Text · Amendment list
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
Document EUDS-AM-784407 · 2025/2069(INI)
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- 12 February 2026
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- Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
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- 2025/2069(INI)
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| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising, the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), the Anti-SLAPP Directive, the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), the Digital Single Market Copyright Directive (DSM Directive) and the AI Act across all Member States; stresses that, where failures or persistent shortcomings in implementation are identified, the Commission, in its role as guardian of the Treaties, should act in a systematic and timely manner and make full use of the legal instruments at its disposal in order to ensure the effective, uniform and credible application of Union law throughout the Union ; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; acknowledges the objective of simplifying and streamlining digital legislation through the proposed Digital Omnibus Regulation; stresses, however, that such simplification must not result in the dilution of existing safeguards or a lowering of standards for fundamental rights, consumer protection or democratic integrity; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Calls for the full implementation and enforcement of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on the systemic risk posed by of recommender systems in the distribution and amplification to counter online disinformation, ensure information integrity and protect democratic discourse in election periods; underlines that digital platforms are used as a tool by perpetrator states of transnational repression and calls on the Commission to consequently implement digital legislation to protect persons targeted by TNR online; notes that hate and defamation campaigns, including illegal content, against individuals or institutions can be a component of TNR, notes that tech companies have a responsibility to prevent abuse of their digital services for repressive purposes; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and efforts to halt the finalisation of technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; regrets that the Commission did not consider all options to ensure a swift implementation of high-risk rules in the AI Act; calls on the Commission to ensure that if standards are not ready by the set deadline, common specifications are prepared to avoid a regulatory vacuum; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Evin Incir, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose, Adnan Dibrani
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Considers that the effective enforcement of EU digital rules is essential to the Union’s democratic resilience and digital sovereignty; calls on the Commission and all Member States to fully implement and enforce the entire digital-related EU acquis, including key legislation , such as the DSA, the DMA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act; calls on the Commission to firmly resist any external political or economic pressure against such implementation and enforcement; considers that the reinforced implementation and enforcement of digital legislation must have a strengthened focus on countering FIMI and online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse during and outside of in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; regrets that the Commission in this context, proposed to delay the deadline for Gen AI system providers to comply with machine-readable marking requirements until 2 February 2027, in its Digital Omnibus, despite the fact that the final Code of Practice to support compliance with the transparency obligations related to marking and labelling of AI-generated content are on route to be published in May-June 2026; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Reminds that the implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, must be conducted in full respect of fundamental rights, with freedom of expression recognised as a non-negotiable principle across all Member States; akes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on upholding open discussion and ensuring transparency of the Commission’s communication with both societal and business stakeholders; recalls that countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods cannot be used as a pretext to target opposing or dissenting views, even where such views are controversial; expresses concern, in this regard, that guidelines and technical standards must not constitute obstacles to freedom of expression and should remain strictly technical instruments aimed at facilitating the effective implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; expresses concern over the persistent enforcement gap in the implementation of the Digital Services Act in certain Member States; calls on the Commission to ensure the rapid activation of infringement procedures and, where appropriate, sanctions in cases of systematic non-compliance or deliberate obstruction of DSA enforcement, in order to safeguard the digital resilience of the Union as a whole; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Believes that the Union faces an existential challenge from foreign state-led threats and attacks targeting its democratic values and legal order, compounded by failures of very large online platforms (VLOPs) to comply with those same values and rules, in particular the obligations set out in the Digital Services Act (DSA); Therefore calls for the full implementation and enforcement of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; stresses that the full implementation of this legislation must explicitly address systemic risks to elections arising from algorithmic amplification, covert political advertising and coordinated inauthentic behaviour; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States and robust enforcement in case of non-compliance; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act and calls for their timely adoption; |
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Calls for the full enforcement of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; recalls that AI Act itself does not address disinformation in a direct manner but establishes mechanisms relevant to fight it; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Calls for a comprehensive revision of the EU´s legal framework for digital sphere, with a view to strengthening freedom of expression, media pluralism and the right of the citizens to access information, while preventing the misuse of EU legislation for censorship or political control; calls, in this context, for the strict respect of Member States ‘competences and the principles of subsidiarity an proportionality in the implementation of key legislation in the digital space, including the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act; stresses that the enforcement of such legislation must remain limited to clearly defined illegal content and must not lead to the suppression of lawful opinions or political speech; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States, while underlining that enforcement actions must strictly respect the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality, and must not result in the removal, suppression or algorithmic demotion of lawful content, including religious, philosophical or ethical expression; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; warns that the proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission could weaken data protection standards without improving European AI competitiveness; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15. Calls for the full implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; | 15. Calls for a fair implementation of key legislation in the digital space, such as the DSA, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising and the AI Act, across all Member States; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse in election periods; expresses concern, in this regard, that delayed guidelines and technical standards pose an obstacle to the timely implementation of the AI Act; welcomes the fact that in its proposed Digital Omnibus to simplify AI legislation the Commission seeks to address this by linking the implementation timeline for rules on high-risk AI systems to the availability of standards or other support tools; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. Notes that the Digital Services Act (DSA) provides for several review and reporting milestones, including the Commission’s obligation to submit, by 17 November 2025, a report on the application of Article 33 concerning the designation of very large online platforms and very large online search engines and on the interaction of the Regulation with other Union legal acts; further recalls the general evaluation due by 17 November 2027 and every five years thereafter, notably on the effectiveness of supervisory and enforcement mechanisms and on the impact of the Regulation on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information; considers that these review clauses constitute a timely and strategic opportunity not only to assess implementation but also, where necessary, to strengthen the Regulation, in particular as regards systemic risk mitigation, transparency obligations, enforcement capacities, cooperation between national authorities and Union bodies, and safeguards ensuring both the integrity of the information space and the full respect of fundamental rights. |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. Underlines in this regard that the Commission should apply democratic values consistently across its broader legislative agenda;, deeply regrets the lack of an impact assessment on democracy and integrity of information spaces for the Digital Omnibus; is concerned that the Digital Omnibus may deepen some of the problems highlighted in the Communication on Democracy Shield and calls on the immediate suspension of the work on the digital omnibus until there is a proper assessment of its impacts on democracy and the fundamental right to freedom of information; stresses that any simplification or streamlining of digital legislation must not result in deregulation or the weakening of existing safeguards reiterates that any initiative that limits fundamental rights in the digital space for the benefit of commercial interests runs counter to the goals of the Democracy Shield.; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. Expresses concerns that foreign authoritarian actors, in particular Russia, have developed disinformation playbooks whose effects have become increasingly visible during recent elections in Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Kosovo; highlights evidence of coordinated networks of fake or anonymous accounts and paid influencers exploiting engagement-driven algorithms to artificially amplify narratives and create the illusion of public support, particularly among young voters and diaspora communities; stresses that such algorithmic amplification enables malicious actors to reach large audiences while distorting users’ political information environment, posing a serious risk to democratic discourse and electoral integrity; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. Expresses deep concern regarding the ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression resulting from the threat of heavy fines under the Digital Services Act (DSA); notes that, in order to minimalize legal and financial risks,, platforms are incentivised to remove lawful but controversial content (so-called ‘over-compliance’); stresses that online platforms must not act as private censors or substitute courts in determining what may be said in public debate; underlines that, where legality of content is not manifestly clear, the presumption must remain in favour of freedom of expression and that any restriction must be interpreted narrowly and applied; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. Calls on the Commission to make an effort in promoting implementing the DSA and other relevant acts beyond the EU borders, in particular by supporting candidate and potential candidate countries in the development and implementation of legal frameworks aligned with the EU digital rulebook, including the Digital Services Act and the European Media Freedom Act, by providing clear guidance on EU alignment, facilitating exchanges with Member State authorities, experts and civil society, and enabling gradual integration into relevant EU enforcement and cooperation mechanisms, where appropriate; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. calls for online platforms subject to the Digital Services Act to be required to publish, at least on an annual basis, remuneration flows allocated to publishers, influencers and creators of political content operating within the Union; calls for such flows to be subject to independent audits; considers that, where beneficiaries linked to sanctioned entities or hostile third-country governments are identified, automatic sanctions should apply, including the suspension of monetisation programmes; |
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. Condemns Trump administration’s threats to sanction EU officials involved in the Digital Services Act, as well as other attempts at intimidation and coercion, such as threatening sanctions against individual EU members and introducing visa bans on former EU officials and European NGOs on unsubstantiated grounds; urges the Commission and the Member States to stand together in solidarity, not to yield to threats, and to uphold European regulations and sovereignty; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. Stresses the strategic importance of a timely, full and uniform implementation across Member States of the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising as a key instrument in countering foreign interference in democratic and electoral processes by introducing transparency in the market of political advertising both online and offline and strengthening data protection for citizens; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. Recognises the constantly changing technological infrastructure underpinning the digital public sphere, especially given the rapid proliferation of AI technologies; welcomes the Commission’s willingness to keep updating tools such as the DSA Election Toolkit; calls for the continual reassessment of existing legislation by the Commission, in order to ensure continued legislative adequacy and suitability; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. Notes reports of highly targeted online and offline political advertising and influence messaging in proximity to institutional decision-making venues, including during plenary periods; stresses the need for the effective implementation and enforcement of the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising and relevant obligations under the Digital Services Act; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. While recognising the role of the Digital Services Act, notes the risk of an improper use of it in the way it could limit freedom of expression; calls on the Union to ensure a proportionate application respectful of fundamental rights, avoiding unjustified restrictive effects, particularly when motivated by political objectives; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 a. Rebukes any attempt at weakening digital regulations targeting VLOPs and VLOSEs; recalls that these companies’ annual turnovers mean they have the capacity to implement EU digital legislations; rebukes, in the same way, any attempt by the US administration to coerce the EU into delaying the implementation of its legislation; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Evin Incir, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 b. Calls on the Commission to immediately and fully enforce the DSA, namely by: | |
| a) using all the tools at its disposal to monitor and enforce the transparency and risk assessment and mitigation obligations related to FIMI and electoral integrity contained in the DSA; taking into account the risk of ideological lock-in within the list of systemic risks; | |
| b) making use of its regulatory powers to impose interim measures in the event of serious breaches, the retention of documents or direct access to data bases and algorithms; | |
| c) enabling full transparency and communication between the services of the Commission, the national competent authorities and the co-legislators with regard to investigations into VLOPs, ensuring clearly-defined investigation deadlines, including maximum deadlines for each investigation phase, in order to operationalise the DSA and strengthen the credibility of its application; | |
| d) auditing the algorithms used by VLOPs and VLOSE to ensure these actors are held accountable for their own choice and design of algorithmic systems and all its consequences, including when they are designed according to criteria of maximization of engagement, popularity of content, and freshness of content, which can lead to amplification of disinformation; | |
| e) ensuring the fines and periodic penalties are sufficiently dissuasive in the event of non-compliance, |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 b. Calls on the Commission to develop and publish official, harmonised guidelines and a standardised template for systemic risk assessments under Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, in order to ensure comparability, completeness and legal certainty across platforms; stresses that the absence of a common methodological framework risks leading to fragmented, inconsistent or incomplete assessments ; underlines that such guidelines should clearly define mandatory risk categories, minimum methodological standards, reporting indicators and transparency requirements, while allowing for proportionality and service-specific adaptation; emphasises that a common template would enhance accountability, facilitate independent auditing and ensure that all relevant systemic risks - including those relating to democratic processes, media freedom, algorithmic amplification and information manipulation - are consistently and rigorously covered across the Union; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 b. Welcomes the proposal for a Digital Network Act; is of the opinion that the rules governing radio spectrum management, which enables grants to public television in exchange of certain requirements, must not be swept aside, in particular the “must carry” principle; recalls that, to operate, broadcasters rely both on broadcast and broadband infrastructures: terrestrial and satellite, fibre, and 5G; insists on the need to protect radio’s presence in connected vehicles, thus ensuring listeners can easily access radio content, including in case of crisis; is of the opinion that additional fee on European content providers for the online delivery of content to audiences would undermine attempts at restoring a viable media environment; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 b. Calls on the Commission to increase efforts in aligning key EU digital legislative acts, including the Digital Services Act and the European Media Freedom Act, on candidate and potential candidate countries and ensure that prospective Member States have the necessary tools and guidance in order to prepare for implementation of such laws; calls for these areas to be systematically included and assessed as part of the annual Rule of Law Report and the Enlargement Package, and for structured dialogue with relevant national authorities and civil society organisations on monitoring their application; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 c. Stresses that the protective and redress mechanisms established under Union digital legislation - including out-of-court dispute settlement bodies, trusted flaggers and other user-safeguard structures - must themselves be adequately protected against political, economic or coordinated external pressures that risk undermining their independence, impartiality or operational effectiveness; calls for the European Democracy Shield to incorporate dedicated safeguards, monitoring tools and institutional support mechanisms aimed at preserving the integrity and security of these enforcement and protection frameworks, in order to counter increasing attempts by both foreign and domestic actors to influence, intimidate or circumvent their functioning; |
