Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Change 83

Changed103.126. Expresses its concern that in case of 13 quantifiable errors, the Court considers that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this heading would have been 2,2 percentage points lower;

Change 84

Added127. Draws attention to the need for simplification, further development and promotion of digital tools, and stronger controls to reduce the level of ineligible expenditure; stresses the importance of reducing administrative burdens on farmers to strengthen sound financial management;

128. Is reassured by the Court’s conclusion that the direct payments under CAP, excluding eco-schemes remained free of material error in 2024; acknowledges the Commission’s assessment that this confirms the important role the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) plays in preventing and reducing the risk of errors, as direct payments are managed by each Member State through IACS, which interlinks databases of holdings, aid applications, animal registries and agricultural areas;

Change 85

Changed105.129. Recalls that under the performance-based model of CAP 2023-2027, Member States set the rules to be complied with by final beneficiaries in accordance with the general framework of the Union, while the Commission focuses on performance results and the functioning of the systems that Member States put in place to ensure the respect of those conditions and no longer on the individual transactions; further recalls that accordingly for CAP 2023-2027, Member States are obliged to report to the Commission on output and result indicators related to policy performance, and not on control statistics; notes the Court's observation in its special report 07/2024 ‘The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure’ that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50/50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court's warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

130. Notes the Commission’s replies to the Court that it considers that the audit work of the Certification Bodies continues to be a key element of assurance for the CAP expenditure under the Strategic Plans; notes, furthermore, that for CAP 2023-2027, Member States are required to report to the Commission their assurance packages, including the new annual performance reports and the Certification Body’s opinion and accompanying reports, which the Commission then uses, together with the results of its own audit findings and those of the Court, to conclude on the assurance for CAP expenditure; underlines that the Commission does not calculate an error rate or risk at payment for expenditure under the CAP Strategic Plans; acknowledges the Commission’s explanation that since 74,8 % of the expenditure of the MFF heading 3 in 2024 corresponded to performance-based expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans, no risk at payment could be determined for this heading and, as a consequence, for the Union budget as a whole;

131. Observes that for 2024, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) assessed 82 % of CAP 2023-2027 spending as low-risk, 11 % as medium-risk, and the remaining 7 % as high-risk; notes the Court’s clarification that low-risk spending corresponds to interventions unaffected by potential serious deficiencies in their governance systems and that most low-risk spending relates to direct payments and other support covered by the IACS; further notes that in its Annual Activity Report for 2024, DG AGRI combined the result of the performance-based and compliance-based payments and concluded that overall 77 % of CAP spending in 2024 was low-risk (compared to 69 % of CAP spending in 2023 and 72 % in 2022), 10 % was medium-risk, and 13 % was high-risk;

132. Notes with concern the reservations issued in DG AGRI’s 2024 AAR, namely, ten reservations for nine Member States for IACS expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans due to potential serious deficiencies identified in the functioning of the governance systems, 6 reservations for five Member States concerning non-IACS expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans due to potential serious deficiencies identified in the functioning of the governance systems, six reservations for four Member States concerning market measures due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 14,92 million, one reservation for one Member State concerning direct payments under programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI) due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 28,83 million, 12 reservations for ten Member States concerning rural development due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 209,80 million;

133. Welcomes that as part of its 2024 audit, the Court also collected and analysed information on the introduction of annual performance reports for CAP 2023-2027; is reassured by the Court’s overall conclusion that that annual performance reporting has, for the most part, been introduced as planned and that it has not identified any issues with the reported data; is reassured by the Court’s finding that for the nine paying agencies it reviewed, correspondence can be established between the payments made and the outputs recorded in their IT systems for producing annual performance reports;

134. Notes the Court’s finding, based on its survey of 19 Member States, that paying agencies’ performance reporting systems were still under development in 2024, with 18 paying agencies having automated the production of performance indicators and two using a manual or partly automated approach to produce some key output indicators for their 2024 annual performance reports; notes with concern that the IT systems used for producing the annual performance reports, at the time of Court’s audit work, had not yet undergone full testing to check their compliance with the international information security standards (ISO 27001);

