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Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

CONT-PR-789970 → A-10-2026-0210

From
CONT-PR-789970 report parliamentary committee draft of 29 Jun 2026
To
A-10-2026-0210 Plenary report of 17 Jul 2026
Changes
1 change to the text
Paragraphs
+0 added · −0 removed · 6 changed
More facts (3)
Title (from)
on the nomination of Gerald Loacker as a Member of the Court of Auditors
Title (to)
on the nomination of Gerald Loacker as a Member of the Court of Auditors
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 16 Sept 2026

The report now delivers a favourable opinion on the nomination of Gerald Loacker as a Member of the Court of Auditors, where the earlier draft left open whether the opinion would be favourable or unfavourable.1

The notes class 1 change as substance, 0 as formal, 0 as wording only.

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Part 5 of 5: Paragraphs 151–178

28 unchanged paragraphs

(2) adequate public resources, in the form of well-managed and suitable administrative capacity as well as appropriate funding, in line with the principle of economy. This includes not to waste taxpayers’ money for unnecessary services or infrastructure but also to ensure reliable quality services and infrastructure. Furthermore, it requires excellent management of the administration. The European Court of Auditors can help in evaluating the management of the public administration and suggesting improvements. It can also evaluate funded projects to assess whether the selection offered the best quality for the best price. As part of this work, it can help ensure that any financial mismanagement and corruption will be investigated and prosecuted to protect taxpayers’ financial interests.

(3) that the provided resources achieve the defined objectives to the best extent possible, based on the principle of effectiveness. This includes delivering the best added value for citizens. The European Court of Auditors can provide in-depth analysis about the impact of EU action and funding. This is crucial in many areas such as the Single Market and climate change. It can help to identify bottlenecks, improve legislation, and better target funding to the most effective projects that deliver the maximum European added value to EU citizens.

(4) Together, economy and efficiency should result in achieving the objectives at a reasonable price, based on the principle of efficiency. This ensures good value for money for taxpayers. The European Court of Auditors can provide assessments on the archived value for money and identify areas for improvement. This includes comparative analysis between member states and promoting best practices. It can also help to report on progress and increase transparency, based on factual evidence. Furthermore, it provides assurance on the reliability of related public reporting.

15. Under the Treaty, the Court is required to assist Parliament in exercising its powers of control over the implementation of the budget. How would you further improve the cooperation between the Court and the European Parliament (in particular, its Committee on Budgetary Control) to enhance both the public oversight of the general spending and its value for money?

As I have not been part of the operational relations between the European Court of Auditors and the European Parliament, so far, my insights are limited to publicly available information. Based on these, I would like to:

(1) encourage close dialogue with the European Parliament to take into account Parliament’s information needs, key risks for the EU budget and the legislative and discharge calendar, while fully respecting the ECA’s independence in selecting and conducting audits. This should result in timely audits, adding the best possible value to the European Parliament and therefore EU citizens.

(2) explore the possibility of detailed follow-up assessments to provide the European Parliament information about the implementation of recommendations and whether they have resulted in better sound financial management.

(3) help further strengthen the annual discharge procedure, as the key tool available to the Committee on Budgetary Control to ensure budgetary oversight. This could be done by adding relevant contextual review work to the Annual Report and by aligning some performance audits with the content and timeline of the discharge procedure.

16. What added value do you think performance auditing brings and how should the findings be incorporated in management procedures?

While the legality and regularity of EU revenue and expenditure must always be ensured, citizens and legislators are ultimately interested not only in compliance, but also in results. Performance auditing therefore brings essential added value to sound financial management. They assess whether public funds are used economically, efficiently and effectively, whether programmes achieve their objectives, and whether EU actions deliver real value for citizens.

Based on my experience as a legislator, manager, consultant and court-certified independent expert, I am aware of the practical challenges involved in implementing projects and funding programmes effectively and efficiently. Performance audits help to make these challenges visible. They provide reliable facts, identify weaknesses in design or implementation, highlight good practices and support better public management.

The importance of performance auditing has further increased against the background of the Commission’s proposals for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034 and recent tools like the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Where funding is increasingly linked to milestones, targets or performance rather than directly to costs, it becomes even more important to assess whether formal achievements translate into genuine impact. In times of limited resources and competing priorities, ensuring value for money is more important than ever.

The findings of performance audits should be presented clearly to the European Parliament and other key stakeholders, so that they can support public debate, democratic oversight and informed decision-making. However, their value depends on whether they are followed up in practice. This is why clear and actionable recommendations are key. They enable the responsible institutions and administrations to consider appropriate improvements, define responsibilities where necessary and monitor progress over time.

