Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Change 26

Changed27.47. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF reportReport revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; underlines that organised criminal groups are increasingly exploiting corruption to infiltrate public administrations to distort procurement processes and secure illicit economic advantages; observes that the study on high-risk corruption areas of 4 November 202423 indicates that public procurement, construction and infrastructure, and healthcare are the areas most at risk of overlaps between fraud and corruption; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus due to a similar chance or situation and not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen thetargeted, userisk-based ofdetection specifictools analysis-basedand detectionproactive tools;investigation strategies, rather than relying on non-systematic controls; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication on– online and through other channels accessible to the internetgeneral public – of detailed information about the use of EuropeanEU funds, the full identity of final beneficiariesbeneficiaries, given that this concerns public money, the outcomes of subsidised programmes and projects, and the results of public procurement procedures; considers that the low level of reporting of fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS points to structural deficiencies in detection and reporting systems; calls on the Commission itself to lead by example and assess the quality and completeness of the data transmitted by Member States and to issue specific recommendations to address these deficiencies; acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States, but underlines that their evaluation and periodical revision are needed; encourages the Commission to monitor the progress of the actions launched in the Member States, provide periodic updates and report on the analyses carried out by the competent authorities of the Member States, and to lead by example itself;

Change 27

Changed28.48. Calls,Stresses that the protection of the EU’s financial interests must be fully integrated into enlargement policy; underlines that candidate countries must demonstrate their capacity to prevent, detect and address fraud and corruption affecting public funds, in line with EU rules and standards; calls on the Commission to implement stronger transparency rules with regard to EU funds being granted to non-EU countries, and calls, before any further enlargement of the EU, for a thorough examination of the effectiveness of control systems and safeguards for the protection of the EU’s financial interests and of the state of corruption in the candidate countries, including their anti-corruption frameworks, judicial independence and administrative capacity, especially if they become net beneficiaries of the budget after accession, in order to guard against any drift and any damage to the financial interests of the UnionEU by a future Member State; stresses that, in the event of the integration into the EU of a country presenting problems in these areas, effective controls and post-accession monitoring are essential;

Main threats – conflicts of interest

Change 28

Changed29.49. Maintains, as indicated in the ECA’s audit work, that the main source of information on conflicts of interest is the IMS and that the quantity and quality of data recorded in the IMS varies from one Member State to another; is aware that Member States have so far failed to report cases of conflict of interest that were part of a wider fraud case; notes thatthat, by the end of 2024, 418 cases related to conflicts of interest had been reported through the IMS (92 % concerned cohesion, 3 % agriculture and 3 % pre-accession), representing around EUR 159 million;

Change 29

Changed30.50. Notes thatthat, in 2024, Member States focused on preventing ‘conflicts of interest’ and that the adoption of 30 measures was reported by 16 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden); notes that these measures targeting conflicts of interest revolve around training and capacity building, management and deterrence, transparency and improved governance; notes that these measures place a strong focus on prevention and detection, suggesting a transition to comprehensive conflict of interest management systems that use both human oversight and technological innovation to reduce fraud risks;

51. Notes that the ECA has identified weaknesses in national control systems designed to ensure compliance with EU rules, in particular on public procurement and State aid, which increases the risk of undetected conflicts of interest; notes that these weaknesses concern the content, quality, timing and documentation of controls;

Change 30

Removed32. Recalls that the budgetary conditionality mechanism established by the Conditionality Regulation is a legally regulated tool to prevent risks to the Union budget; notes that its application can, however, be justified only where there is a direct, real and demonstrated link between the failures found and the harm to the financial interests of the Union; expresses its concern that any extension of its scope beyond this budgetary purpose would be contrary to the spirit of the Treaties and the principle of proportionality; recalls that the legitimacy of this mechanism is based on a strictly objective application, free from any political considerations, and respectful of equal treatment between Member States;

