Text · Amendment list
On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, No 648/2012, No 600/2014, No 909/2014, 2015/2365, 2019/1156, 2021/23, 2022/858, 2023/1114, No 1060/2009, 2016/1011, 2017/2402, 2023/2631 and 2024/3005 as regards the further development of capital market integration and supervision within the Union
Full title
On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, No 648/2012, No 600/2014, No 909/2014, 2015/2365, 2019/1156, 2021/23, 2022/858, 2023/1114, No 1060/2009, 2016/1011, 2017/2402, 2023/2631 and 2024/3005 as regards the further development of capital market integration and supervision within the Union
Document ECON-AM-791103 · COM(2025)0943 – C100328/2025 – 2025/0383(COD)
- Kind
- Amendment list ECON-AM-791103
- Date
- 31 July 2026
- Committee
- Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
- Dossier
- 2025-0383
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- COM(2025)0943 – C100328/2025 – 2025/0383(COD)
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| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) The Savings and Investments Union (SIU) strategy is part of the Commission strategy to provide a vision of the Union as an economic powerhouse. For that purpose, it is necessary to establish a single market for financial services by addressing market inefficiencies resulting from fragmentation and to create the truly integrated European capital markets which are accessible to all citizens and businesses across the Union. It is also important that financial markets potential of the Union is unlocked by providing access to more efficient capital-market based financing and by facilitating cross-border capital flows, which in turn should support the economy of the Union, stimulate job creation and enhance competitiveness. | (1) The Savings and Investments Union (SIU) strategy is part of the Commission strategy to provide a vision of the Union as an economic powerhouse. For that purpose, it is necessary to establish a single market for financial services by addressing market inefficiencies resulting from fragmentation and to create the truly integrated European capital markets which are accessible to all citizens and businesses across the Union. It is also important that financial markets potential of the Union is unlocked by providing access to more efficient capital-market based financing and by facilitating cross-border capital flows, which in turn should support the economy of the Union, stimulate job creation and enhance competitiveness. That integration should be supported by open and competitive markets, reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and making it easier for European savings to finance businesses, in particular SMEs, innovative companies, infrastructure and growth projects. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) The Savings and Investments Union (SIU) strategy is part of the Commission strategy to provide a vision of the Union as an economic powerhouse. For that purpose, it is necessary to establish a single market for financial services by addressing market inefficiencies resulting from fragmentation and to create the truly integrated European capital markets which are accessible to all citizens and businesses across the Union. It is also important that financial markets potential of the Union is unlocked by providing access to more efficient capital-market based financing and by facilitating cross-border capital flows, which in turn should support the economy of the Union, stimulate job creation and enhance competitiveness. | (1) The Savings and Investments Union (SIU) strategy is part of the Commission strategy to provide a vision of the Union as an economic powerhouse. For that purpose, it is necessary to establish a single market for financial services by addressing market inefficiencies resulting from fragmentation and to create the truly integrated European capital markets which are accessible to all citizens and businesses across the Union. It is also important that financial markets potential of the Union is unlocked by providing access to more efficient capital-market based financing and by facilitating cross-border capital flows, which in turn should support the economy of the Union, stimulate job creation, enhance competitiveness and contribute to the green transition. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1a) The integration of capital markets should remain a market-driven process, aided by Union rules that remove unjustified barriers to cross-border activity, foster investments, cut administrative costs and improve legal certainty. The supervisory and convergence measures provided for in this Regulation should be applied in a proportionate manner and should not lead to new layers of supervision, reporting obligations, duplication of requirements or fees that are not necessary for market integrity or financial stability. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2a) The Savings and Investments Union should help harness European savings for investment, improve access to market financing for European companies, improve the Union’s competitiveness and enable long-term investment in innovation, infrastructure, defence, energy, digitalisation and business growth. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2b) While the steps taken in this regulation should facilitative cross-border capital flows, including the removal of certain barriers in the sectors of trading, post-trading and asset management, and more central supervision, further and real progress can ultimately be made by addressing differences and uncertainty in national regulation, including in insolvency law, securities law, corporate law and investor protection. Current regulatory fragmantation witin the Union and the single market leads to too many costs and complexity for investors and businesses. True cross-border and globally competitive scale will only be within reach if these broader barriers are addressed as well. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (4) The development of a deeper and more integrated Union capital market, as envisaged in the Savings and Investments Union Communication, requires consistent and effective supervision across Member States. Divergent national supervisory practices create legal uncertainty, increase the cost of cross-border activity and fragment the single market for financial services, thereby hindering market integration and the efficient allocation of capital. To address those challenges, it is necessary to strengthen supervisory convergence and, where appropriate, entrust the European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) with additional tasks and powers to ensure the uniform application of Union law and the effective oversight of entities with significant cross-border relevance. | (4) The development of a deeper and more integrated Union capital market, as envisaged in the Savings and Investments Union Communication, requires consistent and effective supervision across Member States. Divergent national supervisory practices create legal uncertainty, increase the cost of cross-border activity and fragment the single market for financial services, thereby hindering market integration and the efficient allocation of capital. To address those challenges, it is necessary to strengthen supervisory convergence and, where appropriate, entrust the European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) with additional tasks and powers to coordinate the uniform application of Union law and the effective oversight of entities with significant cross-border relevance. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to significant entities in the field of market infrastructure and to crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. | (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to significant entities in the field of market infrastructure and to crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. Assigning direct supervisory duties to ESMA should be reserved for cases where the cross-border dimension, systemic importance, activity or operational interdependencies of the institution or activity concerned make Union-wide supervision more effective. In other cases, alignment of supervision, cooperation between competent authorities and efficient information exchange should be the preferred instruments. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to significant entities in the field of market infrastructure and to crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. | (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to significant entities in the field of market infrastructure and to crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. In exercising its supervisory and policy powers, the impact on competitiveness is a relevant consideration. However, ESMA should always keep financial stability and safety as the primary objectives. Competitiveness can be considered when there are multiple options for action that sufficiently satisfy prudential and financial stability objectives. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to significant entities in the field of market infrastructure and to crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. | (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to significant entities in the field of market infrastructure, over significant crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) and over less significant entities that have designated ESMA as their competent authority, together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to significant entities in the field of market infrastructure and to crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. | (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to significant entities in the field of market infrastructure and to significant crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to significant entities in the field of market infrastructure and to crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. | (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to entities in the field of market infrastructure and to crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient decision-making at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. The transfer of direct supervisory powers to ESMA in relation to significant entities in the field of market infrastructure and to crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), together with enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. | (5) For that purpose, ESMA should be given additional competences and its governance and funding framework should be reinforced to promote transparent, accountable and efficient supervisory convergence and coordination at Union level and to ensure that ESMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. Enhanced supervisory convergence tools, should contribute to a more integrated, competitive and resilient capital market that delivers better outcomes for investors, firms and the broader economy. Any direct Union-level supervision should be clearly evidence-based, proportionate, cost-effective and targeted at genuine Union-level risks.” |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5a) Third-country multi-issuer stablecoin schemes, whereby a Union-authorized issuer partners with a non-Union entity to issue fungible stablecoins that are technically identical and legally indistinguishable, generate inherent vulnerabilities and amplify systemic risks to the financial stability of the Union. The structural vulnerabilities of such schemes significantly weaken the Union’s prudential framework by increasing the likelihood of redemption runs, liquidity mismatches and regulatory arbitrage. The lack of oversight over third-country issuers and the fragility of cross-border reserve balancing mechanisms in third-country multi-issuance schemes can amplify these risks, and the interconnectedness between issuers and banks could potentially lead to contagion risks. To protect consumers and the safety of the EU financial system, the joint issuance of interchangeable crypto-assets by a Union issuer and a non-Union entity should be prohibited. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5a) The integration of capital markets should not lead to a closed market structure that locks in a duopoly or oligopoly of a few large, often non-Union, players. To ensure a diverse ecosystem, supervisory convergence should preserve room for small and medium-sized Union asset managers and prevent market concentration that could harm end-investors through reduced choice or anti-competitive fee structures. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7a) Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 should provide that, solely when exercising the tasks conferred upon it by that Regulation to contribute to the establishment of high-quality common regulatory standards, ESMA should take account of the potential impact on the competitiveness of the financial and commodity markets in the Union. Such consideration should have no bearing on the exercise of ESMA's supervisory and enforcement powers. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9) To ensure the effective exercise of its direct supervisory responsibilities, ESMA should establish structured yet flexible cooperation arrangements with other authorities. Such cooperation should capture a range of situations, corresponding to the evolving role of ESMA. Such arrangements should cater, first, for cases where national competent authorities are still responsible for certain entities or activities but will cease to be in charge of supervision of certain entities following the assumption of direct supervisory powers by ESMA, thereby requiring transitional solutions to ensure continuity and an orderly transfer of responsibilities. Second, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where, alongside ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, other Union or national authorities, although not acting or having acted as competent authorities, hold relevant expertise or consultation rights under Union law, such as the European Central Bank in relation to central counterparties. Third, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where tasks are not transferred to ESMA, such as market surveillance for trading venues. To address these different situations and, in particular, to ensure a smooth transition, the Authority should have the flexibility to set up cooperation arrangements adapted to the sector concerned, the nature of the tasks and the degree of involvement required. Such arrangements may range from close structural cooperation, including the establishment of joint supervisory teams or the conduct of joint inspections, to looser forms of operational coordination and, progressively, to more autonomous supervisory action by the Authority as its capacity develops. Those cooperation arrangements should also allow for their gradual adjustments over time and, where appropriate, the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States. Those cooperation arrangements should also promote effective and resource-efficient supervision, ensure the continuity and consistency of supervisory outcomes, and take due account of the statutory responsibilities and resources of other authorities. Cooperation should be guided by the principles of efficiency, proportionality, mutual trust and good faith, and should promote the effective use of resources while safeguarding ESMA’s independence and accountability for the performance of its tasks. To reflect the progressive build-up of ESMA’s supervisory capacity and to ensure the full and effective assumption of its supervisory tasks, the cooperation arrangements should be subject to regular review by ESMA. | (9) National competent authorities have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of trading venues and financial market infrastructures within their territory, featured with economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Moreover, national competent authorities carry out important functions in relation to other relevant actors in financial markets, like intermediaries and issuers. Therefore, in order to ensure effective and high-quality, Union-wide supervision, national competent authorities should be responsible for assisting ESMA in the preparation and implementation of any acts relating to the exercise of ESMA direct supervisory responsibilities, as part of a structurally coordinated supervisory framework. This should include, in particular, the ongoing day-to-day supervisory tasks and related on-site verifications, as well as the preparation of draft supervisory measures and decisions. In addition, ESMA and other Union or national competent authorities should establish, where appropriate, structured yet flexible cooperation arrangements to capture a range of situations, corresponding to the evolving role of ESMA. Such arrangements should cater, first, for cases where national competent authorities will remain responsible for certain entities or activities but will cease to be on their own in charge of supervision of certain entities following the assumption of direct supervisory powers by ESMA, thereby requiring transitional solutions to ensure continuity and an orderly transfer of responsibilities in the new setting that envisages the cooperation between ESMA and national authorities. Second, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where, alongside ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, other Union or national authorities, although not acting or having acted as competent authorities, hold relevant expertise or consultation rights under Union law, such as the European Central Bank in relation to central counterparties. Third, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where tasks are not transferred to ESMA, such as market surveillance for trading venues. To address these different situations and, in particular, to ensure a smooth transition, the Authority should have the flexibility to set up cooperation arrangements adapted to the sector concerned, the nature of the tasks and the degree of involvement required. Those cooperation arrangements should also allow for their gradual adjustments over time and, where appropriate, the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States. Those cooperation arrangements should also promote effective and resource-efficient supervision, ensure the continuity and consistency of supervisory outcomes, and take due account of the statutory responsibilities and resources of other authorities. Cooperation should be guided by the principles of efficiency, proportionality, mutual trust and good faith, and should promote the effective use of resources while safeguarding ESMA’s independence and accountability for the performance of its tasks. To reflect the progressive build-up of ESMA’s supervisory capacity and to ensure the full and effective assumption of its supervisory tasks, the cooperation arrangements should be subject to review by ESMA as necessary. To ensure a smooth transition and avoid blurred accountability, the transfer of responsibilities to ESMA should follow a sequenced integration mechanism. During an initial five-year phase, supervision should rely on the structurally coordinated supervisory framework to leverage national expertise while building capacity at Union level, with full direct supervision for systemic actors occurring only after a comprehensive effectiveness review. |
To ensure the effective exercise of ESMA direct supervisory responsibilities and considering that national competent authorities have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of financial markets infrastructures and participants, national competent authorities should be involved in the day-to-day supervision through the establishment of structural and coordinated supervisory teams composed of ESMA staff and staff of the relevant national authorities. Level 1 should directly and clearly states key principles concerning the functions, composition, cost reimbursement and functioning of such teams, whereas Level 2 measures should further specify the relevant details, including the rules applicable to on-site inspections and other forms of cooperation between ESMA and national authorities. Finally, to ensure a smooth transition, the framework functions as a sequenced integration mechanism whereby the transfer of full responsibilities to the Authority is conducted in two phases, with the move to direct supervision for systemic actors occurring only after an initial five-year period and a comprehensive effectiveness review.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9) To ensure the effective exercise of its direct supervisory responsibilities, ESMA should establish structured yet flexible cooperation arrangements with other authorities. Such cooperation should capture a range of situations, corresponding to the evolving role of ESMA. Such arrangements should cater, first, for cases where national competent authorities are still responsible for certain entities or activities but will cease to be in charge of supervision of certain entities following the assumption of direct supervisory powers by ESMA, thereby requiring transitional solutions to ensure continuity and an orderly transfer of responsibilities. Second, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where, alongside ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, other Union or national authorities, although not acting or having acted as competent authorities, hold relevant expertise or consultation rights under Union law, such as the European Central Bank in relation to central counterparties. Third, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where tasks are not transferred to ESMA, such as market surveillance for trading venues. To address these different situations and, in particular, to ensure a smooth transition, the Authority should have the flexibility to set up cooperation arrangements adapted to the sector concerned, the nature of the tasks and the degree of involvement required. Such arrangements may range from close structural cooperation, including the establishment of joint supervisory teams or the conduct of joint inspections, to looser forms of operational coordination and, progressively, to more autonomous supervisory action by the Authority as its capacity develops. Those cooperation arrangements should also allow for their gradual adjustments over time and, where appropriate, the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States. Those cooperation arrangements should also promote effective and resource-efficient supervision, ensure the continuity and consistency of supervisory outcomes, and take due account of the statutory responsibilities and resources of other authorities. Cooperation should be guided by the principles of efficiency, proportionality, mutual trust and good faith, and should promote the effective use of resources while safeguarding ESMA’s independence and accountability for the performance of its tasks. To reflect the progressive build-up of ESMA’s supervisory capacity and to ensure the full and effective assumption of its supervisory tasks, the cooperation arrangements should be subject to regular review by ESMA. | (9) To ensure the effective exercise of its direct supervisory responsibilities, ESMA should establish structured yet flexible cooperation arrangements with other authorities. Such cooperation should capture a range of situations, corresponding to the evolving role of ESMA. Such arrangements should cater, first, for cases where national competent authorities are still responsible for certain entities or activities but will cease to be in charge of supervision of certain entities following the assumption of direct supervisory powers by ESMA, thereby requiring transitional solutions to ensure continuity and an orderly transfer of responsibilities. Second, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where, alongside ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, other Union or national authorities, although not acting or having acted as competent authorities, hold relevant expertise or consultation rights under Union law, such as the European Central Bank in relation to central counterparties. Third, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where tasks are not transferred to ESMA, such as market surveillance for trading venues. To address these different situations and, in particular, to ensure a smooth transition, the Authority should have the flexibility to set up cooperation arrangements adapted to the sector concerned, the nature of the tasks and the degree of involvement required. Such arrangements may range from close structural cooperation, including the establishment of joint supervisory teams or the conduct of joint inspections, to looser forms of operational coordination and, progressively, to more autonomous supervisory action by the Authority as its capacity develops. Without prejudice to relevant provisions of the Treaties and of Union law, ESMA should have the right to give instructions to the national competent authorities and other relevant national authorities when giving support and performing tasks under these cooperation arrangements. Those cooperation arrangements should also allow for their gradual adjustments over time and, where appropriate, the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States. Those cooperation arrangements should also promote effective and resource-efficient supervision, ensure the continuity and consistency of supervisory outcomes, and take due account of the statutory responsibilities and resources of other authorities. Cooperation should be guided by the principles of efficiency, proportionality, mutual trust and good faith, and should promote the effective use of resources while safeguarding ESMA’s independence and accountability for the performance of its tasks. In this regard, cooperation arrangements should ensure that ESMA and the authorities devote the necessary financial and human resources to the exercise of the tasks under these cooperation arrangements. To reflect the progressive build-up of ESMA’s supervisory capacity and to ensure the full and effective assumption of its supervisory tasks, the cooperation arrangements should be subject to regular review by ESMA. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9) To ensure the effective exercise of its direct supervisory responsibilities, ESMA should establish structured yet flexible cooperation arrangements with other authorities. Such cooperation should capture a range of situations, corresponding to the evolving role of ESMA. Such arrangements should cater, first, for cases where national competent authorities are still responsible for certain entities or activities but will cease to be in charge of supervision of certain entities following the assumption of direct supervisory powers by ESMA, thereby requiring transitional solutions to ensure continuity and an orderly transfer of responsibilities. Second, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where, alongside ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, other Union or national authorities, although not acting or having acted as competent authorities, hold relevant expertise or consultation rights under Union law, such as the European Central Bank in relation to central counterparties. Third, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where tasks are not transferred to ESMA, such as market surveillance for trading venues. To address these different situations and, in particular, to ensure a smooth transition, the Authority should have the flexibility to set up cooperation arrangements adapted to the sector concerned, the nature of the tasks and the degree of involvement required. Such arrangements may range from close structural cooperation, including the establishment of joint supervisory teams or the conduct of joint inspections, to looser forms of operational coordination and, progressively, to more autonomous supervisory action by the Authority as its capacity develops. Those cooperation arrangements should also allow for their gradual adjustments over time and, where appropriate, the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States. Those cooperation arrangements should also promote effective and resource-efficient supervision, ensure the continuity and consistency of supervisory outcomes, and take due account of the statutory responsibilities and resources of other authorities. Cooperation should be guided by the principles of efficiency, proportionality, mutual trust and good faith, and should promote the effective use of resources while safeguarding ESMA’s independence and accountability for the performance of its tasks. To reflect the progressive build-up of ESMA’s supervisory capacity and to ensure the full and effective assumption of its supervisory tasks, the cooperation arrangements should be subject to regular review by ESMA. | (9) To ensure the effective exercise of its direct supervisory responsibilities, ESMA should establish structured yet flexible cooperation arrangements with other authorities. Such cooperation should capture a range of situations, corresponding to the evolving role of ESMA. Such arrangements should cater, first, for cases where national competent authorities are still responsible for certain entities or activities but will cease to be in charge of supervision of certain entities following the assumption of direct supervisory powers by ESMA, thereby requiring transitional solutions to ensure continuity and an orderly transfer of responsibilities. Second, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where, alongside ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, other Union or national authorities, although not acting or having acted as competent authorities, hold relevant expertise or consultation rights under Union law, such as the European Central Bank in relation to central counterparties. To address these different situations and, in particular, to ensure a smooth transition, the Authority should have the flexibility to set up cooperation arrangements adapted to the sector concerned, the nature of the tasks and the degree of involvement required. Such arrangements may range from close structural cooperation, including the establishment of joint supervisory teams or the conduct of joint inspections, to looser forms of operational coordination and, progressively, to more autonomous supervisory action by the Authority as its capacity develops. Those cooperation arrangements should also allow for their gradual adjustments over time and, where appropriate, the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States. They should be designed in a manner that ensures sound financial management and budgetary predictability. In particular, where the cooperation arrangements involve the performance of tasks or the provision of staff, expertise, facilities or other support by national competent authorities at ESMA’s request, the estimated costs of those arrangements should be proportionate, duly justified and directly linked to the tasks performed for the purpose of ESMA’s supervisory responsibilities, without prejudice to the statutory responsibilities of national competent authorities under Union or national law. Those cooperation arrangements should also promote effective and resource-efficient supervision, ensure the continuity and consistency of supervisory outcomes, and take due account of the statutory responsibilities and resources of other authorities. Cooperation should be guided by the principles of efficiency, proportionality, mutual assistance and good faith, and should promote the effective use of resources while safeguarding ESMA’s independence and accountability for the performance of its tasks. To reflect the progressive build-up of ESMA’s supervisory capacity and to ensure the full and effective assumption of its supervisory tasks, the cooperation arrangements should be subject to regular review by ESMA. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9) To ensure the effective exercise of its direct supervisory responsibilities, ESMA should establish structured yet flexible cooperation arrangements with other authorities. Such cooperation should capture a range of situations, corresponding to the evolving role of ESMA. Such arrangements should cater, first, for cases where national competent authorities are still responsible for certain entities or activities but will cease to be in charge of supervision of certain entities following the assumption of direct supervisory powers by ESMA, thereby requiring transitional solutions to ensure continuity and an orderly transfer of responsibilities. Second, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where, alongside ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, other Union or national authorities, although not acting or having acted as competent authorities, hold relevant expertise or consultation rights under Union law, such as the European Central Bank in relation to central counterparties. Third, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where tasks are not transferred to ESMA, such as market surveillance for trading venues. To address these different situations and, in particular, to ensure a smooth transition, the Authority should have the flexibility to set up cooperation arrangements adapted to the sector concerned, the nature of the tasks and the degree of involvement required. Such arrangements may range from close structural cooperation, including the establishment of joint supervisory teams or the conduct of joint inspections, to looser forms of operational coordination and, progressively, to more autonomous supervisory action by the Authority as its capacity develops. Those cooperation arrangements should also allow for their gradual adjustments over time and, where appropriate, the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States. Those cooperation arrangements should also promote effective and resource-efficient supervision, ensure the continuity and consistency of supervisory outcomes, and take due account of the statutory responsibilities and resources of other authorities. Cooperation should be guided by the principles of efficiency, proportionality, mutual trust and good faith, and should promote the effective use of resources while safeguarding ESMA’s independence and accountability for the performance of its tasks. To reflect the progressive build-up of ESMA’s supervisory capacity and to ensure the full and effective assumption of its supervisory tasks, the cooperation arrangements should be subject to regular review by ESMA. | (9) To ensure the effective exercise of its direct supervisory responsibilities, ESMA should establish structured yet flexible cooperation arrangements with other authorities. Such cooperation should capture a range of situations, corresponding to the evolving role of ESMA. Such arrangements should cater, first, for cases where national competent authorities are still responsible for certain entities or activities but will cease to be in charge of supervision of certain entities following the assumption of direct supervisory powers by ESMA, thereby requiring transitional solutions to ensure continuity and an orderly transfer of responsibilities. Second, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where, alongside ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, other Union or national authorities, although not acting or having acted as competent authorities, hold relevant expertise or consultation rights under Union law, such as the European Central Bank in relation to central counterparties. Third, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where tasks are not transferred to ESMA, such as market surveillance for trading venues. To address these different situations and, in particular, to ensure a smooth transition, the Authority, in close involvement by the national authorities, should have the flexibility to set up cooperation arrangements adapted to the sector concerned, the nature of the tasks and the degree of involvement required. Such arrangements may range from close structural cooperation, including the establishment of joint supervisory teams or the conduct of joint inspections, to looser forms of operational coordination and, progressively, to more autonomous supervisory action by the Authority as its capacity develops. Those cooperation arrangements should also allow for their gradual adjustments over time and, where appropriate, the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States. Those cooperation arrangements should also promote effective and resource-efficient supervision, ensure the continuity and consistency of supervisory outcomes, and take due account of the statutory responsibilities and resources of other authorities. Cooperation should be guided by the principles of subsidiarity, efficiency, proportionality, mutual trust and good faith, and should promote the effective use of resources while safeguarding ESMA’s independence and accountability for the performance of its tasks. To reflect the progressive build-up of ESMA’s supervisory capacity and to ensure the full and effective assumption of its supervisory tasks, the cooperation arrangements should be subject to regular review by ESMA. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (9) To ensure the effective exercise of its direct supervisory responsibilities, ESMA should establish structured yet flexible cooperation arrangements with other authorities. Such cooperation should capture a range of situations, corresponding to the evolving role of ESMA. Such arrangements should cater, first, for cases where national competent authorities are still responsible for certain entities or activities but will cease to be in charge of supervision of certain entities following the assumption of direct supervisory powers by ESMA, thereby requiring transitional solutions to ensure continuity and an orderly transfer of responsibilities. Second, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where, alongside ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, other Union or national authorities, although not acting or having acted as competent authorities, hold relevant expertise or consultation rights under Union law, such as the European Central Bank in relation to central counterparties. Third, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where tasks are not transferred to ESMA, such as market surveillance for trading venues. To address these different situations and, in particular, to ensure a smooth transition, the Authority should have the flexibility to set up cooperation arrangements adapted to the sector concerned, the nature of the tasks and the degree of involvement required. Such arrangements may range from close structural cooperation, including the establishment of joint supervisory teams or the conduct of joint inspections, to looser forms of operational coordination and, progressively, to more autonomous supervisory action by the Authority as its capacity develops. Those cooperation arrangements should also allow for their gradual adjustments over time and, where appropriate, the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States. Those cooperation arrangements should also promote effective and resource-efficient supervision, ensure the continuity and consistency of supervisory outcomes, and take due account of the statutory responsibilities and resources of other authorities. Cooperation should be guided by the principles of efficiency, proportionality, mutual trust and good faith, and should promote the effective use of resources while safeguarding ESMA’s independence and accountability for the performance of its tasks. To reflect the progressive build-up of ESMA’s supervisory capacity and to ensure the full and effective assumption of its supervisory tasks, the cooperation arrangements should be subject to regular review by ESMA. | (9) To ensure the effective exercise of its direct supervisory responsibilities, ESMA should establish structured yet flexible cooperation arrangements with other authorities. Such cooperation should capture a range of situations, corresponding to the evolving role of ESMA. Such arrangements should cater, first, for cases where national competent authorities are still responsible for certain entities or activities but will cease to be in charge of supervision of certain entities following the assumption of direct supervisory powers by ESMA, thereby requiring transitional solutions to ensure continuity and an orderly transfer of responsibilities. Second, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where, alongside ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, other Union or national authorities, although not acting or having acted as competent authorities, hold relevant expertise or consultation rights under Union law, such as the European Central Bank in relation to central counterparties. Third, those cooperation arrangements should cover cases where tasks are not transferred to ESMA, such as market surveillance for trading venues. To address these different situations and, in particular, to ensure a smooth transition, the Authority should have the flexibility to set up cooperation arrangements adapted to the sector concerned, the nature of the tasks and the degree of involvement required. Such arrangements may range from close structural cooperation to looser forms of operational coordination and, progressively, to more autonomous supervisory action by the Authority as its capacity develops. Those cooperation arrangements should also allow for their gradual adjustments over time and, where appropriate, the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States. Those cooperation arrangements should also promote effective and resource-efficient supervision, ensure the continuity and consistency of supervisory outcomes, and take due account of the statutory responsibilities and resources of other authorities. Cooperation should be guided by the principles of efficiency, proportionality, mutual trust and good faith, and should promote the effective use of resources while safeguarding ESMA’s independence and accountability for the performance of its tasks. It should in no case lead to unnecessary layers of supervision or regulatory and administrative burden. To reflect the progressive build-up of ESMA’s supervisory capacity and to ensure the full and effective assumption of its supervisory tasks, the cooperation arrangements should be subject to regular review by ESMA. