Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Change 2

RemovedSHORT JUSTIFICATION

AddedAMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT*

RemovedThe Council position at first reading reflects the agreement reached between Parliament and the Council in interinstitutional negotiations at early second reading stage, after legal-linguistic verification. Since the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), in its vote on 5 November 2025, already confirmed the outcome of those interinstitutional negotiations, as your rapporteur, I propose that ECON recommends that the Plenary confirms the position of the Council at first reading without amending it.

Addedto the Commission proposal

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Added2023/0115 (COD)

AddedProposal for a

AddedDIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

Addedamending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency

Added(Text with EEA relevance)

AddedTHE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

AddedHaving regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 53(1) thereof,

AddedHaving regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

AddedAfter transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

AddedHaving regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,

AddedHaving regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,

AddedHaving regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank,

AddedActing in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

AddedWhereas:

Added(1) In accordance with Article 19(5) and (6) of Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, the Commission has reviewed the application and the scope of that Directive and concluded that the objective of protection of depositors in the Union through the establishment of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) has mostly been met. However, the Commission also concluded that there is a need to address the remaining gaps in depositor protection and to enhance the functioning of DGSs, while harmonising rules for DGSs interventions other than payout proceedings.

Added(1a) At present, the banking union rests on just two of its intended three pillars, namely, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). It therefore remains incomplete, due to the absence of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). The ongoing review of the Union crisis management and deposit insurance framework is intended to pave the way towards the long-due completion of the banking union, including the establishment of EDIS. The completion of the banking union forms an integral part of economic and monetary union and of financial stability, most notably by mitigating the risks of so-called ‘doom loop’ that arise as a result of the bank-sovereign nexus.

Added(1b) To ensure a smooth transition to the completion of the banking union, it is necessary to harmonise the functions that DGSs can perform. Therefore, the number of discretions under national law included in Directive 2014/49/EU should be limited and all DGSs should be able to finance resolution measures, preventive measures and other alternative measures to the payout of depositors.

Added(1c) The Union crisis management framework should ensure at all times that losses are not being socialised and taxpayers’ resources are not employed to aid or rescue credit institutions in difficulty.

Added(2) The failure to comply with the obligations to pay contributions to DGSs or to provide information to depositors and DGSs could undermine the objective of depositor protection. DGSs, or where relevant, designated authorities can apply pecuniary sanctions for late payment of contributions. It is important to improve coordination between DGSs, designated and competent authorities to take enforcement actions against a credit institution that does not comply with its obligations. Although the application of supervisory and enforcement measures by the competent authorities against credit institutions is regulated under national laws and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, it is necessary to ensure that designated authorities inform the competent authorities in time about any infringement of obligations of credit institutions under deposit protection rules.

Added(3) To support further convergence of DGSs’ practices and assist DGSs in testing their resilience, the European Banking Authority (EBA) should develop draft regulatory standards on the performing of stress tests of DGS’ systems.

Added(4) Pursuant to Article 5(1), point (d), of Directive 2014/49/EU, deposits of certain financial institutions, including investment firms are excluded from coverage by the DGS. However, the funds that those financial institutions receive from their clients and that they deposit in a credit institution on behalf of their clients, in the exercise of the services they offer, should be protected subject to certain conditions.

Added(5) The range of depositors that are currently protected through repayment by a DGS is motivated by the wish to protect non-professional investors, while professional investors are deemed not to need such protection. For that reason, public authorities have been excluded from coverage. However, most public authorities (which in some Member States include schools and hospitals) cannot be considered to be professional investors. It is therefore necessary to ensure that deposits of all non-professional investors, including public authorities, can benefit from the protection offered by a DGS.

Added(6) Deposits resulting from certain events, including real estate transactions relating to private residential properties or the payout of certain insurance benefits, can temporarily lead to large deposits. For that reason, Article 6(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU currently obliges Member States to ensure that deposits resulting from those events are protected above EUR 100 000 for at least 3 months, but for no longer than 12 months from the moment the amount has been credited or from the moment when such deposits become legally transferable. To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.

Added(7) During a real estate transaction, the funds can transit through different accounts prior to the actual settlement of the transaction. Therefore, to protect depositors going through real estate transactions in a homogenous manner, protection of temporary high balances should apply to the proceeds of a sale as well as to the funds deposited for a purchase of a private residential property within a predefined short-term period.

