Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to report parliamentary committee draft

2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section II – European Council and Council

(2025/2147(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section II – European Council and Council,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the second report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A100000/2026),

Change 2

ChangedA. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability,accountability and by implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting anda good governance of human resources;

B. whereas, under Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the Union, and whereas the budget of the European Council and of the Council is a section of the Union budget;

C. whereas, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council is not to exercise legislative functions;

D. whereas, under Article 317 TFEU, the Commission is to implement the Union budget on its own responsibility, having regard to the principles of sound financial management, and whereas, under the framework in place, the Commission is to confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

Change 3

ChangedE. whereas, under Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU, the European Council and the Council (the ‘Council’) are assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council (the ‘Secretariat’),Council, and whereas the Secretary-General of the Council is wholly responsible for the sound management of the appropriations entered in Section II of the Union budget;

Change 4

ChangedF. whereas, over the course of more thanalmost twenty years, Parliament has been implementing the well-established and respected practice of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and whereas the Commission supports that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution, body, office and agency for its administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued;

Change 5

ChangedG. whereas, according to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutionsinstitutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

Change 6

ChangedH. whereas, since the 2009 budget discharge,2009, the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure has compelled Parliament to refuse to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council;

I. whereas the European Council and the Council, as Union institutions and as recipients of the general budget of the Union, should be transparent and democratically accountable to the citizens of the Union and subject to democratic scrutiny of the spending of public funds;

Change 7

RemovedJ. whereas Article 15(3) TFEU requires the Union institutions to ensure in their Rules of Procedure that their proceedings are transparent, while in several of its inquiries and decisions Ombudsman has criticised the Council for its lack of transparency suggesting that the Council has failed fully to grasp the critical link between democracy and the transparency of decision-making;

AddedJ. whereas the recommendation of the European Ombudsman (the ‘Ombudsman’) in strategic inquiry OI/2/2017/TE on the transparency of the Council legislative process indicated that the Council’s practice with regard to transparency in the legislative process constituted maladministration and should be addressed in order to enable citizens to follow the Union legislative process;

Change 8

ChangedK. whereas the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirms the right of taxpayers and of the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue and that the General Court in in its judgment of 25 January 2023 in Case T-163/21, De Capitani v Council, stated on transparency within the Union legislative process that documents produced by the Council in its working groups are not of technical nature but legislative and are therefore subject to access to documents requests;

Change 9

Removed1. Notes that the budget of the Council falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 13,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,9 % of the total Union budget); notes that the Council’s budget of approximately EUR 0,7 billion represents 5,26 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

Added1. Deeply regrets that since 2009, and again for the financial year 2024, Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure, preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget and thereby compelling Parliament to refuse discharge;

Removed2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2024 (the ‘Court’s report’) examined a sample of 70 transactions under the heading ‘Administration’, the same number as in 2023, whereas the Court further states that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2024 accounted for approximately 69 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology (IT), and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

Added2. Notes that on 22 September 2025, the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat of the Council containing 103 important questions from Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with thorough answers to all questions;

Removed3. Notes that 16 (23 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the three errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold; notes that the Court’s report did not identify any specific issues concerning the Council;

Added3. Regrets that, on 3 October 2025, the General Secretariat of the Council informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing which was arranged for 6 November 2025 as part of the discharge procedure and in which all other institutions that were invited participated;

RemovedState of play of the discharge procedure

Added4. Emphasises Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU, as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability towards Union taxpayers;

Change 10

Changed4. Deeply5. regretsUnderlines that sinceArticle 200959(1) andof againthe forFinancial Regulation states that the financialCommission yearshall 2023confer Parliamentthe hasrequisite hadpowers toon refusethe dischargeother toUnion institutions for the Councilimplementation becauseof the Councilsections continuesof tothe refusebudget relating to cooperatethem withand, Parliamenttherefore, onfinds theit dischargeonce procedure,again preventingincomprehensible Parliamentthat fromthe takingCouncil anbelieves informedit decisionappropriate basedthat ondischarge ashould seriousbe andgranted thoroughto scrutinythe ofCommission for the implementation of the Council’sCouncil budget;

Change 11

Removed5. Notes that, on 22 September 2025, the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat of the Council containing 103 important questions for Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with detailed answers to all the questions;

Added6. Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of almost twenty years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued by Parliament;

Removed6 Regrets that, on 3 October 2025, the Secretariat informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing organised on 6 November 2025 as part of the discharge process and in which all other invited institutions participated;

Added7. Stresses that the current situation allows Parliament to check only the reports of the Court of Auditors and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website, because the Council continues its malpractice of non-cooperation with Parliament which makes it difficult for Parliament to carry out its duties properly and make an informed decision on granting discharge;

Removed7. