Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Added3. Underlines that the rule of law is a cornerstone of the EU and is essential for protecting EU financial interests in all Member States; stresses that the rule of law conditionality mechanism must be applied where breaches directly affect the EU budget; underlines that decisions to protect EU financial interests must be based on technical and legal findings; calls on the Commission to ensure consistent and proportionate use of the mechanism, while respecting Member States’ primary responsibility for upholding rule of law principles and ensuring coherence across EU instruments;

Removed4. Notes that the number of irregularities reported by EU competent authorities and national authorities in 2024 was slightly lower than in 2023 (totalling 13 589 in 2024, 13 947 in 2023 and 12 455 in 2022), while the corresponding irregular amounts were reported to be relatively stable (EUR 1.84 billion in 2024 compared to EUR 1.90 billion in 2023, reaching EUR 1.77 billion in 2022); observes that fraud cases account for around 10 % of the total irregularities reported, the number having increased sharply to 1 364 (26 % more than in 2023); notes that the financial amounts related to these fraud cases also increased to EUR 548.8 million in 2024 (+ 138.7 % compared to 2023); points out that since checks are not systematic but are often carried out by sampling, these figures should be interpreted with caution;

Added4. Underlines that enhanced digitalisation could significantly simplify controls, reduce bureaucracy for beneficiaries and ensure that taxpayers’ money is used more efficiently;

Added5. Recalls that digitalisation must move from analytical reflection to operational deployment, while ensuring data protection, a high level of cybersecurity and appropriate human oversight; stresses that digitalisation will deliver added value only if accompanied by effective interoperability between national and EU systems, and sufficient analytical capacities to translate data into early detection, risk prioritisation and measurable corrective actions;

Added6. Points out that enhanced digitalisation, including through national anti-fraud strategies, the digitalisation of processes and the use of common digital tools, is essential to enable effective knowledge sharing, data accessibility and processing and the comprehensive reporting necessary for results-based governance in the protection of the EU’s financial interests; underlines that digitalisation can provide the foundation for genuine transparency for citizens and their elected representatives, which is essential when public money is at stake;

Added7. Notes that the number of irregularities reported by EU competent authorities and national authorities in 2024 was slightly lower than in 2023 (totalling 13 589 in 2024, 13 947 in 2023 and 12 455 in 2022), while the corresponding irregular amounts were reported to be relatively stable (EUR 1.84 billion in 2024 compared to EUR 1.90 billion in 2023 and EUR 1.77 billion in 2022); observes that fraud cases account for around 10 % of the total irregularities reported, the number having increased sharply to 1 364 in 2024 (26 % more than in 2023); notes that the financial amounts related to these fraud cases also increased to EUR 548.8 million in 2024 (+ 138.7 % compared to 2023); recalls that the information reported in the IMS is primarily based on data transmitted by the Member States, which rely on a variety of detection sources and methods; recalls that since checks often rely on risk-based analysis, these figures should be interpreted in their proper methodological context, which does not allow for a precise assessment of the actual scale of fraud affecting the EU budget; calls on the Commission to address the analytical gap through strengthened risk analysis, more harmonised control practices and improved qualitative assessment of cases;

8. Expresses its concern that the number of irregularities reported in 2024 was 3.6 % higher than the five-year average, while the financial amounts involved were 12 % higher, and that the number of frauds reported in 2024 was 19 % higher and the amounts involved were 56 % higher than the average over the five-year period;

Change 9

Changed6.9. Notes that the results of OLAF investigations are stable, indicating thatthat, in 2024, it closed 246 investigations (265(compared to 265 in 2023 and 256 in 2022) and issued 301 recommendations (309 in 2023 and 275 in 2022), with a total recommended recovery amount of EUR 871.5 million (EUR 1 043.8 million in 2023 compared toand EUR 426.8 million in 2022);

Change 10

Changed7.10. Notes that the EPPO’s activities have steadily increased since June 2021, in terms of the number of investigations opened (in 2024, 1 504 investigations, compared to 1 371 in 2023 and 865 in 2022), the number of investigations currently ongoing (2 666 in 2024 compared to 1 927 in 2023 and 1 117 in 2022), the number of indictments (205 in 2024 compared to 139 in 2023 and 87 in 2022), the number of judicial convictions (102 criminal cases were closed in 2024 with one conviction compared to 48 cases in 2023 and 20 cases in 2022) and the number of freezing orders obtained (in 2024 for EUR 2.42 billion compared to EUR 1.5 billion in 2023, EUR 359.1 million in 2022); stresses, however, that the sustained growth in the EPPO’s activities should be assessed not only in terms of the number of investigations and convictions, but also in terms of effective budgetary impact, including the recovery of funds and the deterrent effect; calls for this dimension to be systematically integrated into future PIF reports; calls for sufficient resources, commensurate with workload and case complexity, to be ensured by the Commission and the budgetary authority, and for those resources to be sufficient, in turn, to generate financial revenue;