Added52. Welcomes the Commission’s ongoing revision of the handbook on reporting irregularities in shared management24, in cooperation with Member State experts, and expects reporting of conflict of interest cases in the IMS to be comprehensive, detailed and legally certain, allowing for clear and proportionate assessment; commends, furthermore, the dedicated focus group on conflict of interest prevention and detection held during the 2024 annual technical working meeting with national audit bodies for the RRF; calls for measures addressing conflicts of interests to be implemented in a way that ensures legal certainty, and for these measures to be based on a clear and proportionate assessment of the risks and allow for their practical application by the competent authorities;

Added53. Recalls that the budgetary conditionality mechanism established by the Conditionality Regulation is a legally regulated tool to prevent risks to the EU budget; notes that its application can, however, be justified only where there is a direct, real and demonstrated link between the failures found and the harm to the financial interests of the EU; expresses its concern that any extension of its scope beyond this budgetary purpose would be contrary to the spirit of the Treaties and the principle of proportionality; recalls that the legitimacy of this mechanism is based on a strictly objective application, free from any political considerations, and respectful of equal treatment between Member States; notes that its implementation has raised practical and operational challenges, as highlighted by ECA special report 03/2024 on the rule of law in the EU; calls on the Commission to apply the mechanism consistently and transparently on the basis of objective evidence;

Added54. Maintains that the integrity and reputation of the EU’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies is a core element of citizens’ trust; believes that accountability in the use of EU budget resources is crucial for democratic legitimacy, and that requirements related to transparency and the protection of the EU’s financial interests must apply equally to every beneficiary and without exception within each EU institution, including Parliament, in order to guarantee sound financial management and effective controls for public funds;

Revenue

Change 31

Changed33.55. Stresses that at a time when Europeanthe EU institutions are regularly debating introducing new own resources, priority should instead be given to enhancing fraud prevention and detection through strengthened controls, which would enablereduce revenue losses and ensure the recovery of funds legitimately owed to the EU and currently lost; considers that a rigorous analysis of the potential for recovering revenue currently lost due to fraud and evasion should therefore be carried out;

Change 32

Removed34. Stresses that VAT remains an essential resource for the EU budget24 and reiterates its concerns about the substantial financial damage caused by cross-border fraud, including VAT fraud, due to the increasing involvement of organised crime groups; stresses that at the end of 2024, the EPPO reported 767 active investigations with a cross-border dimension, of which 573 (74 %) related to revenue, including 416 related to VAT fraud, 86 to non-VAT fraud and 71 to combined fraud; notes that the estimated total financial damage amounted to EUR 13.6 billion, representing 87 % of the financial damage related to cross-border fraud, with a significant negative impact on national budgets, tax fairness and fair competition; considers, however, that the analysis and quantification of these phenomena should be based on homogeneous data and uniform reporting standards, taking into account the system of own resources of the Union;

Added56. Insists that stepping up protection of existing revenue represents a direct and sustainable means of strengthening the EU budget; recalls that every euro recovered through effective anti-fraud measures is a euro that does not need to be raised through additional taxation of EU citizens; considers that the protection of the EU’s revenue should become a strategic priority of the AFA, reflected both in the allocation of resources and in the operational planning of the competent actors at EU and national levels;

Added57. Stresses that VAT remains an essential resource for the EU budget25 and reiterates its concerns about the substantial financial damage caused by cross-border fraud, including VAT fraud; considers that the scale and sophistication of fraud affecting the EU's financial interests, particularly on the revenue side of the budget, point to the significant involvement of serious and organised crime groups; stresses that at the end of 2024, the EPPO reported 767 active investigations with a cross-border dimension, of which 573 (74 %) were related to revenue, including 416 related to VAT fraud, 86 to non-VAT fraud and 71 to combined fraud; notes that the estimated total financial damage amounted to EUR 13.6 billion, representing 87 % of the financial damage related to cross-border fraud, with a significant negative impact on national budgets, tax fairness and fair competition; considers, however, that the analysis and quantification of these phenomena should be based on homogeneous data and uniform reporting standards, taking into account the EU’s system of own resources, in particular when quantifying the financial impact of the EPPO’s activities and the recovery expectations;