Change 86

Changed111.135. Recalls that CAP 2023-2027 is builtstructured around ten key objectives, including ensuring a viable, fair and stable income for farmers;farmers, safeguarding food security and strengthening the resilience of the agricultural sector; considers that direct income support under CAP should be providedbetter onlytargeted to active farmers whoseactively mainengaged activityin isagricultural agriculture,production, while preserving legal certainty and avoiding excessive administrative constraints, with a specific focus on supporting those most in need, such as family-sized andfarms, small farms, farms located in areas withfacing natural constraints or other specific challenges, young farmers and female farmers; considerscalls thaton the Commission should take measures to increaseimprove the effectivenessefficiency and targeting of Union agricultural funds and ensure that only active farmers receive direct income support, while at the same time ensuring proportionality and notmaintaining landowners;robust controls;

Change 87

Removed112. Is concerned by the allegations of large-scale fraud affecting Union agricultural funds, which were first reported in the media in February 2025, concerning the Greek Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aids (OPEKEPE); recalls that EPPO published a press release in May 2025 confirming that they were conducting an investigation into an alleged organised fraud scheme involving agricultural funds and corruption involving public officials of OPEKEPE; recalls that EPPO has, according to press reports, handed over information to the Greek Parliament with a view to investigating two former ministers; notes that the OPEKEPE scandal has led to the resignation of several ministers and deputy ministers over their alleged involvement in the scandal; notes with concern EPPO’s press release of 22 October 2025 that explains that in the course of EPPO’s preliminary investigation, an organised criminal group, allegedly involved in a systematic large-scale subsidy fraud scheme and money-laundering activities, has been identified;

Added136. Notes the Court’s 2025 conclusions on Union funding for forest-fire-related action: while Member States increasingly used Union funds for prevention, the Commission had an incomplete overview of total forest-fire spending and monitoring of results was weak, an issue with clear agricultural and rural implications; calls on the Commission to improve aggregation of forest-fire related spending and to strengthen monitoring of outcomes and long-term sustainability of preventive measures;

Removed113. Acknowledges that DG AGRI issued in its AAR 2024 four reservations related to expenditure managed by OPEKEPE; notes that one such reservation covers all the IACS interventions under the CAP Strategic Plans, as DG AGRI’s conformity audit and the work of the certification body revealed a number of potential serious deficiencies in relation to the implementation of the identification system for agricultural parcels, as well as in the design and functioning of the management and control system; notes another reservation was issued concerning non-IACS expenditure under the CAP Strategic Plans covering the wine sector and apiculture due to potential serious deficiencies in relation to the design or set-up of the systems not covering the principles of economy, efficiency and measures to avoid double funding; notes that the third reservation for OPEKEPE concerns 2014-2022 rural development programmes, for which the adjusted error rate is estimated to be 7,45 %, due to DG AGRI’s audits in 2023 and 2024 that identified several weaknesses related to land parcel identification system, weaknesses in the OPEKEPE’s on-the-spot checks, serious deficiencies with regard to the supervision and checks of the local action groups, procedures to verify the potential creation of artificial conditions, checks on double financing and public procurement and deficiencies in the evaluation of the reasonableness of costs and verification of SME status; notes the fourth reservation concerning market measures outside of CAP Strategic Plans was issued covering fruit and vegetable producer organisations and exceptional measures, for which an adjusted error rate of 10 % is estimated following DG AGRI’s audit in 2024 that identified deficiencies in administrative and on-the-spot checks impacting exceptional measures and due to fact that, based on the Certification Body’s assessment, adjustments were made to the error rates for fruit and vegetable producer organisations and promotion;

