Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The European Union is founded on the values of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which form the basis of its political order, institutional legitimacy and societal cohesion. Over the past years, these foundations have been increasingly targeted by a rapid intensification of hostile activities. Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), hybrid operations, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and other forms of malign influence have grown in scale, sophistication and impact.

These tactics deliberately exploit social fractures, manipulate public debate, and seek to undermine citizens’ confidence in the institutions and democratic processes of the Union and its Member States. Their increasingly digital nature – amplified through opaque online platforms and cross-border dissemination networks – has made the threat landscape more complex and more difficult for Member States to confront individually. Against this backdrop, the Union has recognised the need for a more strategic, coordinated, and anticipatory response. Building on the work carried out by its previous special committees dedicated to foreign interference in democratic processes (INGE and INGE2), the European Parliament decided in December 2024 to establish a Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS), tasked with examining how the Union can better defend its democratic foundations.

Change 52

ChangedThe Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield, presented by the Commission together with the VP/HR, marks an important contribution to this effort. It provides a structured overview of the current threat environment and identifies several domains where further action is required to protect the Union against FIMI and disinformation, and to strengthen societal resilience. The rapporteur has welcomed this initiative and recognised its added value in consolidating the Union’s understanding of the challenges ahead.

Change 53

ChangedHowever, while the communicationCommunication sets the right direction, its level of ambition remains toooverly limited in light of the scale of the threats. What is needed is not only a framework for reflection but a concrete reform agenda capable of delivering operational capacity, accountability, and long-term preparedness.

Change 54

ChangedThe Union has developed a growing ecosystem of structures, tools, and programmes aimed at countering foreign information manipulation and disinformation. These efforts – including the work of relevant task forces, cooperation networks, and early-warning mechanisms – are significant. Yet, to take this work to the next level, reforms must also be put in place. The proposal to establish a European Centre for Democratic Resilience is a welcome and promising initiative. However, in the form presented in the Communication, such initiative lacks the operational clarity required for the Centre to become an effective hub of expertise and action. Concrete recommendations have been put forward in the draft report for this objective to be achieved.

Change 55

ChangedRegarding the digital sphere – which in many ways is exploited by malign third-country actors to conduct their operations – the rapporteurSpecial Committee is of the view that relevant EU legislation must be upheld and that the Commission needs to intensify its enforcement actions, particularly where there are indications of election-related manipulation, systemic algorithmic opacity, coordinated inauthentic behaviour, or large-scale misuse of platform functionalities.

Change 56

ChangedThe evolving threat environment also requires the Member States to cooperate more effectively at Union level on the conduct of elections. The integrity of electoral processes lies at the heart of democratic resilience. In this context, the draft report stresses the need for significantly enhancing the European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE) and encourages a comprehensive reform to make this network more ambitious and operationally relevant. Furthermore, election-related infrastructure should be recognised as part of the Union’s critical infrastructure and protected accordingly.

Change 57

ChangedThe rapporteur has also welcomed that the Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield includesincluded an external dimension. The objectives of the Democracy Shield cannot be achieved without close cooperation with relevant candidate countries and partners in the Union’s neighbourhood, particularly candidate countries that are increasingly exposed to intense foreign interference. Support for their resilience – including through capacity-building, training, and the provision of expertise – is indispensable for safeguarding Europe’s wider democratic space. The draft report calls on the EEAS to systematically incorporate hybrid-threat preparedness measures into the mandates of CSDP missions and operations, thereby strengthening the ability of national counterparts to detect and counter malign influence. As part of the Shield’s external dimension, a review of relevant sanctions instruments should also be undertaken to ensure they are optimally calibrated to target actors undermining Europe’s democratic integrity. Alignment with like-minded partners is also important with a view to ensuring effective collective responses; the rapporteurreport welcomes the use of multilateral and bilateral channels of cooperation, including the existing EU Security and Defence Partnerships.

Change 58

ChangedThe draft report further emphasises the need for an ambitious agenda to make society more resilient. Reforms to support the media sector are an important component of this, alongside measures to strengthen media literacy. Civil society and the EU’s civil societydedicated strategy constitute another key aspect: a strong and independent civil society is essential for democratic resilience. The rapporteurreport pleads in favour of robust programmes supporting the policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative within the next multiannual financial framework 2028-2034.

In strengthening societal resilience, enhanced protection of critical infrastructure is also crucial and should be reassessed in light of the objectives of the Democracy Shield. This in turn necessitates reforms to increase European sovereignty over digital infrastructure, operating systems, data centres, semiconductors, AI, cybersecurity, cloud computing, and various digital platforms and services. The revision of the mandates of relevant EU agencies, such as Europol and Frontex, can also play a significant role in improving resilience and protection against hybrid threats.

Change 59

ChangedFinally, the draft report stresses that building democratic resilience also requires societies that can continue to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions. Reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness – from crisis-management capacities to the continuity of democratic institutions – must therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield. The draft report concludes that protecting and strengthening Europe’s democratic systems requires not only vigilance and resilience at every level of society, but also a coordinated and forward-looking Union strategy, backed by sufficient resources and political commitment.