Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

194. Notes that, as in previous years, a significant share of the errors detected by the Court concerned contracts implemented under indirect management by pillar-assessed organisations, including international institutions; observes that for these contracts the Commission accepted expenditure on the basis of a financial report and a management declaration, the latter being a self-issued certification by the pillar-assessed organisation attesting to the completeness, accuracy and compliance of the financial information provided; notes with concern that 26 of the 42 quantified errors detected by the Court related to such contracts, contributing 3,1 percentage points to the estimated level of error, thereby highlighting persistent vulnerabilities in the assurance framework for indirect management with pillar assessed entities;

195. Expresses concern that, once again, the Court encountered delays in obtaining requested documentation from certain international organisations and international financial institutions, thereby hindering the timely conduct of its audit work, despite its previous recommendation from 2020; notes that in 19 audited transactions these entities limited access to documents to temporary, view-only electronic consultations, without allowing the Court to retain copies, which impeded proper planning, execution and quality control of the audit; regrets that these obstacles persisted despite the Commission’s efforts to resolve the issue through sustained communication with the organisations concerned, as also highlighted in the report of the 2024 annual report on the EDFs;

196. Expresses serious concern that no Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) missions took place in 2024, owing to the termination of the two existing ROM service contracts in 2025; highlights with concern that the planned 2024 restricted tender for the new generation of ROM contracts had to be cancelled due to the unavailability of NDICI support expenditure credits, forcing DG INTPA to rely on operational credits and to prepare a standalone NDICI Support Measure to finance ROMs; notes that a new restricted tender procedure was relaunched in October 2025 under a suspensive clause, with the new three-year ROM contract expected to be signed only in April 2026; underlines that this funding and procurement disruption has resulted in a full suspension of the ROM system since early 2025, delaying independent performance monitoring of programme implementation and weakening the overall results-orientation of external action;

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Changed168.197. Notes that, EUUnion investment in trade-related assistance to the world’s least-developed countries (LDCs) has declined, with only 12,0 % of Aid for Trade (AfT) flows reaching LDCs in 2022 compared to 18,0 % on average between 2010 and 2015; notes with concern that this underperformance persists despite the 25,0 % spending target for LDCs set in the revised 2017 EU Aid for Trade strategy; takes note of the findings of the European Court of Auditors in Special Report 17/2025,17/2025 ‘EU aid for trade to least developed countries’, which concluded that EU Aid for Trade is not on track to meet the 2030 target; welcomes the Commission’s acceptance of the Court’s recommendation to analyse the underlying causes of this decline and notes that this assessment is planned for 2026, stressing the need for timely corrective action to ensure that Union trade assistance reaches those most in need;

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Removed169. Stresses that Union aid must under no circumstances, directly or indirectly, finance terrorism, and therefore must not support any entity linked to Hamas or to any other terrorist or extremist organisation; recalls that, to this end, it is both legitimate and essential to clearly identify all final beneficiaries of Union assistance, also in third countries; emphasises the need for rigorous oversight of the distribution and use of aid to ensure that no funds are misused;

Added198. Notes that budget support reported in 2024 by INTPA and DG NEAR to countries outside of the Union amounted to EUR 1,56 billion; regrets the absence of publicly available data identifying beneficiary countries, as published statistics refer only to regions or country groupings; further regrets the lack of transparency regarding the use of these funds and the identification of final recipients; emphasises that budget support should be aligned with partner countries’ needs and the Union’s strategic policy objectives;

Removed170. Welcomes the Commission’s continued engagement with the Palestinian Authority on curriculum reform and acknowledges the tangible progress reported in 2025, including the ongoing review and amendment of textbooks by the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education to ensure alignment with UNESCO standards; notes in particular that the revised Grade 12 textbooks were finalised and made public in early October 2025 and are currently undergoing review by the Union;