Added(8) To ensure timely disbursement of the amount to be repaid by a DGS, and to simplify the administrative and calculation rules, the discretion to take into account due liabilities when calculating the repayable amount should be removed.

Added(9) It is necessary to optimise the operational capacities of DGSs and to reduce their administrative burden. For that reason, it should be established that when it comes to the identification of depositors that are entitled to deposits in beneficiary accounts or the assessment of whether depositors are eligible for temporary high balances safeguards, it remains the depositors’ and account holders’ responsibility to demonstrate, by their own means, their entitlement.

Added(10) Certain deposits may be subject to a longer repayment period because they require DGSs to verify the claim for repayment. To harmonise the rules across the Union, the period for repayment should be limited to 20 working days after the reception of relevant documentation.

Added(11) The administrative cost related to the repayment of small amounts on dormant accounts can outweigh the benefits for the depositor. It is therefore necessary to specify that DGSs should not be obliged to take active steps to repay deposits held in such accounts below certain thresholds that should be set at national level. The right of depositors to claim such amount should, however, be preserved. In addition, where the same depositor also has other active accounts, DGSs should include that amount in the calculation of the amount to be reimbursed.

Added(12) DGSs have diverse methods to repay depositors, ranging from cash payouts to electronic transfers. However, to ensure the traceability of the repayment process from DGSs and to stay in line with the objectives of the Union framework on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, depositor reimbursements via credit transfers should be the default payout method when reimbursement exceeds the amount of EUR 10 000.

Added(13) Financial institutions are excluded from deposit protection. However, certain financial institutions, including e-money institutions, payment institutions and investment firms, also deposit the funds received from their clients in bank accounts, often on a temporary basis, to comply with safeguarding obligations in line with sectorial legislation, including Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. Considering the growing role of those financial institutions, DGSs should protect such deposits under the condition that those clients are identified or identifiable.

Added(14) Clients of financial institutions do not always know which credit institution the financial institution has chosen to deposit their funds. DGSs should therefore not aggregate such deposits with a deposit that the same clients might have in the same credit institution where the financial institution has placed their deposits. Credit institutions may not know the clients entitled to the sum held in the client accounts, or be able to check and record individual data of those clients. ▌

Added(15) When reimbursing depositors, DGSs may encounter situations that give rise to money laundering concerns. DGS should therefore withhold the payout to a depositor when notified that a financial intelligence unit has suspended a bank or payment account in accordance with the applicable anti-money laundering rules.

Added(16) Article 9 of Directive 2014/49/EU provides that where a DGS makes payments in the context of resolution proceedings, the DGS should have a claim against the credit institution concerned for an amount equal to its payments and that claim should rank pari passu with covered deposits. That provision does not distinguish between a DGS’s contribution when an open-bank bail-in tool is used, and DGS’s contribution to the financing of a transfer strategy (sale of business or bridge institution tool) followed by liquidation of the residual entity. To ensure clarity and legal certainty with respect to the existence and amount of a DGS’s claim in different scenarios, it is necessary to specify that when the DGS contributes to support the application of the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool, or alternative measures, whereby a set of assets, rights and liabilities, including deposits, of the credit institution are transferred to a recipient, that DGS should have a claim against the residual entity in its subsequent winding-up proceedings under national law. To ensure that the shareholders and creditors of the credit institution left behind in the residual entity effectively absorb the losses of that credit institution and improve the possibility of repayments in insolvency to the DGS, the DGS claim should have the same ranking as covered deposits. In case the open bank bail-in tool is applied (i.e., the credit institution continues its operations), the DGS contributes in the amount by which covered deposits would have been written down or converted to absorb the losses in that credit institution, had covered deposits been included within the scope of bail-in. Therefore, the DGS’s contribution should not result in a claim against the institution under resolution as it would eliminate the purpose of the DGS’s contribution.

Added(17) To ensure convergence of DGS practices and legal certainty for depositors to claim their deposits, and to avoid operational hurdles for DGSs, it is important to set an adequately long period within which depositors can claim the repayment of their deposits, in those cases where the DGS has not repaid depositors within the deadlines laid down in Article 8 of Directive 2014/49/EU in the case of a payout.

Added(18) Pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU, Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0,8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In order to objectively assess whether DGSs fulfil that requirement, a clear reference period should be set to determine the amount of covered deposits and DGSs’ available financial means. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0,8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.

