Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

11. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

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with observations forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission and executive agencies and the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds

(2025/2145(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission,

– having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2024,

– having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

Changed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0000/2026),(A10-0085/2026),

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

A. whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

B. whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

C. whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

D. whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR);

Political priorities

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Changed1. Stresses the importance of respect for the Union’s fundamental values and principles as defined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process puts special emphasis on the principlesprinciple of the rule of law as set out in Article 2 TEU, the principle of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and the protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

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Changed2. Recalls that respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights is a precondition for sound financial management of the Union budget and that the Commission has a wide range of instruments at its disposal to ensure respect for these principles; notes with serious concern the continued backsliding with regard to the rule of law backsliding,and systemic corruption and attacks on fundamental rights in several Member States, with direct implications for the sound management of Union funds;funds, notes that the lack of Union funds has an alarming effect on the provision of public services; highlights in particular the deteriorating situation in Hungary, marked by widespread corruption and entrenched oligarchic networks;networks, which requires continued attention; deplores that, while problems persist or worsen, the pressure exerted by the Commission to induce meaningful reforms has diminished as the amounts of funds that remain frozen are decreasing; stresses that the Commission needs to move beyond monitoring and to make full and consistent use of the available instruments to suspend or protect Union funding where rule of law deficiencies affect sound financial management,management in Hungaryall andMember inStates concerned; stresses that respect for the rule of law must apply to all otherparticipants Memberin StatesUnion concerned;programmes, including third countries;

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Changed3. Welcomes that the European Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2024 has again issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, deplores that the Court has had to issue an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure, for the 6th consecutive year, and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

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Changed4. Notes that the Court highlights several issues in theirits Annual Report for 2024 that give cause for serious concern; welcomes that the overall error rate has declined from 5,6 % for 2023 to 3,6 % for 2024; stresses, however, that this decrease should be interpreted with caution, as it may not necessarily reflect an improvement in the financial management or in the effectiveness of control systems but could also be influenced by contextual factors such as the end of COVID-19 related emergency spending, a comparatively low level of budgetary implementation in 2024 and the early stage of implementation of the 2021-2027 MFF; is particularly concerned that while the error rate for the heading ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ has decreased from 9,3 % to 5,7 %, it is still considerablywell above the materiality threshold of 2 %;% with the Court continuing to identify weaknesses in control and detection systems on both the Commission’s and the Member States’ side; expresses concern that the recurrent nature of these findings risks normalising the current level of error in cohesion policy; expresses serious concern in this context about proposals to introduce a new spending model under the next MFF that would rely even more heavily on Member States’ control systems, while the underlying causes of persistently high error rates do not yet appear to have been adequately addressed; recalls that cohesion policy remains a fundamental instrument of the Union for promoting economic, social and territorial convergence and supporting balanced development across regions, and stresses that any future reform of spending models must preserve the objectives, predictability and dedicated budgetary framework of cohesion policy;

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Changed5. Expresses deep concern about the persistent shortcomings in the implementation of the RRF; notes that the Court has issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of RRF expenditure for the third consecutive year and that it estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; underlines the serious audit and control deficiencies identified by the Court, which continue to undermine assurance over the regular use of RRF funds; is particularly concerned about the significant accountability gap resulting from the lack of reliable and complete information on final beneficiaries of Union funding, due in particular to the Commission’s interpretation of the concept of ‘final recipient’ under the RRF, which contradicts the existing legislation; considers that, taken together, these shortcomings in the RRF would justify a refusal to grant discharge for the implementation of the RRF in 2024 if the discharge authority were able to take this decision separately; recalls that Parliament has repeatedly raised serious concerns in previous discharge resolutions regarding the RRF, including on the transparency of final beneficiaries, and thereforebeneficiaries; demandsconsiders that the Commission provide, within six months, a complete and meaningful list of finalshould beneficiaries,start excludinginfringement merelyproceedings; intermediaryalso entitiesconsiders suchthat asthe ministriesCommission orshould managingact authorities;without statesundue that,delay failingand this,fully Parliamentexercise willits bringpowers theas matterguardian beforeof the EuropeanTreaties Courtagainst ofMember JusticeStates to ensure that citizens and stakeholders have full access to this information; should it fail to do so, Parliament will consider all appropriate measures within its prerogatives to ensure compliance, including legal action;

