Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Added(9) To ensure an adequate level of transparency, the price and the volume of a non-equity transaction should be published as close to real time as possible and the price should only be delayed until maximally the end of the trading day. However, in order not to expose liquidity providers in non-equity instruments to undue risk, it should be possible to mask the price and volume of very large transactions for a longer period of time, which should not exceed four weeks. The exact calibration of the various buckets corresponding to different time deferrals should be left to ESMA due to the technical expertise required to specify the calibration as well as due to the need to allow for the flexibility to amend the calibration. Those deferrals should be based on the liquidity of the non-equity instrument, using the issuance size as a proxy, and the size of the transaction (trade size) only. In order to simplify the pre-trade transparency regime for bonds and derivatives, the size specific to the instrument should be removed, and the large in scale size should be lowered so that only one threshold remains at an adequate level. ESMA should regularly review the calibrations of the deferrals applicable to the various buckets, with the goal to gradually decrease them should the qualitative and quantitative evidence allow it.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 2 – point a b (new), Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 17: (ab) point (17) is replaced by the following: / ‘(17) ‘liquid market’ means: / (iiia) the issuance size used to define a liquid market for bonds and may be used to define a liquid market for other non-equity instruments; / (b) for the purposes of Articles 4, 5 and 14, a market for a financial instrument that is assessed according to the following criteria: / (i) traded daily; / (ia) market capitalisation; / (iii) the average daily turnover for those financial instruments;’;

Added(10) Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue to make the pre-trade and post-trade information on transactions in financial instruments available to the public on a reasonable commercial basis (‘RCB’), and to ensure non-discriminatory access to that information. That Article has, however, not delivered on its objectives. The information provided by trading venues, APAs and systematic internalisers on a reasonable commercial basis does not enable users to understand market data policies and how the price for market data is set. ESMA issued guidelines explaining how the concept of RCB should be applied. These guidelines should be converted to legal obligations. Due to the high level of detail required to specify RCB and the required flexibility in amending the applicable rules based on the fast changing data landscape, ESMA should be empowered to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying what constitutes a reasonable commercial basis and how RCB should be applied, thereby further strengthening the harmonised and consistent application of Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014.

Removed(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0600-20220101)

Added(11) In order to reinforce the price formation process and to maintain a level playing field between trading venues and systematic internalisers, Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to make public all quotes in equity instruments placed by that systematic internaliser below the standard market size. Systematic internalisers are free to decide which sizes they quote, as long as they quote at a minimum size of 10% of the standard market size. That possibility, however, has led to very low levels of pre-trade transparency provided by systematic internalisers in equity instruments, and has hampered the achievement of a level playing field. It is therefore necessary to require systematic internalisers to publish firm quotes relating to a minimum size to be determined by ESMA. When determining the minimum size, it is appropriate for ESMA to consider the following objectives: increasing pre-trade transparency of equity instruments for the benefit of end-investors; maintaining a level playing field between trading venues and systematic internalisers; providing end investors with an adequate choice of trading options; and ensuring that the trading landscape in the Union remains attractive and competitive both domestically and internationally.

RemovedAmendment to clarify thati) the issuance size can be used to determine the liquidity of an instrument, where relevant - in line with the proposed provisions under Article 11;ii) as ‘an instrument being traded daily’ is a precondition for liquidity and treated as a fourth criterion, it is added to the list of criteria under point (17).iii) ‘free float’ is replace by ‘market capitalisation’ as:- market participants reportedly struggle to provide free-float information;- free-float does not seem to be the most relevant parameter to assess the liquidity of an instruments;- free-float is not a concept that exists in the ETFs and certificates markets;The number of outstanding shares to be used for the calculation of the market cap to be used for this assessment is also an important information in the context of the Short Selling Regulation.

