Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Added10. Underlines that competition authorities need improved data accessibility to ensure effective competition enforcement; stresses the importance of improving data collection, facilitating access to procurement data for national competition authorities, and strengthening fraud detection mechanisms in their enforcement of competition policy; calls, furthermore, on competition authorities to promote simplified procedures, enhance transparency and improve market access for emerging SMEs;

Removed9. Underlines that effective enforcement can only be achieved if rules to address abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFEU) and the DMA work together, combining ex ante and ex post approaches; calls on the Commission to streamline and better articulate the competition rulebook;

Added11. Underlines the importance of Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) for financing large strategic EU projects; calls on the Commission to streamline and simplify IPCEI notification procedures as they are burdensome, in particular for SMEs, and to ensure proportionality, provide clear and predictable criteria for admissibility, and enhance transparency and legal certainty throughout the assessment process;

Removed10. Supports enforcement under the DMA; welcomes the Commission’s recent market investigations into cloud service providers, such as Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure and its two proceedings against Google on Android interoperability and fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory access to anonymised Google Search data;

Added12. Welcomes the enforcement of the FSR as a necessary tool to create a level playing field and address market distortions caused by foreign subsidies; welcomes the FSR guidelines; maintains that State aid that is not allowed under the EU Treaties should also not be allowed from non-EU countries; calls for rigorous assessment of competition distortions via the FSR and the appropriate screening of foreign direct investment alongside traditional trade defence instruments; calls on the Commission to strengthen the enforcement of the FSR with regard to online platforms and marketplaces established in non-EU countries; calls on the Commission to ensure that SMEs and smaller transactions are not disproportionately burdened by FSR compliance obligations;

Removed11. Recalls that enforcement of the DMA is still suboptimal; suggests stable funding through a ‘DMA fee’, similar to the DSA;

Added13. Underlines that, according to the latest Eurobarometer survey and the Eurobarometer post-electoral survey in 2024, respondents expect the EU to prioritise addressing inflation, rising prices and the cost of living; stresses that ensuring fair and effective competition is an important element in tackling these challenges and should therefore remain a priority within competition policy;

Removed12. Calls for the DMA review process, expected to take place in May 2026, to be transparent, thorough and ambitious;

Added14. Underlines that strict and consistent competition policy enforcement contributes to strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion across the EU and its outermost regions; notes that there are persistent economic and infrastructural gaps between internal, rural, peripheral, outermost and island regions, and calls on the Commission to take into account the territorial impact of competition decisions, in order to promote appropriate cohesion policies accompanying the development of the single market, while ensuring the uniform application of competition rules;

Removed13. Urges the Commission to consider AI and cloud services as core platform services within the DMA; requests the Commission to include SMEs in the DMA review consultations;

Added15. Welcomes the signing of the EU-UK Competition Cooperation Agreement15, a key step in strengthening coordination between the respective competition authorities;

Removed14. Stresses that DMA enforcement applies to all market participants regardless of nationality; notes Booking’s gatekeeper status and recalls that the French and Spanish authorities penalised the company over its parity clauses; urges the Commission to take decisive action accordingly;

AddedMore independent and more effective EU competition enforcement

Added16. Calls on the Commission to explore avenues towards strengthening the independence of EU competition enforcement;

Added17. Stresses that strengthening the existing enforcement capacity is essential in the short term; calls on the Commission to ensure as a matter of urgency that its Directorate-General for Competition is sufficiently staffed with the necessary resources and technical expertise to effectively enforce antitrust law, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and merger rules;

Added18. Underlines the importance of competition enforcement being conducted in an impartial, politically independent manner; calls on the Commission to present an impact assessment on the merits of establishing a dedicated European competition authority, examining subsidiarity, the proper delineation between competition and regulatory functions, democratic accountability to Parliament, and the potential implications for the European Competition Network (ECN); stresses the need for adequate staffing, expertise and powers;

AddedCompetition in the digital age and enforcement of the DMA amid global challenges

Added19. Urges the Commission to fully enforce the EU competition rulebook, including the DMA, in a consistent, impartial and legally robust manner, to safeguard Europe’s regulatory autonomy against political pressures; notes with concern external pressure surrounding the DMA and warns against foreign interference;

Added20. Underlines that effective enforcement can only be achieved if rules to address the abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFEU) and the DMA work together, combining ex ante and ex post approaches; calls on the Commission to streamline and better articulate the competition and digital rulebook;

Added21. Welcomes the publication of the Commission’s report on 28 April 2026 on the review of the DMA; notes the Commission’s conclusion, in this first review of the DMA, that the DMA is fit for purpose and does not need to be amended at this stage, although it identifies particular areas of focus going forward, namely AI and cloud computing services, while highlighting that the DMA should not be seen in isolation when it comes to regulatory tools aiming to capture the AI or cloud value chain;