Change 11

Changed8.11. NotesRecognises the level of cooperation among some of the AFA authorities; notes that in 2024, the EPPO reported that Europol had provided support (information exchange, analytical supportsupport, including financial information, joint operations, operational meetings, action days and expertise) in response to 83 requestsrequests, a steep increase compared to 2023, and that by the end of 2024, 25 cases were ongoing with the support of Eurojust’s national offices; notes that in 2024, OLAF sent 74 cases to the EPPO for the opening of a criminal investigation, and that the EPPO opened 69 cases on the basis of OLAF’s contributions,input, and that in the same year OLAF closed 26 additionalcomplementary investigations and opened 17;17 (in 2023, 22 complementary investigations were opened by OLAF and four supporting investigations were requested by the EPPO); maintains that the use of complementary investigations (ex Article 12(f) of the OLAF Regulation16) and investigations in support (ex Article 12(e) of the OLAF Regulation) is still suboptimal and reiterates its call on the Commission to address the legal and operational causes of this when reviewing the relevant regulations; expects that the revision of the anti-fraudAFA, architectureas willlaunched provideby opportunitiesthe Commission to strengthenbetter thissafeguard the EU’s financial interests and to ensure more efficient cooperation between EU anti-fraud actors and Member States, will meaningfully strengthen operational cooperation, strategic coordination and data sharing between OLAF, the EPPO, Eurojust, Europol and national authorities and will set ambitious and results-oriented targets aligned with EU priorities; underlines that this review should prioritise interoperability, risk analysis and the use of modern technologies;

Change 12

Removed9. Stresses that the fight against fraud requires a comprehensive approach, involving a wide range of actors and interconnected processes that influence each other and cover the four main stages of the anti-fraud cycle, namely prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution, as well as recovery and sanctions;

Added12. Notes that the ECA found that, in 40 cases, OLAF had independently concluded, without informing the EPPO, that no criminal conduct was suspected; points out that only the EPPO and national public prosecutors’ offices are competent to assess whether conduct is suspected of being criminal; notes that OLAF does not have access to reports closed by the EPPO, which, according to the ECA, hinders OLAF’s ability to take relevant administrative action; points out that the ECA has concluded that the procedures for exchanging reports between the EPPO and OLAF are not efficient enough and recommends that received reports of suspected fraud be centrally registered to ensure efficient procedures; stresses the need to close the information gaps between national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO; calls on the Commission to strengthen operational information-sharing channels and ensure timely, structured and secure exchanges of relevant information throughout the anti-fraud cycle; calls on the Commission to prioritise the improvement of the coordination process, in line with the ECA’s analysis;

Added13. Recalls that the operational protection of the EU’s financial interests from fraud, irregularities and other illicit activities is entrusted to national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO; stresses the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the EU’s financial interests and the fight against fraud, especially when it comes to cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results of the EPPO and OLAF; welcomes, in this vein, the integration of OLAF and EPPO findings into the 2024 PIF Report; underlines that a deeper analysis of the interaction between the AFA components is needed and encourages further engagement in holistic reporting to provide a clearer, more complete and more concrete picture of the overall state of play of the protection of the EU’s financial interests, encompassing the entirety of anti-fraud action at both national and EU levels; believes that the analysis to be run during the revision of the AFA will offer the opportunity to find ways to ensure that future reporting will be more complete than is currently the case; emphasises that the upcoming revision of the mandates of key EU entities, such as Europol and EPPO, planned for 2026, offers a unique opportunity to consolidate a well-functioning and effective cross-agency operational framework to counter, among others, PIF-related organised criminal organisations; considers that the coexistence of multiple actors within the EU’s AFA requires a structural evaluation based on efficiency to assess, in a transparent manner, whether the current allocation of functions allows for the maximisation of detection, investigation, recovery and deterrence, or whether more far-reaching adaptations of the model are necessary;