Added(12) In order to create a level playing field, in addition to the obligation to publish firm quotes ▌systematic internalisers should also not be allowed to match at midpoint below a size to be determined by ESMA and aligned with the size below which systematic internalisers’ pre-trade transparency requirements apply. It should furthermore be clarified that systematic internalisers should be allowed to match at midpoint above this size without complying with the tick-size regime. That would bring the Union in line with the prevalent international market practices.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 600/2014

Added(13) Market participants need core market data to be able to make informed investment decisions. Pursuant to the current Article 27h of Regulation (EU) 600/2014, sourcing core market data about certain financial instruments directly from trading venues and APAs requires that consolidated tape providers enter into separate licensing agreements with all those data contributors. That process is burdensome, costly and time consuming. It has been one of the obstacles to consolidated tape providers emerging on a cross market basis. This obstacle should be removed in order to enable consolidated tape providers to obtain the market data and to overcome licencing issues. Trading venues and APAs, or investment firms and systematic internalisers without intervention of APAs (‘market data contributors’) should be required to submit their market data to consolidated tape providers, and to use harmonised templates respecting high–quality data standards to do so. Only CTPs selected and authorised by ESMA should be able to collect harmonised market data from the individual data sources in accordance with the mandatory contribution rule. To make the market data useful for investors, market data contributors should be required to provide the CTP with market data as close as technically possible to real time.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 2 – point b, Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 34 a (new): ‘(34a) ‘market data contributor’ means a trading venue, APA, and, for the purpose of pre-trade transparency for shares, an investment firm operating a systematic internaliser;’;

Added(14) Title II and III of Regulation (EU) 600/2014 require trading venues, APAs, investment firms and systematic internalisers (‘market data contributors’) to publish pre-trade data on financial instruments, including bid and offer prices and post-trade data on transactions, including the price and volume at which a transaction in a specific instrument has been concluded. Market participants are not obliged to use the consolidated core market data provided by the CTP. The requirement to publish those pre-trade and post-trade data should therefore remain applicable to enable market participants to access market data. However, to avoid undue burden on market data contributors, it is appropriate to align the requirement for market data contributors to publish data as much as possible with the requirement to contribute data to the CTP.

RemovedThe role of investment firms (SIs) contributing to the CTP should be limited to pre-trade data.APAs will submit post-trade data for investment firms to the CTP. Allowing investment firms also to submit such data might result in double-reporting and inconsistencies.

Added(15) Due to the disparate quality of market data, it is difficult for market participants to compare those data, which devoids data consolidation of much added-value. It is of the utmost importance for the proper functioning of the transparency regime set out in Title II and III of Regulation No (EU) 600/2014 and for the consolidation of data by consolidated tape providers that market data are of high quality. It is therefore appropriate to require that those market data comply with high quality standards in terms of both substance and format. It should be possible to change the substance and the format of the data within a short time to allow for changing market practices and insights. Therefore the requirements for the quality of data should be specified by ESMA in draft regulatory technical standards and should take into account prevailing industry standards and practices, international developments and standards agreed at the Union or international level, as well as the advice of a dedicated consultative group, established by the Commission and tasked with providing indications limited to the output of the consolidated tape. ESMA should be closely involved in the work of that consultative group.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 600/2014

Added(16) To better monitor reportable events, Directive 2014/65/EU harmonised the synchronisation of business clocks for trading venues and their members. To ensure that, in the context of the consolidation of market data, timestamps reported by different entities can be compared meaningfully, it is appropriate to extend the requirements for harmonisation of the synchronisation of business clocks to systematic internalisers, APAs and consolidated tape providers. Due to the level of technical expertise required to specify the requirements for application of a synchronized business clock, ESMA should be empowered to develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the accuracy with which the clocks should be synchronized.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new), Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 36a: (ca) point (36a) is replaced by the following: / ‘(36a) ‘data reporting services provider’ means a person referred to in points (34), (35) and (36) and a person referred to in Article 27b(2);’;

Added(17) Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires that the majority of trading in shares takes place on trading venues or systematic internalisers (‘share trading obligation’). This requirement does not apply to trades in shares which are non-systematic, ad hoc or irregular and infrequent. It is not clear when this exemption applies. ESMA therefore clarified this by making a distinction between shares on the basis of their International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). Pursuant to that distinction, only shares with an EEA ISIN are subject to the share trading obligation. That approach provides clarity to market participants trading in shares. It is therefore appropriate to incorporate ESMA’s current practice in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, while simultaneously removing the exemption for trades in shares which are non-systematic, ad-hoc or irregular and infrequent.▌