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13a) ESMA shall take into account the impact of its activities on competition and innovation, particularly during the development and application of the single rulebook. In that connection, it should follow the guidelines set out by the Commission in its communication of 16 March 2023 on the EU’s long-term competitiveness, which seeks to safeguard the EU’s attractiveness and preserve its position in the global economy. The communication highlights the importance of a regulatory framework that is conducive to growth and based on a new competitiveness check. In particular, the Commission stresses the importance of a growth-friendly regulatory framework that is based on the introduction of a new competitiveness check. Impact assessments produced before legislative proposals should thus take account of expected effects on price and cost competitiveness, including at international level, and on the competitiveness of innovation capacity. The cumulative effects of measures adopted at EU level must also be taken into account more effectively, including through the ‘one in, one out’ principle. In the same vein, ESMA should take account of the conclusions of the European Council of 17 and 18 April 2024 on the new European competitiveness deal, which call for a significant reduction in administrative and regulatory burdens and for the prevention of over-transposition. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (13b) ESMA should set up a regulatory committee to examine whether the single rulebook meets the growth and competitiveness objectives. The committee should publish its findings in a publicly available annual report, and they should be presented at the annual hearings organised by the European Parliament. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (15) To address proven supervisory failures in the approval of financial products, services or entities operating across the Union, it is necessary to enable ESMA to require a competent authority to seek its opinion before granting approval where a peer review or an investigation reveals failures in supervision which could jeopardize the integrity of financial markets, financial stability, or investor protection. The peer review or investigation process, as set out in Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, provides a robust and transparent framework for identifying supervisory failures and for taking corrective action. ESMA’s opinion should provide an additional layer of scrutiny and oversight, ensuring that financial products and services, and entities operating in the Union meet the highest standards of supervision. To prevent products, services or entities from entering the EU market without adequate supervision, it is necessary to enable ESMA to require in its opinion that competent authorities take corrective actions to address any shortcomings in supervision identified by ESMA. | (15) To address proven supervisory failures in the approval of financial products, services, activities or entities operating across the Union, it is necessary to enable ESMA to require a competent authority to seek its opinion before granting approval where a peer review, an inquiry, or a collaboration platform reveals failures in supervision which could jeopardize the integrity of financial markets, financial stability, or investor protection. The peer review, investigation process, as set out in Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, or collabration platform work provides a robust and transparent framework for identifying supervisory failures and for taking corrective action. ESMA’s opinion should provide an additional layer of scrutiny and oversight, ensuring that financial products, services, activities, and entities operating in the Union meet the highest standards of supervision. To prevent products, services, activities or entities from entering the EU market without adequate supervision, it is necessary to enable ESMA to require in its opinion that competent authorities take corrective actions to address any shortcomings in supervision identified by ESMA. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17) Due to the lack of a mechanism for mutual recognition of administrative decisions, national competent authorities have significant difficulties in enforcing recovery of administrative fines in a cross-border context. To ensure effective enforcement of rules and the proper functioning of the single market in the area of financial services, it is necessary to introduce a mechanism for mutual recognition of decisions imposing an administrative fine and for assistance in executing requests to recover such a fine and such mechanism should be based on the principle of mutual trust. To that end, the grounds for a refusal to execute the request to recover an administrative fine should be limited to the minimum necessary. | (17) Due to the lack of a mechanism for mutual recognition of administrative decisions, national competent authorities have significant difficulties in enforcing recovery of administrative fines in a cross-border context. To ensure effective enforcement of rules and the proper functioning of the single market in the area of financial services, it is necessary to introduce a mechanism for mutual recognition of decisions imposing an administrative fine and for assistance in executing requests to recover such a fine and such mechanism should be based on the principle of mutual assistance. To that end, the grounds for a refusal to execute the request to recover an administrative fine should be limited to the minimum necessary. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (17a) The Union supervisory handbook shapes day-to-day supervisory practice across the Union more directly than any high-level statement of objectives. To ensure that convergence towards common supervisory approaches does not come at the expense of the competitiveness of Union capital markets, the development of the handbook should take due account of its effects on market competitiveness and should be guided by the principle of proportionality. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (18a) Where supervisory competences are transferred from national competent authorities to ESMA under this Regulation, the supervisory fees and charges levied by those authorities on entities becoming subject to direct ESMA supervision should reflect the supervisory tasks retained by those authorities following such transfer. This principle is intended to support proportionality and to avoid unnecessary cost burdens for regulated entities, without prejudice to the applicable national frameworks governing the setting and adjustment of such fees and charges. The new ESMA supervisory layer must not result in double-charging of regulated entities. On the contrary, a more harmonised supervisory approach should result in overall efficiency gains. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) In light of the future new competences of ESMA, its governance structure should be adapted accordingly. To ensure the effective and impartial functioning of ESMA it is necessary to strengthen its governance by introducing an independent Executive Board with full-time members, which should enhance its capacity to take swift and Union-oriented decisions, in particular for the supervision of financial market participants. The Executive Board, composed of the Chairperson and five independent full-time members with diverse supervisory experiences and expertise in the sectors under ESMA’s supervision, should be responsible for decisions addressed to financial market participants in supervisory matters. The Executive Board should also be responsible for decisions addressed to one or a limited number of competent authorities, including dispute settlements, breaches of Union law, and peer reviews. These decisions are attributed to the Executive Board to increase the agility and reactivity of the decision-making and to ensure that the decisions take into account a common European interest. The Executive Board should also assume the competence of the current Management Board in preparing ESMA’s work programmes and budget. This should ensure effective, impartial and EU-oriented decisions. To ensure transparency and democratic control, the full-time members of the Executive Board should be appointed by the Council, based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission and a proposal by the Board of Supervisors, following approval by the European Parliament. | (19) In light of the future new competences of ESMA, its governance structure should be adapted accordingly. To ensure the effective and impartial functioning of ESMA it is necessary to strengthen its governance by introducing an independent Executive Board with full-time members, composed of the Chairperson and five independent full-time members with diverse supervisory experiences, should be responsible for decisions addressed to financial market participants in supervisory matters. The Executive Board should also be responsible for decisions addressed to one or a limited number of competent authorities, including dispute settlements, breaches of Union law, and peer reviews. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) In light of the future new competences of ESMA, its governance structure should be adapted accordingly. To ensure the effective and impartial functioning of ESMA it is necessary to strengthen its governance by introducing an independent Executive Board with full-time members, which should enhance its capacity to take swift and Union-oriented decisions, in particular for the supervision of financial market participants. The Executive Board, composed of the Chairperson and five independent full-time members with diverse supervisory experiences and expertise in the sectors under ESMA’s supervision, should be responsible for decisions addressed to financial market participants in supervisory matters. The Executive Board should also be responsible for decisions addressed to one or a limited number of competent authorities, including dispute settlements, breaches of Union law, and peer reviews. These decisions are attributed to the Executive Board to increase the agility and reactivity of the decision-making and to ensure that the decisions take into account a common European interest. The Executive Board should also assume the competence of the current Management Board in preparing ESMA’s work programmes and budget. This should ensure effective, impartial and EU-oriented decisions. To ensure transparency and democratic control, the full-time members of the Executive Board should be appointed by the Council, based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission and a proposal by the Board of Supervisors, following approval by the European Parliament. | (19) In light of the future new competences of ESMA, its governance structure should be adapted accordingly. To ensure the effective and impartial functioning of ESMA it is necessary to strengthen its governance by introducing an independent Executive Board with full-time members, which should enhance its capacity to take swift and Union-oriented decisions, in particular for the supervision of financial market participants. The Executive Board, composed of the Chairperson and five independent full-time members with diverse supervisory experiences and expertise in the sectors under ESMA’s supervision, as well as from main capital markets under supervision. To ensure the latter, its membership should reflect objective criteria that capture the capital market’s overall size (e.g. stock market capitalization), the capital market’s importance for the national economy (e.g. overall capital market financing to GDP and average retail investor capital per capita) and funded pension capital to GDP. The Executive board should be responsible for decisions addressed to financial market participants in supervisory matters. The Executive Board should also be responsible for decisions addressed to one or a limited number of competent authorities, including dispute settlements, breaches of Union law, and peer reviews. These decisions are attributed to the Executive Board to increase the agility and reactivity of the decision-making and to ensure that the decisions take into account a common European interest. The Executive Board should also assume the competence of the current Management Board in preparing ESMA’s work programmes and budget. This should ensure effective, impartial and EU-oriented decisions. To ensure transparency and democratic control, the full-time members of the Executive Board should be appointed by the Council, based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission and a proposal by the Board of Supervisors, following approval by the European Parliament. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) In light of the future new competences of ESMA, its governance structure should be adapted accordingly. To ensure the effective and impartial functioning of ESMA it is necessary to strengthen its governance by introducing an independent Executive Board with full-time members, which should enhance its capacity to take swift and Union-oriented decisions, in particular for the supervision of financial market participants. The Executive Board, composed of the Chairperson and five independent full-time members with diverse supervisory experiences and expertise in the sectors under ESMA’s supervision, should be responsible for decisions addressed to financial market participants in supervisory matters. The Executive Board should also be responsible for decisions addressed to one or a limited number of competent authorities, including dispute settlements, breaches of Union law, and peer reviews. These decisions are attributed to the Executive Board to increase the agility and reactivity of the decision-making and to ensure that the decisions take into account a common European interest. The Executive Board should also assume the competence of the current Management Board in preparing ESMA’s work programmes and budget. This should ensure effective, impartial and EU-oriented decisions. To ensure transparency and democratic control, the full-time members of the Executive Board should be appointed by the Council, based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission and a proposal by the Board of Supervisors, following approval by the European Parliament. | (19) In light of the future new competences of ESMA, its governance structure should be adapted accordingly. To ensure the effective and impartial functioning of ESMA it is necessary to strengthen its governance by introducing an independent Executive Board with full-time members, which should enhance its capacity to take swift and Union-oriented decisions, in particular for the supervision of financial market participants. The Executive Board, composed of the Chairperson and five independent full-time members with diverse supervisory experiences and, collectively, expertise in each of the sectors under ESMA’s supervision, should be responsible for decisions addressed to financial market participants in supervisory matters. The Executive Board should also be responsible for decisions addressed to one or a limited number of competent authorities, including dispute settlements, breaches of Union law, and peer reviews. These decisions are attributed to the Executive Board to increase the agility and reactivity of the decision-making and to ensure that the decisions take into account a common European interest. In order to uphold the integrity of the dispute settlement system, in instances where ESMA, in its direct supervisory role, is a party to the dispute, the relevant Executive Board members should be replaced by members of the Board of Supervisors when making the decision. The Executive Board should also assume the competence of the current Management Board in preparing ESMA’s work programmes and budget. This should ensure effective, impartial and EU-oriented decisions. To ensure transparency and democratic control, the full-time members of the Executive Board should be appointed by the Council, based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission and a proposal by the Board of Supervisors, following approval by the European Parliament. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) In light of the future new competences of ESMA, its governance structure should be adapted accordingly. To ensure the effective and impartial functioning of ESMA it is necessary to strengthen its governance by introducing an independent Executive Board with full-time members, which should enhance its capacity to take swift and Union-oriented decisions, in particular for the supervision of financial market participants. The Executive Board, composed of the Chairperson and five independent full-time members with diverse supervisory experiences and expertise in the sectors under ESMA’s supervision, should be responsible for decisions addressed to financial market participants in supervisory matters. The Executive Board should also be responsible for decisions addressed to one or a limited number of competent authorities, including dispute settlements, breaches of Union law, and peer reviews. These decisions are attributed to the Executive Board to increase the agility and reactivity of the decision-making and to ensure that the decisions take into account a common European interest. The Executive Board should also assume the competence of the current Management Board in preparing ESMA’s work programmes and budget. This should ensure effective, impartial and EU-oriented decisions. To ensure transparency and democratic control, the full-time members of the Executive Board should be appointed by the Council, based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission and a proposal by the Board of Supervisors, following approval by the European Parliament. | (19) In light of the future new competences of ESMA, its governance structure should be adapted accordingly. To ensure the effective and impartial functioning of ESMA it is necessary to strengthen its governance by introducing an independent and gender-balanced Executive Board with full-time members, which should enhance its capacity to take swift and Union-oriented decisions, in particular for the supervision of financial market participants. The Executive Board, composed of the Chairperson and five independent full-time members with diverse supervisory experiences and expertise in the sectors under ESMA’s supervision, should be responsible for decisions addressed to financial market participants in supervisory matters. The Executive Board should also be responsible for decisions addressed to one or a limited number of competent authorities, including dispute settlements, breaches of Union law, and peer reviews. These decisions are attributed to the Executive Board to increase the agility and reactivity of the decision-making and to ensure that the decisions take into account a common European interest. The Executive Board should also assume the competence of the current Management Board in preparing ESMA’s work programmes and budget. This should ensure effective, impartial and EU-oriented decisions. To ensure transparency and democratic control, the full-time members of the Executive Board should be appointed by the Council, based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission and a proposal by the Board of Supervisors, following approval by the European Parliament. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (19) In light of the future new competences of ESMA, its governance structure should be adapted accordingly. To ensure the effective and impartial functioning of ESMA it is necessary to strengthen its governance by introducing an independent Executive Board with full-time members, which should enhance its capacity to take swift and Union-oriented decisions, in particular for the supervision of financial market participants. The Executive Board, composed of the Chairperson and five independent full-time members with diverse supervisory experiences and expertise in the sectors under ESMA’s supervision, should be responsible for decisions addressed to financial market participants in supervisory matters. The Executive Board should also be responsible for decisions addressed to one or a limited number of competent authorities, including dispute settlements, breaches of Union law, and peer reviews. These decisions are attributed to the Executive Board to increase the agility and reactivity of the decision-making and to ensure that the decisions take into account a common European interest. The Executive Board should also assume the competence of the current Management Board in preparing ESMA’s work programmes and budget. This should ensure effective, impartial and EU-oriented decisions. To ensure transparency and democratic control, the full-time members of the Executive Board should be appointed by the Council, based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission and a proposal by the Board of Supervisors, following approval by the European Parliament. | (19) In light of the future new competences of ESMA, its governance structure should be adapted accordingly. To ensure the effective and impartial functioning of ESMA it is necessary to strengthen its governance by introducing an independent Executive Board with full-time members, which should enhance its capacity to take swift and Union-oriented decisions, in particular for the supervision of financial market participants. The Executive Board, composed of the Chairperson and nine independent full-time members with diverse supervisory experiences and expertise in the sectors under ESMA’s supervision, should be responsible for decisions addressed to financial market participants in supervisory and regulatory matters. The Executive Board should also be responsible for decisions addressed to one or a limited number of competent authorities, including dispute settlements, breaches of Union law, and peer reviews. These decisions are attributed to the Executive Board to increase the agility and reactivity of the decision-making and to ensure that the decisions take into account a common European interest. The Executive Board should also assume the competence of the current Management Board in preparing ESMA’s work programmes and budget. This should ensure effective, impartial and EU-oriented decisions. To ensure transparency and democratic control, the full-time members of the Executive Board should be appointed by the Council, based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission and a proposal by the Board of Supervisors, following approval by the European Parliament. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board as voting members for supervisory decisions. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory decisions taken by the Executive Board within 10 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases), while the Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities and should be able to request opinions on supervisory matters. | (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the five independent full-time members of the Executive Board as voting members for supervisory decisions. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives, the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory and enforcement decisions taken by the Executive Board within 10 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases). Such decisions subject to the non-objection procedure should include also the most relevant supervisory decisions based on sectoral legislation, including, for example, decisions concerning the authorisation of a regulated market, the withdrawal of such authorisation, and other decisions with significant impact on supervised entities or on the orderly functioning of financial markets. The Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities, providing information that is sufficiently complete, timely and structured to enable the Board of Supervisors to exercise its oversight function and to be able to give opinions on any draft decisions of the Executive Board, including those relating to supervisory matters. |
Executive Board members shall participate in discussions of the Board of Supervisors with voting rights. The amendment clarifies the scope of the non-objection procedure by specifying that it should cover the most relevant supervisory and enforcement decisions adopted by the Executive Board, such as the authorization of a regulated market, the withdrawal of such authorisation and other decisions with significant impact on supervised entities or on the orderly functioning of financial markets. Moreover, it is clarified that the Board of Supervisors should receive complete information to exercise its oversight functions and that it can give opinion to the Executive Board on any draft decision, including those relating to supervisory actions. This clarification strengthens legal certainty and ensures that the Board of Supervisors can effectively exercise its oversight role in relation to decisions that may have significant regulatory, supervisory or market consequences, while preserving the efficiency of ESMA’s decision-making process.
Johan Van Overtveldt, Giovanni Crosetto, Francesco Ventola, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Marco Squarta, Denis Nesci
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board as voting members for supervisory decisions. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory decisions taken by the Executive Board within 10 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases), while the Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities and should be able to request opinions on supervisory matters. | (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board as non-voting members for supervisory decisions. The European Central Bank (ECB) should also be represented, as a non-voting member. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory decisions taken by the Executive Board within 10 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases). These decisions should include, for example, decisions concerning the authorisation of a regulated market, the withdrawal of such authorisation, and other decisions with significant impact on supervised entities or on the orderly functioning of financial markets based on sectoral legislation. The Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities. The Board of Supervisors should be able to give opinions on any draft decisions of the Executive Board, including those relating to supervisory matters. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board as voting members for supervisory decisions. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory decisions taken by the Executive Board within 10 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases), while the Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities and should be able to request opinions on supervisory matters. | (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board as voting members for supervisory decisions. The ECB should also be represented as an observer without voting rights. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board as voting members for supervisory decisions. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory decisions taken by the Executive Board within 10 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases), while the Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities and should be able to request opinions on supervisory matters. | (20) To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board as voting members for supervisory decisions. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory decisions taken by the Executive Board within 5 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases), while the Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities and should be able to request opinions on supervisory matters. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board as voting members for supervisory decisions. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory decisions taken by the Executive Board within 10 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases), while the Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities and should be able to request opinions on supervisory matters. | (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board as non-voting members for supervisory decisions. The European Central Bank (ECB) should also be represented, as a non-voting member. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory decisions taken by the Executive Board within 10 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases), while the Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities and should be able to request opinions on supervisory matters. |
The ECB should be a non-voting member of the ESMA Board of Supervisors. This would further enhance the effectiveness of cooperation, coordination and exchange of information between the ECB, ESMA and the other authorities represented in the ESMA Board of Supervisors, and thereby reinforce cross-sectoral coordination in respect of the stability of the financial system.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board as voting members for supervisory decisions. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory decisions taken by the Executive Board within 10 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases), while the Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities and should be able to request opinions on supervisory matters. | (20) To ensure a clear division of responsibilities and effective checks and balances, the Board of Supervisors should remain ESMA’s main body for regulatory decisions and supervisory convergence. To enhance the Union dimension in the decision-making process within the Board of Supervisors its composition should be adjusted to include the full-time members of the Executive Board. To ensure a balanced approach and the consideration of national perspectives the Board of Supervisors should have the power to object to major supervisory decisions taken by the Executive Board within 10 days (or 48 hours in urgent cases), while the Executive Board should be required to report to the Board of Supervisors twice a year on its supervisory activities and should be able to request opinions on supervisory matters. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (21a) The further integration of Union capital markets should be pursued through genuine simplification, removal of concrete cross-border barriers and proportionate supervisory alignment. Direct supervision by the Authority should remain exceptional and should be limited to cases where objective evidence demonstrates that the objectives of this Regulation cannot be achieved through less intrusive means, including cooperation between national competent authorities, peer reviews and common templates. The existence of cross-border activity or divergent national practices should not, by itself, justify a transfer of direct supervisory powers from national competent authorities to the Authority. Any such transfer should be based on clear significance criteria, a demonstrated supervisory need, and a positive assessment of its impact on national markets, supervisory costs, market access and the competitiveness of Union financial market participants. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22) Central counterparties (‘CCPs’) within the Union are currently authorised and supervised by the competent authorities of the Member States in which they are established, in cooperation with ESMA and CCP colleges. Despite progress achieved so far in harmonising supervisory activity for CCPs in the Union, diverging supervisory practices for CCPs amongst those national authorities across the Union persist, creating an unlevel playing field among CCPs within the Union. This increases the complexity of the Union CCP framework and places an additional burden and additional costs on CCPs within the Union, including when compared with Tier 2 CCPs directly supervised by ESMA. With the development of deeper, more liquid Union capital markets under the Savings and Investments Union, that unlevel playing field could increase the risk of, and incentives for, supervisory arbitrage which could in turn lead to financial stability issues. Therefore, to ensure that the prudential, organisational and business conduct requirements for CCPs within the Union are applied in a uniform manner, in particular for CCPs with substantial clearing activity, CCPs with a material cross-border dimension, and CCPs that are part of a group that includes other market infrastructures that are supervised by ESMA, should be supervised by ESMA, based on its expertise and experience in the application of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 . CCPs with low clearing activity and a more domestic standing, deemed less significant, should continue to benefit from the supervision of local authorities with a greater familiarity with domestic markets.4 | (22) Central counterparties (‘CCPs’) within the Union are currently authorised and supervised by the competent authorities of the Member States in which they are established, in cooperation with ESMA and CCP colleges. Despite progress achieved so far in harmonising supervisory activity for CCPs in the Union, diverging supervisory practices for CCPs amongst those national authorities across the Union persist, creating an unlevel playing field among CCPs within the Union. This increases the complexity of the Union CCP framework and places an additional burden and additional costs on CCPs within the Union, including when compared with Tier 2 CCPs directly supervised by ESMA. With the development of deeper, more liquid Union capital markets under the Savings and Investments Union, that unlevel playing field could increase the risk of, and incentives for, supervisory arbitrage which could in turn lead to financial stability issues. Therefore, to ensure that the prudential, organisational and business conduct requirements for CCPs within the Union are applied in a uniform manner, CCPs should be supervised by ESMA, based on its expertise and experience in the application of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council3. |
| 3 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/648/oj). | 3 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/648/oj). |
| 4 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/648/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (22) Central counterparties (‘CCPs’) within the Union are currently authorised and supervised by the competent authorities of the Member States in which they are established, in cooperation with ESMA and CCP colleges. Despite progress achieved so far in harmonising supervisory activity for CCPs in the Union, diverging supervisory practices for CCPs amongst those national authorities across the Union persist, creating an unlevel playing field among CCPs within the Union. This increases the complexity of the Union CCP framework and places an additional burden and additional costs on CCPs within the Union, including when compared with Tier 2 CCPs directly supervised by ESMA. With the development of deeper, more liquid Union capital markets under the Savings and Investments Union, that unlevel playing field could increase the risk of, and incentives for, supervisory arbitrage which could in turn lead to financial stability issues. Therefore, to ensure that the prudential, organisational and business conduct requirements for CCPs within the Union are applied in a uniform manner, in particular for CCPs with substantial clearing activity, CCPs with a material cross-border dimension, and CCPs that are part of a group that includes other market infrastructures that are supervised by ESMA, should be supervised by ESMA, based on its expertise and experience in the application of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 . CCPs with low clearing activity and a more domestic standing, deemed less significant, should continue to benefit from the supervision of local authorities with a greater familiarity with domestic markets.4 | (22) Central counterparties (‘CCPs’) within the Union are currently authorised and supervised by the competent authorities of the Member States in which they are established, in cooperation with ESMA and CCP colleges. Despite progress achieved so far in harmonising supervisory activity for CCPs in the Union, diverging supervisory practices for CCPs amongst those national authorities across the Union persist, creating an unlevel playing field among CCPs within the Union. This increases the complexity of the Union CCP framework and places an additional burden and additional costs on CCPs within the Union, including when compared with Tier 2 CCPs directly supervised by ESMA. With the development of deeper, more liquid Union capital markets under the Savings and Investments Union, that unlevel playing field could increase the risk of, and incentives for, supervisory arbitrage which could in turn lead to financial stability issues. Therefore, to ensure that the prudential, organisational and business conduct requirements for CCPs within the Union are applied in a uniform manner, CCPs should be supervised by ESMA, based on its expertise and experience in the application of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 . |
| 3 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/648/oj). | 3 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/648/oj). |
| 4 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/648/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (23) To determine which CCPs authorised under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should be deemed significant and thus subject to supervision by ESMA, it is necessary to provide clear and objective criteria, which should reflect the activities and risks of the CCPs concerned. With the aim of simplification and of avoiding unnecessary administrative burden, an existing CCP determined as significant at a later stage, should not be re-authorised. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (23) To determine which CCPs authorised under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should be deemed significant and thus subject to supervision by ESMA, it is necessary to provide clear and objective criteria, which should reflect the activities and risks of the CCPs concerned. With the aim of simplification and of avoiding unnecessary administrative burden, an existing CCP determined as significant at a later stage, should not be re-authorised. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (23) To determine which CCPs authorised under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should be deemed significant and thus subject to supervision by ESMA, it is necessary to provide clear and objective criteria, which should reflect the activities and risks of the CCPs concerned. With the aim of simplification and of avoiding unnecessary administrative burden, an existing CCP determined as significant at a later stage, should not be re-authorised. | (23) To determine which CCPs authorised under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should be deemed significant and thus subject to supervision by ESMA, it is necessary to provide clear and objective criteria, which should reflect the activities and risks of the CCPs concerned. With the aim of simplification and of avoiding unnecessary administrative burden, an existing CCP determined as significant at a later stage, should not be re-authorised. The transfer of supervisory responsibilities for significant central counterparties to ESMA shall not take place unless the corresponding Union-level resolution framework has been adapted to ensure appropriate involvement of the home Member State authority responsible for resolution and any associated contingent liabilities. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (24) National competent authorities supervising less significant CCPs should have stronger cooperation with ESMA to ensure a consistent approach to supervision and hence ensure a level playing field for CCPs. In case they wish to do so, Member States should have the option to designate ESMA as the competent authority for less significant CCPs established in their jurisdictions. Moreover, should a previously significant CCP no longer meet the conditions to be considered as such, a sufficient transition period should be granted to the national competent authority to allow it to prepare before formally taking over supervisory responsibilities for that CCP. Alternatively, the national competent authority should be able to leave the supervision of this previously significant CCP to ESMA. In addition, to ensure consistency and a level playing field between significant and less significant CCPs, ESMA should also be the authority responsible for authorising interoperability arrangements and for chairing the colleges for less significant CCPs. The new supervisory arrangements for CCPs in the Union, in particular the role of ESMA as competent authority for significant CCPs, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) 2021/23 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 . | deleted |