Depending on the findings, performance audits may point to a need to review programme design, legislation, budget allocation, administrative procedures, reporting systems or internal controls. The decision on such changes remains, of course, with the competent political, legislative and administrative authorities. In my view, performance auditing should not be seen as an isolated ex-post exercise, but as a tool for learning and continuous improvement. It helps administrations and decision-makers identify weaknesses, build on good practices and achieve better results with public money.

17. How could cooperation between the Court of Auditors, the national audit institutions and the European Parliament (Committee on Budgetary Control) on auditing of the EU budget be improved?

Cooperation between the European Court of Auditors, national supreme audit institutions and the European Parliament is particularly important because a large part of the EU budget is implemented in or with the Member States. Existing structures, in particular the Contact Committee of the Heads of EU Supreme Audit Institutions and the European Court of Auditors, provide a useful framework for exchanging information, identifying common risks, sharing audit experience and avoiding unnecessary duplication.

I would support using this framework more systematically, while fully respecting the independence of each audit institution. In areas such as shared management, the Recovery and Resilience Facility, future performance-based financing instruments and possible National and Regional Partnership Plans, coordinated audit approaches, parallel audits and exchanges on methodology could improve the quality, comparability and usefulness of audit findings.

The European Parliament, and especially the Committee on Budgetary Control, should benefit from this cooperation through clearer information on systemic risks, data quality, implementation weaknesses and good practices across Member States. In my view, the aim should not be to create additional bureaucracy, but to make better use of existing audit knowledge so that EU funds can be scrutinised more effectively and at lower administrative cost.

18. How would you further develop the reporting of the ECA to give the European Parliament all the necessary information on the accuracy of the data provided by the Member States to the European Commission?

The key issue for Parliament is not only whether Member States provide data to the Commission, but whether that data is accurate, complete, comparable, timely and supported by a reliable audit trail.

Through its Strategy for 2026-2030, the European Court of Auditors has defined priority areas for its work. In line with these priorities, I would encourage audits that build on each other to provide insights and assurance on large policy areas, both, in a meaningful and detailed but also overall and horizonal way. Such an approach could allow examining differing aspects of key policies, such as the reliability of the IT systems used, data quality and accuracy of reporting as well as various performance aspects, using synergies between consecutive audits. Afterwards, horizontal review products could be used to summarize audits within an area to provide an overview of key challenges, as happened for the Recovery and Resilience Facility. They could also be further enhanced through targeted audit work to update information and fill gaps.

In line with the Financial Regulation, I would like to contribute to timely performance audits within the foreseen 13-month timeline. This requires existing knowledge to be built over time, such as a good understanding of existing procedures and available data in specific policy areas. It may also require streamlining clearing and adversarial procedures, as recommended in the 2025 peer-review of the European Court of Auditors.

A key challenge for providing assurance on the accuracy of Member State data are differing data collection methods as well as national monitoring and reporting systems. Modern IT tools and, where appropriate, AI-based analytical methods can support risk analysis, plausibility checks and the identification of outliers. Thus, I intend to contribute to the European Court of Auditors digital strategy with my experience from the private sector. However, considering many of the reported findings by the European Court of Auditors, it is clear to me that audit work in the member states remains crucial, for instance to identify differences between documentation and reality.

Other questions

19. Will you withdraw your candidacy if Parliament’s opinion on your appointment as Member of the Court is unfavourable?

Yes. I would withdraw my candidacy if the European Parliament’s opinion were unfavourable.

Having served as a Member of the Austrian Parliament for more than eleven years, I have a deep respect for parliamentary decisions and for the democratic legitimacy they express. The European Court of Auditors is required by the Treaties to assist the European Parliament in exercising its powers of control over the implementation of the EU budget. Such cooperation must be based on trust and mutual respect.

If Parliament did not have confidence in my appointment, I would consider it inconsistent with my understanding of parliamentary democracy and institutional cooperation to disregard that opinion. I would therefore respect Parliament’s decision and withdraw my candidacy.

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
27 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2026). “Changes between CONT-PR-789970 and A-10-2026-0210”. Text, 17 July 2026. from CONT-PR-789970, to A-10-2026-0210, reference 2026/0806(NLE). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/CONT-PR-789970/compare/A-10-2026-0210?all=1&part=5 (retrieved 27 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2026-07-17,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between CONT-PR-789970 and A-10-2026-0210}},
  year = {2026},
  date = {2026-07-17},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/CONT-PR-789970/compare/A-10-2026-0210?all=1&part=5}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/CONT-PR-789970/compare/A-10-2026-0210?all=1&part=5},
  urldate = {2026-09-27},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from CONT-PR-789970, to A-10-2026-0210, reference 2026/0806(NLE). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}