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Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

EUDS-PR-775431 → A-10-2026-0199

From
EUDS-PR-775431 report parliamentary committee draft of 18 Dec 2025
To
A-10-2026-0199 Plenary report of 25 Aug 2026
Changes
59 changes to the text
Paragraphs
+237 added · −138 removed · 87 changed
More facts (3)
Title (from)
on the findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
Title (to)
on the findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 18 Sept 2026

The new version adds many recitals and calls on the Centre's governance, funding and mandate, including Member State and Parliament representation and a feasibility assessment on administering EU funding.13 It adds measures on platform recommender systems, account verification, AI labelling, advertising transparency, Telegram, influencers and user safeguards, and on public service media, spyware, media ranking and online advertising.1522 It adds provisions on digital dependencies, critical raw materials, hack-for-hire, secure communications, GPS jamming, submarine cables, maritime hubs and cybersecurity, and on cooperation with Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, EU Delegations and CSDP missions.2532 It adds provisions on preparedness reporting, crisis-alert apps, household booklets, exercises, Erasmus+, funding, institutional security, Frontex's mandate, crypto-asset political donations and the rule of law report.304249 The other changes are formal: updated citations and cross-references.15

The notes class 10 changes as substance, 0 as formal, 0 as wording only; 49 smaller changes were not described.

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Part 4 of 10: Paragraphs 181–240

AddedQ. whereas AI drives innovation, knowledge access, productivity and new digital industries, presenting new opportunities, such as the strengthening of election management and oversight through the detection of unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes, thus requiring timely and effective democratic safeguards and regulatory oversight; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated LLMs with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems in order to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language and undermine democratic discourse and trust in digital technologies; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for improved AI literacy in education, work and society at large, increased transparency in relation to LLM training, and adequate research funding; whereas AI outputs may reflect biases introduced through the design of the systems;

RemovedT. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI;

AddedR. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy and democratic procedures, promoting fact-based content or contributing to a healthy political debate; whereas, at the same time, a growing share of citizens, especially minors and young adults, rely extensively on content creators and influencers on social media, gaming services and video- and content-sharing services, including for news and current-affairs information, thereby exposing themselves to risks linked to addictive design, harmful content and manipulative practices; whereas online personalities and influencers can have a significant capacity to shape public opinion and information flows without being subject to standards of accountability comparable to those for media;

RemovedU. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programmes, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the expressions of real persons with inauthentic content;

AddedS. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives and distort electoral competition; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked the creation of over 116 000 spam accounts and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms; whereas evidence points to two main operational patterns: the coordinated manipulation of recommendation algorithms through networks of synchronised accounts generating artificial traffic and trend amplification, and the covert instrumentalisation of content creators, and both patterns show how technical platform dynamics can be exploited and can circumvent democratic safeguards;

RemovedV. whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media are cornerstones of the European way of life, embedded in Article 11(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; whereas editorially independent, high-quality journalism is a powerful antidote to FIMI and disinformation;

AddedT. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content, recruitment for sabotage, political propaganda and disinformation relating to EU and national laws; whereas Telegram’s origins in Russia, its opaque ownership structures and its lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for classification as a VLOP under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements; whereas the Commission’s lengthy assessment has not yet reached a conclusion;

RemovedW. whereas under the DMA, app developers distributing their apps via app stores should be able to inform customers, free of charge, of alternative offers outside of the app store; whereas the Commission has opened an investigation into a potential breach of the DMA by Google in demoting media publishers’ content in search results; whereas the Commission launched its first review of the DMA on 3 July 2025;

AddedU. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, satellite communication, cloud services, online platforms, payment solutions and IT software, including in sectors such as defence; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, ensuring fair and competitive digital markets, enforcing the digital rulebook, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure, resilient and independent EU digital ecosystem, while limiting the opportunities for hostile interference, information manipulation and economic coercion; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology; whereas AI is reshaping and accelerating globalisation, creating a new phase of strategic competition; whereas EU digital sovereignty is especially difficult to achieve when VLOPs and VLOSEs operate in a de facto state of oligopoly;

RemovedX. whereas the Audiovisual Media Services Directive requires the Member States to take measures to develop media literacy skills and report their efforts every three years;