| 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/23 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 806/2014 and (EU) 2015/2365 and Directives 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2014/59/EU and (EU) 2017/1132 (OJ L 22, 22.1.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/23/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (24) National competent authorities supervising less significant CCPs should have stronger cooperation with ESMA to ensure a consistent approach to supervision and hence ensure a level playing field for CCPs. In case they wish to do so, Member States should have the option to designate ESMA as the competent authority for less significant CCPs established in their jurisdictions. Moreover, should a previously significant CCP no longer meet the conditions to be considered as such, a sufficient transition period should be granted to the national competent authority to allow it to prepare before formally taking over supervisory responsibilities for that CCP. Alternatively, the national competent authority should be able to leave the supervision of this previously significant CCP to ESMA. In addition, to ensure consistency and a level playing field between significant and less significant CCPs, ESMA should also be the authority responsible for authorising interoperability arrangements and for chairing the colleges for less significant CCPs. The new supervisory arrangements for CCPs in the Union, in particular the role of ESMA as competent authority for significant CCPs, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) 2021/23 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 . | (24) National competent authorities supervising less significant CCPs should have stronger cooperation with ESMA to ensure a consistent approach to supervision and hence ensure a level playing field for CCPs. In case they wish to do so, Member States and less significant CCPs should have the option to designate ESMA as the competent authority for less significant CCPs established in their jurisdictions. Moreover, should a previously significant CCP no longer meet the conditions to be considered as such, a sufficient transition period should be granted to the national competent authority to allow it to prepare before formally taking over supervisory responsibilities for that CCP. Alternatively, the national competent authority should be able to leave the supervision of this previously significant CCP to ESMA. In addition, to ensure consistency and a level playing field between significant and less significant CCPs, ESMA should also be the authority responsible for authorising interoperability arrangements and for chairing the colleges for less significant CCPs. The new supervisory arrangements for CCPs in the Union, in particular the role of ESMA as competent authority for significant CCPs, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) 2021/23 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 . |
| 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/23 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 806/2014 and (EU) 2015/2365 and Directives 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2014/59/EU and (EU) 2017/1132 (OJ L 22, 22.1.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/23/oj). | 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/23 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 806/2014 and (EU) 2015/2365 and Directives 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2014/59/EU and (EU) 2017/1132 (OJ L 22, 22.1.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/23/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (24) National competent authorities supervising less significant CCPs should have stronger cooperation with ESMA to ensure a consistent approach to supervision and hence ensure a level playing field for CCPs. In case they wish to do so, Member States should have the option to designate ESMA as the competent authority for less significant CCPs established in their jurisdictions. Moreover, should a previously significant CCP no longer meet the conditions to be considered as such, a sufficient transition period should be granted to the national competent authority to allow it to prepare before formally taking over supervisory responsibilities for that CCP. Alternatively, the national competent authority should be able to leave the supervision of this previously significant CCP to ESMA. In addition, to ensure consistency and a level playing field between significant and less significant CCPs, ESMA should also be the authority responsible for authorising interoperability arrangements and for chairing the colleges for less significant CCPs. The new supervisory arrangements for CCPs in the Union, in particular the role of ESMA as competent authority for significant CCPs, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) 2021/23 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 . | (24) National competent authorities supervising less significant CCPs should have stronger cooperation with ESMA to ensure a consistent approach to supervision and hence ensure a level playing field for CCPs. In case they wish to do so, Member States should have the option to designate ESMA as the competent authority for less significant CCPs established in their jurisdictions. Moreover, should a previously significant CCP no longer meet the conditions to be considered as such, a sufficient transition period should be granted to the national competent authority to allow it to prepare before formally taking over supervisory responsibilities for that CCP. Alternatively, the national competent authority should be able to leave the supervision of this previously significant CCP to ESMA. In addition, to ensure consistency and a level playing field between significant and less significant CCPs, ESMA should also be the authority responsible for authorising interoperability arrangements The new supervisory arrangements for CCPs in the Union, in particular the role of ESMA as competent authority for significant CCPs, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) 2021/23 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 . |
| 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/23 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 806/2014 and (EU) 2015/2365 and Directives 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2014/59/EU and (EU) 2017/1132 (OJ L 22, 22.1.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/23/oj). | 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/23 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 806/2014 and (EU) 2015/2365 and Directives 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2014/59/EU and (EU) 2017/1132 (OJ L 22, 22.1.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/23/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (25a) A fully integrated and competitive post-trade landscape is essential for the completion of the Savings and Investment Union. Currently, the fragmentation of clearing and settlement infrastructures across national lines imposes unnecessary frictional costs and restricts user choice. To unlock pan-European investment opportunities, it is necessary to mandate full interoperability among significant central counterparties (CCPs) for cash equities, moving beyond the restrictive 'preferred clearing' model to ensure genuine investor choice, foster competition, and maximise multilateral netting efficiencies. Furthermore, to prevent artificial barriers to such open access, connectivity and access fees between infrastructures must be strictly limited to a one-time, reasonable, and cost-recovery basis. At the settlement layer, interoperability must be similarly enhanced through the establishment of mandatory reciprocal links between Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) and by requiring that links between CSDs connected to a common settlement infrastructure integrated with central bank real-time gross settlement systems be established directly via that common infrastructure, thereby optimising liquidity and settlement efficiency across the Union. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26) The new supervisory responsibilities granted to ESMA and the changes to ESMA’s internal organisational structure, including the removal of the CCP Supervisory Committee, whose tasks should be assigned to the newly established Executive Board, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. Due to the unique status of third-country CCPs, the provisions concerning the procedures applying to them should remain in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 rather than shifting those provisions to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. Furthermore, taking into account those changes, to further simplify the future organisational structure and working arrangements, and to remove unnecessary burden, significant CCPs should not be required to have a college. Similarly, given ESMA’s new supervisory responsibilities for significant CCPs, the requirements for ESMA opinions in relation to those CCPs should be removed. Supervisory arrangements for less significant CCPs should largely remain as they were as those CCPs have a more domestic scope and should benefit from the local knowledge and expertise of national authorities. | (26) The new supervisory responsibilities granted to ESMA and the changes to ESMA’s internal organisational structure, including the removal of the CCP Supervisory Committee, whose tasks should be assigned to the newly established Executive Board, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. Due to the unique status of third-country CCPs, the provisions concerning the procedures applying to them should remain in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 rather than shifting those provisions to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. Furthermore, taking into account those changes, to further simplify the future organisational structure and working arrangements, and to remove unnecessary burden, CCPs should not be required to have a college. Similarly, given ESMA’s new supervisory responsibilities for CCPs, the requirements for ESMA opinions in relation to those CCPs should be removed. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26) The new supervisory responsibilities granted to ESMA and the changes to ESMA’s internal organisational structure, including the removal of the CCP Supervisory Committee, whose tasks should be assigned to the newly established Executive Board, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. Due to the unique status of third-country CCPs, the provisions concerning the procedures applying to them should remain in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 rather than shifting those provisions to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. Furthermore, taking into account those changes, to further simplify the future organisational structure and working arrangements, and to remove unnecessary burden, significant CCPs should not be required to have a college. Similarly, given ESMA’s new supervisory responsibilities for significant CCPs, the requirements for ESMA opinions in relation to those CCPs should be removed. Supervisory arrangements for less significant CCPs should largely remain as they were as those CCPs have a more domestic scope and should benefit from the local knowledge and expertise of national authorities. | (26) The new supervisory responsibilities granted to ESMA and the changes to ESMA’s internal organisational structure, including the removal of the CCP Supervisory Committee, whose tasks should be assigned to the newly established Executive Board, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. Due to the unique status of third-country CCPs, the provisions concerning the procedures applying to them should remain in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 rather than shifting those provisions to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. Furthermore, taking into account those changes, to further simplify the future organisational structure and working arrangements, and to remove unnecessary burden, significant CCPs should not be required to have a college. Similarly, given ESMA’s new supervisory responsibilities for significant CCPs, the requirements for ESMA opinions in relation to those CCPs should be removed. Supervisory arrangements for less significant CCPs should remain with the competent authorities as those CCPs have a more domestic scope and should benefit from the local knowledge and expertise of national authorities. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26a) The calculation of positions against the clearing thresholds under Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should reflect the actual rolling exposure of non-financial counterparties to long-dated over-the-counter derivative contracts, rather than the full lifetime notional value of such contracts as measured at the date of their conclusion. The current methodology disproportionately constrains non-financial counterparties entering into long-term contracts such as virtual power purchase agreements, which are essential to financing the deployment of low-carbon energy generation, by causing a single contract to consume a substantial share of the applicable threshold at inception irrespective of the counterparty's actual risk profile over time. A calculation based on the notional value attributable to a rolling twelve-month period, consistent with the methodology applied under equivalent third-country frameworks, would address this effect across all relevant asset classes while preserving the integrity of the clearing threshold as a measure of systemic relevance. |
Article 10's current lifetime-notional methodology front-loads threshold consumption for long-dated contracts, with the clearest practical effect on virtual power purchase agreements financing low-carbon investment. A rolling twelve-month calculation, mirroring the Dodd-Frank approach, corrects this without narrowing the clearing threshold's systemic risk function.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26a) To address the financial stability risks stemming from the EU reliance on third-country CCPs, Regulation (EU)2024/2987 introduced an “Active Account requirement” (AAR) for financial and non-financial counterparties subject to the clearing requirement. The ESMA Interim Report on the Active Account Requirement of 6th July 2026 shows that there is only a “limited shift in market shares from systemically important third-country central counterparties (Tier 2 CCPs) to EU CCPs in certain AAR-related products”. In view of ensuring the EU financial sovereignty and addressing the financial stability risks stemming from the EU dependencies on third-country financial market infrastructure, the Commission should present a comprehensive report, based on ESMA and the Joint Monitoring Mechanism input, accompanied with legislative proposals by 30 June 2027. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (26a) Given the more limited complexity and systemic importance of less significant CCPs, which generally primarily serve local markets, the establishment of a supervisory college is no longer necessary. To preserve supervisory convergence and support financial stability, cooperation and information exchange between the competent authority, ESMA and, where appropriate, other relevant competent authorities should be strengthened through proportionate coordination mechanisms. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (27) Regulation (EU) 2024/791 of the European Parliament and of the Council6 amended Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 to remove obstacles to the emergence of consolidated tapes in bonds, shares and exchange-traded funds ('ETFs') and OTC derivatives. For a given share or ETF at any given timestamp, the provider of the consolidated tape is required to disseminate the European best bid and offer price (‘EBBO’) and the volume available at those prices across the Union. However, the consolidated tape would not disclose the identity of the trading venue of the EBBO, as it would not attribute the volumes that are available at the EBBO to individual trading venues, nor would it include bid and offer data beyond the EBBO and accompanying volumes. That significantly limits the value added of the consolidated tape, depriving its users of the ability to locate the volumes available at the EBBO and of a representative view of the depth of liquidity that is available for trading. Therefore, to further enhance its attractiveness, the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs should offer a more in-depth view of trading interests, covering the five best buying and selling prices, with the volumes available at those prices, and the indication of the individual trading venue on which those volumes are available. | deleted |
| 6 Regulation (EU) 2024/791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as regards enhancing data transparency, removing obstacles to the emergence of consolidated tapes, optimising the trading obligations and prohibiting receiving payment for order flow (OJ L, 2024/791, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/791/oj). | |
| 7 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/600/oj). |
The deletion proposed by the rapporteur in his draft report should be maintained, as expanding the equity consolidated tape before it becomes operational is premature and disproportionate. Article 52(14) MiFIR already requires an evidence-based ESMA review, followed where appropriate by a Commission proposal. This process should be completed before any changes to the tape’s content are considered.
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (27) Regulation (EU) 2024/791 of the European Parliament and of the Council6 amended Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 to remove obstacles to the emergence of consolidated tapes in bonds, shares and exchange-traded funds ('ETFs') and OTC derivatives. For a given share or ETF at any given timestamp, the provider of the consolidated tape is required to disseminate the European best bid and offer price (‘EBBO’) and the volume available at those prices across the Union. However, the consolidated tape would not disclose the identity of the trading venue of the EBBO, as it would not attribute the volumes that are available at the EBBO to individual trading venues, nor would it include bid and offer data beyond the EBBO and accompanying volumes. That significantly limits the value added of the consolidated tape, depriving its users of the ability to locate the volumes available at the EBBO and of a representative view of the depth of liquidity that is available for trading. Therefore, to further enhance its attractiveness, the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs should offer a more in-depth view of trading interests, covering the five best buying and selling prices, with the volumes available at those prices, and the indication of the individual trading venue on which those volumes are available. | (27) Regulation (EU) 2024/791 of the European Parliament and of the Council6 amended Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 to remove obstacles to the emergence of consolidated tapes in bonds, shares and exchange-traded funds ('ETFs') and OTC derivatives. For a given share or ETF at any given timestamp, the provider of the consolidated tape is required to disseminate the European best bid and offer price (‘EBBO’) and the volume available at those prices across the Union. However, the consolidated tape would not disclose the identity of the trading venue of the EBBO, as it would not attribute the volumes that are available at the EBBO to individual trading venues, nor would it include bid and offer data beyond the EBBO and accompanying volumes. That significantly limits the value added of the consolidated tape, depriving its users of the ability to locate the volumes available at the EBBO and of a representative view of the depth of liquidity that is available for trading. Therefore, to further enhance its attractiveness, the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs should offer a more in-depth view of trading interests, covering the best buying and selling prices, with the volumes available at those prices, and the indication of the individual trading venue on which those volumes are available. The creation of a consolidated tape should not only serve as a repository of post-trade and pre-trade data but should also foster the development of tools that contribute to the integration of Union capital markets. To improve the visibility of issuers across all Member States and to facilitate cross-border investment in the Union, the CTP should be mandated to provide a non-proprietary EU-wide index family, functioning as a public good, which also ensures that companies in smaller jurisdictions are adequately represented in the Union's financial landscape. |
| 6 Regulation (EU) 2024/791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as regards enhancing data transparency, removing obstacles to the emergence of consolidated tapes, optimising the trading obligations and prohibiting receiving payment for order flow (OJ L, 2024/791, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/791/oj). | 6 Regulation (EU) 2024/791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as regards enhancing data transparency, removing obstacles to the emergence of consolidated tapes, optimising the trading obligations and prohibiting receiving payment for order flow (OJ L, 2024/791, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/791/oj). |
| 7 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/600/oj). | 7 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/600/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (27) Regulation (EU) 2024/791 of the European Parliament and of the Council6 amended Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 to remove obstacles to the emergence of consolidated tapes in bonds, shares and exchange-traded funds ('ETFs') and OTC derivatives. For a given share or ETF at any given timestamp, the provider of the consolidated tape is required to disseminate the European best bid and offer price (‘EBBO’) and the volume available at those prices across the Union. However, the consolidated tape would not disclose the identity of the trading venue of the EBBO, as it would not attribute the volumes that are available at the EBBO to individual trading venues, nor would it include bid and offer data beyond the EBBO and accompanying volumes. That significantly limits the value added of the consolidated tape, depriving its users of the ability to locate the volumes available at the EBBO and of a representative view of the depth of liquidity that is available for trading. Therefore, to further enhance its attractiveness, the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs should offer a more in-depth view of trading interests, covering the five best buying and selling prices, with the volumes available at those prices, and the indication of the individual trading venue on which those volumes are available. | (27) Regulation (EU) 2024/791 of the European Parliament and of the Council6 amended Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 to remove obstacles to the emergence of consolidated tapes in bonds, shares and exchange-traded funds ('ETFs') and OTC derivatives. For a given share or ETF at any given timestamp, the provider of the consolidated tape is required to disseminate the European best bid and offer price (‘EBBO’) and the volume available at those prices across the Union. However, the consolidated tape would not disclose the identity of the trading venue of the EBBO, as it would not attribute the volumes that are available at the EBBO to individual trading venues, nor would it include bid and offer data beyond the EBBO and accompanying volumes. That significantly limits the value added of the consolidated tape, depriving its users of the ability to locate the volumes available at the EBBO and of a representative view of the depth of liquidity that is available for trading. Therefore, to further enhance its attractiveness, the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs should offer a more in-depth view of trading interests, covering the full order book prices, with the volumes available at those prices, and the indication of the individual trading venue on which those volumes are available. |
| 6 Regulation (EU) 2024/791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as regards enhancing data transparency, removing obstacles to the emergence of consolidated tapes, optimising the trading obligations and prohibiting receiving payment for order flow (OJ L, 2024/791, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/791/oj). | 6 Regulation (EU) 2024/791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as regards enhancing data transparency, removing obstacles to the emergence of consolidated tapes, optimising the trading obligations and prohibiting receiving payment for order flow (OJ L, 2024/791, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/791/oj). |
| 7 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/600/oj). | 7 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/600/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (27a) As there is no consolidated tape provider yet operational, it is appropriate to assess the functioning and market impact of the initial implementation before extending its scope. ESMA should therefore, by June 2028, provide advice to the Commission on whether an extension of the scope of the consolidated tape is justified in light of operational experience and the objectives of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014. The Commission should take that advice into account when deciding whether to proceed with such an extension. Where the Commission adopts an affirmative decision, the relevant provisions of this Regulation should apply 24 months after the adoption of that decision. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (28) The closing price of the trading day is essential for equity markets as it provides a key reference price, typically used for the valuation of funds, ETFs and benchmarks. Most times, the closing price is derived from the closing auction that takes place on the trading venue where the securities were first admitted to trading (the ‘primary exchange’). The proportion of equity volumes traded at the closing auction has increased significantly over time. However, competition in the closing auction segment remains limited, with primary exchange closing auctions still capturing the largest share of closing auction trading. In addition, that situation raises resilience concerns, as incidents, including outages, on the primary exchanges may have a direct impact on the capacity of market participants to value their assets. To foster competition in the closing price segment and to ensure that market participants can rely on a closing price that is alternative to the closing auction price produced by the primary exchange, it is necessary to require the provider of the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs to disseminate a volume-weighted closing price resulting from all closing auctions operated by trading venues that are data contributors. ESMA should issue recommendations to specify the methodology that the consolidated tape should apply to determine the volume-weighted closing price. | deleted |
The deletion proposed by the rapporteur in his draft report should be maintained, as expanding the equity consolidated tape before it becomes operational is premature and disproportionate. Article 52(14) MiFIR already requires an evidence-based ESMA review, followed where appropriate by a Commission proposal. This process should be completed before any changes to the tape’s content are considered.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (28) The closing price of the trading day is essential for equity markets as it provides a key reference price, typically used for the valuation of funds, ETFs and benchmarks. Most times, the closing price is derived from the closing auction that takes place on the trading venue where the securities were first admitted to trading (the ‘primary exchange’). The proportion of equity volumes traded at the closing auction has increased significantly over time. However, competition in the closing auction segment remains limited, with primary exchange closing auctions still capturing the largest share of closing auction trading. In addition, that situation raises resilience concerns, as incidents, including outages, on the primary exchanges may have a direct impact on the capacity of market participants to value their assets. To foster competition in the closing price segment and to ensure that market participants can rely on a closing price that is alternative to the closing auction price produced by the primary exchange, it is necessary to require the provider of the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs to disseminate a volume-weighted closing price resulting from all closing auctions operated by trading venues that are data contributors. ESMA should issue recommendations to specify the methodology that the consolidated tape should apply to determine the volume-weighted closing price. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (30) The organisational requirements laid down in Article 19(3) and in Article 47 of Directive 2014/65/EU do not take into account whether a market operator or an investment firm operating a trading venue is part of a group. In particular, any intra-group arrangement for resource or function allocation between group entities is treated in the same way as an outsourcing arrangement entered into with entities outside the group. That approach fails to acknowledge the emergence of cross-border groups of trading venues and, as a result, limits the ability of those groups to enjoy group synergies and benefit from economies of scale, thus creating barriers to the cross-border allocation of resources and functions within a group. Additionally, allocating resources within a group, where all entities are subject to the same internal controls and procedures, carries a lower level of risk compared to outsourcing to external parties. The current approach, however, does not sufficiently distinguish between the risks associated with intragroup resource allocation and external outsourcing. Therefore, organisational requirements for trading venues should be simplified for trading venues that are part of a group and that intend to rely on the resources of or the performance of a function by another entity that is part of the same group and that is located in the Union. Such group arrangements should not be considered outsourcing for the purpose of Regulation No (EU) 600/2014, provided that certain conditions are met to ensure effective supervision. A trading venue that relies on the resources of or the performance of a function by another entity that is part of the same group should however remain fully responsible for the discharge of its obligations under Regulation No (EU) 600/2014. Given the increased supervisory risks, an intra-group arrangement that involves an entity located outside the Union should still be considered outsourcing. | (30) The organisational requirements laid down in Article 19(3) and in Article 47 of Directive 2014/65/EU do not take into account whether a market operator or an investment firm operating a trading venue is part of a group. In particular, any intra-group arrangement for resource or function allocation between group entities is treated in the same way as an outsourcing arrangement entered into with entities outside the group. That approach fails to acknowledge the emergence of cross-border groups of trading venues and, as a result, limits the ability of those groups to enjoy group synergies and benefit from economies of scale, thus creating barriers to the cross-border allocation of resources and functions within a group. Additionally, allocating resources within a group, where all entities are subject to the same internal controls and procedures, carries a lower level of risk compared to outsourcing to external parties. The current approach, however, does not sufficiently distinguish between the risks associated with intragroup resource allocation and external outsourcing. Therefore, organisational requirements for trading venues should be simplified for trading venues that are part of a group and that intend to rely on the resources of or the performance of a function by another entity that is part of the same group and that is located in the Union. Such group arrangements should not be considered outsourcing for the purpose of Regulation No (EU) 600/2014, provided that certain conditions are met to ensure effective supervision, including an obligation to notify the competent authority after the arrangement is put in place. A trading venue that relies on the resources of or the performance of a function by another entity that is part of the same group should however remain fully responsible for the discharge of its obligations under Regulation No (EU) 600/2014. Given the increased supervisory risks, an intra-group arrangement that involves an entity located outside the Union should still be considered outsourcing. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (30a) The sound and orderly functioning of the wholesale government bond markets is closely linked to the conditions under which Member States are able to finance their public debt, and therefore has a direct bearing on the fiscal position of the Member State issuing those securities. National competent authorities are best placed to understand the specific features of their domestic government bond markets, the structure of their primary dealer networks, and the interaction between debt management operations and national fiscal policy. Since the responsibility for fiscal policy and for the management of sovereign debt remains, under the Treaties, firmly within the competence of the Member States and in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the supervision of operators active in the wholesale markets for government bonds of a given Member State should remain incardinated within that Member State's national competent authority. |
