Text · Comparison of two versions
Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report
ECON-PR-779796 → A-10-2026-0171
- From
- ECON-PR-779796 report parliamentary committee draft of 23 Feb 2026
- To
- A-10-2026-0171 Plenary report of 12 Jun 2026
- Changes
- 15 changes to the text
- Paragraphs
- +75 added · −33 removed · 19 changed
More facts (3)
- Dossier
- 2025/2134(INI)
- Title (from)
- on competition policy – annual report 2025
- Title (to)
- on competition policy – annual report 2025
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
The report adds extensive new content on SMEs, energy, AI, and defence, and removes calls for an independent competition authority and specific DMA enforcement actions.124 It introduces calls for a new competition tool, binding time limits, and studies on fines and oligopolies, while expanding merger and State aid sections.4678 It strengthens Parliament's oversight role and adds calls for an interinstitutional agreement and international cooperation.91015 The explanatory statement is updated to reflect these changes, including on DMA financing and merger control.11121314 The other changes are formal: renumbering and updated references.35
The notes class 13 changes as substance, 0 as formal, 2 as wording only.
Every difference
The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.
Part 4 of 4: EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
Change 11
RemovedAccording to Rule 56(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the explanatory statement is still subject to change and can be amended closer to the vote.
AddedIn an increasingly fragmented global economy marked by geopolitical pressure and growing market concentration, EU competition policy must not only ensure effective competition in the Single Market but also defend Europe’s strategic autonomy and regulatory sovereignty. Our rules must be applied without compromise, ensuring that economic success is driven by innovation, efficiency, and consumer choice rather than by the abuse of dominance. Competition policy must evolve and become forward-looking, supporting European innovation while firmly resisting external political influence. Europe will not outsource its sovereignty: our competition rules are non-negotiable and they are enforceable on all market actors.
RemovedIn an increasingly fragmented global economy marked by geopolitical pressure and growing market concentration, EU competition policy must not only ensure effective competition in the Single Market but also defend Europe’s strategic autonomy and regulatory sovereignty. Our rules must be applied without compromise, ensuring that economic success is driven by innovation, efficiency, and consumer choice rather than by the abuse of dominance. Recent external pressures, particularly from the United States, repeatedly challenged our frameworks, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and such interference cannot be tolerated. Competition policy must evolve and become forward-looking, supporting European innovation while firmly resisting external political influence. Europe will not outsource its sovereignty: our competition rules are non-negotiable and they are enforceable on all market actors.
AddedAgainst this backdrop, our competition rulebook is a central pillar of Europe’s strategic autonomy. The EU competition acquis has long supported broader Union objectives by enabling firms to grow and innovate under fair conditions. Building on the recommendations of the Draghi and Letta reports, competition policy must be adapted to new market realities while emphasising that consumer interests should remain central, while taking into account the need for competition policy to contribute to key objectives, such as competitiveness, resilience, security, strategic autonomy and sustainability. This includes actively promoting technology-friendly market conditions, based on open standards and interoperable infrastructures as well as the introduction of a New Competition Tool at EU level to address structural market failures that cannot be effectively tackled under the current competition framework. As digital markets continue to evolve rapidly, the Commission should assess whether the current list of core platform services adequately reflects market realities, including in areas such as artificial intelligence and cloud services. Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) must be delivered faster, through simplified or fast-track notification procedures, particularly for SMEs. At the same time, the enforcement of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) is an important and necessary tool to address competition distortions caused by foreign state-backed investments. Europe must defend its markets and technological edge.
RemovedAgainst this backdrop, our competition rulebook is a central pillar of Europe’s strategic autonomy. The EU competition acquis has long supported broader Union objectives by enabling firms to grow and innovate under fair conditions. Building on the recommendations of the Draghi and Letta reports, competition policy must be adapted to new market realities. This includes actively promoting technology-friendly market conditions, based on open standards and interoperable infrastructures. In this context, cloud services should be recognised as strategic European infrastructure, critical for digital sovereignty. Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) must be delivered faster, through simplified or fast-track notification procedures, particularly for SMEs. At the same time, the enforcement of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) is an important and necessary tool to address distortions caused by foreign state-backed investments. Europe must defend its markets and technological edge.
AddedTo deliver on this objectives, effective enforcement is essential to the credibility of the EU competition rulebook. Competition enforcement must remain politically independent and be protected from undue external influence. At the same time, the Commission must urgently ensure that DG Competition is equipped with sufficient staffing, technical expertise and financial resources to effectively enforce antitrust rules, merger control and the Digital Markets Act. Looking ahead the Union should, explore, through an impact assessment, the merits of establishing a strong and independent European Competition Authority under democratic oversight by the European Parliament. Such an assessment should examine ways to shield competition enforcement from political interference. This needs to be looked at in relation to the European Competition Network (ECN) which plays a central role in the effective enforcement European competition rules. This would ensure consistent, impartial, and credible enforcement of EU competition.