Added(19) To ensure the resilience of DGSs, their funds should derive from stable and irrevocable contributions. Certain sources of DGS financing, including loans and expected recoveries, are too contingent to be accounted as contributions to reach the DGS’ target level. To harmonise DGSs’ conditions for the fulfilment of their target level and to ensure that DGSs’ available financial means are financed by contributions from the industry, funds that qualify to reach the target level should be distinguished from funds that are considered as complementary sources of financing. Outflows of DGS funds, including foreseeable loan repayments, can be planned and factored in regular contributions from DGS members, and should therefore not lead to a decrease of the available financial means below the target level. It is therefore necessary to specify that, after the target level has been reached for the first time, only a shortfall in DGS’ available financial means caused by a DGS intervention (payout, or preventive, resolution or alternative measures) should trigger a four-year replenishment period. Where, after such a DGS intervention, the available financial means have been reduced by less than one third, the replenishment period should be two years. To ensure consistent application, the EBA should develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology for the calculation of the target level by the DGSs.

Added(20) The available financial means of a DGS should be immediately usable to face sudden events of payout or other interventions. In view of various practices across the Union, it is appropriate to lay down requirements for DGSs’ funds investment strategy to mitigate any negative impact on the ability of a DGS to fulfil its mandate. Where a DGS is not competent to set the investment strategy, the authority, or body or entity in the Member State that is responsible for setting the investment strategy should, when setting that investment strategy, also respect the principles regarding diversification and investments in low-risk and liquid assets. To preserve full operational independence and flexibility of the DGS in terms of access to its funds, where DGS funds are deposited with the treasury, those funds should be earmarked and placed on a segregated account.

Added(21) The option to raise the available financial means of a DGS through mandatory contributions paid by member institutions to existing schemes of mandatory contributions established by a Member State to cover the costs related to systemic risk has never been used and should therefore be removed.

Added(22) It is necessary to enhance depositor protection, while avoiding the need for a fire sale of the assets of a DGS and limiting possible negative pro-cyclical effects over the banking industry caused by the collection of extraordinary contributions. DGSs should therefore be allowed to use alternative funding arrangements that enable them to obtain at any time short-term funding from sources other than contributions, including before using their available financial means and funds collected through extraordinary contributions. Because credit institutions should primarily bear the cost and responsibility for financing DGSs, alternative funding arrangements from public funds should not be permitted.

Added(23) To ensure adequately diversified investment of DGS funds and convergent practices, the EBA should issue guidelines to provide DGSs with guidance in that respect.

Added(24) While the primary role of DGSs is the repayment of covered depositors, interventions outside payout can prove more cost-effective for DGSs and ensure uninterrupted access to deposits by facilitating transfer strategies. DGSs may be required to contribute to the resolution of credit institutions. In addition, in some Member States, DGSs may finance preventive measures to restore the long-term viability of credit institutions, or alternative measures in insolvency. While such preventive and alternative measures can significantly improve the protection of deposits, it is necessary to subject such measures to adequate safeguards, including in the form of a harmonised least cost test, to ensure a level playing field and the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of such measures. Such safeguards should only apply to interventions financed with the DGS’s available financial means regulated under this Directive.

Added(24a) It is essential that any involvement of the DGS in any scenario be conducted with a focus on cost effectiveness and transparency. That approach is essential to avoid distorting the level playing field and to ensure that no unfair advantages are conferred on specific market participants. Transparency and cost efficiency are fundamental principles that underpin the integrity and equitable functioning of the DGS.