58. Notes that in 2024, the Commission estimated the 2022 VAT compliance gap at EUR 89.3 billion, representing 7.0 % of the total VAT liability; recalls that the VAT compliance gap measures the difference between the VAT revenue that would be collected in case of full compliance and the actual revenue collected and that it is not only the result of fraud, evasion or other misconduct, but also of insolvency, bankruptcy and administrative errors; maintains, however, that VAT fraud contributes significantly to VAT non-compliance and considers that digital tools and enhanced cooperation between national tax authorities and relevant EU investigative bodies are effective means to address this issue and should be encouraged and further developed; understands that, based on this data, the gap has been narrowing since 2018, when it was estimated at EUR 121.2 billion, representing 11.2 % of the total VAT due;

Change 33

Changed36.59. Notes the need to strengthen operational cooperation between the EPPO, OLAF, the customs and tax authorities of the Member States and EuropeanEU law enforcement authorities; stresses that the massive customs and VAT fraud uncovered reveals persistent loopholes in the chain of control, from customs clearance to the distribution of goods within the internal market; considers that stricter surveillance of high-risk imports and better exchange of data in real time are essential conditions for preventing the recurrence of systemic fraud of this magnitude; notes, in particular, that many ports in Europe are vulnerable places jeopardising the protection of the Union’sEU’s financial interests and that a major plan should be launched to make these gateways safer and better controlled, bearing in mind that, while the means put in place to monitor them cost money, they also make it possible to bring in additional, sometimes significant, revenue;

Expenditure

Change 34

Changed37.60. MaintainsUnderlines that, when assessing models for the implementation of EU spending, account should be taken of exposure to the risks of fraud and other misuse; regrets that the remarks repeatedly made by Parliament and the ECA and inspired by the design and implementation of the RRF have been neglectedignored in the proposed design of future EU funding instruments, notably in the post-2027 MFF; stresses that shortcomings have been identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud and double funding, lack of transparency, limited data accessibilityaccessibility, insufficient traceability of final recipients and opaque overall management,management and that theythese shouldshortcomings haveshould servedserve as a lesson for improving the design and governance of the future EU financial frameworks; recalls that the RRF is an exceptional and temporary instrument; reiterates its opposition to any replication of the RRF model in its current form and calls for any future performance-based funding to be provided with significantly stricter safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms in order to ensure the proper management of EU funds;funds, demonstrate clear added value for EU citizens and comply with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness;

Change 35

Changed38.61. Reiterates its concerns about the financial impact of irregularities detected and reported in the field of agriculture, recalling that, according to the ECA, the rural development area is exposed to a higher risk of error than direct payments to farmers; notes furthermore that in 2024, Member States reported the first fraudulent irregularities related to expenditure under their new CAP Strategic Plans, with around 25 % of fraudulent irregularities reported that year related to expenditure under those plans, almost all linked to climate and environment programmes;programmes, which suggests the need for strengthened controls to ensure sound use of the resources deployed to pursue the EU's objectives;

62. Notes that, as regards expenditure in direct management mode, in 2024, the Commission reported that it had registered 1 040 recovery posts classified as irregularities in ABAC, for a total amount of EUR 135.39 million, and that 63 of the posts were reported as fraudulent, for a total amount of EUR 62.44 million; notes that, on average, during the period 2020-2024, 43 recovery posts were classified as fraudulent irregularities per year and that the ratio between the financial amounts affected by these irregularities and the total expenditure under direct management was very low (0.05 %); notes that during the same period, 4 692 recovery posts were registered as non-fraudulent irregularities, for a total recovery amount of EUR 268.32 million, and that the ratio between the financial amounts involved in these irregularities and the total expenditure under direct management was around 0.15 %;