Added199. Stresses that Union aid must under no circumstances, directly or indirectly, finance terrorism or any activities incompatible with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and therefore must not support any entity linked to Hamas or to any other terrorist or extremist organisation; recalls that, to this end, it is both legitimate and essential to clearly identify all final beneficiaries of Union assistance, also in third countries; emphasises the need for rigorous oversight of the distribution and use of aid to ensure that no funds are misused; further calls on strengthening due diligence, monitoring and control mechanisms in order to prevent any form of ideological infiltration in programmes financed by the Union; underlines that anti-terror safeguards and transparency requirements must be applied rigorously without undermining humanitarian principles and the delivery of life-saving assistance;

Removed171. Notes that, as in previous years, no Union funding in 2024 has been used to support the production of Palestinian textbooks, and that Union assistance under both the 2024 Emergency Support package and the Multiannual Comprehensive Programme for Palestinian Recovery and Resilience (2025-2027) is strictly limited to traceable expenditure items such as salaries, social allowances and arrears to hospitals; notes that this multiannual programme is conditional upon an ambitious Reform Matrix agreed with the Palestinian Authority, which includes a systematic review of learning materials;

Added200. Recalls that education is a central pillar of peacebuilding, coexistence and preparation for a negotiated two-state solution, and a key mean of countering extremism, intolerance and radical ideologies; recalls that Union financial assistance and political engagement should support education that promotes peace, tolerance and coexistence; welcomes the Commission’s continued engagement with the Palestinian Authority on curriculum reform and acknowledges the tangible progress reported in 2025, including the ongoing review and amendment of textbooks by the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education to ensure alignment with UNESCO standards; notes in particular that some revisions were made to Grade 12 and more comprehensive revisions to Grades 1-4, and new learning material has been published in December 2024 and October 2025 respectively and is currently undergoing review by the Union; recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards, in particular those containing antisemitism, incitement to violence, glorification of jihad and martyrdom, and the rejection of peaceful conflict resolution; reminds the Commission to base its review on public and verifiable evidence and to publish the result of its reviews;

Removed172. Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to enhance support to UNRWA as well as to all trusted partners, including local CSOs; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

Added201. Notes that, as in previous years, no Union funding in 2024 has been used to support the production of Palestinian textbooks, and that Union direct financial assistance provided to the Palestinian Authority via the Union mechanism PEGASE under both the 2024 Emergency Support package and the Multiannual Comprehensive Programme for Palestinian Recovery and Resilience (2025-2027) is strictly limited to traceable expenditure items such as salaries, social allowances and arrears to hospitals; notes that this financial support to the Palestinian Authority is partially linked to the achievement of reforms agreed in an ambitious Reform Matrix with the Palestinian Authority in 2024, which includes a progressive and systemic review of learning materials; recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards, particularly those encouraging antisemitism and including violence, to which Palestinian children should not be exposed; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards; calls on the Commission to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly to educational materials that contain antisemitic references or examples which incite hatred and violence;

Removed173. Expresses grave concern over serious shortcomings in the management of DG NEAR under the responsibility of Commissioner Várhelyi during his mandate as Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement (2019–2024); notes that, during this period, an unprecedented number of senior management positions remained vacant for exceptionally long durations, severely undermining the Directorate-General’s leadership capacity; notes in particular that the post of Director-General remained vacant for 28 months, Director A for 25 months, Director NEAR B (Southern Neighbourhood) for 48 months, Director NEAR D (Western Balkans) for 35 months, Director of the Support Group for Ukraine for 32 months, and Director R for 22 months; underlines that these prolonged vacancies affected some of the Union’s most politically sensitive and operationally critical portfolios, including during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Hamas terrorist attack against Israel; further notes the results of the April 2022 DG NEAR staff survey showing significant declines in confidence in senior management’s leadership, the worst results of the DG’s staff survey ever recorded; considers that leaving DG NEAR without stable senior leadership for years cannot be reconciled with the duty of sound administration and effective management expected from a Commissioner;

