddedBE. whereas the EU’s dependence on foreign actors and foreign-made technologies in critical infrastructure and supply chains remains of major concern, and is one of the EU’s most significant vulnerabilities; whereas this is particularly prevalent in the tech and digital sectors, posing a key challenge for cybersecurity and European strategic autonomy;

AddedBF. whereas the EU remains heavily dependent on US technology and financial services, exposing European data and digital infrastructure to risks stemming from US legal frameworks such as the CLOUD Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Patriot Act, which grant US authorities broad access to data held by US companies, even when stored in the EU; whereas the Commission adopted the EU-US Data Privacy Framework in July 2023, allowing the free flow of personal data between the EU and the United States under adequate protection rules and providing a mechanism for EU individuals to access an independent and impartial redress mechanism in relation to the collection and use of their data by US intelligence agencies; whereas Microsoft itself has admitted to the French Senate that it cannot protect EU data from US surveillance;

AddedBG. whereas Spain has awarded Huawei a contract to manage and store judicially authorised wiretaps used by both law enforcement and intelligence services; whereas the Commission has restricted Huawei from 5G networks across the EU because of security concerns;

AddedBH. whereas all US federal government agencies are subject to ‘buy American’ requirements, which prioritise the purchase of US-made products; whereas the EU procurement framework is different and may, in some cases, contribute to dependencies on non-EU products and related risks for European businesses; whereas despite reasonable European alternatives being available in many cases, the European Parliament and the other EU institutions continue to purchase software and hardware products made outside Europe;

AddedBI. whereas on 20 January 2026, the Commission presented a revised CSA, proposing binding requirements for managing ICT supply chain security in critical infrastructure through systematic risk assessments and restrictions on high-risk vendors from countries that pose elevated security risks; whereas this new framework moves beyond the voluntary 2020 5G security toolbox by proposing mandatory compliance obligations on the Member States; whereas the revised CSA, as proposed, could significantly expand ENISA’s operational mandate and budget by more than 80 % to include real-time cyber incident coordination, early warning systems and threat intelligence sharing across the Member States;

AddedBJ. whereas the Digital Networks Act proposed by the Commission on 21 January 2026 establishes EU-level oversight of spectrum allocation, including in relation to satellite service providers, prescribing withdrawal of the right to provide networks and services in cases where the provider is not complying with the ICT supply chain security requirements of the revised CSA, as proposed; whereas among other critical infrastructure, electoral infrastructure increasingly depends on digital networks and diverse communication pathways to avoid single points of failure;

AddedBK. whereas fossil-free energy is a crucial stepping stone for Europe’s energy sovereignty; whereas according to analysis published in 2025 by Wood Mackenzie, 9 of the 10 largest global solar inverter suppliers were based in China; whereas hidden communication devices have been discovered in Chinese-made solar power inverters used in Europe and the United States; whereas according to the Czech cybersecurity office, there are risks regarding data protection and, in extreme cases, remote manipulation of solar inverters; whereas solar power plants interconnected through a decentralised dense network are susceptible to cyberattacks and therefore require adequate cybersecurity safeguards;

AddedBL. whereas hybrid attacks represent a recognised security threat facing the EU and its Member States, with a significant impact on democracy; whereas internal security remains a responsibility of the Member States but the cross-border, interconnected and multi-dimensional nature of those attacks requires strengthened cooperation, systematic information-sharing and coordinated action at EU level, supported by adequate funding; whereas the European internal security strategy of April 2025 underlines that EU criminal law already covers certain forms of FIMI and disinformation activities and that reinforced EU cooperation can contribute to countering that type of conduct more effectively; whereas criminal law tools can contribute to the European Democracy Shield to the extent that the activities concerned constitute criminal offences in accordance with applicable law;