Added14. Stresses that the fight against fraud requires a comprehensive and coherent governance approach, involving a wide range of actors and interconnected processes covering all main stages of the anti-fraud cycle, namely prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, recovery and sanctions; stresses that weaknesses or fragmentation at any stage reduce the effectiveness of the entire system; insists that, without substantial progress at the stage of timely and effective recovery of funds and the application of appropriate sanctions, efforts in prevention and detection lose part of their deterrent effect; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with OLAF, the EPPO and the competent national authorities, to develop and apply harmonised indicators enabling the assessment of the real budgetary impact of anti-fraud policies, to guide decision-making and the allocation of resources;

Prevention and detection

Change 13

Changed10.15. Recalls that the fight against fraud must not be carried out only a posteriori, but must concernbe allintegrated from the Europeanoutset institutionsinto asthe soondesign asof funding schemes, instruments and programmes areand drawnfostered up;by all EU institutions; stresses, therefore, that better involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the anti-fraud architectureAFA and of Parliament at the stage of developing the arrangements, instruments and programmes would certainly lead to better protection of the Union’sEU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to takebetter noteinvolve ofall thisactors upstream and to betterintegrate involveanti-fraud allconsiderations actorsat upstream;an early stage of programme design, including in risk-based assessment and the clear assignment of responsibilities;

Change 14

Changed11.16. Stresses that, in addition to the necessary efforts to limit fraud through the design of public policies, a more determined proactive effort is also needed to detect and combat fraud; highlights the fact that artificial intelligence isand oneadvanced ofanalytics are among the tools tothat should be usedeffectively deployed, in a proportionate manner and subject to appropriate human oversight, to optimise thisfraud fight;detection;

Change 15

Changed12.17. Notes that infringement reports submitted to the EPPO, information on potential investigative interests transmitted to OLAF and the reporting of irregularities, as well as the periodic updates to them submitted to the Commission through the IMS, are the main source of data for assessing detection levels; notes that detection levels vary from one Member State to another and among the sources of information, and maintains that the level of detection in a geographical area or a budgetary or politicalpolicy sector does not necessarily correspond to the actual incidence of fraud or other misconduct in that area or sector; stresses, furthermore, that the results of detection efforts vary considerably across sectors and countries; calls on the Commission to develop a standardised risk and efficiency benchmark to identify underperforming, high-risk programmes and allow for the reallocation of funds to initiatives with lower risk and higher added value for EU citizens; emphasises the need for improved harmonisation of definitions and reporting standards to enable meaningful comparison of detection levels across Member States and sectors;

Change 16

Removed13. Notes that, in the common agricultural policy (CAP), cohesion policy and fisheries sectors, during the period 2020-2024, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to the detection of fraud, with no improvement compared to the previous period (2015-2019); notes that the detection of fraud based on alerts by whistleblowers remains low, as fraud has only been detected once as a result of information published in the media in the context of direct payments, while in the cohesion and fisheries sectors the role of information from civil society has increased, with around 18 % of irregularities detected on this basis; stresses that for irregularities affecting the CAP, the analysis of the detection concentration presented in the 2024 PIF Report shows a higher concentration for fraudulent irregularities than for non-fraudulent irregularities, suggesting that differentiated approaches to investigations and criminal prosecutions may have been a determining factor in these detection levels; notes, furthermore, that for the detection of non-fraudulent irregularities, neither risk analysis nor civil society information play a significant role and recalls that in 2023, a significant level of error persisted under the heading ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, reaching 9.3 %; reiterates its concerns about the excessive length of procedures needed to finalise cases where irregularities are detected, noting that in the period 2020-2024, it took on average more than four years in the CAP sector between the start of the irregularity and the suspicion of a fraudulent irregularity, and then about three more years to close the case after informing the Commission, while in the cohesion sector almost two years were needed to detect a suspicion of fraud and almost two and a half more years to finalise the case; understands that in both sectors the average duration is shorter for non-fraudulent irregularities, possibly due to higher obstacles to verification in cases of fraud and the need to mobilise specialised resources that are generally limited; stresses that the length of these procedures hampers the adoption of effective recovery or mitigation measures and deprives the actions taken of their deterrent effect; considers, lastly, that the modalities and timing of the initial handling of cases have a decisive influence on the subsequent conduct of proceedings and calls on the Commission to consider adopting appropriate measures to speed up these processes, in particular by intensifying its dialogue with the authorities of the Member States, which is in the interest of protecting the financial interests of the Union;