AddedV. whereas research shows a concerning trend in the revenue redistribution programmes of online platforms, revealing that media outlets that are subject to sanctions, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, remained listed as ‘partner-publishers’ on Facebook months after the launch of EU sanctions against Russia, which raises questions about whether they have continued to benefit financially; whereas such opaque monetisation mechanisms enable foreign state-affiliated actors to profit from sharing disinformation and to continue to destabilise EU and national information spaces despite regulatory measures; whereas the non-transparent nature of online advertising allows large amounts of money to be funnelled from legitimate brands to disinformation sites, funding polarising content and undermining quality journalism; whereas Meta is the only major tech company to publish limited monetisation data, while others remain non-transparent;

RemovedY. whereas the Media Freedom Rapid Response documented 1 548 press freedom violations in 2024, ranging from legal, physical and psychological threats to forms of censorship, targeting 2 567 media-related persons or entities in 35 European countries, an alarming increase compared to the 1 153 violations recorded in 2023;

AddedW. whereas in a survey held in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, 1 in 10 respondents declared that they would be likely to ask AI for voting advice, while another 13 % declared that they might ask; whereas in the Netherlands, more than one third of the youngest respondents answered that they were likely to use or might use AI for voting advice; whereas this trend is consistent with findings across the Member States and globally; whereas a recent study by the Dutch data protection authority demonstrates that voting recommendations generated by AI chatbots often present a highly distorted and polarised view of the political landscape; whereas investing in the development of open-source LLMs is one way to reduce concerns about hidden biases, backdoors or data misuse in AI chatbots;

RemovedZ. whereas Parliament and Council negotiators reached a provisional agreement on the proposed regulation on the screening of foreign investments in the Union on 11 December 2025;

AddedX. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programs, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the communications of real persons with inauthentic content;

RemovedAA. whereas the work of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is of strategic interest to the EU; whereas the EU has approved EUR 5.5 million in emergency funding for this work, in the aftermath of the reform of the United States’ foreign aid policy; whereas a sustainable funding solution for RFE/RL needs to be developed;

AddedY. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;

RemovedAB. whereas new technologies, such as AI, can improve journalistic working conditions and methods, but can also expose journalists to new threats, such as quick and cheap impersonations of existing media, the mass creation of disinformation outlets and coordinated attacks against journalists;

AddedZ. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, algorithms, bots or AI;

RemovedAC. whereas the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine illustrates the vital role that civil society plays when communities are in crisis situations, particularly when it comes to providing humanitarian aid, securing basic needs and ensuring the continuation of the everyday lives of affected populations;

AddedAA. whereas authoritarian regimes have used social media platforms to undermine freedom of expression; whereas users expect transparency, due process and the protection of freedom of expression, which must be upheld under the requirements of the DSA; whereas full enforcement of EU digital legislation is therefore necessary to safeguard these principles;

RemovedAD. whereas civil society also plays an essential role in contributing to policymaking, delivering social and community services, raising awareness of important social issues, representing diverse groups in vulnerable situations, and promoting and protecting the fundamental rights of citizens;

AddedAB. whereas freedom of expression and information, and the freedom and pluralism of the media as enshrined in Article 11(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and reflected in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, are cornerstones of democratic and resilient societies; whereas editorially independent, high-quality, fact-based, well-funded and commercially viable journalism, including that of journalists in exile, is a key safeguard against FIMI and disinformation and an essential tool for informed decision-making;

RemovedAE. whereas the Commission has published its EU Strategy for Civil Society, which is said to complement the actions set out in the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield; whereas the EU Strategy for Civil Society confirms that the Civil Society Platform, which the Commission has announced will be established as part of the implementation of the strategy, will aim to provide a regular and structured framework for the protection and promotion of EU values and the streamlining and strengthening of engagement on fundamental rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law, and will become operational in 2026; whereas the strategy also includes the creation of an online Knowledge Hub on Civic Space, which should document existing civic-space monitoring initiatives, reports and protection resources, at national, EU and international level, in cooperation with the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights;

AddedAC. whereas the term ‘information integrity’ is regularly used by the EU institutions in policy and operational documents, whereas no official or commonly agreed definition of this concept has been established at EU level; whereas this lack of definition may lead to potential ambiguities in its interpretation and application;