AddedBM. whereas judicial and police cooperation mechanisms and cross-border information exchange tools need to be adjusted and strengthened, in the light of the growing challenges posed by foreign interference to the EU’s internal security; whereas new strategies developed by terrorist and criminal organisations are increasingly exploited for running and financing foreign interference operations, including the use of crypto assets and communication via various digital channels, including video games or e-shops, to circumvent sanctions and transfer money illegally; whereas as a consequence, there is a need to provide adequate training for criminal justice and law enforcement authorities on modern investigative methods and technologies and on the entire value chain of manipulation and interference, to ensure that they can properly collect, process, store and use evidence in criminal proceedings; whereas transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations that are necessary for the purpose of police, criminal justice or border management cooperation are subject to specific conditions under Union law and should only take place when the integrity and security of those data can be ensured;

AddedBN. whereas Europol has warned, in its latest EU-SOCTA report, published in March 2025, about the involvement of criminal organisations in hybrid attacks, including disinformation campaigns; whereas the Commission communication on ProtectEU acknowledges that various factors prevent Europol from fully reaching its operational potential in supporting activities to counter cross-border crime, including gaps in its mandate as regards new security threats, notably sabotage, hybrid threats and information manipulation; whereas the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield announced that the revision of the mandates of both Europol and the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) would explore ways to further enhance efforts to counter FIMI and disinformation activities;

AddedBO. whereas the Commission has committed to launching a reform that will make Europol a truly operational police agency; whereas law enforcement officers are privileged witnesses of the destabilising effects that FIMI and disinformation campaigns can have on the communities concerned; whereas they can therefore be key partners in safeguarding democratic institutions; whereas the legal, professional and ethical framework required for the performance of this role should be better defined and further harmonised throughout the EU;

AddedBP. whereas Eurojust may be requested by the Member States to assist national authorities in dealing with any type of illegal conduct under their jurisdiction; whereas judicial cooperation can prove particularly challenging when expanding to new criminal areas, requiring a modernised legal toolbox;

AddedBQ. whereas the situation at the external borders of the Member States with Russia and Belarus remains of concern because of persistent hybrid threats; whereas EU justice and home affairs agencies have a key role to play, in cooperation with national authorities, in establishing and maintaining common situational awareness of risks related to such threats and in assisting front-line Member States in crisis situations; whereas the Commission has included the strengthening of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in its flagship initiatives for the 2024-2029 legislative term; whereas other initiatives such as the Eastern Flank Watch may contribute to strengthening the protection of the external borders and enhancing resilience to hybrid threats;

AddedBR. whereas transnational repression includes systematic intimidation and harassment by third-country authorities, or their proxies, targeting journalists and activists, human rights defenders, political opponents and members of diaspora communities residing in the EU, such as in the case of Russian-led legal harassment against Ukrainian journalists, Turkish and Azerbaijani attempts at silencing opposition, and attacks planned against the Belarusian diaspora in Lithuania; whereas the growing surveillance of human rights defenders should be considered a form of transnational repression; whereas such practices not only violate the safety and fundamental rights of those targeted, but also undermine EU and Member States’ sovereignty and security, democratic freedoms and the rule of law; whereas victims of transnational repression in the EU should continue to receive protection;

AddedBS. whereas candidate countries and EU neighbourhood countries, notably Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and the Western Balkans countries, remain acutely targeted by FIMI and hybrid threats; whereas the Republic of Moldova, in particular, is facing persistent, coordinated and state-sponsored disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining democratic institutions, electoral integrity and its path to EU accession; whereas these countries require EU support to build civic and institutional resilience and to fight FIMI and hybrid threats, including through the financial support mechanisms of the Ukraine Facility, the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, and the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova; whereas the EU should take into account the feedback and experience of these countries, as they have been facing Russian hybrid attacks for many years; whereas the effectiveness of the EU’s efforts to strengthen institutional resilience in candidate countries depends on their willingness to adopt relevant measures, implement necessary reforms and cooperate effectively;