The amendment provides the rationale for keeping supervision of operators active in the wholesale government bond markets within the competence of national authorities. The reasoning rests on three elements: first, the direct link between the functioning of these markets and the fiscal position of the issuing Member State; second, the greater expertise of national authorities in understanding the specific features of their domestic markets, primary dealer networks, and the interaction between debt management and fiscal policy; and third, the principle of subsidiarity, reinforced by the fact that fiscal policy and sovereign debt management remain, under the Treaties, firmly within Member State competence.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (30a) Wholesale government bond markets play an important role in supporting the management of public debt. Debt Management Offices in various Member States have issued national rules for primary dealers, to ensure the good functioning of primary and secondary government bonds markets. This Regulation should be without prejudice to such rules, to the stability of these markets and to the role of Debt Management Offices in this area. Given the strict interplay between those aspects and the rules governing wholesale government bond markets, Member States may require prior approval by the national authorities of any amendments to the rules of those markets. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (32) Directive 2014/65/EU currently requires that each regulated market in the Union is subject to an individual authorisation. It follows that market operators that intend to operate regulated markets in different Member States can only do so by seeking authorisation, for each individual regulated market that they intend to operate, from the competent authority of the home Member State, which is also responsible for the ongoing supervision of that market. That led to the situation where several Member States had introduced national laws to require, as a condition for the authorisation of a regulated market, that the market operator is a legal entity established in the Member State where a regulated market seeks authorisation. Due to that, groups operating regulated markets in several Member States cannot streamline their organisational structure and supervisory relationships, as they are obliged to maintain several supervised entities in different Member States. That significantly increases the costs and complexity of operating regulated markets across different Member States. To remove barriers and reduce operational costs for cross-border groups, it is necessary to remove the possibility for Member States to require the set-up of a separate legal entity in their territories as a condition for the authorisation of a regulated market. In addition, to further facilitate the cross-border operation of regulated markets, a new framework is introduced to allow legal persons that wish to operate more than one trading venue in more than one Member State to do so based on a single authorisation as a pan-European market operator (‘PEMO’) granted by ESMA. That new framework should not replace the existing authorisation and operation regime for regulated markets. Instead, it should apply on a voluntary basis to those entities that wish to operate under a single authorisation. | (32) Directive 2014/65/EU currently requires that each regulated market in the Union is subject to an individual authorisation. It follows that market operators that intend to operate regulated markets in different Member States can only do so by seeking authorisation, for each individual regulated market that they intend to operate, from the competent authority of the home Member State, which is also responsible for the ongoing supervision of that market. That led to the situation where several Member States had introduced national laws to require, as a condition for the authorisation of a regulated market, that the market operator is a legal entity established in the Member State where a regulated market seeks authorisation. Due to that, groups operating regulated markets in several Member States cannot streamline their organisational structure and supervisory relationships, as they are obliged to maintain several supervised entities in different Member States. That significantly increases the costs and complexity of operating regulated markets across different Member States. To remove barriers and reduce operational costs for cross-border groups, it is necessary to remove the possibility for Member States to require the set-up of a separate legal entity in their territories as a condition for the authorisation of a regulated market. In addition, to further facilitate the cross-border operation of regulated markets, a new framework is introduced to allow legal persons that wish to operate more than one trading venue in more than one Member State or a trading venue in one Member State and another regulated market infrastructure in another Member State to do so based on a single authorisation as a pan-European market operator (‘PEMO’) granted by ESMA. That new framework should not replace the existing authorisation and operation regime for regulated markets. Instead, it should apply on a voluntary basis to those entities that wish to operate under a single authorisation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (33) The authorisation of a PEMO should list all the trading venues that the PEMO is authorised to operate. A PEMO that intends to operate additional trading venues should seek an extension of its original authorisation. To ensure that the supervisory arrangements of a PEMO are effectively simplified, the PEMO should not be required to seek individual authorisation for the trading venues that it operates in the Member States where those trading venues are situated or operated. Similarly, when a PEMO becomes the operator of an existing trading venue, the authorisation granted to that specific regulated market, or, in the case of MTFs or OTFs, to the market operator or investment firm for the purpose of operating that trading venue, should be deemed revoked upon the entry into effect of the authorisation to the PEMO or of the extended authorisation containing the amended list of the trading venues that that PEMO operates. | (33) The authorisation of a PEMO should list all the trading venues and other market infrastructure that the PEMO is authorised to operate. A PEMO that intends to operate additional trading venues should seek an extension of its original authorisation. To ensure that the supervisory arrangements of a PEMO are effectively simplified, the PEMO should not be required to seek individual authorisation for the trading venues that it operates in the Member States where those trading venues are situated or operated. Similarly, when a PEMO becomes the operator of an existing trading venue, the authorisation granted to that specific regulated market, or, in the case of MTFs or OTFs, to the market operator or investment firm for the purpose of operating that trading venue, should be deemed revoked upon the entry into effect of the authorisation to the PEMO or of the extended authorisation containing the amended list of the trading venues that that PEMO operates. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (34a) Given the importance of liquidity provision for the orderly and efficient functioning of financial markets, multilateral systems operated as regulated markets, MTFs or OTFs should facilitate the participation of a plurality of liquidity providers. A diversity of liquidity providers and market makers contributes to efficient pricing, market resilience and the availability of liquidity under varying market conditions. Trading venues should not establish or maintain arrangements which grant exclusive rights to a single liquidity provider or market maker, or which confer preferential treatment that is not objectively justified and proportionate, where such arrangements have the object or effect of limiting effective competition or participation in liquidity provision. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (35a) In order to ensure a smooth price formation system and market resilience, it is crucial to apply pre-trade transparency requirements consistently, regardless of the trading system. In particular, transparency regime for non-equity instruments should not be limited to certain trading systems, such as central limit order books and periodic auction systems. It is therefore necessary to apply pre-trade transparency requirements to exchange traded derivatives block trading system. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (36) Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers that deal in sizes of up to and including two times the standard market size to make public firm quotes on a regular and continuous basis during normal trading hours in respect of those shares, depositary receipts, ETFs, certificates and other similar financial instruments traded on a trading venue, for which they are systematic internalisers and for which there is a liquid market. Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to execute orders they receive from their clients in respect of those instruments at the quoted prices at the time of reception of the order. That Article also allows systematic internalisers to execute clients’ orders at a better price provided that the price falls within a public range close to market conditions. To strengthen price formation for retail orders, it is necessary to ensure that, where a systematic internaliser executes a retail client’s order, specifically flagged as such, at a price that is better than the quoted price, that systematic internaliser immediately, and in any event before execution, updates the quoted price to reflect that price improvement. In addition, systematic internalisers should be obliged to transmit to the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs the data that they publish pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 to allow the consolidated tape to disseminate, for a given share or ETF, in addition to the best bids and offers for continuous order books, separately, the five best bid and offer quotes across the Union published by systematic internalisers with the indication of the individual systematic internaliser where those are offered. Those five best bid and offer quotes should correspond to the five best bid and offer quotes across all quotes for a given share or ETF published in the Union by different systematic internalisers. | (36) Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers that deal in sizes of up to and including two times the standard market size to make public firm quotes on a regular and continuous basis during normal trading hours in respect of those shares, depositary receipts, ETFs, certificates and other similar financial instruments traded on a trading venue, for which they are systematic internalisers and for which there is a liquid market. Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to execute orders they receive from their clients in respect of those instruments at the quoted prices at the time of reception of the order. That Article also allows systematic internalisers to execute clients’ orders at a better price provided that the price falls within a public range close to market conditions. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (36) Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers that deal in sizes of up to and including two times the standard market size to make public firm quotes on a regular and continuous basis during normal trading hours in respect of those shares, depositary receipts, ETFs, certificates and other similar financial instruments traded on a trading venue, for which they are systematic internalisers and for which there is a liquid market. Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to execute orders they receive from their clients in respect of those instruments at the quoted prices at the time of reception of the order. That Article also allows systematic internalisers to execute clients’ orders at a better price provided that the price falls within a public range close to market conditions. To strengthen price formation for retail orders, it is necessary to ensure that, where a systematic internaliser executes a retail client’s order, specifically flagged as such, at a price that is better than the quoted price, that systematic internaliser immediately, and in any event before execution, updates the quoted price to reflect that price improvement. In addition, systematic internalisers should be obliged to transmit to the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs the data that they publish pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 to allow the consolidated tape to disseminate, for a given share or ETF, in addition to the best bids and offers for continuous order books, separately, the five best bid and offer quotes across the Union published by systematic internalisers with the indication of the individual systematic internaliser where those are offered. Those five best bid and offer quotes should correspond to the five best bid and offer quotes across all quotes for a given share or ETF published in the Union by different systematic internalisers. | (36) Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers that deal in sizes of up to and including two times the standard market size to make public firm quotes on a regular and continuous basis during normal trading hours in respect of those shares, depositary receipts, ETFs, certificates and other similar financial instruments traded on a trading venue, for which they are systematic internalisers and for which there is a liquid market. Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to execute orders they receive from their clients in respect of those instruments at the quoted prices at the time of reception of the order. That Article also allows systematic internalisers to execute clients’ orders at a better price provided that the price falls within a public range close to market conditions. To strengthen price formation for retail orders, it is necessary to ensure that, where a systematic internaliser executes a retail client’s order, specifically flagged as such, at a price that is better than the quoted price, that systematic internaliser immediately, and in any event before execution, updates the quoted price to reflect that price improvement. In addition, systematic internalisers should be obliged to transmit to the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs the data that they publish pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 to allow the consolidated tape to disseminate, for a given share or ETF, in addition to the bids and offers for continuous order books, separately, the full depth of bid and offer quotes across the Union published by systematic internalisers with the indication of the individual systematic internaliser where those are offered. Those bid and offer quotes should correspond to the full depth of bid and offer quotes across all quotes for a given share or ETF published in the Union by different systematic internalisers. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (36) Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers that deal in sizes of up to and including two times the standard market size to make public firm quotes on a regular and continuous basis during normal trading hours in respect of those shares, depositary receipts, ETFs, certificates and other similar financial instruments traded on a trading venue, for which they are systematic internalisers and for which there is a liquid market. Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to execute orders they receive from their clients in respect of those instruments at the quoted prices at the time of reception of the order. That Article also allows systematic internalisers to execute clients’ orders at a better price provided that the price falls within a public range close to market conditions. To strengthen price formation for retail orders, it is necessary to ensure that, where a systematic internaliser executes a retail client’s order, specifically flagged as such, at a price that is better than the quoted price, that systematic internaliser immediately, and in any event before execution, updates the quoted price to reflect that price improvement. In addition, systematic internalisers should be obliged to transmit to the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs the data that they publish pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 to allow the consolidated tape to disseminate, for a given share or ETF, in addition to the best bids and offers for continuous order books, separately, the five best bid and offer quotes across the Union published by systematic internalisers with the indication of the individual systematic internaliser where those are offered. Those five best bid and offer quotes should correspond to the five best bid and offer quotes across all quotes for a given share or ETF published in the Union by different systematic internalisers. | (36) Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers that deal in sizes of up to and including two times the standard market size to make public firm quotes on a regular and continuous basis during normal trading hours in respect of those shares, depositary receipts, ETFs, certificates and other similar financial instruments traded on a trading venue, for which they are systematic internalisers and for which there is a liquid market. Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to execute orders they receive from their clients in respect of those instruments at the quoted prices at the time of reception of the order. That Article also allows systematic internalisers to execute clients’ orders at a better price provided that the price falls within a public range close to market conditions. To strengthen price formation for retail orders, it is necessary to ensure that, where a systematic internaliser executes a retail client’s order, specifically flagged as such, at a price that is better than the quoted price, that systematic internaliser immediately, and in any event before execution, updates the quoted price to reflect that price improvement. To that end, those updates should not be subject to the tick size regime. In addition, systematic internalisers should be obliged to transmit to the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs the data that they publish pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 to allow the consolidated tape to disseminate, for a given share or ETF, in addition to the best bids and offers for continuous order books, separately, the five best bid and offer quotes across the Union published by systematic internalisers with the indication of the individual systematic internaliser where those are offered. Those five best bid and offer quotes should correspond to the five best bid and offer quotes across all quotes for a given share or ETF published in the Union by different systematic internalisers. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (36a) In order to ensure effective price formation and maintain an appropriate level of transparency in exchange-traded derivatives markets, it is important that trading systems which facilitate the conclusion of transactions on trading venues remain subject to pre-trade transparency requirements. Recent amendments to the transparency regime for non-equity instruments have limited the application of pre-trade transparency obligations to certain trading systems, such as central limit order books and periodic auction systems. While those changes aim to simplify the framework, they may have the unintended effect of excluding from scope certain trading systems which formalise transactions without enabling meaningful multilateral interaction, including so-called “blocking” systems or “crossing” facilities. Where such systems fall outside the scope of pre-trade transparency, transactions may be executed on-venue without prior exposure to market interaction, including transactions below the large-in-scale thresholds. This risks undermining the effectiveness of transparency waivers, weakening price formation, and reducing the overall level of transparency in exchange-traded derivatives markets. It is therefore appropriate to ensure that trading systems operated by trading venues which formalise transactions in exchange-traded derivatives remain subject to pre-trade transparency requirements, unless a waiver applies in accordance with this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (36a) Trading venues and systematic internalisers perform distinct functions within Union financial markets. Trading venues facilitate multilateral interaction between multiple buying and selling interests, while systematic internalisers provide bilateral trading by dealing on own account with clients. The differentiated transparency framework laid down in this Regulation reflects those differences in trading models and ensures that transparency obligations remain proportionate to the nature of the activity performed. In particular, it recognises that quotes provided by systematic internalisers are tailored to specific client interactions, reflect counterparty-specific conditions, they are not generally reproducible, and therefore do not contribute to public price formation in the same manner as prices established on trading venues. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (36a) To enhance the completeness of post-trade transparency within the Union, systematic internalisers shall make public, as close to real time as technically possible and through an approved publication arrangement, details of transactions concluded below the large-in-scale threshold. Such disclosures shall include the identification of the systematic internaliser responsible for the execution. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (37) Article 21(1) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires investment firms which, either on own account or on behalf of clients, conclude transactions in OTC derivatives as referred to in Article 8a(2) of that Regulation, to make public the volume and price of those transactions and the time at which they were concluded through an Approved Publication Arrangement (‘APA’). To minimise burden for investment firms and to avoid the publication of misleading information, investment firms should not be required to publish through an APA the transactions in OTC derivatives that they conclude on a third-country trading venue, provided that the third-country trading venue (i) operates a multilateral system, (ii) is subject to authorisation, ongoing supervision and enforcement in accordance with the legal and supervisory framework of the third-country, and (iii) is subject to post-trade transparency provisions under which transactions concluded on that trading venue are published as soon as possible after the transaction was executed or, in clearly defined situations, after a deferral period. To ensure legal certainty and a high degree of supervisory convergence in the Union, ESMA should publish and regularly update a list of third-country trading venues that are considered to meet all criteria. Investment firms concluding transactions in OTC derivatives on third-country trading venues that do not meet all criteria should be required to make those transactions public in the Union through an APA. | (37) Article 20(1) and 21(1) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 require investment firms which, either on own account or on behalf of clients, conclude transactions outside a trading venue, to make public the volume and price of those transactions and the time at which they were concluded through an Approved Publication Arrangement (‘APA’). To minimise burden for investment firms and to avoid the publication of misleading information, investment firms should not be required to publish through an APA the transactions that they conclude on a third-country trading venue, which is subject to similar post-trade transparency requirements as EEA trading venues. Similarly, non-EEA branches of EEA investment firms should not be required to publish through an APA the transactions that they conclude outside a trading venue with a non-EEA counterparty and that they make transparent through a third-country approved publication arrangement, where the third-country regime imposes on investment firms transparency provisions that are similar to those applicable to EEA investment firms under the MiFID II/MiFIR framework. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (37a) Systematic internalisers provide liquidity to clients by committing their own capital and assuming inventory risk. The transparency framework should not expose liquidity providers to undue risk. Therefore, any publication or disclosure of transaction details or quotes through Approved Publication Arrangements (APAs) or the Consolidated Tape must in no case disclose the direction of the trade (i.e., whether the systematic internaliser acted as a buyer or a seller), nor the identity of the individual systematic internaliser involved. Disclosing such information could expose the inventory positions and commercial strategies of systematic internalisers to predatory trading, thereby undermining their ability to provide competitive pricing and tailored liquidity to investors. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (40) Pursuant to Title VI of Directive 2014/65/EU, national competent authorities are currently responsible for the oversight of trading venues in the Union. On 20 March 20259 , the European Council adopted conclusions where it called for the improvement of the efficiency of supervision of Union capital markets and the reduction of their fragmentation. Furthermore, the Draghi and Letta reports10 called for a more integrated supervision at the Union level. To reduce fragmentation and foster consistency in supervisory outcomes to support the establishment of a Savings and Investment Union, it is appropriate to confer on ESMA direct supervisory powers for significant trading venues with an important cross-border dimension. ESMA should also have direct supervisory powers over PEMOs. To determine what should be understood by ‘significant trading venues’, it is necessary to set out specific conditions. To avoid multiple supervisors for entities within the same group, it is also necessary to ensure that all entities that operate trading venues within the same group become subject to supervision by ESMA, once any entity within that group meets the conditions to be a significant trading venue. Similarly, all entities that operate trading venues in the group, in which at least one CCP or CSD is subject to supervision by ESMA, should also become subject to supervision by ESMA. | (40) Pursuant to Title VI of Directive 2014/65/EU, national competent authorities are currently responsible for the oversight of trading venues in the Union. On 20 March 20259 , the European Council adopted conclusions where it called for the improvement of the efficiency of supervision of Union capital markets and the reduction of their fragmentation. Furthermore, the Draghi and Letta reports10 called for a more integrated supervision at the Union level. To reduce fragmentation and foster consistency in supervisory outcomes to support the establishment of a Savings and Investment Union, it is appropriate to confer on ESMA direct supervisory powers for trading venues. ESMA should also have direct supervisory powers over PEMOs. |
| 9 European Council meeting (20 March 2025) – Conclusions | 9 European Council meeting (20 March 2025) – Conclusions |
| 10 The Draghi Report on Competitiveness, September 2024Enrico Letta – Much more than a market, April 2024 | 10 The Draghi Report on Competitiveness, September 2024Enrico Letta – Much more than a market, April 2024 |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (41) For ESMA to ensure effective oversight over PEMOs and significant trading venues, ESMA should have the necessary supervisory powers, including the powers to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, to impose fines or periodic penalty payments to put an end to an infringement of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, and to request the necessary information. To ensure that ESMA adequately performs its supervisory duties over PEMOs and significant trading venues, it is important that ESMA carries out such duties in close cooperation with national surveillance authorities. To avoid inefficient supervisory approaches resulting from double supervision, the involvement of national surveillance authorities should be limited to the powers and tasks explicitly conferred upon them by Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and Directive 2014/65/EU. | (41) For ESMA to ensure effective oversight over PEMOs and significant trading venues, ESMA should have the necessary supervisory powers, including the powers to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, to impose fines or periodic penalty payments to put an end to an infringement of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, and to request the necessary information. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (41) For ESMA to ensure effective oversight over PEMOs and significant trading venues, ESMA should have the necessary supervisory powers, including the powers to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, to impose fines or periodic penalty payments to put an end to an infringement of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, and to request the necessary information. To ensure that ESMA adequately performs its supervisory duties over PEMOs and significant trading venues, it is important that ESMA carries out such duties in close cooperation with national surveillance authorities. To avoid inefficient supervisory approaches resulting from double supervision, the involvement of national surveillance authorities should be limited to the powers and tasks explicitly conferred upon them by Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and Directive 2014/65/EU. | (41) For ESMA to ensure effective oversight over PEMOs and significant trading venues, ESMA should have the necessary supervisory powers, including the powers to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, to impose fines or periodic penalty payments to put an end to an infringement of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, and to request the necessary information. To ensure that ESMA adequately performs its supervisory duties over PEMOs and significant trading venues, it is important that ESMA carries out such duties in close cooperation with national surveillance authorities. Market operators, including PEMOs, play a central role in ensuring orderly trading and market integrity and preventing and detecting market abuse pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. Accordingly, they are supervised by national surveillance authorities in accordance with that Regulation. To avoid inefficient supervisory approaches resulting from double supervision, the involvement of national surveillance authorities should be limited to the powers and tasks explicitly conferred upon them by Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, Directive 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (41) For ESMA to ensure effective oversight over PEMOs and significant trading venues, ESMA should have the necessary supervisory powers, including the powers to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, to impose fines or periodic penalty payments to put an end to an infringement of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, and to request the necessary information. To ensure that ESMA adequately performs its supervisory duties over PEMOs and significant trading venues, it is important that ESMA carries out such duties in close cooperation with national surveillance authorities. To avoid inefficient supervisory approaches resulting from double supervision, the involvement of national surveillance authorities should be limited to the powers and tasks explicitly conferred upon them by Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and Directive 2014/65/EU. | (41) For ESMA to ensure effective oversight over trading venues, ESMA should have the necessary supervisory powers, including the powers to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, to impose fines or periodic penalty payments to put an end to an infringement of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, and to request the necessary information. To ensure that ESMA adequately performs its supervisory duties over trading venues, it is important that ESMA carries out such duties in close cooperation with national surveillance authorities. To avoid inefficient supervisory approaches resulting from double supervision, the involvement of national surveillance authorities should be limited to the powers and tasks explicitly conferred upon them by Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and Directive 2014/65/EU. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42) Considering the geographical proximity of national supervisors with the local ecosystems, it is necessary, for significant trading venues and PEMOs, that the responsibility for the surveillance of markets and oversight of issuers, remains with authorities that are competent at national level. Therefore, while ESMA should be in charge of enforcing the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 vis-à-vis significant trading venues and PEMOs and, where relevant, the rules laid down in Directive 2014/65/EU, including with respect to the assessment of effective systems and controls aiming to prevent and detect market abuse or the assessment of parameters for halting trading, national surveillance authorities should retain some powers to enable those authorities to perform market surveillance tasks or carry out duties necessary for the preservation of market integrity. Those powers should include the receipt of transaction data, the possibility to request order book data, or the adoption of urgent measures to impose temporary trading halts in emergency situations or suspend financial instruments from trading. When exercising their powers, national surveillance authorities should cooperate closely with ESMA. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42) Considering the geographical proximity of national supervisors with the local ecosystems, it is necessary, for significant trading venues and PEMOs, that the responsibility for the surveillance of markets and oversight of issuers, remains with authorities that are competent at national level. Therefore, while ESMA should be in charge of enforcing the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 vis-à-vis significant trading venues and PEMOs and, where relevant, the rules laid down in Directive 2014/65/EU, including with respect to the assessment of effective systems and controls aiming to prevent and detect market abuse or the assessment of parameters for halting trading, national surveillance authorities should retain some powers to enable those authorities to perform market surveillance tasks or carry out duties necessary for the preservation of market integrity. Those powers should include the receipt of transaction data, the possibility to request order book data, or the adoption of urgent measures to impose temporary trading halts in emergency situations or suspend financial instruments from trading. When exercising their powers, national surveillance authorities should cooperate closely with ESMA. | (42) Considering the geographical proximity of national supervisors with the local ecosystems, and their mandate to ensure market integrity pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, it is necessary, for significant trading venues and PEMOs, that the responsibility for the surveillance of markets and oversight of issuers, remains with authorities that are competent at national level. Therefore, while ESMA should be in charge of enforcing the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 vis-à-vis significant trading venues and PEMOs and, where relevant, the rules laid down in Directive 2014/65/EU, including with respect to the assessment of effective systems and controls aiming to prevent and detect market abuse or the assessment of parameters for halting trading, national surveillance authorities should retain some powers to enable those authorities to perform market surveillance tasks or carry out duties necessary for the preservation of market integrity also under Regulation (EU) No 600/2014. Those powers should include the receipt of transaction data, the possibility to request order book data, or the adoption of urgent measures to impose temporary trading halts in emergency situations or suspend financial instruments from trading. Moreover, national surveillance authorities should be adequately involved in the supervision of those organisational arrangements, systems, controls and functions that are directly relevant to the detection, prevention and investigation of market abuse and the maintenance of orderly trading conditions. When exercising their powers, national surveillance authorities should cooperate closely with ESMA. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42) Considering the geographical proximity of national supervisors with the local ecosystems, it is necessary, for significant trading venues and PEMOs, that the responsibility for the surveillance of markets and oversight of issuers, remains with authorities that are competent at national level. Therefore, while ESMA should be in charge of enforcing the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 vis-à-vis significant trading venues and PEMOs and, where relevant, the rules laid down in Directive 2014/65/EU, including with respect to the assessment of effective systems and controls aiming to prevent and detect market abuse or the assessment of parameters for halting trading, national surveillance authorities should retain some powers to enable those authorities to perform market surveillance tasks or carry out duties necessary for the preservation of market integrity. Those powers should include the receipt of transaction data, the possibility to request order book data, or the adoption of urgent measures to impose temporary trading halts in emergency situations or suspend financial instruments from trading. When exercising their powers, national surveillance authorities should cooperate closely with ESMA. | (42) Considering the geographical proximity of national supervisors with the local ecosystems, it is necessary, that the responsibility for the surveillance of markets and oversight of issuers, remains with authorities that are competent at national level. Therefore, while ESMA should be in charge of enforcing the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 vis-à-vis trading venues and, where relevant, the rules laid down in Directive 2014/65/EU, including with respect to the assessment of effective systems and controls aiming to prevent and detect market abuse or the assessment of parameters for halting trading, national surveillance authorities should retain some powers to enable those authorities to perform market surveillance tasks or carry out duties necessary for the preservation of market integrity. Those powers should include the receipt of transaction data, the possibility to request order book data, or the adoption of urgent measures to impose temporary trading halts in emergency situations or suspend financial instruments from trading. When exercising their powers, national surveillance authorities should cooperate closely with ESMA. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42) Considering the geographical proximity of national supervisors with the local ecosystems, it is necessary, for significant trading venues and PEMOs, that the responsibility for the surveillance of markets and oversight of issuers, remains with authorities that are competent at national level. Therefore, while ESMA should be in charge of enforcing the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 vis-à-vis significant trading venues and PEMOs and, where relevant, the rules laid down in Directive 2014/65/EU, including with respect to the assessment of effective systems and controls aiming to prevent and detect market abuse or the assessment of parameters for halting trading, national surveillance authorities should retain some powers to enable those authorities to perform market surveillance tasks or carry out duties necessary for the preservation of market integrity. Those powers should include the receipt of transaction data, the possibility to request order book data, or the adoption of urgent measures to impose temporary trading halts in emergency situations or suspend financial instruments from trading. When exercising their powers, national surveillance authorities should cooperate closely with ESMA. | (42) For ESMA to ensure effective oversight over PEMOs and significant trading venues, ESMA should have the necessary supervisory powers, including the powers to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, to impose fines or periodic penalty payments to put an end to an infringement of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, and to request the necessary information. To ensure that ESMA adequately performs its supervisory duties over PEMOs and significant trading venues, it is important that ESMA carries out such duties in close cooperation with national surveillance authorities. Market operators, including PEMOs, play a central role as the first line of defence in ensuring orderly trading and market integrity and preventing and detecting market abuse pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. To this end, they are supervised by national authorities in accordance with that Regulation. To avoid inefficient supervisory approaches resulting from double supervision, the involvement of national surveillance authorities should be limited to the powers and tasks explicitly conferred upon them by Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, Directive 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. |
Preserving orderly trading and market integrity is key to maintaining trust in the market, which is a necessary precondition for investors’ participation. The EU regulatory framework includes extensive provisions in this regard, both in MiFIR as well as in Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. Under the latter Regulation, market operators and investment firms operating trading venues play a central role as the first line of defence, alongside investment firms, and are therefore subject to the supervision of national authorities designated in accordance with that Regulation.
For this reason, national competent authorities are also entrusted with supervisory powers under MiFIR, including the receipt of transaction data, the ability to request order book data, and the power to adopt urgent measures, such as imposing temporary trading halts in emergency situations or suspending financial instruments from trading.
At the same time, market operators and investment firms operating trading venues are subject to organisational requirements under Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 that are closely linked to the obligations applicable to them under Regulation (EU) No 596/2014.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42a) Where this Regulation confers on the European Securities and Markets Authority direct supervisory competence over significant trading venues, Pan-European Market Operators, central counterparties or central securities depositories, that competence should also determine responsibility for overseeing those entities' digital operational resilience. A single supervisor ensures the transfer of competence to the European Securities and Markets Authority is complete, avoiding a split between market and operational-resilience oversight that would reintroduce the fragmentation this Regulation seeks to remove. |
Direct ESMA supervision of significant venues, PEMOs, CCPs and CSDs should extend to digital operational resilience oversight. Leaving this unclarified risks a national authority retaining DORA oversight of an entity ESMA otherwise fully supervises, splitting accountability and undermining the single-supervisor model. This recital confirms the transfer of competence is comprehensive, consistent with the Regulation's fragmentation-reduction objective.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42a) Given the strict interplay between supervisory responsibilities assigned to ESMA for significant trading venues and PEMOs, in particular as regards organisational requirements, and the supervisory responsibilities of national competent authorities in ensuring market integrity, both under Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, when performing their activities, ESMA and national authorities should closely cooperate. |
Preserving orderly trading and market integrity is key to maintaining trust in the market, which is a necessary precondition for investors’ participation. The EU regulatory framework includes extensive provisions in this regard, primarily in MiFIR and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. Under the latter Regulation, market operators and investment firms operating trading venues play a central role as the first line of defence, alongside investment firms, and are therefore subject to the supervision of national authorities designated in accordance with that Regulation.
For this reason, national competent authorities are also entrusted with supervisory powers under MiFIR, including the receipt of transaction data, the ability to request order book data, and the power to adopt urgent measures, such as imposing temporary trading halts in emergency situations or suspending financial instruments from trading.
