Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section II – European Council and Council

(2025/2147(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section II – European Council and Council,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the second report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A100000/2026),(A10-0051/2026),

Change 2

ChangedA. whereas the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions derives first and foremost from strict respect for the Treaties, which lay down the institutional balance and the clear distribution of competences; whereas transparency, accountability and sound financial management are essential obligations of all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies when spending taxpayers’ money; whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountabilityaccountability, and by implementing athe concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

Change 3

ChangedB. whereas, under Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the Union, and whereas the budget of the European Council and of the Council (the ‘Council’) is a section of the Union budget;budget and is therefore legally bound by the Treaties and the Financial Regulation to ensure transparency, accountability and sound financial management, irrespective of its intergovernmental nature;

Change 4

ChangedC. whereas, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union,Union (TEU), the European Council is not to exercise legislative functions;

D. whereas, under Article 317 TFEU, the Commission is to implement the Union budget on its own responsibility, having regard to the principles of sound financial management, and whereas, under the framework in place, the Commission is to confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

Change 5

ChangedE. whereas, under Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU, the European Council and the Council (the ‘Council’)‘Council’ areis assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council,Council (the ‘Secretariat’), and whereas the Secretary-General of the Council is wholly responsible for the sound management of the appropriations entered in Section II of the Union budget;

Change 6

ChangedF. whereas, over the course of almostmore than twenty years, Parliament has been implementing the well-established and respected practice of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and whereas the Commission supports that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution, body, office and agency for its administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued;

Change 7

ChangedG. whereas, according to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall confer on the other Union institutionsInstitutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

Change 8

ChangedH. whereas, since 2009,the 2009 budget discharge, the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure has prevented Parliament from exercising its democratic scrutiny role and has repeatedly compelled Parliament to refuse to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council;

I. whereas the European Council and the Council, as Union institutions and as recipients of the general budget of the Union, should be transparent and democratically accountable to the citizens of the Union and subject to democratic scrutiny of the spending of public funds;

Change 9

ChangedJ. whereas theArticle recommendation15(3) ofTFEU requires the EuropeanUnion Ombudsmaninstitutions (theto ‘Ombudsman’)ensure in strategictheir inquiryRules OI/2/2017/TEof onProcedure thethat transparencytheir ofproceedings theare Counciltransparent, legislativewhile processin indicatedseveral thatof theits Council’sinquiries practiceand withdecisions regardthe toEuropean transparencyOmbudsman in(the ‘Ombudsman’) has criticised the legislativeCouncil processfor constitutedits maladministrationlack andof shouldtransparency besuggesting addressedthat inthe orderCouncil tohas enablefailed citizensfully to followgrasp the Unioncritical legislativelink process;between democracy and the transparency of decision-making;

Change 10

ChangedK. whereas the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirms the right of taxpayers and of the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue and that the General Court in in its judgment of 25 January 2023 in Case T-163/21, De Capitani v Council, stated on transparency within the Union legislative process that documents produced by the Council in its working groups are not of technical nature but legislative and are therefore subject to access to documents requests;

Change 11

Removed1. Deeply regrets that since 2009, and again for the financial year 2024, Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure, preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget and thereby compelling Parliament to refuse discharge;

Added1. Notes that the budget of the Council falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 13,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,9 % of the total Union budget); notes that the Council’s budget of approximately EUR 0,7 billion represents 5,26 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

Removed2. Notes that on 22 September 2025, the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat of the Council containing 103 important questions from Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with thorough answers to all questions;

Added2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2024 (the ‘Court’s report’) examined a sample of 70 transactions under the heading ‘Administration’, the same number as in 2023, whereas the Court further states that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2024 accounted for approximately 69 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology (IT), and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

Removed3. Regrets that, on 3 October 2025, the General Secretariat of the Council informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing which was arranged for 6 November 2025 as part of the discharge procedure and in which all other institutions that were invited participated;

Added3. Notes that 16 (23 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the three errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold; notes that the Court’s report did not identify any specific issues concerning the Council;

Removed4. Emphasises Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU, as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability towards Union taxpayers;

AddedState of play of the discharge procedure

Removed5. Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer the requisite powers on the other Union institutions for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it once again incomprehensible that the Council believes it appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget;

Added4. Deeply regrets that since 2009 and again for the financial year 2023 Parliament has had to refuse discharge to the Council because the Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure despite Parliament’s repeated efforts to establish constructive cooperation, thereby preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget;

Removed6. Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of almost twenty years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued by Parliament;