AddedBT. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and China’s assertive geopolitical posture have intensified the use of disinformation, economic coercion and strategic influence, targeting not only the EU, but also vulnerable regions such as the Western Balkans, Eastern Partnership countries and the Global South; whereas various sources reveal that Russia’s annual budget for spreading disinformation and propaganda amounts to several billion euro; whereas Russia’s disinformation warfare has not been matched by the EU with adequate financing or effective strategy; whereas elections and political events across Europe demonstrate persistent, targeted and sophisticated full-scale offensive hybrid warfare perpetrated by Russia, aiming to destabilise trust in European political systems and institutions, and to create constant confusion between facts and false information; whereas such warfare requires an appropriate response and a shift from a mere defensive strategy to an offensive one;

AddedBU. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as its broader hybrid warfare against Europe and interference in the democratic processes of other countries, has been enabled and justified by the nationalist imperialist ideology of ‘Ruscism’, and forms part of a wider strategy directed against the West and its interests and values, including the international rules-based order, the rule of law, democracy, human rights and common security; whereas Parliament has condemned the ideology, policies and practices of the current Russian regime as incompatible with international law and EU values;

AddedBV. whereas Russia employed a multilayered hybrid interference campaign to disrupt Moldova’s 2024 and 2025 elections, combining disinformation, financial manipulation, cyberattacks and proxy networks; whereas Russia invested massively in those attempts, which failed thanks to the efficacy of Moldova’s defensive policies and the support provided by the EU; whereas the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in the Republic of Moldova was established on 24 April 2023 with the explicit purpose of supporting the Moldovan authorities in combating FIMI;

AddedBW. whereas parliamentary elections were held in Armenia on 7 June 2026 following a period of intensified Russian interference, including through leveraging certain religious actors and the international diaspora to undermine Armenian democratic institutions, derail peace talks with Azerbaijan and reassert Russian influence; whereas according to Armenia’s 2026 annual report on external security risks, foreign actors are activating their agents within Armenia;

AddedBX. whereas Serbia has become a key hub for disinformation and a proxy for Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese influence operations; whereas in 2024, according to Moldova’s court rulings, Serbia and Bosnia’s Republika Srpska hosted a Russia-linked militant training camp that recruited and trained agitators to create mass disorder during Moldova’s elections and referendum; whereas Serbian cyber infrastructure was used to launch sophisticated spear-phishing attacks impersonating the Belgrade Security Conference and targeting EU and NATO officials and diplomats; whereas Serbia has become a safe haven for Russian spies and oligarchs who monitor Russian opposition figures and find ways to evade sanctions; whereas Serbian citizens, allegedly connected to Russia, have been arrested for carrying out hate-motivated acts in France and Germany, including defacing Jewish sites to sow ethnic and religious discord;

AddedBY. whereas the concerning reduction in US support for international democracy through the withdrawal from key multilateral and international frameworks has created a substantial global gap in funding, including for countering disinformation and authoritarian influence;

AddedBZ. whereas the US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy reflect a shift in long-standing US foreign policy, marked, among other indicators, by the explicit focus of US interests in the Western hemisphere and the downplaying of the threat posed by Russia and China; whereas the National Security Strategy also includes critical references to alleged democratic shortcomings in certain EU Member States and announces actions akin to foreign interference; whereas the strategy frames global developments largely in terms of economic nationalism and strategic interests, revealing a more transactional approach to traditional allies and thus questioning the principles that have underpinned US foreign policy for decades;

AddedCA. whereas China employs more sophisticated methods compared to other actors to gain influence in the EU, including through co-opting political elites, luring former officials with lucrative jobs, and building extensive networks of students, researchers and business operatives who then push pro-Chinese narratives and policies; whereas such methods also extend to coordinated information manipulation and disinformation activities in third countries, as illustrated by reports by a bipartisan US commission that China conducted a disinformation campaign to discredit French Rafale fighter jets used by India against Chinese weapons in the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict;

AddedCB. whereas international initiatives, including those by the UN, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Council of Europe, like-minded countries in East Asia including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and the G7, have begun to outline principles and frameworks for safeguarding information integrity, anchored in democratic values, media pluralism and human rights;