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Changed6. Notes with concern that the current implementation rate for the cohesion funds is significantly lower than the implementation rate during the previous MFF 2014-2020, which coincides with the fact that only around 50 % of funds under the RRF had been disbursed by the end of 2024, implying that the remaining 50 % of the funds must be disbursed before then end of the RRF implementation period in December 2026; notes with concern that the total amount of outstanding EUUnion bonds rose to EUR 578,2 billion at the end of 2024 and notes with concern the Court’s estimates that this amount could reach EUR 900 billion by the end of 2027, which maywill place a significant burden on future MFFs due to the associated interest payments and principal repayments; notes that the sustainability of Union debt must be factored into all future budgetary decisions;

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Changed7. Stresses that transparency is not an abstract governance principle but a core element of an effective control environment; underlines that incomplete documentation, inconsistent registration practices or reliance on informal communication channels directly weaken audit trails and hinder the discharge authority’s capacity to assess legality, regularity and sound financial management; in that regard regrets that there have been numerous examples over the last years where the Commission failed to live up to reasonable standards of transparency asand alsotakes statednote inof thecase EuropeanT-36/23, CourtStevi ofand JusticeThe caseNew concerningYork Times v Commission; recalls that under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 text messages betweensent or received by Union officials will only be qualified as documents if they concern Union policy or decisions; emphasises that the Commission Presidentshould andensure thetransparency CEOpractices ofmeet Pfizer;high recallsgovernance standards to guarantee that the Generaldischarge Courtauthority annulledcan thefully Commission’sassess refusallegality, decisionregularity, inand sound financial management of the NewUnion Yorkbudget; Times/Stevinotes casethe concerningimportance accessof totimely relevantresponses textto messages,access-to-documents underliningrequests; encourages the needCommission forto crediblestrengthen searchesits andprocedures robustto record-keepingensure forthat ephemeraloversight communications;bodies iscan similarlyfully concernedassess legality, regularity and sound financial management; considers that failures to ensure proper documentation and transparency at senior leadership level risk undermining public trust, institutional accountability and the credibility of the Commission onas manyguardian occasionsof hasthe notTreaties; providedcalls answerson tothe accessCommission leadership to documentensure requestsfull withincompliance stipulatedwith deadlines,transparency especiallyobligations, concerningproper casesregistration underof all work-related communications, including at the confirmatorylevel applicationsof wherethe President and Members of the EuropeanCollege, Ombudsmanand hasto foundstrengthen systemicinternal procedures and significantaccountability delaysmechanisms in theorder Commissionto administration’sprevent response;similar shortcomings in the future;

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Changed8. Notes that Andrej Babiš has resumed officea asformer Prime Minister of Czechia since December 2025; recalls he had previously beenwas found to behave been in a situation of a conflict of interest linked toduring his ownershipprevious ofterm Agrofertin whileoffice exercisingwhich thatled functionto the suspension and thatfinancial thiscorrection conflictof Union funding; takes note of interestpublic ledstatements toby the suspensionPrime andMinister, financialindicating correctionan intention to relinquish ownership and control of business interests potentially benefiting from Union fundingfunds inthrough the past;creation notesof withan concernallegedly that,irreversible attrust present,arrangement; norecalls the importance of establishing verifiable legal arrangements haveto beenprevent putany risk that Union funds could benefit private business interests of public office holders; underlines that Member States should ensure that effective safeguards are in place to definitivelyuphold eliminatetransparency, theincluding riskon thatdisclosure Unionof fundsbeneficial couldownership benefit,information, directlyintegrity orand indirectly,sound hisfinancial privatemanagement businessof interests;Union funds;

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Changed9. Stresses that Members of the Commission must meet the highest standards of integrity, independence and accountability, both in their current functions and in their previous roles; notes with concern that several senior management positions remained vacant in DG NEAR during the period in which Commissioner Várhelyi,the nowcurrent Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare,Welfare was responsible for this Directorate-General in his capacity as Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, and notes that athe spyinformation ringprovided allegedlyby operatedthe outCommission in this regard during the exchange of views with the Permanentdischarge Representationauthority was inaccurate; stresses that the Commission must ensure that all Members of Hungarythe toCollege meet the Unionstandards whileof heintegrity, wasindependence and professional conduct required in chargeorder which,to exercise their responsibilities, particularly where those responsibilities involve the management of politically sensitive portfolios and significant Union funds; considers that, taken together, underminethe trustpast serious and prolonged management failures in hisDG abilityNEAR, tothe exerciseprovision officeof inaccurate information to Parliament in athe mannercontext fullyof consistentthe withdischarge procedure, and the Union’sadditional valuesconcerns relating to conduct and independence outlined above demonstrate a pattern that is incompatible with the requirementsstandards of accountability, reliability and sound administration;administration required of a Member of the Commission;

