Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

31. Do dollar-denominated stablecoins pose threats to financial stability and monetary sovereignty and how could the international role of the Euro be enhanced in this context?

As remarked in previous questions, stablecoins have grown rapidly throughout 2025, with the stablecoin market being dominated by USD denominated stablecoins, and in particular two large players, USDT (Tether) and USDC (Circle). Euro-denominated stablecoins remain very small in comparison though they have grown quickly. The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) provided regulatory clarity and the EU is thereby at the forefront of mitigating risks and providing clear rules for stablecoin issuers and those offering stablecoin-related services.

Stablecoins may pose financial stability risks, arising from certain inherent structural weaknesses and their interconnectedness with traditional finance. At the same time, financial stability risks at the current juncture are limited in the euro area, notably because stablecoins are not widely used for transactions involving real-world assets, and did not cause significant retail deposit outflows. It is particularly interesting to look at the current use cases for stablecoins, in order to understand who uses them for what and with which risk: The by far dominant use case for stablecoins is crypto trading. This means, stablecoins are used primarily within the crypto ecosystem, and they are therefore essential primarily for and within this ecosystem. This notably means that within the “real world”, they so far only play a minor role, and there is no concrete evidence that stablecoins are used systematically for remittances or other cross-border transaction.

A growing adoption of USD denominated stablecoins could potentially undermine the euro area's monetary sovereignty and strategic autonomy if they became widely used for payments in the euro area. Thus, such a wide use could reduce demand for the euro, shift payment activity outside EU infrastructures and increase dependence on non-EU issuers and intermediaries which in turn could weaken monetary policy transmission and the Eurosystem's ability to steer liquidity and safeguard the safety and efficiency of payment systems. In my view, safeguarding the role of the euro as the trusted monetary anchor is essential to prevent such risks from materialising. MiCAR contains guardrails on the use of foreign currency denominated stablecoins in Europe, which are designed to address these risks. In my view the challenge is enforcing these rules.

Europe already benefits from safe and efficient payment systems. And I would like to raise the importance of the euro, our central bank money, which is the trusted anchor of our monetary system. It is crucial to preserve this role of the euro, and hence it is imperative that we also bring our central bank money into the digital age. The digital euro project and the work to enable settling distributed ledger technology (DLT) transactions using central bank money via a dual track-approach (Pontes and Appia) are of key importance in this respect and will be instrumental in preserving monetary sovereignty.

As I already mentioned, providing tokenised central bank money will be instrumental to support an integrated European market for digital assets. Vibrant, deep and liquid markets for European digital assets will attract foreign investors, thereby boosting the international role of the euro.

32. What are the main structural obstacles to strengthening the international role of the euro, and how can the ECB contribute to addressing them?

The euro is facing a window of opportunity to strengthen its international role. Concerns over the longterm stability and reliability of the United States as a global economic partner have led investors to reassess the dollar’s safe haven status, and recent episodes – such as the market reaction to tariff threats linked to tensions around Greenland – have shown that the euro can increasingly behave as a safe haven. Yet, despite such signs of shifting perceptions, there has not so far been a broad reallocation away from dollar assets. This underlines that, while the euro’s potential is significant, structural obstacles still constrain its ability to translate episodic safehaven behaviour into a more durable, broader international role.

From a structural perspective, three main sets of obstacles stand out and here I very much concur with the analysis that the ECB President presented in her speech “Earning influence: lessons from the history of international currencies” on 26 May 2025 in Berlin. First, Europe’s geopolitical weight and trade power are not yet fully translated into coherent external action. Although the EU is the world’s largest trader and the euro is used to invoice around 40% of its trade, fragmentation in foreign and security policy, and the difficulty of speaking with one voice, limit Europe’s geopolitical credibility and thus the willingness of partners to hold euro assets. Second, the euro area’s economic foundations remain weaker than those underpinning the other global currencies. Economic growth remains lower, capital markets are fragmented, and the supply of highquality eurodenominated safe assets is constrained. Third, institutional and legal complexity, including the prevalence of vetoes in key policy areas, hampers timely collective decisions and obscures from the outside the strength of the EU’s commitments, even though the strong foundations in terms of the rule of law and the independence of the ECB are major comparative advantages. By advancing EU integration and pursuing an ambitious reform agenda the EU will increase the attractiveness of the euro and thus overcome these obstacles.

Within its mandate, the ECB and Eurosystem can contribute in three key areas. First, improve crossborder payment systems involving the euro by interlinking fast payment system with key foreign partners. Second, support the emergence of a European digital asset ecosystem to increase the efficiency and attractiveness of European financial markets. Third, reinforce the

global use of the euro by providing euro liquidity lines to noneuro area central banks. The network of swap and repo lines, currently involving major advanced economy central banks and several regional partners, acts as a backstop against euro liquidity shortages abroad that could disrupt the smooth transmission of monetary policy. Over time, greater use of the euro for trade invoicing and financial contracts would reduce the passthrough of exchange rate movements into euro area import prices and thus the sensitivity of euro area inflation to external shocks, in line with the price stability mandate.

33. What are your views on the digital euro? To which extend do you consider it could help addressing the challenges mentioned above?