Added202. Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population to cooperate with reliable partners on the ground to guarantee the uninterrupted and secure delivery of humanitarian assistance and to ensure that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to terrorist or extremist movements opposed to the Union’s fundamental values; recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023; acknowledges the United Nations' response to those allegations including the investigations launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), after which nine staff members had their employment formally terminated in the interest of the Agency and the recommendations issued through the Colonna Report; notes that the Commission has been working with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA; notes the Commission’s assessment that UNRWA remains committed to implementing the agreed recommendations as well as the fulfilment of all conditions agreed with the Union for continued funding in 2024; encourages, in this regard, the Commission’s continued engagement and close monitoring to ensure that funding is met with solid guarantees on neutrality, transparency and accountability;

Removed174. Notes the statements made by Commissioner Várhelyi during the exchange of views in the Committee on Budgetary Control on 12 January 2026, in which he claimed that the post of Director of the Support Group for Ukraine had only been created in 2022 and filled immediately thereafter; deplores that this information provided to Parliament was inaccurate, as the Support Group for Ukraine was established in 2014 and, between 2020 and 2023, its leadership was ensured on an interim basis by the Deputy Director-General of DG NEAR in addition to her many other functions;

Added203. Notes that during the period between 2019–2024 six out of nine senior management positions in DG NEAR remained vacant for extended periods; notes in particular that the post of Director-General remained vacant for 28 months, Director A for 25 months, Director NEAR B (Southern Neighbourhood) for 48 months, Director NEAR D (Western Balkans) for 35 months, Director of the Support Group for Ukraine for 32 months, and Director R for 22 months; underlines that these prolonged vacancies affected some of the Union’s most politically sensitive and operationally critical portfolios, including during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Hamas terrorist attack against Israel; further notes the results of the April 2022 DG NEAR staff survey showing significant declines in confidence in senior management’s leadership;

Removed175. Notes recent investigative reporting published in October 2025 by several European media outlets alleging that Hungarian intelligence services engaged in espionage activities in Brussels, including attempts to recruit Hungarian nationals working in Union institutions; notes that these activities reportedly intensified during the period 2015–2019, when Mr. Várhelyi served as Hungary’s Permanent Representative to the Union and was formally the superior of intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover; underlines that, while these allegations concern a period prior to his appointment as Commissioner, they further contribute to serious concerns regarding his conduct and independence; notes that the Commission has confirmed that it is examining these allegations internally and it expects to be informed of the outcome of this examination as soon as it is concluded;

Added204. Notes that between 2020 and 2023 the Support Group for Ukraine, leadership was provided on an interim basis by the Deputy Director-General of DG NEAR in addition to her many other functions, further notes that the Ukraine Support Group was dissolved in 2023 with portfolios redistributed to the Ukraine Facility and other units; notes that the information provided by the Commission in this regard during the exchange of views with the discharge authority was inaccurate and calls on the Commission to ensure clear and accurate reporting to Parliament by all Members of the Commission;

Removed176. Considers that, taken together, the serious and prolonged management failures in DG NEAR, the provision of inaccurate information to Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure, and the additional concerns relating to conduct and independence outlined above demonstrate a pattern that is incompatible with the standards of accountability, reliability and sound administration required of a Member of the Commission; concludes therefore that Commissioner Várhelyi cannot be considered fit to exercise the responsibilities of a Commissioner entrusted with the management of politically sensitive portfolios and significant Union funds;

Added205. Notes recent investigative reporting published in October 2025 by several European media outlets alleging that Hungarian intelligence services engaged in espionage activities in Brussels, including attempts to recruit Hungarian nationals working in Union institutions; notes that these reports refers to the 2015-2019 period and that the Commission has confirmed that it is examining these allegations internally; expects the Commission and competent authorities to conduct a thorough analysis and investigation based on evidence and to inform the Parliament as soon as the investigation has been finalised;