Added137. Stresses that in the context of growing natural-disaster risks the Commission and Member States must ensure that Union-funded prevention measures are well-targeted, based on up-to-date risk assessments, and sustained beyond one-off project cycles so that investments deliver lasting benefits for agriculture and rural communities;

Removed114. Acknowledges the Commission’s written replies that in 2023 and again in June 2024, DG AGRI requested that the Greek competent authority places OPEKEPE’s accreditation under probation; notes the explanation in DG AGRI’s AAR that deficiencies affecting several accreditation criteria were identified by the Certification Body and by DG AGRI, and as a result, Greek authorities put the accreditation of OPEKEPE under probation in September 2024 and drew up an accreditation action plan; further notes that the Commission is following the progress of the implementation of this remedial action plan; insists that the Commission share the latest revised action plan and its assessment with the discharge authority;

Added138. Is concerned by the allegations of large-scale fraud affecting Union agricultural funds, which were first reported in the media in February 2025, concerning the Greek Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aids (OPEKEPE); recalls that EPPO published a press release in May 2025 confirming that they were conducting an investigation into an alleged organised fraud scheme involving agricultural funds and corruption involving public officials of OPEKEPE; recalls that EPPO has, according to press reports, handed over information to the Greek Parliament with a view to investigating two ministers who later stepped down; notes with concern EPPO’s press release of 22 October 2025 that explains that in the course of EPPO’s preliminary investigation, an organised criminal group, allegedly involved in a systematic large-scale subsidy fraud scheme and money-laundering activities, has been identified; acknowledges the measures taken by Greek authorities without delay, including inter alia the decision to establish a special investigative task force, comprising the Financial Police and the Independent Authority for Public Revenue; underlines, in this context, that the assets of several individuals suspected of involvement in the alleged criminal activities have been seized;

Added139. Acknowledges that DG AGRI issued in its AAR 2024 four reservations related to expenditure managed by OPEKEPE; notes that one such reservation covers all the IACS interventions under the CAP Strategic Plans, as DG AGRI’s conformity audit and the work of the certification body revealed a number of potential serious deficiencies in relation to the implementation of the identification system for agricultural parcels, as well as in the design and functioning of the management and control system; notes another reservation was issued concerning non-IACS expenditure under the CAP Strategic Plans covering the wine sector and apiculture due to potential serious deficiencies in relation to the design or set-up of the systems not covering the principles of economy, efficiency and measures to avoid double funding; notes that the third reservation for OPEKEPE concerns 2014-2022 rural development programmes, for which the adjusted error rate is estimated to be 7,45 %, due to DG AGRI’s audits in 2023 and 2024 that identified several weaknesses related to land parcel identification system, weaknesses in the OPEKEPE’s on-the-spot checks, serious deficiencies with regard to the supervision and checks of the local action groups, procedures to verify the potential creation of artificial conditions, checks on double financing and public procurement and deficiencies in the evaluation of the reasonableness of costs and verification of SME status; notes the fourth reservation concerning market measures outside of CAP Strategic Plans was issued covering fruit and vegetable producer organisations and exceptional measures, for which an adjusted error rate of 10 % is estimated following DG AGRI’s audit in 2024 that identified deficiencies in administrative and on-the-spot checks impacting exceptional measures and due to fact that, based on the Certification Body’s assessment, adjustments were made to the error rates for fruit and vegetable producer organisations and promotion; acknowledges that the Greek Authorities drew up an Action Plan, which has been accepted by DG AGRI as a sufficient basis for remedying the above mentioned deficiencies; recalls that all corrective measures are subject to ongoing monitoring by the Commission; insists that the Commission report to the discharge authority on the implementation of the action plan and on measurable improvements in control performance;