In my interviews as Governor, I have emphasised the vital role central banks play – within their mandate – in ensuring that citizens have seamless access to, and ease of use of, public money for their daily transactions. This principle applies not only to the physical space – with cash – but should also extend to the digital realm. To uphold this, it is essential to develop a digital version of cash: the digital euro. The digital euro is not intended to replace cash but to complement it, safeguarding the relevance and accessibility of public money in an increasingly digitalized world. It would be available to users anytime and anywhere in the euro area, allowing them to make payments free of charge – online or offline – on websites, in stores, or between individuals.

In my view, a digital euro is also essential for strengthening Europe’s monetary sovereignty and addressing key challenges in an evolving global landscape. It will help reduce reliance on non-European-dominated payment platforms, thereby providing a secure and autonomous payment system. Furthermore, the digital euro would bolster the euro’s global competitiveness, positioning it as a trusted and innovative currency for digital payments. Complementing the ongoing strategy for developing DLT compatible central bank money for wholesale use, with Pontes and Appia, the digital euro would actively drive financial innovation and promote market integration across Europe, all while safeguarding monetary sovereignty. This approach would maintain Europe’s independence in the financial sector and reinforce its leadership in the digital economy. Let me reiterate that future-proofing Europe’s monetary system is particularly crucial in light of the challenges posed by stablecoins, especially non-EUR-denominated ones that currently dominate the market. The growing prevalence of USD-denominated stablecoins risks creating new dependencies that could compromise Europe’s monetary autonomy and diminish the euro’s role in global digital finance.

Importantly, the digital euro is not designed to compete with existing European private payment solutions. Instead, it aims to serve as a public, secure, and European-governed alternative, offering citizens an additional complementary payment option while strengthening Europe’s monetary sovereignty and resilience. Furthermore, it will provide a robust, technically advanced platform that enables European private payment providers to connect seamlessly with customers across the region, fostering greater innovation and accessibility within the payments ecosystem.

Finally, the digital euro is a shared European project. Its success will depend on robust legislation and broad democratic legitimacy. The European Parliament plays a central role in adopting the legal framework. I am committed to engaging constructively with Parliament and other stakeholders to ensure that the digital euro meets citizens’ expectations, strengthens Europe’s strategic autonomy, and supports trust in our monetary system for the decades ahead.

E. Functioning of the ECB and democratic accountability and transparency

34. Central bank independence is a cornerstone of the ECB’s institutional design. However, the scope of ECB action has expanded in recent years, while independence remains unchanged in formal terms. How should independence be preserved and exercised in practice as the scope of ECB action evolves while preserving institutional balance?

Central bank independence remains indispensable for delivering on the ECB’s primary objective of price stability, a point firmly established in extensive theoretical analyses and empirical evidence. Independence enables the ECB to take forwardlooking decisions with a mediumterm horizon, free from shortterm political pressures, and grounded in the analytical evidence needed to keep inflation expectations well anchored. In my view, this set-up is precisely what allows monetary policy to remain credible and effective in an environment marked by heightened uncertainty and structural change.

This crucial independence is best preserved through the accountability architecture between the ECB and the European Parliament. In the last years, the two institutions have deepened their engagement materially – through more frequent interactions and innovations to make their dialogue more interactive – thanks to the commitment from both institutions. This has allowed the ECB to remain responsive to evolving challenges and scrutiny demands, providing transparency on the ECB’s actions taken under its monetary policy mandate. Further, the accountability dialogue has been extended substantially in the face of the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, governed by its own accountability framework, and the ongoing work on a digital euro, with several dedicated hearings each year. Maintaining this close and dynamic dialogue will continue to be essential, especially as the ECB navigates uncertainty and structural changes to the economy. This must be complemented by continued communication with the general public that is clear and accessible, and by engaging with stakeholders across society.

Looking ahead, the ECB must – in my view – continue to exercise its independence with great discipline: firmly focused on its mandate, transparent about its decisions and constraints, and respectful of the institutional balance set out in the Treaties.

35. Which elements of the current accountability framework between the ECB and the European Parliament could be strengthened to allow for more meaningful parliamentary scrutiny?

Accountability is a crucial counterpart to central bank independence. It is essential for maintaining a central bank’s credibility and democratic legitimacy, and it ultimately supports the effectiveness of central bank policies and citizens’ trust in the institution. An accountability framework that enables informed and critical scrutiny by the European Parliament is therefore very much in the ECB’s own interest.

The relationship between the ECB and the European Parliament has developed over time, responding to increased scrutiny requests, and goes well beyond the requirements in the Treaty. The regular dialogue, notably in the ECON committee, has been enriched by innovations from both sides of this relationship, such as the ECB’s introductory statement in charts and the chance for MEPs to ask follow-up questions, which have clearly strengthened the dialogue and allow for a dynamic and granular discussion of complex and evolving policy issues. The Exchange of Letters between the ECB and the European Parliament is an additional demonstration of the quality and mutual commitment in this relationship.