Removed(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0600-20220101)

Added(18) Determination of the date by which transactions are reported is important to ensure sufficient preparedness by both supervisors and reporting entities. It is also crucial to align the timing of changes in different reporting frameworks. Setting this date in a delegated act will provide the necessary flexibility and aligns ESMA’s empowerments with those laid down in Regulation (EU) 2019/834. To increase overall market reporting consistency, ESMA should also take account of international developments and standards agreed upon at Union or global level when developing relevant draft regulatory technical standards.

RemovedWithout amending this point, the drafting would include “market data contributors” (34a) in the DRSP definition.This would cause confusion as to whether the provision referring to DRSPs also applies to market data contributors (in particular trading venues and SIs), whereas they are only meant for ARMs, APAs and CTPs.

Added(19) Reporting in financial markets – in particular transaction reporting – is already highly automated and data is more standardised. Some inconsistencies between frameworks have already been resolved in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) Refit and Securities Financing Transactions Regulation (SFTR). The empowerments for ESMA should be aligned to adopt technical standards and ensure greater consistency in transaction reporting between the EMIR, SFTR and MiFIR frameworks. This will improve transaction data quality and avoid unnecessary additional costs for the industry. In addition, the transaction reporting should allow for a broad exchange of transaction data between national competent authorities to adequately reflect the latter’s evolving supervisory needs to monitor the most recent market developments and potential related risks. This should address, for instance, the need for any national competent authority to obtain a comprehensive overview of the investment made by clients residing, domiciled or established in its jurisdiction, including where such investments are made through investment firms authorised in another Member State or financial instruments for which it is not the competent authority of the most relevant market in terms of liquidity.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 600/2014

Added(19a) Market participants and ESMA have shown that the existing reporting regime can create uncertainty about who should report transactions and can lead to double reporting. The problem is particularly acute when investment firms trading with each other do not know whether their counterparty is a systematic internaliser for the traded financial instrument, and as such should report transactions to the approved publication arrangement. In addition, the link between the reporting obligation and the status of systematic internaliser has led to an inflated number of systematic internalisers in the Union, distorting the picture of market participants. The link between the systematic internaliser status and the post-trade transparency and reporting requirements should be removed, introducing instead the possibility for market participants to register as a designated reporting entity. In addition, ESMA should establish a register of all designated reporting entities, specifying their identity as well as the instruments or classes of instruments for which they are designated reporting entities. That would eliminate uncertainty about who should report a transaction and reduce the regulatory burden on investment firms, particularly smaller ones. Such an approach would also have the advantage that only those firms that qualify or have opted in as systematic internalisers will act as liquidity providers, providing further clarity to the overall structure of the equity market.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 2 – point d, Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 36b – point a – introductory part: all of the following data on shares and ETFs:

Added(20) Competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. However, no entity has, up until now, applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. It is therefore considered appropriate to empower ESMA to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. ESMA should prioritise the selection and authorisation of a consolidated tape provider for bonds, followed by shares and ETFs and finally by derivatives. The selection processes for each CTP should be staggered at regular intervals, with each selection process starting no later than six months following the initiation of the preceding one. Given the similarities between shares and ETFs, ESMA should conduct a parallel process for those two financial instruments, accepting proposals for either a single consolidated tape comprising both shares and ETFs, or two separate tapes. For both shares and ETFs the market data that data contributors are required to send to the relevant CTP should contain pre-trade and post-trade market data related to the first five layers of the order books.

RemovedClarifying scope of consolidated tape by enhancing the legal clarity with regards to the fact that with equities what is intended is shares and ETFs.