Added140. Acknowledges the Commission’s written replies that in 2023 and again in June 2024, DG AGRI requested that the Greek competent authority places OPEKEPE’s accreditation under probation; notes the explanation in DG AGRI’s AAR that deficiencies affecting several accreditation criteria were identified by the Certification Body and by DG AGRI, and as a result, Greek authorities put the accreditation of OPEKEPE under probation in September 2024 and drew up an accreditation action plan; further notes that the Commission is following the progress of the implementation of this remedial action plan; insists that the Commission share the latest revised action plan and its assessment with the discharge authority; acknowledges that Greek authorities have taken corrective measures without delay to address the identified structural weaknesses, enhance transparency of beneficiaries and reinforce controls and anti-fraud measures; welcomes in this context, the reform recently introduced by law to fully transfer OPEKEPE to the Independent Authority for Public Revenues (AADE);

141. Notes the Commission’s reply that in June 2025, the Commission applied a financial correction of EUR 415 million for the deficiencies identified in the management and control system in Greece during the years 2015-2022; notes with concern that the Commission was aware of serious deficiencies related to OPEKEPE since at least 2021, as a then ongoing accreditation related conformity enquiry was already reported in DG AGRI’s AAR for 2021; regrets the fact that the Commission has not taken action earlier to thoroughly investigate the serious deficiencies found in relation to OPEKEPE’s work, mitigate risks and better protect the Union budget;

142. Expresses its concerns over the number of irregularities and allegations of fraud related to Union-funded guesthouses; notes the Commission’s written replies that for the 2014-2022 programming period, guesthouses were financed, together with other types of investments, under Rural Development sub-measure 6.4 (investments in creation and development of non-agricultural activities) and the Leader programme; finds it regrettable, that since the Member States are not reporting to the Commission the number and type of investments supported by these measures, the Commission could not provide to the discharge authority an overview of Union-funded guesthouse projects; notes that the Commission’s audits on rural development measures are system-based and do not assess the legality and regularity of individual transactions; acknowledges the Commission’s written reply that findings on the management and control system implemented by the Member States in connection with guesthouses have been raised in Hungary, Slovakia (measure 6.4) and in Greece (Leader); considers that given the number of fraud allegations connected to guesthouses, the Commission should also monitor and audit individual guesthouse projects, including their use beyond the project implementation period and consider extending the durability period for these kinds of projects to prevent further misuse as well as to introduce strict conflict of interest checks as a prerequisite for the allocation of Union funds to build guesthouses;

Change 88

Changed117.143. Recalls that thea currentformer Prime Minister of Czechia was found to behave been in a situation of conflict of interest during his previous mandateterm in office and the related the European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2018; notes the Commission’s written replies concerning the measures taken in response to the conflict of interest due toarising Andrejfrom Babiš'shis ownership of Agrofert while servinga asprivate Primeholding Ministercompany ofwhile Czechia;holding inpublic particularoffice notesand that the Commission suspended in March 2020 the payment of one Agrofert project worth EUR 30 606,96; notes that in June 2022, the Commission applied a financial correction of EUR 3,3 million to Czechia, part of which (EUR 30 606,96) concerned the situation of conflict of interest of the Prime Minister during his mandate that ended in 2021; insists that the Commission should continue to monitor possible conflicts of interestsinterest that might affect Union funds, especially in relation to elected officials, and take action to protect the Union budget;

Change 89

Changed118.144. Notes that Andrej Babišfollowing hasnational beenelections, re-electeda andnew assumedgovernment thetook office of Prime Minister ofin Czechia in December 2025; takes note of his public announcementstatements thatby hethe intendsPrime Minister, indicating an intention to relinquish ownership and control of Agrofertbusiness interests potentially benefiting from Union funds through the creation of an allegedly irreversible trust arrangement; notes, however, that as of mid-January 2026, no concretepublicly available legal documentation has so far been madeprovided public,to thatdemonstrate the trust structure has noteffective yetestablishment beenand establishedoperational assafeguards of 15 January 2026, that its jurisdiction,such governancearrangements and trustees remainthat unknownthe andPrime thatMinister Mrof BabišCzechia continues, at present, to own Agrofert and other business interests which could potentially benefit from Union funds; notes,stresses further,that that,the evenmere underannouncement theof arrangementfuture asarrangements described,is Agrofertinsufficient wouldto ultimatelydispel beconcerns transferredof toconflict hisof children,interest; therebyinsists maintainingthat aany clearfuture long-termarrangements must ensure the effective removal of economic interests and influence, in line with Union rules on conflict of interest; stresseswelcomes recent media reports that the mereCommission announcementhas offormally futurerequested arrangementsdetailed isinformation insufficientfrom the Czech authorities on the measures put in place to dispelprevent concernspotential conflicts of conflictinterest ofin interest;relation to companies owned or controlled by the Prime Minister, and has sought assurances that no further Union funds are directed to Agrofert until the situation is fully clarified;