Added18. Reiterates the view that the IMS should have greater interoperability with other key tools used by the Commission to protect the EU’s financial interests, such as ARACHNE and the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES), and with digital tools in the Member States; understands that interoperability with the IMS will be part of the broader assessment of the interoperability among different Commission databases and ARACHNE+ in the context of the post-2027 MFF, and that the Commission is currently running a survey across the Member States on the IMS-EDES interface, in the framework of the extension of EDES to shared management; asks the Commission to promptly inform Parliament about the progress of the specific EDES-IMS-ARACHNE interface;

Removed14. Notes that, in the area of direct management, during the period 2020-2024, OLAF was presumably the main source of detection of recovery elements related to fraudulent irregularities, accounting for 89.8 % of cases and 96.9 % of the total amounts recovered, while the Commission’s ex post controls detected an additional 6.0 % of these elements, corresponding to 1.9 % of the amounts recovered; notes furthermore that around 95.7 % of the recovery items classified as non-fraudulent irregularities were detected through Commission controls, both ex ante and ex post; notes, in this regard, the analysis of the 2024 PIF Report on the relationship between the source of detection and the amounts to be recovered, which shows that the Commission’s ex post controls and OLAF investigations led to the highest amounts recovered for non-fraudulent and fraudulent irregularities, respectively;

Added19. Observes that the 2024 recast of the Financial Regulation introduced a legal basis for ARACHNE+, a modernised data-mining and risk-scoring tool, to be available for the post-2027 MFF and to be used for all management modes with mandatory feeding of relevant data categories by EU institutions and bodies, Member States, and other entities implementing the EU budget; points out that, currently, the use of ARACHNE+ by the Member States is voluntary and that the Commission, the Council and Parliament have committed to examining and revisiting the discussion on the mandatory use of the corporate tool by Member States for the post-2027 MFF based on an assessment of the tool’s readiness by the end of 2027; stresses that, irrespective of the national digital systems in use by the Member States, ARACHNE is uniquely oriented towards cross-border fraud detection and is particularly effective in evaluating the risk of fraud, conflicts of interest, and irregularities affecting transnational operations and cooperation; believes that, to effectively improve prevention and detection through its profiling and pattern recognition, ARACHNE has to meet the specific needs and challenges within each national framework; notes that the Commission is expected to provide robust support mechanisms and to allow for the adaptations needed to maximise ARACHNE’s positive effects; points out that Member States have highlighted the need for comprehensive training and support in order to maximise the tool’s effectiveness;

Removed15. Notes that in recent years, the increase in detection by Union bodies has been proportionately lower than that by private whistleblowers or national authorities (in 2024, reports of offences to the EPPO by private whistleblowers increased by 85 %, those by national authorities by 13 % and those by the EU’s institutions, bodies, office and agencies by 5 %, and in 2023, reports of offences from private whistleblowers, national authorities and IBOA increased by 30 %, 24 % and 5 % respectively compared to 2022); reiterates its call on the Commission and other EU authorities to promote detection by facilitating reporting processes and strengthening staff and management awareness initiatives and internal communication;

Added20. Regrets that risk analyses relating to the common agricultural policy (CAP), cohesion policy and the fisheries sector contributed only marginally to fraud detection in the 2020-2024 period, with no improvement compared to the previous period (2015-2019); calls on the Commission to analyse the causes of this and develop an action plan to improve the quality of risk analyses in cooperation with the authorities responsible in the Member States; notes that fraud detection based on whistleblower reports remains low, with only one instance of fraud being detected based on information published in the media, in the context of direct payments, while the role of civil society in the cohesion and fisheries sectors has increased, with approximately 18 % of irregularities detected in this way; stresses that, as regards irregularities related to the CAP, the analysis of detection rates in the 2024 PIF Report shows a higher concentration of fraudulent irregularities than of non-fraudulent ones, suggesting that differentiated approaches in investigations and criminal prosecutions may have been a decisive factor in these detection rates; notes, furthermore, that neither risk analysis nor information from civil society plays a significant role in the detection of non-fraudulent irregularities; stresses the need to reinforce risk analysis methodologies, to improve data-mining tools and use them more systematically, and to further promote secure and effective reporting channels for whistleblowers; recalls that, in 2023, there was still a significant error rate under the heading ‘Cohesion, Resilience and Values’, namely 9.3 %; reiterates its concern about the excessively long duration of the procedures required to close cases in which irregularities have been detected, noting that in the 2020-2024 period in the CAP sector, on average, it took more than four years between the occurrence of the irregularity and the suspicion of fraud, followed by a further three years to close the case after the Commission was notified, while in the cohesion sector, it took almost two years to detect a suspicion of fraud and almost two and a half years to close the case; understands that, in both sectors, the average duration is shorter for non-fraudulent irregularities, possibly due to the greater obstacles to verification in fraud cases and the need to deploy specialised resources, which are often limited; emphasises that the length of these procedures hinders the adoption of effective remedial or mitigating measures and deprives the measures taken of their deterrent effect; considers, finally, that the modalities and timing of the initial handling of cases have a decisive influence on the subsequent course of the procedures and calls on the Commission to take appropriate measures to accelerate these procedures, in particular by stepping up its dialogue with the Member States’ authorities, which is in the interest of protecting the EU’s financial interests;