At the same time, market operators and investment firms operating trading venues are subject to organisational requirements under Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 that are closely linked to the obligations applicable to them under Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. These requirements should be supervised by ESMA, which acts as the competent authority pursuant to MiFIR, and national authorities in close cooperation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42a) ESMA and national authorities should closely cooperate, in light of the strict interplay between supervisory responsibilities assigned to ESMA for significant trading venues and PEMOs, in particular as regards organisational requirements, and the supervisory responsibilities of national competent authorities in ensuring market integrity under Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42b) National surveillance authorities perform a critical function in safeguarding market integrity and bear responsibility for the supervision of trading venues and their operators in that regard, as well as for oversight over issuers and investment firms. In order to ensure that ESMA has at its disposal all information necessary for its supervisory decisions, national surveillance authorities should be involved in the processes which may lead to the granting or withdrawal of authorisation of regulated markets and PEMOs, as well as to the registration of SME growth markets. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (42b) National surveillance authorities play a critical role in ensuring market integrity and are responsible for the supervision of trading venues and their operators in this area. Moreover, they oversee issuers and investment firms. To ensure that ESMA has access to all the necessary information to take informed decisions, national surveillance authorities should be involved in processes that may lead to the authorisation or withdrawal of authorisation of regulated markets and PEMOs, as well as to the registration of SME growth markets. |
The involvement of national surveillance authorities is essential to support ESMA in its supervisory activities, because they possess direct oversight of trading venues, issuers and investment firms, and have a thorough understanding of how markets operate at national level. Their proximity to market participants allows them to identify specific risks and market features that may not be fully visible at EU level. By contributing to authorisation, withdrawal and registration processes, they help ensure that ESMA’s decisions are based on complete, accurate and context-specific information, thereby strengthening the quality and effectiveness of supervisory outcomes.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (43) To ensure equal treatment as regards supervisory oversight of operators of trading venues, ESMA should become the competent authority for all relevant trading venues, including those operated by investment firms. It follows that ESMA should be entrusted with the authorisation and supervision of investment firms in case they wish to be exclusively authorised to operate relevant MTFs or OTFs. Investment firms that simultaneously operate MTFs or OTFs, that are subject to ESMA supervision, and perform other investment activities or provide other investment services should remain under national supervision for those other investment services and activities. To ensure that those investment firms maintain one point of entry and contact with a single supervising authority when seeking authorisation, it is necessary to introduce a specific framework for the authorisation of those investment firms. Where those investment firms wish to be initially authorised to perform other investment services together with the operation of MTFs or OTFs, the national competent authority of the Member State where those applicant investment firms are based should be entrusted with the authorisation, considering that their authorisation also covers other services that are not under ESMA supervision. Nevertheless, in those cases, to ensure ESMA can perform its duties as competent authority for relevant trading venues, it should provide the national competent authority with a binding opinion on the authorisation of the trading venues. The national competent authority concerned should not authorise the applicant investment firms to operate MTFs or OTFs in case of a negative opinion by ESMA. The same approach should be followed in case an investment firm, originally authorised to provide other investment services, wishes to extend its authorisation to the operation of MTFs or OTFs that are subject to ESMA supervision. In case of a negative opinion by ESMA, the extension of the authorisation should not be granted by the national competent authority. Lastly, where an investment firm authorised by ESMA to exclusively operate MTFs or OTFs seeks to extend its authorisation to other investment services, the national competent authority of the Member State where the investment firm is based should issue to ESMA a binding opinion on the provision of the additional investment services. In case of a negative opinion, ESMA should not extend the authorisation. | (43) Considering the geographical proximity of national supervisors with the local ecosystems, as well as their supervisory responsibilities for ensuring market integrity pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, it is necessary, for significant trading venues and PEMOs, that the responsibility for the surveillance of markets and oversight of issuers remain with authorities that are competent at national level. Therefore, while ESMA should be in charge of enforcing the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 vis-à-vis significant trading venues and PEMOs and, where relevant, the rules laid down in Directive 2014/65/EU, including with respect to the assessment of effective systems and controls aiming to prevent and detect market abuse or the assessment of parameters for halting trading, national surveillance authorities should retain some powers to enable those authorities to perform market surveillance tasks or carry out duties necessary for the preservation of market integrity also under Regulation (EU) No 600/2014. Those powers should include the receipt of transaction data, the possibility to request order book data, or the adoption of urgent measures to impose temporary trading halts in emergency situations or suspend financial instruments from trading. In addition, national surveillance authorities, which are already responsible for the supervision of requirements under national law such as those relating to listing, should be adequately involved in the supervision of those organisational arrangements, systems, controls and functions that are directly relevant to the detection, prevention and investigation of market abuse and the maintenance of orderly trading conditions. When exercising their powers, national surveillance authorities should cooperate closely with ESMA. |
Preserving orderly trading and market integrity is key to maintaining trust in the market, which is a necessary precondition for investors’ participation. The EU regulatory framework includes extensive provisions in this regard, primarily in MiFIR and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. Under the latter Regulation, market operators and investment firms operating trading venues play a central role as the first line of defense, alongside investment firms, and are therefore subject to the supervision of national authorities designated in accordance with that Regulation.
For this reason, national competent authorities are also entrusted with supervisory powers under MiFIR, including the receipt of transaction data, the ability to request order book data, and the power to adopt urgent measures, such as imposing temporary trading halts in emergency situations or suspending financial instruments from trading.
At the same time, market operators and investment firms operating trading venues are subject to organisational requirements under Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 that are closely linked to the obligations applicable to them under Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. These requirements would be transferred to the ESMA direct supervision, which will act as the competent authority pursuant to MiFIR. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that national surveillance authorities are adequately involved in the supervision of these requirements in close cooperation with ESMA.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (44) To ensure that trading venues are subject to the most appropriate supervisory model, it is important to put in place a process whereby trading venues deemed significant are placed under ESMA’s supervision, while introducing the possibility for trading venues that no longer meet the conditions to be ‘significant’ to revert to national supervision. In that context, ESMA should identify which trading venues meet the conditions to qualify as significant, and should regularly monitor whether trading venues continue to meet those conditions over time. To ensure that the change of a supervisory model occurs smoothly and without causing excessive burden for trading venues, it is important to establish an appropriate timeline and a supervisory transition plan, developed through a thorough collaboration between ESMA and the national supervisory authority concerned. To provide clarity to market participants, ESMA should also establish and regularly update a list of all significant trading venues under its supervision and publish it on its website. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (46a) In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union and without prejudice to the judicial review by the Court of Justice, this Regulation should not affect the responsibility of Member States with regard to essential State functions concerning public security, defence and the safeguarding of national security, for example concerning the supply of information which would be contrary to the safeguarding of national security. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (46a) In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union and without prejudice to the judicial review by the Court of Justice, this Regulation should not affect the responsibility of Member States with regard to essential State functions concerning public security, defence and the safeguarding of national security, for example concerning the supply of information which would be contrary to the safeguarding of national security. |
CSDs are systemically important entities providing critical services for European societies and citizens. CSDs ensure the integrity of an issue, secure collateral for monetary policy operations between credit institutions and hold records of the citizens’ holdings. Europe’s security environment is changing and ensuring the continuity of critical infrastructures like CSDs in all circumstances is becoming more important. A simple clarifying addition to the CSDR reiterates the existing division of legislative powers between the EU Treaties and Member States. EU treaties vest the legislative powers concerning national defense and security frameworks specifically to Member States. The amendment clarifies the coexistence of national preparedness frameworks and CSDR.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (47) The concepts used and the rules laid down, in Regulation (EU) No 909/2014, should not hinder the use of any particular technology, including distributed ledger technology (DLT). To account for innovation and the application of new technologies in the provision of CSD services, in particular where those services are provided using DLT, Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 should be amended to ensure that all definitions, concepts and requirements should be updated so that they can be applied to situations in which a CSD provides its services using DLT. It is equally necessary to ensure that certain tokenised assets, including e-money tokens can be used as a means of payment when settling securities transactions or to pay penalties for settlement fails. | (47) The concepts used and the rules laid down, in Regulation (EU) No 909/2014, should not hinder the use of any particular technology, including distributed ledger technology (DLT). To account for innovation and the application of new technologies in the provision of CSD services, in particular where those services are provided using DLT, Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 should be amended to ensure that all definitions, concepts and requirements should be updated so that they can be applied to situations in which a CSD provides its services using DLT. It is equally necessary to ensure that certain tokenised assets, such as tokenised deposits, can be used as a means of payment when settling securities transactions or to pay penalties for settlement fails. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (48a) Operators of DLT trading and settlement systems and DLT settlement systems that have already been granted a specific permission under Regulation (EU) 2022/858, together with an authorisation under Directive 2014/65/EU or Regulation (EU) No 909/2014, as applicable, have already demonstrated compliance with a substantial part of the requirements necessary to operate as a fully authorised central securities depository. Requiring such operators to undergo the same assessment as a first-time applicant when transitioning to full compliance would duplicate supervisory effort without a corresponding benefit to investor protection or financial stability, and would create a disincentive to the development of distributed ledger technology market infrastructure in the Union. Competent authorities and the European Securities and Markets Authority should therefore limit their assessment to those requirements from which the operator was previously exempted, and adopt their decisions within timelines that reflect the more limited scope of that assessment. |
A simplified CSDR authorisation route for DLT Regime graduates should be introduced. Such a regime should avoid duplicative supervisory reassessment of matters already verified.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (50) CSDs in the Union are authorised and supervised by the competent authorities of the Member States in which they are established, in cooperation with a college of supervisors where those CSDs offer services of substantial importance in two or more host Member States. Despite progress so far, diverging supervisory practices for CSDs amongst those national authorities persist, creating an unlevel playing field among CSDs in the Union and increasing the costs and burden for CSDs and groups of CSDs operating and seeking to operate cross-border. With the development of deeper, more liquid Union capital markets under the SIU, that unlevel playing field increases the risk of supervisory arbitrage which could lead to financial stability issues. To ensure that the prudential, organisational and business conduct requirements for CSDs established in the Union are applied in a uniform manner, in particular for CSDs with substantial settlement activity, CSDs with a material cross-border dimension, and CSDs that are part of a group that includes other market infrastructures that are supervised by ESMA, should be supervised by ESMA, based on its expertise and experience in the application of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. | (50) CSDs in the Union are authorised and supervised by the competent authorities of the Member States in which they are established, in cooperation with a college of supervisors where those CSDs offer services of substantial importance in two or more host Member States. Despite progress so far, diverging supervisory practices for CSDs amongst those national authorities persist, creating an unlevel playing field among CSDs in the Union and increasing the costs and burden for CSDs and groups of CSDs operating and seeking to operate cross-border. With the development of deeper, more liquid Union capital markets under the SIU, that unlevel playing field increases the risk of supervisory arbitrage which could lead to financial stability issues. To ensure that the prudential, organisational and business conduct requirements for CSDs established in the Union are applied in a uniform manner, CSDs should be supervised by ESMA, based on its expertise and experience in the application of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (50) CSDs in the Union are authorised and supervised by the competent authorities of the Member States in which they are established, in cooperation with a college of supervisors where those CSDs offer services of substantial importance in two or more host Member States. Despite progress so far, diverging supervisory practices for CSDs amongst those national authorities persist, creating an unlevel playing field among CSDs in the Union and increasing the costs and burden for CSDs and groups of CSDs operating and seeking to operate cross-border. With the development of deeper, more liquid Union capital markets under the SIU, that unlevel playing field increases the risk of supervisory arbitrage which could lead to financial stability issues. To ensure that the prudential, organisational and business conduct requirements for CSDs established in the Union are applied in a uniform manner, in particular for CSDs with substantial settlement activity, CSDs with a material cross-border dimension, and CSDs that are part of a group that includes other market infrastructures that are supervised by ESMA, should be supervised by ESMA, based on its expertise and experience in the application of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. | (50) CSDs in the Union are authorised and supervised by the competent authorities of the Member States in which they are established, in cooperation with a college of supervisors where those CSDs offer services of substantial importance in two or more host Member States. Despite progress so far, diverging supervisory practices for CSDs amongst those national authorities persist, creating an unlevel playing field among CSDs in the Union and increasing the costs and burden for CSDs and groups of CSDs operating and seeking to operate cross-border. With the development of deeper, more liquid Union capital markets under the SIU, that unlevel playing field increases the risk of supervisory arbitrage which could lead to financial stability issues. To ensure that the prudential, organisational and business conduct requirements for CSDs established in the Union are applied in a uniform manner, CSDs should be supervised by ESMA, based on its expertise and experience in the application of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (51) To determine which CSDs authorised under Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 should be subject to supervision by ESMA, it is necessary to lay down clear and objective criteria for their identification, including criteria based on size and cross-border activity. With the aim of simplification and of avoiding unnecessary administrative burden, a CSD that has already been authorised should not be re-authorised by ESMA once it becomes significant. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (51) To determine which CSDs authorised under Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 should be subject to supervision by ESMA, it is necessary to lay down clear and objective criteria for their identification, including criteria based on size and cross-border activity. With the aim of simplification and of avoiding unnecessary administrative burden, a CSD that has already been authorised should not be re-authorised by ESMA once it becomes significant. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (52) Given CSDs’ central role in securities markets, their connection to other financial market infrastructures and the fact that most of the volume of settlement transactions in CSDs in the Union happens in central bank money, ESMA should develop deep and comprehensive cooperation arrangements with other authorities, in particular the ECB and other central banks of issue of the most relevant Union currencies that the CSDs settle in. Such cooperation arrangements should cover the close involvement of those other authorities in the daily supervision of significant CSDs and should include arrangements for regular events, such as onsite inspections, and ad hoc events, such as emergency situations. | (52) Given CSDs’ central role in securities markets, their connection to other financial market infrastructures and the fact that most of the volume of settlement transactions in CSDs in the Union happens in central bank money, ESMA should develop deep and comprehensive cooperation arrangements with other authorities, in particular the ECB and other central banks of issue of the most relevant Union currencies that the CSDs settle in. Such cooperation arrangements should cover the close involvement of those other authorities in the daily supervision of CSDs and should include arrangements for regular events, such as onsite inspections, and ad hoc events, such as emergency situations. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (53) The amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, and in particular the changes to ESMA’s internal organisational structure and the shift in supervisory responsibilities, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. In addition, taking into account the shift in supervisory responsibilities, the involvement of national competent authorities in ESMA’s governance structure, and to avoid any duplicative assignment of tasks between ESMA and the supervisory college, significant CSDs should no longer be required to have a college. | (53) The amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, and in particular the changes to ESMA’s internal organisational structure and the shift in supervisory responsibilities, should be reflected in Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. In addition, taking into account the shift in supervisory responsibilities, CSDs should no longer be required to have a college. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (54) As opposed to significant CSDs, less significant CSDs do not have substantial cross-border activities. They should therefore remain under the supervision of their national competent authorities. Supervisory arrangements for less significant CSDs should largely remain as they were. However, to ensure a consistent supervisory approach for those CSDs, it is necessary to provide for stronger cooperation between those national competent authorities with ESMA. In case they wish to do so, Member States should have the option to designate ESMA as the competent authority for less significant CSDs established in their jurisdictions. Moreover, should a previously significant CSD no longer meet the conditions to be considered as such, a sufficient transition period should be granted to the national competent authority to allow it to prepare before formally taking over supervisory responsibilities for that CSD. Alternatively, the national competent authority should be able to leave the supervision of this previously significant CSD to ESMA. In addition, to ensure consistency and a level playing field between significant and less significant CSDs, ESMA should also be the authority responsible for authorising interoperability arrangements such as, in the context of CSD services, interoperable links. For these purposes, ESMA should also be responsible for chairing the colleges for less significant CSDs. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (54) As opposed to significant CSDs, less significant CSDs do not have substantial cross-border activities. They should therefore remain under the supervision of their national competent authorities. Supervisory arrangements for less significant CSDs should largely remain as they were. However, to ensure a consistent supervisory approach for those CSDs, it is necessary to provide for stronger cooperation between those national competent authorities with ESMA. In case they wish to do so, Member States should have the option to designate ESMA as the competent authority for less significant CSDs established in their jurisdictions. Moreover, should a previously significant CSD no longer meet the conditions to be considered as such, a sufficient transition period should be granted to the national competent authority to allow it to prepare before formally taking over supervisory responsibilities for that CSD. Alternatively, the national competent authority should be able to leave the supervision of this previously significant CSD to ESMA. In addition, to ensure consistency and a level playing field between significant and less significant CSDs, ESMA should also be the authority responsible for authorising interoperability arrangements such as, in the context of CSD services, interoperable links. For these purposes, ESMA should also be responsible for chairing the colleges for less significant CSDs. | (54) As opposed to significant CSDs, less significant CSDs do not have substantial cross-border activities. They should therefore remain under the supervision of their national competent authorities. Supervisory arrangements for less significant CSDs should largely remain as they were. However, to ensure a consistent supervisory approach for those CSDs, it is necessary to provide for stronger cooperation between those national competent authorities with ESMA. In case they wish to do so, Member States should have the option to designate ESMA as the competent authority for less significant CSDs established in their jurisdictions. Moreover, should a previously significant CSD no longer meet the conditions to be considered as such, a sufficient transition period should be granted to the national competent authority to allow it to prepare before formally taking over supervisory responsibilities for that CSD. Alternatively, the national competent authority should be able to leave the supervision of this previously significant CSD to ESMA. In addition, to ensure consistency and a level playing field between significant and less significant CSDs, ESMA should also be the authority responsible for authorising interoperability arrangements such as, in the context of CSD services, interoperable links. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (54) As opposed to significant CSDs, less significant CSDs do not have substantial cross-border activities. They should therefore remain under the supervision of their national competent authorities. Supervisory arrangements for less significant CSDs should largely remain as they were. However, to ensure a consistent supervisory approach for those CSDs, it is necessary to provide for stronger cooperation between those national competent authorities with ESMA. In case they wish to do so, Member States should have the option to designate ESMA as the competent authority for less significant CSDs established in their jurisdictions. Moreover, should a previously significant CSD no longer meet the conditions to be considered as such, a sufficient transition period should be granted to the national competent authority to allow it to prepare before formally taking over supervisory responsibilities for that CSD. Alternatively, the national competent authority should be able to leave the supervision of this previously significant CSD to ESMA. In addition, to ensure consistency and a level playing field between significant and less significant CSDs, ESMA should also be the authority responsible for authorising interoperability arrangements such as, in the context of CSD services, interoperable links. For these purposes, ESMA should also be responsible for chairing the colleges for less significant CSDs. | (54) As opposed to significant CSDs, less significant CSDs do not have substantial cross-border activities. They should therefore remain under the supervision of their national competent authorities. Supervisory arrangements for less significant CSDs should largely remain as they were. However, to ensure a consistent supervisory approach for those CSDs, it is necessary to provide for stronger cooperation between those national competent authorities with ESMA. In case they wish to do so, Member States and less significant CSDs should have the option to designate ESMA as the competent authority for less significant CSDs established in their jurisdictions. Moreover, should a previously significant CSD no longer meet the conditions to be considered as such, a sufficient transition period should be granted to the national competent authority to allow it to prepare before formally taking over supervisory responsibilities for that CSD. Alternatively, the national competent authority should be able to leave the supervision of this previously significant CSD to ESMA. In addition, to ensure consistency and a level playing field between significant and less significant CSDs, ESMA should also be the authority responsible for authorising interoperability arrangements such as, in the context of CSD services, interoperable links. For these purposes, ESMA should also be responsible for chairing the colleges for less significant CSDs. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (54a) Given the more limited complexity and systemic importance of less significant CSDs, the establishment of a supervisory college is no longer necessary nor proportionate. To preserve supervisory convergence and support financial stability, cooperation and information exchange between the competent authority, ESMA and, where appropriate, other relevant competent authorities should be strengthened through proportionate coordination mechanisms. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (58) CSDs should be able to take advantage of the functionality offered by a common settlement infrastructure offering securities settlement with central bank money, in particular where such common settlement infrastructure provides for liquidity optimisation tools and promotes safe and efficient settlement, including across borders. To give to their participants the possibility to settle their securities transactions on that common settlement infrastructure, CSDs that offer settlement in currencies available on such a common settlement infrastructure should be required to directly connect to it. The requirement to connect to a common settlement infrastructure should take into account the technological developments in the area of central bank money settlement. | (58) CSDs should be able to take advantage of the functionality offered by a common settlement infrastructure offering securities settlement with central bank money, in particular where such common settlement infrastructure provides for liquidity optimisation tools and promotes safe and efficient settlement, including across borders. To give to their participants the possibility to settle their securities transactions on that common settlement infrastructure, CSDs that offer settlement in currencies available on such a common settlement infrastructure should be required to directly connect to it and to effectively use it. The requirement to connect to a common settlement infrastructure should take into account the technological developments in the area of central bank money settlement. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (59) Regulation (EU) 1114/2023 of the European Parliament and of the Council13 sets out a framework for the safe issuance in the Union of e-money tokens. To support innovation in securities settlement, CSDs in the Union should be able to settle the payments of securities transactions in e-money tokens, subject to appropriate safeguards. That possibility should be available to both CSDs that are authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services and CSDs that are not. CSDs that are not authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services should be able to settle the payments in e-money tokens, in any currency, through accounts opened with CSDs that are authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services or through accounts opened with a credit institution, subject to the threshold determined by EBA for the settlement of payments in commercial bank money. | deleted |
| 13 Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937 (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 40, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (60) Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 sets out rules for the establishment and the maintenance of link arrangements set up between CSDs. To foster the provision of cross-border services, the access to another CSD in the Union via a standard link should be facilitated and the related process simplified. In addition, with the aim of fostering further integration of Union capital markets, CSDs should be required to establish a minimum number of bilateral links. To ensure proportionality, the number of links a CSD should be required to establish should depend on the significance of the CSD. | (60) Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 sets out rules for the establishment and the maintenance of link arrangements set up between CSDs. To foster the provision of cross-border services, the access to another CSD in the Union via a standard link should be facilitated and the related process simplified. In addition, with the aim of fostering further integration of Union capital markets, CSD hubs should be required to establish standard or relayed links with the spoke-CSDs. To ensure proportionality, the number of links a CSD should be required to establish should depend on the significance of the CSD. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (61a) Regulation (EU) 2019/1156 does not define the term "language customary in the sphere of international finance". Given the extensive and long-standing use of English in the preparation, negotiation and cross-border distribution of investment fund documentation, English should be understood as satisfying that criterion. This understanding should guide the application of the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/1156 by competent authorities. |
Given the extensive and long-standing use of English in fund documentation and cross-border distribution, this recital clarifies that English satisfies the criterion of being a "language customary in the sphere of international finance", guiding competent authorities' application of the term. This removes a source of potential divergent interpretation and strengthens legal certainty for cross-border marketing, without amending the operative text or displacing Member States' authority over retail-facing disclosure requirements.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (63) To reduce unnecessary delays and divergent supervisory practices and to facilitate the seamless marketing of AIFs and UCITS in the Single Market, it is appropriate that Regulation (EU) 2019/1156 prohibits the competent authorities of the host Member State from requiring the notification of marketing communications as a prior condition for the marketing of AIFs and UCITS in their territory. In order to protect investors in the host Member State and improve supervisory cooperation and effectiveness, where the competent authorities of the host Member State have reasonable grounds to believe that marketing communications are not in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2019/1156 or the relevant Commission delegated acts, they retain the right to request the competent authorities of the home Member State of the AIFM, EuVECA or EuSEF manager or UCITS to take all appropriate measures to prevent or penalise further irregularities. The competent authorities of host Member States may further refer the matter to ESMA if they are not satisfied with the actions taken by the home competent authorities. | (63) To reduce unnecessary delays and divergent supervisory practices and to facilitate the seamless marketing of AIFs and UCITS in the Single Market, it is appropriate that Regulation (EU) 2019/1156 prohibits the competent authorities of the host Member State from requiring the notification of marketing communications as a prior condition for the marketing of AIFs and UCITS in their territory. In order to protect investors in the host Member State and improve supervisory cooperation and effectiveness, where the competent authorities of the host Member State have reasonable grounds to believe that marketing communications are not in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2019/1156 or the relevant Commission delegated acts, they retain the right to request the competent authorities of the home Member State of the AIFM, EuVECA or EuSEF manager or UCITS to take all appropriate measures to prevent or penalise further irregularities. The competent authorities of host Member States may further refer the matter to ESMA if they are not satisfied with the actions taken by the home competent authorities or take corrective actions. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (64) In order to ensure high levels of transparency on the fees or charges levied by host competent authorities for carrying out their duties in relation to AIFs and UCITS marketed in their territory and to facilitate the recovery of those fees or charges, ESMA should publish up to date information on the amount of fees or charges levied by each host competent authority, their frequency and the modalities of their payment. To ensure consistency of the fees or charges levied by competent authorities, ESMA should, every 2 years, analyse whether such fees or charges are consistent with the overall cost relating to the performance of the functions of the competent authorities and submit a report to the Commission on that basis. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (70) To ensure greater harmonisation in the exercise of supervisory powers by the competent authorities of home and host Member States, the provisions of Directive 2011/61/EU and Directive 2009/65/EC concerning supervisory powers over UCITS and AIFs marketed across the Union should be transferred into Regulation (EU) 2019/1156. In order to promote effective cooperation between home and host competent authorities and to ensure that any potential disagreements are resolved efficiently and without creating obstacles to the marketing of UCITS and AIFs within the Union, it is necessary to clarify that the competent authorities of host Member States should refer to ESMA any matters of disagreement with the competent authorities of the home Member State of the UCITS or AIFM, or cases where the host Member State considers that the marketing of a UCITS or AIF should be prohibited in its territory. In such cases, ESMA should resolve the matter in accordance with its powers to address cross-border issues. | (70) To ensure greater harmonisation in the exercise of supervisory powers by the competent authorities of home and host Member States, the provisions of Directive 2011/61/EU and Directive 2009/65/EC concerning supervisory powers over UCITS and AIFs marketed across the Union should be transferred into Regulation (EU) 2019/1156. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (71) To ensure the effective functioning of the Single Market for investment funds and remove supervisory obstacles that impede the cross-border exercise of passporting rights, ESMA should be empowered to detect and address instances of divergent, duplicative, redundant or deficient supervisory practices that hinder the cross-border marketing of UCITS and AIFs or instances where the cross-border marketing of UCITS or AIFs does not comply with Union law. In those cases, ESMA should implement an escalation process, starting with engaging with competent authorities and stakeholders, fostering greater collaboration between them and, where necessary, using its convergence and intervention powers so that unjustified restrictions on cross-border activities or cases of non-compliance with EU law are remedied in a timely and effective manner. For the same reasons, it is necessary to ensure that, if those problems persist despite this escalation process, ESMA should then exercise its powers to launch breach of Union law procedures in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, to suspend the right to market UCITS or AIFs on a cross-border basis in accordance with Article 17aaa of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, to arrange binding mediation in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 or to organise collaboration platforms in accordance with Article 19a of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, where appropriate, in order to effectively remedy those problems. | (71) To ensure the effective functioning of the Single Market for investment funds and remove supervisory obstacles that impede the cross-border exercise of passporting rights, ESMA should be empowered to detect instances of divergent, duplicative, redundant or deficient supervisory practices that hinder the cross-border marketing of UCITS and AIFs or instances where the cross-border marketing of UCITS or AIFs does not comply with Union law. In those cases, ESMA should engage with competent authorities and stakeholders, fostering greater collaboration between them. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (71) To ensure the effective functioning of the Single Market for investment funds and remove supervisory obstacles that impede the cross-border exercise of passporting rights, ESMA should be empowered to detect and address instances of divergent, duplicative, redundant or deficient supervisory practices that hinder the cross-border marketing of UCITS and AIFs or instances where the cross-border marketing of UCITS or AIFs does not comply with Union law. In those cases, ESMA should implement an escalation process, starting with engaging with competent authorities and stakeholders, fostering greater collaboration between them and, where necessary, using its convergence and intervention powers so that unjustified restrictions on cross-border activities or cases of non-compliance with EU law are remedied in a timely and effective manner. For the same reasons, it is necessary to ensure that, if those problems persist despite this escalation process, ESMA should then exercise its powers to launch breach of Union law procedures in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, to suspend the right to market UCITS or AIFs on a cross-border basis in accordance with Article 17aaa of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, to arrange binding mediation in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 or to organise collaboration platforms in accordance with Article 19a of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, where appropriate, in order to effectively remedy those problems. | (71) To ensure the effective functioning of the Single Market for investment funds and remove supervisory obstacles that impede the cross-border exercise of passporting rights, ESMA should be empowered to detect and address instances of divergent, duplicative, redundant or deficient supervisory practices that hinder the cross-border marketing of UCITS and AIFs or instances where the cross-border marketing of UCITS or AIFs does not comply with Union law. In those cases, ESMA should implement an escalation process, starting with engaging with competent authorities and stakeholders, fostering greater collaboration between them and, where necessary, using its convergence and intervention powers so that unjustified restrictions on cross-border activities or cases of non-compliance with EU law are remedied in a timely and effective manner. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (73) It is necessary to amend Regulation (EU) 2021/23 to account for ESMA’s new role as the supervisor of significant CCPs and the abolition of colleges for those CCPs. | (73) It is necessary to amend Regulation (EU) 2021/23 to account for ESMA’s new role as the supervisor of CCPs and the abolition of colleges for those CCPs. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (74a) In order to take national specificities into account, Member States should be provided with the option to allow their competent authorities to grant permission in accordance with the laws, regulations or administrative provisions governing the issuance, the recording and the circulation of DLT financial instruments (collectively referred to as national DLT regime). Permissions could be granted subject to strictly defined conditions: the criteria for the scrutiny of the applications and the procedures for the approval thereof should be comparable with those laid down under the Regulation; the national competent authorities should notify ESMA the permissions granted under national DLT regime and their underlying rationale; the differences in the criteria for the scrutiny of the applications and in the procedures for the approval would not increase over time after [OP please insert the date of application of this amending Regulation]. Member States should also notify the EC and ESMA the decision to exercise the above-mentioned option. With a view to promoting the necessary consistency and coherence in the application of this Regulation, ESMA should issue guidelines to ensure the comparability of the criteria for the scrutiny of the application and the procedures for the approval. On annual basis, ESMA shall publish a report containing statistics on the exercise by Member States of the above-mentioned option, on the permissions granted by national competent authorities in accordance with laws, regulations or administrative provisions mentioned above and notified to it and on the degree of comparability with this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (74b) Transparency about the national DLT regimes is key to ensuring progressive convergence of regulatory requirements and authorization practices provided for this Regulation and the national DLT regimes. Consistently with this approach, national DLT regimes should be made publicly available and should be kept updated by Member States. The publication of the national DLT regime would exclusively pursue informational purposes. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (75a) To ensure a smooth and efficient transition from the DLT Pilot Regime to the permanent regulatory framework, it is necessary to establish simplified authorisation and notification procedures for operators of DLT Settlement Systems (DLT SS) and DLT Trading and Settlement Systems (DLT TSS) that seek full authorisation under Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 (CSDR). Entities already holding a specific permission and subject to equivalent requirements under the DLT Pilot Regime or Directive 2014/65/EU should benefit from a streamlined transition path to achieve a clean transition without parallel regimes or redundant authorisation procedures. Furthermore, to guarantee proportionality within the simplified regime, capital requirements for DLT market infrastructures should be aligned with their actual risk profile. Given that statutory volume limitations inherently cap the risk exposure of these entities, a graduated approach to capital compliance should be introduced. This allows capital requirements to scale progressively in tandem with the entity's growth, reserving the requirement for full capital compliance exclusively for the point at which the operator seeks authorisation to operate beyond the established volume limitations |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (76) Regulation (EU) 2022/858 lays down various limits to the scale of activities carried out under the Pilot, with limits to the issuance size and market capitalisation of assets eligible for the DLT Pilot (asset-specific caps), and an aggregate cap that limits the total value of financial instruments intermediated by a DLT market infrastructure of EUR 6 billion. Those activity thresholds have made it difficult for certain large market participants to use the Pilot framework for their activity and develop large scale business models. Therefore, all asset-specific caps should be withdrawn, whereas the aggregate cap should be raised to EUR 100 billion. To mitigate risks from increased activity, those changes should be accompanied by targeted increases in prudential requirements for those Pilot participants providing CSD services that wish to benefit from increased thresholds. At the same time, to make it easier for small innovative companies to use the DLT Pilot for their activities, a simplified regime comprising obligations that are proportionate to the risk and size of those companies should be established. The simplified regime should be open to operators of a DLT TSS or a DLT SS where the aggregate market value of all DLT financial instruments that they service does not exceed EUR 10 billion at the moment of admission to trading or initial recording of a new DLT financial instrument. | (76) Regulation (EU) 2022/858 lays down various limits to the scale of activities carried out under the Pilot, with limits to the issuance size and market capitalisation of assets eligible for the DLT Pilot (asset-specific caps), and an aggregate cap that limits the total value of financial instruments intermediated by a DLT market infrastructure of EUR 6 billion. Those activity thresholds have made it difficult for certain large market participants to use the Pilot framework for their activity and develop large scale business models. Therefore, all asset-specific caps should be withdrawn, whereas the aggregate cap should be significantly raised to at least EUR 1000 billion. The Commission should be mandated to adapt this limit through delegated acts. To mitigate risks from increased activity, those changes should be accompanied by targeted increases in prudential requirements for those Pilot participants providing CSD services that wish to benefit from increased thresholds. At the same time, to make it easier for small innovative companies to use the DLT Pilot for their activities, a simplified regime comprising obligations that are proportionate to the risk and size of those companies should be established. The simplified regime should be open to operators of a DLT TSS or a DLT SS where the aggregate market value of all DLT financial instruments that they service does not exceed EUR 100 billion at the moment of admission to trading or initial recording of a new DLT financial instrument. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (76) Regulation (EU) 2022/858 lays down various limits to the scale of activities carried out under the Pilot, with limits to the issuance size and market capitalisation of assets eligible for the DLT Pilot (asset-specific caps), and an aggregate cap that limits the total value of financial instruments intermediated by a DLT market infrastructure of EUR 6 billion. Those activity thresholds have made it difficult for certain large market participants to use the Pilot framework for their activity and develop large scale business models. Therefore, all asset-specific caps should be withdrawn, whereas the aggregate cap should be raised to EUR 100 billion. To mitigate risks from increased activity, those changes should be accompanied by targeted increases in prudential requirements for those Pilot participants providing CSD services that wish to benefit from increased thresholds. At the same time, to make it easier for small innovative companies to use the DLT Pilot for their activities, a simplified regime comprising obligations that are proportionate to the risk and size of those companies should be established. The simplified regime should be open to operators of a DLT TSS or a DLT SS where the aggregate market value of all DLT financial instruments that they service does not exceed EUR 10 billion at the moment of admission to trading or initial recording of a new DLT financial instrument. | (76) Regulation (EU) 2022/858 lays down various limits to the scale of activities carried out under the Pilot, with limits to the issuance size and market capitalisation of assets eligible for the DLT Pilot (asset-specific caps), and an aggregate cap that limits the total value of financial instruments intermediated by a DLT market infrastructure of EUR 6 billion. Those activity thresholds have made it difficult for certain large market participants to use the Pilot framework for their activity and develop large scale business models. Therefore, all asset-specific caps should be withdrawn, whereas the aggregate cap should be raised to EUR 1500 billion. To mitigate risks from increased activity, those changes should be accompanied by targeted increases in prudential requirements for those Pilot participants providing CSD services that wish to benefit from increased thresholds. At the same time, to make it easier for small innovative companies to use the DLT Pilot for their activities, a simplified regime comprising obligations that are proportionate to the risk and size of those companies should be established. The simplified regime should be open to operators of a DLT TSS or a DLT SS where the aggregate market value of all DLT financial instruments that they service does not exceed EUR 50 billion at the moment of admission to trading or initial recording of a new DLT financial instrument. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (76a) The Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) Pilot Regime established under Regulation (EU) 2022/858 was conceived as a temporary, bounded sandbox designed to test the application of DLT in market infrastructures while identifying necessary adjustments to ensure technological neutrality in sectoral legislation. It was not intended to create a permanent, parallel regulatory framework. Expanding the aggregate caps by multiple orders of magnitude or removing temporal limitations risks transforming a trial framework into a regime of systemic scale running alongside the traditional frameworks of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 (MiFIR) and Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 (CSDR). To prevent competitive distortions, market fragmentation, and regulatory arbitrage, EU financial regulation must strictly adhere to the principle of "same activity, same risk, same rules". Any scaled transition of DLT models should occur through the timely update of permanent sectoral legislation rather than the indefinite expansion of sandbox derogations. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (77) Regulation (EU) 2022/858 limits the types of eligible entities that can participate in the Pilot, which have to be either trading venues authorised under Directive 2014/65 or CSDs. That approach excludes regulated financial entities that have an interest and experience in organising trading and transfers of digital assets to participate in the Pilot, namely the crypto-assets services providers (CASP) that operate trading platforms. Therefore, those CASPs should be allowed, under certain conditions and subject to their compliance with the relevant requirements set out in Directive 2014/65, Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and Regulation (EU) No 909/2014, as applicable, to obtain a specific permission to operate a DLT trading venue (DLT TV) or a DLT trading and settlement system (DLT TSS). Accordingly, the rules laid down for entities operating DLT market infrastructure should be apply to CASPs. | (77) Regulation (EU) 2022/858 limits the types of eligible entities that can participate in the Pilot, which have to be either trading venues authorised under Directive 2014/65 or CSDs. That approach excludes regulated financial entities that have an interest and experience in organising trading and transfers of digital assets to participate in the Pilot, namely the crypto-assets services providers (CASP) that operate trading platforms. Therefore, those CASPs should be allowed, to obtain a specific permission to operate a DLT trading venue (DLT TV) or a DLT trading and settlement system (DLT TSS). CASP should also be able to trade assets issued in the DLT pilot regime authorised venues. Accordingly, the rules laid down for entities operating DLT market infrastructure should be apply to CASPs. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (78) Regulation (EU) 2022/858 grants its participants the possibility to request exemptions from specific provisions of the sectoral legislation. However, certain provisions of sectoral legislation may be identified as incompatible with DLT only by applicants to the Pilot themselves, as they develop their business models and apply for a permission to operate a DLT market infrastructure, or after obtaining the permission. To ensure flexibility of the Pilot regime in supporting innovation, the competent authorities should be allowed to grant requests for exemptions from provisions belonging to the specified parts of sectoral legislation under certain conditions. Such requests should be based on clear justification by the DLT TV or DLT SS operators that the required exemption is incompatible or disproportionate with the use of DLT, and should be accompanied, where appropriate, with compensatory measures that can achieve the objective of the provision for which the exemption is requested. To ensure supervisory convergence between competent authorities granting the exemptions, ESMA should be closely involved in granting the requests by issuing non-binding opinions on the requests and assessments made by the competent authorities. | (78) Regulation (EU) 2022/858 grants its participants the possibility to request exemptions from specific provisions of the sectoral legislation. However, certain provisions of sectoral legislation may be identified as incompatible with DLT only by applicants to the Pilot themselves, as they develop their business models and apply for a permission to operate a DLT market infrastructure, or after obtaining the permission. To ensure flexibility of the Pilot regime in supporting innovation, the competent authorities should be allowed to grant requests for exemptions from provisions belonging to the specified parts of sectoral legislation under certain conditions. Such requests should be based on clear justification by the DLT TV or DLT SS operators that the required exemption is incompatible or disproportionate with the use of DLT, and should be accompanied, where appropriate, with compensatory measures that can achieve the objective of the provision for which the exemption is requested. To ensure supervisory convergence between competent authorities granting the exemptions, ESMA should be closely involved in granting the requests by issuing binding opinions on the requests and assessments made by the competent authorities. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (80) Since e-money tokens have emerged as one of the most widely used means of DLT-based settlement, further legal clarity should be provided for the use of e-money tokens in the Pilot. To recognise that Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, adopted after Regulation (EU) 2022/858, governs the services of custody of e-money tokens, it should be specified that e-money tokens cash accounts for the purpose settlement may be provided by a set of appropriately regulated financial institutions, including CASPs. However, it should be laid down that most banking type ancillary services with regards to e-money tokens, other than providing cash accounts and processing payments, may be provided only by credit institutions. Furthermore, to promote the use of e-money tokens denominated in Union currencies and to protect the market from foreign exchange risk, settlement of payments for assets denominated in Union currencies should be carried out in e-money tokens referencing EU currencies. To support the development of euro denominated stablecoins, DLT market infrastructures should be encouraged to offer settlement in e-money tokens denominated in euro, even if the financial instrument that is settled is denominated in a non-EU currency. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (80) Since e-money tokens have emerged as one of the most widely used means of DLT-based settlement, further legal clarity should be provided for the use of e-money tokens in the Pilot. To recognise that Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, adopted after Regulation (EU) 2022/858, governs the services of custody of e-money tokens, it should be specified that e-money tokens cash accounts for the purpose settlement may be provided by a set of appropriately regulated financial institutions, including CASPs. However, it should be laid down that most banking type ancillary services with regards to e-money tokens, other than providing cash accounts and processing payments, may be provided only by credit institutions. Furthermore, to promote the use of e-money tokens denominated in Union currencies and to protect the market from foreign exchange risk, settlement of payments for assets denominated in Union currencies should be carried out in e-money tokens referencing EU currencies. To support the development of euro denominated stablecoins, DLT market infrastructures should be encouraged to offer settlement in e-money tokens denominated in euro, even if the financial instrument that is settled is denominated in a non-EU currency. | (80) Since e-money tokens have emerged as one of the most widely used means of DLT-based settlement, further legal clarity should be provided for the use of e-money tokens in the Pilot. To recognise that Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, adopted after Regulation (EU) 2022/858, governs the services of custody of e-money tokens, it should be specified that e-money tokens cash accounts for the purpose settlement may be provided by a set of appropriately regulated financial institutions, including CASPs. However, it should be laid down that most banking type ancillary services with regards to e-money tokens, other than providing cash accounts and processing payments, may be provided only by credit institutions. Furthermore, to promote the use of e-money tokens denominated in Union currencies and to protect the market from foreign exchange risk, settlement of payments for assets denominated in Union currencies should be carried out in e-money tokens referencing EU currencies. |
It is generally preferable for financial market infrastructures to settle payments relating to securities transactions in the currency in which the securities are denominated to avoid foreign exchange risk.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (83) DLT financial instruments issued and safeguarded by the DLT notary and DLT account keepers outside a CSD should only be settled through a DLT SS, DLT TSS or a CSD operating solely under Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. Furthermore, given the experimental nature of this model for the distributed provision of CSD services, the market value of DLT financial instruments issued and safeguarded by DLT notaries and DLT account keepers should be limited by allowing operators of a DLT SS, DLT TSS or a CSD operating solely under Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 to admit for settlement up to EUR 10 billion of market value of such instruments, which should be increased to EUR 30 billion of market value for transferable securities issued by SMEs. | (83) DLT financial instruments issued and safeguarded by the DLT notary and DLT account keepers outside a CSD should only be settled through a DLT SS, DLT TSS or a CSD operating solely under Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (89) Colleges of supervisors should be established to ensure the efficient supervision of the novel business models for CSD services allowed under the Pilot and the necessary cooperation and exchange of information between all the supervisors that those business models may involve. Firstly, colleges of supervisors should be established in accordance with Article 24a of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 where a DLT SS or a DLT TSS operating under the regular regime provides CSD services and fulfils the conditions set out in that article. To ensure comprehensive involvement of all relevant authorities, competent authorities of the DLT notary or the DLT account keeper that is involved in the provision of CSD services and EBA, where e-money tokens are used for the settlement of payments, should be allowed to join the college of supervisors. Secondly, ESMA should also establish and chair a college of supervisors for settlement schemes, comprising ESMA, the competent authorities of DLT account keepers participating in the settlement scheme and the central bank in the Union of the currency that is or will be used for the settlement of cash payments in the settlement scheme. Competent authorities of DLT notaries participating in the settlement scheme should be able to participate in the college upon request. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (90) To remove any ambiguity in relation to the long-term viability of the Pilot, the time limits for the duration of the permissions granted in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2022/858 should no longer apply. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (90) To remove any ambiguity in relation to the long-term viability of the Pilot, the time limits for the duration of the permissions granted in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2022/858 should no longer apply. | (90) Regulation (EU) 2022/858 established a temporary pilot regime to enable the testing of distributed ledger technology in market infrastructures while allowing the Commission, ESMA and competent authorities to assess its benefits and risks. However, the indefinitive temporary status and ambiguity in relation to the long-term viability of the Pilot risk creating a parallel regulatory framework and can be a disincentive to participants. To provide legal certainty for market participants, the Commission should establish objective indicators for assessing the maturity of the Pilot. Those indicators should guide the Commission's assessment of whether the regulatory measures tested under Regulation (EU) 2022/858 should be integrated into the existing sectoral legislation and support an orderly transition for operators authorised under that Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (90) To remove any ambiguity in relation to the long-term viability of the Pilot, the time limits for the duration of the permissions granted in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2022/858 should no longer apply. | (90) To remove any ambiguity in relation to the long-term viability of the Pilot, the time limits for the duration of the permissions granted in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2022/858 should no longer apply. To avoid the creation of parallel regimes, further legislative follow-up will be necessary to adapt the regulatory framework in the spirit of technological neutrality. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (92) Because crypto-asset service providers are a new area of financial activity which has only recently come under supervision and because it is important to ensure supervisory consistency from the beginning, ESMA should exercise that centralised supervision, thereby guaranteeing a level playing field. Crypto-asset services is also an area dominated by increased cross-border activity carried out using electronic means and new technology. Risks should therefore be monitored and addressed in a comprehensive and consistent manner. Centralised oversight should ensure the consistent application of standards and rules, mitigate supervisory gaps across jurisdictions and address the disproportionate impact a potential failure of crypto-asset service providers could have on the Union’s crypto-asset ecosystem. Centralised supervision should mean the danger of supervisory fragmentation will not materialise. | (92) Because crypto-asset service providers are a new area of financial activity which has only recently come under supervision and because it is important to ensure supervisory consistency from the beginning, ESMA should exercise that centralised supervision, thereby guaranteeing a level playing field. Crypto-asset services is an area dominated by increased cross-border activity carried out using electronic means and new technology. Crypto-assets services participate to a structural shift in financial architecture with risks of amplifying financial instability and contagion effects through speed and concentration. Risks should therefore be monitored and addressed in a comprehensive and consistent manner. Centralised oversight should ensure the consistent application of standards and rules, mitigate supervisory gaps across jurisdictions and address the disproportionate impact a potential failure of crypto-asset service providers could have on the Union’s crypto-asset ecosystem. Centralised supervision should mean the danger of supervisory fragmentation will not materialise. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (92) Because crypto-asset service providers are a new area of financial activity which has only recently come under supervision and because it is important to ensure supervisory consistency from the beginning, ESMA should exercise that centralised supervision, thereby guaranteeing a level playing field. Crypto-asset services is also an area dominated by increased cross-border activity carried out using electronic means and new technology. Risks should therefore be monitored and addressed in a comprehensive and consistent manner. Centralised oversight should ensure the consistent application of standards and rules, mitigate supervisory gaps across jurisdictions and address the disproportionate impact a potential failure of crypto-asset service providers could have on the Union’s crypto-asset ecosystem. Centralised supervision should mean the danger of supervisory fragmentation will not materialise. | (92) Because crypto-asset service providers are a new area of financial activity which has only recently come under supervision, it is important to ensure supervisory consistency and a level playing field from the beginning. However, the allocation of supervisory responsibilities should take account of the principle of proportionality and the different levels of risk posed by individual crypto-asset service providers. While all crypto-asset service providers should be subject to robust supervision, centralised supervision at Union level should be reserved for those providers whose size, cross-border activities, interconnectedness, importance for the Union’s crypto-asset ecosystem or potential impact in the event of failure justify direct supervision by the Union authority. In execeptional cases, national competent authorities may request that ESMA assumes the supervision of one or more crypto-asset service providers in their jurisdiction. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (93) In the fight against market abuse of crypto-assets admitted to trading or of which a request for admission to trading has been made, centralised market surveillance by ESMA and investigation powers for cross border cases should achieve economies of scale, overcome the issue of fragmented access to data, reduce reliance on international cooperation and ultimately give ESMA a better view over complex strategies taking place across jurisdictions. | (93) For other less significant crypto-asset service providers, national competent authorities should remain responsible for supervision, supported by effective supervisory convergence mechanisms at Union level, ensuring that supervisory resources are allocated efficiently, unnecessary duplication of supervisory structures is avoided, and effective oversight is maintained across a growing and diverse crypto-asset services market. Less significant crypto-asset service providers may also elect to be supervised by ESMA in order to streamline their supervisory interactions. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (94) In this respect, ESMA should be responsible for the authorisation and supervision of the crypto-asset service providers and ongoing monitoring for market abuse in the crypto-asset sector. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (94) In this respect, ESMA should be responsible for the authorisation and supervision of the crypto-asset service providers and ongoing monitoring for market abuse in the crypto-asset sector. | (94) In this respect, ESMA should be responsible for the authorisation and supervision of the significant and designated crypto-asset service providers and ongoing monitoring for market abuse in the crypto-asset sector. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (97) To supervise crypto-asset service providers, ESMA should have the powers to suspend or, prohibit the provision of a crypto-asset service, to withdraw the authorisation of a crypto-asset service provider, to investigate infringements of the rules on market abuse, to request information, to carry out on-site inspections and investigations, to take supervisory measures and to impose fines. When determining the type and level of an administrative penalty or other administrative measure, ESMA should take into account all relevant circumstances, including the gravity and the duration of the infringement and whether it was committed intentionally. In order to carry out its supervisory duties, ESMA should cooperate and be assisted by other competent authorities as well as the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of [Directive (EU) 2015/849]. | (97) To supervise significant crypto-asset service providers, ESMA should have the powers to suspend or, prohibit the provision of a crypto-asset service, to withdraw the authorisation of a crypto-asset service provider, to investigate infringements of the rules on market abuse, to request information, to carry out on-site inspections and investigations, to take supervisory measures and to impose fines. When determining the type and level of an administrative penalty or other administrative measure, ESMA should take into account all relevant circumstances, including the gravity and the duration of the infringement and whether it was committed intentionally. In order to carry out its supervisory duties, ESMA should cooperate and be assisted by other competent authorities as well as the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of [Directive (EU) 2015/849]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (99a) Multi-issuance arrangements for electronic money tokens involve a Union-authorised issuer collaborating with a non-Union issuer to jointly issue tokens that share the same technical characteristics, are submitted to the same legal and supervisory framework and are deemed interchangeable, with the same reserve assets backing those tokens distributed across the jurisdictions of both issuers. Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 establishes a prudential framework based on the authorisation and supervision of individual issuers of electronic money tokens and asset-referenced tokens within the Union. The legal status of multi-issuance arrangements under Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 might create uncertainty for issuers and token holders that is incompatible with the objective of a single rulebook for crypto-asset markets. That regulation was not designed to accommodate multiissuer arrangements involving fungible electronic money tokens and asset-referenced tokens issued across EU and third countries. Such arrangements create additional risks relating to financial stability, monetary sovereignty, monetary policy transmission, smooth functioning of the payment system and investor protection. In order to address the risks associated with multi-issuer arrangements involving electronic money tokens and assetreferenced tokens, additional prudential requirements should be introduced to ensure the protection of the EU financial system. Given that the correct functioning of those arrangements relies on the alignment of the regulation across EU and third-countries and on effective supervisory cooperation, the authorisation of such arrangements should remain exceptional and provide at least the same level of protection as that established under Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 for cases of electronic money tokens and asset-referenced tokens issued by multiple entities all established and licensed in the EU. The requirement for strict equivalence reflects the serious risks identified by the European Systemic Risk Board in its recommendations of October 2025 on third-country multi-issuer stablecoin schemes, and by the European Central Bank in its opinion of April 2026 on the proposals for the further development of capital market integration and supervision within the Union. Those institutions have identified that multi-issuance arrangements involving thirdcountry entities create specific and material risks to financial stability, monetary policy transmission and monetary sovereignty that cannot be adequately mitigated by outcome-based or functional equivalence standards. The strict equivalence standard established in Article 48a is therefore necessary and proportionate to the objective of ensuring that the Union financial system and Union holders are afforded a level of protection equivalent to that provided under this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (99a) Third country multi-issuer stablecoin schemes are arrangements under which the tokens issued by an EU issuer under the Union legal framework are fully fungible or interchangeable with tokens issued by an issuer established in a third country and not regulated under EU law nor subject to Union oversight. When a token is issued and marketed under such schemes it may be impossible, once those tokens are in circulation, to determine which issuer issued a particular token. The Union issuer may consequently face redemption claims relating to tokens issued outside the Union, while the corresponding reserve assets or funds are not subject to Union requirements, oversight and enforcement. Such arrangements increase liquidity, credit, operational risks, including risks related to financial crime, and may act as a channel of contagion to the banking sector. They may therefore expose the Union to significant financial stability and money laundering risks. In addition, they may create opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by enabling third-country issuers to benefit from access to the Union market without being subject to the same regulatory, prudential and supervisory requirements as Union issuers.Where the e-money tokens reference a non-Union currency, such arrangements may also facilitate the wider use in the Union of foreign-currency-denominated private means of payment and reinforce dependence on foreign reserve assets, to the detriment of the objectives of the Savings and Investments Union, the international role of the euro, and the Union’s monetary and digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (99b) The legal status of third country multi-issuer stablecoin arrangements is currently unclear, since this Regulation does not expressly regulate or prohibit them. That lack of clarity has resulted in divergent supervisory approaches by competent authorities across Member States, creating legal uncertainty for issuers and token holders that is incompatible with the objective of establishing a single market for crypto-asset markets and may undermine the integrity of the internal market. It is therefore necessary to clarify expressly that multi-issuer arrangements are permissible only where all participating issuers are established in the Union and subject to the Union regulatory framework, whereas arrangements where the tokens are fungible or interchangeable with tokens issued by a non-EU issuer should not be permitted. That restriction should not prevent the issuance in the EU of tokens referencing a non-Union currency, where all issuers are established in the EU and the corresponding reserve assets or funds for the total issuance are subject to this Regulation and to Union supervision, or the marketing in third countries of tokens issued by an Union issuer. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (99c) Crypto-asset lending, borrowing and staking services are increasingly provided in the Union, alongside services already covered by this Regulation. However, they are currently not expressly included among the crypto-asset services regulated under MiCA. Their exclusion from the harmonised regulatory framework constitutes a regulatory gap which creates fragmentation within the Single Market, opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and an uneven level of investor protection across the internal market. The EBA and ESMA have identified significant risks arising from excessive leverage, interconnectedness and procyclical liquidation, as well as increased money laundering and terrorist financing, fraud and cyber risks. Those risks can result in losses for clients and create contagion to the wider financial sector. Crypto-asset lending and borrowing services provided or facilitated on a professional basis should therefore be included among the crypto-asset services covered by this Regulation and be subject to appropriate regulatory requirements. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
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| (101) To ensure consistent application of the relevant provisions under Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, the Commission should be empowered to adopt, in accordance with Article 290 TFEU and Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA related to the authorisation of regulated markets and PEMOs, and to the operation of trading venues. Furthermore, to ensure consistent harmonisation of standards, the Commission should be empowered to adopt, in accordance with Article 290 TFEU and with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council15 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, regulatory technical standards developed by the European Banking Authority ('EBA') and by the European Securities and Markets Authority ('ESMA') with regard to the procedures for the calculation of the criteria for establishing the significance of a CSD and the set of data EU CSDs are to report to ESMA for such calculation; the measures to be put in place by CSDs and market participants to prevent settlement fails and to increase the settlement efficiency of Union capital markets; the conditions under which an outsourcing arrangement is to be considered as the outsourcing of core CSD services; the measures to be implemented by CSDs to mitigate the specific risks stemming from the provision of CSD services using DLT; and the risk management measures and prudential requirements with respect to the settlement in commercial bank money and in e-money tokens. In addition, in order to ensure consistent harmonisation in the fees to be charged by ESMA to UCITS and AIFMs in connection with the passporting procedure and the maintenance of the data platform, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of measures to specify the type, amount, frequency and the modalities governing the payment of those fees. Furthermore, in order to ensure consistent harmonisation in the marketing communications made available to investors, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the TFEU should be delegated to the Commission to specify the content and format of marketing communications. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. Lastly, to identify the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 that should apply to the providers of the DLT notary and DLT central account maintenance service, and adapt them to the use of distributed ledger technology and the specificities of business models involving DLT notaries and DLT account keepers, ESMA should develop draft regulatory technical standards to supplement the provisions of Title III of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. | (101) To ensure consistent application of the relevant provisions under Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, the Commission should be empowered to adopt, in accordance with Article 290 TFEU and Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA related to the authorisation of regulated markets and PEMOs, and to the operation of trading venues. Furthermore, to ensure consistent harmonisation of standards, the Commission should be empowered to adopt, in accordance with Article 290 TFEU and with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council15 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, regulatory technical standards developed by the European Banking Authority ('EBA') and by the European Securities and Markets Authority ('ESMA') with regard to the measures to be put in place by CSDs and market participants to prevent settlement fails and to increase the settlement efficiency of Union capital markets; the conditions under which an outsourcing arrangement is to be considered as the outsourcing of core CSD services; the measures to be implemented by CSDs to mitigate the specific risks stemming from the provision of CSD services using DLT; and the risk management measures and prudential requirements with respect to the settlement in commercial bank money and in e-money tokens. In addition, in order to ensure consistent harmonisation in the fees to be charged by ESMA to UCITS and AIFMs in connection with the passporting procedure and the maintenance of the data platform, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of measures to specify the type, amount, frequency and the modalities governing the payment of those fees. Furthermore, in order to ensure consistent harmonisation in the marketing communications made available to investors, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the TFEU should be delegated to the Commission to specify the content and format of marketing communications. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. Lastly, to identify the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 that should apply to the providers of the DLT notary and DLT central account maintenance service, and adapt them to the use of distributed ledger technology and the specificities of business models involving DLT notaries and DLT account keepers, ESMA should develop draft regulatory technical standards to supplement the provisions of Title III of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. |