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 c. Welcomes the planned Digital Fairness Act announced for the end of 2026; recalls that the stated aim of the act is of critical importance to fight dark patterns, disguised marketing by influencers, the addictive design of digital products and unfair personalisation practices; recalls that some influencers can be used to spread FIMIs virally, as was the case during the Romanian elections; notes that the lack of regulation on the profession makes it easier to divert them from their usual commercial messaging and be hired by malicious state or non-state actors; notes that labelling of paid content should be made mandatory with proper sanctions in case of violation; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 c. Underlines that relevant EU legislation could usefully be complemented by enhanced consumer protection in the digital sphere, based on Article 169 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to take into account the particularity of these products and the risks they pose to the health, including mental health, and safety of consumers of digital services; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Evin Incir, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 d. Notes with concern that elements of the new United States Security and Defense strategy place increased emphasis on the information domain as an arena of strategic competition, including through influence over digital platforms and information flows; warns of the risks that such an approach may entail for the integrity of democratic discourse when it enables or tolerates political interference in support of certain political movements or narratives; stresses therefore the urgent need for the European Union to safeguard its information space, and ensure that digital platforms operating within its jurisdiction uphold transparency, accountability, and the protection of democratic processes; Condemns the US decision to impose travel restrictions on five European individuals, including former European Commissioner Thierry Breton, in the context of their attempts to influence our democratic legislative processes; calls for the immediate lifting of these measures; reiterates that freedom of expression is a fundamental right in Europe and a shared core value with the United States and across the democratic world; recalls that the EU is an open, rules-based single market, with the sovereign right to regulate economic activity in line with our democratic values and international commitments; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Evin Incir, Heléne Fritzon, Adnan Dibrani, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 15 e. Expresses serious concern over the spread of AI-generated sexualised deepfakes, including political candidates and elected representatives, and particularly targeting women; underlines that such practices constitute targeted abuse aimed at silencing and deterring democratic participation; calls for an EU-wide coordinated response, including the swift enforcement of the Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence to ban the non-consensual sharing of intimate and sexually abusive images, including AI-generated deepfakes, and ensure their prompt removal by digital service providers; Calls on the Commission to ensure that the DSA incident and crisis response protocol explicitly covers large-scale deepfake incidents and coordinated campaigns involving AI-generated content, avatars or bots impersonationg real or fictious persons; stresses that such incidents should trigger rapid information-sharing, platform obligations to act without undue delay, and coordinated responses with national electoral authorities, where relevant; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | deleted |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; stresses that the Code of Practice on Disinformation should remain a dynamic instrument subject to continuous monitoring, periodic review and, where necessary, timely adaptation ; underlines that the Commission should continue to oversee the individual commitments and their effective implementation by signatory providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines, including, where appropriate, the organisation of regulatory dialogues and the adoption of proportionate follow-up measures where shortcomings or systemic risks are identified ; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; emphasises, however, that participation in a voluntary code cannot be construed as a substitute for the binding duties established under the DSA, and insists that platforms remain subject to their full legal responsibilities, including the obligation to conduct rigorous, evidence-based systemic risk analyses and to deploy effective, proportionate mitigation measures where democratic integrity, media pluralism or the sustainability of editorial media may be adversely affected; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Takes note of the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media and online platforms more generally, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification via hyperpersonalised engagement-based recommender systems, as well as the production and dissemination of AI-generated and other misleading content, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods necessitating strict mitigation measures in line with Article 35 of the Digital Services Act; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; urges the Commission to consider the suppression of political content on recommender systems a systemic risk to civic discourse and the electoral processes; expresses deep concern that the foreign interference in the elections in Romania via TikTok has shown how easy it is to manipulate hyperpersonalised engagement-based recommender systems and that bot networks have not been adequately adressed, therefore posing a direct threat to our democracy; calls for the Commission to effectively tackle this risk by imposing measures on online platforms to replace recommender systems based on engagement or hyperpersonalisation; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Evin Incir, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Notes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; underlines that at this stage the Code has not been used to determine compliance of VLOPs/VLOSEs, and public assessments from civil society organizations state that VLOP s/VLO /SEs are not compliant with their own voluntary engagements; urges the Commission to closely monitor and further encourage compliance with the Code; calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to the full implementation of the Code of Conduct against Disinformation by its signatories, in particular by very large platforms with regards to access to data for researchers, specific measures to combat disinformation related to AI-generated content, transparency on the promotion of political content, indicators of reliability of information, and references to authoritative sources in relation to societal or public interest topics; Stresses that the Code of Conduct on Disinformation should take into account trends observed in candidate and potential candidate countries; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; |
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; calls on the Commission to clarify the implications of potential non-compliance with the Code by VLOPs vis-a-vis DSA compliance and enforcement; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; reminds that self-regulation and voluntary adherence have proven largely ineffective in combatting disinformation on VLOPs; stresses that compliance with the Code of Practice does not replace the legally binding obligations laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the DSA, and calls on the European Commission to ensure that VLOPs and VLOSEs carry out robust, evidence-based risk assessments and implement effective mitigation measures addressing systemic risks to democratic processes, including risks affecting media freedom, media pluralism and the sustainability of editorial media; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls on online platforms to take effective measures to identify, limit and mitigate the impact of automated and AI-driven accounts, in particular where such activity undermines electoral integrity or democratic discourse; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; calls on the Commission to clarify the implications of a failure by VLOPs to do so; calls on the Commission to clarify the implications of potential non-compliance with the Code by VLOPs vis-a-vis DSA compliance and enforcement; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; notes that the European Fact-Checking Standards Network has persistently raised the issue of the lack of information or action from big tech to their commitments under the Code of Practice51e; is of the opinion that the participation to the code of practice should be mandatory; |
| 51e EFCSN, Fact-checking and related Risk-Mitigation Measures for disinformation in the Very Large online platforms and search engines,December 2024 |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; expresses concern regarding the opaque functioning of platform recommender systems and content-ranking algorithms, which can amplify polarising, misleading or harmful content without effective accountability; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA, while recalling that voluntary self-regulatory instruments cannot substitute binding obligations and effective enforcement where systemic risks to democratic processes persist; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address illegal major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to adhere to the voluntary Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it, provided that this does not undermine freedom of expression, pluralism or open public debate; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code; stresses that compliance with the Code of Practice does not replace the legally binding obligations laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the DSA; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification of divisive content, and dissemination of manipulated AI-generated content such as deepfakes, to be among the most serious risks to free, authentic and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Expresses deep concern about cases of outright censorship imposed by fact-checking and content moderation mechanisms imposed by the Digital Services Act (DSA), with particular reference to the very serious case of censorship in Italy of the video by historian Alessandro Barbero expressing his legitimate opinion on justice reform; deplores the fact that the mechanism devised by the European Union often degenerates into instruments of indirect censorship and manipulation of information, repeatedly violating the obligations of proportionality, transparency and protection of the fundamental rights of citizens of Member States; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers that the business models of online platforms, often based on the attention economy, monetisation of hate speech and recommender systems that prioritise polarisation over factual information are among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16. Welcomes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA; considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to fully adhere to the Code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it; | 16. Considers the inauthentic use of social media, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms and artificial engagement and amplification, to be among the most serious risks to free and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; calls urgently on all VLOPs and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) operating in the EU to ensure politically neutral and non-discriminatory content moderation and algorithmic decision-making, in full respect of freedom of expression and information and urges in particular the platform X to do so; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 a. Recalls that Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act) requires very large online platforms and very large online search engines to adopt reasonable, proportionate and effective risk-mitigation measures, which may include ensuring that synthetic or manipulated content, such as deepfakes, can be clearly distinguished from authentic material; stresses that the notion of proportionality must be interpreted as requiring measures that are technically robust, transparent and adapted to the scale and systemic impact of the service concerned, while fully respecting freedom of expression and data-protection principles; underlines that effective mitigation may encompass, inter alia, reliable labelling and watermarking technologies, traceability of origin, user-visible context indicators, independent auditing of detection tools, and cooperation with trusted fact-checking and research entities; calls on the Commission to provide further guidance and harmonised benchmarks clarifying what constitutes proportionate and effective measures in this field, in order to ensure legal certainty, consistent enforcement and a high level of protection against large-scale manipulation; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 a. Calls to urgently investigate to clarify, in a transparent and comprehensive manner, the allegations contained in the Interim Staff Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives entitled “The Foreign Censorship Threat, Part II: Europe’s Decade-Long Campaign to Censor the Global Internet and How It Harms American Speech in the United States”, in particular as regards the nature and scope of Commission's engagement and regulatory interactions with major online platforms that raise allegations as to the freedom of expression's breaches; calls to explain whether, and on what legal basis, any regulatory frameworks, policy instruments or informal enforcement practices have entailed extraterritorial effects leading to the removal, suppression or downranking of lawful content in the electoral campaign period, including political speech originating in third countries; calls on the Commission to demonstrate how its actions ensure full respect for freedom of expression, democratic debate and electoral integrity, in line with fundamental rights and international democratic standards; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 a. Notes with concern the growth in reported incidents of AI-generated audio-visual content and deepfakes falsely depicting real political candidates, deliberately designed to mislead voters and influence elections; underlines that such practices pose a serious threat to democratic processes; expresses concern over the absence of an EU-wide framework to protect individuals from the non-consensual use of their identity and personal characteristics in manipulated or AI-generated content; calls for a coordinated EU response and urges the Commission to investigate measures to safeguard individual’s right to their own body, facial features and voice and protect individuals against the dissemination of manipulated and AI-generated digital image, audio or video content, imitating their personal characteristics, ‘deep fakes’, without consent; highlights that digital service providers covered by the Digital Services act have a clear obligation to act against illegal content; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 a. Expresses serious concern that activities by private actors, including the monitoring, rating, or classification of news outlets and online information, can influence the visibility, credibility, and perceived reliability of media sources, posing a risk to editorial independence, media pluralism, and the diversity of information available to the public; stresses that such practices may shape public perception and discourse in ways that undermine democratic debate and the equitable treatment of all news providers; calls on EU institutions and Member States to ensure transparency, accountability, and safeguards, including effective redress mechanisms for media outlets affected by such ratings, in the use of third-party media-assessment tools, and to prevent disproportionate influence over the European information ecosystem and restrictions on freedom of expression and information; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 a. Notes with concern that the current conceptual framework for identifying disinformation and FIMI often presumes intent on the basis of content similarity, amplification patterns or narrative convergence, without a clearly defined and publicly verifiable methodology for establishing deliberate manipulation; stresses that the attribution of intent is a decisive but methodologically challenging step that requires rigorous evidentiary standards; calls on the Commission to clarify the criteria, thresholds and analytical methods used to infer intent, coordination or foreign direction, in order to prevent the conflation of lawful democratic expression with hostile influence operations; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 a. Expresses deep concern that European citizens and European democracies are insufficiently protected against addictive, radicalising, hate and disinformation-spreading engagement-based recommender systems; underlines that it is evident from whistle-blowers’ testimonies that safer alternative recommender systems can be deployed, such as those based on user choice, diversified feeds and algorithmic pluralism or those based on more secure settings by default; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 a. Calls on the Commission to ensure that proposals leading to excessive privacy interference, such as blanket monitoring of private communications, mandatory linkage of user accounts to identity documents or biometric data, or disproportionate age-verification requirements, are not pursued, as such measures risk undermining trust, fundamental rights and democratic participation without effectively addressing online harms; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 b. Stresses that the DSA identifies gender-based violence, the protection of minors, and mental well-being as systemic risks; notes that radicalisation is particularly prevalent among young men, notably those with low self-esteem or other issues around mental well-being, with more and more minors joining online communities like the manosphere (a community focussed around hyper-masculinity and hatred against women), which normalise gender-based violence, which are often freely accessible or even actively recommended to minors on Very Large Online Platforms and pose systemic risks to the protection of minors, mental well-being, gender-based violence and civic discourse; underlines that underlying issues such as lack of belonging and community, pressure to adhere to heterosexual masculinity standards need to be addressed; notes that such communities are often targeted and exploited by malicious foreign actors and therefore need to be examined also as an element of FIMI; recalls that the DSA demands to include any actual or foreseeable negative effects in relation to gender-based violence in the risk assessment of VLOPs; Highlights that studies have shown that preferences of users are not respected when it comes to content suggested by recommender systems, extremist content reaches young men without their conscious choice and “against their will”, referred to as “passive radicalization”; and urges the Commission to take action about these failures to mitigate systemic risks, such as to civic discourse and to protection of minors as systemic risks to under the DSA; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 b. Calls on the Commission and the relevant supervisory authorities to promote greater transparency and accountability in the design of large-scale algorithmic recommendation and advertising systems, including the introduction of clearly defined weighting and prioritisation factors governing the ranking and visibility of online content; recognises, however, that fully abandoning engagement-based recommendation models may neither be technically feasible nor economically realistic, and stresses instead the need to mitigate their adverse effects; underlines that regulatory efforts should focus on reducing the structural over-promotion of sensationalist or polarising material driven solely by engagement metrics, while preserving lawful expression; emphasises that extreme or controversial content should not be subject to blanket prohibition but, where it poses heightened risks of manipulation or misinformation, should be accompanied by appropriate contextual warnings, visibility adjustments and user-choice mechanisms; highlights the value of involving independent third parties, including academic experts and civil-society organisations, in the periodic assessment and calibration of these prioritisation parameters in order to safeguard pluralism, user autonomy and a balanced digital public sphere; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 b. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; further calls for full financial transparency obligations for all NGOs engaged in fact-checking activities or otherwise involved in public-interest or public-policy-related matters, including the disclosure of funding sources, major donors and institutional affiliations; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 b. Stresses that fact-checking must be accompanied by integrated media literacy programmes so that people are taught how to critically assess information even when not fact-checked; calls on the Commission to support Member States in integrating flexible media literacy programmes into their education systems, which can adapt along with rapid changes in the information environment; calls on the Member States to promote media education as a lifelong learning process, ensuring that all generations develop the necessary critical thinking skills to resist manipulation in an ever-evolving information landscape; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 b. Calls on the Commission to ensure that participation in voluntary codes and related task-forces remains genuinely voluntary and cannot be used as a de facto “safe-harbour” or enforcement lever under the DSA; calls, in particular, for full transparency of the Code of Practice on Disinformation’s governance, including publication of agendas, participant lists, minutes and Commission “asks”, as well as clear separation between voluntary cooperation and supervisory/enforcement activity; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 b. Calls on the Commission to publish regular and comparable reporting on the state of DSA enforcement across Member States, including the resourcing, independence and operational capacity of Digital Services Coordinators; urges the establishment of clear triggers for coordinated EU-level intervention where persistent non-enforcement exposes the Union to systemic risks; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 c. Notes concerns that “crisis response” formats can evolve into recurring, informal pressure channels on platforms’ content-moderation policies; calls for clear rule-of-law safeguards for any crisis-related coordination, including written terms of reference, traceable requests, and ex post reporting to Parliament on actions taken, so that emergency-style structures do not normalise permanent narrative-management; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 16 c. Stresses the need to substantially reduce coordinated inauthentic behaviour online, including the large-scale use of fake accounts, bot networks and AI-generated content, which are frequently exploited in foreign information manipulation and interference operations; calls on the Commission to prioritise enforcement actions addressing such behaviour as a matter of democratic security; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; | 17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; calls on the Commission to take preventive measures such as a ban for VLOPs to use recommender systems not based on explicit user choice, at minimum 90 days prior to elections; urges the Commission to act fast in this regard and ensure that risks, especially to electoral processes can be addressed and mitigated early on and not only months or years after the fact; requires online platforms to implement high-friction measures such as two-factor identification for automated accounts participating in political discourse to prevent the artificial amplification of narratives; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; | 17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; | 17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol including clear escalation pathways, timelines and coordination arrangements between the Commission, Digital Services Coordinators and the European Board for Digital Services, to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; | 17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a proposal of DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; calls on the Commission to consult Parliament on this protocol and to include Parliament's views and comments into this protocol; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; | 17. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should cover all platforms and should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17 a. Supports the development of a European common virtual space for the governance and removal of illegal content related to foreign information manipulation and interference; stresses that where a platform is notified of illegal content or FIMI by a competent authority in one Member State, the obligation to remove such content should extend to all identical or replicated instances across the Union, reflecting the borderless nature of the digital information space; notes in this context the increasing instrumentalisation of diaspora communities in cross-border online influence operations and underlines the need for Union-level solutions to address these risks effectively. |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17 a. Expresses serious concern about the systemic risks posed by engagement-based recommendation systems operated by Very Large Online Platforms to civic discourse and electoral processes, in particular through the amplification of disinformation and polarisation; calls on the Commission to fully use its powers under Articles 34 and 35 of DSA to conduct evidence-based risk assesments and address these risks; calls on the Commission to require effective mitigation measures where recommendation systems distort democratic debate, override users’ explicit content preferences or undermine media pluralism; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17 a. Calls on the Commission, where existing Union legislation relevant to the protection of democratic integrity and the digital space is not properly implemented or enforced, to make full use of its powers under the Treaties, including the timely initiation of infringement proceedings against non-compliant Member States, in order to ensure uniform application of EU law and preserve the credibility and effectiveness of the Union’s regulatory framework ; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17 a. Calls for full transparency regarding any Rapid Response System or equivalent election-period coordination mechanism, including a public list of participating entities, their funding sources, and the nature and volume of inputs provided into election-related flagging, referrals or “risk” reporting; stresses that informal or voluntary frameworks must not produce de facto restrictions on lawful content without traceable accountability and redress; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17 a. Stresses the need to take particular note of trends observed in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the Western Balkans, notably Serbia, when conducting election-related work under the Code of Conduct on Disinformation, including the mapping and analysis of novel and emerging threats linked to information manipulation campaigns and not be limited to individual cases; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17 a. Underlines that the promotion of democratic values must not result in political interference in the internal democratic processes, nor in attempts to influence electoral outcomes through funding, advocacy or public pressure; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 17 b. Stresses that assessments of “systemic risk” under the DSA must be evidence-based and content-neutral, and must not rely on political, ideological or theological assumptions when evaluating lawful speech or belief-based narratives; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; | 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; expresses deep concern regarding the European Union's hostile attitude towards political candidates expressing legitimate opinions that diverge from the positions formally endorsed by the European Union, but in full respect of democratic principles; Deplores any attempt to delegitimise democratic elections on grounds of alleged ideological incompatibilities, as exemplified by the direct interventions of Ursula von der Leyen and Thierry Breton in the Romanian case in 2024, invoking the Digital Services Act and issuing financial threats against the Member State; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; | 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; stresses that the strength and credibility of the Digital Services Act ultimately depend on its effective and consistent enforcement, and emphasises that the Commission should not hesitate to open new investigations or initiate appropriate enforcement actions whenever necessary in order to ensure full compliance and safeguard democratic integrity in the Union ; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; | 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; calls on the Commission to ensure that systematic and repeated breaches of the DSA and DMA by very large online platforms, in particular those affecting electoral integrity, information integrity and media pluralism, automatically trigger proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, including fines, behavioural remedies and, where appropriate, structural measures; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; | 18. Calls for a full independent parliamentary inquiry into Commission actions, platform contacts and regulatory measures taken in relation to the 2024 Romanian presidential election, including whether unverified or contested intelligence claims were used to justify content moderation pressure; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; | 18. Welcomes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; welcomes the decision of the Commission of 26 January to start an investigation into the integration of Grok AI into X and the extension of the existing investigations into X’ recommender systems to establish whether X has properly assessed and mitigated all systemic risks, as defined in the DSA; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; | 18. Stresses that rigorous, consistent and timely enforcement of EU digital legislation is an essential pillar of European digital sovereignty and must be a precondition for operating in the single market; notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots and to ensure compliance of platforms without delay; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; | 18. Welcomes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, culminating by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to pursue with greater urgency, determination and consistency the remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, particularly where such breaches may have facilitated election interference, enabled persistent algorithmic opacity, or allowed the large-scale proliferation of fake accounts and bots networks that distort public discourse; urges, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly and thoroughly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes, electoral integrity and the information space; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; | 18. Calls on the Commission to conduct a rigorous analysis and to ensure complete transparency in its investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, as outlined in the Interim Staff Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives entitled “The Foreign Censorship Threat, Part II: Europe’s Decade-Long Campaign to Censor the Global Internet and How It Harms American Speech in the United States”, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to accurately conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; | 18. Urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; | 18. Notes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations into suspected breaches of EU digital legislation, including those involving election interference, algorithmic opacity, or the proliferation of fake accounts and bots; stresses that a lack of transparency regarding content moderation and recommendation practices poses a systemic risk to democratic discourse; calls, in particular, on the Commission to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in the context of the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, including its obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 a. Notes with concern that the Union’s efforts to strengthen its digital resilience and strategic autonomy are increasingly threatened by the rapid expansion and dominance of US dollar-denominated stablecoins, which risks deepening the Union’s structural dependence on US-controlled digital, financial and payment infrastructures; is concerned that the development of US-dollar denominated stablecoins are part of a broader geopolitical agenda of the current US administration to reinforce the hegemony of the dollar in the global economy and sustain demand of US public debt in a context of de-dollarisation trends, while shifting economic and monetary power away from democratic institutions towards private tech elites; highlights that US dollar-denominated stablecoins account for around 99 % of the global stablecoin market, which is projected to grow 10-fold up to 3.7 trillion by 2030; in this context, notes with concern that non-EU stablecoins issuers have started to operate in the Union under de facto equivalence schemes, despite repeated warnings and recommendations from Union supervisors and the European Central Bank not to authorise such schemes; regrets that Commission has not acted decisively on such warnings and recommendations; stresses that failure to address these risks may expose the Union to new systemic, security and democratic threats and calls on the Commission to strictly enforce the MiCA Regulation, as part of an offensive strategy to strengthen the Union’s digital, financial and payment resilience and reinforce the international role of the euro in a fragmented geopolitical context; |
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 a. Notes the contribution of the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT) and the Joint Research Centre in the context of these investigations; is worried by the fact that it took about three years to conclude these investigations on X, Meta, TikTok and e-commerce platforms like Temu and Shein; is of the opinion that the causes that led to such a delay should be dealt with the utmost urgency as protecting European citizens and European democracy is critical; reminds that independent researchers had achieved in a drastically shorter timeframe; wonders if these investigative structure is the most appropriate to deal with these inquiries; proposes that investigation should rather be launched and given to dedicated task forces established per investigation, with a clear mandate, a limited timeframe, and a clear set of questions to answer with precise deliverables, in order to pace up the process and limit intermediaries; overall, recommends the Commission avoid box-ticking; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 a. Expresses concern about indications that political and trade considerations, as well as external pressure from third countries and large technology companies, may influence the timing, firmness or presentation of enforcement actions under Union digital legislation; stresses that the credibility of the Union’s regulatory framework depends on its consistent, timely and impartial application; underlines that voluntary cooperation by major online platforms cannot substitute effective enforcement where legal obligations exist; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that decisions concerning the application of EU digital rules remain independent from geopolitical or commercial considerations and are guided solely by Union law and the protection of democratic interests ; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 a. Calls on the Commission to assess whether the cost allocation and certification model for out-of-court dispute settlement bodies may create structural incentives favouring restriction of lawful content; calls, where necessary, for safeguards ensuring genuine neutrality and independence, meaningful due-process standards, and that platforms are not indirectly pressured into risk-averse removals to avoid procedural penalties; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 a. recalls that the Romanian presidential elections demonstrated the large-scale use of fake accounts, bots, undeclared influencer payments and algorithmic manipulation to distort electoral competition; stresses therefore the need for swift, robust and enforceable action by the Commission, including the use of sanctioning powers, to ensure effective deterrence during electoral periods; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 a. Stresses that timely enforcement is essential to deterrence; calls on the Commission to provide regular public reporting on the state of play of major systemic-risk investigations and follow-up, including on the use of interim measures and commitments where appropriate, in order to make compliance the default rather than the exception. |
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 a. Recognises the role of not-for-profit community governed platforms, such as online encyclopedias, in providing neutral and verifiable information at global scale and calls on the Commission to ensure that the EU regulatory framework fully and properly safeguard their distributed content moderation model; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 a. Expresses deep concern over political interference by the United States administration in the Union’s democratic processes, including through public endorsements and political messaging in support of far-right movements; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 a. Takes note of the European Commission’s preliminary evaluation that indicates that TikTok is in breach of the Digital Services Act for its addictive design; calls on the Commission to assertively ensure such breach is remedied; |
Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Tomáš Zdechovský, Sandra Kalniete, Lena Düpont, Lukas Mandl, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Ana Miguel Pedro, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 a. Condemns the targeted sanctions against legislators responsible for the Digital Services Act and other digital regulations, in particular against a former commissioner; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 b. Calls on the Commission and relevant EU bodies to investigate whether algorithms and platform design on social media services, including platforms such as X, have been used or manipulated in ways that favour far-right political parties, as such practices may contribute to the interference of among others, the United States administration in European democratic processes; stresses the importance of transparency, accountability, and safeguards to ensure that digital platforms do not undermine fair electoral competition and democratic debate; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 b. Calls on the Commission to bring to a timely conclusion the ongoing investigation under the Digital Services Act into Meta’s compliance, with specific attention to the visibility and handling of political content and users’ rights to report and challenge moderation decisions, and to promptly publish detailed findings and, where appropriate, enforcement measures in order to strengthen transparency, accountability and the protection of democratic discourse online; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 18 b. Stresses that the growing entry of Big Tech firms into the European payments space and financial sector further enhances the threats to the Union’s digital resilience and strategic autonomy, in light of the already significant risks from the high concentration of, and critical dependency on, non-European providers of ICT-services as cloud services by the financial sector; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources; | 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to systematically investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, including networks operating through coordinated clusters of propaganda websites and narrative-laundering techniques ; such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; notes with concern the rapid quantitative and qualitative escalation of such campaigns since the invasion of Ukraine, characterised by the widespread use of AI-generated content, deepfakes, synthetic media and automated amplification tools that significantly increase their sophistication and reduce detection thresholds ; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources; | 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network as well as cases of direct intervention by owners of AI systems, such as the explicit manipulation of Grok (xAI); urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems and communicate findings as foreseen under the AI Act to the relevant authorities; calls, furthermore, for the AI Office to enhance its efforts in overseeing the security landscape of AI models and aid in developing the setting of security standards for such models, including large language models (LLM); calls on the AI Office to ensure that transparency is improved with regard to the training of data sources in accordance with the AI Act and the Code of Practice for GPAI models; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources; | 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, including such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems, while stressing that any such measures must not result in censorship, political interference or arbitrary content removal, and must fully respect the freedom of expression and information as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources; |
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources; | 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; insist however on the balance between exposure aiming at stopping campaign and exposure that may increase its visibility; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources; | 19. Calls on relevant nationals regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources; underlines the necessity to do so while refusing censorship and with full respect of freedom of speech, opinion and information; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Evin Incir, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency with regard to the training of data sources; | 19. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to investigate and publicly expose covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the setting of security standards for large language model (LLM) providers to be coordinated at international level, ensuring improved transparency and respect for personal integrity with regard to the training of data sources; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19 a. Highlights that the proliferation of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) as well as domestic disinformation is increasingly driven not only by the content itself but by the design and economic incentives of algorithmic recommendation and amplification systems; stresses that engagement- and profit-driven algorithms, optimised to maximise user attention and advertising revenue, can inadvertently prioritise sensational, polarising or misleading material while marginalising moderate and fact-based viewpoints, thereby distorting public debate; calls on the Commission and relevant authorities to address the systemic role of algorithmic curation, including through greater transparency, independent auditing, risk-mitigation obligations and the promotion of user choice and non-manipulative default settings, in order to ensure that digital information environments do not structurally favour disinformation or undermine democratic pluralism; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19 a. Expresses concern over lack of labelling of AI generated content on online platforms, in particular very large online platforms, which can deceive users or is aimed at targeting users with misinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify whether content not labelled as “AI-generated” in accordance with the AI Act, Art 50 and the corresponding Code of Practice, and uploaded on online platforms, is considered “illegal content”; further calls on the Commission to take urgent efforts to clarify that AI content should be labelled clearly on social media platforms as a mitigation measure under the DSA or specify other ways of compliance under the DSA to ensure that users are informed accordingly; is worried that slow action and enforcement in this regard provides an opening for malicious FIMI actors; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19 a. Stresses that scientific consensus is not static and evolves over time through challenge and debate; points to the example of the ‘lab leak theory’ regarding the origins of COVID-19, which was initially labelled as ‘disinformation’ and suppressed by social media platforms, only to be later recognised by various intelligence agencies and scientific bodies as a plausible hypothesis; warns that empowering platforms or authorities to police ‘scientific truth’ hinders inquiry and suppresses legitimate hypotheses; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19 b. Draws attention to the growing impact of generative artificial intelligence on the information ecosystem, noting that automated content-generation and recommendation tools can disproportionately elevate certain viewpoints, perpetuate societal and gender biases, skew editorial priorities and reduce the visibility of smaller, local or independent media actors; emphasises that these dynamics are especially harmful to minority languages and regional news markets, which risk being progressively excluded from AI-mediated distribution channels; notes with concern recent independent studies indicating a high rate of factual inaccuracies and misleading summaries in responses produced by widely used AI assistants across multiple languages and jurisdictions; warns that, as citizens increasingly rely on such systems as primary gateways to news and often attribute them a high degree of credibility, systemic inaccuracies and narrative imbalances may erode public trust, weaken media pluralism and adversely affect democratic discourse; calls, therefore, for strengthened transparency requirements, clear source identification, diversity-by-design safeguards and regular independent audits of AI-driven information services in order to ensure equitable access to accurate and pluralistic news content; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19 b. Expresses deep concern over the targeting of women in politics through AI-facilitated gender-based disinformation, including deepfakes and non-consensual sexual content, which serves as a strategic tool to erode trust in democratic institutions; calls upon the Commission to urgently ban the generation of sexualised deepfake images; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19 c. Calls for a thorough assessment of whether existing accountability and due-diligence frameworks remain adequate in light of the growing role of digital intermediaries and AI-driven services in selecting, ranking and synthesising news and public-interest information; notes that, although such services are not always directly involved in the creation of journalistic content and often rely on automated processes or user-generated material, they nonetheless exercise substantial gatekeeping power over visibility, distribution and, in certain instances, content generation; stresses that this evolving role can have far-reaching consequences for media pluralism, freedom of opinion and expression, citizens’ access to independent and trustworthy news, the sustainability of local information ecosystems and, ultimately, the proper functioning of democratic processes; invites the Commission to consider whether targeted adjustments, clarifications or complementary safeguards are required to ensure that emerging digital services operate with appropriate levels of responsibility, transparency and proportionality in line with fundamental rights and the public interest; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19 d. Calls on the Commission to closely monitor and periodically assess the effectiveness and adequacy of the existing copyright framework as it applies to journalistic content, including press publications, in light of evolving market conditions, the growing role of digital platforms and the deployment of artificial-intelligence technologies; stresses that such assessment should duly incorporate the perspectives and rights of rightholders and be undertaken, inter alia, in the context of the forthcoming evaluation of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 19 e. Calls for the reinforcement and broad deployment of media-literacy initiatives aimed at countering misinformation and disinformation and strengthening societal resilience across all age groups, with particular attention to vulnerable groups and minors; encourages targeted awareness-raising measures on the risks associated with relying on AI-driven tools for accessing news and on the importance of verifying sources before sharing information online, especially for users with large or influential audiences; further supports the development and promotion of initiatives designed to detect, signal and clearly label AI-generated or AI-manipulated content, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union legislation, in order to enhance transparency, informed decision-making and responsible digital participation; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; | 20. Calls on the Commission to engage in close cooperation with the Belgian regulator in order to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, including the recruitment of saboteurs, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation, extremism and terrorist content within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; considers that the lack of transparency regarding Telegram’s links to Russian intelligence services, as well as doubts concerning the security of its servers and data handling practices, requires urgent clarification; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; | 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently assesses Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; calls on the Commission to ensure full transparency with the European Board for Digital Services regarding the methodology, data sources, and assumptions used in that assessment, and to reassess the platform without delay (if new evidence or changes in usage patterns emerge); urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; | 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a thorough evaluation of the factors behind the platform’s rapid growth and popularity, including its speech-permissive model and its stated resistance to direct influence by state actors; stresses that any consideration of classification as a VLOP under the DSA should take into account user demand for privacy, autonomy and minimal content intervention; further calls on the Commission and relevant authorities to ensure that investigations into alleged criminal activity, election interference or disinformation are evidence-based and proportionate, and invites continued dialogue with the platform on transparency and voluntary standards, while safeguarding freedom of expression and equal treatment across the digital information space; |
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; | 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality, as was the case with WhatsApp, and determine whether it meets the classification of a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; | 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, strongly encourages the platform to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and comply fully with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; | 20. Calls on the Commission to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation within the EU; furthermore, to take all available enforcement steps to ensure that the platform fully complies with EU transparency, content moderation and data access requirements to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 20 a. Notes that recent restrictions imposed by the Russian authorities on communication platforms, including Telegram, demonstrate the strategic importance of independent digital channels for the free exchange of information; emphasises that the fact that a platform faces pressure or criticism from multiple state actors should not in itself be treated as evidence of alignment with any particular foreign interest; calls, therefore, for assessments of foreign interference risks to remain strictly evidence-based, proportionate and respectful of freedom of communication; calls on the Union to exercise self-restraint and reflection when considering restrictive measures against such services, ensuring that actions taken in the name of security do not mirror the very practices of control and limitation of communication that it seeks to criticise elsewhere; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 20 a. Considers that the sale of TikTok’s US operations to American companies may serve as an example for strengthening European technological sovereignty; believes that the Union should assess and pursue comparable approaches; at the same time, expresses concern about the implications of the TikTok US sale for ongoing and future Commission investigations under the Digital Services Act (DSA), as well as for TikTok’s content moderation obligations concerning US-origin content accessible to users in the Union, in accordance with the DSA; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 20 a. Recommends that the sanctions taken against platforms be used to pay independent and reliable media as defined by sectorial standards, such as the Journalism Trust Initiative; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; | 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; calls on the Commission to ensure that future legislation clarifies distinction between “ad” or “organic” content via uniform transparency labels across different platforms in order to ensure that consumers understand whether content has been paid for or not; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; calls in this regard on the Commission to continue to enforce the Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising, especially when it comes to online platforms and to facilitate compliance for influencers via the envisioned “Influencer Hub”; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; | 21. Recalls that influencers enjoy freedom of expression and contribute to a lively and pluralistic media landscape; rejects any endeavours of incentivising, funding, controlling or channeling content creators; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; | 21. Recommends further mapping and examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for targeted awareness-raising and voluntary guidance to help influencers recognise and resist manipulation and covert influence operations, including those originating from third countries; reiterates the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators in full respect of freedom of speech, opinion and expression and the right to information, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; | 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly, in the EU and globally; Welcomes the commitment of the Commission to assess the role of online influencers in the upcoming evaluation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive; stresses, in this regard, the need for competent authorities to provide, and for online platforms to adopt, robust standards on transparency, including into all forms of platform-facilitated payments, and on information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; | 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; welcomes the commitment of the European Commission to assess the role of online influencers in the upcoming evaluation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; |
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; | 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; welcomes the commitment of the European Commission to assess the role of online influencers in the upcoming evaluation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; | 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; calls on the Commission to address any remaining loopholes in this respect in the framework of the Digital Fairness Act; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; | 21. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; stresses, in this regard, the need for robust standards on transparency of funding, remuneration and sponsorship arrangements and information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and transparent; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21 a. Recalls that only press and audiovisual service publishers are subject to strict obligations, and that journalists are subject to ethical obligations; notes however that influencers are also producers of information and that, while their freedom of expression and freedom of enterprise should be respected, the public must be able to distinguish between those who express an individual opinion and those who aim or present themselves as providing the public with fact-based and trustworthy information; in as much as these influencers provide content that take the shape or is presented as quality information to the general public, additional requirements should fall on them in terms of information processing and methodology; recommends therefore the creation of a label of “information influencer”; note that this label should not be confused with actual journalist training; welcomes any attempts at establishing standards for responsible online influencers, such as France’s Certificat de l’influence responsable delivered by the Autorité de régulation professionnelle de la publicité; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21 a. Calls on the Commission to ensure citizens' access to reliable and editorially independent sources of information (as per EMFA article 3) and to include, particularly in the context of the upcoming revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, measures aimed at strengthening the visibility of reliable and editorially independent sources of information, including on online platforms, so that they prioritise reliable news sources by default, rather than promoting disinformation and propaganda; calls on the Commission to consider measures requiring social media algorithms to prioritise reliable news sources by default, rather than promoting disinformation and propaganda; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21 a. Expresses deep concern regarding the media offensive waged by Israeli state apparatuses against European sovereignty, denouncing the structural convergence between the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and the private cyber-surveillance industry led by former members of Unit 8200; firmly condemns the covert funding of influencers and astroturfing campaigns aimed at manipulating public opinion and whitewashing military operations, calling for the immediate cessation of such hybrid warfare practices that import the logic of occupation into the democratic space of the European Union; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21 a. calls for the establishment of a mandatory European public register of influence operators linked to third countries, including foundations, NGOs, cultural centres, religious entities, publishing platforms, media outlets and actors engaged in the production or amplification of political content; stresses that registration must entail the obligation to declare foreign funding, beneficial ownership and institutional partnerships; considers that failure to register should result in ineligibility for any form of direct or indirect Union funding; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 21 a. Calls on the Commission to encourage brands to work together with influencers who can be certified voluntarily to ensure they have the knowledge of legal rules