Added(25) Measures to prevent failure of a credit institution through sufficiently early interventions can play an effective role in the continuum of crisis management tools to maintain depositor confidence and financial stability. Those measures can take various forms - capital support measures through own funds instruments (including Common Equity Tier 1 instruments) or other capital instruments, guarantees, or loans. DGSs have had heterogeneous recourse to those measures. To ensure the continuum of crisis management tools and recourse to preventive measures in a manner consistent with the resolution framework and the state aid rules, it is necessary to specify the timing and conditions for their application. Preventive measures are not appropriate for the absorption of incurred losses when the credit institution is already failing or likely to fail and should be used early to prevent deterioration of the financial situation of the bank. Designated authorities should therefore verify whether the conditions for such DGS intervention have been fulfilled. Finally, those conditions for the use of DGS available financial means should be without prejudice to the assessment by the competent authority of whether an IPS fulfils the criteria laid down in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Added(26) To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to present to the competent authority a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. ▌Such note should contain all elements which aim at preventing the outflow of funds and strengthening the capital and liquidity position of the credit institution, enabling the credit institution to comply with all the relevant prudential and other regulatory requirements on a forward-looking basis. Such note should therefore contain capital raising measures, including rules on the issuance of rights, the voluntary conversion of subordinated debt instruments, liability management exercises, capital generating sales of assets, the securitisation of portfolios, and earnings retention, including dividend bans and bans on the acquisition of stakes in undertakings. Additionally, the note should detail the credit institution’s initial capital shortfall, the capital-raising measures implemented and the safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the distribution of dividends or variable remuneration or repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments. Such note should also contain an exit strategy for any support measures received. Within a reasonable timeframe, the credit institution should provide the competent authority with a business reorganisation plan to secure long-term viability. Preventive measures granted to a credit institution should be suspended where the competent authority is not satisfied that the business reorganisation plan is credible and feasible to secure long-term viability. Where the credit institution is a member of an IPS referred to in Article 1(2) point (c), the IPS should approve the business reorganisation plan, after consulting the competent authority. Where the competent authority is not satisfied with the business reorganisation plan, it should implement appropriate measures to ensure that long-term viability is secured. Competent authorities and resolution authorities are best positioned to assess the relevance and credibility of the measures envisaged in the business reorganisation plan. To ensure that the designated authorities of the DGS that is requested to finance a preventive measure by the credit institution can assess that all the conditions for preventive measures are fulfilled, the competent authorities should cooperate with the designated authorities. To ensure a consistent approach to the application of preventive measures across the Union, the EBA should issue guidelines to assist credit institutions to draft such abusiness reorganisation plan.

Added(26a) To mitigate moral hazard, where appropriate, the credit institution receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures, its shareholders, its creditors or the business group to which it belongs should contribute to the restructuring from their own resources and provide adequate remuneration for the preventive measure granted by the DGS.

Added(27) To ensure that credit institutions receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures deliver on their commitments, competent authorities should request a remediation plan from credit institutions that failed to fulfil their commitments, to repay the amount contributed under the preventive measures or to comply with the exit strategy. Where a competent authority is of the opinion that the measures in the remediation plan are not capable of achieving the credit institution’s long-term viability, the DGS should not provide any further preventive support to the credit institution and the relevant authorities should carry out an assessment whether the institution is failing or is likely to fail, pursuant to Article 32 of Directive 2014/59/EU. The same consequences should apply in cases where the credit institution fails to comply with the remediation plan. To ensure a consistent approach to the application of preventive measures across the Union, the EBA should issue guidelines to assist credit institutions to draft such a remediation plan.

Added(28) To avoid detrimental effects on competition and on the internal market, it is necessary to lay down that in the case of alternative measures in insolvency, relevant bodies representing a credit institution in the context of national insolvency proceedings (liquidator, receiver, administrator or other) should make arrangements for the marketing of the business of the credit institution or part of it in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory process, while aiming to maximise, as far as possible, the sale price. The credit institution or any intermediary acting on behalf of the credit institution should apply rules that are adequate for the marketing of assets, rights and liabilities that are to be transferred to potential purchasers. In any event, the use of State resources should remain subject to the relevant State aid rules under the Treaty, where applicable.

Added(29) Since the main aim of DGSs is to protect covered deposits, DGSs should only be allowed to finance interventions other than payouts where such interventions are cheaper than payouts. Experience with the application of that rule (‘least cost test’) has revealed several shortcomings as the current framework does not detail how to determine the cost of those interventions nor the cost of the payout. To ensure a consistent application of the least cost test across the Union, it is necessary to specify the calculation of those costs. At the same time, it is necessary to avoid excessively stringent conditions that would effectively disable the use of DGS funds for other interventions than payout. When carrying out the least cost assessment, DGSs should first verify that the cost to finance the selected measure is lower than the cost of reimbursement of covered deposits. The methodology for the least cost assessment should take into account the time value of money.

Added(30) Liquidation can be a lengthy process whose efficiency depends on national judicial efficiency, insolvency regimes, individual bank features, and the circumstances of the failure. For DGS interventions as part of alternative measures, the least cost test should rely on the valuation of the assets and liabilities of the credit institution, laid down in Article 36(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, and the estimate laid down in Article 36(8) of that Directive. However, the precise evaluation of liquidation recoveries can be challenging in the context of the least cost test for preventive measures, which supposedly happen long before any foreseeable liquidation. Therefore, the counterfactual for the least cost test for preventive measures should be adjusted accordingly, and in any case, the expected recoveries should be limited to a reasonable amount based on recoveries in past payout events.