NextGenerationEU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility

Change 36

Changed40.63. Is deeply concerned about the ECA’s findings that the stock of EU loans increased by more than 30 % in 2024, as a direct result of the use of capital markets to finance large-scale programmes such as SURE and NGEU; notes that the total outstanding debt of the UnionEU could exceed EUR 900 billion by 2027, almost 10 times higher than the level observed in 2020 before the creation of NGEU; notes the absence of a clear, predictable and credible deleveraging strategy, even though the rapid and continuous growth of debt exposes the EU budget to increased sustainability risks, particularly in times of high interest rates; stresses that the dramatic increase in the Union’sEU’s indebtedness is automatically restricting the budgetary margins available in the current MFF; calls on the Commission to present without delay a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s debt sustainability, including medium- and long-term management scenarios, and to identify the measures necessary to ensure that debt developments do not jeopardise fiscal stability or the protection of the EU’s financial interests; urges the Commission to increase transparency on emissions, borrowing costs and associated risks, in line with the recommendations of the ECA; insists that, as a result of this unprecedented fiscal pressure, a rigorous cost-benefit analysis should be mandatory for all new EU spending programmes;

Change 37

Changed41.64. Notes that there are still inconsistencies in the reports, for example on NGEU and the RRF, thus demonstrating the limitations of the flexible instruments that the Commission intends to replicate,replicate; fornotes which,with concern, in fact, that in 2023, the EPPO reported having many ongoing investigations (233) into the recovery and resilience programmes whose estimated related financial losses werestood worryingat (EUREUR 1.86 billion);billion; notes thatthat, at the end of 2024, the EPPO was handling 311 NGEU-related active cases, including 307 from the RRF, corresponding to around 17 % of all active investigations into expenditure fraud; notes that, according to the EPPO, the estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of the Union amounts to EUR 2.8 billion, corresponding to 30 % of the total estimated damage for expenditure fraud (compared to 25 % last year); stresses, however, that in the 2023 PIF report, EPPO cases were not included in the analysis of fraud and irregularities affecting expenditure, unlike in other expenditure items, and that in the 2024 PIF Report different data is reported on EPPO investigations related to the RRF (279 investigations instead of 307, for an estimated total damage of EUR 2.7 billion instead of EUR 2.8 billion); calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the EPPO, to ensure consistent and clearly explained reporting of RRF and NGEU case figures across Commission and EPPO publications, including transparent reconciliation of methodological differences, to avoid weakening oversight and public trust;

65. Points out that the annual payments of grants under the RRF financed by NGEU reached only half of the amount anticipated by the Commission in June 2023 (EUR 96 billion); notes that by December 2024, 15 Member States had submitted payment requests for a total amount of EUR 58.5 billion;

Change 38

Changed43.66. Notes that RRF grants paid to Member States in 2024 amounted to EUR 55 896 million, which is more than the remainder of expenditure under direct management (EUR 50 172 million) and that, overall, 23 Member States received grants under the RRF, as well as loans, which in 2024 amounted to EUR 29 446 million; observes that Germany received the largest amount (EUR 13 514 million), followed by Spain and France (EUR 10 926 million and EUR 7 483 million, respectively) and that only a few countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Luxembourg and Sweden) received no grants;

Change 39

Changed44.67. Underlines that thein CommissionABAC, recordedat 1the 040end recoveryof items2024, inamong ABACthe thatrecovery wereitems classifiedrecorded asby operatingthe irregularitiesCommission under the Commission’s direct management, amounting to EURmanagement 135.39implementation millionmode and(1 reported040 as fraudulent in 63 cases,irregularities totallingand EURthe 62.4463 million,as butfraudulent), underlinesthere thatare no RRF-related irregularities were reported in ABAC at the end of 2024;irregularities; asks the Commission to report on the results of the implementation of Annex IV of the RRP Guidelines25Guidelines26 on the RRF reduction and recovery framework; points out that, according to data published in the EPPO’s 2024 annual report, 311 NGEU-related cases were ongoing at the end of 2024, all but four of which concerned the RRF, accounting for around 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations; notes that the estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of the Union amounts to EUR 2.8 billion, representing 30 % of the total financial damage related to expenditure fraud in the EU-27, compared to 25 % in 2023;

