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Amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action

Document ECON-AM-755990 · COM(2023)0227 – C90135/2023 – 2023/0112(COD)

Kind
Amendment list ECON-AM-755990
Date
6 November 2023
Committee
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Dossier
2023/0112(COD)
More facts (2)
Formats
Official page PDF Word
Reference
COM(2023)0227 – C90135/2023 – 2023/0112(COD)
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Amendment 250

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) having regard to the timing, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;(b) having regard to the timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;

Or. en

Justification

The timeframe to implement alternative private measures should not be artificially limited.

Amendment 251

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) having regard to the timing, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;(b) notwithstanding point (a) of this paragraph and having regard to the timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;

Or. en

Justification

Preventive measures by an IPS have always to be considered in a holistic manner, focusing on the institution's “going concern” without taking into account the resolution strategy proposed by the resolution authority. Including the implementation of the resolution strategy as a new parameter could enforce the IPS to contribute to the strategy, falling outside its mandate.

Amendment 252

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) having regard to the timing, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;(b) having regard to the timing, and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;

Or. en

Amendment 253

Herbert Dorfmann, Othmar Karas

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) having regard to the timing, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;(b) having regard to the timing and other relevant circumstances, there is, notwithstanding point (a) of this paragraph, no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;

Or. en

Justification

Preventive measures by an IPS must always be considered in a holistic manner, focusing on the institution's ongoing viability without regard to the resolution strategy proposed by the resolution authority. Including the implementation of the resolution strategy as a new parameter could force the IPS to contribute to the strategy, which falls outside its mandate.

Amendment 254

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b a) taking into account, however, that preventive measures carried out by an IPS falling under Article 1 (2) (c) of Directive 2014/49/EU shall not lead to the determination that the credit institution is failing or likely to fail according to this Article or Article 18 (1) of Regulation (EU) 806/2014 if the provisions of Article 11 f (new) of Directive 2014/49/EU are met

Or. en

Amendment 255

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 2 – subaparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that the competent authority makes an assessment of the condition referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), after having consulted the resolution authority.Prior to determining an institution failing or likely to fail, the relevant authority referred to in point (a) of Article 32(1) shall examine whether there exist measures, including alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures, which can avoid the failing or likely to fail declaration.

Or. en

Amendment 256

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The assessment of the condition referred to in paragraph 1, point (b), shall be made by the resolution authority in close cooperation with the competent authority. The competent authority shall, without delay, provide the resolution authority with any relevant information that the resolution authority requests to inform its assessment. The competent authority may also inform the resolution authority that it considers the condition laid down in the paragraph 1, point (b), to be met.;The assessment of the conditions referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) and (b), shall only be made by the relevant authority after consulting an IPS of which the institution is a member.

Or. en

Amendment 257

Herbert Dorfmann, Othmar Karas, Markus Ferber

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The assessment of the conditions referred to in paragraph 1, points (a) and (b), shall only be made by the relevant authority after having consulted an IPS of which the institution is a member.

Or. en

Justification

Proposed changes to Art. 11 of Directive 2014/49/EU suggest that a Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) cannot take preventive actions if an institution is deemed failing or likely to fail under Art. 32 (4) BRRD. If a DGS is recognized as an IPS, this would undermine its core mission and hinder compliance with Art. 113 (7) CRR, potentially resulting in the loss of its DGS status. Thus, an institution should only be considered failing or likely to fail if an IPS did not prevent or remedy the failure. To avoid overlooking such measures, the IPS must be consulted beforehand.

Amendment 258

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point b – point -i (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(-i) in the first subparagraph, the introductory part is replaced by the following:
For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1, an institution shall be deemed to be failing or likely to fail in one or more of the following circumstances:For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1, an institution shall be deemed to be failing or likely to fail in one or more of the following circumstances and if, in the case where the institution is a member of an IPS, alternative measures by the IPS cannot prevent a likely failure, or remedy the failure of the institution that occurred, within a reasonable timeframe:

Or. en

Justification

Proposed changes to Art. 11 of Directive 2014/49/EU suggest that a DGS cannot take preventive actions if an institution is deemed failing or likely to fail under Art. 32 (4) BRRD. If a DGS is recognized as an IPS, this would undermine its core mandate and prevent compliance with Art. 113 (7) CRR, possibly resulting in the loss of its DGS status. Thus, an institution should only be considered failing or likely to fail if an IPS did not prevent or remedy the failure. To avoid overlooking such measures, the IPS must be consulted beforehand.

Amendment 259

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point b – point -i (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – points a, b, c

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(-i) in the first subparagraph, points (a), (b) and (c) are replaced by the following:
(a) the institution infringes or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the near future, infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority including but not limited to because the institution has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete all or a significant amount of its own funds;(a) the institution infringes or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the following 12 months, infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority including but not limited to because the institution has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete part or all or a significant amount of its own funds;
(b) the assets of the institution are or there are objective elements to support a determination that the assets of the institution will, in the near future, be less than its liabilities;(b) the assets of the institution are or there are objective elements to support a determination that the assets of the institution will, in the following 12 months, be less than its liabilities;
(c) the institution is or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the near future, be unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due(c) the institution is or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the following 12 months, be unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due

Or. en

Amendment 260

Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point b – point i

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 4 – point d

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(d) extraordinary public financial support is required except where such support is granted in one of the forms referred to in Article 32c;(d) extraordinary public financial support is required except where such support is granted in one of the forms referred to in Article 32c or in the form of transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership.

Or. en

Amendment 261

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 31(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, the resolution objectives referred in that Article, and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent. Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, pursuant to Articles 10(1) and 45c(2), the resolution authority, in order to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, considers the following elements:
(a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model;
(b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities;
(c) the extent to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.

Or. en

Amendment 262

Othmar Karas

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), for entities that are subject to simplified obligations in relation to recovery and resolution planning in accordance with Article 4, a resolution action shall not be treated as in the public interest, unless the resolution authority determines that its failure and subsequent winding up under normal insolvency proceedings would be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions, or on the wider economy. For entities that are not subject subject to simplified obligations in relation to recovery and resolution planning in accordance with Article 4, a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.

Or. en

Justification

The European Commission proposal widens the scope of resolution compared to the current BRRD. In order to ensure for the necessary degree of proportionality, this amendment aims to assume negative public interest assessments by default for entities that are subject to simplified obligations. However, where the Resolution Authority sees far-reaching risks, the assessment could also be turned positive.

Amendment 263

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent.
For entities designated as significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Regulation 1024/2013 there shall be a presumption that winding up under insolvency procedures would not meet the resolution objectives to the same extent.

Or. en

Justification

Resolution measures should only be applied where insolvency proceedings are less effective.

Amendment 264

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 considered from an holistic perspective and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent.

Or. en

Amendment 265

Herbert Dorfmann, Othmar Karas

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent.

Or. en

Amendment 266

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to Article 31(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent.

Or. en

Amendment 267

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent.

Or. en

Amendment 268

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 –subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same degree.

Or. en

Justification

This seems to be an arbitrary from a legal point of view, which a legislator has to consider.

Amendment 269

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Resolution action shall be presumed not to be in the public interest for the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), of this Article where the institution qualifies as a small and non-complex institution as defined in Article 4(1), point 145, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In case the resolution authority assesses that one or more of those resolution objectives would be at risk, the presumption shall not apply.

Or. en

Justification

In order to increase predictibility in the framework, there should be a presumption of negative PIA for small and non complex institutions, and of positive PIA for large institutions. As long as there is leeway left to national resolution authorities to perform the public interest assessment, there could remain diverging practices across jurisdictions, that could eventually affect the level playing field and the predictability of the framework. It is therefore suggested to include a requirement for resolution authorities to justify the outcome of the PIA against each of the resolution objectives as part of the resolution plan, in addition to an RTS to increase harmonization in the application of the PIA. Additionnally, in order to foster convergence and a better understanding of national practices, an EBA report on NRA practices as regards the PIA is proposed at a later stage.

Amendment 270

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1b (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Resolution action shall be presumed to be in the public interest for the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), of this Article where the institution qualifies as a large institution as defined in Article 4(1), point (146) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In case the resolution authority assesses that no resolution objective would be at risk, the presumption shall not apply.

Or. en

Justification

In order to increase predictibility in the framework, there should be a presumption of negative PIA for small and non complex institutions, and of positive PIA for large institutions. As long as there is leeway left to national resolution authorities to perform the public interest assessment, there could remain diverging practices across jurisdictions, that could eventually affect the level playing field and the predictability of the framework. It is therefore suggested to include a requirement for resolution authorities to justify the outcome of the PIA against each of the resolution objectives as part of the resolution plan, in addition to an RTS to increase harmonization in the application of the PIA. Additionnally, in order to foster convergence and a better understanding of national practices, an EBA report on NRA practices as regards the PIA is proposed at a later stage.

Amendment 271

Herbert Dorfmann, Othmar Karas, Markus Ferber

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;deleted

Or. en

Amendment 272

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;deleted

Or. en

Justification

Only considering extraordinary public financial support does not take into account higher costs associated with the planning of the resolution mechanism and casts a distorted light on liquidation in insolvency. Cost aspects should not be part of the PIA.

Amendment 273

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law. If liquidation aid is expected to be granted in winding up the institution according to the national law, the resolution action shall be assessed to be in the public interest.

Or. en

Amendment 274

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, pursuant to Article 10(1) and 45c(2), the resolution authority, in order to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, consider the following elements:
(a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model;
(b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities;
(c) the extent to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.

Or. en

Amendment 275

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law, including costs related to the reimbursement of depositors, where applicable.;

Or. en

Amendment 276

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;

Or. en

Amendment 277

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;

Or. en

Amendment 278

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Moreover, in the resolution plan, the resolution authority shall include its reasoning as regards the procedure best achieving resolution objectives for each of the resolution objectives laid down in Article 31.
In order to ensure effective and consistent application of this Article, the EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards.
The EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by …[OP – please insert the date= 12 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive].
Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
By [48 months after the entry into force of this directive], the EBA shall publish a report of the practices of resolution authorities as regards the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph. ’;

Or. en

Justification

In order to increase predictibility in the framework, there should be a presumption of negative PIA for small and non complex institutions, and of positive PIA for large institutions. As long as there is leeway left to national resolution authorities to perform the public interest assessment, there could remain diverging practices across jurisdictions, that could eventually affect the level playing field and the predictability of the framework. It is therefore suggested to include a requirement for resolution authorities to justify the outcome of the PIA against each of the resolution objectives as part of the resolution plan, in addition to an RTS to increase harmonization in the application of the PIA. Additionnally, in order to foster convergence and a better understanding of national practices, an EBA report on NRA practices as regards the PIA is proposed at a later stage.

Amendment 279

Herbert Dorfmann, Othmar Karas, Markus Ferber

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
An institution’s membership in an IPS shall, in general, be considered as a sufficient guarantee of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31.

Or. en

Justification

An extension of the resolution mechanism to institutions which are members to an IPS is not necessary as preventive measures by an IPS are usually the best way to prevent failure or to handle the unlikely event of an indeed occurring failure, this way safeguarding the resolution objectives to a sufficient extent.

Amendment 280

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
5 a. EBA shall contribute to monitoring and promoting the effective and consistent application of the public interest assessment referred to in paragraph 5.
By ... [three years after the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], EBA shall provide a report on the scope and application of paragraph 5 across the Union. That report shall be shared with the Commission in order to assess the effectiveness of the measures outlined in paragraph 5 and their impact on the level playing field.
Based on the outcomes of the review, proposals or guidelines may be developed with the aim of converging practices and levelling the playing field among Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 281

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
5 a. By ... [three years after the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], EBA shall provide a report on the scope and application of paragraph 5 across the Union. That report shall be shared with the Commission in order to assess the effectiveness of the measures outlined in paragraph 5 and their impact on the level playing field.
Based on the outcomes of the review, proposals or guidelines may be developed with the aim of enhancing market efficiency and levelling the playing field among Member States.”

