Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to report parliamentary committee draft

AddedSHORT JUSTIFICATION

RemovedRecital 17: (17) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to manage the failure of any institution or entity that has a positive public interest assessment, namely, when the tools available under national law are not adequate. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to any failing institution or entity should be specified.

AddedThe Council position at first reading reflects the agreement reached between Parliament and the Council in interinstitutional negotiations at early second reading stage, after legal-linguistic verification. Since the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), in its vote on 5 November 2025, already confirmed the outcome of those interinstitutional negotiations, as your rapporteur, I propose that ECON recommends that the Plenary confirms the position of the Council at first reading without amending it.

RemovedRecital 18: (18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect, among other factors, the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, protection of depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more or equally costly for the deposit guarantee scheme.

RemovedRecital 19: (19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect the prioritisation of using industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) instead of funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Board should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the deposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States.

RemovedRecital 20: (20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the public interest assessment should consider whether the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively than resolution, and not only to the same extent.

RemovedRecital 35: (35) In order to ensure institutional continuity and the build-up of institutional expertise, the five-year term of the Chair, the Vice-Chair and the other full-time members of the Board should be available for a single two-year extension of their respective positions, based on an evaluation by the Commission of the discharge of their duties.

RemovedRecital 36 a (new): (36a) In order to foster a strengthened culture of institutional cohesion within the Single Resolution Mechanism, the plenary session’s involvement in crucial aspects of the decision-making process such as resolution planning, setting of MREL requirements and adopting resolution schemes should be ensured. Furthermore, for sensitive decisions in the context of resolution action, including the extent to which losses are to be imposed, or defining the contribution from the deposit guarantee scheme, the Board should closely cooperate with the ECB, the respective national competent authority and the relevant national resolution authority, as appropriate. The Board should regularly liaise, consult and give proper consideration to the feedback provided throughout that process.

RemovedRecital 40 a (new): (40a) The use of deposit guarantee funds in the context of resolution and liquidation, particularly given the proposed changes to the creditor hierarchy, risks increasing the demands on those industry-funded safety nets. To avoid a deposit guarantee scheme becoming insufficiently funded and unable to support a new intervention, robust and favourable alternative funding arrangements are required.

RemovedRecital 40 b (new): (40b) Given the creditor hierarchy review, market conditions might not be as favourable to deposit guarantee schemes that seek such alternative funding arrangements. Therefore, to prevent temporary financing by the Member States, and to ensure that it remains a last resort, the Board should be able to provide a guarantee based on the Single Resolution Fund to a deposit guarantee scheme in order to facilitate its access to markets at favourable financing conditions. The Single Resolution Fund's guarantee should be provided when the deposit guarantee scheme is required to intervene in resolution, yet available financial means are insufficient to satisfy the needs of such action.

RemovedRecital 40 c (new): (40c) The provision of Single Resolution Fund guarantees to national deposit guarantee schemes pursuing alternative funding arrangements must not preclude, nor delay, any progress in the establishment of a fully-fledged European deposit insurance scheme, which remains the optimal solution.

RemovedRecital 40 d (new): (40d) Despite an agreement having been reached on the introduction by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) of a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund, its implementation has not yet been achieved. The additional function of the Single Resolution Fund to provide guarantees to deposit guarantee schemes thus warrants additional safeguards to the former, such as the ratification of the ESM backstop to the Single Resolution Fund.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c a (new), Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 55 a (new): (ca) the following point is added: / ‘(55a) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely, in one or more Member States, to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national or regional level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross-border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;’

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b, Article 8 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 3: The identification of the measures to be taken in respect of the subsidiaries referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), that are not resolution entities may be subject to a simplified approach by the Board, after consulting with the relevant national resolution authority, and if such approach would not negatively affect the resolvability of the group, taking into account the size of the subsidiary, its risk profile, the absence of critical functions and the group resolution strategy.;

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15, Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part: (a) the institution or entity meets the conditions referred to in Article 102 of Directive 2013/36/EU, or in Article 16(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, or in Article 38 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, or the competent authority has determined that the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by the institution or entity and the own funds and liquidity held by that institution or entity do not ensure a sound management and coverage of its risks, and either of the following applies:

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15, Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point a – point ii: (ii) the ECB deems that remedial actions other than early intervention measures are insufficient to address the problems due to a significant deterioration of the financial condition of the entity;