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Removed10. Deplores that the Court in several Special Reports over the last years has repeatedly documented that the Commission systematically overestimates the positive climate effects of Union spending; at the same time regrets that the Commission methodologies for tracking climate and biodiversity effects of Union spending do not capture all of the effects of Union activities, for instance, the impact of some subsidies under the common agricultural policy that are harmful to climate and biodiversity; notes that only tracking the positive effects of the Union budget on climate and biodiversity leads to a systematic overestimation of the contribution of the Union budget to these objectives and provides an overly positive impression of the performance of the Union budget; stresses that these methodological shortcomings translate into concrete accountability gaps for the discharge authority; regrets in particular that the Commission was unable to provide traceable information on projects rejected or modified in 2024 on the basis of the Do No Significant Harm principle, despite its central role in the RRF and cohesion policy; underlines that the Parliament’s ability to exercise budgetary control also depends on verifiable, project-level evidence of environmental compliance and impact;

Added10. Stresses that the Commission must act in a fully impartial and transparent manner, which includes eliminating conflicts of interest, providing clear accountability for the management of Union funds and complying with its own guidelines on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to strengthen transparency and accountability regarding the appointment and activities of its special advisers by systematically publishing detailed information on their selection criteria, mandate, tasks, duration of assignment, remuneration, and declarations of interests; stresses that special advisers may exercise significant influence on policy development and therefore must be subject to clear governance standards, regular reporting obligations and proactive disclosure in line with the principles of sound financial management and Article 15(3) TFEU;

Removed11. Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 review of NGO grant agreements confirmed the absence of breaches of the law; underlines that civil society organisations are legitimate beneficiaries of Union funding under the Treaties and often contribute to the delivery of Union objectives in a cost-effective and impact-oriented manner; stresses that budgetary control, safeguards and transparency requirements must be applied in a neutral, proportionate and evidence-based way, respecting legal certainty and that they must not single out NGOs as a risk category; emphasises that selective transparency undermines trust in the discharge process and that effective scrutiny requires the application of equivalent standards to all beneficiaries, including companies and consultancies;

Added11. Stresses that the Commission's follow-up actions cannot lead to an extension of its competences beyond the scope provided for in the Treaties,

Removed12. Recalls that due to the urgent need to boost the Union's defence capabilities, the number and volume of Union defence funding instruments has increased since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines the need for a comprehensive Union approach to defence funding, with increased focus on countering hybrid threats, including those related to artificial intelligence, drones and cyber-attacks; underlines that democratic accountability, auditability and transparency must increase in parallel with expenditure and that security considerations cannot be used to justify weaker oversight, fragmented reporting or reduced access for the discharge authority; stresses the need for further improvement of the transparency of Union defence funding, including by ensuring audit arrangements equivalent in practical effect to those applicable to civilian spending, and that the discharge authority can exercise democratic scrutiny of all Union-funded activities, during the adoption, design and implementation phases;

Added12. Notes that, in several special reports over the last years, the Court has identified shortcomings in the Commission’s methodology for estimating the climate effects of Union spending which have led to systemic overestimation by the use of ex-ante tagging systems based on the expected effect of activities and which do not factor in actual results; stresses that limitations of current methodologies may affect the reliability of reported figures and have implications for the discharge authority’s assessment of performance; further notes that the current methodologies for tracking climate and biodiversity expenditure do not fully capture all effects of Union activities, including certain measures under the common agricultural policy; notes that the application of the Do No Significant Harm (DNSH) principle helps prevent the implementation of non-compliant measures; emphasises that such methodological limitations can create accountability challenges for the discharge authority; underlines that Parliament’s ability to exercise effective budgetary control depends on transparent, verifiable and project-level evidence of environmental compliance and impact;

Added13. Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 review of NGO grant agreements found no breaches of the law; nevertheless, underlines that any recipient of Union funding, including NGOs, should be subject to robust, proportionate and risk-based scrutiny and transparency requirements, in line with legal provisions and sound financial management; stresses that budgetary control, safeguards and transparency requirements must be applied in a neutral, proportionate and evidence-based way, ensuring that transparency and oversight apply effectively across all categories of beneficiaries and that the scrutiny is risk-based; emphasises that the lack of transparency undermines trust in the discharge process and that effective scrutiny requires the application of equivalent standards to all beneficiaries; takes note of the Court’s findings in its special report 11/2025 ‘Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs’;

Added14. Notes that, under the Treaties, civil society organisations are legitimate beneficiaries of Union funding and frequently support the attainment of Union objectives; stresses that budgetary control, safeguards and transparency requirements must be applied in a neutral, proportionate and evidence-based way, with due regard for legal certainty; highlights that selective transparency can undermine confidence in the discharge process, and that effective scrutiny requires the consistent application of comparable standards to all beneficiaries; takes note of the Scrutiny Working Group established within Parliament in this regard;