145. Recalls that climate and biodiversity are two of the horizontal policy priorities for the 2021-2027 Union budget; notes that the Commission defines climate and biodiversity mainstreaming as the systematic consideration of climate and biodiversity objectives in the design, preparation, implementation and evaluation of each spending programme;

146. Recalls that the 2020 Interinstitutional Agreement established a binding 30 % target for climate spending, but only an annual ‘ambition’ of 7,5 % in 2025 and 10 % in 2026 and 2027 for biodiversity spending; notes that the Commission tracks Union spending on climate and biodiversity-related activities by means of dedicated methodologies; stresses that the climate and biodiversity tracking methodologies are ex-ante tagging systems based on the expected effect of activities and do not factor in results; recalls that the mainstreaming of priorities in the Union budget entails the consideration of that priority in all stages of the budgetary cycle; underlines, therefore, that the tracking of spending related to climate or biodiversity objectives is only one step in a comprehensive green budgeting cycle, in which climate and biodiversity objectives are considered throughout the whole lifecycle of the budget;

Change 90

Changed121.147. Notes that applying its climate and biodiversity tracking methodologies, the Commission calculates that the Union is on track to meet its 30 % climate spending target for 2021-2027 and its biodiversity spending ambition of 7,5 % for 2024;2025; regrets that it is not on track to meet its biodiversity spending ambition of 10 % for 2026 and 2027; notes, furthermore, that there is an average annual financing gap of EUR 21,4 billion to achieve Union biodiversity goals; underlines that increased budgetary allocations must be accompanied by improved effectiveness, better monitoring of biodiversity outcomes, while making sure that these changes to do not create disproportionate administrative burdens for farmers and local authorities;

Change 91

Changed122.148. Is concerned that in several audits, the Court found that Union funds’ contribution to climate objectives was unclear and potentially overestimated due to weaknesses in the Commission tracking methodologies; recalls that in its special report 09/2022 on climate spending in the 2014-2020 Union budget, the Court found that the climate contribution of the Union budget had been overstated by EUR 72 billion under the 2014-2020 MFF, as reported spending was not always relevant to climate action, particularlyincluding under the CAP; is aware that in response to above special report the Commission commissioned a study with a view to establishing a more scientific approach to quantify the CAP climate contribution and considers that the study should be made public; looks forward to receiving the Court’s assessment of the Commission’s follow-up of its recommendations made in special report 09/2022 in 2026;

Change 92

Changed123.149. Notes the Commission’s written reply that from 2021 to 2023, agricultural greenhouse gas emissions in the Union decreased by 3 %, while those for energy supply and industry decreased by 16 %; considers all policy areas and activities must contribute fairly to reducing emissions; notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply,reply; in particularparticular, thatnotes the Court’s overall conclusionassessment that the CAP Strategic Plans 2023-2027 arerepresent ‘greener’an thanimprovement incompared to the previous CAPprogramming period, but do notincluding matchwith theregard Union’sto ambitionsclimate forand theenvironment climateconsiderations, andthough the environment,monitoring and that key elementsperformance forframework assessingcould performancebe arefurther missing;strengthened; welcomes that the Court also recommends the Commission to estimate the CAP’s contribution to the Green Deal targets and strengthen the future CAP monitoring framework forwith a view to improving its contribution to the Union's climate and environmental objectives; considers that improvements to the environment;monitoring and performance framework should not result in additional administrative burden for farmers or managing authorities;