Removed16. Reminds the Commission that for fraud to be detected, checks are needed and that although this may cost money, it also makes it possible to bring in – sometimes significant – additional revenue and/or to avoid irregular expenditure; notes therefore that it is essential to provide resources to those involved in the anti-fraud architecture to enable them to carry out more frequent checks;

Added21. Notes that, according to the PIF Report 2024, in the area of direct management, during the period 2020-2024, OLAF was the main source of detection of recovery elements related to fraudulent irregularities, accounting for 89.8 % of cases and 96.9 % of the total amounts recovered, while the Commission’s ex post controls detected an additional 6.0 % of this type of recovery item, accounting for 1.9 % of the amounts recovered; notes furthermore that around 95.7 % of the recovery items classified as non-fraudulent irregularities were detected through Commission controls, both ex ante and ex post; notes, in this regard, the analysis of the 2024 PIF Report on the relationship between the source of detection and the amounts to be recovered, which shows that the Commission’s ex post controls and OLAF investigations led to the highest amounts recovered for non-fraudulent and fraudulent irregularities respectively;

Added22. Notes that in recent years, the increase in detection by EU bodies has been proportionately lower than that by private whistleblowers or national authorities (in 2024, reports of offences to the EPPO by private whistleblowers increased by 85 %, those by national authorities by 13 % and those by the EU’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies by 5 %, and in 2023, reports of offences from private whistleblowers, national authorities and the EU’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies increased by 30 %, 24 % and 5 % respectively compared to 2022); reiterates its call on the Commission and other EU authorities to promote detection by facilitating reporting processes and strengthening staff and management awareness initiatives and internal communication; is concerned that this low level of detection may raise concerns about the Commission’s ability to oversee EU funds;

Added23. Emphasises that public authorities have a crucial role in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud, and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, and other types of misuse of funds do not occur in the first place;

Added24. Maintains that whistleblowers play a key role in boosting fraud detection; observes with concern the remarks presented in the 2024 Commission report on the implementation and application of the Whistleblower Directive on the protection of persons who report breaches of EU law, which suggests that the transposition process is still far from complete; regrets that, in March 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union fined five Member States (Germany, Luxembourg, Czechia, Estonia and Hungary) for failing to properly transpose the directive; welcomed the Commission’s launch, on 25 August 2025, of a public consultation on its forthcoming action plan on whistleblower protection, which is part of the Commission’s broader evaluation of the directive; calls on the Commission to take into the utmost consideration the feedback from relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, trade unions, research institutions and their staff, and individual whistleblowers, on the implementation of the directive, and to introduce measures to fill the identified gaps; points out, furthermore, that Parliament is expected to adapt its internal rules in line with the directive to safeguard its own whistleblowers, as stemming from the judgment of the General Court of 11 September 2024 in Case T-793/2217 according to which the current framework fails to provide balanced and effective protection against retaliation;

Added25. Emphasises that independent media and investigative journalism could play a role in the fight against fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, and other forms of misuse of public funds;

Added26. Reminds the Commission that for fraud to be detected, checks are needed and that, although this may cost money, it also makes it possible to bring in – sometimes significant – additional revenue and/or to avoid irregular expenditure; notes therefore that it is essential to provide resources to those involved in the AFA to enable them to carry out more frequent checks; calls for a strategic and targeted allocation of resources to high-risk sectors and cross-border investigations, combined with enhanced training and capacity building for national authorities, in order to ensure a results-driven approach, strengthen budgetary accountability and safeguard every euro of the EU budget;

Added27. Underlines the importance of protecting the EU’s financial interests by implementing and enforcing clear rules about taxation and transparency for businesses, particularly those operating on a transnational level, especially in the context of EU-backed investments;

Investigations and prosecutions

Change 17

Changed17.28. Considers that the excessive length of investigations and administrative procedures undermines the effectiveness of the protection of the Union’sEU’s financial interests, in particular as regards monitoring, recovery and prosecution;