Added22. Calls for the process of the DMA review, which is expected to take place every three years, to be transparent, evidence-based, proportionate, targeted and ambitious, while ensuring regulatory stability and avoiding unnecessary expansion of obligations for market participants; insists that the periodic review of the DMA, every three years, should assess systematically the effectiveness and practical impact of existing obligations, legal certainty for market participants, the DMA’s interaction with sector-specific regulation, and the need for any adjustments to gatekeeper designation thresholds in the light of market developments; calls on the Commission to systematically include SMEs in the DMA review consultations;

Added23. Stresses that increasing concentration in cloud services may undermine competition, innovation and the EU’s strategic autonomy; highlights that practices such as bundling, cloud marketplaces and contractual mechanisms, including credits and spend commitments, can reinforce vendor lock-in and limit switching or multi-cloud strategies; stresses that cloud obligations must be updated; notes that, in its first review of the DMA, the Commission reports that it opened three market investigations into cloud computing services in November 2025, two to assess whether Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services should be designated as gatekeepers for cloud computing services, and a third to assess whether the DMA can effectively address practices that may limit competitiveness and fairness in cloud computing services16; calls on the Commission to use the cloud services market investigation to adjust DMA obligations and ensure that they effectively address the barriers that prevent users from switching providers;

Added24. Recalls that enforcement of the DMA is still suboptimal; supports stronger enforcement of the DMA in relation to all market participants falling under the scope of its regulation regardless of nationality and encourages the Commission to conclude open investigations within the time frames provided for under the DMA; notes that effective DMA enforcement requires adequate and sustainable resources; calls on the Commission and the budgetary authorities to ensure that adequate and stable resources are allocated to DMA enforcement through the EU budget; calls therefore for sustainable finance solutions to be explored, while respecting institutional balance, notably for introduction of a ‘DMA fee’, similar to the fee under the DSA, to be explored;

Added25. Calls on the Commission to make full and proactive use of all enforcement instruments provided for under the DMA, including further market investigations, non-compliance proceedings, inspections, interim measures, fines and periodic penalty payments, in order to prevent circumvention and ensure effective compliance;

Added26. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the Commission’s reluctance to address market dominance through structural remedies;

Added27. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition, in its first review of the DMA, that the future-proofing tools incorporated by the co-legislators are crucial in enabling the framework to respond to developments in markets and technologies; calls therefore on the Commission to enforce the DMA, in a consistent and future-proof manner, in relation to technological developments, by addressing AI-driven services and cloud-based infrastructure in a timely manner, in order to prevent new forms of lock-in, foreclosure or gatekeeping practices, including where gatekeepers leverage control over data, computing resources or integrated services to the detriment of emerging AI developers and innovative market entrants;

Added28. Welcomes the fact that the Commission is already monitoring the deployment of AI tools within designated core platform services under the DMA; notes that, in its first review of the DMA, the Commission reports that, with respect to AI services, it has started addressing various fairness and contestability issues that featured prominently in the public consultation, for instance, through its regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers on ensuring that default settings can be changed easily and that AI services have equal access to operating systems; notes that two specification proceedings were opened in January 2026 in relation to Alphabet that also have an AI dimension relating to interoperability and access to search data; calls on the Commission to develop and apply new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the incumbents and assess, within the upcoming DMA review, whether the current list of core platform services adequately reflects market realities, including in areas such as AI models, AI chatbots and cloud services, main virtual assistant services and connected TV operating systems; calls on the Commission to include SMEs, start-ups, industry associations, academic experts and consumer organisations across all Member States in the DMA review consultations;

Added29. Stresses that DMA enforcement applies to all designated gatekeepers regardless of nationality or origin, and calls on the Commission to apply DMA obligations consistently; welcomes the coordination between the Commission and NCAs on DMA-related conduct; urges the Commission to take decisive action accordingly;

Added30. Calls on the Commission to examine, in the context of the implementation of the Digital Single Market Directive17, potential abuses by gatekeepers under the DMA in their negotiations with press publishers, and in particular to examine whether such negotiations comply with the FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) obligations, ensuring equitable remuneration, transparent terms and non-discriminatory access to online audiences;

Added31. Calls on the Commission to make full use of Article 13 DMA to address any circumvention by gatekeepers of their obligations under Articles 5 and 6 DMA;

Antitrust

Change 5

Changed15.32. Urges the Commission to make appropriate use of interim measures to stop any practices that harm competition, especially in fast-evolving digital markets; calls on the Commission to modernise Regulation (EC) 1/20031/200318 and ImplementingCommission Regulation (EC) 773/2004773/200419 into itsimprove upcomingthe review,efficiency, especiallylegal regardingcertainty theand useproportionality of EU antitrust enforcement; supports a clarified framework for interim measures;measures in cases of serious and irreparable harm to competition, with appropriate due process safeguards;