Added206. Notes that Commissioners exercise significant political and regulatory authority and their conduct must therefore reflect the highest standards of independence, transparency, accountability, and ethical behaviour; stresses that strict adherence to the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Commission is essential to safeguarding the integrity, credibility, and democratic legitimacy of the Union’s executive; underlines that full compliance with the Code of Conduct is also indispensable to preventing conflicts of interest, avoiding undue influence, and ensuring that decisions are taken solely in the European interest; considers that, taken together, the past serious and prolonged management failures in DG NEAR, the provision of inaccurate information to Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure, and the additional concerns relating to conduct and independence outlined above demonstrate a pattern that is incompatible with the standards of accountability, reliability and sound administration required of a Member of the Commission;

207. Notes with concern that Union funding to Ukraine is spread across numerous instruments and facilities, creating a fragmented and complex financing landscape; underlines that the absence of a consolidated and transparent overview of how these funds, including loans guaranteed by the MFF headroom, are allocated and spent hinders effective democratic oversight, accountability and the ability to assess the overall impact of Union support;

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Changed178.208. Notes that Ukraine’s anti-corruption specialised bodies (NABU, SAPO and HACC) continue to deliver investigations, prosecutions and judgments in high-level cases, demonstrating that independent anti-corruption institutions are starting to function and that recent resignations of accused ministers show a degree of governmental responsiveness and accountability; regrets, however, that progress remainscommends limited,the thatreforms investigationsundertaken by other law-enforcement bodies have stagnated,Ukraine andin thatthe legislativemidst initiativesof adopteda orfull-fledged tabledinvasion; innotes 2024,that includingthe attempts to place NABU and SAPO under the authority of the Prosecutor General, risked undermining the independence and effectiveness of the anti-corruption framework; welcomes the swift reversal of these amendments following domestic and international pressure, but expresses concern at reports from anti-corruption institutions and civil society of growing pressurehighlighting fromchallenges statein authorities,maintaining reducedthe transparency,effectiveness and attempts to limitindependence liabilityof forthe corruptionanti-corruption offences;framework; calls on the authorities to prevent backsliding, address procedural delays and obstructions in high-level cases, and revise statutes of limitation in line with European standards;

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Changed179.209. Notes with concern the recent fraud allegations in Ukraine’s energy sector, including suspected large-scale misappropriation, procurement manipulation and illicit enrichment involving state-owned energy companies and regulatory bodies;sector; underlines that these allegations, if confirmed, point to structural vulnerabilities in governance, oversight and internal control systems; stresses that suchthe casesneed riskto underminingbuild public trust,trust weakeningto strengthen Ukraine’s reform credibility andthrough jeopardisingrobust EUpublic financialprocurement support;and internal control systems;

210. Notes that, to ensure sound financial management of the Ukraine Facility, the Commission established in June 2024 a dedicated Audit Board through Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1697, composed of independent experts appointed by the Commission; notes that the Audit Board’s mandate is to detect systemic weaknesses in Ukraine’s management and control of Facility funds, including deficiencies in fraud prevention, anti-corruption safeguards and conflict-of-interest systems, and to report such issues directly to the Commission;

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Changed181.211. Underlines that, beyond its oversight role, the Audit Board may issue recommendations to the Ukrainian authorities on addressing financial irregularities or structural shortcomings in the management of Union funds; stresses that Ukraine, represented by the Ministry of Economy, must provide a written response to each recommendation, either outlining implementation measures or providing a justified explanation for non-implementation; highlights that the Audit Board’s findings may carry significant financial consequences,consequences; asunderlines itsthat reports,sustained similarlyUnion tofinancial thosesupport ofmust OLAF,be mayaccompanied constituteby groundssound forfinancial themanagement, Commissiontransparency and performance monitoring in order to reduce,ensure suspendeffective oruse withholdof Union fundingfunds underand maintain the Ukrainecredibility Facility;of the enlargement policy;

212. Recalls that, under the Ukraine Facility, regular payments are conditional on the Commission verifying the implementation of Ukraine’s recovery and reform plan and the continuous respect of democratic mechanisms, the rule of law and human rights; notes that, to date, the Commission has on five occasions concluded that individual reform steps were not fulfilled under instalments one to five, leading to the suspension of corresponding amounts, one of which has since been remedied; welcomes in this regard the Commission’s strict conditionality approach and its demonstrated willingness to verify implementation thoroughly and to withhold funds where conditions are not met;

213. Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO;

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Changed184. Is214. concernedExpresses aboutconcern thethat allocation of EFSD+ under the EFSD+ new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefitingbenefits countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs and fragile and conflict-affected countries;

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Changed185.215. Notes that despite longstanding Union funding to strengthen Libyan border and migration controlscontrols, reports indicate that such assistance has not prevented the continuation of systemic violations, including forcedcontinues returns,to inhumaneraise detentionserious conditionsoperational and deaths,humanitarian andconcerns mayas havewell madeas theconcerns Unionwith vulnerableregard to reputational damage; underlines that the discovery of mass graves in Libya in 2025 and continued allegations from civilfundamental societyrights and human rightsgovernance, organisationspotentially aboutexposing the treatment of migrants heighten concerns about whether Union funding in this context aligns with fundamental Union values, including respect for humanto rights,reputational andrisks; stresses the need for rigorous monitoring, transparency and accountability mechanisms to ensure that migration-related assistance does not indirectly contribute to further harm;

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Changed186.216. Notes that, as of 1 February 2025, the European Commission reorganised the former Directorate-General for DG NEAR, dividing its responsibilities between two newly established directorates: the Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), responsible for candidate countries and the Eastern Neighbourhood, and the Directorate-General for the Mediterranean,Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA), which now covers the Mediterranean region;

European Development Funds (EDF)

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Changed187.217. Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 85 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 16 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 54 transactions authorised by 14 EUUnion delegations, 14 transactions approved by Commission headquarters and 1 transaction related to the Bêkou Trust Fund;

▸8 unchanged paragraphs

218. Notes with concern that, out of the 85 transactions examined, 34 (40,0 %) contained errors, compared to 62 (44,3 %) in 2023 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 27 errors (52 in 2023), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2024 to be 6,5 % (8,9 % in 2023);

219. Highlights with concern that the three most frequent types of errors detected in the 2024 financial year were: ineligible expenditure (40,0 %), the absence of essential supporting documentation (32,0 %) and the over-clearing of pre-financing (14,0 %);

220. Notes with bewilderment that, as of 31 December 2024, the full accounting closure of the 9th European Development Fund, covering the period 2000-2007, had still not been completed, more than 17 years after the introduction of the sunset clause, with eight contracts still ongoing, illustrating the exceptional complexity and duration of certain EDF programmes;

221. Notes positively that the Commission has improved the calculation of cut-off estimates by systematically taking into account extensions of contract implementation periods occurring after the reporting year, following a recommendation made by the Court in its 2023 annual report;

222. Notes with concern that, as in previous years, significant pre-financing balances remain uncleared for excessively long periods, including EUR 446,0 million outstanding for more than 10 years, largely linked to the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, whose long-term operations result in very slow clearing of pre-financing;

223. Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing;

224. Notes that the Director-General’s declaration of assurance in DG INTPA’s 2024 Annual Activity Report contains no reservations, continuing a trend in which the Directorate-General reduced the scope of reservations from 16,0 % of expenditure in 2017 to 1,0 % in 2018 and to zero from 2019 onwards; notes further that DG INTPA estimates the amount at risk at payment at EUR 89,7 million (1,1 % of 2024 expenditure) and the amount at risk at closure at EUR 78,6 million (0,97 %), and that it expects EUR 11,1 million (12,4 % of the amount at risk at payment) to be corrected in subsequent years through its own checks; observes however that, of the EUR 5,0 million reported as recovered in 2024, the Court’s testing showed that EUR 0,2 million should not have been counted as implemented corrective capacity, raising concerns about the reliability of the DG’s reporting;