Change 40

Changed45.68. Stresses the need for greater transparency in the implementation of the RRF and recalls that the ‘final beneficiary’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, so that information on the ‘final beneficiary’ must be made available; regrets that Member States are only required to publish information on the 100 final beneficiaries receiving the highest amounts, which constitutes an arbitrary limit preventing any visibility onof the actual majority of beneficiaries and onof the potential risksrisks; considers that publishing information beyond the 100 final beneficiaries is necessary and would support the effective identification of risks related to fraud, mismanagement or conflicts of interest; points out that the examination of national practices reveals significant discrepancies in disclosure methods because some Member States report the amounts actually disbursed, others the amounts simply allocated, while others are limited to partial data or combined with national funding, which undermines the comparability, readability and reliability of the information published; calls for the publication of the full list of final recipients and beneficial owners for RRF-funded measures in a harmonised, machine-readable format across the Member States; stresses the need for a single audit trail in the future MFF allowing for budget contributions to be traced to the projects funded and the final beneficiaries, defined as the economic operators, not the receiving administrative entities; calls on the Commission to introduce mandatory fraud and irregularity reporting via the IMS for all RRF-related cases;

Change 41

Changed46.69. Reiterates its call on the Commission to strengthen its controls on the risk of double funding resulting from the financing, by both the EU budget and the RRF, of similar measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, which is enabled by the standard complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments; recalls that the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs actually incurred, but rather rewards the achievement of milestones and targets that could have been fully financed by funds other than the RRF, without this being noted due to the absence of a link in the RRF with the reimbursement of costs actually incurred; considers that limited data exchanges and insufficient use of data miningdata-mining tools such as ARACHNE, together with a lack of direct access to the full list of RRF final beneficiaries, increase the level of risk; welcomes the precautions taken by some Member States to avoid combining the RRF with other UnionEU instruments in order to mitigate the risk of double funding; reiterates its calls on the Commission to maintain adequate ex post audit procedures and to pay close attention to the risk of reversal after payment for the achievement of targets previously audited and assessed as satisfactorily fulfilled; calls on the Commission to accelerate work aimed at maximising the use of data-mining tools (including ARACHNE) to prevent double funding and detect cross-border patterns;

Change 42

RemovedExternal dimension of the protection of the financial interests of the Union

Added70. Underlines that at the current expectedly advanced implementing stage of the RRF, the scarce information on results and the lack of information on actual costs is concerning; observes that the Commission mainly relies on Member States to detect and correct serious irregularities affecting the RRF and to ensure compliance with EU and national rules, but that national controls systems have weaknesses for which remedies could not be found at the implementation stage; stresses that this results in a substantial lack of sufficient assurance that control systems adequately protect the EU’s financial interests, in the context of an error-prone facility, weakened by ambiguities in the legal framework, with often vaguely defined milestones and targets and where the fraud risk is high; reiterates its call on the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

Removed47. Appreciates the Union’s efforts, on the recommendation of the ECA, to ensure that anti-corruption measures are integrated into the EU’s external action instruments; maintains its recommendation to suspend budget support and withdraw funds from non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly do not take any concrete action against widespread corruption, without compromising support to citizens;

AddedExternal dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests

Removed48. Takes note of the conclusions of ECA special report 15/2025 on EU humanitarian aid under remote management, recognising that this management approach provides a useful framework for providing life-saving assistance in hard-to-reach areas, but that there are weaknesses in its design and implementation; observes that the Commission recognises that remote management is inherently more risky than direct implementation and that fraud and aid diversion are among the main risks, as the inability of humanitarian organisations and donors to monitor action on the ground increases the level of risk; notes that the Commission has a dedicated team, as do all donors, to deal with suspected cases of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses, however, that its risk register does not take into account the impact that remote management may have on the likelihood and impact of non-critical risks identified, such as the risk of reputational damage in the event of fraud, misuse of aid or non-compliance with ethical standards; stresses, in particular, that the insufficient integration of the risks inherent in remote management into its risk management, control and audit strategy may limit its ability to prevent, detect and adequately manage those risks, which entails a risk of damage to its reputation in the event of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses that the control strategy does not provide for any specific checks to address the inherent risks of remote management and that it does not take into account the impact of remote management on control tasks related to the fight against fraud or audits on the ground; underlines that, in fact, in the Commission’s 2021-2027 audit strategy, actions managed remotely do not automatically receive a higher risk rating in the risk-based selection of actions to be audited, despite the specific difficulties these actions face; agrees with the ECA’s recommendations, fully accepted by the Commission, on the need to improve the approach and guidance on remote management, to strengthen the certification process for non-governmental organisation partners, to verify the information provided by partners and to report on remote management to stakeholders; urges the Commission to act accordingly and to implement the ECA’s recommendation, which is fully accepted;