applicable to their activities, giving brands cooperating with certified influencers assurance that their products are marketed in a legally compliant manner and enabling users to place greater trust in influencers; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; | 22. Considers building an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be an indispensable strategic pillar of digital resilience and strategic autonomy, ensuring that Europeans’ personal data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a strong and water-tight definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; proposes a labelling scheme to better distinguish the level of sovereignty a data centre provider can offer (grade A-D) in order to ensure full transparency and clarity and avoid “sovereignty washing”; highlights recent developments around Nexperia, a Dutch chip manufacturer that was acquired by the Chinese company Wingtech or Solvinity, the company running the Dutch public e-ID infrastructure, being bought by US-based Kyndryl; points out the complexities around foreign ownership and investment of essential infrastructures and the importance of a requirements of effective control, even if the party the government entered into procurement with is initially European; calls on the Commission and the Member States to do a digital autonomy stress test by mapping dependencies on large commercial tech companies for essential public services across the EU and perform a stress test of these digital infrastructures; calls on the Commission to present a clear strategy on how the EU can become more resilient and secure in this regard, as the dependencies on growing-owned essential infrastructures not only weakens our competitiveness, but puts our security at risk; urges the Commission to increase efforts in funding a truly European tech ecosystem to ensure that Europe is independent from foreign influence across the entire value chain; calls on the Commission to react to the unsuccessful creation of cybersecurity schemes and in particular on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services, and to act decisively together with the co-legislators in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, to include the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to the concentration of power and the impact of third country legislation; urges the Member States to speed up the development of regulatory sandboxes already mandated under EU law, laments that many Member States have not yet fulfilled their obligations in order to do so, putting legal certainty at risk; calls for increased funding mechanisms to support sovereign innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; calls upon the Commission to ensure immediate and long-term funding of elements structurally necessary for EU online platform initiatives to succeed, such as common content moderation solutions, technical infrastructure and the development of innovative business models for the integration of media and journalistic content on social media platforms that make sure that the majority of the revenues goes to those creating the content, s designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; is worried in this regard that the efforts of the Commission in the area of simplification have led to a lot of legal uncertainty, hampering innovation especially of small players; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; | 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; stresses that their algorithmic systems should promote access to diverse and reliable information while avoiding amplification mechanisms that foster disinformation, manipulation or societal polarisation; calls on the Commission to propose a comprehensive EU-wide strategy to ensure that the EU can attract, maintain and retain critical technologies within the EU, including by limiting foreign takeovers; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; | 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of a competitive, pluralistic and innovation-driven European digital ecosystem, including European social media platforms designed in accordance with fundamental rights, freedom of expression and user choice, without creating de facto monopolies or imposing political or ideological bias and without undermining the free market and competition, ensuring that citizens remain free to choose which platforms they use, including non-EU platforms, in full respect of subsidiarity and proportionality; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; | 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres and further considers that the monetisation of disinformation, FIMI and content produced by sanctions-listed or hostile state-controlled entities constitutes a systemic risk under the DSA and must lead to immediate corrective measures, including the introduction of proper oversight and governance of revenue-redistribution mechanisms; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; | 22. Considers resilient and competitive digital infrastructure in Europe, including secure data centres and strong cloud and edge-computing capacities, to be an important pillar of digital resilience and economic growth; stresses that policies in this area should strengthen Europe’s technological capabilities while preserving openness, competition and interoperability with global partners; calls on the Commission to propose a clear and proportionate definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act, avoiding unnecessary barriers to innovation and investment; invites the Commission to address the outstanding discussions on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to present a balanced and workable solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account both cybersecurity concerns and the need to maintain a dynamic and competitive market; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and targeted funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in strategically important sectors; further supports the long-term development of diverse and competitive social media platforms in Europe that respect transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; | 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to make every effort to enable the design, development and deployment of a genuine European sovereign cloud; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; |
Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Tomáš Zdechovský, Sandra Kalniete, Lena Düpont, Lukas Mandl, Eszter Lakos, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Ana Miguel Pedro, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is not stored in foreign data centres; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; calls on the Commission to reflect on the unsuccessful discussion on the EU cybersecurity certification scheme for cloud services and to propose a tangible solution in the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, taking into account the cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns related to a concentration of power; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; | 22. Considers an EU digital infrastructure, including secure local data centres and sovereign EU cloud and edge computing capacities, to be a strategic pillar of digital resilience, ensuring that Europeans’ sensitive data is protected from risks associated with storage in foreign data centres, in particular exposure to extraterritorial legislation, welcomes the proposal for a revised Cybersecurity Act (CSA) introducing strengthened EU cybersecurity certification schemes; calls on the Commission to prioritise the swift adoption of cloud certification schemes (EUCS) taking into account cybersecurity and sovereignty concerns; calls on the Commission to propose the scope of their application in the planned Cloud and AI Development Act; urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support innovation by EU tech start-ups, particularly in sectors with critical dependencies; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, freedom of expression and democratic accountability; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22 a. Urges the Commission to swiftly adjust procurement rules and, together with the Member States, to mainstream 'buy European' policies in government institutions, schools, hospitals and other civil bodies; welcomes the EU Parliament’s attempts to transition to its own cloud infrastructure, but warns that such half-measures can create a false sense of security as metadata remains exposed, and, more importantly, software solutions provided by foreign entities can be abused to "lock out" the Parliament from accessing its data, effectively rendering it useless; urges the EU institutions to urgently make European and open-source software available to their employees, drawing on the experience of other state entities in Germany, Denmark, Austria and France, which have made significant progress in reducing their reliance on foreign technology and saving on licensing fees; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22 a. Strongly suggests that all digital infrastructure used for national transparency registers or democratic reporting systems should be based on Open Source software to allow for continuous public security audits; welcomes in this regard the Commission’s planned Open Source strategy as part of its sovereignty package; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22 a. Recognises the availability of gigabit networks as a fundamental prerequisite for strengthening the robustness of digital networks, enabling the deployment and uptake of advanced, secure digital infrastructures; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 22 b. Emphasises that EU leadership is required to support building value-driven innovative solutions made in Europe; calls upon the Commission to adequately fund the development and scaling of European initiatives to avoid the risk of venture capitalist capture; notes an array of good EU examples for European alternatives, ranging from GPT-NL, an initiative creating a generative AI-system based on fairly remunerated content from publishers, the creative sector and researchers, or the SURF initiative of Dutch universities to become independent from big tech and jointly procure their own digital software and infrastructures with the goal to safeguard the quality of civic discourse, strengthen democratic resilience, and reduce strategic dependence on foreign platforms whose design and governance models have been shown to undermine democratic processes in the Union; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; | 23. Calls on the Commission, national competent authorities and online platforms to ensure transparency in traditional monetization, revenue redistribution programmes and other platform-facilitated monetization services (such as fan tips, subscriptions, and branded content and affiliated marketing services.) that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; Notes that elections can generate heightened online engagement and attract financially motivated foreign actors, who may disrupt civic discourse and contribute disinformation; considers that theall monetisation of FIMI activities should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA and; urges the Commission to use the DSA risk assessment procedure to gain insight into monetisation practises of VLOPs and VLOPSEs; stresses that the Commission should establish legal frameworks providing transparency on platforms’ monetisation practices and removing financial incentives for spreading misinformation on for-profit platforms; emphasizes that this includes addressing sponsored content and targeting algorithms that amplify false or misleading information; Stresses that efforts to demonetise disinformation through advertising, both online and in traditional media, should explicitly include candidate countries, in order to prevent regulatory loopholes and cross- border spill-over effects; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; | 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; stresses the need to effectively address the problem of monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes; calls, therefore, for systematic tracking and disclosure of monetisation algorithms and financial flows linked to online content, and for the effective demonetisation of disinformation and FIMI activities, including through the full use of Articles 27, 34, 35 and 38 of the DSA and the advertising repositories established under the DSA and the TTPA; stresses that platforms' recommender systems and AI assistants should ensure due prominence of trusted and editorially independent media and verified sources for news and civic information, including through enforceable ‘trusted sources by default’ settings, and that in the digital information space veracity must systematically outrank virality. |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; | 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; strongly calls on the Commission to ensure full transparency regarding the provision of public support and funding to civil society, including by publishing the relevant documents and contracts, the amounts of public money granted or promised, as well as the real ultimate beneficiaries, founders, stakeholders and donors, including where relevant financial sources originating from third countries; underlines that citizens have the right to information on the allocation of public funds to private entities and calls for rules comparable to those applied in the area of anti-money laundering; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; | 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes and other platform-facilitated monetization services, such as subscriptions or affiliated marketing services that could allow FIMI actors, perpetrators of transnational repression or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; stresses that efforts to demonetise disinformation financed through targeted advertising, both online and in traditional media, should explicitly include candidate and potential candidate countries, in order to prevent regulatory loopholes and crossborder spill-over effects, particularly as recent events have shown that candidate countries are often the focus of such disinformation campaigns and therefore particularly vulnerable; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; | 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA, including where such monetisation channels are used by non-state actors, networks or intermediaries identified in national security and intelligence assessments ; considers that the monetisation of disinformation, FIMI and content produced by sanctions-listed or state-controlled entities constitutes a systemic risk under the DSA and must lead to immediate corrective measures, including the suspension of revenue-sharing mechanisms; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; | 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; and calls for enhanced cooperation between digital regulators, financial intelligence units and law enforcement authorities to detect and disrupt the illicit financing of disinformation campaigns |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; | 23. Calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctions-listed entities to earn income; underlines that advertising and revenue-sharing policies and opaque algorithms indirectly incentivise the spread of manipulative or harmful content; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23 a. Is concerned that online platforms’ monetisation services, especially on social media, can and have been exploited to undermine electoral integrity, including by incentivising and amplifying content that interferes with democratic processes; further acknowledges that social media companies have continued to roll-out of monetisation programmes and services, despite potential violations against sanctions regimes or their own terms of service; laments that this has contributed to the emergence of new disinformation actors and networks, incentivising the production of harmful content and, in some cases, facilitating the evolution of such actors into providing coordinated political manipulation or scamming campaigns as a service for hire; calls, in this regard, urgently for online platforms to halt such monetisation schemes until full transparency into the actors can be provided, and to ensure transparency regarding the monetisation status of accounts found to violate platform terms of service or policies, including where monetisation has been suspended, restricted or terminated; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23 a. recalls that excessive regulation risks slowing down innovation and investment, and stresses that the success of digital companies is primarily driven by competition, openness and technological excellence rather than protectionism; underlines the strong transatlantic tradition of freedom of expression, notably reflected in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and considers the United States in this regard as a key partner rather than a competitor; further recalls that users expect platforms to protect freedom of expression, transparency and due process, rather than rely on excessive control or centralised content management; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23 a. Recalls that algorithms of online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use data about the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making these platforms more influential than traditional publishers; thus, considers the current practices of online advertising, namely behavioural advertising and similar techniques which violate the right to privacy, as well as the use of behavioural targeting by recommender systems, to be deeply vulnerable to exploitation by malign actors in FIMI campaigns, rendering them a national security threat; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23 a. Is appalled by the reports that Meta earned 10% of its overall annual revenue in 2024 from ads for scams and banned goods, exposing users to 15 billion scam ads per day, and reportedly developed an internal playbook aimed at sidestepping pressure from regulators to crack down on scam advertising on its platforms; Welcomes the request for information made to Meta by the Commission, but calls on the latter to launch a DSA investigation into this matter and to ensure Meta and other VLOPs halt this practice; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23 a. Commends the Commission’s commitment to working towards the demonetisation of disinformation; recalls that disinformation cannot be demonetised without adequate transparency into existing monetisation practices and policies by online platforms; notes that updated monetisation rules should not penalise genuine creators and media outlets, and that they should be compensated for lost revenue in the event of erroneous or unfair demonetisation; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23 a. Stresses that, alongside foreign information manipulation and interference, domestic disinformation ecosystems and platform incentive structures can also undermine democratic debate; calls on the Commission to explicitly recognise and address these dynamics with effective measures, including through systemic risk assessments and mitigation measures under the DSA. |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23 a. Denounces the support provided by certain political parties, including the Hungarian governing party Fidesz, which echo narratives originating outside the EU and contribute to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), thereby undermining the European Democracy Shield, weakening the Union’s digital legislation and eroding democratic values; |