Change 18

Changed18.29. Underlines the strategic role of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) at all stages of the anti-fraud cycle and calls on the Commission to strengthen their activities; considers that persistent disparities among Member States in terms of administrative capacity, human resources and analytical tools weaken the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of defining common minimum anti-fraud capacity standards for the competent national authorities, in particular AFCOS, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity;

Change 19

Removed19. Stresses that information on the EPPO’s ongoing investigations should be forwarded to the Commission where the conditions laid down in Article 103 of the EPPO Regulation23 so permit; notes, however, that according to the 2024 PIF Report, from the start of the implementation of the RRF until 27 May 2025, the Commission received only 75 notifications from the EPPO, of which 64 concerned ongoing cases, while 279 investigations related to the RRF existed at the end of 2024, with an estimated total financial damage of EUR 2.7 billion; observes that this prevents a full understanding of the state of play of the implementation of the RRF;

Added30. Recalls that Member States manage the largest share of EU expenditure and are therefore the first line of defence for the protection of the EU’s financial interests; notes that, in 2024, all 27 Member States reported having some form of strategy in place to protect the EU’s financial interests; observes, however, that approaches differ significantly; regrets that the adoption of comprehensive national anti-fraud strategies remains uneven across Member States and stresses that such strategies are essential to ensure effective coordination, risk analysis and follow-up of fraud cases at national and EU levels; calls on the Member States to adopt and regularly update their NAFS in order to better identify and address emerging fraud risks, with the support of the Commission; regrets, furthermore, that information collected in 2024 shows limited progress in strengthening national anti-fraud governance compared to previous years, despite the Commission’s recommendations to establish or improve dedicated national anti-fraud networks; calls on the Commission to assess the quality, scope and effective implementation of national anti-fraud strategies and to provide guidance and support to ensure that such strategies are coherent, comprehensive and results-oriented; welcomes the fact that, following repeated calls by Parliament, the Commission has included national anti-fraud strategies among the key requirements for national management and control systems in its proposal for the 2028-2034 MFF; reiterates that Member States would benefit from regular evaluations or peer reviews of their anti-fraud frameworks, in order to improve consistency and ensure high standards across the EU;

Added31. Stresses that information on the EPPO’s ongoing investigations should be forwarded to the Commission where the conditions laid down in Article 103 of the EPPO Regulation18 so permit; notes, however, that according to the 2024 PIF Report, from the start of the implementation of the RRF until 27 May 2025, the Commission received only 75 notifications from the EPPO, of which 64 concerned ongoing cases, while 279 investigations related to the RRF existed at the end of 2024, with an estimated total financial damage of EUR 2.7 billion; observes that this prevents a full understanding of the state of play of the implementation of the RRF; calls for improved, timely and structured information sharing that fully respects the EPPO’s independence, in particular for high-risk programmes such as the RRF;

Added32. Acknowledges that EPPO investigations can only be launched if information has reached the prosecutors; expects the Member States to comply with their legal obligations and to report all relevant cases to the EPPO; notes with concern that some Member States have been declaring criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the EU as national cases instead of acknowledging the competences of the EPPO; expresses its concern that these conflicts of competence can have a possible negative impact on investigations, including the loss of evidence or the belated collection of evidence; observes that, in spite of the EPPO’s competences being clearly outlined in Article 22(1) and (2) and in Article 23 of the EPPO Regulation, questions of competence between the national authorities and the European Delegated Prosecutors come up frequently, including several in 2024; underlines that, as things stand, these cases should be handled in compliance with the EPPO Regulation, which states that they should be referred to the national judicial authority with the competence to decide cases of conflict of competences between national prosecutors, under the condition that its decision can be subject to a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice, as provided for by Article 25(6) of the EPPO Regulation, drawing on Article 267 TFEU, which provides that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provision on conflicts of competence between the EPPO and national authorities; reiterates that the current situation lacks legal clarity since, in many Member States, the national authority’s decision on the conflict of competence cannot be the subject of a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice; calls on the Commission to collect and assess information regarding cases of conflicts of competence, with a view to obtaining the relevant data and to addressing the matter during the revision of the EPPO Regulation;

Recoveries and reporting

Change 20

Removed20. Acknowledges that recovery is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities; reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure effective follow-up of OLAF recommendations and of EPPO proceedings in order to reliably measure the actual impact of their actions and to provide further evidence in support of results-oriented policymaking;