Or. en

Amendment 282

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32 – paragraph 5 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(c a) The following paragraph 5a is added:
5a. EBA shall contribute to monitoring and promoting the effective and consistent application of the public interest assessment referred to in paragraph 5.
By ... [two years after the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], EBA shall publish a report on the scope and application of paragraph 5 across the Union in order to assess the effectiveness of the measures outlined in paragraph 5 and their impact on the level playing field.
Based on the outcomes of the review, the EBA may develop draft regulatory technical standards with the aim of converging practices and levelling the playing field among Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 283

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32a – title

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Conditions for resolution with regard to a central body and credit institutions permanently affiliated to a central bodyConditions for resolution with regard to a central body and permanent affiliates to a central body

Or. en

Justification

The solidarity mechanism among a central body and its affiliates ensures that losses of one or more affiliates will be shared among all affiliates, leading them all to be FOLTF. Thus, it is important to clarify that FOLTF assessment in relation to a central body and its affiliates should not be done on an entity-by-entity basis, but on the whole affiliation perimeter given the solidarity mechanism. This is important to ensure that the resolution authorities can effectively use the power described in this article. It must also be ensured that resolution authorities can take resolution action in relation to a central body and all kind of affiliated entities and institutions that are part of resolution group (and not only in relation to credit institutions affiliated to a central body).

Amendment 284

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32a – paragraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities may take a resolution action in relation to a central body and all credit institutions permanently affiliated to it that are part of the same resolution group where the central body and all credit institutions permanently affiliated to it, or the resolution group to which they belong, comply as a whole with the conditions established in Article 32(1).When a resolution action is deemed necessary in the public interest, Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities shall take a resolution action in relation to a central body and all permanent affiliates to it that are part of the same resolution group where the central body and all permanent affiliates to it, or the resolution group to which they belong, comply as a whole with the conditions established in Article 32(1). The assessment of the conditions refered to in Article 32(1) shall be made exclusively for the central body and its permanent affiliates as a whole.

Or. en

Justification

The solidarity mechanism among a central body and its affiliates ensures that losses of one or more affiliates will be shared among all affiliates, leading them all to be FOLTF. Thus, it is important to clarify that FOLTF assessment in relation to a central body and its affiliates should not be done on an entity-by-entity basis, but on the whole affiliation perimeter given the solidarity mechanism. This is important to ensure that the resolution authorities can effectively use the power described in this article. It must also be ensured that resolution authorities can take resolution action in relation to a central body and all kind of affiliated entities and institutions that are part of resolution group (and not only in relation to credit institutions affiliated to a central body).

Amendment 285

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32b – paragraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that, when a resolution authority determines that an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), meets the conditions laid down in Article 32(1), points (a) and (b), but not the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (c), the relevant national administrative or judicial authority has the power to initiate without delay the procedure to wind up the institution or entity in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law.1. Member States shall ensure that, when a resolution authority determines that an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), meets the conditions laid down in Article 32(1), points (a) and (b), but not the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (c), the relevant national administrative or judicial authority has the power to initiate without delay the procedure to wind up the institution or entity in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law. The EBA shall issue guidelines clarifying the conditions associated with that orderly manner.

Or. en

Amendment 286

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32b – paragraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
3. Member States shall ensure that when a resolution authority determines that an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), meets the conditions in Article 32(1), points (a) and (b), but not the condition in Article 32(1), point (c), the determination that the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail pursuant to Article 32(1), point (a) is a condition for the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority pursuant to Article 18 of Directive 2013/36/EU.3. Member States shall ensure that when a resolution authority determines that an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), meets the conditions in Article 32(1), points (a) and (b), but not the condition in Article 32(1), point (c), the determination that the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail pursuant to Article 32(1), point (a) is a sufficient condition for the competent authority to withdraw the authoritsation pursuant to Article 18 of Directive 2013/36/EU.

Or. en

Amendment 287

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32b – paragraph 4

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
4. Member States shall ensure that the withdrawal of the authorisation of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) is a sufficient condition for a relevant national administrative or judicial authority to be able to initiate without delay the procedure to wind up the institution or entity in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law.’:4. Member States shall ensure that the withdrawal of the authorisation of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) declared when the conditions mentioned in paragraph 3 are met is a sufficient condition for a relevant national administrative or judicial authority to be able to initiate without delay the procedure to wind up the institution or entity in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law. ’:

Or. en

Amendment 288

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32b – paragraph 4

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
4. Member States shall ensure that the withdrawal of the authorisation of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) is a sufficient condition for a relevant national administrative or judicial authority to be able to initiate without delay the procedure to wind up the institution or entity in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law.’:4. Member States shall ensure that the withdrawal of the authorisation of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) is a sufficient condition for a relevant national administrative or judicial authority to initiate without delay the procedure to wind up the institution or entity in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law.’:

Or. en

Amendment 289

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – title

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Extraordinary public financial supportExtraordinary financial support

Or. en

Amendment 290

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – title

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Extraordinary public financial supportPublic financial support

Or. en

Amendment 291

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – title

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Extraordinary public financial supportPublic financial support

Or. en

Amendment 292

Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:1. Before granting public financial support, Member States shall consider transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership. If the Member State decides to grant public financial support instead of transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership, it shall provide for a public statement in writing and before the national parliament explaining the reasons for its decision.
Member States shall ensure that extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis:

Or. en

Amendment 293

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:1. Member States shall ensure that public financial support outside of resolution action or of the winding-up according to the applicable procedures may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), only in one of the following cases and provided that the public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:

Or. en

Amendment 294

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:1. Member States shall ensure that public financial support outside of resolution action or the winding up according to the applicable procedures may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), only in one of the following cases and provided that the public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:

Or. en

Amendment 295

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:1. Member States shall ensure that extraordinary financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:

Or. en

Amendment 296

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:deleted
(i) a State guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks in accordance with the central banks’ conditions;
(ii) a State guarantee of newly issued liabilities;
(iii) an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neither the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a), (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted;

Or. en

Amendment 297

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:(a) where, to remedy a very large scale disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability where that is negatively affected by systemic events of a large scale, the public financial support takes any of the following extraordinary forms:

Or. en

Amendment 298

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the public financial support takes any of the following extraordinary support measures:

Or. en

Amendment 299

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:

Or. en

Amendment 300

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(iii) an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neither the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a), (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted;(iii) an acquisition of own funds instruments or a use of impaired assets measures provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a), (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted;

Or. en

Amendment 301

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;Deleted

Or. en

Justification

DGS funds are privately collected. Therefore, their use should not be subject to state-aid control.

Amendment 302

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;(b) where an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to maintain the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution constitutes extraordinary public financial support in compliance with the conditions set out in the Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that
(i) subject to the cases referred to in point (ii), none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;
(ii) in case of a deposit guarantee scheme which is acknowledged as institutional protection scheme, the resolution authority has not taken any resolution action under Article 32;

Or. en

Justification

In line with our proposed amendments to Art. 11 et seq. of the draft DGSD, Deposit Guarantee Schemes that are also recognised as Institutional Protection Schemes shall remain able to act in case that the institution is failing or likely to fail. Accordingly, the references here to Art. 11 ff. DGSD and the rendition of Art. 11 (3) DGSD, according to which preventive measures may only be carried out before a FOLF status, must be adjusted. These amendments are required to maintain the mission and functioning of institutional protection schemes. The suggested wording of point (b) can be misunderstood to mean that in the future all preventive measures, including those of private deposit guarantee schemes, are to constitute state aid. This should be clarified.

Amendment 303

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;(b) where the public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;

Or. en

Amendment 304

Herbert Dorfmann, Othmar Karas

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;(b) where an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution constitutes extraordinary public financial support in compliance with the conditions set out in Directive 2014/49/EU:

Or. en

Justification

The suggested wording of point (b) can be misunderstood to mean that in the future all preventive measures, including those of private deposit guarantee schemes, are to constitute state aid. Since such a comprehensive change of the legal situation is not intended, the wording should be made clearer, and it should be specified that it only applies if the conditions of state aid are fulfilled. Moreover, in line with our proposed amendments to Art. 11 et seq. of the draft DGSD, Deposit Guarantee Schemes that are also recognised as Institutional Protection Schemes shall remain able to act in case that the institution is failing or likely to fail. Accordingly, the references here to Art. 11 ff. DGSD and the rendition of Art. 11 (3) DGSD, according to which preventive measures may only be carried out before a FOLF status, must be adjusted. These amendments are essential to maintain the mission and functioning of institutional protection schemes.

Amendment 305

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;

Or. en

Amendment 306

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;(b) where the public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;

Or. en

Amendment 307

Herbert Dorfmann, Othmar Karas, Markus Ferber

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b a) subject to the cases referred to under point (bb), none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;

Or. en

Amendment 308

Herbert Dorfmann, Othmar Karas, Markus Ferber

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b b) in case of a deposit guarantee scheme which is acknowledged as IPS, the resolution authority has not taken any resolution action under Article 32;

Or. en

Amendment 309

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point c

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(c) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an institution pursuant to Article 32b and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;(c) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of a credit institution pursuant to Article 32b and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;

Or. en

Amendment 310

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point c

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(c) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an institution pursuant to Article 32b and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;(c) where the public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an institution pursuant to Article 32b and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;

Or. en

Amendment 311

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point c

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(c) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an institution pursuant to Article 32b and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;(c) where the public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an institution pursuant to Article 32b and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;

Or. en

Amendment 312

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point d

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(d) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU granted in the context of the winding up of the institution or entity pursuant to Article 32b of this Directive, other than the support granted by a deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU.deleted

Or. en

Amendment 313

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point d

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(d) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU granted in the context of the winding up of the institution or entity pursuant to Article 32b of this Directive, other than the support granted by a deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU.(d) where the extraordinary public financial support in response to a large-scale systemic threat to financial stability, whether ongoing or potential, takes the form of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU granted in the context of the winding up of the institution or entity pursuant to Article 32b of this Directive, other than the support granted by a deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU.

Or. en

Amendment 314

Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:Member States shall ensure that the support measures for the institution concerned are conditional on behavioural or structural measures that promote the public interest, including the reduction of risks associated with the complexity, interconnectedness and size of institutions in the banking sector. In addition, the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

Or. en

Amendment 315

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, points (a) and (b), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

Or. en

Justification

Preventive forms of support should be treated on an equal footing to preserve the level playing field, whether they come from public funds or from a private DGS. In precautionary recapitalisation, it is important to make sure the most appropriate valuation is used.

Amendment 316

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (b) shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

Or. en

Amendment 317

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the competent authority, including a clearly specified termination date, sale date or repayment schedule for any of the measures provided;(b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the competent authority;

Or. en

Amendment 318

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future.(d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur in the following 12 months.

Or. en

Amendment 319

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
By way of derogation from paragraph 2, point (d), the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) can be used to offset losses that the institution or entity is likely to incur in the near future where an exception to the burden-sharing requirement is made under Union State aid framework.

Or. en

Amendment 320

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an institution or entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the competent authority has concluded that no breach has occurred, or is likely to occur in the 12 following months, of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under Union or national law.For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an institution or entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the competent authority has concluded that no breach has occurred of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under Union or national law. The competent authority may deem an institution or entity to be solvent where it determines that a breach of these requirements is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the institution or entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan to remedy the breach within an appropriate timeframe as determined by the competent authority.

Or. en

Amendment 321

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an institution or entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the competent authority has concluded that no breach has occurred, or is likely to occur in the 12 following months, of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under Union or national law.For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an institution or entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the competent authority has concluded that no breach has occurred of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under Union or national law.

Or. en

Amendment 322

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Irene Tinagli, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The competent authority may deem an institution or entity to be solvent where it determines that a breach of these requirements is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the institution or entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan to remedy the breach within an appropriate timeframe as determined by the competent authority.

Or. en

Amendment 323

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The competent authority should make its best efforts to ensure that the quantification is based on the market value of the institution or entity’s assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items.

Or. en

Amendment 324

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on the institution or entity’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor, and, where available, on asset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections conducted by the competent authority.For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on asset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections conducted by the competent authority. Where such exercises cannot be undertaken in due time, the competent authority can base its evaluation on the institution or entity’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor. The competent authority should make its best efforts to ensure that the quantification is based on the market value of the institution or entity’s assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items.

Or. en

Justification

Preventive forms of support should be treated on an equal footing to preserve the level playing field, whether they come from public funds or from a private DGS. In precautionary recapitalisation, it is important to make sure the most appropriate valuation is used.

Amendment 325

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on the institution or entity’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor, and, where available, on asset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections conducted by the competent authority.For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum on asset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections conducted by the competent authority. Where such exercises cannot be undertaken in due time, the competent authority can base its evaluation on the institution or entity’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor.

Or. en

Amendment 326

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), shall be limited to measures that have been assessed by the competent authority as necessary to maintain the solvency of the institution or entity by addressing its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario of national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests or equivalent exercises conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, where applicable, confirmed by the competent authority.Support meausures may involve an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neither the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a), (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted;
The support shall be limited to measures that have been assessed by the competent authority as necessary to maintain the solvency of the institution or entity by addressing its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario of national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests or equivalent exercises conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, where applicable, confirmed by the competent authority. Such support shall not be used to address a capital shortfall established in the baseline scenario of national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests or equivalent exercises conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities.