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15, Article 13 – paragraph 2 – point f a (new): (fa) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up a plan that the entity can implement in case the relevant corporate body decides to initiate the voluntary winding down of the entity, including analyses of the necessary capital and liquidity support for the winding down and of the concrete relevant strategic options for a market exit.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16, Article 13b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 5: Any temporary administrator shall fulfil the requirements set out in Article 91(1), (2) and (8) of Directive 2013/36/EU. The assessment by the ECB of whether the temporary administrator complies with those requirements shall be an integral part of the decision to appoint that temporary administrator.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16, Article 13c – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a: (a) any of the measures referred to in Article 16(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 or Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU they require an entity or group to take that aim to address a deterioration in the situation of that entity or group;

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16, Article 13c – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3: The ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall closely monitor, in close cooperation with the Board, the situation of the entities and groups referred to in the first subparagraph and their compliance with the measures referred to in the first subparagraph, point (a), that aim to address a deterioration in the situation of those entities and groups and with the early intervention measures referred to in the first subparagraph, point (c).

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16, Article 13c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3: Following the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall, in close cooperation with the Board, monitor the situation of the entity, the implementation of the any relevant measures within their expected timeframe and any other relevant developments. For that purpose, the Board and the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall meet regularly, with a frequency set by the Board considering the circumstances of the case. The ECB or the relevant national competent authority and the Board shall provide each other with any relevant information without delay.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16, Article 13c – paragraph 4 a (new): 4a. Where, in the use of the power referred to in paragraph 4, the Board decides to directly market to potential purchasers, it shall have due regard to the circumstances of the case and the potential impact that the exercise of that power might have on the entity's overall position.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16, Article 13c – paragraph 5 – point b: (b) require the relevant national resolution authority to draft a preliminary resolution scheme for the entity concerned; in such a case, Article 84(1), point (e), of Directive 2014/59/EU shall apply.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c, Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2: When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on the information available to it at the time, shall consider and compare all extraordinary public financial support to be granted to the entity, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20, Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii: (iii) an acquisition of own funds instruments or a use of impaired assets measures provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 18(4), points (a), (b) or (c), or Article 21(1) are present at the time the public support is granted.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20, Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point b: (b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none or of the circumstances referred to in Article 18(4) are present;

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20, Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point c: (c) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of a credit institution pursuant to Article 32b of Directive 2014/59/EU and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20, Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b: (b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority;

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20, Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2: For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority have concluded that no breach has occurred of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under national or Union law.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20, Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new): The ECB or the relevant national competent authority may deem an entity to be solvent where they determine that a breach of the requirements referred to in the second subparagraph is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan for the remedy of the breach within an appropriate timeframe, as determined by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20, Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5: Acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20, Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6: In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall request the institution or entity to submit a remediation plan describing the steps to be taken in order to ensure or restore compliance with supervisory requirements, its long-term viability and to repay the amount provided, as well as the associated timeframe.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20, Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6 a (new): Where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 18.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20, Article 18a – paragraph 2 a (new): 2a. The ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall inform the Board of its assessment whether the conditions referred to in paragraph 2, points (a), (b) and (d), with respect to the entities and groups referred to in Article 7(2), and to the entities and groups referred to in Article 7(4), point (b), and Article 7(5) are met.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point a, Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1: Where resolution action involves the granting of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU or of Fund aid in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, the resolution scheme referred to in Article 18(6) of this Regulation shall not enter into force until such time when the Commission adopts a positive or conditional decision, or a decision not to raise objections, concerning the compatibility of the use of such aid with the internal market, while taking into consideration the need for timely execution of the resolution scheme by the Board. The Commission shall take the decision concerning the compatibility of the use of State aid or of Fund aid with the internal market at the latest when it endorses or objects to the resolution scheme pursuant to Article 18(7), second subparagraph, or when the period of 24 hours referred to in Article 18(7), fifth subparagraph, expires, whichever is earlier. In the absence of such decision within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the resolution scheme shall be deemed authorised by the Commission and shall enter into force in accordance with Article 18(7), fifth subparagraph.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 806/2014

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point b, Article 19 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 5: The decision may also lay down obligations on the Board, the national resolution authorities in the participating Member State or Member States concerned or the beneficiary, as applicable and to the extent that those obligations fall within their respective remits, to enable compliance with it to be monitored. This may include requirements for the appointment of a trustee or other independent person to assist in monitoring. A trustee or other independent person may perform such functions as may be specified in the Commission decision.