| 15 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority). | 15 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (101) To ensure consistent application of the relevant provisions under Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, the Commission should be empowered to adopt, in accordance with Article 290 TFEU and Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA related to the authorisation of regulated markets and PEMOs, and to the operation of trading venues. Furthermore, to ensure consistent harmonisation of standards, the Commission should be empowered to adopt, in accordance with Article 290 TFEU and with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council15 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, regulatory technical standards developed by the European Banking Authority ('EBA') and by the European Securities and Markets Authority ('ESMA') with regard to the procedures for the calculation of the criteria for establishing the significance of a CSD and the set of data EU CSDs are to report to ESMA for such calculation; the measures to be put in place by CSDs and market participants to prevent settlement fails and to increase the settlement efficiency of Union capital markets; the conditions under which an outsourcing arrangement is to be considered as the outsourcing of core CSD services; the measures to be implemented by CSDs to mitigate the specific risks stemming from the provision of CSD services using DLT; and the risk management measures and prudential requirements with respect to the settlement in commercial bank money and in e-money tokens. In addition, in order to ensure consistent harmonisation in the fees to be charged by ESMA to UCITS and AIFMs in connection with the passporting procedure and the maintenance of the data platform, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of measures to specify the type, amount, frequency and the modalities governing the payment of those fees. Furthermore, in order to ensure consistent harmonisation in the marketing communications made available to investors, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the TFEU should be delegated to the Commission to specify the content and format of marketing communications. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. Lastly, to identify the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 that should apply to the providers of the DLT notary and DLT central account maintenance service, and adapt them to the use of distributed ledger technology and the specificities of business models involving DLT notaries and DLT account keepers, ESMA should develop draft regulatory technical standards to supplement the provisions of Title III of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. | (101) To ensure consistent application of the relevant provisions under Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, the Commission should be empowered to adopt, in accordance with Article 290 TFEU and Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA related to the authorisation of regulated markets and PEMOs, and to the operation of trading venues. Furthermore, to ensure consistent harmonisation of standards, the Commission should be empowered to adopt, in accordance with Article 290 TFEU and with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council15 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, regulatory technical standards developed by the European Banking Authority ('EBA') and by the European Securities and Markets Authority ('ESMA') with regard to the procedures for the calculation of the criteria for establishing the significance of a CSD and the set of data EU CSDs are to report to ESMA for such calculation; the measures to be put in place by CSDs and market participants to prevent settlement fails and to increase the settlement efficiency of Union capital markets; the conditions under which an outsourcing arrangement is to be considered as the outsourcing of core CSD services; the measures to be implemented by CSDs to mitigate the specific risks stemming from the provision of CSD services using DLT; and the risk management measures and prudential requirements with respect to the settlement in commercial bank money . In addition, in order to ensure consistent harmonisation in the fees to be charged by ESMA to UCITS and AIFMs in connection with the passporting procedure and the maintenance of the data platform, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of measures to specify the type, amount, frequency and the modalities governing the payment of those fees. Furthermore, in order to ensure consistent harmonisation in the marketing communications made available to investors, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the TFEU should be delegated to the Commission to specify the content and format of marketing communications. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. Lastly, to identify the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 that should apply to the providers of the DLT notary and DLT central account maintenance service, and adapt them to the use of distributed ledger technology and the specificities of business models involving DLT notaries and DLT account keepers, ESMA should develop draft regulatory technical standards to supplement the provisions of Title III of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. |
| 15 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority). | 15 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (101a) The proliferation of global stablecoins issued or backed by reserve structures in third countries poses significant risks to the Union’s financial stability and monetary sovereignty. To avoid 'offshore' issuance having systemic 'onshore' impacts without adequate Union oversight, it is necessary to restrict the offering of such tokens to retail investors unless they meet stringent Union-based prudential and governance standards, including the requirement for reserve assets to be held within the Union and to be governed by Union law. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (105) To ensure consistency with the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should apply 12 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. However, to enable ESMA to start assessing whether a CCP is a significant CCP before the obligations on significant CCPs start to apply, the provisions that relate to that assessment should start to apply from the date of entry into force of this Regulation. To allow ESMA to gradually phase in the new supervisory responsibilities and to establish the necessary capacity and frameworks of cooperation, the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 that relate to the supervision of significant CSDs should apply 24 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. However, to enable ESMA to start assessing whether a CSD is a significant CSD before the obligations on significant CSDs start to apply, the provisions that relate to that assessment should apply from the date of entry into force of this Regulation. | (105) To ensure consistency with the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should apply 12 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. To allow ESMA to gradually phase in the new supervisory responsibilities and to establish the necessary capacity and frameworks of cooperation, the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 that relate to the supervision of CSDs should apply 24 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (106) To ensure legal certainty and to avoid disruptions to the establishment of the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs by the first CTP authorised in accordance with Article 27db of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, the amendments to that Regulation that relate to the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs should apply from [OP insert date = the day following the expiry of the first period of 5 years referred to in Article 27da of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 with respect to the CTP for shares and ETFs]. To ensure consistency with the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 that relate to ESMA’s powers should start to apply 12 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. To allow for sufficient time to prepare the transfer from national competent authorities to ESMA of competences and duties with respect to the relevant trading venues, ESMA should become the competent authority for the entities concerned 24 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. | (106) The amendments to that Regulation that relate to the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs should apply from [OP insert date = 12 months after the date of entry into force of this Regulation. To ensure consistency with the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 that relate to ESMA’s powers should start to apply 12 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. To allow for sufficient time to prepare the transfer from national competent authorities to ESMA of competences and duties with respect to the relevant trading venues, ESMA should become the competent authority for the entities concerned 24 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (106) To ensure legal certainty and to avoid disruptions to the establishment of the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs by the first CTP authorised in accordance with Article 27db of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, the amendments to that Regulation that relate to the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs should apply from [OP insert date = the day following the expiry of the first period of 5 years referred to in Article 27da of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 with respect to the CTP for shares and ETFs]. To ensure consistency with the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 that relate to ESMA’s powers should start to apply 12 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. To allow for sufficient time to prepare the transfer from national competent authorities to ESMA of competences and duties with respect to the relevant trading venues, ESMA should become the competent authority for the entities concerned 24 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. | (106) To ensure legal certainty and to avoid disruptions to the establishment of the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs by the first CTP authorised in accordance with Article 27db of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, the amendments to that Regulation that relate to the consolidated tape for shares and ETFs should apply from [OP insert date = the day following the expiry of the first period of 5 years referred to in Article 27da of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 with respect to the CTP for shares and ETFs]. To ensure consistency with the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 that relate to ESMA’s powers should start to apply 12 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. To allow for sufficient time to prepare the transfer from national competent authorities to ESMA of competences and duties with respect to the trading venues, ESMA should become the competent authority for the entities concerned 24 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3b. The Authority shall exercise powers over certain financial market participants, in accordance with this Regulation and other Union acts. Such powers shall include, where conferred by this Regulation and other Union acts, the registration, authorisation, recognition, ongoing supervision, investigation including the power to conduct on-site inspections, and enforcement in respect of those entities. | 3b. The Authority shall exercise powers over certain financial market participants, in order to ensure their compliance with the requirements applicable to them, in accordance with this Regulation and other Union acts. Such powers shall include, where conferred by this Regulation and other Union acts, the registration, authorisation, recognition, ongoing supervision, investigation including the power to conduct on-site inspections, and enforcement in respect of those entities. |
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (-1) in Article 1, the introductory part of paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: | |
| 5. The objective of the Authority shall be to protect the public interest by contributing to the short-, medium- and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system, for the Union economy, its citizens and businesses. The Authority shall, within its respective competences, contribute to: | "5. The objective of the Authority shall be to protect the public interest by contributing to the short-, medium- and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system, for the Union economy, its citizens and businesses. |
| Without prejudice to the primary mandate stated in the previous paragraph, ESMA in its regulatory capacity and as a secondary mandate shall foster the EU economy competitiveness and innovation in EU financial markets. In the exercise of its direct supervisory and enforcement competences, its only mandate shall be to guarantee financial stability, market integrity and investor protection. | |
| The Authority shall, within its respective competences, contribute to:" |
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (-1) in Article 1, the introductory part of paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: | |
| 5. The objective of the Authority shall be to protect the public interest by contributing to the short-, medium- and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system, for the Union economy, its citizens and businesses. The Authority shall, within its respective competences, contribute to: | "5. The objective of the Authority shall be to protect the public interest by contributing to the short-, medium- and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system, for the Union economy, its citizens and businesses. The Authority shall also support the competitiveness of the Union’s economy and its sustainable growth. The Authority shall, within its respective competences, contribute to:" |
Whilst financial stability and investor protection remain the core elements of ESMA’s role, ESMA shall be provided with a secondary statutory competitiveness objective, in line with the developments observed for other third country regulators’ mandate.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) improving the functioning of the internal market, including in particular a sound, effective and consistent level of regulation, supervision and enforcement, | (a) improving the functioning of the internal market, including in particular a sound, effective, proportionate and consistent level of regulation, supervision and enforcement, |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) strengthening international supervisory coordination and exchange of information; | (c) strengthening international supervisory and enforcement coordination, and exchange of information. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) supporting market integration in the Union and innovation in the financial sector. | (h) enhancing the competitiveness of the financial sector and supporting market integration in the Union and innovation in the financial sector when acting as regulator, and enhancing the simplification when pursuing its objectives as regulator and supervisor. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) supporting market integration in the Union and innovation in the financial sector. | (h) supporting market integration in the Union; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ha) supporting the alignment of the financial sector with the Union’s objective of achieving climate neutrality. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ha) facilitating the international competitiveness of the Union’s economy, in particular its financial sector, and its growth in the medium to long term. |
Whilst financial stability and investor protection remain the core elements of ESMA’s role, ESMA shall be provided with a secondary statutory competitiveness objective, in line with the developments observed for other third country regulators’ mandate.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ha) fostering and supporting the competitiveness of Union financial market participants; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3a) The following subparagraph is added: | |
| 'In the exercise of the tasks conferred upon it by Article 8, subparagraph 1 of this Regulation to contribute to the establishment of high-quality common regulatory standards, the Authority shall take account of the any potential impact on the competitiveness of the financial and commodity markets in the Union.' |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (-a) in Article 3(3), the following subparagraph is added: | |
| ‘In its annual report, the Authority shall outline how it has complied with its duty to advance the Union’s global competitiveness. The report shall in particular explain: | |
| (a) the actions taken by the Authority to ensure that the Union’s global competitiveness is embedded in its operations, processes and decision-making as regulator; and | |
| (b) how any rule and guidance that the Authority has adopted in the exercise of it regulatory competences contribute to that objective.' |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (-a) In Article 3, paragraph 3a is inserted: | |
| ‘3a. ESMA shall publish every year, by 15 June at the latest, a report on how it has helped to achieve the competitiveness and growth objectives. The report shall set out, among other matters: the measures taken to integrate those objectives into its activities, procedures and decision-making processes; and how the rules and guidance it adopts contribute to their achievement. The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the European Economic and Social Committee.’ |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Present text | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (-1) In article 8(1), point (a) is replaced by the following: | |
| (a) based on the legislative acts referred to in Article 1(2), to contribute to the establishment of high-quality common regulatory and supervisory standards and practices, in particular by developing draft regulatory and implementing technical standards, guidelines, recommendations, and other measures, including opinions; | '(a) based on the legislative acts referred to in Article 1(2), to contribute to the establishment of high-quality common regulatory and supervisory standards and practices, in particular by developing draft regulatory and implementing technical standards, ESMA technical specifications, guidelines, recommendations, and other measures, including opinions;' |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (aa) to develop and maintain an up-to-date Union supervisory handbook on the supervision of financial market participants in the Union and enforcement of the rules regulating their activity which is to set out best practices and high-quality methodologies and processes and takes into account, inter alia, business practices and business models and the size of financial market participants and of markets;; | (aa) to develop and maintain an up-to-date Union supervisory handbook on the supervision of financial market participants in the Union and enforcement of the rules regulating their activity which is to set out best practices and high-quality methodologies and processes and takes into account, inter alia, business practices and business models and the size and the risks of financial market participants and of markets |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1a) the following point (aaa) is inserted: | |
| '(aaa) to monitor situations where market developments or EU legislative acts may give rise to threats to fair competition between firms based in the Union and those based in third countries or where such markets developments may lead to a disproportionate burden of compliance by firms based in the Union with a specific requirement set out in one of the legislative acts referred to in Article 1(2) and its supervisory convergence tools to address such situations with the view of mitigating such unlevel playing field situations impacting firms in the Union;' |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) to contribute to the consistent application of legally binding Union acts, in particular by contributing to a common supervisory and enforcement culture, ensuring consistent, efficient and effective application of the legislative acts referred to in Article 1(2), preventing regulatory arbitrage, fostering and monitoring supervisory independence, mediating and settling disagreements between competent authorities, ensuring effective and consistent supervision of financial market participants and enforcement of the rules regulating their activity, ensuring a coherent functioning of colleges of supervisors or other forms of supervisory cooperation and taking actions, inter alia, in emergency situations;; | (b) to contribute to the consistent application of legally binding Union acts, in particular by contributing to a common supervisory and enforcement culture, ensuring consistent, efficient and effective application of the legislative acts referred to in Article 1(2), in particular by identifying national requirements or obligations exceeding the requirements or obligations of the aforementioned legislative acts, preventing regulatory arbitrage, fostering and monitoring supervisory independence, mediating and settling disagreements between competent authorities, ensuring effective and consistent supervision of financial market participants and enforcement of the rules regulating their activity, ensuring a coherent functioning of colleges of supervisors or other forms of supervisory cooperation and taking actions, inter alia, in emergency situations;; |
Regulatory goldplating practices are source of fragmentation that hinder the development of the single market. ESMA should be tasked with identifying national requirements or obligations exceeding the requirements or obligations of the aforementioned legislative acts referred to in Article 1(2).
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) to contribute to the consistent application of legally binding Union acts, in particular by contributing to a common supervisory and enforcement culture, ensuring consistent, efficient and effective application of the legislative acts referred to in Article 1(2), preventing regulatory arbitrage, fostering and monitoring supervisory independence, mediating and settling disagreements between competent authorities, ensuring effective and consistent supervision of financial market participants and enforcement of the rules regulating their activity, ensuring a coherent functioning of colleges of supervisors or other forms of supervisory cooperation and taking actions, inter alia, in emergency situations;; | (b) to contribute to the consistent application of legally binding Union acts, in particular by contributing to a common supervisory methodology, ensuring effective supervision of financial market participants, ensuring a coherent functioning of colleges of supervisors and taking actions, inter alia, in emergency situations; and monitoring circumstances where market developments may undermine the level playing field between undertakings established in the Union and those established in third countries, or impose disproportionate compliance burdens on Union undertakings resulting from the requirements stemming from Article 1(2). To that end, ESMA should use its supervisory convergence tools to address those circumstances and limit distortions of the level playing field affecting firms within the Union. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ba) develop ESMA technical specifications in the specific cases referred to in Article 15a. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3a) the following point (ea) is inserted: | |
| '(ea) to conduct reviews of supervisory activities of competent authorities and, in that context, to identify the origin of divergencies in supervisory practices, and to propose remedial actions;' |
Divergences in supervisory practices may be source of fragmentation that hinder the development of the single market. ESMA should be tasked with identifying the origin of divergencies in supervisory practices, conducting reviews and proposing remedial actions.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (5a) the following point (kaa) is inserted: | |
| '(kaa) to publish on its website, and to update regularly, information relating to national requirements or obligations exceeding the requirements or obligations of the legislative acts, as referred to in Article 8(1)(b);' |
Regulatory goldplating practices are source of fragmentation that hinder the development of the single market. ESMA should be tasked with identifying national and supervisory gold plating and, to ensure transparency, it must publish information in relation thereto on its website.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (m) to carry out the prudential supervision of central counterparties and central securities depositories when exercising its powers under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and Regulation (EU) No 909/2014*, and in relation thereto, to cooperate with the European Central Bank and the other relevant central banks of issue of the Union currencies; | (m) to carry out the prudential supervision of central counterparties and central securities depositories when exercising its powers under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and Regulation (EU) No 909/2014*, and in relation thereto, to cooperate with the European Central Bank and the central banks of issue of the Union currencies other than the euro; |
This clarification is necessary, in particular, to avoid an overly restrictive interpretation of the term ‘relevant’.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (m) to carry out the prudential supervision of central counterparties and central securities depositories when exercising its powers under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and Regulation (EU) No 909/2014*, and in relation thereto, to cooperate with the European Central Bank and the other relevant central banks of issue of the Union currencies; | (m) to carry out the prudential supervision of central counterparties and central securities depositories when exercising its powers under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and Regulation (EU) No 909/2014*, and in relation thereto, to cooperate with the European Central Bank and central banks of issue of Union currencies other than the euro ; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (n) to assess the resilience of the financial system of the Union, as well as risks arising from cross-border activities of financial market participants under the Authority’s supervision, including risks due to interconnectedness, interlinkages or concentration risks, when carrying out supervisory duties in accordance with this Regulation or other Union acts.’; | (n) to assess the resilience of the financial system of the Union, as well as risks arising from cross-border activities of financial market participants under the Authority’s supervision, including risks due to interconnectedness, interlinkages or concentration risks. When carrying out those assessments for large cross-border asset management groups, the Authority shall identify potential risks to market diversity and investor choice by analyzing market concentration and the comparative position of Union versus non-Union providers. The Authority shall publish annual anonymized statistics and transmit a reasoned report to the Commission where it identifies material risks to the competitive structure of the market, to facilitate the exercise of the Commission’s powers under Union competition law. In carrying out this task, the Authority shall coordinate closely with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the European Central Bank (ECB), particularly regarding liquidity mismatches and leverage-related vulnerabilities in large cross-border groups. The Authority shall report its findings and any recommended macroprudential measures to the Commission and the ESRB on an annual basis. |
This amendment introduces a technical mandate for ESMA to perform market concentration analyses and identify barriers to entry for small and medium-sized providers. By requiring the publication of anonymized statistics and the transmission of reasoned reports to the Commission, it creates a data-driven mechanism to monitor the competitive structure of the asset management sector. This structural oversight facilitates the application of Union competition law to ensure that market integration preserves investor choice and maintains transparent fee structures. Integrates a specific obligation into ESMA’s review powers to assess "systemic and cross-border contagion risks in the asset management sector", requiring close coordination with the ESRB and the ECB. It focuses on liquidity mismatches and leverage vulnerabilities.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (n) to assess the resilience of the financial system of the Union, as well as risks arising from cross-border activities of financial market participants under the Authority’s supervision, including risks due to interconnectedness, interlinkages or concentration risks, when carrying out supervisory duties in accordance with this Regulation or other Union acts.’; | (n) to assess the resilience of the financial system of the Union, as well as risks arising from the activities of financial market participants under the Authority’s supervision, including risks due to interconnectedness, interlinkages or concentration risks, when carrying out supervisory duties in accordance with this Regulation or other Union acts.’; |
The identification and assessment of risks shall cover the entirety of financial market participants rather than specifically focusing on the cross-border dimension of such activities. Considering cross-border activities as inherently risky goes against the fundamental principle of the Single Market.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (na) to ensure that the reliance on intra-group resources allowed under Directives 2009/65/EC and 2011/61/EU does not lead to the creation of letter-box entities or regulatory arbitrage. The Authority’s periodic reviews of large cross-border groups shall explicitly assess the impact of delegation chains and group structures involving non-Union parent entities on the Union’s supervisory visibility and effective decision-making capacity. Where such arrangements are found to weaken Union-based oversight, the Authority shall issue recommendations to the relevant competent authorities to ensure the authorized entity retains adequate own substance. |
This amendment introduces technical safeguards to ensure that the simplified regime for intra-group resource sharing does not facilitate the creation of letter-box entities or regulatory arbitrage. By requiring ESMA to evaluate the impact of third-country delegation chains and group structures on Union-based oversight, it preserves supervisory visibility and effective decision-making capacity. The provision enables ESMA to issue corrective recommendations to competent authorities when specific arrangements are found to weaken effective oversight, thereby ensuring that authorized entities maintain adequate substance.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (aa) In Article 8(1a), the following point is added: | |
| '(ca) where financial market participants operate as a group as defined in Directive 2014/65/EU article 2 point (34) this shall be duly reflected in the supervision.' |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (aa) In Article 8(1a), the following point is added: | |
| '(ca) where financial market participants operate as a group as defined in Directive 2014/65/EU article 2 point (34) this shall be duly reflected in the supervision.' |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) take individual decisions addressed to financial market participants, in the specific cases referred to in Article 17(6), Article 17aaa, Article 18(4) and Article19(4); | (f) take individual decisions addressed to financial market participants, in the specific cases referred to in Article 17(6), Article 18(4) and Article19(4); |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) take individual decisions addressed to financial market participants, in the specific cases referred to in Article 17(6), Article 17aaa, Article 18(4) and Article19(4); | (f) take individual decisions addressed to financial market participants, in the specific cases referred to in Article 17(6), Article 18(4) and Article19(4); |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3) point (ga) is deleted; | (3) deleted |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (k) to take individual decisions addressed to financial market participants when exercising direct supervisory tasks and adopt supervisory, investigatory and enforcement measures as referred to in Chapter IIa of this Regulation and other Union acts;’; | (k) to take individual decisions addressed to financial market participants or any other natural or legal persons when exercising direct supervisory or market surveillance tasks or tasks relating to market abuse investigation and enforcement and adopt supervisory, investigatory and enforcement measures as referred to in Chapter IIa of this Regulation and other Union acts;’ |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (la) issue suspension decisions in accordance with Article 9(6). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ba) The following subparagraph is added to Article 8(3): | |
| ‘In the exercise of its tasks as part of the acts referred to in paragraph 2, ESMA shall contribute to furthering: | |
| (a) the international competitiveness of the Union economy, including the financial services sector; | |
| (b) medium and long-term sustainable growth of the Union economy.’ |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Both the Authority and the authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information to effectively exercise their tasks. When exercising its tasks, the Authority may draw from the expertise and knowledge of the authorities, including their supervisory experience and understanding of economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), the authorities shall be responsible for assisting the Authority, under the conditions set out in the arrangements set out in this Article. This may include support with the preparation and implementation of acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 8(1) point (l), including assistance in verification activities or performance of specific operational tasks. The authorities shall follow the instructions given by the Authority when giving support and performing tasks under these arrangements. | 2. Both the Authority and the authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information to effectively exercise their tasks. When exercising its tasks, the Authority shall draw from the expertise and knowledge of the authorities, including their supervisory experience and understanding of economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), the authorities shall be responsible for assisting the Authority, under the conditions set out in the arrangements set out in this Article and in Article 8b. The exercise of those responsibilities shall follow the sequenced integration mechanism and the two-phase architecture set out in Article 8b. This shall include support with the preparation and implementation of acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 8(1) point (l), including assistance in verification activities or performance of specific operational tasks. The authorities shall follow the instructions given by the Authority when giving support and performing tasks under these arrangements. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Both the Authority and the authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information to effectively exercise their tasks. When exercising its tasks, the Authority may draw from the expertise and knowledge of the authorities, including their supervisory experience and understanding of economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), the authorities shall be responsible for assisting the Authority, under the conditions set out in the arrangements set out in this Article. This may include support with the preparation and implementation of acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 8(1) point (l), including assistance in verification activities or performance of specific operational tasks. The authorities shall follow the instructions given by the Authority when giving support and performing tasks under these arrangements. | 2. Both the Authority and the authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information and provide mutual assistance to effectively exercise their tasks and powers in relation to the acts referred to in Article 1(2). When exercising its tasks, the Authority may draw from the expertise and knowledge of the authorities, including their supervisory experience and understanding of economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), the authorities shall be responsible for assisting the Authority, under the conditions set out in the arrangements set out in this Article. This may include support with the preparation and implementation of acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 8(1) point (l), including assistance in verification activities or performance of specific operational tasks. The authorities shall follow the instructions given by the Authority when giving support and performing tasks under these arrangements. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Both the Authority and the authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information to effectively exercise their tasks. When exercising its tasks, the Authority may draw from the expertise and knowledge of the authorities, including their supervisory experience and understanding of economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), the authorities shall be responsible for assisting the Authority, under the conditions set out in the arrangements set out in this Article. This may include support with the preparation and implementation of acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 8(1) point (l), including assistance in verification activities or performance of specific operational tasks. The authorities shall follow the instructions given by the Authority when giving support and performing tasks under these arrangements. | 2. Both the Authority and the authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information to effectively exercise their tasks. When exercising its tasks, the Authority shall draw, where appropriate, from the expertise and knowledge of the authorities, including their supervisory experience and understanding of economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), the authorities shall be responsible for assisting the Authority, under the conditions set out in the arrangements set out in this Article. This may include support with the preparation and implementation of acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 8(1) point (l), including assistance in verification activities or performance of specific operational tasks. The authorities shall follow the instructions given by the Authority when giving support and performing tasks under these arrangements. |
National competent authorities possess valuable supervisory experience and knowledge of local markets. ESMA should therefore draw on that expertise where appropriate. This strengthens cooperation and helps ensure informed decisions, while preserving ESMA’s discretion to determine, case by case, whether and how national expertise is relevant, without affecting its responsibility for the final decision.