Or. en

Amendment 327

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be exceptionally permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.Acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise.

Or. en

Amendment 328

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be exceptionally permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise.

Or. en

Amendment 329

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be exceptionally permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.By way of derogation from the fourth subparagraph, acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be exceptionally permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Or. en

Amendment 330

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.deleted

Or. en

Amendment 331

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Irene Tinagli, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall request the institution or entity to submit a remediation plan describing the steps to be taken in order to ensure or restore compliance with supervisory requirements, its long-term viability and to repay the amount provided, as well as the associated timeframe.

Or. en

Amendment 332

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) and (b), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.

Or. en

Justification

Preventive forms of support should be treated on an equal footing to preserve the level playing field, whether they come from public funds or from a private DGS.In precautionary recapitalisation, it is important to make sure the most appropriate valuation is used.

Amendment 333

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.

Or. en

Amendment 334

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Irene Tinagli, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Where the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 32.

Or. en

Amendment 335

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 33 – paragraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(20) in Article 33, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:deleted
‘
2.
Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities take a resolution action in relation to an entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (c) or (d), when that entity meets the conditions laid down in Article 32(1).
For those purposes, an entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (c) or (d), shall be deemed to be failing or likely to fail in any of the following circumstances:
(a) the entity meets one or more of the conditions laid down in Article 32(4), points (b), (c) or (d);
(b) the entity infringes materially or there are objective elements that show that the entity will, in the near future, infringe materially the applicable requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or in Directive 2013/36/EU.;
’

Or. en

Amendment 336

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 33a – paragraph 4

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(-a) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:
The period of the suspension pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be as short as possible and shall not exceed the minimum period of time that the resolution authority considers necessary for the purposes indicated in points (c) and (d) of paragraph 1 and in any event shall not last longer than the period from the publication of a notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 to midnight in the Member State of the resolution authority of the institution or entity at the end of the business day following the day of the publication. At the expiry of the period of suspension referred to in the first subparagraph, the suspension shall cease to have effect."The period of the suspension pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be as short as possible and shall not exceed the minimum period of time that the resolution authority considers necessary for the purposes indicated in points (c) and (d) of paragraph 1 and in any event shall not last longer than:
(a) where the notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 is published outside of normal trading hours, the period from the publication of the notice to midnight in the Member State of the institution or entity at the end of the second business day following the day of the publication;
(b) where the notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 is published on a business day during normal trading hours, the period from the publication of the notice to midnight in the Member State of the institution or entity at the end of the business day following the day of the publication.
Exceptionally, where necessary to choose the appropriate resolution actions or to ensure the effective application of one or more resolution tools, the resolution authority may determine a longer period of suspension.
In any event, this period of suspension shall not last longer than the period from the publication of the notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 to midnight in the Member State of the institution or entity at the end of the third business day following the day of the publication.
At the expiry of the period of suspension referred to in the first subparagraph, the suspension shall cease to have effect.
"

Or. en

(Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 337

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 35

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(22) Article 35 is amended as follows:deleted
(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
‘
1.
Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities may appoint a special manager to replace or to work with the management body of the institution under resolution or the bridge institution. Resolution authorities shall make public the appointment of a special manager. Resolution authorities shall ensure that the special manager has the qualifications, ability and knowledge required to carry out his or her functions.
Article 91 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall not apply to the appointment of special managers.;
’
(b) in paragraph 2, the first sentence is replaced by the following:
‘
The special manager shall have all the powers of the shareholders and the management body of the institution under resolution or the bridge institution.;
’
(c) paragraph 5 is replaced by the following:
‘
5. Member States shall require that a special manager draw up reports for the appointing resolution authority on the economic and financial situation of the institution under resolution or the bridge institution and on the acts performed in the conduct of his or her duties, at regular intervals set by the resolution authority and at the beginning and the end of his or her mandate.;
’

Or. en

Amendment 338

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 35 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The special manager shall have all the powers of the shareholders and the management body of the institution under resolution or the bridge institution.;Unless a requirement of prior consent is clearly stipulated by the relevant resolution authority, the special manager shall have all the powers of the shareholders and the management body of the institution under resolution or the bridge institution.;

Or. en

Amendment 339

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 35 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b a) the following subparagraph is added at the end of paragraph 3:
Member States shall ensure that the liability of the special manager for acts or omissions in the performance of his or her duties in accordance with this Article is limited to cases of wilful misconduct or gross negligence.

Or. en

Amendment 340

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 36 – paragraph 1 – sentence 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Before determining whether the conditions for resolution or the conditions for the write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59 are met, resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), is carried out by a person that is independent from any public authority, including the resolution authority, and the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d).;1. Before taking resolution action or exercising the power to write down or convert relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities in accordance with Article 59, resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), is carried out by a person that is independent from any public authority, including the resolution authority, and the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d).

Or. en

Justification

According to the current version of Art. 36 (1), the resolution authority shall only obtain a valuation of the assets and liabilities by a third party if a write-down of capital instruments or a resolution takes place. Now, the valuation is to be obtained before it is determined that the conditions for resolution or write-down exist. It is therefore possible for the authority to obtain a valuation even though the corresponding measures are not subsequently taken because the conditions are not met. It is not clear why the timing of the assessment is brought forward. The burdens that regularly accompany such an assessment therefore do not appear to be justified at this stage yet.

Amendment 341

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 36 – paragraph 1 – sentence 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Before determining whether the conditions for resolution or the conditions for the write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59 are met, resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), is carried out by a person that is independent from any public authority, including the resolution authority, and the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d).;1. Before taking resolution action or exercising the power to write down or convert relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities in accordance with Article 59, resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), is carried out by a person that is independent from any public authority, including the resolution authority, and the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d).;

Or. en

Justification

The valuation exercise is only relevant when resolution action is imminent.

Amendment 342

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point b a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 36 – paragraph 13a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b a) The following paragraph 13a is inserted:
'13a. The independent valuer shall have no duty or responsibility to shareholders or creditors of the institution under resolution and shall have no liability to such shareholders or creditors for acts and omissions when carrying out the valuation, unless the act or omission implies gross negligence or wilful misconduct in accordance with national law which directly affects rights of such shareholders or creditors.'

Or. en

Amendment 343

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 37 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(23 a) in Article 37(4), the following subparagraph is added:
‘The resolution plan shall consider the combination of resolution tools which is the best suited to achieve resolution objectives.’

Or. en

Justification

This amendment aims at incentivizing resolution authorities to consider the use of several resolution tools together as part of the preferred resolution strategy, for transfer tools can usefully complement bail-in in order to better achieve resolution objectives while minimizing the destruction of value.

Amendment 344

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 37 – paragraph 11

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(24) in Article 37, the following paragraph 11 is added:deleted
‘
11.
EBA shall monitor the actions and preparation of resolution authorities to ensure an effective implementation of the resolution tools and powers in the event of resolution. EBA shall report to the Commission on the state of play of existing practices and possible divergences across Member States by … [PO please insert the date = 2 years after the date of entry into force of this Directive] and monitor the implementation of any recommendation set out in that report, where appropriate.
The report referred to in the first subparagraph shall cover at least the following:
(a) the arrangements in place to implement the bail-in tool and the level of engagement with financial market infrastructures and third-country authorities, where relevant;
(b) the arrangements in place to operationalise the use of other resolution tools;
(c) the level of transparency towards relevant stakeholders regarding the arrangements referred to in points (a) and (b).;
’

Or. en

Amendment 345

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 25 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 41 – paragraph 2

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(25 a) Article 41(2) is replaced by the following:
Subject to any restrictions imposed in accordance with Union or national competition rules, the management of the bridge institution shall operate the bridge institution with a view to maintaining access to critical functions and selling the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), its assets, rights or liabilities, to one or more private sector purchasers when conditions are appropriate and within the period specified in paragraph 4 of this Article or, where applicable, paragraph 6 of this Article."Subject to any restrictions imposed in accordance with Union or national competition rules, the management of the bridge institution shall operate the bridge institution with a view to maintaining access to critical functions and allowing the resolution authority to seek the sale of the bridge institution, its assets, rights or liabilities, to one or more private sector purchasers when conditions are appropriate and within the period specified in paragraph 5 of this Article or, where applicable, paragraph 6 of this Article.
"

Or. en

(Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 346

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant;(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1);

Or. en

Amendment 347

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant;(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1);

Or. en

Justification

Follow-up amendment relating to changes in Article 109, see below.

Amendment 348

Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant;(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1);

Or. en

Amendment 349

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant;(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1) where relevant;

Or. en

Amendment 350

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant;(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where applicable;

Or. en

Justification

Depending on the form of the bridge that will be agreed, this article needs to acknowledge that the bridge will be subject to certain conditions.

Amendment 351

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 44 – paragraph 7

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(c) paragraph 7 is replaced by the following:deleted
‘
7.
The resolution financing arrangement may make a contribution from resources which have been raised through ex-ante contributions as referred to in Article 100(6) and Article 103 and which have not yet been used, provided that all of the following conditions are met:
(a) the resolution financing arrangement has made a contribution pursuant to paragraph 4 and the 5 % limit referred to in paragraph 5, point (b), has been reached;
(b) all liabilities ranking lower than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2) and 44(3), have been written down or converted in full.
In extraordinary circumstances, as an alternative or in addition to the contribution from the resolution financing arrangement referred to in the first subparagraph, where the conditions laid down in the first subparagraph are met, the resolution authority may seek further funding from alternative financing sources.;
’

Or. en

Justification

This is further increasing potential costs for RF outside of exceptionnal circumstances. This is not needed to make the bridge work.This is not in line with depositor hierarchy in case single tier is not maintained.

Amendment 352

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 44 – paragraph 7 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) all liabilities ranking lower than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2) and 44(3), have been written down or converted in full.(b) all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities other than deposits have been written down or converted in full.

Or. en

Amendment 353

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 44 – paragraph 7 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) all liabilities ranking lower than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2) and 44(3), have been written down or converted in full.(b) all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities other than deposits, have been written down or converted in full.

Or. en

Amendment 354

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 28 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 44a

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(28 a) Article 44a is replaced by the following:
Article 44a"Article 44a
Selling of subordinated eligible liabilities to retail clientsSelling of MREL eligible instruments to retail clients
1. Member States shall ensure that a seller of eligible liabilities which meet all conditions referred to in Article 72a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 except for point (b) of Article 72a(1) and paragraphs 3 to 5 of Article 72b of that Regulation sells such liabilities to a retail client, as defined in point 11 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, only where all of the following conditions are fulfilled:1. Member States shall ensure that a seller of MREL eligible instruments qualifying as own funds or eligible liabilities sells such instruments to a retail client, as defined in point 11 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, only where all of the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) the seller has performed a suitability test in accordance with Article 25(2) of Directive 2014/65/EU;(a) the seller has performed a suitability test in accordance with Article 25(2) of Directive 2014/65/EU;
(b) the seller is satisfied, on the basis of the test referred to in point (a), that such eligible liabilities are suitable for that retail client;(b) the seller is satisfied, on the basis of the test referred to in point (a), that such instruments are suitable for that retail client;
(c) the seller documents the suitability in accordance with Article 25(6) of Directive 2014/65/EU.Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, Member States may provide that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (c) of that subparagraph shall apply to sellers of other instruments qualifying as own funds or bail-inable liabilities.(c) the seller documents the suitability in accordance with Article 25(6) of Directive 2014/65/EU. Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, Member States may provide that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (c) of that subparagraph shall apply to sellers of other instruments qualifying as bail-inable liabilities.
Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, Member States may provide that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (c) of that subparagraph shall apply to sellers of other instruments qualifying as bail-inable liabilities.
2. Where the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are fulfilled and the financial instrument portfolio of that retail client does not, at the time of the purchase, exceed EUR 500 000 the seller shall ensure, on the basis of the information provided by the retail client in accordance with paragraph 3, that both of the following conditions are met at the time of the purchase:2. Where the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are fulfilled and the financial instrument portfolio of that retail client does not, at the time of the purchase, exceed EUR 500 000 the seller shall ensure, on the basis of the information provided by the retail client in accordance with paragraph 3, that the initial investment amount invested in one or more instruments referred to in paragraph 1 is at least EUR 50 000.
(a) the retail client does not invest an aggregate amount exceeding 10 % of that client's financial instrument portfolio in liabilities referred to in paragraph 1;
(b) that initial investment amount invested in one or more liabilities instruments referred to in paragraph 1 is at least EUR 10 000 .
3. The retail client shall provide the seller with accurate information on the retail client's financial instrument portfolio, including any investments in liabilities referred to in paragraph 1.3. The retail client shall provide the seller with accurate information on the retail client's financial instrument portfolio, including any investments in instruments referred to in paragraph 1.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the retail client's financial instrument portfolio shall include cash deposits and financial instruments, but shall exclude any financial instruments that have been given as collateral.4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the retail client's financial instrument portfolio shall include cash deposits and financial instruments, but shall exclude any financial instruments that have been given as collateral.
5. Without prejudice to Article 25 of Directive 2014/65/EU, and by way of derogation from the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article, Member States may set a minimum denomination amount of at least EUR 50 000 for liabilities referred to in paragraph 1, taking into account the market conditions and practices of that Member State as well as existing consumer protection measures within the jurisdiction of that Member State.
6. Where the value of total assets of entities referred to in Article 1(1) that are established in a Member State and are subject to the requirement referred to in Article 45e does not exceed EUR 50 billion, that Member State may, by way of derogation from the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 5 of this Article, apply only the requirement set out in paragraph 2(b) of this Article.
7. Member States shall not be required to apply this Article to liabilities referred to in paragraph 1 issued before 28 December 2020.7. Member States shall not be required to apply this Article to liabilities referred to in paragraph 1 issued before 28 December 2020.
7a. MREL eligible instruments sold without fulfilling the conditions under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not count towards the requirements under Articles 45 to 45f of this Directive.
7b. Resolution authorities shall, as part of the assessment of resolvability in accordance with Articles 15 to 18 monitor the extent to which MREL eligible instruments are held by retail investors and report the results to EBA at least once per year.
7c. EBA shall disclose annually on a group or, where relevant, institution specific basis the amounts of MREL eligible instruments held by retail investors.
Where, on the basis of this information, EBA deems it necessary, it shall issue warnings or recommendations for remedial action.
7d. By … [PO please insert the date = 18 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive], EBA shall report to the Commission on the application of this Article. That report shall compare the measures adopted by the Member States to comply with this Article, analyse their effectiveness in protecting retail investors and assess their impact on cross-border operations.
On the basis of that report, the Commission may submit a legislative proposal to amend this Directive
"