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23 b. Notes with concern that online platforms, including Meta, have reported granting access to their monetisation services to politicians and government actors in the EU, despite having ostensibly implemented restrictions to prevent this; acknowledges the risk of online platforms facilitating access to illicit financing through their monetisation services; calls on the Commission, EU digital regulators and online platforms to ensure transparency of monetisation programs and services, and the management of risks to electoral integrity as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23 b. Calls on the Commission to undertake swift action to counter addictive design of dominant social media platforms, as well as the challenge presented by algorithmic manipulation, and the polarising affect of targeted algorithmic recommender systems and ad targeting, both by leveraging existing tools and proposing new legal instruments for any remaining gaps; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 23 c. Calls to set up an inquiry committee on the Commission's implementation and enforcement of the EU digital rulebook; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; | 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI and to consider whether any further legislative action is needed in this respect; stresses, furthermore, the urgent need to develop secure EU-based data infrastructures, sovereign cloud capabilities and sustained long-term investment in European digital platforms aligned with democratic values, fundamental rights and the rule of law. |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; | 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; further notes that similar risks of bias and deliberate steering of voters towards particular political parties or positions may also arise from traditional tools, including voting advice applications and content produced by organisations or media outlets presenting themselves as non-partisan; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; | 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to critically asses chatbot outputs and data-protection safeguards for chatbot voting aids (transparency and data inputs, limits on profiling and data minimisation) in line with EU data protection rules and deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; | 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; underlines that the revision of the Cybersecurity Act (CSA) must ensure a high common level of data security, particularly for the most sensitive data; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; | 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission AI Office to investigate to what extent such practices are in breach of applicable law, in particular the AI Act, and deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; | 24. Notes with concern the findings - of the Dutch data protection authority, which are indicative of wider concerns across the Union, indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI; | 24. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 a. Welcomes the forthcoming Digital Fairness Act as an important step to strengthen consumer protection, fairness and transparency in the digital environment and to address harmful commercial practices; furthermore, underlines its relevance in mitigating risks linked to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), insofar as such risks are facilitated by opaque and manipulative online practices aiming at influencing citizens; stresses that tackling these threats requires addressing systemic features of platform design and monetisation, in particular engagement-based and polarisation-driven business models that incentivise the amplification of divisive, sensationalist and misleading content to the detriment of consumers and democratic resilience; calls on the Commission to address these loopholes without delay. |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 a. Expresses concern about the growing negative impact of social media platforms on the physical and mental health, well-being and development of children, including through addictive design features, exposure to harmful content and manipulative practices; recalls Parliament’s position for ambitious EU action to protect minors online, including the introduction of a harmonised EU-wide digital minimum age for access to social media; calls on the Commission to explore and advance effective age-assurance mechanisms, while fully respecting minors’ privacy and data protection; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 a. Calls on big-tech companies to sustain funding to internet freedom organizations for open-source circumvention, VPN, and secure-messaging projects in repressive autocratic regimes, such as Iran, China and Russia; Is concerned by the gradual rollback in corporate commitments to internet-freedom initiatives, cutting funding for open-source projects that protect human rights defenders; Believes that scaling-back support for circumvention technologies leaves millions vulnerable to surveillance and coercion; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 a. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to step up a EU-wide digital literacy actions specifically tailored to AI-mediated political information, including practical guidance that shall enable citizens to verify sources and provenance, recognize hallucinations, bias and manipulation, understand the effects of personalisation and recommender systems, and avoid over-reliance on chatbot outputs when forming electoral choices. |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 a. Regrets that, whereas even small organizations like Bits of Freedom in the Netherlands have been able to enforce provisions of the DSA which VLOPs have bluntly disrespected through court actions, the Commission is yet no act decisively in that regard; Calls on the Commission to urgently conclude its multiple ongoing investigations; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 a. Calls for the Code of Practice on Disinformation to be reconsidered and revised as it may lead to de facto content moderation, political steering and over-removal of lawful content, thereby restricting fundamental rights and freedoms, including the freedom of expression and the right to receive and impart information; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 a. Notes that media literacy, civic education and AI-supported informational tools must respect parental rights and the diversity of moral and religious traditions across Member States, in accordance with Article 14(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and must remain pluralistic and non-prescriptive; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 a. Highlights the need to prohibit any entity found to be utilising or facilitating the use of unauthorised intrusive surveillance technology from receiving any Union funding, public procurement contracts nor official access to the Union institution or its public servants; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 b. Calls on the Commission to propose a Union-level legislative framework requiring mandatory identity verification on social media platforms, in particular Very Large Online Platforms, with the objective of ensuring that each user account corresponds to a natural person using their legal name and identity; stresses that such verification should be carried out through secure and privacy-preserving mechanisms, including the European Digital Identity (eID) Wallet or equivalent trusted solutions, whereby the verification system confirms to the platform only whether the identity corresponds to a valid legal person, without transmitting personal data or identity documents; underlines that access to verified identity data by public authorities must be strictly limited to clearly defined legal conditions, such as judicial authorisation; emphasises that these measures should complement, and not replace, platforms’ obligations under the Digital Services Act to mitigate systemic risks and safeguard democratic discourse; stresses that this approach is essential to enhance transparency and digital accountability and to prevent foreign information manipulation and interference, coordinated inauthentic behaviour, bot farms and covert political campaigning, while fully respecting freedom of expression and data protection; |
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri, Fidias Panayiotou
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 b. Emphasizes that, according to the established case law of the European Court of Human Rights, freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and applies not only to information and ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb; underlines that democratic debate cannot be subjected to political gatekeeping or ideological !truth control”, including through indirect pressure on platforms and intermediaries; recalls that restrictions on speech must be exceptional, strictly necessary and proportionate and must never result in the suppression of lawful content; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 b. Calls on the Commission, as well as EU institutions and Member States to ensure that any transparency or security measures within the Democracy Shield framework adhere to the principle of data minimisation; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 c. Stresses the need fully respect freedom of expression and information, including freedom of opinion, as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the European Convention on Human Rights, underlines that any restrictions of these freedoms must be exceptional, strictly necessary and proportionate; recalls that measures against disinformation must not be used as a pretext for censorship, political interference or ideological filtering of public debate, and should focus on combating illegal content and clearly criminal conduct, including direct incitement to violence; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 24 d. Stresses that there is a significant risk that the measures aimed at combating disinformation and foreign interference may be misused to justify monitoring of citizens and businesses in the Union, to exert undue influence on public debate and to create a chilling effect on lawful speech; warns that public authorities, or private platforms under public pressure, may end up acting de facto as regulators of political debate through “soft law” arrangements, voluntary codes, guidance or quasi-licensing schemes, leading to the removal, suppression or downranking of lawful content; underlines that a clear distinction must be preserved between legitimate protection of democratic processes and censorship; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Freedom of speech | Freedom of expression |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; | 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; recalls that the VLOPs exclusive and intransparent control over amplification or suppression of speech on their platforms is currently the greatest threat to freedom of expression in democratic countries; calls upon the Commission to investigate politically motivated censorship, such as the recent cases of TikTok’s censorship of messages, following the change in ownership, containing the word “Epstein” or Metas censorship of pro-Palestinian content; notes in this regard that the amplification of certain content or opinions, and the silencing of others, constitutes a breach of freedom of expression; calls on the Commission to ensure that platforms are held accountable in this regard under the DSA; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; | 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI, and to promote accountability for actions in the digital public space; and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; calls on online platforms to enable users to choose to interact primarily or exclusively with verified or authenticated accounts, thereby allowing the creation of online spaces less exposed to automated or inauthentic behaviour, without restricting access to the digital public sphere for other users; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; | 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must respect freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU used to be among the strongest worldwide; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental right that protects against restrictions imposed by the state; |
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; | 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield is intended to protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; insists on the fact that free speech cannot be used as an argument to protect information manipulation; recalls that whatever is illegal in Europe will remain so until the European citizens decide otherwise, no matter the external pressure put on the EU and the Member States; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; | 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses that very large online platforms and major digital technology providers must therefore acknowledge and effectively address the broader societal and democratic consequences of their services, including through robust risk-mitigation and accountability measures; stresses that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers have a shared responsibility to safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information have been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; | 25. Underlines that freedom of expression is a universal human right, as clearly stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights; takes the firm view that any legislation at EU or national level, including the European Democracy Shield, must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable both offline and online; highlights that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU environment and attract European customers share a responsibility to respect and safeguard those protections; stresses, however, that the freedoms of expression and information are designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibit inauthentic behaviour, such as AI- and bot-driven amplification and engagements, and automated software programmes performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 a. Emphasises that culture is a strategic pillar of the European project, as cultural freedom, heritage and creativity foster democratic participation, critical thinking and trust in democratic institutions; stresses that programmes such as AgoraEU play a key role in translating these values into tangible support, including in the audiovisual sector by fostering independence throughout the entire value chain, and in the music and book sectors by promoting independent labels and publishing houses; regrets that attacks on liberal democracy increasingly target artists, cultural actors and institutions through censorship, intimidation, funding cuts or political pressure; stresses therefore that protecting artistic freedom and cultural institutions is an integral part of safeguarding liberal democracy and freedom of expression in the Union; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 a. Stresses that freedom of expression and media pluralism constitute core pillars of democratic societies; recalls that online platforms, including large social media platforms, play an essential role in enabling open public debate, journalistic activity and political pluralism; warns against the risk that the enforcement of digital legislation, including the DSA, may be perceived or applied in a manner that disproportionately targets specific platforms or viewpoints; underlines that regulatory action must not result in indirect censorship, political pressure or the silencing of unlawful speech under the pretext of combating disinformation; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 a. Stresses that the most effective and sustainable protection of freedom of expression and information lies in a high level of media and information literacy; underlines the importance of empowering citizens to critically assess, contextualise and decode information, including online content, algorithmic amplification and disinformation narratives; calls therefore for increased efforts at Union and Member State level to promote education, training and lifelong learning initiatives aimed at strengthening citizens’ critical thinking skills and resilience in the digital information environment; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 a. Stresses that the principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of EU law, requiring that rules must be clear and precise so that individuals can ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are; considers that the term disinformation lacks a sufficiently clear and universally accepted legal definition and remains inherently ambiguous; warns that basing legislative or restrictive measures on such vague concepts risks leading to arbitrary enforcement and to the suppression of legitimate political debate and lawful speech; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 a. Stresses that the principle of legal certainty (lex certa) is a fundamental principle of EU law, requiring that rules must be clear and precise so that individuals can ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are; considers that the term ‘disinformation’ lacks a precise legal definition in criminal law and is inherently ambiguous; warns that basing legislative or restrictive measures on such vague concepts inevitably leads to arbitrary enforcement and the suppression of legitimate political speech; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 a. Underlines that any measures envisaged under the European Democracy Shield that affect the visibility, ranking, dissemination or accessibility of lawful content may constitute interferences with freedom of expression under Article 11 of the Charter and must therefore be provided for by law, pursue a legitimate aim and comply strictly with necessity and proportionality in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 a. Stresses that freedom of expression, while a fundamental right, is not absolute and may be subject to proportionate and lawful limitations aimed at protecting democratic order, public security and the rights of others; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 b. Stresses that the Union must continue to actively counter narratives claiming that its digital and democratic legislation undermines freedom of expression; reaffirms that freedom of expression is a core value of the European Union and is firmly enshrined in its legal order and fundamental rights framework; underlines, however, that this freedom cannot be invoked to justify or legitimise illegal content or unlawful activities online; emphasises that the European Union and its Member States, as sovereign democratic entities, are fully entitled to determine and enforce their own legislation in accordance with Union law and international obligations; further emphasises that the Union’s regulatory framework in the digital and democratic sphere must not be subject to political or economic bargaining with third countries or private actors, and that the enforcement and further development of EU rules should remain guided solely by the protection of fundamental rights, democratic integrity and the interests of Union citizens ; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 b. Stresses that the DSA’s systemic-risk framework must not be interpreted or applied in a manner that effectively regulates or suppresses lawful political expression, including through indirect measures affecting content visibility or distribution; calls on the Commission to publish objective, predefined criteria governing when alleged foreign interference justifies EU-level action, in order to ensure legal certainty, equal treatment and democratic accountability; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 c. Emphasises that recommender systems and ranking mechanisms perform an editorial function comparable to that exercised by media actors; stresses that compelled disclosure or modification of such systems may engage protections under Articles 11, 16 and 17 of the Charter and must remain exceptional, strictly necessary and proportionate, subject to effective review; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 d. Stresses that the European Democracy Shield must draw a strict operational line between (i) countering externally directed FIMI operations and (ii) the moderation, ranking or downranking of lawful domestic political speech; calls on the Commission to ensure that Shield-related mechanisms, guidance or “protocols” are limited to clearly evidenced foreign manipulation and do not become a vehicle for general “speech management”; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 e. Calls for minimum rule-of-law safeguards for any EU-level situational-awareness or early-warning structures on FIMI, including public methodology, traceable evidentiary standards, records of actions taken, and meaningful possibilities for review and redress where platforms or authorities act on Shield-related referrals; stresses that executive-only “internal distribution” models are incompatible