RemovedAF. whereas the AgoraEU programme, proposed by the Commission for the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), constitutes an important step forward in strengthening EU support for culture, media and civil society, with an anticipated budget of EUR 9 billion;

AddedAD. whereas the EMFA represents a milestone in promoting an independent and pluralistic media landscape across Europe; whereas media fulfil a democratic function distinct from that of ordinary commercial entities; whereas robust safeguards are necessary to protect editorial independence, particularly in cases of ownership concentration, takeovers or changes in control, and to ensure transparency, source accountability and professional standards; whereas the Commission should make an effort to better involve candidate countries in the EU’s media policy; whereas this should also entail a corresponding commitment from the candidate countries themselves;

RemovedAG. whereas hybrid attacks targeting critical infrastructure in the EU have become more frequent than ever, with incidents linked to the same malicious actors such as Russia and China, but also Iran and North Korea; whereas these attacks often target essential systems, networks, and facilities that are vital for a society’s functioning, including public safety, security, and economic stability; whereas such attacks take various shapes and forms, such as physical sabotage, arson attacks, espionage and signal jamming, as well as cyberattacks and other grey zone activities, all of which demonstrate a coordinated effort to test, disrupt and undermine the EU’s security and societal resilience;

AddedAE. whereas the digital advertising ecosystem, while enabling new opportunities for media outreach, has also led to market concentration and unfair competition, with a few large online platforms capturing a disproportionate share of advertising revenue; whereas according to a 2023 report by the French ARCOM and Ministry of Culture, media organisations that invest in news content and audiovisual creation received only 40 % of advertising revenue in 2022, down from 65 % in 2012, and this figure is projected to fall to 29 % by 2030; whereas this is often to the detriment of professional European media companies and the sustainability of independent journalism;

RemovedAH. whereas the Baltic Sea has witnessed an unprecedented rise in the number of disruptions to submarine cables, which are vital for internet connectivity and power supply in the whole Baltic and Nordic region; whereas, since 2023, at least 11 incidents of cable damage have been recorded, suggesting coordinated sabotage;

AddedAF. whereas the abusive practices of dominant online advertising market players, such as the practices that resulted in the Commission imposing a EUR 2.95 billion fine against Google for distorting competition in online advertising, underscore the need for more structural measures to ensure fair competition, greater transparency, accountability and safeguards to protect media pluralism, editorial independence and the integrity of democratic processes; whereas structural deficiencies in the digital advertising market can be exploited by malicious actors, as demonstrated by the so-called doppelganger operators using advertisements on social media to target users and by various Russian online campaigns aimed at discouraging Ukrainian men from enlisting;

RemovedAI. whereas in recent months multiple airspace violations and unauthorised drone incursions have been reported over several EU Member States and neighbouring NATO allies, including Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Norway; whereas a number of these incidents have been clearly attributed to Russian military aircraft and drones, while other incidents, involving unidentified aerial objects, remain under investigation but are widely suspected to form part of the same pattern of hybrid intimidation and destabilisation directed against Europe;

AddedAG. whereas the DMA is essential for ensuring fair digital markets and media pluralism; whereas challenges remain in its implementation; whereas under the DMA, app developers can inform customers, free of charge, of offers outside app stores; whereas the Commission is investigating a potential DMA breach by Google in demoting media publishers’ content; whereas the Commission launched its first review of the DMA on 3 July 2025;

RemovedAJ. whereas several European countries, including France, Estonia, Germany, Czechia and Norway, have recently faced major cyberattacks targeting government systems, critical infrastructure and private enterprises, attributed to Russia’s military intelligence services and Chinese state-linked actors, all of which underline the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s collective cyber-resilience and cyber attribution capabilities;

AddedAH. whereas the Audiovisual Media Services Directive regulates audiovisual media services, ensuring consumer protection and fulfilling other public interest objectives in the audiovisual media market; whereas it requires the Member States to take measures to develop media literacy skills and report their efforts every three years; whereas the Commission is currently evaluating the directive and launched a call for contributions in November 2025, in preparation for the renewed assessment scheduled for 2026;

RemovedAK. whereas the EU’s dependence on foreign actors and foreign-made technologies in critical infrastructure and supply chains remains of major concern, and is one of the EU’s most significant vulnerabilities; whereas this is particularly prevalent in the tech and digital sectors, posing a key challenge for cybersecurity;