Added(21) According to data presented in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this Regulation, the expected revenue generation for the consolidated tape will vary depending on the precise features of the tape. The expected revenue of the CTP should significantly exceed the cost of its production and therefore help to build a solid revenue participation scheme whereby the CTP and the market data contributors share aligned commercial interests. This principle should not prevent CTPs from making a necessary margin to maintain a viable business model and from using the core market data to offer further analytics or other services aimed to increase the revenue pool. The market data contributor should at least receive a remuneration based on the costs it has incurred in generating the data and providing it to the CTP. Retail investors should have access to the consolidated tape, either free of charge or for a nominal annual fee, and the tape provider should ensure that the information provided to retail investors is easily accessible and displayed in a user-friendly and understandable format.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 600/2014

Added(22) There is an objective difference between a venue of primary admission and other trading venues that serve as secondary trading markets. A venue of primary admission admits companies to the public markets, playing a crucial role in the life of a share and for the share’s liquidity. This is particularly true in the case of shares listed on smaller regulated markets which remain typically traded mostly on the venue of primary admission. In smaller regulated markets and SME growth markets the level of concentration of trading in shares, for which they are also the venue of primary admission, means that their relative contribution to the fragmentation of trading in the Union is less significant compared to that of larger regulated markets. The average daily trading volume of shares in the smaller regulated markets is relatively low, often accounting for less than 1 % of the average daily trading volume of the Union as a whole. Smaller regulated markets and SME growth markets are, on average, less diversified and more dependent on data revenues, and the mandatory contribution to the consolidated tape for shares could deprive them of their most important source of income. Therefore, given the lower levels of fragmentation of smaller markets, their relative share of the overall trading landscape and legitimate concerns about the viability of their business, an exclusion from the mandatory contributions to the consolidated tape should be considered appropriate to allow them to maintain their local admissions and safeguard a rich and vibrant ecosystem in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union. From a procedural perspective, the first exclusion criterion should be market share; if the market share at any future point exceeds the threshold set out in this Regulation, fragmentation criteria should apply as alternative exemption criteria. Notwithstanding the mandatory contribution exemption, smaller regulated markets that wish to be included in the consolidated view provided by the consolidated tape should be able to opt in to the mandatory contribution scheme by notifying ESMA of their intent. Nevertheless, the development of a consolidated tape should aim to eventually attain a complete representation of the Union’s trading venues, to achieve the full benefits of an integrated capital markets union.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 2 – point d, Article 2 - paragraph 1 - point 36b – point a - point i: (i) the best bids and offers with corresponding volumes and timestamps, limited to pre-trade transparency data for shares. For auction systems, that also means the price at which the auction trading system would best satisfy its trading algorithm and the volume that participants in that system would potentially execute at that price;

Added(23) The desired outcome of the consolidated tape would be to provide end investors with a truly consolidated overview of the trading opportunities available in the Union, including small regulated markets and lower trading costs through increased cross-border competition, thereby increasing the overall domestic and international attractiveness of Union capital markets, and fostering their growth, in line with the objectives of the capital markets union. Regardless of the exemption granted to smaller regulated markets under this Regulation from the mandatory contribution of market data to the consolidated tape, a dedicated revenue participation scheme▌ for the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs should be established, in order to incentivise their opt-in to the mandatory contribution scheme, which should remain nonetheless entirely voluntary. In particular, data from trades in the less liquid shares should attract a higher remuneration than their notional trading value would indicate. Whether a share is less liquid should be determined on the basis of the proportion of pre-trade transparent liquidity displayed by the regulated market that admits the less liquid share, relative to the average daily trading turnover in that share.

RemovedCore market” data should be limited only to the instruments that are in scope of the CTP in the proposal. As the pre-trade CTP would be only for shares and not for all equities, the amendment clarifies that pre-trade data only relates to share. Please note that this does not exclude the possibility of a single CTP provider for shares and ETFs, as the appointed CTP could simply consolidate the different data streams separately.