RemovedTo deliver on this objectives, effective enforcement is essential to the credibility of the EU competition rulebook. The Union should move towards a strong and independent European Competition Authority under democratic oversight by the European Parliament. Such an authority must be separated from the executive branch to shield it from any political interference, in line with the model of national competition authorities. This would ensure consistent, impartial, and credible enforcement of EU competition. It should be empowered to enforce antitrust, merger control, state aid, digital, and consumer policy rules, and be equipped with adequate human and financial resources.
Europe should also strengthen its international cooperation. European and global partners should make full use of international fora, such as the International Competition Network (ICN) and the OECD Competition Committee, to promote cooperation and convergence in competition enforcement.
Change 12
ChangedWhen it comes to the DMA, enforcement must be strict, independent, and non-negotiable. The DMA is indispensable to restoring competition in digital markets dominated by powerful gatekeepers.markets. It must apply equally to all marketdesignated participantsgatekeepers and safeguard Europe’s regulatory autonomy from external political influence. The robustness of the EU competition rulebook depends on the DMA and abuse-of-dominance rules working together, combining ex-ante and ex-post enforcement. Nonetheless, recent investigations into major cloud service providers illustrate both the scale and the complexity of DMA enforcement. We observe that the DMA enforcement remains uneven and requires a transparent and thorough review, including of cloud services and AI interfaces with a view to designate them as core platform services. EnforcementThe effective enforcement of the Digital Markets Act shouldrequires beadequate supportedand bystable aresources. dedicatedThe supervisoryCommission fee,should similarexplore tosustainable thefinancing supervisorysolutions, feeincluding introducedthe underpossible theintroduction Digitalof Servicesa Act.dedicated DMA fee.
Change 13
ChangedIn parallel, traditional antitrust enforcement remains the backbone of competition policy and must be modernised to address algorithmic, data-driven market power, and artificial intelligence. Regulation 1/2003 and its implementing rules require updating. In that regard, full cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN),ECN, between the Commission and national competition authorities, as well as with relevant private and public stakeholders and consumer organisations, is more than necessary. When it comes to Commission enforcement, its use of interim measures remains insufficient and should be normalisedapplied more systematically to stop anti-competitive practices in fast-changing markets, such as the digital market.
Change 14
ChangedIn addition, merger control must also evolve to remain effective in changing market conditions. Merger guidelines should be revised toso they are better reflectaligned innovation,with investment,new market realities and long-termthe competitiveness,EU’s priorities in fostering a more resilient and competitive Europe, while safeguarding high consumer welfare and preventing killer acquisitions, notably in AIdigital, AI, pharma and other strategic sectors. A forward-looking approach is particularly needed in telecomstelecoms, banking, payments, defence and audiovisualenergy markets. At the same time, Europe’s lack of scale in strategic sectors undermines its competitiveness and resilience and calls for a framework that doesassesses notpan-European hampermergers paneuropeanin mergersa andforward thuslooking enablesmanner theand emergenceensure ofthat Europeanany championsconsolidation increating key‘EU sectorschampions’ likeenhances telecoms,consumer payment,welfare, bankingmarket contestability and energy,long toterm ableresilience, toparticularly competein globallykey andsectors securesuch Europe’sas strategictelecoms, autonomy.banking, payments, defence and energy State aid policy must also support the green and digital transitions without fragmenting the Single Market, through the Clean Industrial State Aid Framework, a simplified GBER, and effective IPCEIs.
Change 15
ChangedFinally, competition policy must be subject to strong democratic oversight. The European Parliament must be fully and timely involved in the revision,review, implementation, and external dimension of competition policy, including all discussions with third countries that may affect DMA enforcement. This is why an interinstitutional agreement should be concluded to formalise the European Parliament's role in competition policy oversight. Transparency and accountability are essential to maintain legitimacy, trust, and public support for a strong and credible EU competition framework. Europe’s rules are our rules: external actors have no veto over how we enforce competition. Our regulatory autonomy is a cornerstone of ourthe EU’s strategic sovereignty and has to be defended at all costs.
Sources & citation
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- https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-PR-779796/compare/A-10-2026-0171?all=1&part=4
- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 26 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2026). “Changes between ECON-PR-779796 and A-10-2026-0171”. Text, 12 June 2026. from ECON-PR-779796, to A-10-2026-0171, reference 2025/2134(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-PR-779796/compare/A-10-2026-0171?all=1&part=4 (retrieved 26 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2026-06-12,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{Changes between ECON-PR-779796 and A-10-2026-0171}},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-06-12},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-PR-779796/compare/A-10-2026-0171?all=1&part=4}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-PR-779796/compare/A-10-2026-0171?all=1&part=4},
urldate = {2026-09-26},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. from ECON-PR-779796, to A-10-2026-0171, reference 2025/2134(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}