Johan Van Overtveldt, Giovanni Crosetto, Francesco Ventola, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Marco Squarta, Denis Nesci
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Both the Authority and the authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information to effectively exercise their tasks. When exercising its tasks, the Authority may draw from the expertise and knowledge of the authorities, including their supervisory experience and understanding of economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), the authorities shall be responsible for assisting the Authority, under the conditions set out in the arrangements set out in this Article. This may include support with the preparation and implementation of acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 8(1) point (l), including assistance in verification activities or performance of specific operational tasks. The authorities shall follow the instructions given by the Authority when giving support and performing tasks under these arrangements. | 2. Both the Authority and the authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information to effectively exercise their tasks. When exercising its tasks, the Authority shall draw from the expertise and knowledge of the authorities, including their supervisory experience and understanding of economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), the authorities shall be responsible for assisting the Authority, under the conditions set out in the arrangements set out in this Article. This may include support with the preparation and implementation of acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 8(1) point (l), including assistance in verification activities or performance of specific operational tasks. The authorities shall follow the instructions given by the Authority when giving support and performing tasks under these arrangements. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Both the Authority and the authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information to effectively exercise their tasks. When exercising its tasks, the Authority may draw from the expertise and knowledge of the authorities, including their supervisory experience and understanding of economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), the authorities shall be responsible for assisting the Authority, under the conditions set out in the arrangements set out in this Article. This may include support with the preparation and implementation of acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 8(1) point (l), including assistance in verification activities or performance of specific operational tasks. The authorities shall follow the instructions given by the Authority when giving support and performing tasks under these arrangements. | 2. Both the Authority and the authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information to effectively exercise their tasks. When exercising its tasks, the Authority shall draw from the expertise and knowledge of the authorities, including their supervisory experience and understanding of economic, organisational and cultural specificities. Where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), the authorities shall be responsible for assisting the Authority, under the conditions set out in the arrangements set out in this Article. This may include support with the preparation and implementation of acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 8(1) point (l), including assistance in verification activities or performance of specific operational tasks. The authorities shall follow the instructions given by the Authority when giving support and performing tasks under these arrangements. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. For the purpose of carrying out tasks according to Article 8(1), point (l), and without prejudice to specific arrangements envisaged in other Union acts, the Authority shall establish, under its overall responsibility, and after consulting with the authorities the practical arrangements for cooperation. | 3. For the purpose of carrying out tasks according to Article 8(1), point (l), and without prejudice to specific arrangements envisaged in Article 8b or in other Union acts, the Authority and the authorities identified in paragraph 1 shall establish the practical arrangements for cooperation. The relevant national competent authorities, as well as the other authorities identified in paragraph 1, shall be timely involved in the negotiations and drafting of the cooperation arrangements. Such cooperation arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the authorities before they are transmitted to the Executive Board in accordance with paragraph 6. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. For the purpose of carrying out tasks according to Article 8(1), point (l), and without prejudice to specific arrangements envisaged in other Union acts, the Authority shall establish, under its overall responsibility, and after consulting with the authorities the practical arrangements for cooperation. | 3. For the purpose of carrying out tasks according to Article 8(1), point (l), and without prejudice to specific arrangements envisaged in other Union acts, the Authority shall establish, under its overall responsibility, and with the close involvement of the authorities, the practical arrangements for cooperation. The Authority shall ensure the close involvement of the authorities throughout the drafting and revision process for the practical arrangements for cooperation, thereby guaranteeing an inclusive process that adequately reflects the legitimate concerns of the authorities in day-to-day cooperation. |
Competent authorities and relevant authorities should be closely involved by ESMA throughout the drafting and revision process of cooperation arrangements, thereby guaranteeing an inclusive process that adequately reflects their legitimate concerns in day-to-day cooperation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. For the purpose of carrying out tasks according to Article 8(1), point (l), and without prejudice to specific arrangements envisaged in other Union acts, the Authority shall establish, under its overall responsibility, and after consulting with the authorities the practical arrangements for cooperation. | 3. For the purpose of carrying out tasks according to Article 8(1), point (l), and without prejudice to specific arrangements envisaged in other Union acts, the Authority shall establish, under its overall responsibility, and after consulting with and in agreement with the authorities the practical arrangements for cooperation. Those arrangements shall respect the statutory responsibilities, legal constraints, available resources and operational capacity of the authorities concerned and shall not impose obligations that go beyond the tasks expressly conferred on those authorities by Union law or national law. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. For the purpose of carrying out tasks according to Article 8(1), point (l), and without prejudice to specific arrangements envisaged in other Union acts, the Authority shall establish, under its overall responsibility, and after consulting with the authorities the practical arrangements for cooperation. | 3. For the purpose of carrying out tasks according to Article 8(1), point (l), and without prejudice to specific arrangements envisaged in other Union acts, the Authority shall establish, under its overall responsibility, and after consulting with the authorities the practical arrangements for cooperation. The Authority shall ensure the close involvement of the authorities throughout the drafting and revision process for the practical arrangements for cooperation, thereby guaranteeing an inclusive process that adequately reflects the legitimate concerns of the authorities in day-to-day cooperation. |
Eero Heinäluoma, Francisco Assis, Jonás Fernández, César Luena, Evelyn Regner, Aurore Lalucq, Nikos Papandreou, Claire Fita
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. For the purpose of carrying out tasks according to Article 8(1), point (l), and without prejudice to specific arrangements envisaged in other Union acts, the Authority shall establish, under its overall responsibility, and after consulting with the authorities the practical arrangements for cooperation. | 3. For the purpose of carrying out tasks according to Article 8(1), point (l), and without prejudice to specific arrangements envisaged in other Union acts, the Authority shall establish, under its overall responsibility, and after consulting with the authorities a framework for the implementation of this Article. The framework applicable to a given sector shall be adopted before the end of the transitional period defined for this sector. Key aspects of this framework that might impact the relationship with supervised entities shall be made public. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. The Authority shall bear any costs incurred by the authorities, in connection with the cooperation provided pursuant to this Article, unless otherwise agreed. | 4. The Authority shall bear any costs incurred by the authorities, in connection with the cooperation provided pursuant to this Article and Article 8b. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. The practical arrangements for cooperation shall define the modalities of support, the procedures and processes, including time-limits, for the cooperation between the Authority and the authorities and shall be guided by the following principles: | 5. The practical arrangements for cooperation shall define the modalities of support, the procedures and processes, including time-limits, for the cooperation between the Authority and the authorities. The arrangements shall ensure that cooperation between the Authority and the competent authorities does not lead to overlapping or conflicting requests for information, duplicate inspections, varying criteria applicable to the same institution or activity, or unnecessary operational burdens for participants in the financial market. Where an institution is affected by a cooperation arrangement, the Authority and the competent authorities shall, where appropriate, designate a single point of contact for that institution. The authorities shall be guided by the following principles: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. The practical arrangements for cooperation shall define the modalities of support, the procedures and processes, including time-limits, for the cooperation between the Authority and the authorities and shall be guided by the following principles: | 5. The practical arrangements for cooperation shall define the modalities of support, the procedures and processes, including time-limits, for the cooperation between the Authority and the authorities, shall establish a systematic framework for the sharing of expertise and knowledge of local markets between the Authority and the authorities, and shall be guided by the following principles: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. The practical arrangements for cooperation shall define the modalities of support, the procedures and processes, including time-limits, for the cooperation between the Authority and the authorities and shall be guided by the following principles: | 5. The practical arrangements for cooperation shall define the modalities of support, the procedures and processes, including time-limits, for the cooperation between the Authority and the authorities and shall clearly define the allocation of responsibilities and governance and be guided by the following principles: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. The practical arrangements for cooperation shall define the modalities of support, the procedures and processes, including time-limits, for the cooperation between the Authority and the authorities and shall be guided by the following principles: | 5. The practical arrangements for cooperation shall define the modalities of support, the procedures and processes, including time-limits, for the cooperation between the Authority and the authorities and shall clearly define the allocation of responsibilities and governance and be guided by the following principles: |
The practical arrangements for cooperation to be established by ESMA should ensure close cooperation between ESMA and the national competent authorities and, where applicable, the other relevant authorities involved in these arrangements.
Johan Van Overtveldt, Giovanni Crosetto, Francesco Ventola, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Marco Squarta, Denis Nesci
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) they shall allow for transitional solutions to ensure continuity and smooth transfer of responsibilities from the authorities to the Authority and from the Authority to the authorities; | (b) they shall allow for transitional solutions to ensure continuity and smooth transfer of responsibilities from the authorities to the Authority and from the Authority to the authorities, including the gradual build-up of the Authority’s supervisory capabilities through the integration of expertise and personnel drawn from the authorities; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) they shall promote efficiency in terms of both time and resources and shall take due account of resource implications and cost-efficiency; | (c) they shall promote efficiency in terms of both time and resources and shall take due account of resource implications and cost-efficiency building on the supervisory capacity already established within the authorities, containing the growth of the Authority's own resource base to what is strictly necessary; |
Cooperation arrangements should be built to draw on supervisory capacity that already exists at national level, not to replicate it. This keeps ESMA's own resource growth proportionate to genuine gaps in capacity, consistent with the cost-efficiency objective already set out in this paragraph.
Johan Van Overtveldt, Giovanni Crosetto, Francesco Ventola, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Marco Squarta, Denis Nesci
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) they shall promote efficiency in terms of both time and resources and shall take due account of resource implications and cost-efficiency; | (c) they shall promote efficiency in terms of both time and resources and shall take due account of resource implications and cost-efficiency, including by making effective use of existing expertise within the authorities to avoid unnecessary duplication of supervisory capacity; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) they shall promote efficiency in terms of both time and resources and shall take due account of resource implications and cost-efficiency; | (c) they shall promote efficiency in terms of both time and resources and shall take due account of resource implications and cost-efficiency, including by making effective use of existing expertise within the authorities; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (g) they shall set out operational or organisational modalities in relation to the Authority’s direct supervisory tasks, including arrangements such as joint teams, cooperation in investigations, on-site inspections or implementation activities; | (g) they shall set out, in accordance with Article 8b, implementing provisions concerning the operational and organisational modalities governing the coordinated supervisory teams established for the exercise of the Authority’s direct supervisory tasks, for the purpose of conducting joint supervision during Phase 1, as referred to in Article 8b(2), and assisting direct supervision during Phase 2, as referred to in Article 8b(5); |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (g) they shall set out operational or organisational modalities in relation to the Authority’s direct supervisory tasks, including arrangements such as joint teams, cooperation in investigations, on-site inspections or implementation activities; | (g) they shall set out operational or organisational modalities in relation to the Authority’s direct supervisory tasks, including arrangements such as joint teams, cooperation in investigations, on-site inspections or implementation activities, ensuring close cooperation with the national competent authorities and, where relevant, the other authorities referred to in paragraph 1; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (g) they shall set out operational or organisational modalities in relation to the Authority’s direct supervisory tasks, including arrangements such as joint teams, cooperation in investigations, on-site inspections or implementation activities; | (g) they shall set out operational or organisational modalities in relation to the Authority’s direct supervisory tasks, including arrangements such as joint teams, cooperation in investigations, on-site inspections or implementation activities, ensuring close cooperation with the national competent authorities and, where relevant, the other authorities referred to in paragraph 1; |
The practical arrangements for cooperation to be established by ESMA should ensure close cooperation between ESMA and the national competent authorities and, where applicable, the other relevant authorities involved in these arrangements.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) where appropriate, they may envisage the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States; | (h) where strictly necessary for the performance of direct supervisory tasks conferred on the Authority by Union law, and subject to the agreement of the competent authority of the Member State concerned, they may envisage the establishment of local presences of the Authority in Member States; such local presences shall not create parallel supervisory structures, duplicate the tasks of national competent authorities or impose additional administrative costs on competent authorities or supervised entities; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ia) they shall ensure that the Authority and the authorities devote the necessary financial and human resources to the exercise of the tasks referred to in Article 8(1), point (l). |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ia) they shall enable a continuous sharing of expertise and, especially in the transition phase, knowledge of the local market. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ia) they shall avoid the unnecessary layering of supervisory requirements or administrative burden for supervised entities. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ib) they shall consider establishing a formalised supervisory secondment programme between the Authority and the authorities, including whereby personnel remain based within their authority but are made available to the Authority for the purposes of promoting convergence in supervisory culture or sharing of local market expertise. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5a. ESMA, in consultation with NCAs, shall adopt a transitional framework to ensure continuity and smooth transfer of responsibilities from the authorities to the Authority. | |
| This framework shall: | |
| (i) define the expected length of the transitional period for each sector, | |
| (ii) consider the needs expressed by the Authority’s in terms of number of staff and expertise to perform its supervisory tasks, | |
| (iii) define the operational arrangements for NCAs staff participation in the transfer of competence and expertise, from the entry into force of this regulation, until the Authority reaches full capacity, including, if needed, after the Authority assumes direct supervisory responsibility, | |
| (iv) define the modalities of the transfer of supervisory knowledge, supervisory files, historical data and information on any procedure initiated by the supervised entity before or after the start of the transitional period, until ESMA assumes direct responsibility. | |
| During this transitional period, ESMA shall, in consultation with NCAs, express its needs in terms of number of staff and expertise to perform its supervisory tasks. The cost of staff allocated to the Authority under this framework shall be borne by the Authority. The Authority’s needs may be updated at least on an annual basis. | |
| ESMA shall be in charge of the composition of the teams involved in any direct supervisory tasks. Where NCAs staff is allocated to ESMA supervision, the allocation of the staff shall be proposed by the NCAs, based on the expertise needs expressed by ESMA. ESMA may require the NCAs to modify the appointments they have made if appropriate for the composition of the supervisory teams. | |
| During this period, NCAs staff shall report on a continuous basis on the performance of these activities. | |
| The duration of the transitional period may vary per sector and shall not exceed 3 years after ESMA assumes direct supervisory responsibility. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. The practical arrangements for cooperation established pursuant to this Article shall be subject to periodic review by the Authority, in consultation with the authorities, to ensure their continued effectiveness, proportionality and consistency with the Authority’s evolving supervisory capacity and Union law. | 7. The practical arrangements for cooperation established pursuant to this Article shall be subject to review by the Authority as necessary, in consultation with the authorities, to ensure their continued effectiveness, proportionality and consistency with Union law. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7a. No later than ... [five years after the date of entry into force of this amending Regulation], the Authority shall submit a comprehensive effectiveness review of the Structurally Coordinated Supervisory Framework to the Commission. That review shall assess whether the framework has ensured Union-wide convergence and whether a transition to direct supervision for systemic actors, including asset management groups with an aggregate EU-wide net asset value exceeding EUR 500 billion, is necessary to preserve market integrity or financial stability. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7a. ESMA shall consult the competent authority of the home Member State before adopting any supervisory measure that may materially affect the supervision, resolution responsibilities or financial stability of that Member State. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7a) The following article is inserted: | |
| ‘Article 8aa | |
| Establishment of the Structurally Coordinated Supervisory Framework | |
| 1. The Authority shall exercise its powers over financial market participants through an Integrated Hub-and-Spoke Architecture conducted in two phases. | |
| 2. Phase 1: For a period of five years from ... [the date of application of this amending Regulation], the supervision of significant market infrastructures and large cross-border asset management groups shall be conducted via a Structurally Coordinated Supervisory Framework consisting of: | |
| (a) Coordinated Supervisory Teams (CSTs), composed of staff from the Authority and relevant competent authorities; the CSTs shall be responsible for preparatory tasks, including day-to-day supervision, joint on-site inspections, and the drafting of supervisory measures and decisions; | |
| (b) Supervisory Colleges, acting as the consensus-based forum for the formal adoption of supervisory decisions based on the drafts prepared by the CSTs; | |
| (c) the Authority, which shall chair both the CSTs and the Supervisory Colleges and shall have the power to take binding decisions in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 44b(2) to ensure Union-wide supervisory convergence. | |
| 3. Coordinated supervisory teams shall be established for the supervision of the entities subject to the Authority’s direct supervisory powers pursuant to Regulations (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2023/1114, with the exemption of data reporting service providers. Each coordinated supervisory team shall be composed of staff from the Authority and from the relevant competent authorities of the Member State in which the entity is established or in which, based on the assessment of the Authority carried out in accordance with paragraph 9, that entity carries out significant operations or where its activities have significant relevance for the orderly functioning of financial markets. The members of the coordinated supervisory team shall be appointed in accordance with paragraph 9 and shall have a sufficient level of knowledge, expertise and experience, including expertise relating to the specific markets, instruments, infrastructures, entities and activities supervised, and with sufficiently diverse knowledge, backgrounds, expertise and experience. | |
| 4. During Phase 1, the tasks of a coordinated supervisory team shall be preparatory in nature and shall include the following: | |
| (a) performing the ongoing day-to-day supervision, supervisory reviews and assessments of the entities; | |
| (b) preparing and coordinating investigations, on-site inspections, supervisory inquiries, verification activities and implementation activities; | |
| (c) participating in the drafting of preparatory supervisory measures and decisions to be submitted to the Supervisory Colleges for formal adoption; | |
| (d) liaising with competent authorities and, where relevant, other Union bodies or authorities where that is necessary for the exercise of supervisory tasks; | |
| (e) ensuring the secure and timely exchange of information necessary for the performance of supervisory tasks. | |
| 5. Phase 2: Following the assessment referred to in Article 8a(8), the following entities shall transition to direct supervision by the Authority in accordance with Chapter IIa: | |
| (a) Pan-European Market Operators (PEMOs); | |
| (b) significant CCPs and significant CSDs; | |
| (c) EU groups of management companies and AIFMs with aggregate EU-wide net asset values exceeding EUR 500 billion. | |
| 6. Upon the commencement of Phase 2, the CSTs shall remain operational to assist the Authority in day-to-day supervisory tasks, crisis management and liquidity coordination with central banks, ensuring that national authorities who bear the fiscal repercussions of market failure remain integrated in the supervisory process. | |
| 7. The Authority shall be responsible for the establishment and the composition of coordinated supervisory teams. The Authority and the relevant competent authorities shall appoint one or more persons from their staff as a member or members of a coordinated supervisory team. A member may be appointed as a member of more than one coordinated supervisory team. | |
| 8. The Authority and the relevant competent authorities shall consult each other and agree on the use of staff with regard to coordinated supervisory teams, taking due account of the nature, scale, complexity and cross-border relevance of the activities of the entity concerned, the statutory responsibilities of the authorities involved and the expertise and resources available. The practical arrangements referred to in Article 8a shall specify, among others, the actual composition of the coordinated supervisory teams and the modalities for the reimbursement of any costs incurred by competent authorities in connection with their participation in coordinated supervisory teams. | |
| 9. The Authority shall develop internal operational rules and procedures regarding the composition and functioning of coordinated supervisory teams, notably with regard to staff from each competent Authority, the status of staff from competent authorities, the allocation of human resources by the Authority and by competent authorities to coordinated supervisory teams, the organisation of investigations, on-site inspections, verification activities and implementation activities, information flows, confidentiality safeguards and reporting lines. Those rules and procedures shall also define the objective criteria on the basis of which the Authority shall carry out the assessment referred to in paragraph 3. | |
| 10. The establishment and functioning of coordinated supervisory teams shall be without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the Authority for the exercise of the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation and by the legislation referred to in Article 1(2), and without prejudice to the statutory responsibilities of competent authorities under Union and national law.’; |
This amendment establishes an Integrated Hub-and-Spoke Architecture where, during Phase 1, coordinated teams perform preparatory supervisory tasks while Colleges maintain formal decision-making authority. It introduces a systemic filter for the transition to Phase 2, reserving direct ESMA supervision for entities with the most significant cross-border impact, including management groups exceeding EUR 500 billion NAV. The CSTs are maintained as a permanent infrastructure for crisis management, ensuring that national authorities who bear fiscal risks remain integrated in the supervisory process
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (7a) The following article is inserted: | |
| ‘Article 8aa | |
| Joint Supervisory Teams | |
| 1. For the supervision of each significant supervised entity falling under the direct supervision of the Authority, joint supervisory teams shall be established starting from [OP: please insert date = when the list of significant entities is published by ESMA], to facilitate the cooperation between ESMA and the national competent authorities in the exercise of the supervisory tasks. | |
| 2. Each joint supervisory team shall be composed of staff members from ESMA and from the national competent authorities, working under the coordination of a designated staff member (hereinafter the ‘JST coordinator’) and, where appropriate, one or more sub-coordinators. During the transition period referred to in Article 22g, the JST coordinator shall be a member from the national competent authority. After the expiry of that transition period, the JST coordinator shall be a staff member from ESMA. Within the JST tasks can be shared or allocated among the JST members by the JST coordinator | |
| 3. Without prejudice to other provisions of this Regulation, the tasks of a joint supervisory team shall include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) performing the supervision of the respective supervised entity; (b) planning supervisory activities, including on-site inspections; (c) participating in the preparation of draft decisions applicable to the respective supervised entity; (d) conducting on-site inspections; (f) ensuring exchange of information between ESMA and the national competent authorities. | |
| 4. The appointment of staff members from the national competent authorities to joint supervisory teams shall be made by the respective authorities. These authorities shall appoint one or more persons from their staff as a member or members of a joint supervisory team. An staff member may be appointed as a member of more than one joint supervisory team. | |
| 5. Notwithstanding paragraph 4, where ESMA is the competent authority, ESMA may require the national competent authorities to modify the appointments they have made if appropriate for the purpose of the composition of a joint supervisory team.’ | |
| (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.) |
This amendment establishes a specific legal framework governing joint supervisory teams, consistent with comparable mechanisms already provided for under other Union legal instruments (such as DORA and AMLA). Its purpose is to guarantee the durable and structured participation of national competent authorities in the ongoing supervision of entities falling within ESMA's direct supervisory remit, without prejudice to ESMA's overarching responsibility and accountability in that regard. The provision takes account of the fact that national competent authorities retain close and continuous contact with local markets, and possess extensive expertise, market insight and supervisory experience acquired over time in relation to trading venues, financial market infrastructures, intermediaries, issuers and other relevant financial market participants. Their meaningful involvement is accordingly indispensable to enhancing the overall effectiveness of supervisory activity. The newly inserted Article 8 aa operates in conjunction with Article 8a, and in particular point (g) thereof, by laying down, at Level 1, the legal foundation for the establishment of joint supervisory teams, while entrusting to the practical cooperation arrangements the task of determining the operational and organisational modalities governing their composition, functioning, coordination, investigative activities, on-site inspections, verification measures, implementation activities, information exchange, confidentiality protections and cost reimbursement. This approach serves to reinforce the quality, continuity and consistency of supervision across the Union, and to secure effective cooperation between ESMA and the relevant competent authorities, all without compromising ESMA's independence or its accountability.
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- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
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- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2026). “AMENDMENTS 201 - 410 - Draft report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, No 648/2012, No 600/2014, No 909/2014, 2015/2365, 2019/1156, 2021/23, 2022/858, 2023/1114, No 1060/2009, 2016/1011, 2017/2402, 2023/2631 and 2024/3005 as regards the further development of capital market integration and supervision within the Union”. Text, 31 July 2026. docId ECON-AM-791103. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-AM-791103 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: EP Open Data API: document record, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/api/v2/documents/ECON-AM-791103 (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-econ-am-791103,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{AMENDMENTS 201 - 410 - Draft report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, No 648/2012, No 600/2014, No 909/2014, 2015/2365, 2019/1156, 2021/23, 2022/858, 2023/1114, No 1060/2009, 2016/1011, 2017/2402, 2023/2631 and 2024/3005 as regards the further development of capital market integration and supervision within the Union}},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-07-31},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-AM-791103}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-AM-791103},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. docId ECON-AM-791103. Data: EP Open Data API: document record (CC BY 4.0)}
}