Added(24) Given the novelty of the consolidated tape in the context of the EU financial markets, ESMA should be entrusted with providing the European Commission with an assessment of the revenue participation scheme designed to incentivise smaller regulated markets to opt in to the mandatory contribution of market data in the context of the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs. This report should be prepared on the basis of at least 18 months of operation of the CTP and subsequently at the request of the Commission, where deemed necessary or appropriate. The assessment should focus in particular on whether the participation of small regulated markets in the revenue of the CTP is fair and effective in inducing those markets to contributing to the consolidated tape and in safeguarding the role that these markets play in their local financial ecosystem. It is appropriate for that assessment to establish whether the inclusion of those smaller regulated markets in the consolidated tape resulted in an increase in the trading volumes of shares in those regulated markets, a positive effect on the participation of professional and retail investors in the market, and an improvement of the trading conditions for end-investors. The Commission should be empowered to revise the mechanism of allocation by way of a delegated act, where necessary or appropriate.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 600/2014

Added(25) It is necessary to ensure that consolidated tape providers remedy information asymmetries in the capital markets in a sustainable manner, and to ensure that consolidated tape providers provide consolidated data that are reliable. Consolidated tape providers should therefore be obliged to adhere to organisational requirements and quality of service standards that must be met at all times once they have been authorised by ESMA. Quality standards should cover aspects related to the collection of consolidated core market data, accurate time-stamping of such data at various stages in the delivery chain, collection and administration of market data subscription fees, and allocation of revenue to market data contributors.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 2 – point d, Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 36b – point b – introductory part: all of the following data on bonds and derivatives:

Added(26) In order to safeguard market participants’ continued trust in the operation of a consolidated tape provider, such entities should periodically make a series of public reports concerning compliance with their obligations under this Regulation, in particular on performance statistics and incident reports relating to data quality and systems. Due to the highly technical nature of the substance of the report, ESMA should be empowered to specify the substance, format and timing.

RemovedIn line with previous amendments and comments.

Added(27) The requirement that trade reports should be made available free of access charges after 15 minutes currently applies to all trading venues, APAs and CTPs. For CTPs, that requirement stands in the way of commercialising the consolidation of the core market data and considerably limits the commercial viability of a potential CTP, since certain potential clients could prefer waiting for the consolidated free data rather than subscribing to the consolidated tape. This is in particular the case for bonds and derivatives that are in general not traded frequently and for which the data has often kept most of its value after 15 minutes. While the requirement to deliver the data for free after 15 minutes should remain in place for trading venues and APAs, it should be abandoned for CTPs to protect its potential business model.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 600/2014

Added(28) Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires that OTC derivatives that are subject to the clearing obligation are traded on trading venues. Regulation (EU) 2019/834 of the European Parliament and of the Council amended Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council to reduce the scope of the entities that are subject to the clearing obligation. In light of the close interconnection between the clearing obligation under Regulation (EU) 648/2012 and the derivatives trading obligation under Regulation (EU) 600/2014, and to ensure greater legal coherence and to simplify the legal framework, it is necessary and appropriate to re-align the derivatives trading obligation with the clearing obligation for derivatives. Without that alignment, certain smaller financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties would no longer be captured by the clearing obligation but continue to be captured by the trading obligation.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 2 – point d, Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 36b – point b – point iii: (iii) for bonds, the standardised instrument identifier that applies across venues;

Added(29) Article 6a of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 provides for a mechanism to temporarily suspend the clearing obligation where the criteria on the basis of which specific classes of OTC derivatives have been made subject to the clearing obligation are no longer met, or where such suspension is considered necessary to avoid a serious threat to financial stability in the Union. Such suspension may, however, prevent counterparties from being able to comply with their trading obligation, laid down in Regulation (EU) 600/2014 because the clearing obligation is a pre-requisite to the trading obligation. It is therefore necessary to lay down that, where the suspension of the clearing obligation would lead to a material change in the criteria for the trading obligation, it should be possible to concurrently suspend the trading obligation for the same class or classes of OTC derivatives that are subject to the suspension of the clearing obligation.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 600/2014