Change 6

Removed16. Reaffirms the need for strong cooperation between the Commission and national competition authorities within the European Competition Network;

Added33. Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations; calls for binding procedural time limits on antitrust investigations to prevent undue delays that harm legal certainty and the rights of defence;

Removed17. Notes current investigations of US-based companies, including the Commission’s preliminary investigation into Visa and Mastercard fees; calls on the Commission to continue this investigation and act to preserve European competition; emphasises the need to review the Interchange Fee Regulation to address rising card scheme fees and ensure a competitive and transparent market for Europeans;

Added34. Urges the Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the deterrent effect of its fines; insists that sanctions must be sufficiently high to surpass the illicit economic benefit derived from the infringement;

Added35. Stresses the importance of effective actions for damages as a complement to public antitrust enforcement, ensuring that victims of infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can obtain full compensation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the effective implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive20 and to remove remaining barriers to private enforcement;

Added36. Reaffirms the need for strong and effective cooperation between the Commission and NCAs within the ECN as well as with relevant private and public stakeholders and consumer organisations; underlines that NCAs must remain politically independent and adequately resourced, and that the ECN+ Directive21 should be fully and consistently transposed and implemented across all Member States; calls for enhanced convergence of enforcement standards, timely information-sharing, and clear allocation of competences to avoid duplicated proceedings; stresses that the ECN needs to move towards a fully integrated form of cooperation, with a view to enhancing cost efficiency and improving the handling of cross-border aspects, including by enabling joint investigations and joint decision-making; calls for the ECN to further guide companies, especially SMEs, in applying the competition rulebook;

Added37. Calls on the Commission and NCAs to establish easily accessible and SME-friendly complaint mechanisms for anti-competitive practices, ensuring the swift and effective handling of cases;

Added38. Notes current investigations of non-EU companies, including the Commission’s preliminary investigation into Visa and Mastercard fees; calls on the Commission to ensure that the payments market remains competitive, transparent and accessible for consumers and businesses; emphasises the need to review the Interchange Fee Regulation22 to assess its effectiveness in addressing rising fees; calls on the Commission to conclude ongoing investigations in the payments sector without undue delay; emphasises that the digital euro is a crucial opportunity to reduce the over-reliance on non-EU card schemes, and to strengthen competition and the EU’s strategic autonomy in the payments sector, including by helping to ensure more competitive pricing conditions for businesses, in particular SMEs;

Added39. Underlines the importance of competition in the banking sector and completion of the banking union; calls on the Commission to use all available instruments to ensure fair competition and monitor trends in the banking sector during high inflation periods; stresses the importance and urgency of the Commission’s upcoming report on the competitiveness of the EU banking sector and expects the Commission to adopt the report by July 2026; welcomes, furthermore, the upcoming assessment of the functioning of Directive 2002/87/EC23 and the Solvency II Directive24 on aspects relating to the level playing field among insurance and banking market participants;

Added40. Notes the existence of oligopolies in the provision of certain services that are critical for EU financial market participants, such as market aggregators and connectivity providers that are characterised by limited numbers of providers, significant difficulty switching from one provider to another, or asymmetrical pricing power to the benefit of the provider, which ultimately inflates costs for investors; further notes that the three largest credit rating agencies and the four biggest companies in the audit market still hold market shares of over 90 %; urges the Commission to investigate existing oligopolies and take the appropriate measures to the benefit of EU competition;

Added41. Recalls that the European Central Bank has noted that food prices remain high, affecting vulnerable consumers in particular; expresses concern about the high market concentration at certain levels of the agricultural and food supply chain; urges the Commission to assess the scale and impact of buying alliances, and further analyse their effects not only on prices but also on farmers’ and agri-food producers’ ability to supply healthy, safe and sustainable products to consumers; invites the Commission to assess whether additional guidelines are needed on the application of Article 102 TFEU on exploitative abuses, including excessive or unfair prices, in order to improve legal certainty and make enforcement more effective in highly concentrated consumer markets;

Merger control

Change 7

Removed18. Stresses that Europe lacks large-scale companies; considers scale as a strategic EU imperative, as highlighted by the Letta report, for competing effectively on global markets;

Added42. Stresses that Europe lacks large-scale companies capable of competing globally in numerous key strategic areas; considers scaling up within the single market as a strategic EU imperative to mobilise investments, drive competitiveness, invest in innovation and enable EU companies to compete effectively on global markets, as highlighted by the Letta report; stresses that the completion of the single market and the removal of internal barriers remain key priorities in this regard; notes that structural barriers to scaling up within the EU may result in innovative EU companies being acquired by non-EU players, with potential negative effects on long-term competition and innovation capacity in the EU; considers therefore that merger control should take full account of the ability of EU companies to invest in innovation;

Removed19. Calls on the Commission to apply competition policies dynamically, adapt them to new market realities, and analyse the effects of concentrations;

