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Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

ECON-PR-787030 → A-10-2026-0214

From
ECON-PR-787030 report parliamentary committee draft of 15 Apr 2026
To
A-10-2026-0214 Plenary report of 31 Jul 2026
Changes
11 changes to the text
Paragraphs
+45 added · −18 removed · 7 changed
More facts (3)
Title (from)
on the global role of the euro
Title (to)
on the global role of the euro
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 18 Sept 2026

The report adds new recitals and an explanatory statement setting out the euro's global position, the dollar's dominance, geopolitical tensions and the case for a stronger international role.111 It adds calls for the EU to promote global interoperability, strengthen its monetary and geopolitical influence, and pursue a balanced approach to financial stability and digital finance.239 It replaces or drops paragraphs on foreign infrastructure dependence, stablecoins, industrial policy and a sovereignty fund, and adds text on payment infrastructure, the digital euro, swap lines, safe assets and a joint strategy by the end of 2026.4678 It adds hedging to the activities market participants should be able to carry out in euro across cross-border value chains.5

The notes class 11 changes as substance, 0 as formal, 0 as wording only.

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Every difference

The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.

Part 2 of 3: Paragraphs 61–76

Removed14. Calls for the development of a deep and liquid common European safe asset as a key precondition for strengthening the euro’s international role; points out that EU safe assets can provide high-quality collateral in international repo markets and offer a euro-denominated liquidity buffer alongside public backstops; underlines that, within the EU, such assets would reduce financing costs, help create a genuine European bond yield curve, which would deepen capital market integration, and weaken the bank-sovereign nexus;

Added24. Stresses that reinforcing the euro’s role across cross-border value chains requires the further expansion of bilateral swap lines with EU Member States and internationally, which remain currently restricted; points out that expanding the Eurosystem’s international liquidity backstops to partner jurisdictions can help safeguard euro liquidity abroad, as well as financial stability within the euro area, and thereby enhance the offshore use of the euro; highlights that liquidity lines, such as repo lines, are not substitutes for permanent foreign currency swap lines, which are essential for fostering deep-seated trust in the euro’s global availability; welcomes the ECB’s enhanced Eurosystem repo facility for central banks (EUREP), which provides standing access to euro liquidity lines, in principle, for all international central banks, while noting that it benefits central banks already holding euro reserves rather than those in the process of building them; calls on the ECB to better address, in its annual report to Parliament, the criteria applied to determine eligibility for swap line arrangements, and to assess whether those criteria adequately serve the objective of euro internationalisation, including, where relevant, with respect to the Global South countries; acknowledges that Ukraine has no ECB swap line and that a swap line would help reduce Ukraine’s foreign exchange strains;

Removed15. Stresses that an EU safe asset can only fulfil these functions if issuance reaches a scale sufficient to create a deep and liquid market amounting to 20% of the EU's GDP; underlines that this requires both new common issuance to finance European public goods and the exchange of part of the outstanding stock of national sovereign debt into common EU bonds;

Removed16. Supports the establishment of a European debt agency, anchored in the EU's budgetary framework, that would consolidate existing borrowing programmes and future common issuance under one roof; considers that this would lower issuance costs across different legal regimes and help develop a more liquid market;

Financial stability

Change 7

Changed17.25. Underlines that USstablecoins dollar-backedbacked stablecoinsby third-country currencies actively reinforce the international dominance of thethose dollar,currencies by increasing demand for USrelated debt instruments and further boosting thetheir use of the dollar in international transactions;

Change 8

Changed18.26. Warns that the circulation in the EU of fully fungible US dollar-denominated stablecoins issued by both EU and non-EU entities creates potential new financial stability risks by incentivising the concentration of reserves in the United States while shifting redemption pressure to the EU; strongly urges the Commission to clarify that such multi-issuance schemes are not permissible under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation1;

Change 9

Changed19.27. Warns of the risks to the EU'sEU’s financial stability that could arise from a correction in highly leveraged markets, including the AI sector in the United States; stresses that such shocks may be amplified through EU banks’ reliance on short-term US dollar wholesale funding; underlines the need to monitor closely, beyond net current account balances, gross capital flows as a source of macroeconomic imbalances; stresses that the EU should pursue a balanced approach that safeguards financial stability while enabling responsible innovation and the development of competitive European digital financial markets;

Change 10

RemovedInvestment for an EU industrial policy

Added28. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the ECB, to present, by the end of 2026, a joint euro internationalisation strategy to Parliament and the Council;

Removed20. Considers that the EU's core challenge is not a shortage of financial capital, but a lack of state capacity to direct it towards common strategic priorities at the necessary pace and scale; stresses that this requires an industrial policy that provides not only incentives, but also the necessary discipline;

Removed21. Supports the establishment of an EU sovereignty fund as an effective instrument to reduce reliance on US asset managers and redirect European savings from US equity markets towards strategic investment in the EU;

Removed22. Calls on the Commission and the ECB to present, by the end of 2026, a joint euro internationalisation strategy to Parliament and the Council for approval;

°

° °

29. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
27 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2026). “Changes between ECON-PR-787030 and A-10-2026-0214”. Text, 31 July 2026. from ECON-PR-787030, to A-10-2026-0214, reference 2025/2249(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-PR-787030/compare/A-10-2026-0214?all=1&part=2 (retrieved 27 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2026-07-31,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between ECON-PR-787030 and A-10-2026-0214}},
  year = {2026},
  date = {2026-07-31},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-PR-787030/compare/A-10-2026-0214?all=1&part=2}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-PR-787030/compare/A-10-2026-0214?all=1&part=2},
  urldate = {2026-09-27},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from ECON-PR-787030, to A-10-2026-0214, reference 2025/2249(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}