Added15. Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds, in compliance with the Financial Regulation, to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

Added16. Welcomes that due to the urgent need to boost the Union's defence capabilities, the number and volume of Union defence funding instruments has increased since the start of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; considers that defence and support for Ukraine must be treated as the budgetary priority in the current geopolitical context and that adequate resources should be allocated to meet this objective; underlines the need for a comprehensive Union approach to security and defence funding, responding to both conventional military threats and non-conventional threats, including hybrid threats, such as those related to artificial intelligence, drones and cyber-attacks; considers that technologies that provide the greatest operational advantage should be prioritised in the funding of technologies; underlines that democratic accountability, auditability and transparency must increase in parallel with expenditure, while recognising that legitimate security requirements may limit the disclosure of certain sensitive information, without reducing the overall capacity of the discharge authority to exercise effective oversight; stresses the need for further improvement of the transparency of Union defence funding, including by ensuring audit arrangements proportionate to the sensitivity of defence activities but fully ensuring effective oversight, and by guaranteeing that the discharge authority can exercise democratic scrutiny of all Union-funded activities, during the adoption, design and implementation phases;

Added17. Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter); recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policymaking and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting;

Added18. Recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on the European Union;

Added19. Recalls the importance of ensuring that Union funds are allocated and implemented in full compliance with the Financial Regulation and the Union’s fundamental values; stresses the need for appropriate oversight, transparency and safeguards to prevent fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding, money laundering and misuse of funds, including by beneficiaries whose activities are incompatible with the Union’s values; highlights in this framework the key role played by the anti-fraud architecture of the Union as a whole and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, notably the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO);

Key recommendations:

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Changed13.20. Calls on the CommissionCommission, in particularparticular, to:

(i) urgently reassess and address the deterioration of the rule of law and risks to the Union budget in Hungary, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation and other available tools, including full suspension of Union funds;

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Changed(ii) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the ‘final recipients’, of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (the RRF Regulation), by revising its Guidance on RRPs, to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of ‘final recipients’ andrecipients’, to provide the discharge authority,ensure withinMember sixStates months,collect withand aprovide completeinformation andon meaningfulthe listlast ofentities finalreceiving beneficiaries,funds, excluding merely intermediary entities such as ministries or managing authorities;authorities, and making this information available to the discharge authority by the last RRF payment disbursement submission deadline, and start infringement proceedings if necessary;

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Removed(iii) ensure full compliance with Union rules on access to documents, including regarding text messages and other electronic communications of the Commission President and Commissioners;

Added(iii) publish the list of final recipients and contractors across all instruments in a harmonised, machine-readable format;

Removed(iv) ensure that no Union funds are paid, directly or indirectly, to Agrofert or any other business interests of Andrej Babiš if the identified conflict of interest has not been demonstrably and verifiably resolved;

Added(iv) ensure compliance with Union rules on access to documents, including text messages, while recognising that institutional communications of public interest should be made accessible in a proportionate manner and respecting the legal and security requirements, in order to safeguard democratic oversight and accountability;

Removed(v) calls on the President of the Commission, pursuant to Article 17(6) TEU, to withdraw confidence in Commissioner Várhelyi;

Added(v) ensure that no Union funds are paid, directly or indirectly, to beneficiaries, including those related to members of the European Council, where a conflict of interest has been identified and has not been demonstrably and verifiably resolved, in accordance with the applicable Union rules and safeguards;

Removed(vi) calls on the Commission to strengthen the existing control framework through independent ex-ante verification of climate and biodiversity coefficients, systematic publication of project-level climate data and transparent reporting on environmentally harmful expenditure, in line with the Court’s recommendations;

Added(vi) ensure that all Commissioners and senior officials exercise their functions in full compliance with Union rules on integrity, conflicts of interest and sound administration;

Added(vii) adequately apply the control framework for the Union expenditure related to climate and biodiversity objectives, including a proportionate verification mechanism, timely reporting of project-level climate data and transparent communication on environmentally impacts, in line with the Court’s recommendations and with due regard for operational feasibility and economic competitiveness; improve the monitoring and reporting of results, beyond mere spending targets, with a view to maximising the impact of Union climate and biodiversity funding;

Added(viii) examine, in line with the Financial Regulation, any potentially fraudulent or irregular beneficiaries; recalls the importance of appropriate oversight of Union funding, with particular attention to respect for the Union’s fundamental values, and the Commission’s legal obligation to ensure that beneficiaries uphold these values and refrain from professional misconduct;

Added(ix) ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to Union funding, including RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

Added(x) continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget in fostering gender equality;