AddedCC. whereas FIMI campaigns and activities may also arise from actors within the EU, including Member States; whereas the credibility of democratic institutions also depends on their respective governments refraining from disseminating inaccurate, misleading or politically instrumentalised information, particularly during natural disasters, health emergencies and humanitarian crises; whereas the acceptance of remunerated positions or advisory roles by former high-ranking officials of EU Member States and the EU institutions or other forms of cooperation with authoritarian third-country regimes, or their state-controlled enterprises, risks undermining the credibility of the EU and the independence of its decision-making process;

AddedCD. whereas the phenomenon of information manipulation and interference in the domestic context, as well as its impact, should be further examined and understood, particularly in its interaction with FIMI; whereas measures presented to combat FIMI also contribute to increasing the overall resilience of societies in the domestic context, particularly with regard to enhancing situational awareness, increasing transparency and pluralism, and strengthening media, digital and AI literacy levels across all age groups; whereas effectively disrupting and countering information manipulation activities requires a whole-of-society approach across sectors;

AddedCE. whereas the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union, published in December 2023, have yet to be fully implemented across all the Member States, including the provisions aimed at strengthening cooperation between national authorities during and ahead of electoral processes through the establishment of national election networks;

AddedCF. whereas FIMI in electoral contexts often follows recurring patterns, including efforts to discredit candidates or political actors, erode trust in electoral processes and exploit societal divisions; whereas efforts to ensure election integrity must take a holistic approach;

AddedCG. whereas ECNE has played an increasingly important role in recent years, but currently lacks the resources and capacity needed to elevate its activities to the next level;

AddedCH. whereas candidate countries have been invited to participate in ECNE meetings; whereas in addition to such participation, there is still significant potential for further enhancing cooperation with these countries within the context of ECNE’s activities, to learn from each other’s experiences when encountering threats, and to exchange best practice in fighting these threats;

AddedCI. whereas there is a clear need to strengthen the protection of the electoral infrastructure and that of national political parties that have also been a target of cyberattacks and other forms of FIMI operations, not least in the light of the large-scale cyberattacks that targeted the Romanian electoral authorities in autumn 2024; whereas the ENISA annual activity report for 2019 already recommended the classification of election systems, processes and infrastructures as critical infrastructure so that the necessary cybersecurity measures would be put in place;

AddedCJ. whereas several reports and investigations, including findings related to doppelganger campaigns impersonating established media outlets, suggest that it is likely that Russia interfered in the 2025 German federal elections by targeting pro-European political parties; whereas it is also possible that other third country actors engaged in interference activities in relation to the same electoral process, as part of a broader pattern of interference observed in multiple European countries;

AddedCK. whereas the covert funding of political parties and movements in the EU by non-EU countries, as evidenced by existing documented instances of foreign interference by authoritarian regimes through direct or indirect financing of political parties, foundations or affiliated media organisations, poses a threat to democratic resilience, electoral integrity and the legitimacy of the democratic process;

AddedCL. whereas Parliament has been the target of espionage and foreign interference, including the conviction of an assistant to former Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Maximilian Krah, a member of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), for spying on behalf of China; whereas MEPs and their staff have access to sensitive information and documents within Parliament;

CM. whereas judicial independence is an indispensable structural component of electoral integrity; whereas electoral integrity depends on the existence of accessible and effective remedies against violations of voting rights and electoral procedures, insulated from political and executive pressure;

Change 2

ChangedBD. whereas, betweenCN. 2022whereas andsince 2025,2022, the EU has imposed a total of 1920 packages of extensive and unprecedented sanctions in response to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine,Ukraine; whereas those sanctions are aimed at substantially increasing pressure on the Russian war economy,economy by targeting key sectors such as energy, finance and the defence industry, special economic zones, and enablers and profiteers of its war of aggression, and ending the EU’s dependency on fossil fuel imports from Russia; whereas the EU has also adopted sanctions against Belarus, Iran and North Korea in response to their support for Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; whereas the efficacy of such measures should be strengthened and loopholes allowing for their circumvention should be closed;