Added(31) The designated authorities should estimate the cost of the measure for the DGS, including after the repayment of a loan, a capital injection or the use of a guarantee, net of expected earnings, operational expenses, and potential losses, against a counterfactual based on a hypothetical final loss at the end of the insolvency proceedings, which should take into account recoveries from the DGS as part of a bank’s liquidation proceedings. Additionally, the counterfactual should take into account the possible cost for the DGS of economic and financial instability, including the need to use additional funds, within the DGS mandate, to protect depositors and financial stability, and to prevent contagion. To give a fair and more comprehensive picture of the actual cost of depositors’ repayment, the estimation of the loss incurred due to the reimbursement of covered deposits should include costs indirectly related to the reimbursement of depositors. Such costs should include ▌the cost that the DGS might bear due to the recourse to alternative financing. To ensure consistent application of the least cost test, the EBA should develop draft regulatory technical standards on the methodology to calculate the cost of different DGS interventions. To ensure consistency of the methodology for the least cost assessment with the DGS statutory or contractual mandate▌, the EBA should ▌develop draft regulatory technical standards ▌.

Added(32) To enhance harmonised protection of depositors and specify respective responsibilities across the Union, the DGS of the home Member State should ensure the payout to depositors located in Member States where the credit institutions that are a member of the DGS take deposits and other repayable funds by offering deposit services on cross-border basis without establishment in the host Member State. To facilitate the payout operations and provision of information to depositors, the DGS of the host Member State should be allowed to operate as a point of contact for depositors at credit institutions that exercise the freedom to provide services.

Added(33) The cooperation between DGSs across the Union is vital to ensure fast and cost-efficient depositors’ repayment where credit institutions conduct banking service through branches in other Member States. In view of technological advancements that promote the use of cross-border transfers and remote identification, the DGS of the home Member State should be allowed to make the repayments directly to depositors at branches located in another Member State, provided that the administrative burden and costs are lower than if the repayment would be carried out by the DGS of the host Member State. That flexibility should complement the current cooperation mechanism, requiring the DGS of the host Member State to repay depositors in branches on behalf of the DGS of the home Member State. To preserve depositor confidence in both host and home Member States, EBA should issue guidelines to assist the DGSs in such cooperation, inter alia by suggesting a list of conditions under which a DGS of the home Member State could decide to reimburse depositors at branches located in the host Member State.

Added(34) Credit institutions may change affiliation to a DGS because they move their headquarters to another Member State or convert their subsidiary into a branch or vice versa. Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49/EU requires that the contributions of that credit institution paid during the 12 months preceding the transfer are transferred to the other DGS in proportion to the amount of covered deposits transferred. To ensure that the transfer of contributions to the receiving DGS is not dependent on divergent national rules regarding invoicing or actual date of payment of contributions, the DGS of origin should calculate the amount to be transferred on the basis of the potential liabilities borne by the receiving DGS as a result of the transfer. EBA should develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the methodology for the calculation of the amount to be transferred to ensure a neutral impact of the transfer on the financial situation of both the receiving DGS and the DGS of origin relative to the risks they cover.

Added(35) It is necessary to ensure equal protection of depositors across the Union that cannot be fully guaranteed by an equivalence assessment regime of depositor protection in third countries. For that reason, branches in the Union of a credit institution that has its head office in a third country should join a DGS in the Member State where they perform their deposit-taking activity. That requirement would also ensure consistency with Directives 2013/36/EU and 2014/59/EU that aim to introduce a more robust prudential and resolution frameworks for third country groups providing banking services in the Union. Conversely, it should be avoided that DGSs are exposed to the economic and financial risks of third countries. Deposits in branches established in third countries by Union credit institutions should therefore not be protected.

Added(36) Standardised and regular information disclosure enhances awareness of depositors about deposit protection. To align disclosure requirements with technological developments, those requirements should take into account the new digital communication channels whereby credit institutions interact with depositors. Depositors should obtain clear and homogeneous information that explains their deposit protection, while limiting the related administrative burden for credit institutions or DGSs. The EBA should be mandated to develop draft implementing technical standards to specify, on the one hand, the content and format of the depositor information sheet to communicate to depositors on annual basis and, on the other hand, the template information that either DGSs or credit institutions are required to communicate to depositors in specific situations, including mergers of credit institutions, determination that deposits are unavailable, or repayment of client funds deposits.