Added5. Notes that, on 22 September 2025, the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat containing 103 important questions for Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with detailed answers to all the questions;

Removed7. Stresses that the current situation allows Parliament to check only the reports of the Court of Auditors and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website, because the Council continues its malpractice of non-cooperation with Parliament which makes it difficult for Parliament to carry out its duties properly and make an informed decision on granting discharge;

Added6. Regrets that, on 3 October 2025, the Secretariat informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing organised on 6 November 2025 as part of the discharge procedure and in which all other invited institutions participated;

Removed8. Deplores that the Council, for 15 years, has shown a lack of political willingness to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure; underlines that this attitude has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions, has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and has damaged the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity;

Added7. Reiterates Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability to Union taxpayers;

Removed9. Reaffirms its deep frustration regarding the Council's attitude towards the discharge procedure, which conveys an inappropriate message to Union citizens at a time when greater transparency is essential; underlines that the Council must adhere to the same standards of accountability it expects from other Union institutions;

Added8. Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it incomprehensible that the Council believes it appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget;

Removed10. Emphasises that all other Union institutions acknowledge and comprehend the principle that, given the delegation of power concerning budget implementation, Parliament holds both the right and the obligation to scrutinise their budgets and their execution as part of the discharge procedure; in light of this, expresses its strong disapproval that the Council persists in its refusal to cooperate with Parliament in this regard;

Added9. Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of more than 20 years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including the Council; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of granting discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure and implementation of the Union budget should continue to be pursued directly by Parliament to preserve the compliance of the principle of sound financial management; recalls that all other institutions, bodies, offices and agencies cooperate fully with Parliament in the discharge procedure, and considers the Council’s refusal to do so unjustified and incompatible with the principle of institutional loyalty under the Treaties;

Removed11. Recalls that the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenues; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure;

Added10. Stresses that the current situation implies that Parliament can only check the reports of the Court and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website, which makes it impossible for Parliament to make an informed decision on granting discharge; underlines that the lack of cooperation of the Council undermines Parliament’s prerogative to effectively fulfil its oversight role;

Removed12. Stresses that the current situation must be improved through better interinstitutional cooperation within the existing framework of the Treaties; considers that a possible revision of the Treaties could make the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by explicitly empowering Parliament to grant discharge individually to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and urges the Council to actively engage with Parliament to address the current situation;

Added11. Deplores the lack of political willingness from the Council, for more than a decade, to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure, thereby creating a structural blind spot in the Union’s system of checks and balances, and that this has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions and has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and on the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity; stresses that such persistent institutional obstruction undermines the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in the Treaties; considers that continued non-cooperation risks further eroding the legitimacy of the Union’s budgetary governance framework; underlines that the Council must adhere to the same standards of accountability and transparency as the other Union institutions;

Removed13. Recalls that on 6 May 2025, during his intervention in Parliament’s plenary, the Representative of the Presidency of the Council expressed the latter’s willingness ‘to engage in a meaningful and pragmatic cooperation between our institutions’ when it comes to discharge in relation to the European Council and Council section of the Union budget, and reiterates its call for this intention to be translated into concrete steps in due time; calls therefore on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible, involving the Secretary-Generals and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and find a solution while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensuring transparency and proper democratic control of budget implementation; reiterates its request that the Commission and the Council legal services provide an opinion on potential Treaty-based solutions to enforce Council’s accountability in the discharge procedure;

Added12. Reiterates that the Council’s continued refusal to engage in the discharge procedure is an unacceptable breach of democratic accountability; calls on the introduction of concrete and effective measures to ensure that any Union institution failing to comply with transparency obligations is held fully accountable, by exploring practical measures in line with Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, and the principle of sound financial management, that incentivise cooperation, including enhanced conditionality in administrative arrangements and reporting requirements;

Removed14. Stresses that Parliament’s observations concerning budgetary and financial management, internal management, performance and internal control, human resources, equality and well-being, ethical framework and transparency, digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection, buildings, environment and sustainability, interinstitutional cooperation and communication from its discharge resolution of 29 April 2026 are still valid;

Added13. Recalls that the case-law of the CJEU supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenues; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure and insists on the full application of Article 14(1) TEU;

Removed15. Reiterates its regret that the budget of the European Council and the Council has not been divided into two clearly separated budgets as recommended by Parliament in previous discharge resolutions in order to improve transparency and accountability, not least concerning the European Council, given that it is currently impossible to obtain reliable information regarding its costs; stresses the importance of reliable data for objective control; calls for compliance with the recommendation of the discharge authority;