Change 3

ChangedBE.CO. whereas,whereas since 8 October 2024, the EU sanctions framework has enabledbeen expanded to enable the targeting of a broad range of hybrid activities carried out by Russia, including the undermining of electoral processes and the functioning of democratic institutions, threats against and the sabotaging of economic activities, services of public interest and critical infrastructure, the use of coordinated disinformation and FIMI, malicious cyber activities, the instrumentalisation of migrantsmigration, and other destabilising activities; whereas this framework has already led to the sanctioning of tens of individuals and entities, including Russian oligarchs, propagandists, military intelligence operatives, media outlets and companies, for spreading pro-Kremlin narratives, conducting sabotage and undermining democratic processes; whereas relatedthis measuressanctions regime now allowallows the EU to include asset freezes, travel bans and the suspension of broadcasting licences, and to prohibit financial and crypto-asset transactions linked to hybrid activities;

Change 4

ChangedBF.CP. whereas retaliatory measures including arrest warrants and in-absentia proceedings are commonly used by the Moscow regime against foreign nationals located abroad who are blamed for criticising its policies or resisting its influence; whereas on 28 December 2024, the Russian Government announced that it had ‘significantly expanded’ its blacklist of EU citizens and officials, including representatives of the EU institutions, national governments, law-enforcementlaw enforcement agencies and commercial organisations; whereas this blacklist, targeting those who promote democratic values and oppose Russian aggression in Ukraine, seeks to intimidate and silence voices through opaque and arbitrary restrictions,restrictions and false legal accusations, often without any formal notification, justification or right of appeal; whereas such coercion follows a pattern of escalation, beginning with administrative exclusion, progressing to online harassment and culminating in physical threats, surveillance, the intimidation of family members or even violent attacks; whereas the threat of being blacklisted alone may lead EU officials to self-censor in anticipation and to refrain from taking political positions; whereas the Moscow regime in parallel maintains lists of Russian citizens living outside Russia as a means of transnational repression;

Change 5

RemovedBG. whereas hybrid threats, foreign interference and disinformation campaigns have evolved into complex, full-scale and cross-sectoral crises with detrimental effects on safety and security, the well-being of citizens, and the functioning of society and the economy as a whole, constituting a key challenge to the EU’s internal affairs and destabilising democratic institutions across the Member States, as has been seen throughout Russia’s aggression against Ukraine;

AddedCQ. whereas the Russian blacklist should be recognised as an instrument of hybrid warfare and foreign coercion; whereas an adequate response from the EU should include enhanced intelligence-sharing, as well as targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans on foreign officials, handlers and financial facilitators who are responsible for coercive practices, and disruption of the financial and logistical networks enabling these operations, including cryptocurrency channels;

RemovedBH. whereas effective civilian and defence preparedness requires a comprehensive, whole-of-society, whole-of-government and all-hazards approach that integrates the national authorities of the Member States with EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, as well as businesses, academia, civil society and individual citizens; whereas this effort needs to be accompanied by long-term investment, strategic foresight and the embedding of resilience into policymaking, infrastructure development, education systems and supply chains;

AddedCR. whereas the EU has adopted an Anti-Coercion Instrument to protect itself and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries;

RemovedBI. whereas empowering citizens is key to societal resilience, and preparedness must include practical tools such as an EU-wide crisis alert app, a household preparedness booklet, and wide-reaching awareness campaigns promoting self-sufficiency and crisis readiness;

AddedCS. whereas hybrid threats, foreign interference and disinformation campaigns have evolved into complex, full-scale and cross-sectoral crises with detrimental effects on safety and security, the well-being of citizens and the functioning of society, institutions and the economy as a whole, constituting a key challenge to the EU’s internal affairs and destabilising democratic institutions across the Member States, as well as threatening the future of the whole of Europe, as has been seen throughout Russia’s aggression against Ukraine;

RemovedBJ. whereas civil-military cooperation, dual-use capabilities and the integration of preparedness into educational programmes are essential for enhancing defence readiness through targeted training not only for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers and public servants, but also civil society actors and the public at large;