Added33. Acknowledges that recovery is a powerful deterrent and an effective tool to tackle serious and organised crime and that it is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities as well; notes that the main obstacles to recovery stem from lengthy administrative and judicial proceedings, restrictive conditions for recovering funds under certain measures, and strict limitation periods in sector-specific legislation; calls on the Commission to develop a benchmarking system to measure recovery effectiveness, including indicators such as the ratio between amounts recommended for recovery and those established for recovery, the length of time between the end of the investigation and the recovery decision, and the relationship between the duration of recovery procedures and the results;

Removed21. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to its resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets that only aggregated data is made available; highlights the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap;

Added34. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure effective follow-up of OLAF recommendations and of EPPO proceedings in order to reliably measure the actual impact of their actions and to provide further evidence in support of results-oriented policymaking; calls on the Commission to establish a structured feedback loop on recoveries and precautionary measures following EPPO cases; recalls the recent adoption of Directive (EU) 2024/1260 on asset recovery and confiscation19; highlights the fact that the upcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation could offer the opportunity to clarify the recovery process and to protect the EU’s financial interests after the confiscation has occurred;

Added35. Welcomes Eurojust’s offer, in the context of the yearly interinstitutional exchange of views in November 2025, to play a bigger role in the recovery process, specifically the contribution that Eurojust contact points could have in the identification and assessment of relevant property in the Member States; calls on the Commission to propose the creation of an EU asset recovery office at Europol, in the framework of the upcoming revision of Europol’s mandate, planned for 2026;

Added36. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to Parliament’s resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets the fact that only aggregated data is made available; notes that, following repeated calls by Parliament, the PIF Report 2024 includes figures on recoveries following OLAF recommendations for the period 2022-2024, indicating recovered amounts of EUR 4.5 billion; notes, however, that this figure largely reflects the outcome of a single major case (C-213/1920), accounting for more than EUR 2.7 billion, which limits its value as a benchmark for assessing the overall impact of OLAF’s activities on the EU budget; points out that other Commission data indicate that, between 2015 and 2024, OLAF issued 982 financial recommendations on expenditure, amounting to EUR 3.3 billion; stresses that effective recovery rates remain limited and vary significantly depending on the budget implementation mode, with approximately 38 % under shared management, 14 % under indirect management and 7 % under direct management, resulting in total effective recoveries of EUR 974 million over the same period; expresses concern about the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap; calls on the Commission to publish an annual breakdown of the legal and administrative bottlenecks preventing recovery, with a comparative analysis of recovery rates across Member States, followed up with recommendations on best practice;

Added37. Notes the establishment in 2024 of the OLAF Monitoring Site, which should enable centralised and real-time communication within the Commission and its executive agencies, and should contribute to more accurate financial and administrative monitoring of the follow-up to OLAF cases; calls on the Commission to propose those amendments to the existing regulatory framework that are necessary to ensure effective, comprehensive, updated and constant reporting in the IMS; calls on OLAF to live up to its responsibility to support Member States by giving advice and guidance in establishing internal procedures and organisational arrangements, which should be built on the national experiences of the Member States in the relevant sector and which must be embedded into specific guidelines for reporting and monitoring, as well as for the implementation of national anti-fraud strategies (NAFS) and for the organisation of AFCOS;

Added38. Understands that, after the necessary corrective actions have been taken, the carrying out of further analysis would allow for lessons to be learnt from each case of fraud and for the improvement of the measures that could prevent similar cases from occurring in the future; asks the Commission to support the Member States in the analysis of the enabling factors behind fraud, because this analysis would allow appropriate assessment of the need to revise the national management and control systems accordingly;

Added39. Notes the findings of the ECA on financial corrections in cohesion policy21; regrets that it took more than 10 years for the Commission to adopt its first financial correction decision for the 2014-2020 period in September 2025, and that several proposed corrections were reduced or even withdrawn without proper justification; calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings identified by the ECA in the application of the financial corrections instrument; points out the need to clarify the legal framework for financial corrections and to work with a clearly defined time frame for procedures in the future to avoid unnecessary delays;

Main threats – organised crime

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Changed22.40. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) of the EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the Union’sEU’s financial interests linked to organised crime; underlines that the EPPO brings added value to the fight against fraud; recalls that Europol supports and strengthens action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime, including those against the EU’s financial interests; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved; considers that the increasing involvement of organised crime in offences affecting the EU’s financial interests requires improved data analysis capacity at the EU level and the provision of adequate resources for the bodies responsible for combating fraud, as the work carried out by these bodies contributes to generating revenue for the EU budget;