Change 93

Changed124.150. Notes the Court’s special report 14/2024 ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’ and the Commission’s reply; istakes disappointednotes byof Court’s overall conclusionfindings thathighlighting weaknesses and limitations in the design and implementation of the RRF call intoas questionregards the achievementmeasurement of its climate and environmental objectives and that the RRF’s contribution to the green transition isclimate notand clear;environmental isobjectives; concernednotes that the Court found that tracking climate expenditure involves a high level of approximation and some coefficients were leading to potential overestimations; welcomes that the Court also recommends that the Commission tofurther betterrefine estimatemethodologies for estimating climate spending underin future funding instruments and ensureto adequateincorporate the lessons in the design of future funding instruments that are to supportsupporting the climate and environmental objectives and targets;

151. Notes the Court’s Special report 15/2024 on climate adaptation in the Union and the Commission’s reply; appreciates the Court’s conclusion that the overall Union framework for adaptation policy was sound; is concerned by the finding that Member States sometimes used outdated scientific data for their national adaptation strategy documents and that the Member States’ reporting on climate adaptation was insufficient and added little value in terms of tracking progress; is disappointed by the Court’s findings that a third of the sampled projects had little or no impact on increasing adaptive capacity and that there is a risk that two projects (out of 36) might result in maladaptation; welcomes that the Court also recommends that the Commission improve reporting on climate adaptation through common indicators to measure progress and follow up on the weaknesses identified;

152. Recalls that all Union spending must comply with the horizontal ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle, laid down in point 16 of the Interinstitutional Agreement, which stipulates that Union spending must not cause harm to the six environmental objectives set out in Article 17 of the Taxonomy Regulation, namely climate mitigation and adaptation, sustainable use and protection of water resources, the circular economy, pollution prevention and control, and biodiversity protection; considers that, in light of the Court’s recurrent findings, the negative environmental effects of Union spending should also be tracked and reported on;

Change 94

Changed127.153. Recalls that EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a key component of the European Green Deal and one of the main instruments for achieving the Union’s climate ambition; welcomes that according to the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s (DG CLIMA) 2024 AAR, the EU ETS generated EUR 43,6 billion of revenue for climate-action investments in the previous year, out of which EUR 7,4 billion was supplied to the ETS Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund and EUR 2,8 billion was supplied to the RRF, which Member States use to advance the clean energy transition and boost energy security; notes the finding of 2024 IAS audit on the implementation and monitoring of the EU ETS that despite the heavy workload, complex legal framework and scarce resources they operate with, the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DGDG CLIMA)CLIMA staff showed commitment to perform their tasks and willingness to improve the efficiency of the EU ETS related processes; appreciates the Commission’s written confirmation that DG CLIMA intends to address most internal audit recommendations by 2025 and all by mid-2028;

154. Recalls that since 2010, DG CLIMA has issued a reservation in all of its AARs on reputational, legal and/or financial grounds related to security weaknesses identified in the Union Registry for the EU ETS, which was maintained in the AAR 2024; deplores the fact that the underlying weaknesses have not been addressed since 2010; is alarmed by the Commission’s written clarification that the level of risk is closely linked to the value of the assets handled by the EU ETS, which have increased tenfold since 2017, and is also further aggravated by the deteriorating geopolitical context; underlines, that while the financial impact of the reservation for 2024 cannot be quantified, at the time of DG CLIMA’s AAR 2024 the Union Registry held allowances in the value of over EUR 200 billion at current prices;