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)

Amendment 355

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45 – paragraph 1a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(29a) in Article 45, the following paragraph 1a is inserted:
1a. Within a resolution group, subsidiaries that are institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) but are not resolution entities, whose total assets do not exceed EUR 5 billion and that do not reach a 2% threshold of the resolution group’s total risk exposure amount, or leverage exposure, shall not be subject to the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Or. en

Justification

A materiality threshold for consideration of iMREL decisions for subsidiaries within resolution groups should be introduced in the level 1 text, that will serve as a floor to the MREL policy of the resolution authorities. The current MREL policy threshold should be used to calibrate this floor in the level 1 text.

Amendment 356

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(29 a) in Article 45, the following paragraph 1a is inserted:
The calculation of the minimum requirement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 12 (4) of Regulation (EU) 806/2014 shall, in case of institutions operating promotional loans, exclude the liabilities of the intermediary institution towards the originating or another promotional bank or another intermediary institution and the liabilities of the original promotional bank towards its funding parties in so far as the amount of these liabilities is matched by the promotional loans of that institution.

Or. en

(see wording of Article 5 paragraph 1 point f of Regulation (EU) 2015/63)

Amendment 357

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45a

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(29 a) Article 45a is replaced by the following:
Article 45a"Article 45a
Exemption from the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilitiesExemption from the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
1. Notwithstanding Article 45, resolution authorities shall exempt from the requirement laid down in Article 45(1) mortgage credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law, provided that all of the following conditions are met:Notwithstanding Article 45, resolution authorities shall exempt credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law from the requirement laid down in Article 45(1).
(a) those institutions will be wound up in national insolvency proceedings, or in other types of proceedings laid down for those institutions and implemented in accordance with Article 38, 40 or 42; and"
(b) the proceedings referred to in point (a), ensure that creditors of those institutions, including holders of covered bonds, where relevant, bear losses in a way that meets the resolution objectives.
2. Institutions exempted from the requirement laid down in Article 45(1) shall not be part of the consolidation referred to in Article 45e(1).

Or. en

(DIRECTIVE 2014/59/EU)

Justification

Article 45a(2) currently provides that credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law are exempted from MREL providing that (i) they would be wound up under NIPs or transfer measures in case of failure and (ii) NIP (or equivalent) for these institutions ensure that resolution objectives are met. In this case, these institutions shall not be part of the consolidation referred to in Article 45e(1).These provisions should be improved in order to better take into account that such institutions are structurally designed to mainly issue covered bonds, and not MREL eligible liabilities.The specific guarantees of holders of covered bonds ensure they would not bear losses in NIPs or in resolution (see Directive (EU) 2019/2162). Therefore, credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law do not need an additional loss-absorption capacity based on MREL and should be per se exempted of MREL.In addition, the exclusion of the consolidation perimeter has resulted in unforeseen consequences. In some cases, this exclusion leads to an unwarranted increase of the TREA used in the calculation of the group’s external MREL (and thus an increase in external MREL). Credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law are simply pass-through vehicles and their deconsolidation should not result in a increase of risks.

Amendment 358

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(-a) the second subparagraph of paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:
" Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures, the resolution authority limits the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) for that entity, so that it does not exceed an amount sufficient to absorb losses in accordance with point (a) of the first subparagraph, except in extraordinary cases of the need for additional buffer. The buffer in any case shall be lower than the recapitalisation amount as referred to in paragraph 3."

Or. en

Amendment 359

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 5

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(-a) in paragraph 3, the fifth subparagraph is replaced by the following :
When setting the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs, the resolution authority shall:"When setting the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs, the resolution authority shall:
(a) use the most recently reported values for the relevant total risk exposure amount or total exposure measure, adjusted for any changes resulting from resolution actions set out in the resolution plan; and(a) use the most recently reported values for the relevant total risk exposure amount or total exposure measure, adjusted for any changes resulting from resolution actions set out in the resolution plan, including the reduced size and risk profile of the resolution group resulting from resolution, in particular when the preferred resolution strategy includes the use of resolution tools referred to in Article 37(3), points (a), (b) or (c), as well as for any changes resulting from the recovery options included in the recovery plan that are expected to be implemented by the time of resolution or shortly thereafter;
(b) after consulting the competent authority, adjust the amount corresponding to the current requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU downwards or upwards to determine the requirement that is to apply to the resolution entity after the implementation of the preferred resolution strategy.(b) after consulting the competent authority, adjust the amount corresponding to the current requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU downwards to determine the requirement that is to apply to the resolution entity after the implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, taking into account changes referred to in point (a) of this subparagraph;
(b a) after consulting the competent authority, for resolution entities subject to the requirement of Article 131 of Directive 2013/36/EU, adjust the combined buffer requirement applicable to the resolution group, taking into account the changes referred to in point (a) of this subparagraph. .
"

Or. en

(Directive 2014/59/EU)

Justification

Concerns paragraph 3 subparaphs 5&6 :The current Article 45c(3) is focused on setting the appropriate level of the MREL with the assumption of the bail-in tool as the preferred resolution strategy. On the other hand, Article 45ca is only focused on setting MREL requirements where the PRS envisages primarily a market exit with the use of the sale of business tool or bridge institution tool (with the asset separation tool as a secondary tool).Where the resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of open bank bail-in combined with the use of any transfer tool, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned may be smaller after resolution than in the case of resolution strategies that only rely only on the bail-in tool.Article 45c(3) should therefore foresee the specific case of PRS envisaging the combination of bail-in as the primary resolution tool with transfer tools as secondary tools, and take into account the reduced post-resolution size and risk profile of the resolution group that can be expected as a result.This is consistent with the principle that MREL should equal funding needs in resolution which justifies the proportionalization introduced in article 45ca.Moreover, adjustements to the group profile post-resolution can also come from recovery options comprised in the recovery plan, should these be credible enough and implementable in a coherent timeframe, so they can be taken into account at the resolution planning stage.

Amendment 360

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 6

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(-a a) in paragraph 3 the sixth subparagraph is replaced by the following :
The resolution authority shall be able to increase the requirement provided in point (a)(ii) of the first subparagraph by an appropriate amount necessary to ensure that, following resolution, the entity is able to sustain sufficient market confidence for an appropriate period, which shall not exceed one year."The resolution authority shall be able to increase the requirement provided in point (a)(ii) of the first subparagraph by an appropriate amount necessary to ensure that, following resolution, the entity is able to sustain sufficient market confidence for an appropriate period, which shall not exceed one year, except where its preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market.
The resolution authority shall communicate to the resolution entity the rationale behind the adjustments mentioned in points (a), (b) and (c) of the fifth subparagraph.
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology to be used by resolution authorities to conduct the adjustments mentioned in this paragraph.
EBA shall by… [PO please insert the date = 12 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the previous subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’ .
"

Or. en

(Directive 2014/59/EU)

Justification

Concerns paragraph 3 subparaphs 5&6 : Likewise, adjustements to the group profile post-resolution also warrant considering adaptations to the G-SIB buffer post-resolution when applicable.As regards the market confidence charge (MCC) increasing the RCA, it is needed in case of open bank bail-in in order for the institution to maintain access to market funding. This equally applies to a bridge institution should it need to access wholesale market for funding and liquidity. In contrast, under the sale of business tool in market exit, the liquidity and funding provision will be assumed by the purchaser and the MCC might therefore not be needed.So far, all of the adjustments mentioned in the level 1 text have not been fully applied by resolution authorities, probably also due to a lack of methodology to assess the profile of the group post-resolution and its implication on prudential requirements. Therefore it is suggested to include a mandate for the EBA to draft a RTS.

Amendment 361

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45c – paragraph 3a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a a) the following paragraph is inserted:
3a. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology to be used by resolution authorities to conduct the adjustments referred to in paragraph 3.
EBA shall by… [PO please insert the date = 12 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’ .

Or. en

Justification

Concerns paragraph 3 subparaphs 5&6 : Likewise, adjustements to the group profile post-resolution also warrant considering adaptations to the G-SIB buffer post-resolution when applicable.As regards the market confidence charge (MCC) increasing the RCA, it is needed in case of open bank bail-in in order for the institution to maintain access to market funding. This equally applies to a bridge institution should it need to access wholesale market for funding and liquidity. In contrast, under the sale of business tool in market exit, the liquidity and funding provision will be assumed by the purchaser and the MCC might therefore not be needed.So far, all of the adjustments mentioned in the level 1 text have not been fully applied by resolution authorities, probably also due to a lack of methodology to assess the profile of the group post-resolution and its implication on prudential requirements. Therefore it is suggested to include a mandate for the EBA to draft a RTS.

Amendment 362

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59 EU

Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(-a) in paragraph 3, the introductory part to the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:
For resolution entities, the amount referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 shall be the following:"For resolution entities, the amount referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 shall be at least the following:
"

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)

Amendment 363

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(-a) in paragraph 2, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:
Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures, the resolution authority limits the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) for that entity, so that it does not exceed an amount sufficient to absorb losses in accordance with point (a) of the first subparagraph, except in extraordinary cases of the need for additional buffer. The buffer in any case shall be lower than the recapitalisation amount as referred to in paragraph 3.

Or. en

Amendment 364

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59 EU

Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(-a) In paragraph 3, the following subparagraph is inserted after the second subparagraph:
"The resolution authority shall be able to adjust the requirement provided for in point (a)(i) of the first subparagraph, taking into account the information requested from the competent authority relating to the institution’s business model, funding model, and risk profile, and in order to reduce or remove an impediment to resolvability or absorb losses on holdings of MREL instruments issued by other group entities as well as whenever the combined buffer requirement is deemed irrelevant to ensure that losses can be absorbed in resolution.
"

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)

Amendment 365

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(32) the following Article 45ca is inserted:deleted
‘
Article 45ca
Determination of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities for transfer strategies leading to market exit
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;
(b) the shares, other instruments of ownership, assets, rights or liabilities to be transferred to a recipient as identified in the resolution plan, taking into consideration:
(i) the core business lines and critical functions of the resolution entity;
(ii) the liabilities excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2);
(iii) the safeguards referred to in Articles 73 to 80;
(c) the expected value and marketability of the shares, other instruments of ownership, assets, rights or liabilities of the resolution entity referred to in point (b), taking into account:
(i) any material impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are directly related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool;
(ii) the losses resulting from the assets, rights or liabilities left in the residual institution;
(d) whether the preferred resolution strategy envisages the transfer of shares or other instruments of ownership issued by the resolution entity, or of all or part of the assets, rights and liabilities of the resolution entity;
(e) whether the preferred resolution strategy envisages the application of the asset separation tool.
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.
3. The application of paragraph 1 shall not result in an amount that is higher than the amount resulting from application of Article 45c(3).;
’

Or. en

Justification

The first paragraph aims to set MREL requirements when a transfer strategy is preferred for resolution. This applies, in particular, to small and medium-sized institutions, which often struggle to issue MREL liabilities and should remain exempt. Simply easing requirements won't suffice.The second paragraph concerns cases in which insolvency proceedings are chosen as the preferred strategy. In such cases, no further-reaching MREL requirements should continue to be issued on a regular basis. Therefore, a corresponding application of paragraph 1 is regularly irrelevant.