AddedAI. whereas there is a need to equip children with skills to resist disinformation; whereas, in this regard, hostile actors may intensify the targeting of educational systems in order to counter efforts to increase digital literacy; whereas, for different reasons, certain groups are particularly vulnerable to misinformation, including children and young people because of their high digital exposure; whereas there is a need to foster media literacy and critical thinking from an early age;

RemovedAL. whereas criminal law tools can contribute to the European Democracy Shield to the extent that the activities concerned constitute criminal offences;

AddedAJ. whereas EDMO plays a crucial role in monitoring and countering disinformation; whereas EDMO’s mandate has been extended to continue its important work; whereas the extension of the mandate is not accompanied by a corresponding increase in financial resources, which may limit EDMO’s capacity to fulfil its objectives;

RemovedAM. whereas judicial and police cooperation mechanisms and cross-border information exchange tools need to be adjusted and strengthened, in light of the growing challenges posed by foreign interference to the EU’s internal security;

AddedAK. whereas the temporary nature of the Media Resilience programme could provide an opportunity to consider new innovative approaches to supporting independent local and regional media;

RemovedAN. whereas the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) has warned, in its latest EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment report (EU-SOCTA), published in March 2025, about the involvement of criminal organisations in hybrid campaigns; whereas the Commission communication on ProtectEU acknowledges that various factors prevent Europol from fully reaching its operational potential in supporting activities to counter cross-border crime, including gaps in the agency’s mandate as regards new security threats, notably sabotage, hybrid threats and information manipulation;

AddedAL. whereas the Media Freedom Rapid Response documented 1 481 press freedom violations in 2025, affecting 2 377 media-related persons or entities across 36 European countries, encompassing legal, physical and psychological threats as well as various forms of censorship; whereas this figure, while representing a slight decrease compared to the 1 548 violations recorded in 2024, remains at an alarmingly high level and constitutes a significant increase compared to 2023, thereby underscoring the persistent and systemic nature of the threats to media freedom in Europe; whereas the murders of investigative journalists such as Jan Kuciak, Giorgos Karaivaz, Peter R. de Vries and Daphne Caruana Galizia triggered widespread public outrage;

RemovedAO. whereas the Commission has committed to launching a reform that will make Europol a truly operational police agency; whereas police officers are key partners in safeguarding democratic institutions; whereas this should be more clearly recognised in relevant policies;

AddedAM. whereas Parliament and Council negotiators reached a provisional agreement on the proposed regulation on the screening of foreign investments in the EU on 11 December 2025;

RemovedAP. whereas the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) may be requested by Member States to assist national authorities in dealing with any type of illegal conduct under their jurisdiction; whereas judicial cooperation can prove especially challenging when expanding to new criminal areas, requiring a modernised legal toolbox;

AddedAN. whereas the work of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is of strategic interest to the EU; whereas the EU has approved EUR 5.5 million in emergency funding for this work, in the aftermath of the reform of the US foreign aid policy; whereas a sustainable funding solution needs to be developed for RFE/RL and other independent media outlets that are essential to the strengthening of democratic resilience in neighbouring countries;

RemovedAQ. whereas EU agencies with responsibilities in the area of borders, migration and asylum management, i.e. the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the EU Agency for Asylum, have a key role to play, in cooperation with national authorities, in establishing and maintaining common situational awareness of risks related to the exploitation of migratory flows for political purposes and in assisting frontline Member States crisis situations; whereas the Commission has included the strengthening of Frontex in its flagship initiatives for the 2024-2029 legislative term;

AddedAO. whereas new technologies, such as AI, can improve journalistic working conditions and methods but can also expose journalists to new threats, such as quick and cheap impersonations of existing media, doppelganger campaigns, the mass creation of disinformation outlets and coordinated attacks against journalists; whereas any impersonation of existing media amounts to identity theft and should be addressed appropriately by the judicial authorities; whereas AI models must comply with Union copyright law in order to ensure the protection of rightsholders and legal certainty; whereas the news media sector is facing challenges from the growing influence of AI systems, which is affecting public trust, advertising revenue and copyright protection; whereas the developments in generative AI should be discussed in the context of the Commission’s upcoming review of the EU Copyright Directive, complemented by a report on the main findings; whereas greater transparency of AI training data is important in the context of media policy;