with democratic accountability; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 f. Emphasises that the use of privileged reporting channels (including “trusted flagger” style prioritisation) must be strictly limited to notifications concerning illegal content and must not be extended - directly or indirectly - to contested but lawful viewpoints; calls for transparency of participating entities, their funding, reporting volumes, error rates and dispute outcomes; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 g. Stresses that automated or large-scale dissemination of content does not in itself constitute foreign interference or disinformation where the underlying content is lawful and reflects human editorial intent; calls for the protection of such expression in line with Article 11 of the Charter; urges the Commission to affirm that automated content cannot be subject to pre-emptive removal or downgrade solely due to its format, provenance or volume absent concrete evidence of deceptive manipulation or illegal conduct; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 h. Stresses that privileged notice channels, including trusted flagger prioritisation, must be confined to illegal content and accompanied by strict transparency obligations; calls for annual publication of (i) the list of designated entities, (ii) EU and other public funding received, (iii) reporting volumes, (iv) error and reversal rates, and (v) complaint/outcome statistics, in order to assess independence and proportionality; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 i. Warns that broad and emotionally loaded categories such as “digital violence” risk collapsing the distinction between illegal threats and lawful political criticism; calls for clear definitional boundaries and for safeguards ensuring that Shield-related measures cannot be used to downrank or suppress lawful scrutiny of public authorities, political actors or public policy; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 j. Calls on the Commission, before instrumentalising the DSA for countering FIMI, to assess the cross-border cumulative effects of DSA enforcement and to ensure that content removal obligations remain territorially and legally proportionate, so that lawful expression in one Member State is not indirectly suppressed due to restrictions applicable in another; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 25 k. Calls on the Commission to systematically assess the systemic risk of over-removal of lawful content in the implementation of the DSA, including the impact of precautionary moderation, risk-avoidance behaviour by platforms and cumulative enforcement pressures on democratic discourse, before fielding the DSA against FIMI; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; | 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose;and to ensure that notice, reporting and redress mechanisms remain easy to access, user-friendly and effective in practice; calls on the Commission and national authorities to monitor the practical functioning of these mechanisms, including any design changes that may reduce reporting effectiveness, and to require corrective measures where necessary; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; | 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation and monetization decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content or account gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; stresses, in particular, the crucial need to address the role of recommender systems whose design and operation can significantly shape, prioritise and manipulate the information and feeds presented to users, with potential implications for pluralism, transparency and informed democratic participation; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; | 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; underlines the importance of ensuring equal access to high-quality content moderation across all European languages; calls on the Commission to take concrete EU-level action to address linguistic and regional disparities in content moderation capacity, including through targeted obligations, monitoring and enforcement measures; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; | 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to accessibly challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions, including before administrative and judicial authorities without facing excessive costs, and online platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for online platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; laments in this regard that not all online platforms have implemented the “notice and action” mechanism in accordance with the DSA; calls on the Commission to urgently finalise enforcement actions in this regard; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; | 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and obligation for platforms to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide full transparency and a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; notes, however, that debates in several Member States, have raised concerns regarding the risks of overregulation, excessive administrative powers over online content moderation, and the need to ensure democratic and judicial oversight in order to fully protect freedom of expression; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; | 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; further highlights the need for algorithmic pluralism in order to create a healthier public debate, reduce polarisation, and prevent the information space from being captured by disproportionately powerful entities; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; recalls the obligation under the DSA for platforms to provide a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; | 26. Recognises the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge platforms’ content moderation decisions and platforms’ obligations to inform users when their content is removed or restricted; recalls the obligations under the DSA for platforms to provide internal complaint-handling mechanisms; stresses that safeguarding fundamental rights also requires thorough assessments and mitigation of systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 a. Recalls that fact-checking and independent verification of information do not constitute censorship but rather a transparency and accountability tool aimed at identifying and correcting demonstrably false or misleading claims; underlines that the objective of fact-checking is not to restrict lawful expression but to provide citizens with contextualised, evidence-based information enabling informed choices and a healthier democratic debate; notes that corrective mechanisms such as "community notes" often suffer from structural limitations including delayed visibility, inconsistent quality standards, limited accountability, susceptibility to coordinated manipulation and insufficient reach in fast-moving information environments, and therefore cannot substitute for independent, professionally conducted fact-checking or robust platform risk-mitigation systems; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 a. Insists that the freedom to receive and impart information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), constitutes a fundamental pillar of a democratic society; recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that the public has a right to be informed on matters of public interest and that individuals have the right to share information and ideas ‘without interference by public authority’; underlines that restricting access to information on the subjective or contested grounds, including on the basis that it is ‘false’ or ‘misleading’, may constitute a disproportionate interference with this right; emphasises that the appropriate remedy for false speech is ‘counter-speech’ and open debate, not censorship; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 a. Condemns the Russian regime’s systematic falsification and use of distorted historical arguments, believes that these attempts undermine the collective memory and identity of Europe as a whole and represent a threat to historical truth, democratic values and peace in Europe; regrets the continued use of symbols of totalitarian regimes in public spaces and calls for an EU-wide ban on the use of both Nazi and Soviet communist symbols as well as symbols of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 a. Reaffirms that the determination of the illegality of content is the exclusive prerogative of the independent judiciary, not of private technology companies or administrative bodies; insists that no content should be permanently removed on the grounds of illegality without a prior judicial order or a decision by an independent authority subject to judicial review, in order to guarantee the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 a. Recalls that effective platform governance and media resilience depend on independent, adequately resourced regulators; calls on Member States to fully comply with the requirements on independence and resources applicable to Digital Services Coordinators and national media regulators; calls on the Commission to support training, technical assistance, and rapid cross-border coordination mechanisms so that regulators can keep pace with evolving manipulation tactics and technologies. |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 a. Calls the EU Member States to engage with journalists and media outlets in a transparent and balanced manner; condemns European governments and political parties which, in recent years, have filtered with a partisan bias the questions from journalists and vetoed unfavorable media outlets from press conferences, especially during health crises and humanitarian disasters, when clear and transparent information is more accutely needed; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 a. Recalls that social media platforms have bowed down to autocrats and military dictatorships, such as TikTok in Myanmar; highlights therefore that, contrary to their claim of defending freedom of expression, they cooperate with governments curtailing it; insists therefore on the need to fully implement European digital legislation towards them in order to preserve European freedom of expression; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 a. Emphasises that safeguards for users must fully respect freedom of expression and information as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter; stresses that content moderation decisions should be lawful, transparent, proportionate, and based on clear, objective and predictable rules, avoiding arbitrary or politically biased enforcement; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 b. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to examine avenues for clarifying the scope and practical applicability of the concept of editorial responsibility, as set out in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and the European Media Freedom Act, and its relationship with broader notions of media accountability in the digital environment; stresses that such clarification should aim to safeguard access to reliable news and the consistent application of professional journalistic standards, while reflecting evolving patterns of content creation and distribution; encourages, where appropriate, the gradual extension or voluntary adoption of editorial responsibility principles by emerging actors disseminating news or news-like content, including online content creators and digital media intermediaries, through proportionate and incentive-based approaches; underlines that strengthening awareness and uptake of editorial responsibility across relevant actors can contribute to more trustworthy information ecosystems and positive accountability structures, provided that any such measures fully respect media freedom, editorial independence and freedom of expression; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 b. Recalls the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights of 18 December 2012 in Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey), which recognised that the internet has become one of the principal means by which individuals exercise their right to freedom of expression and information; stresses that online platforms provide essential tools for participation in democratic life and discussions concerning political and public interest issues; warns that measures which block access to entire platforms or restrict lawful speech, including under vague pretexts such as “disinformation”, constitute particularly severe interference with Article 10 ECHR and risk creating a ‘chilling effect’ on democratic debate; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 b. Urges the EU institutions and the Member States to develop and employ effective measures to counter the ‘Ruscist’ nationalist imperialist ideology, policy and practices of the current Russian regime, and calls on them to ensure that the public denial, gross trivialisation or justification of crimes committed in the course of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the promotion of symbols and ideology associated with such aggression, are subject to effective penalties, including under criminal law; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 b. Expresses serious concern over legislative or executive actions in certain Member States that alter the governance mechanisms of public service broadcasters in ways that risk concentrating political influence over editorial boards or management; recalls that public service media must remain independent from government control; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 c. Encourages Member States to reinforce the role of editorial boards within public service radio and television broadcasters to safeguard editorial independence and freedom of the press; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 26 d. Condemns developments in certain Member States where public service broadcasters have turned into synchronised opinion teams, have increasingly aligned with the government’s communication strategies, marginalised opposition voices and prevented pluralistic debate, thereby undermining their role as independent watchdogs serving all citizens rather than incumbent governments; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; | 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; Calls, on Member States to swiftly implement the EMFA and urges the European Commission to ensure robust enforcement of its provisions and to take action when Member States fail to comply; notes that the failure to properly implement and enforce existing EU legislation constitute a serious threat to freedom of information; Stresses that very large online platforms are also failing to comply with their new obligations under the EMFA that aim to protect editorial content from undue removal or restriction of visibility; Calls on the Commission and the European Board for Media Services to investigate the non-compliance by very large online platforms and enforce the EMFA robustly; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; | 27. Takes the view that measures to promote and support free, credible and editorially independent media are central to guaranteeing democratic resilience in the Member States and may form an important part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict and consistent enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme; expresses the view that financial commitments in the upcoming MFF, including measures to strengthen media pluralism, transparency of media ownership and the sustainability of independent journalism, must not be aimed at interfering in the media landscape of the Member States; stresses that any EU funding in this area must remain politically neutral, transparent and based on objective, fair and non-discriminatory criteria, and must not be used to promote specific ideological agendas or to favour particular media outlets or journalists on the basis of their editorial positions towards the EU or its institutions; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; | 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; further stresses that safeguarding an independent and pluralistic media sector from political, economic or structural capture must be recognised as a precondition for ensuring information integrity and democratic resilience, rather than as a secondary or ancillary objective in policies aimed at combating disinformation; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; | 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; emphasises the indispensable role of strong, independent and properly funded public service media in countering disinformation; calls on the Commission and Member States to address the precarious working conditions of journalists which render the sector vulnerable to capture and external influence; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; | 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; observes that the current digital information environment often disadvantages media actors that assume editorial responsibility and public-interest obligations in favour of intermediaries that do not bear comparable duties; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; |
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; | 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; calls therefore for a swift implementation from the Member States and for the Commission to take appropriate action should one fail to comply; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; | 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA, the main provisions of which entered into application on 8 August 2025 ; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27. Takes the view that measures to promote free and editorially independent media are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; welcomes, in this regard, the ground-breaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; underlines, however, that the regulation’s significance can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice and therefore stresses the importance of strict enforcement; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience Programme and calls on matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; | 27. Takes the view that the Members States should promote free and editorially independent media; criticises overregulation and centralisation represented by EMFA and, where relevant, the DMA, as well as interference in Member States' media policies, including establishment of a new European Media Services Authority, which risks undermining Member States ‘competence and media pluralism, contrary to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; ; strongly supports media literacy and critical thinking, particularly through education and awareness-raising at national level; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 a. Notes that the Commission fails to acknowledge that the independent media sector is being financially damaged by the business practices of online advertising services, which themselves raise severe concerns on grounds of competition, privacy and consumer protection; calls on the Commission to move swiftly to ban online-behavioural advertising, as it represents both a threat to privacy and a national security risk, and further calls on all platforms to move towards contextual advertising as the standard model for advertising online;furthermore believes that failing to fix this core problem and instead using public funds to support independent media will end up ultimately subsidising the big tech companies that control the online advertising services; Calls on the Commission to study how EMFA, AVMSD, DMA and competition rules can contribute to and facilitate competitiveness and accessibility of online advertising services for all players in the value chain, including editorial media; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 a. Reiterates the findings of the European Court of Auditors’ 2021 report highlighting the absence of a coherent EU-wide approach to media literacy, including in addressing disinformation, the fragmented nature of related Union actions, and the limited scale, reach and demonstrable impact of many media literacy projects; calls on the Court of Auditors to carry out an updated assessment; cautions against further fragmentation through small-scale media literacy initiatives with limited budgets and effectiveness, and instead calls on the Commission and the Member States to explore alternative approaches to strengthening European traditional media, for example by introducing journalism vouchers for students to acquire traditional media publications, with a view to enhancing both access to and demand for trusted journalism; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 a. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that support under the Media Resilience Programme and other relevant Union instruments includes a dedicated, easily accessible strand for independent local and regional media, including micro-grants and simplified application procedures; stresses that such support should prioritise (i) continuity of local public-interest reporting, (ii) operational resilience, including cybersecurity and business continuity planning, and (iii) where relevant, collaborative cross border investigations involving local and regional outlets , while fully respecting editorial independence and applying transparent, objective and non-discriminatory selection criteria and “independence clauses” in Union grant agreements. |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 a. Calls on the Commission to increase cooperation with candidate or potential candidate countries and look into concrete measures to support national media regulators , including through association with the European Board for Media Services, participation in exchanges with EU regulators; calls on the Commission to make efforts to better involve candidate countries in the development and application of common criteria for independent media policy, as foreseen under the European Democracy Shield; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 a. Calls on the Commission to consider the appropriateness of proposing, at EU level, a clear and rights-based definition of ‘information integrity’, grounded in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the protection of freedom of expression and media freedom; underlines that any EU framework on information integrity must include explicit safeguards against censorship, including transparency obligations, judicial oversight and effective appeal and redress mechanisms. |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 a. Welcomes the Commission’s decision to open an infringement procedure against Hungary (INFR(2025)2194) for failure to comply with several provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 (European Media Freedom Act) and certain requirements under Directive (EU) 2018/1808 (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) and regards this step as clear evidence of the Commission’s vigilance in monitoring the proper transposition and application of Union media legislation; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 a. Expresses concern that one-sided EU funding distorts media independence and enforces a de facto ban on criticism of Union institutions and decisions; stresses that Union support must be politically neutral and must not favour left-wing media or any single viewpoint, with strong safeguards to prevent dependency or undue influence; |
Petras Auštrevičius, Dainius Žalimas, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Helmut Brandstätter
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 a. Notes that attempts to polarise society, weaken trust in democratic institutions and undermine independent media ecosystems serve the objectives of the hybrid warfare waged by the Russian Federation and other hostile powers against the EU and its Member States, which is aimed at eroding democratic resilience; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 b. Recognises the pivotal contribution of public service media to democratic life by ensuring that citizens throughout the entire territory, including remote and minority communities, have access to accurate and impartial information through a wide range of channels, formats and linguistic offerings, thereby helping to counter information manipulation, disinformation and the decline of local news provision; stresses that their credibility and effectiveness depend on strong guarantees of editorial and organisational autonomy, which Member States must uphold in line with the obligations set out in Article 5 of the European Media Freedom Act; further emphasises that public service broadcasters and media organisations should be equipped to evolve with technological and consumption trends so as to remain visible and competitive across emerging platforms and media environments, while continuing to operate within the Union’s framework on state aid and fair competition; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 b. Highlights the democratic role of public service media in providing access to reliable news to all citizens, covering the entire national or regional territory and reaching all segments of society through different distribution channels, in accessible formats and in minority languages, playing a crucial role in mitigating the risks of disinformation, FIMI and news desertification; Stresses the need to safeguard the independence of public service media through proper implementation of Article 5 of the EMFA by the Member States; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 b. Emphasises that support to independent media at local and regional level must be consistent with the Union’s obligations to respect freedom of expression and information and to safeguard media freedom and pluralism; calls for enhanced transparency of beneficiaries and decision-making, and for safeguards to prevent political conditionality or discriminatory allocation. |
Petras Auštrevičius, Dainius Žalimas, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Helmut Brandstätter
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 b. Recognises and appreciates the essential role of public media, in particular national public service media providers, in upholding and promoting the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and in countering disinformation, propaganda and other forms of information manipulation and hybrid interference, thereby safeguarding a pluralistic and resilient democracy; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 c. Calls on the Commission to undertake a comprehensive and forward-looking assessment of whether the existing obligations under both the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act adequately capture the rapid evolution and societal impact of advanced artificial-intelligence functionalities, in particular generative AI systems and interfaces; invites the Commission, where market power or systemic information risks so justify, to consider the introduction of tailored regulatory categories or the adaptation of existing designations in order to ensure effective safeguards for contestability, transparency, media pluralism and democratic integrity in emerging AI-mediated environments, while preserving technological neutrality, legal certainty and proportionality; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 c. Deeply regrets existing or attempted ‘capture’ of public service media in some Member States; requests that the Commission monitor any developments concerning media freedom and public service media independence in such Member States, to assess the compliance of the adopted and pending legislation with the EMFA and the principle of the rule of law; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 d. Calls on the Member States to safeguard and uphold the independence of national public broadcasters by ensuring adequate financial and technical means, as well as transparent procedures for the appointment and dismissal of public service media management, in order to fulfil public broadcasters' social function and serve the public interest, in line with the EMFA; calls for minimum European-level standards and recommendations to bridge the gaps in national rules and approaches on these matters; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 d. Calls for the creation of fair and enabling market conditions that recognise and reward the production of high-quality, editorially responsible journalism, and encourages the development of innovative and sustainable economic models capable of supporting long-term investment in professional news production, media pluralism and the resilience of the democratic information ecosystem; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 e. Calls for strengthened safeguards to preserve the value and integrity of journalistic content within the rapidly evolving artificial-intelligence ecosystem, including through the effective enforcement of copyright and neighbouring rights, fair remuneration mechanisms and robust transparency obligations for AI services that generate or disseminate news-like material; stresses that such measures are essential to prevent the unauthorised appropriation, distortion or devaluation of professional journalistic work and to ensure that innovation in AI develops in a manner compatible with media pluralism, authors’ rights and the sustainability of independent news production; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 e. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to recognise investigative journalism as a core component of democratic resilience and to ensure that public service media is structurally and financially capable of supporting investigative journalism, including long-term and resource-intensive investigations, and that journalists are protected from any form of political pressure, intimidation or retaliation, whether direct or indirect, in response to the lawful exercise of their professional duties; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 27 f. Calls for media freedom, media pluralism and citizens’ access to reliable and independently produced information to be explicitly and consistently integrated into the design and implementation of Union and national digital, geopolitical and security strategies; stresses that the protection of the information space should be recognised as a core component of democratic resilience and strategic autonomy; underlines that policies relating to cybersecurity, foreign policy, defence, digital governance and crisis preparedness should systematically assess their potential impact on the media ecosystem and information integrity; emphasises that embedding these considerations at a strategic level would strengthen coherence across policy domains, enhance the Union’s capacity to counter disinformation and hybrid threats, and ensure that security objectives are pursued in a manner fully compatible with fundamental rights, transparency and the public’s right to information; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; | 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; emphasises quality journalism, news outlets and publishers are suffering under recommender systems of Very Large Online Platforms that are based on engagement-based ranking, which promote shocking and short content and AI-mode of search engines, both leading to less traffic to their websites, while taking into account root causes for the financial struggles of media companies, which is declining revenue, for example due to a lack of competitionin the digital advertising ecosystem, skewed recommender systems, and AI-modes in search engines; Notes that a large majority of news publishers are struggling to diversify their revenue in the future; Stresses the need to support news outlets and publishers in developing online advertising models that are not based on tracking of personal data, to increase their financial independence and ensure direct revenue streams, channelling them directly to the independent media, rather than digital online advertising systems that take a large cut of the profit; calls in that context on the Commission to support the development of a European online contextual advertising infrastructure that all news outlets can sign up to ; urges the Commission segment the online advertising market, separating offer, demand and the bidding markets to segment the monopoly Google currently has while being dominant in every segment of the online advertising market; welcomes in this context the 2.95 billion fine against Google over abusive practices in online advertising technology1a, but emphasises the need for more structural measures; |
| 1a https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1992 |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; | 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of current EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; invites the Commission to duly take into account, where relevant, considerations relating to media freedom, media pluralism and the economic resilience of editorial actors when preparing new legislative and non-legislative initiatives, including in related areas such as digital governance, competition policy and consumer protection ; highlights, in this context, the importance of the Commission’s Rule of Law Report and in particular its pillar on media freedom and independence as an essential early-warning and monitoring instrument for identifying emerging risks, structural weaknesses or undue interference affecting the media landscape in the Member States, and stresses that its findings should be duly taken into account in the design, evaluation and adjustment of Union policies and legislation in the digital and democratic sphere; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; | 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; stresses that safeguarding independent journalism must not result in financial dependency or indirect influence through public funding, minimum standards or eligibility criteria; recalls that media independence requires editorial autonomy, including for critical, adversarial and economically fragile outlets; insists that a concern for sustainability cannot override the market principle of allowing insolvency for business models that have failed; |
Sandro Ruotolo, Krzysztof Brejza, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Saskia Bricmont, Diana Riba i Giner, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Hannah Neumann, Leoluca Orlando, Chloé Ridel, Brando Benifei, Lucia Yar, Raffaele Topo, Marco Tarquinio, Daniel Freund, Pierfrancesco Maran
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; | 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; notes that the failure to properly implement and enforce existing EU legislation constitute a serious threat to freedom of information; recalls that the use of spyware against journalists hampers their ability to carry out their work by undermining and ultimately destroying the essential relationship of trust with their sources; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; | 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU initiatives on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; calls for evidence-based impact assessments and structured consultation of media stakeholders ahead of initiatives that might affect the viability of European media companies; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; | 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; calls on the Commission to examine the need to clarify the rules with regards to the use of spyware and monitoring tools; |
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; | 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and economic and editorial viability viability of media companies’ business models; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; | 28. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU legislation on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding pluralism, as well as the sustainability and viability of media companies’ business models; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28 a. Expresses alarm at the weaponisation of the online advertising supply chain by state-sponsored actors to engage in hybrid warfare, as exemplified by Operation Doppelgänger, where advertising was used to redirect users to cloned websites impersonating legitimate European media outlets; calls on the Commission to facilitate the development of minimum technical standards for harmonised repositories of advertisements of very large online platforms, and to introduce strict traceability obligations for the entire online advertising supply chain to prevent malicious actors from monetising disinformation content; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28 a. Calls on the Commission to introduce a dedicated sub-pillar on disinformation within the media freedom and media pluralism pillar of the Rule of Law Report, in order to systematically assess the impact of disinformation, information manipulation and coordinated inauthentic behaviour on the media ecosystem, democratic debate and editorial independence in the Member States, and to strengthen the Report’s function as a preventive and early-warning instrument in the Union’s democratic resilience framework; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28 a. Welcomes efforts to protect independent media providers against anticompetitive practices in online advertising; notes that current market dynamics in digital advertising can favour large online platforms to the detriment of professional European media companies; calls on the Commission to explore measures to improve transparency, fair competition and the sustainability of European editorial media, including through incentives for advertisers to invest in trusted European editorial media; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28 a. Call on the Commission to consider introducing a digital tax on major online platforms, with part of the proceeds used to fund public interest journalism. It would be fair for these platforms — who profit enormously from the work of others, including journalists, while absorbing an increasing share of the advertising revenues that used to sustain journalism — to contribute to the system they rely on; |
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28 a. Stresses that access to quality and reliable information is essential in the fight against mis- and disinformation, especially in today’s competitive digital environment; recalls that the AVMSD acknowledges the freedom of Member States to take measures to ensure the prominence of media services of general interest; deplores however that only a few Member States have taken action; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28 a. Recommends the Commission to introduce a digital tax on major online platforms with part of it being versed in the Media Resilience Programme; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28 b. Invites the Commission to ensure that the annual Rule of Law Report, and in particular its chapter on media freedom and media pluralism, systematically incorporates clear quantitative indicators, comparable statistical data and year-to-year trend analysis, in order to improve transparency, strengthen early-warning capacity and enable evidence-based policy action at both Union and Member State level; |
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 28 b. Highlights the democratic role of public service media in providing access to reliable news to all citizens, covering the entire national or regional territory and reaching all segments of society through different distribution channels, in accessible formats and in minority languages, playing a crucial role in mitigating the risks of disinformation, FIMI and news desertification; |
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- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
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- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2026). “AMENDMENTS 835 - 1105 - Draft report Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield”. Text, 12 February 2026. docId EUDS-AM-784407. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/EUDS-AM-784407 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: EP Open Data API: document record, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/api/v2/documents/EUDS-AM-784407 (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-euds-am-784407,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{AMENDMENTS 835 - 1105 - Draft report Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield}},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-02-12},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/EUDS-AM-784407}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/EUDS-AM-784407},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. docId EUDS-AM-784407. Data: EP Open Data API: document record (CC BY 4.0)}
}