Amendment 366

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, and where its size and its ability to access the capital markets where it operates so justify in light of the princple of proportionality, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Or. en

Amendment 367

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way that ensures that the resolution group can be resolved in all possible scenarios without the need for external funding on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Or. en

Amendment 368

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way that ensures that the resolution group can be resolved in all possible scenarios without the need for external funding on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Or. en

Justification

Sufficiently high levels of MREL are necessary to ensure credibility of the resolution system

Amendment 369

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority may set a recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3), that may be higher or equal to zero, in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Or. en

Amendment 370

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority may set a recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3), that may be higher or equal to zero, in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Or. en

Amendment 371

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages the exclusively use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Or. en

Amendment 372

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;(a) the resolution entity’s size, resolution entity’s ability to access financial market and DGS funds, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;

Or. en

Amendment 373

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile;

Or. en

Justification

Sufficiently high levels of MREL are necessary to ensure credibility of the resolution system.

Amendment 374

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile;

Or. en

Amendment 375

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile;

Or. en

Justification

Covers all ams to article 45ca :Currently, the depth of the market criteria only applies to the setting of MREL subordinated requirements in accordance with Article 45c(8) BRRD. As the entities that are subject to Article 45ca may not always be subject to MREL subordintated requirements, the inclusion of this criteria in Article 45ca is at odds with the current MREL framework. MREL overall requirements should remain based on intrinsic features of banks, regardless of the type of tools envisaged in the preferred resolution strategy.MREL requirements should not be met with non-covered non-preferred deposits, or other bail-inable liabilities when there is a significant likelihood that such deposits and liabilities would be discretionarily excluded under Article 44(3) in a resolution scenario. This specific risk could be reduced in resolution planning by taking into account MREL-eligible liabilities pursuant to Article 44(3), when setting the level of MREL. This would not replace but act as a complement to any deduction from the MREL capacity of these liabilities pursuant to Article 45c(8).A distinction should be made between the sale of business tool and the bridge institution tool.

Amendment 376

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the ability to access the capital markets for eligible liabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 377

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point ii

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(ii) the liabilities excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2);(ii) the liabilities excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2) or bail-inable liabilities where Article 44(3) is likely to apply with regard to these liabilities;

Or. en

Justification

Covers all ams to article 45ca : The recapitalisation amount should in principle be higher when the prefererred resolution strategy envisages primarly the use of the bridge institution tool as opposed to the sale of business tool, as this institution would need to be capitalised. In particular, if all assets and liabilities of the institution under resolution are transferred to a bridge bank under the bridge institution tool, the recapitalisation amount should theoretically be the same as in the case of an open bank bail-in under Article 45c(3).It is important that funding needs in resolution be evaluated in a coherent manner across Member States, for MREL requirements can in some cases weigh on banks’ profitability. Diverging practices would therefore hinder the level playing field. Likewise, it is important to ensure that the proportionnalization of MREL requirements when transfer tools are used does not lead to under/overestimate funding needs and MREL.

Amendment 378

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(iii a) expected own funds requirements for any bridge institution that may be needed to implement the market exit strategy, to ensure its compliance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU, as applicable;

Or. en

Justification

Covers all ams to article 45ca : The use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU would imply that measures taken in liquidation would be similar to the ones in resolution in case of transfer strategies, with the same economic outcome – namely, “market exit”. These liquidation entities should therefore be subject to the same requirements as resolution entities subject to Article 45ca(1). Should that not be the case, liquidation with alternative measures from the DGS would most probably remain a way to arbitrate resolution while increasing the cost for other banks.

Amendment 379

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(iii a) any risks to the succesful implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, in particular due to an adverse market environment at the time of resolution;

Or. en

Amendment 380

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(iii a) any risks to succesful implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, in particular a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;

Or. en

Amendment 381

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii b (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(iii b) expected demand by the recipient for the transaction to be capital neutral with regards to the requirements applicable to the acquiring entity.

Or. en

Justification

Covers all ams to article 45ca : To ensure that the revised framework remains based on internal loss-aborption not merely in theory but also in practice, the amendment introduces minimum levels of external MREL for resolution entities with the new resolution strategy.Above a size threshold, such resolution entities would also be required to comply with their external MREL target by using a minimum share of instruments that do not include Common Equity Tier 1 instruments : Tier 2 instruments and other MREL-eligible instruments with a higher ranking in insolvency. This would avoid situations where an institution complies with its MREL target almost entirely with Common Equity Tier 1. Although CET1 is an essential safeguard to ensure loss-absorption capabilities in a going-concern, such resources are, due to their very nature, lacking when solvency issues lead an institution into resolution.

Amendment 382

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point i

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(i) any material impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are directly related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool;(i) any impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool;

Or. en

Amendment 383

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point i

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(i) any material impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are directly related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool;(i) any impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool;

Or. en

Amendment 384

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point ii a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(ii a) a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;

Or. en

Amendment 385

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point ii a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(ii a) a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;

Or. en

Amendment 386

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point ea (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(e a) whether any contribution by a deposit guarantee scheme is expected to be made pursuant to Article 109.’

Or. en

Amendment 387

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(e a) the potential recapitalisation amount required under an alternative resolution strategy.

Or. en

Amendment 388

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point ea (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(e a) the potential recapitalisation amount required under an alternative resolution strategy;

Or. en

Amendment 389

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraphs 1a and 1b (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1 a. For resolution entities subject to the proportionalisation rules of paragraph 1 of this Article, the level of the requirement referred to in Article 45c(3) shall be at least equal to:
(a) 16 % when calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 45(2); and
(b) 5,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (b) of Article 45(2).
Resolution entities that are part of a resolution group the total assets of which exceed EUR 5 billion and resolution entities with consolidated total assets in excess of EUR 5 billion shall meet a level of the requirement referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph that is equal to 4,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 45(2) and to 1,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (b) of Article 45(2), using Tier 2 instruments and eligible liabilities.’
1b. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology to be used by resolution authorities to conduct the adjustments mentioned in this Article.
The EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by …[OP – please insert the date= 12 months after the date of entry into force of this amending Directive].
Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Or. en

Amendment 390

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 1a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1 a. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to institutions that are designated as "small and non-complex institutions" in line with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Or. en

Justification

In the interest of proportionality, the new MREL requirements should not apply for small and non-complex institutions.

Amendment 391

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted

Or. en

Amendment 392

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted

Or. en

Amendment 393

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted

Or. en

Amendment 394

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted

Or. en

Amendment 395

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted

Or. en

Amendment 396

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, by way of derogation from Article 45c(2a), the resolution authority shall set a recapitalisation amount as provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph 1.

Or. en

Amendment 397

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45ca – paragraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
3. The application of paragraph 1 shall not result in an amount that is higher than the amount resulting from application of Article 45c(3).;3. The application of paragraph 1 shall not result in an amount that is lower than 90% of the amount resulting from application of Article 45c(3).;

Or. en

Amendment 398

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 33

Directive 2014/59 EU

Article 45d – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The requirement referred to in Article 45(1) for a resolution entity that is a G-SII entity shall consist of the following:;The requirement referred to in Article 45(1) for a resolution entity that is a G-SII entity shall at least consist of the following:;

Or. en

Amendment 399

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 35 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 45m – paragraph 1a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(35 a) in Article 45m, the following paragraph 1a is inserted:
‘1a. Regarding entities that were not part of a resolution group prior to the [date of application of this Directive], resolution authorities shall determine appropriate transitional periods for institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 45e or 45f, or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7), as appropriate. These transitional periods shall not extend beyond 1 January 2030.’

Or. en

Justification

The setting of a transitional period to comply with new MREL requirements for institutions that will newly fall within the scope of resolution is reasonable, but should not be too long. A [5] year transition seems reasonable, leading to end 2029 if the CMDI review enters into force in 2025.

Amendment 400

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 55 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) in paragraph 1, point (b) is replaced by the following:deleted
‘
(b) the liability is not a deposit as referred to in Article 108(1), points (a) or (b);
’

Or. en

Amendment 401

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 55 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) the liability is not a deposit as referred to in Article 108(1), points (a) or (b);(b) the liability is not a deposit as referred to in Article 108(1), point (a);

Or. en

Justification

Amendments to the depositor preference according to Art. 108 (1) are rejected. Consequently, the amendment to Art. 55 (1) point (b) should be deleted as well (i.e., only contain a reference to Art. 108 (1) point (a).

Amendment 402

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 55 – paragraph 1

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(a a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
1. Member States shall require institutions and entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) to include a contractual term by which the creditor or party to the agreement or instrument creating the liability recognises that that liability may be subject to the write down and conversion powers and agrees to be bound by any reduction of the principal or outstanding amount due, conversion or cancellation that is effected by the exercise of those powers by a resolution authority, provided that that liability complies with all of the following conditions:"1. Member States shall require institutions and entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) to include a contractual term by which the creditor or party to the agreement or instrument creating a bail-inable liability recognises that that liability may be subject to the write down and conversion powers and agrees to be bound by any reduction of the principal or outstanding amount due, conversion or cancellation that is effected by the exercise of those powers by a resolution authority, provided that that liability complies with all of the following conditions:
(a) the liability is not excluded under Article 44(2);(a) [deleted]
(b) the liability is not a deposit as referred to in Article 108(1), points (a) or (b);(b) the liability is not a deposit as referred to in Article 108(1), points (a) or (b);
(c) the liability is governed by the law of a third country;(c) the liability is governed by the law of a third country;
(d) the liability is issued or entered into after the date on which a Member State applies the provisions adopted in order to transpose this Section.(d) the liability is issued or entered into after the date on which a Member State applies the provisions adopted in order to transpose this Section.
The first subparagraph shall not apply to liquidation entities for which the resolution authority has not determined the requirement referred to in Article 45(1).
Resolution authorities may decide that the obligation in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall not apply to institutions or entities in respect of which the requirement under Article 45(1) equals the loss-absorption amount as defined under point (a) of Article 45c(2), provided that liabilities that meet the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph and which do not include the contractual term referred to in that subparagraph are not counted towards that requirement.Resolution authorities may decide that the obligation in the first subparagraph shall not apply to the following institutions or entities, provided that liabilities that meet the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph and which do not include the contractual term referred to in that subparagraph are not counted towards the requirement referred to in Article 45(1):
(a) institutions or entities that are subsidiaries of a resolution entity or of a third-country entity, but are not themselves resolution entities;
(b) liquidation entities for which the resolution authority has determined the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) in accordance with Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph.
The first subparagraph shall not apply where the resolution authority of a Member State determines that the liabilities or instruments referred to in the first subparagraph can be subject to write down and conversion powers by the resolution authority of a Member State pursuant to the law of the third country or to a binding agreement concluded with that third country.The first subparagraph shall not apply where the resolution authority of a Member State determines that the liabilities or instruments referred to in the first subparagraph can be subject to write down and conversion powers by the resolution authority of a Member State pursuant to the law of the third country or to a binding agreement concluded with that third country.
"

Or. en

(Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 403

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 55 – paragraph 2a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b a) the following paragraph 2a is inserted:
2a. Institutions and entities referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), shall report to the resolution authority on an annual basis the following:
(a) the total outstanding amounts of all liabilities governed by the law of a third country;
(b) for the items referred in point (a):
(i) their composition, including their maturity profile;
(ii) their ranking in normal insolvency proceedings;
(iii) whether the liability is excluded under Article 44(2);
(iv) whether they include in the contractual provisions the term required by paragraph 1;
(v) where a determination has been made that it is legally or otherwise impracticable to include the contractual recognition of bail-in clause in accordance with paragraph 2, the category of the liability pursuant to paragraph 7.
Where institutions and entities are part of a resolution group, the report shall be done by the resolution entity concerning the resolution group, to the extent required by paragraph 1, second and third subparagraphs.