Added71. Appreciates the EU’s efforts, on the recommendation of the ECA, to ensure that anti-corruption measures are integrated into the EU’s external action instruments; maintains its recommendation to suspend budget support and withdraw funds from non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities fail to take effective action against widespread corruption, while ensuring support for citizens;

Added72. Takes note of the conclusions of ECA special report 15/2025 on EU humanitarian aid under remote management, recognising that this management approach provides a useful framework for providing life-saving assistance in hard-to-reach areas, but that there are weaknesses in its design and implementation; observes that the Commission recognises that remote management is inherently more risky than direct implementation and that fraud and aid diversion are among the main risks, as the inability of humanitarian organisations and donors to monitor action on the ground increases the level of risk; notes that the Commission has a dedicated team, as do all donors, to deal with suspected cases of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses, however, that its risk register does not take into account the impact that remote management may have on the likelihood and impact of non-critical risks identified, such as the risk of reputational damage in the event of fraud, misuse of aid or non-compliance with ethical standards; stresses, in particular, that the insufficient integration of the risks inherent in remote management into its risk management, control and audit strategy may limit its ability to prevent, detect and adequately manage those risks, which entails a risk of damage to its reputation in the event of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses that the control strategy does not provide for any specific checks to address the inherent risks of remote management and that it does not take into account the impact of remote management on control tasks related to the fight against fraud or audits on the ground; underlines that, in fact, in the Commission’s 2021-2027 audit strategy, actions managed remotely do not automatically receive a higher risk rating in the risk-based selection of actions to be audited, despite the specific difficulties these actions face; agrees with the ECA’s recommendations, fully accepted by the Commission, on the need to improve the approach and guidance on remote management, to strengthen the certification process for non-governmental organisation partners, to verify the information provided by partners and to report on remote management to stakeholders; urges the Commission to exercise particular vigilance in order to act accordingly, including by ensuring, in high-risk environments, that remote management systematically results in a higher risk rating for audit selection and in more robust verification of partner-reported information and strengthened fraud-prevention and whistleblowing channels; urges the Commission, furthermore, to implement the ECA’s recommendation, which was fully accepted;

Added73. Stresses that Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction needs are considerable and must be urgently addressed to achieve a lasting peace;

Added74. Expresses concern about recent reports of corruption cases, including allegations involving high-level officials in Ukraine; encourages Ukraine to continue its reforms, including efforts to address the influence of oligarchs, and calls on the Commission to further strengthen its oversight of EU-funded activities in the country;

Added75. Stresses that EU support for Ukraine, as for any non-EU country, must be accompanied by robust measures to protect the EU’s financial interests, including effective prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities, in order to ensure that EU funds are properly monitored and reach their intended beneficiaries;

Added76. Recalls that the Ukraine Facility, established by Regulation (EU) 2024/79227, is the EU’s main instrument to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and reforms, providing up to EUR 50 billion for the period 2024-2027; underlines the conditionality linked to the implementation of agreed reforms and respect for EU values; notes the role of the Framework Agreement between the EU and Ukraine28 in setting out safeguards to prevent and address fraud and corruption affecting the EU’s financial interests, including cooperation with OLAF; takes note of the designation of the State Audit Service of Ukraine as the national anti-fraud coordination point;

Added77. Appreciates the work of OLAF and the EPPO in protecting EU funds deployed in Ukraine, including recent investigations into serious irregularities in EU-funded procurement and recalls that EPPO competences extend to EU funds even when used in non-EU countries; underlines the role of the Member States, OLAF and the EPPO in preventing the circumvention of sanctions and in protecting the EU’s financial interests; calls for the Commission to further strengthen controls on EU support to Ukraine, including where fraud risks involve economic operators located outside Ukraine; encourages continued cooperation between EU bodies and the Ukrainian authorities;

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78. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.