Added43. Considers that competition policy should not create unnecessary obstacles for companies that need to scale up in order to compete globally, while noting that not all EU companies are in need of scaling up; underlines that the EU thrives on the vital link between big and small enterprises; considers that competitive scale should primarily result from fair competition, robust antitrust enforcement and the deepening of the single market, which are the foundation of the EU social market economy and remain the true driver of innovation;

Removed20. Calls for an ambitious revision of the EU merger guidelines so they are better aligned with the EU’s industrial and sectoral policy objectives while continuing to safeguard a high level of consumer welfare; insists that while safeguarding fair competition, merger control should not obstruct pan-European mergers creating ‘EU champions’ in key sectors such as telecoms, banking, payments and energy;

Added44. Calls on the Commission to apply merger policy dynamically, based on an economic and legal assessment, analysing fully the concept of consumer welfare in the assessment of competition, and to consider the broader economic effects of mergers, adapt the policy to new market realities including digital ecosystems, AI, energy and defence, and analyse the effects of concentrations in the long term, taking a forward-looking approach; encourages the Commission to continue to monitor the evolution of market power in Europe, including the impact of mergers on sustainability, innovation and long-term resilience;

Removed21. Calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking approach to mergers, taking efficiency gains into account, allowing companies to form alliances when they contribute to innovation, climate, resilience and security, and reflects sector-specific realities beyond prices and market shares;

Added45. Calls for an ambitious and evidence-based revision of the EU merger guidelines so they are better aligned with new market realities and the EU’s priorities in fostering a more resilient and competitive Europe while continuing to safeguard a high level of consumer welfare; insists that, while remaining grounded in competition analysis and safeguarding effective competition on national markets and within the single market, merger control should assess pan-European mergers in a forward-looking manner and ensure that any consolidation creating ‘EU champions’ enhances consumer welfare, market contestability and long-term resilience, particularly in key sectors such as telecoms, banking, payments, defence and energy; calls for the new merger control guidelines to ensure legal certainty for businesses in creating pan-European players fostering pro-competitive scaling up, while ensuring that national intervention powers, including veto powers, are used only in duly justified and proportionate cases;

Removed22. Recalls that competition safeguards consumer choice; notes Netflix’s and Paramount’s interest in acquiring Warner Bros and calls for a thorough review of future audiovisual mergers;

Added46. Calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking and dynamic approach to mergers, taking into account efficiency gains, including, for example, economies of scale and sustainability gains, as early as possible in the procedure, while ensuring transparency and predictability and allowing companies to form alliances when they contribute to innovation, climate resilience and security, and reflecting an approach to the assessment of market power and sector-specific realities that extends beyond prices and market shares and also includes effects on wages and employment conditions;

Removed23. Calls on the Commission to detect and prevent ‘killer acquisitions’ (i.e. when a company acquires control of an innovative company to eliminate them as a possible source of future competition), particularly in AI and other strategic sectors; urges the Member States to give national competition authorities ‘call in’ powers so they can review mergers and acquisitions, if this is not already the case;

Added47. Recalls that competition safeguards consumer choice, market diversity and affordable prices; notes the decision by Warner Bros. Discovery stockholders on 23 April 2026 approving the merger agreement with Paramount Skydance; calls on the Commission to apply rigorous merger control in the audiovisual and media sector, monitoring the impact of market consolidation in the single market and enabling EU players to scale up;

Added48. Notes that online platforms under the scope of the DMA have acquired nearly 700 smaller companies since 2000, while the Commission was only notified about 19 of these transactions, as most fell below the turnover-based notification thresholds; calls on the Commission to detect ‘killer acquisitions’ (i.e. when a company acquires control of an innovative company to eliminate them as a possible source of future competition) and to adapt regulation in order to prevent such acquisitions, particularly in digital, AI, pharma and other strategic sectors; maintains that a single market legal base should be added to the EC Merger Regulation if it is reviewed, so as to fully involve the co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the DMA; urges the Member States to give national competition authorities ‘call-in’ powers so they can review mergers and acquisitions, if this is not already the case, while ensuring legal certainty and avoiding undue burden on SMEs and start-ups;

Added49. Acknowledges the increasing trend of foreign investment and multi-club ownership in European sports, as well as the rise of dynamic ticket pricing, and calls on the Commission to take into account the implications of this development when supporting efforts to safeguard the financial integrity and competitive balance of European sport; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider all regulatory options, including the prohibition of dynamic pricing at live sports and cultural events in the Digital Fairness Act, with a view to protecting consumers and upholding the social and public value of sport and culture;

State aid

Change 8

Removed24. Welcomes the Clean Industrial State Aid Framework (CISAF); calls for CISAF to be implemented in a way that ensures minimum burden on Member States and prevents them from engaging in subsidy races;