Or. en

Amendment 404

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 55 – paragraph 2a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b a) The following paragraph 2a is added:
2a. Institutions and entities referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), shall report to the resolution authority on an annual basis the following:
(a) the total outstanding amounts of all liabilities governed by the law of a third country;
(b) for the items referred in point (a):
(i) their composition, including their maturity profile;
(ii) their ranking in normal insolvency proceedings;
(iii) whether the liability is excluded under Article 44(2);
(iv) whether they include in the contractual provisions the term required by paragraph 1;
(v) where a determination has been made that it is legally or otherwise impracticable to include the contractual recognition of bail-in clause in accordance with paragraph 2, the category of the liability pursuant to paragraph 7.
Where institutions and entities are part of a resolution group, the report shall be done by the resolution entity concerning the resolution group, to the extent required by paragraph 1, second and third subparagraphs.

Or. en

Amendment 405

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 55 – paragraph 8a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b b) the following paragraph 8a is added:
8a. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify procedures and uniform formats and templates for the reporting to resolution authorities referred to in paragraph 2a.
EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by [PO please insert the date = 1 year after the date of entry into force of this Directive].
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Or. en

Amendment 406

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 55 – paragraph 8a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b b) The following paragraph 8a is added:
EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify procedures and uniform formats and templates for the reporting to resolution authorities referred to in paragraph 2a.
EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by [PO please insert the date = 1 year after the date of entry into force of this Directive].
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Or. en

Amendment 407

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 42 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 59 – paragraph 4 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) having regard to timing, the need to implement effectively the write down and conversion powers or the resolution strategy for the resolution group, and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any action, including alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures, other than the write down or conversion of capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in paragraph 1a, would prevent the failure of the institution or the entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), or the group within a reasonable timeframe.;(b) having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any action, including alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures, other than the write down or conversion of capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in paragraph 1a, would prevent the failure of the institution or the entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), or the group within a reasonable timeframe.;

Or. en

Justification

According to current law, an institution can be considered no longer viable if (among other prerequisites) the failure cannot be averted within a reasonable timeframe by other measures, including alternative measures by the private sector or supervisory authorities, than a write-down carried out individually or together with a resolution measure. It is not clear why the feasibility of the wind-down strategy should play a role in this assessment in the future. When assessing whether a write-down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities is necessary at all, the wind-down strategy should not be a criterion, as it becomes irrelevant in the event of a successful avoidance of default.

Amendment 408

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 45

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 74 – paragraph 3 – point d

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(d) when determining the losses that the deposit guarantee scheme would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, apply the criteria and methodology referred to in Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in any delegated act adopted pursuant to that Article.;(d) when determining the losses that the deposit guarantee scheme, where it does not qualify as an institutional protection scheme, would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, apply the criteria and methodology referred to in Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in any delegated act adopted pursuant to that Article;

Or. en

Justification

Article 11e DGSD draft is rejected, at least insofar as this provision also concerns deposit guarantee schemes that are recognised as institutional protection schemes. The provisions in Art. 11a to 11e DGSD-E threaten their functionality. Therefore, all interconntected amendments are also rejected.

Amendment 409

Herbert Dorfmann, Othmar Karas, Markus Ferber

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 45

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 74 – paragraph 3 – point d

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(d) when determining the losses that the deposit guarantee scheme would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, apply the criteria and methodology referred to in Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in any delegated act adopted pursuant to that Article.;(d) when determining the losses that the deposit guarantee scheme, where it does not qualify as an institutional protection scheme, would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, apply the criteria and methodology referred to in Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in any delegated act adopted pursuant to that Article.;

Or. en

Justification

Article 11e DGSD draft is rejected, at least insofar as this provision also concerns deposit guarantee schemes that are recognised as institutional protection schemes. The provisions in Art. 11a to 11e DGSD-E impair these systems to a considerable extent and threaten their functionality. Therefore, all consequential amendments are also rejected or require a restriction.

Amendment 410

René Repasi, Ernest Urtasun, Andreas Schwab

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 45 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 84 – paragraph 6 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(45 a) In Article 84, the following paragraph 6a is inserted:
This Article shall not preclude the exchange of information between resolution authorities and tax authorities in the same Member State to the extent that such exchange is stipulated by national laws of Member States. Where this information originates in another Member State, it shall only be disclosed with the express agreement of the relevant authority which has disclosed it.

Or. en

Justification

The proposed amendment wants to improve the exchange of information between resolution and tax authorities. Currently, the BRRD does not provide for a solid legal basis for this exchange of information. Against the background of experiences with fraudulent and illegal tax evading capital markets transactions (e.g. cum-ex or cum-cum schemes), it is necessary to improve the close cooperation of tax authorities with financial supervisory authorities and resolution authorities. The suggested amendment reflect the wording of recent amendments to the CRD and AIFMD which should also be included in the BRRD for reasons of consistency across the financial sector.

Amendment 411

René Repasi, Ernest Urtasun, Andreas Schwab

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 46 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 90 – paragraph 4a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(46 a) In Article 90, the following paragraph is added:
4a. Article 84 shall not preclude the exchange of information between resolution authorities and tax authorities in the same Member State to the extent that such exchange is stipulated by national laws of Member States. Where this information originates in another Member State, it shall only be disclosed with the express agreement of the relevant authority which has disclosed it.

Or. en

Justification

The proposed amendment wants to improve the exchange of information between resolution and tax authorities. Currently, the BRRD does not provide for a solid legal basis for this exchange of information. Against the background of experiences with fraudulent and illegal tax evading capital markets transactions (e.g. cum-ex or cum-cum schemes), it is necessary to improve the close cooperation of tax authorities with financial supervisory authorities and resolution authorities. The suggested amendment reflect the wording of recent amendments to the CRD and AIFMD which should also be included in the BRRD for reasons of consistency across the financial sector.

Amendment 412

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 49

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 97 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Competent authorities shall conclude non-binding cooperation arrangements with the relevant third-country authorities referred to in paragraph 2 where appropriate. Those arrangements shall be in line with EBA framework arrangement and shall ensure that the information disclosed to the third-country authorities is subject to a guarantee that professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU are complied with.Competent authorities shall conclude non-binding cooperation arrangements with the relevant third-country authorities referred to in paragraph 2 where appropriate. Those arrangements shall be in line with EBA framework arrangement and shall ensure that the information disclosed to the third-country authorities is subject to a guarantee that professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 84 of this Directive are complied with.

Or. en

Amendment 413

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 50 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 101 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(50a) in Article 101(1), the following subparagraph is added:
‘Where the deposit guarantee scheme makes a contribution pursuant to Article 109(1) and where applicable conditions are met, to contribute the amount needed to close the remaining funding gap after the DGS contribution towards the 8% TLOF, in this case, the contribution made by the resolution financing arrangement is to be repaid in full by the DGS wihin 6 years at the most.’

Or. en

Justification

OPTION 1 : Bridge in liquidity support to the DGS: (Low level of ambition in CMDI package to harmonize crisis management) : Depending on the bridge design, there needs to be a clear reference to this new use case of the resolution financing arrangement in this article. There also needs to be a review of the rules governing contributions to make sure the polluter pays principle is still effective after the entry into force of the CMDI reform.

Amendment 414

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 50 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 101 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(50b) in Article 101(1), the following subparagraph is added:
Where the deposit guarantee scheme makes a contribution pursuant to Article 109 (1) and where applicable conditions are met, to contribute the amount needed to close the remaining funding gap after the DGS contribution towards the 8% TLOF;

Or. en

Justification

OPTION 2 : Bridge in loss sharing between DGS and RF/SRF : (High level of ambition in CMDI package to harmonize crisis management) : Depending on the bridge design, there needs to be a clear reference to this new use case of the resolution financing arrangement in this article. There also needs to be a review of the rules governing contributions to make sure the polluter pays principle is still effective after the entry into force of the CMDI reform.

Amendment 415

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 51 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 101 – paragraph 2a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(51 a) in Article 101, the following paragraph is added:
‘2a. By 31 December 2028, the Commission shall report, to the European Parliament and to the Council, on the appropriateness of the rules governing the contributions to the resolution financing arrangements both at Member State level and Banking Union level.
That report shall take stock of the reforms to the crisis management framework, and assess whether these changes call for a review of the rules governing the contributions to the resolution financing arrangement in order to preserve the effectiveness of the incentives of a "polluter-pays" principle.
Where appropriate, the Commission shall table a legislative proposal. ’

Or. en

Justification

In OPTION 1 & 2 there needs to be a review of the rules governing contributions to make sure the polluter pays principle is still effective after the entry into force of the CMDI reform.

Amendment 416

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 51 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 102 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(51 b) in Article 102(1), the following subparagraph is added:
‘When the available financial means have significantly exceeded the target level for a second consecutive year, the Commission shall assess the situation and report on the appropriateness of introducing a possibility to restitute part of available financial means.’

Or. en

Justification

This reform might change the likelihood of small and midsize banks to access the DGS / RF. This likelihood should be reflected in the contribution rules in order to set the right incentives on a “polluter-pays” model. Until this is reviewed, there should be a pause in contributions, subject to a prudent floor.

Amendment 417

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall resume until the target level is reached. Resolution authorities may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 for 1 or more years where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the resolution authority to use the resolution financing arrangements pursuant to Article 101. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 yearsAfter the target level has been reached for the first time, the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall be subject to the following modulations:
(a) until the available financial means, net of any disbursment, diminish below 85% of the target level, Resolution authorities shall defer the collection of the regular contributions;
(b) where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, Resolution authorities shall defer the collection of the regular contributions.
Furthermore, the resumption of the regular contributions after the deferral mentioned in the previous subparagraphs shall be set at a level allowing for the target level to be reached within 3 years.’;

Or. en

Justification

This reform might change the likelihood of small and midsize banks to access the DGS / RF. This likelihood should be reflected in the contribution rules in order to set the right incentives on a “polluter-pays” model. Until this is reviewed, there should be a pause in contributions, subject to a prudent floor.

Amendment 418

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall resume until the target level is reached. Resolution authorities may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 for 1 or more years where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the resolution authority to use the resolution financing arrangements pursuant to Article 101. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.;If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall resume until the target level specified in paragraph 1 of this Article is reached. Resolution authorities may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 for 1 or more years where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the resolution authority to use the resolution financing arrangements pursuant to Article 101. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.;

Or. en

Amendment 419

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall resume until the target level is reached. Resolution authorities may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 for 1 or more years where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the resolution authority to use the resolution financing arrangements pursuant to Article 101. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.;If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall resume until the target level is reached. Resolution authorities may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 for 1 year where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the resolution authority to use the resolution financing arrangements pursuant to Article 101. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.;

Or. en

Amendment 420

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 103 – paragraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 50 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall be 50 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. The resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.

Or. en

Justification

The European Commission's proposal to increase the IPC share is, in principle, a good idea, however the decision on granting it and the amount of the IPC share remains subject to the discretion of the resolution authorities. In order to improve planning capabilities, the institutions should always have the option of using IPCs to an amount of 50%.

Amendment 421

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 103 – paragraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 50 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 20 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;

Or. en

Amendment 422

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 103 – paragraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 50 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 30 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;

Or. en

Amendment 423

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Irene Tinagli, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 103 – paragraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 50 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 30 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;

Or. en

Amendment 424

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 103 – paragraph 3a – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The resolution authority shall call the irrevocable payment commitments made pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article when the use of the resolution financing arrangements is needed pursuant to Article 101.The resolution authority shall call the irrevocable payment commitments made pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article when the use of the resolution financing arrangements is needed pursuant to Article 101. Where an entity stops being within the scope of Article 1 and is no longer subject to the obligation to pay contributions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the resolution authority shall return the irrevocable payment commitments made pursuant to paragraph 3 as soon as the subsequent regular contribution round pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article has replenished the resolution financing arrangements up to the target level.

Or. en

Justification

The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that adjusting the framework for IPCs (e.g. regarding return of IPCs) does not change their current accounting treatment.

Amendment 425

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 103 – paragraph 3a – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Where an entity stops being within the scope of Article 1 and is no longer subject to the obligation to pay contributions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the resolution authority shall call the irrevocable payment commitments made pursuant to paragraph 3 and still due. If the contribution linked to the irrevocable payment commitment is duly paid at first call, the resolution authority shall cancel the commitment and return the collateral. If the contribution is not duly paid at first call, the resolution authority shall seize the collateral and cancel the commitment.;Where an entity stops being within the scope of this Directive the irrevocable payment commitments shall be cancelled and the collateral backing these commitments shall be returned at the latest two years after the entity has exited the scope of this Directive;

Or. en

Justification

By giving time to the RF to levy new contributions to fill the gap, it is possible for the return of the collateral not to induce a reduction in the available financial means of the RF. Such clarification will also preserve the specificity of the IPC whereby it may be treated not as an expense in the P&L of the banks.