Added14. Notes that on 6 May 2025, during his intervention in Parliament’s plenary, the Representative of the Presidency of the Council expressed the latter’s willingness ‘to engage in a meaningful and pragmatic cooperation between our institutions’ when it comes to discharge in relation to the Council section of the Union budget, and calls for this intention to be translated into concrete and immediate actions; calls therefore on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible, involving the Secretary-Generals and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and find a solution that upholds the institutional competences of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensures transparency and robust democratic control of the budget implementation; reiterates its request that the Commission and the Council legal services provide an opinion on potential Treaty-based solutions to enforce Council’s accountability in the discharge procedure;

Removed16. Stresses that while unanimity voting remains a core principle of the Treaties, its application can, in certain circumstances and in critical policy areas, affect the timelines and effectiveness of the Union, including by paralysing the Union’s decision-making process and therefore making it prone to blackmail by Member States, especially those who fail to respect the rule of law; calls for targeted treaty reforms or, alternatively, practical improvements, within the existing Treaty framework, to strengthen transparency, democratic decision making, accountability and the efficiency of the European Council’s work;

Added15. Stresses that, while the current situation has to be improved through better inter-institutional cooperation within the framework of the Treaties, a revision of the Treaties could make the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by giving Parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies individually; stresses, however, that pending such a review, the current situation must be improved through enhanced inter-institutional cooperation; urges in this sense the Council to actively engage with Parliament;

Added16. Notes that, despite the Council’s longstanding unwillingness to cooperate in the discharge procedure, Parliament, nevertheless, highlights some political priorities and sets out some observations concerning the budgetary and financial management of the Council and other observations relevant for the discharge procedure in this report, in a manner that respects national sovereignty, the Treaties and the principle of sound financial management;

Added17. Notes that, given the Council’s lack of cooperation with Parliament, observations in the following sections primarily rely on aggregated information published on the Council’s website, which provides limited detail;

AddedPolitical priorities

Added18. Recalls that in 2024 the Union agreed to provide predictable financial support to Ukraine through the Ukraine Facility for 2024–2027; stresses that, in this context, the Council and the Secretariat have a heightened responsibility to ensure transparency, integrity and sound financial management in all Council-related administrative spending connected to Ukraine-related decision-making, meetings and logistical arrangements, including clear reporting of related costs and contract management;

Added19. Regrets that the Council exerts its prerogative in the nomination and appointment procedures for many Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, without taking into account the views of interested parties or the recommendations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);

Added20. Notes with concern the Council’s practice regarding appointments made by individual Member States for most positions which may limit the extent to which the professional qualifications of candidates are checked; insists, therefore, on the need for a review of the Council’s prerogative with a view to guaranteeing and strengthening the participation of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies concerned and increasing the legitimacy of those appointed; suggests that one possibility that could be put in place to ensure that candidates have the necessary qualifications would be to apply the same screening by an external panel used for the nominations of the judges and advocates-general of the CJEU;

Added21. Recalls that, pursuant to Article 286(2) TFEU, the Council appoints the members of the Court after consultation with Parliament; recalls that, on the basis of this prerequisite, Parliament delivers an opinion on the candidates; regrets that the Council has repeatedly disregarded Parliament’s recommendations in its consultative role regarding the appointment of the members of the Court; recalls that although Parliament’s opinion is non-binding on the Council, candidates who received an unfavourable opinion withdrew their candidatures by accepting Parliament’s decision, thereby recognising the role of Parliament as the democratic supervisory authority linked to the safeguarding of the Union budget; calls on the Council to recognise Parliament’s role by cooperating in the discharge procedure;

Added22. Stresses that the persistent gender imbalance among the Members of the Court undermines the Union’s equality objectives; reiterates its call on the Council to address this issue by revising the nomination procedure and taking concrete measures, such as requiring Member States to submit at least two candidates of different genders, thus ensuring a more balanced and representative composition of the Court while respecting the principles of merit, excellence and equal opportunities;

Added23. Reaffirms its call for the creation of a Council of Defence Ministers as an institutional forum for political and strategic coordination; considers that a permanent and dedicated Council configuration on defence would reflect the need for the Union to assume greater responsibility for its own security and defence, complementing the establishment of a Security and Defence Committee in Parliament and a Commissioner for Defence and Space in the Commission;

Added24. Regrets that the Council has so far ignored Parliament’s resolution of 17 December 2020 on the need for a dedicated Council configuration on gender equality and insists that a dedicated institutional forum would ensure stronger integration of gender equality in Union policies and strategies as well as essential coordination and progress in the main files related to gender equality;