At the same time, meaningful parliamentary scrutiny must be accompanied by the broader public’s understanding of the ECB’s mandate and decisions and their implications. Direct communication with citizens is therefore integral and can reinforce the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight. Ensuring that complex policy issues are explained in an accessible and transparent manner, both in interactions with the European Parliament and in outreach to the general public, remains a priority.

If appointed, I would remain fully committed to maintaining openness, availability and constructive engagement with the European Parliament. A central bank’s independence and its accountability are mutually reinforcing pillars, and I see a strong, transparent relationship with Parliament as essential to preserving both.

36. What conclusions do you draw from the comparison between the transparency policies followed by the ECB and other main central banks on international level?

The comparison with other major central banks confirms that a high degree of transparency is now a core element of modern central banking. Helping the public understand the ECB’s monetary policy is crucial for credibility and effectiveness. Transparency also complements accountability and builds trust in the institution. At the same time, it is equally important to be transparent about what central banks cannot do, in order to avoid unrealistic expectations that could ultimately damage trust.

International comparisons also highlight that transparency inevitably involves tradeoffs. Full disclosure at all times is not necessarily desirable. Central banks must protect the effectiveness of their policies, avoid fuelling market volatility with overly granular or speculative information, and preserve the integrity of internal deliberations so that policymakers can debate freely. Transparency should maximise clarity and predictability while safeguarding the conditions for sound decisionmaking.

Against this background, I believe the ECB’s practices stand up well in international comparison. External assessments consistently place the ECB among the most transparent central banks globally. The evolution of the ECB’s transparency and communication practices - such as the publication of monetary policy accounts, clearer and more structured press statements, and increased use of visuals and plain language – illustrates the institution’s willingness to adapt and improve.

Looking ahead, I see transparency as an ongoing responsibility rather than a completed task. As the environment becomes more complex – marked by geopolitical tensions, technological change, and heightened uncertainty – the need for clear, accessible and forwardlooking communication only increases. If appointed, I would be committed to contributing to this ongoing effort. In my view, modern central banking requires a continuous dialogue with citizens and their democratically elected representatives.

37. How do you personally intend to improve and promote gender balance within the ECB?

I am convinced that a diverse and inclusive workforce is essential for the ECB’s legitimacy and effectiveness as a public institution serving all Europeans. When different perspectives are represented at all levels, decisions become more robust, better informed and more reflective of the society we serve. This is why I fully support the ECB’s commitment to improving gender balance, and I would contribute actively to advancing this.

This is a long term, institution wide effort: identifying and addressing barriers at each stage of the career path, from how roles are advertised and candidates are selected to how staff are empowered to contribute once they have joined. The ECB already has in place a number of programmes and measures to foster improvements in the gender balance, as well as to support diversity and inclusiveness in general. Initiatives such as the ECB’s Scholarship for Women in economics and related fields, mentoring schemes, and careful communications and recruitment practices to avoid hidden biases are important building blocks in developing a strong pipeline of future female central bankers.

Improving gender balance also means creating an environment in which women can thrive throughout their careers, from trainees to senior managers. I would therefore support measures that make demanding roles compatible with personal and family responsibilities, such as flexible working arrangements and accessible, high-quality childcare. This is beneficial for both men and women and part of a modern approach to staff development. More broadly, I am convinced that diversity only leads to better outcomes if it is matched by genuine inclusion: everyone, regardless of gender or background, must have the space and encouragement to speak up and shape policies with their expertise and experience.

I am also a strong supporter of measures aimed at recognising individuals' potential, both that of younger colleagues new to the world of central banking and that of more experienced members of staff. In addition, I believe that the future of any institution requires recognising excellence. These two principles, while not aimed specifically at improving gender balance or increasing diversity, should, in my view, be overarching principles of an institution, and lead to concrete results. The principles are key factors in hiring and promotion decisions at the Croatian National Bank. As a result, 50% of managers and 63% of employees at the Croatian National Bank (as of 2024) are women. These ratios are higher than in many central banks, including those of the ECB.

38. What do you think about the fact that the Council in the past once ignored the opinion of the European Parliament regarding the appointment of an ECB board member?

The European Parliament, as the direct representative of EU citizens, plays a central role in ensuring the ECB’s democratic legitimacy, including through its involvement in the appointment of Executive Board members. As I have mentioned already, accountability to the European Parliament is the necessary counterpart to the ECB’s independence, and the European Parliament’s opinion on appointments is an important element in that regard.

At the same time, the procedures and the respective roles and competences of the Council and the European Parliament in the appointment procedure are laid down in the Treaties. As a candidate, it is not for me to take a view on how these interinstitutional relations are handled. I can only respect the established framework and follow the appointment procedure.

39. Will you accept your appointment as Vice-President of the ECB if the European Parliament were to vote against it?

As outlined in my answer to the previous question, the European Parliament’s opinion on my standing professional experience is an important step in the appointment process. It also lays the foundation for a fruitful accountability relationship. This questionnaire and my upcoming hearing are key parts of your assessment of my competence and experience. I feel privileged to have been recommended by the Council for this position, and I appreciate this opportunity to engage with the European Parliament to present my experience, competences and views. I therefore hope that you gain sufficient insights to assess my suitability for the position positively and look forward to the constructive dialogue.