Amendment 426

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 54 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 104 – paragraph 3

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(54 a) Article 104 (3) is replaced by the following:
3. The resolution authority may defer, in whole or in part, an institution’s payment of extraordinary ex-post contributions to the resolution financing arrangement if the payment of those contributions would jeopardise the liquidity or solvency of the institution. Such a deferral shall not be granted for a period of longer than six months but may be renewed upon the request of the institution. The contributions deferred pursuant to this paragraph shall be paid when such a payment no longer jeopardises the institution’s liquidity or solvency."3. The resolution authority may defer, in whole or in part, an institution’s payment of extraordinary ex-post contributions to the resolution financing arrangement if the payment of those contributions would jeopardise the liquidity or solvency of the institution. Such a deferral shall not be granted for a period of longer than six months but may be renewed once upon the request of the institution. The contributions deferred pursuant to this paragraph shall be paid when such a payment no longer jeopardises the institution’s liquidity or solvency.
"

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0059)

Amendment 427

Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:deleted
‘
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:
(a) deposits;
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;
(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;
’

Or. en

Amendment 428

Markus Ferber, Othmar Karas, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:deleted
‘
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:
(a) deposits;
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;
(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;
’

Or. en

Justification

While covered deposits are protected from losses in resolution, other eligible deposits are potentially available for loss absorbency purposes. to provide a certain level of protection for natural persons and smaller enterprises holding eligible deposits above the level of covered deposits, such deposits should have a higher priority ranking over the claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors under the national insolvency law. The claim of the DGS should have an even higher ranking under such national law than the aforementioned categories of eligible deposits.

Amendment 429

Enikő Győri

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:deleted
(a) deposits;
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;
(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;

Or. en

Amendment 430

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings:

Or. en

Amendment 431

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings:

Or. en

Amendment 432

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:1. Member States shall establish a general depositor preference, which grants all depositors a higher ranking than claims of ordinary unsecured creditors.
Notwithstanding, the highest priority ranking shall be exclusively shared by the following deposits:

Or. en

Amendment 433

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the claims arising from the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:

Or. en

Amendment 434

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have a higher priority ranking than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:

Or. en

Amendment 435

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) deposits;(a) the following have the same priority ranking which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:
(i) that part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU;
(ii) deposits that would be eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises were they not made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;

Or. en

Justification

The proposed modification of the existing super preference of deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) claims is to be rejected. The modification would artificially increase the costs for the DGS in order to achieve the result intended by the Commission – resolution is less costly than liquidation/insolvency with the consequence that a public interest in resolution would also have to be confirmed for LSIs.Until now, the super-preference had ensured that, in subsequent insolvency proceedings, preference was given to the deposit guarantee scheme in terms of depositor compensationpayments, meaning that losses were recovered in full comparatively quickly, and the deposit guarantee scheme generally incurred few or no losses.In addition, there is no reason to expand the resolution regime in the way the Commission has proposed. The largely harmonised European deposit guarantee schemes have proven their ability to function. For the majority of institutions, it is already possible to ensure an orderly exit from the market without endangering financial market stability through national insolvency/liquidation proceedings. Also, the report submitted by the SRB on resolution planning for Less Significant Institutions (LSIs) in 2021 and 2022 underlines that the current approach is appropriate: According to this report, the NRAs deemed that 96.3% of the LSIs have liquidation as a preferred strategy in case of failure. None of the resolvability assessments carried out by the national resolution authorities found any substantive impediments to resolvability.

Amendment 436

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) deposits;(a) the following claims that have a ranking priority higher than the ranking of claims referred to in point b): deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency, eligible deposits, corporate deposit held for payment and settlement purposes, deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union ;

Or. en

Amendment 437

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) deposits;(a) (i) deposits that are excluded from coverage under Article 5 of Directive 2014/49/EU; and
(ii) deposits of legal entities that are not micro, small and medium-sized enterprises that qualify as eligible liabilities for the purposes of the requirement referred to in Article 45(1);

Or. en

Amendment 438

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) deposits;(a) covered deposits, as defined in Directive 2014/49/EU;

Or. en

Amendment 439

Esther de Lange

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) deposits;(a) eligible retail deposits;

Or. en

Amendment 440

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) deposits;(a) covered deposits;

Or. en

Justification

As regards resolution objectives, larger corporates' deposits should not be better treated than other unsecured senior debt.

Amendment 441

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) deposits;(a) all deposits;

Or. en

Amendment 442

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point aa (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a a) that part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU;

Or. en

Justification

As regards resolution objectives, larger corporates' deposits should not be better treated than other unsecured senior debt.

Amendment 443

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point ab (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a b) deposits that would be eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises were they not made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;

Or. en

Justification

As regards resolution objectives, larger corporates' deposits should not be better treated than other unsecured senior debt.

Amendment 444

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;deleted

Or. en

Justification

As regards resolution objectives, larger corporates' deposits should not be better treated than other unsecured senior debt.

Amendment 445

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;(b) the following have the same priority ranking which is higher than the ranking provided for under point (a):
(i) covered deposits;
(ii) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.

Or. en

Justification

The proposed modification of the existing super preference of deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) claims is to be rejected. The modification would artificially increase the costs for the DGS in order to achieve the result intended by the Commission – resolution is less costly than liquidation/insolvency with the consequence that a public interest in resolution would also have to be confirmed for LSIs.Until now, the super-preference had ensured that, in subsequent insolvency proceedings, preference was given to the deposit guarantee scheme in terms of depositor compensationpayments, meaning that losses were recovered in full comparatively quickly, and the deposit guarantee scheme generally incurred few or no losses.In addition, there is no reason to expand the resolution regime in the way the Commission has proposed. The largely harmonised European deposit guarantee schemes have proven their ability to function. For the majority of institutions, it is already possible to ensure an orderly exit from the market without endangering financial market stability through national insolvency/liquidation proceedings. Also, the report submitted by the SRB on resolution planning for Less Significant Institutions (LSIs) in 2021 and 2022 underlines that the current approach is appropriate: According to this report, the NRAs deemed that 96.3% of the LSIs have liquidation as a preferred strategy in case of failure. None of the resolvability assessments carried out by the national resolution authorities found any substantive impediments to resolvability.

Amendment 446

Christophe Hansen

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;(b) covered deposits, or parts of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 447

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;(b) eligible deposits, as defined in Directive 2014/49/EU, of natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;

Or. en

Amendment 448

Esther de Lange

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;(b) eligible retail deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 449

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;(b) deposits that were made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 450

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;(b) other corporate deposits than those referred to in point a) and non-eligible deposits

Or. en

Amendment 451

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;deleted

Or. en

Justification

The proposed modification of the existing super preference of deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) claims is to be rejected. The modification would artificially increase the costs for the DGS in order to achieve the result intended by the Commission – resolution is less costly than liquidation/insolvency with the consequence that a public interest in resolution would also have to be confirmed for LSIs.Until now, the super-preference had ensured that, in subsequent insolvency proceedings, preference was given to the deposit guarantee scheme in terms of depositor compensationpayments, meaning that losses were recovered in full comparatively quickly, and the deposit guarantee scheme generally incurred few or no losses.In addition, there is no reason to expand the resolution regime in the way the Commission has proposed. The largely harmonised European deposit guarantee schemes have proven their ability to function. For the majority of institutions, it is already possible to ensure an orderly exit from the market without endangering financial market stability through national insolvency/liquidation proceedings. Also, the report submitted by the SRB on resolution planning for Less Significant Institutions (LSIs) in 2021 and 2022 underlines that the current approach is appropriate: According to this report, the NRAs deemed that 96.3% of the LSIs have liquidation as a preferred strategy in case of failure. None of the resolvability assessments carried out by the national resolution authorities found any substantive impediments to resolvability.

Amendment 452

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;deleted

Or. en

Amendment 453

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;deleted

Or. en

Amendment 454

Esther de Lange

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of eligible retail depositors in insolvency.;

Or. en

Amendment 455

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;(c) deposit guarantee schemes when subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;

Or. en

Amendment 456

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 1a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
1 a. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for under paragraph (1):
(a) covered deposits;
(b) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency;

Or. en

Amendment 457

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

Amendment: Present text and Amendment
Present textAmendment
(a a) The introductory part of paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:
2. Member States shall ensure that, for entities referred to in points (a) to (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 1(1), ordinary unsecured claims have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, a higher priority ranking than that of unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments that meet the following conditions:‘2. Member States shall ensure that, for entities referred to in points (a) to (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 1(1), ordinary unsecured claims have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, the same priority ranking as other deposits that are not mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, and a higher priority ranking than that of unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments that meet the following conditions:’ ;

Or. en

Justification

As regards resolution objectives, larger corporates' deposits should not be better treated than other unsecured senior debt.

Amendment 458

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 8

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
8. Where the resolution tools referred to in Article 37(3), point (a) or (b), are used to transfer only part of the assets, rights or liabilities of the institution under resolution, the resolution financing arrangement shall have a claim against the residual institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), for any expense and loss incurred by the resolution financing arrangement as a result of any contributions made to resolution pursuant to Article 101(1) in connection to losses which creditors would have otherwise borne.deleted

Or. en

Justification

The claims of the resolution financing mechanism established here and their preferential position in insolvency proceedings will probably regularly lead to losses of the deposit guarantee schemes and to their financial depletion. This in turn will lead to a loss of confidence on the part of depositors.

Amendment 459

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 8

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
8. Where the resolution tools referred to in Article 37(3), point (a) or (b), are used to transfer only part of the assets, rights or liabilities of the institution under resolution, the resolution financing arrangement shall have a claim against the residual institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), for any expense and loss incurred by the resolution financing arrangement as a result of any contributions made to resolution pursuant to Article 101(1) in connection to losses which creditors would have otherwise borne.8. Where the resolution tools referred to in Article 37(3), point (a) or (b), are used to transfer only part of the assets, rights or liabilities of the institution under resolution, the resolution financing arrangement shall have a claim against the residual institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), for any expense and loss incurred by the resolution financing arrangement as a result of any contributions made to resolution pursuant to Article 101(1).

Or. en

Amendment 460

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 9

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
9. Member States shall ensure that the claims of the resolution financing arrangement referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article and in Article 37(7) have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, a preferred priority ranking, which shall be higher than the ranking provided for the claims of deposits and of deposit guarantee schemes pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article.;deleted

Or. en

Justification

The claims of the resolution financing mechanism established here and their preferential position in insolvency proceedings will probably regularly lead to losses of the deposit guarantee schemes and to their financial depletion. This in turn will lead to a loss of confidence on the part of depositors.

Amendment 461

Christophe Hansen

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 9

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
9. Member States shall ensure that the claims of the resolution financing arrangement referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article and in Article 37(7) have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, a preferred priority ranking, which shall be higher than the ranking provided for the claims of deposits and of deposit guarantee schemes pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article.;deleted

Or. en

Amendment 462

Pedro Marques, René Repasi, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

Article 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 9

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
9. Member States shall ensure that the claims of the resolution financing arrangement referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article and in Article 37(7) have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, a preferred priority ranking, which shall be higher than the ranking provided for the claims of deposits and of deposit guarantee schemes pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article.;9. Member States shall ensure that the claims of the resolution financing arrangement referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article and in Article 37(7) have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, a preferred priority ranking, which shall be equal to the ranking provided for the claims of deposits and of deposit guarantee schemes pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article.

Or. en

Amendment 463

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(56) [...]deleted

Or. en

Amendment 464

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraphs 1 & 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) [...]deleted

Or. en

Justification

The "bridge the gap" approach undermines the key principle that losses should be borne primarily by shareholders and then creditors of a failing bank. "Bridge the gap" is not necessary as MREL requirements ensure sufficient resolution funding.

Amendment 465

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraphs 1 & 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(a) [...]deleted

Or. en

Amendment 466

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action with respect to a credit institution, and provided that such action ensures that depositors continue to have access to their deposits, to prevent depositors from bearing losses the deposit guarantee scheme to which that credit institution is affiliated shall contribute the following amounts:deleted
(a) where the bail-in tool is applied, independently or in combination with the asset separation tool, the amount by which covered deposits would have been written down or converted in order to absorb the losses and recapitalise the institution under resolution pursuant to Article 46(1), had covered deposits been included within the scope of bail-in;
(b) where the sale of business or the bridge institution tools are applied, independently or in combination with other resolution tools:
(i) the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of the covered deposits and of the liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to a recipient; and
(ii) where relevant, an amount necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the recipient following the transfer.