RemovedAR. whereas candidate countries and EU neighbours, notably Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans, remain acutely targeted by FIMI and hybrid threats, and require EU support to build civic and institutional resilience;

AddedAP. whereas changes in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have affected a number of European media outlets; whereas this highlights the importance of strengthening Europe’s own media landscape; whereas EU funding should focus on initiatives with the greatest public impact and include basic operational support;

RemovedAS. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and China’s assertive geopolitical posture have intensified the use of disinformation, economic coercion and strategic influence, targeting not only the EU, but also vulnerable regions such as the Western Balkans, Eastern Partner countries and the Global South; whereas various sources reveal that Russia’s budget for spreading disinformation and propaganda amounts to between USD 1 billion and USD 2 billion per year; whereas elections and political events across Europe demonstrate persistent, targeted and sophisticated full-scale offensive hybrid warfare perpetrated by Russia, aiming to destabilise trust in our political systems and institutions, and to create constant confusion between facts and false information; whereas such warfare requires an appropriate response and a shift from a mere defensive strategy to an offensive one;

AddedAQ. whereas measures adopted by the previous Fidesz-led Hungarian Government have led the Commission to open an infringement procedure against Hungary for non-compliance with the EMFA and the Audiovisual Media Services Directive;

RemovedAT. whereas the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova) was established on 24 April 2023 with the explicit purpose of supporting the Moldovan authorities in combating FIMI;

AddedAR. whereas the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine illustrates the vital role that civil society plays when communities are in crisis situations, particularly in providing humanitarian aid, securing basic needs and ensuring the continuation of the everyday lives of affected populations, and responding to threats related to sabotage and espionage;

RemovedAU. whereas the reduction in US support for international democracy has created a substantial global gap in funding for countering disinformation and authoritarian influence;

AddedAS. whereas civil society also plays an essential role in contributing to policymaking, delivering social and community services, raising awareness of important social issues, enhancing resilience, representing diverse groups in vulnerable situations, promoting and protecting the fundamental rights of citizens and ensuring that governments remain transparent and accountable through public scrutiny and democratic oversight;

RemovedAV. whereas international initiatives, including those by the UN, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the G7, have begun to outline principles and frameworks for safeguarding information integrity, anchored in democratic values, media pluralism and human rights;

AddedAT. whereas the Commission has published its EU Strategy for Civil Society, which is said to complement the actions set out in the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield; whereas the EU Strategy for Civil Society confirms that the Civil Society Platform, to be established as part of the implementation of the strategy, will aim to provide a regular and structured framework for the protection and promotion of EU values and the streamlining and strengthening of engagement on fundamental rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law, and will become operational in 2026; whereas the strategy also includes the creation of an online Knowledge Hub on Civic Space, which should document existing civic-space monitoring initiatives, reports and protection resources, at national, EU and international level, in cooperation with the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights;

RemovedAW. whereas FIMI constitutes a growing challenge to the EU’s democratic resilience; whereas certain forms of manipulative information activities may also arise from actors operating within the EU; whereas the phenomenon of information manipulation and interference in the domestic context should be further examined and understood, particularly in its interaction with FIMI; whereas the measures presented to combat FIMI also contribute to increasing the overall resilience of societies in the domestic context, particularly with regard to enhancing situational awareness, increasing transparency and pluralism, and strengthening media and digital literacy levels across all age groups;

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Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
27 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2026). “Changes between EUDS-PR-775431 and A-10-2026-0199”. Text, 25 August 2026. from EUDS-PR-775431, to A-10-2026-0199, reference 2025/2069(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/EUDS-PR-775431/compare/A-10-2026-0199?all=1&part=4 (retrieved 27 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2026-08-25,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between EUDS-PR-775431 and A-10-2026-0199}},
  year = {2026},
  date = {2026-08-25},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/EUDS-PR-775431/compare/A-10-2026-0199?all=1&part=4}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/EUDS-PR-775431/compare/A-10-2026-0199?all=1&part=4},
  urldate = {2026-09-27},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from EUDS-PR-775431, to A-10-2026-0199, reference 2025/2069(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}