Added(30) An ad-hoc suspension mechanism is necessary to ensure that the Commission may swiftly react to significant changes in market conditions that may have a material effect on the trading of derivatives and their counterparties. Where such market conditions are present, and upon the request of the competent authority of a Member state, the Commission should be able to suspend the trading obligation, independently from any suspension of the clearing obligation. Such a suspension of the trading obligation should be possible where the activities of an EU investment firm with a non-EEA counterparty are unduly affected by the scope of the EU trading obligation on derivatives and where that investment firm acts as a market-maker in the category of derivatives subject to the trading obligation. The issue of overlapping DTOs is particularly acute when trading with counterparties domiciled in a third-country jurisdiction that applies its own DTO. This suspension would also help EU counterparties remaining competitive on global markets. When deciding upon the suspension of the trading obligation, the Commission should take into consideration the impact of such suspension on the clearing obligation laid down in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 2 – point d, Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 36b – point b – point iv – indent 4: — the receipt of market data by the consolidated tape provider;

Added(31) Open access provisions for exchange-traded derivatives reduce attractiveness to invest in new products as competitors may be able to get access without the upfront investment. The application of the open access regime for exchange-traded derivatives, laid down in Article 35 and 36 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, may thus limit competitiveness in these products, by removing incentives for regulated markets to create new exchange-traded derivatives. It should therefore be laid down that that regime should not apply to the CCP or trading venue concerned in respect of exchange-traded derivatives, thus fostering innovation and the development of exchange-traded derivatives in the Union.

RemovedAligning language with Article 2(1)(36b)(a).

Added(32) Financial intermediaries should strive to achieve the best possible price and the highest possible likelihood of execution for trades that they execute on behalf of their clients. To that end, financial intermediaries should select the trading venue or counterparty for executing their client trades solely on the basis of achieving best execution for their clients. It should be incompatible with that principle of best execution that a financial intermediary, when acting on behalf of its clients, receives a fee, a commission or any non-monetary benefit from a third party in exchange for routing client orders for execution by that third party. Investment firms should be therefore be prohibited from receiving such payment or any other non-monetary benefit. This prohibition is rendered necessary in light of the divergent practices by national competent authorities across the Union in their application and supervision of best execution requirements as laid out in Article 27 of Directive 2014/65/EU. For this reason, no further national discretions should be considered acceptable with respect to the rules applicable to the routing of client orders for execution.

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 600/2014

Added(32a) The energy crisis of 2022 has brought to light that the regulatory framework for commodity derivatives trading as set out in Directive 2014/65/EU could be further improved. In particular, the impact of higher and more frequent margin calls and the regulatory status of market participants, the impact of extreme volatility and prices and the impact of third country trade companies are elements that could warrant a review of the commodity derivatives framework. In particular, the impact and the consequences of introducing minimum holding periods for commodity derivatives is an element that deserves further consideration. ESMA should therefore carry out an analysis on whether such minimum holding period could effectively limit the volatility on derivatives markets without negatively impacting the functioning of those markets.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 3 – point a, Article 4 – paragraph 1: deleted / (deleted) / (deleted) / (deleted) / (deleted) / (deleted) / (deleted) / (deleted)

Added(33) The Commission should adopt the draft regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA regarding the precise characteristics of the deferral regime for non-equity transactions, regarding the provision of information on a reasonable commercial basis, regarding the application of the synchronised business clocks by trading venues, systematic internalisers, APAs and CTPs and regarding characteristics of the public reporting obligation of the CTP. The Commission should adopt those draft regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU and in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

RemovedSee justification related to introduction of Article 4(6)(f). Text proposed by the COM for paragraph 1 is deleted as ESMA will be mandated to identify the threshold for the use of the RPW.

Added(34) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to facilitate the emerging of a consolidated tape provider cross markets for each asset classes and to amend certain aspects of the existing legislation in order to improve transparency on markets in financial instruments but also to further enhance the level playing field between regulated markets and systematic internalisers, as well as enhance the international competitiveness of the Union’s capital markets, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at the Union level, measure should be adopted at Union level, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. This Regulation furthermore respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter, in particular the freedom to conduct a business and the right to consumer protection,

RemovedRegulation (EU) No 600/2014

AddedHAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 3 – point b, Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point iii: (iii) the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs;

Added(1) Article 1 is amended as follows:

RemovedReflecting the possibility of a single CTP for shares and equities.