Main threats – VAT fraud

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Changed23.41. Notes that there is an increasing number of reported cases of VAT fraud, that in 2023 it was present in around 20 % of the EPPO’s ongoing cases, with 873 cases, and that in 2024, there were a total of 1 287 VAT infringement cases, accounting for 20.29 % of all infringements, causing an estimated loss of EUR 13.5 billion, representing 53 % of the total estimated loss; observes that the current threshold of EUR 10 million, set in the PIF Directive, is not an effective criterion to establish the competence of the EPPO in VAT cases because of inconsistent approaches on interpretation, damage calculation methods and complexity of the cases, weakening the uniform and consistent handling of VAT fraud cases; reiterates its call on the Commission to review the threshold and to guarantee consistent interpretation of the total damage, providing clearer and explicit guidance to Member States;

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Changed24.42. Stresses the importance of moving towards digital reporting in order to reduce VAT fraud by up to EUR 11 billion per year and to reduce administrative and compliance costs for EU traders by more than EUR 4.4.1 billion per year over the next 10 years, to also ensure that, in the long term, existing national systems converge across the EU and to pave the way for Member States wishing to introduce national digital reporting systems for domestic trade; stresses the importance of strengthening cross-border cooperation and targeted data sharing between Member States, in compliance with the law, to prevent and combat AI-enabled fraud, notably in high-risk areas such as VAT, customs and EU financial aid; calls on the Commission to support Member States through the development of a coordinated exchange of information to monitor and respond to AI-driven fraudulent activity efficiently and in real time;

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Removed25. Stresses that OLAF’s limited and indirect access to certain customs and tax data is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union; recalls that, in order to obtain certain essential information, especially in the field of VAT, OLAF must go through the competent national administrations, resulting in delays that are incompatible with the speed of fraud mechanisms; calls, therefore, for OLAF’s access to relevant data to be improved without delay, in line with the applicable legal framework;

Added43. Is aware of the increasing risk of AI-generated content used to compromise procurement procedures or financial operations and to mislead investigations or falsify contracts and for digital identity theft; deems it necessary to launch a dedicated EU-wide initiative to develop AI-driven fraud detection mechanisms by OLAF, the EPPO and Europol focused on financial crimes against the EU budget; calls on the Commission and the Member States to integrate AI and data analytics into fraud detection systems, ensuring interoperability between national and EU-level databases while maintaining strong data protection safeguards; reiterates its call for the establishment of a mandatory forensic verification process for all digital evidence submitted in financial fraud cases, ensuring the authenticity of documents and audio and video material used in investigations;

Added44. Stresses that OLAF’s limited and indirect access to certain customs and tax data is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU; recalls that, in order to obtain certain essential information, especially in the field of VAT, OLAF must go through the competent national administrations, resulting in delays that are incompatible with the speed of fraud mechanisms; calls, therefore, for OLAF’s access to relevant data to be improved without delay, in line with the applicable legal framework; notes the early-warning and risk-analysis role of Eurofisc in detecting cross-border VAT carousel fraud;

Added45. Maintains that both OLAF and EPPO require direct and timely access to relevant VAT data in order to carry out effective and efficient investigations into intra-Community VAT fraud; considers, in fact, that limitations in access to tax and customs data do not affect OLAF alone but the AFA as a whole; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission proposal of 14 November 202522 to amend Regulation (EU) No 904/2010, which would improve access to VAT information at EU level for both bodies, strengthen cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO and significantly enhance the effectiveness of investigations; calls for the swift adoption and implementation of the proposed amended regulation;

Main threats – corruption

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Changed26.46. Is aware that corruption is a crime closely linked to many serious forms of misconduct; notes that corruption is intrinsically linked to money laundering and that money laundering is one of the main drivers of illegal activities of organised crime, as it allows criminals to transfer the proceeds of their crime into the legal economy; observes that corruption is also detected on a recurrent basis in cases of fraud affecting the financial interests of the UnionEU and notesnotes, in this regardregard, the analysis that explores the relationship between corruption and fraud presented in the 2024 PIF Report, targeting corruption cases reported since 2007 for the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 programming periods in the area of cohesion; underlines that the proposed anti-corruption directive (COM(2023)0234), currently under consideration by the co-legislators, recognises the link between corruption and money laundering and provides for a specific aggravating circumstance for entities engaging in corruption offences; recognises that heterogeneous national systems and fragmented application of the EU anti-money laundering framework have made it difficult to prevent, detect and combat money laundering;