Or. en

Justification

The proposed change of the current use of deposit guarantee schemes in the context of resolution is to be rejected. Otherwise, the financial contributions of deposit guarantee schemes for resolutions will be increased significantly in terms of frequency and amount of co-financing required. The use of deposit guarantee scheme funds for resolution measures is to be made standard, despite the fact that this is inappropriate and unnecessary.In addition, extending the scope of protection to include uncovered and unprotected deposits in resolution gives wholesale investors a free pass. This contradicts the mandate of the deposit protection scheme, which is to protect depositors in the event that a bank becomes insolvent by reimbursing up to 100,000 EUR of money deposited with the bank in question.

Amendment 467

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action with respect to a credit institution, and provided that such action ensures that depositors continue to have access to their deposits, to prevent depositors from bearing losses the deposit guarantee scheme to which that credit institution is affiliated shall contribute the following amounts:Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action with respect to a credit institution, and provided that such action ensures that natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises continue to have access to their deposits, to prevent them from bearing losses the deposit guarantee scheme to which that credit institution is affiliated shall contribute the following amounts:

Or. en

Justification

As regards resolution objectives, larger corporates should not be better treated than other clients, whose funds and assets are already protected by point (e) of Article 31(2).There is a Least Cost Test (see new article 109(2) proposal) that should ensure ex-ante that the losses for the DGS in liquidation would have been higher than the cost of its contribution in resolution.

Amendment 468

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 1 – point b – point i

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(i) the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of the covered deposits and of the liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to a recipient; and(i) the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of the covered deposits and of the liabilities with a higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to a recipient; and

Or. en

Amendment 469

Christophe Hansen

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b – point ii

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(ii) where relevant, an amount necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the recipient following the transfer.deleted

Or. en

Amendment 470

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
In the cases referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail-inable liabilities and the resolution authority assesses that the circumstances referred to in Article 44(3) apply to those deposits or liabilities, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute:deleted
(a) the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to a recipient; and
(b) where relevant, an amount necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the transfer for the recipient.
Member States shall ensure that, once the deposit guarantee scheme has made a contribution in the cases referred to in the second subparagraph, the institution under resolution refrains from acquiring stakes in other undertakings as well as distributions in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital or payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments, or from other activities that may lead to an outflow of funds.
In all cases, the cost of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall not be greater than the cost of repaying depositors as calculated by the deposit guarantee scheme under Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU.
Where it is determined by a valuation under Article 74 that the cost of the deposit guarantee scheme’s contribution to resolution was greater than the losses it would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, the deposit guarantee scheme shall be entitled to the payment of the difference from the resolution financing arrangement in accordance with Article 75.

Or. en

Amendment 471

Christophe Hansen

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) where relevant, an amount necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the transfer for the recipient.deleted

Or. en

Amendment 472

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) where relevant, an amount necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the transfer for the recipient.(b) where relevant, an amount necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the transfer for the recipient. The decision of the resolution authority to exclude eligible deposits from the application of the write-down or conversion powers shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that such an exclusion meets the requirements laid down in Article 44(3). Paragraph 12 of Article 44 shall not apply to such an exclusion.

Or. en

Amendment 473

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
In all cases, the cost of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall not be greater than the cost of repaying depositors as calculated by the deposit guarantee scheme under Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU.In all cases, the cost of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall not be greater than the cost of repaying depositors as calculated by the deposit guarantee scheme under Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and the amount equal to 50% of its target level pursuant to Article 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU. Taking into account the specificities of their national banking sector, Member States may set a percentage which is higher than 50%.

Or. en

Amendment 474

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 5

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Where it is determined by a valuation under Article 74 that the cost of the deposit guarantee scheme’s contribution to resolution was greater than the losses it would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, the deposit guarantee scheme shall be entitled to the payment of the difference from the resolution financing arrangement in accordance with Article 75.deleted

Or. en

Justification

As regards resolution objectives, larger corporates should not be better treated than other clients, whose funds and assets are already protected by point (e) of Article 31(2).There is a Least Cost Test (see new article 109(2) proposal) that should ensure ex-ante that the losses for the DGS in liquidation would have been higher than the cost of its contribution in resolution.

Amendment 475

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2. Member States shall ensure that the resolution authority determines the amount of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme in accordance with paragraph 1 after having consulted the deposit guarantee scheme on the estimated cost of repaying depositors pursuant to Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in compliance with the conditions referred to in Article 36 of this Directive.deleted
The resolution authority shall notify its decision as referred to in the first subparagraph to the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated. The deposit guarantee scheme shall implement that decision without delay.;

Or. en

Justification

The proposed change of the current use of deposit guarantee schemes in the context of resolution is to be rejected. Otherwise, the financial contributions of deposit guarantee schemes for resolutions will be increased significantly in terms of frequency and amount of co-financing required. The use of deposit guarantee scheme funds for resolution measures is to be made standard, despite the fact that this is inappropriate and unnecessary.In addition, extending the scope of protection to include uncovered and unprotected deposits in resolution gives wholesale investors a free pass. This contradicts the mandate of the deposit protection scheme, which is to protect depositors in the event that a bank becomes insolvent by reimbursing up to 100,000 EUR of money deposited with the bank in question.

Amendment 476

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2. Member States shall ensure that the resolution authority determines the amount of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme in accordance with paragraph 1 after having consulted the deposit guarantee scheme on the estimated cost of repaying depositors pursuant to Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in compliance with the conditions referred to in Article 36 of this Directive.deleted
The resolution authority shall notify its decision as referred to in the first subparagraph to the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated. The deposit guarantee scheme shall implement that decision without delay.;

Or. en

Amendment 477

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraphs 2a & 2b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(b) the following paragraphs 2a and 2b are inserted:deleted
‘
2a.
Where the funds of the deposit guarantee scheme are used in accordance with paragraph 1, first subparagraph, point (a), to contribute to the recapitalisation of the institution under resolution, Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme transfers its holdings of shares or other capital instruments in the institution under resolution to the private sector as soon as commercial and financial circumstances allow.
Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme markets the shares and other capital instruments referred to in the first subparagraph openly and transparently, and that the sale does not misrepresent them or discriminate between potential purchasers. Any such sale shall be made on commercial terms.
2b.
The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a).
Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.
However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.;
’

Or. en

Amendment 478

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2a

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2a. Where the funds of the deposit guarantee scheme are used in accordance with paragraph 1, first subparagraph, point (a), to contribute to the recapitalisation of the institution under resolution, Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme transfers its holdings of shares or other capital instruments in the institution under resolution to the private sector as soon as commercial and financial circumstances allow.deleted
Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme markets the shares and other capital instruments referred to in the first subparagraph openly and transparently, and that the sale does not misrepresent them or discriminate between potential purchasers. Any such sale shall be made on commercial terms.

Or. en

Justification

The proposed change of the current use of Use of deposit guarantee schemes in the context of resolution is to be rejected. Otherwise, the financial contributions of deposit guarantee schemes for resolutions will be increased significantly in terms of frequency and amount of co-financing required. The use of deposit guarantee scheme funds for resolution measures is to be made standard, despite the fact that this is inappropriate and unnecessary.

Amendment 479

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2b. The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a).deleted
Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.
However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.;

Or. en

Justification

The proposed change of the current use of Use of deposit guarantee schemes in the context of resolution is to be rejected. Otherwise, the financial contributions of deposit guarantee schemes for resolutions will be increased significantly in terms of frequency and amount of co-financing required. The use of deposit guarantee scheme funds for resolution measures is to be made standard, despite the fact that this is inappropriate and unnecessary.

Amendment 480

Christophe Hansen

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2b

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
2b. The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a).deleted
Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.
However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.;

Or. en

Amendment 481

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a).The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(8), point (a).

Or. en

Amendment 482

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 1

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a).The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1 shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a).

Or. en

Amendment 483

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, and in case the DGS notifies the resolution authority that it anticipates a risk of facing a liquidity shortfall, the resolution authority may decide to limit the gross contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). In such a case, following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101, and any loss that the resolution financing arrangement thereby incurs as a result of its intervention shall be repaid to it by the DGS over a 6 year period at the most.

Or. en

Justification

OPTION 1 : Bridge in liquidity support to the DGS: (Low level of ambition in CMDI package to harmonize crisis management) : The bridge needs to be negotiated hand in hand with the level of ambition on the rest of the review. If there is support for a material expansion of the scope of resolution, for a robust MREL requirement for new transfer tool with market exit, and further conditionalities on the alternative and preventive measures that have been used in the past to circumvent resolution, then it would be appropriate to introduce a loss sharing mechanism to offset part of the cost of the LC intervention of the DGS with the support of the resolution financing arrangement/SRF. If the level of ambition on the rest of the package is more limited, then the RF/SRF intervention under the “bridge” should be designed as a liquidity support for the concerned DGS, which would have to repay the RF/SRF after a certain period of time.

Amendment 484

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be equal to the sum of the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a) and of the amount contributed by the resolution financing arrangement multiplied by the share of covered deposits as part of the total liabilities in the scope of the transfer. Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.

Or. en

Justification

OPTION 2 : Bridge in loss sharing between DGS and RF/SRF (High level of ambition in CMDI package to harmonize crisis management) : The bridge needs to be negotiated hand in hand with the level of ambition on the rest of the review. If there is support for a material expansion of the scope of resolution, for a robust MREL requirement for new transfer tool with market exit, and further conditionalities on the alternative and preventive measures that have been used in the past to circumvent resolution, then it would be appropriate to introduce a loss sharing mechanism to offset part of the cost of the LC intervention of the DGS with the support of the resolution financing arrangement/SRF. If the level of ambition on the rest of the package is more limited, then the RF/SRF intervention under the “bridge” should be designed as a liquidity support for the concerned DGS, which would have to repay the RF/SRF after a certain period of time.

Amendment 485

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 2

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.

Or. en

Amendment 486

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.;deleted

Or. en

Amendment 487

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.;However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that meet any of the following conditions:
i) they have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan;
ii) they have never complied with their fully-loaded MREL requirements since being identified as resolution entities.

Or. en

Justification

OPTION 2 : Bridge in loss sharing between DGS and RF/SRF : (High level of ambition in CMDI package to harmonize crisis management) : The bridge needs to be negotiated hand in hand with the level of ambition on the rest of the review. If there is support for a material expansion of the scope of resolution, for a robust MREL requirement for new transfer tool with market exit, and further conditionalities on the alternative and preventive measures that have been used in the past to circumvent resolution, then it would be appropriate to introduce a loss sharing mechanism to offset part of the cost of the LC intervention of the DGS with the support of the resolution financing arrangement/SRF. If the level of ambition on the rest of the package is more limited, then the RF/SRF intervention under the “bridge” should be designed as a liquidity support for the concerned DGS, which would have to repay the RF/SRF after a certain period of time.

Amendment 488

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point d

Directive 2014/59/EU

Article 109 – paragraph 5 – subparagraphs 2 & 3

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
(d) in paragraph 5, the second and third subparagraphs are deleted;deleted

Or. en

Justification

Reinstates limits for DGS liability.

Amendment 489

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a directive

Article 2 a (new)

Amendment: Text proposed by the Commission and Amendment
Text proposed by the CommissionAmendment
Article2a
Transitional period
1. Institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU whose preferred resolution strategy will change depending on the entry into force of this amending Directive shall comply with the requirements referred to in Articles 45e or 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7) of Directive 2014/59/EU, as appropriate, within five years as from the date of the approval of the resolution plan including the new preferred resolution strategy.
2. During the transitional period referred to in the first paragraph, in the cases referred to in point (b), of the first subparagraph of Article 109(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, as amended by this amending Directive, where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail-inable liabilities, by way of derogation from the second subparagraph of that paragraph, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute to the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, of senior bail-inable liabilities held by retail clients, as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to the recipient.

Or. en

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European Parliament (2023). “AMENDMENTS 250 - 489 - Draft report Amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action”. Text, 6 November 2023. docId ECON-AM-755990. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-AM-755990 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: EP Open Data API: document record, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/api/v2/documents/ECON-AM-755990 (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX 
@misc{epw-text-econ-am-755990,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{AMENDMENTS 250 - 489 - Draft report Amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action}},
  year = {2023},
  date = {2023-11-06},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-AM-755990}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-AM-755990},
  urldate = {2026-09-25},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. docId ECON-AM-755990. Data: EP Open Data API: document record (CC BY 4.0)}
}