155. Notes with concern the Commission’s written reply that the evolution of the risk landscape has systematically outpaced the speed by which the Commission was able to improve security measures; understands that in the Commission’s assessment the security risk identified in the Union Registry for the EU ETS can only be resolved with an increased level of spending and, ultimately, by externalising the Union Registry; is appalled that the proposal to address the security weaknesses of the Union Registry is stalled primarily by the non-availability of appropriate human and financial resources; notes with concern the Commission’s written reply that those resources should come from the introduction of fees per services to the Member States to finance the operation of the EU ETS, but as a suitable legal basis for the introduction of a service fee needs to be first proposed in the ETS Directive, the Commission considers that a solution cannot be found before 2028; considers it imperative that appropriate resources be made available without delay to address the major financial, legal and reputational risks to the Union that the security weaknesses of the Union Registry entail;

156. Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall provide citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue;

Change 95

Changed131.157. Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme, the Union’s only standalone programme for the environment and climate action, toin fundingsupporting nature conservation, circular economy,economy initiatives, climate action and the clean energy transition projectstransition, and more broadly,broadly toin promoting sustainable development across the Union; recalls that the provisions of the LIFE+LIFE Regulation, including Article 11(6), which indicatesprovide that providing operating grants tomay support the functioning of non-profit making entities which are involvedactive in the development, implementation and enforcement of Union legislation and policy,policy; andstresses, whichhowever, arethat primarilysuch activeoperating grants must be implemented in thestrict areacompliance ofwith Union legal, financial and transparency requirements; stresses, furthermore, the environmentimportance orof climateclear action,safeguards includingto energyensure transition,that isUnion anfunds eligibleare actionused exclusively for LIFEthe funding;objectives defined in the programme; notes that operating grants allocated to NGOs under the LIFE Programme represent onlyapproximately 1 % of the programme’s total budget; calls on the Commission to ensure robust monitoring, full accountability and transparency in the use of the Union funds, including advocacy activities;

Change 96

Removed132. Regrets the allegations of undue lobbying made against non-governmental organisations whose activities were supported by LIFE operating grants; notes that the reply of the Commission’s Executive Vice-President for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition to CONT on 2 December 2025 in the discharge hearing confirms that the activities by non-governmental organisations supported by LIFE operating grants did not breach any legal framework and that the implementation of LIFE programme fully respected the Financial Regulation;

Added158. Takes note of concerns raised by certain MEPs regarding the use of LIFE operating and action grants by certain beneficiaries, such as civil society organisations and companies; stresses the importance of full transparency with regard to both beneficiaries and the activities financed, continued monitoring and, where necessary, further clarification of the safeguards in place to ensure that Union funds are used exclusively for the objectives defined in the programme;

Change 97

Changed133.159. Notes that a review of a number of funding contracts between the Commission and economic operators, requested inunder the framework of this discharge procedure,procedure showsindicates that activities aimedrelated atto influencing public policy or decision-making are not limited to NGOs but also appear inmay contractsoccur withacross otherdifferent categories of beneficiaries;beneficiaries, including NGOs; expresses its concern that, in some cases, companies receiving Union funding for such activities may simultaneously have EUUnion decision-makers sitting on their boards and receiving remuneration; furtherstresses notesthat safeguards must ensure that theany IASpotential performedconflicts aof targetedinterest engagementare focussedprevented exclusivelyand onthat NGOUnion fundingfunds underare managed transparently, independently of the LIFEtype programmeof beneficiary; highlights the need to verifyensure consistent oversight and verification across all beneficiaries to guarantee compliance with the guidanceCommission’s on2024 fundingguidance foron activities related tosupporting the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policypolicy; butencourages, didtherefore, notthe verifycreation complianceof witha thatstandardised guidancereview process for applications to operating grants including having at least two members of agreementsthe signedCommission withor otheragency beneficiaries;staff reading and reviewing application proposals and the creation of a standardised set of rules in the selection of external experts for the evaluation board of operating grants;

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

Recommendations

160. Calls on the Commission to:

(i) in cooperation with Member States, make available the financial and human resources necessary to urgently resolve the remaining significant security weaknesses identified in the Union Registry of the EU ETS;