225. Notes that DG INTPA commissioned its 13th Residual Error Rate (RER) study in 2024, an important component underpinning the Director-General’s declaration of assurance and the regularity information disclosed in the Annual Management and Performance Report; observes that the 2024 study, based on a sample of 401 transactions, estimated a residual error rate of 0,48 %, remaining for the ninth consecutive year below the Commission’s 2,0 % materiality threshold; recalls, however, that the Court has repeatedly identified methodological shortcomings that may underestimate the true residual error rate, particularly concerning the treatment of high-value items; notes that while the Commission has revised the RER methodology as of 2025 to clarify certain aspects and limit reliance on management checks and other auditors’ work, the updated methodology still permits the exclusion of ‘isolated’ errors from extrapolation; expects the Commission to implement the revised methodology rigorously and looks forward to the Court’s verification of its application in the next audit cycle;

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Added226. Recalls that the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, established to address the root causes of displacement and irregular migration, has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, of which 88 % from the EDF and the Union budget; regrets the lack of transparency in the management and allocation of these funds and the difficulty in verifying compliance with Official Development Assistance principles, as highlighted by the Court’s Special Report 17/2024; calls for the EUTF to sufficiently support the agreed priorities; also notes with concern the findings of the Court’s Special Report 20/2025 on the Commission’s support to fight hunger in sub-Saharan Africa, which identified weaknesses in cost assessment and project planning, including insufficient scrutiny of budgets and cases of unused or inappropriate equipment; stresses that such shortcomings undermine sound financial management and calls on the Commission to strengthen cost analysis, procurement planning and needs-based implementation;

Recommendations

227. Calls on the Commission to:

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Changed(i) strengthen preventive and corrective controls under heading 6,6 by addressing recurrent weaknesses such as ineligible expenditure, procurement breaches,irregularities, missing supporting documentation and expenditure not actually incurred; calls for reinforced guidance to delegations and implementing partners;

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

(ii) perform a comprehensive review of the assurance framework for indirect management, particularly with pillar-assessed organisations and international financial institutions;

(iii) ensure that the new ROM contract is operational without delay in April 2026 as the interruption of ROM undermines performance monitoring and the results-orientation of NDICI implementation; prevent future disruptions in ROM by securing stable financing and ensuring that monitoring tools are available continuously throughout the MFF period;

(iv) reverse the decline in Aid for Trade funding to LDCs, conduct the planned 2026 analysis without delay and propose corrective measures ensuring that Aid for Trade resources prioritise countries most in need;

(v) integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission's evaluation, including increased use of blending in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

(vi) ensure impartial and evidence-based assessments in enlargement reporting so that political considerations do not override objective evaluation criteria;

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Changed(vii) ensure that no Union assistance to third countries benefits entities that are involved in human rights violations, repression or democratic backsliding, and apply conditionality rigorously, including through suspension of assistance where fundamental Union values are undermined; provide a detailed outline of the safeguards, monitoring mechanisms and corrective measures implemented to uphold the integrity and accountability of Union external assistance;

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Changed(viii) continue support UNRWAto andsupport reliable humanitarian partners, coupled with independent oversight by external experts and the Court, to ensure effective control and confidence in the use of Union funds;

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Removed(ix) calls on the President of the Commission, pursuant to Article 17(6) TEU, to withdraw confidence in Commissioner Várhelyi;

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

(ix) provide a consolidated and transparent overview of all Union financial support to Ukraine, including grants, loans and guarantees under multiple instruments and facilities, in order to strengthen democratic scrutiny and ensure full accountability;

(x) monitor closely the serious fraud allegations in Ukraine, and continue to apply conditionality where systemic risks or misuse of funds are identified; to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

(xi) report on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in LDCs and for transparency on how the quota of allocations within country MIPs is respected;

(xii) report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy;

(xiii) accelerate the closure of the 9th EDF, noting that it remains open 17 years after the sunset clause, and review the reasons that contributed to the prolonged implementation cycle;

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Added(xiv) engage with the EIB to ensure that its lending operations in non-EU countries are aligned with the Union’s external policy objectives and accompanied by effective cooperation frameworks with partner countries;

Added(xv) increase transparency by publishing accessible dashboards tracking high-value external action contracts, performance indicators and the status of the Court’s recommendations;