(ii) provide support to Member States to simplify eco-schemes, as recommended by the Court, without lowering their environmental ambition;

(iii) support Member States with testing and upgrading the IT systems used for producing the annual performance reports, to ensure their compliance with the applicable international information security standards;

Change 98

Added(iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure under the 2023-2027 CAP, and consider the introduction of new incentives for Member States to recover funds;

Added(v) together with Member States, accelerate disbursements of the EAFRD and mobilise measures to increase absorption where delays persist, ensuring balanced support across all regions;

Added(vi) support Member States in targeting funds to high-value preventive measures (e.g. landscape management, maintenance of agricultural firebreaks, restoration of degraded soils, purchase and supply of veterinary vaccines) and promote the dissemination of best practices and effective agriculture projects across Member States;

▸4 unchanged paragraphs

(vii) improve the sound financial management of the current and future CAP by ensuring that direct income support is provided only to active farmers, with a specific focus on those most in need, such as family-sized and small farms, farms in areas with natural or other specific challenges, young and female farmers;

(viii) conduct financial and compliance audits of Union-funded guesthouse projects on a risk basis;

(ix) closely monitor the use of Union-funded guesthouse projects beyond the project implementation period and consider extending the durability period for these kinds of projects to prevent continued misuse as well as introduce strict conflict of interests checks as a prerequisite for the allocation of Union funds to build guesthouses;

(x) collect data from Member State authorities on the number of guesthouse projects funded by Union budget since 2021, indicating also any irregularities detected, and share this information with the discharge authority;

Change 99

Changed(viii)(xi) monitor possible conflicts of interests affecting Union funds, and ensure that conflicts of interests are actually resolved, including for Members of the European Council and ensure, in particular, that no Union funds are paid, directly or indirectly, to Agrofert or any otherbeneficiaries businesswhere interestsconflict of Andrej Babiš as longinterest ashas thebeen identified conflict of interestand has not been demonstrably and verifiably resolved;

Change 100

Added(xii) share the letter addressed to the Czech authorities to clarify the conflict of interest situation of the Prime Minister with the discharge authority and keep it fully informed of any follow-up steps, including the possible launch of an audit procedure;

(xiii) share with the discharge authority all relevant documents concerning the Commission’s follow-up of the OPEKEPE case, including the up-to-date action plan and its assessment by the Commission, under specific confidential modalities, if necessary;

Change 101

Changed(x)(xiv) draw lessons learnt from the OPEKEPE case, strengthen the control system of the EUUnion agricultural funds, reinforce the Commission’s control activities accordingly and report back to the discharge authority on the measures taken;

Change 102

Changed(xi)(xv) improve its methodology used to track Union spending on climate and biodiversity-related activities of 2021-2027 MFF, including by addressing the relevant recommendations made in the Court’s special reports andas alsowell trackingas improving the monitoring and reporting of actual results of investments and negative effects of Union spending on the environment and biodiversity objectives;

Change 103

Removed(xii) develop and implement a comprehensive green budgeting methodology in the next MFF by integrating climate, biodiversity and environmental considerations into all steps of the budget cycle;

Added(xvi) ensure that climate and environmental considerations are taken into account in the next MFF;

Removed(xiii) continue to verify that funding agreements with all types of beneficiaries comply with the Commission guidance of May 2024 on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy;

Added(xvii) propose a dedicated, detailed plan to ensure that the biodiversity spending target set for the years 2026 and 2027 is met, foster financial tools to close the financing gap and fully implement environmental legislation and mainstreaming biodiversity action into key sectors in order to reach policy targets, including with the view of providing financing for the implementation of the Nature Restoration Regulation;

Removed(xiv) ensure strict compliance with Article 61 of the Financial Regulation by effectively preventing, identifying and managing conflicts of interest when concluding grant agreements in particular with beneficiaries that employ or remunerate EU decision-makers;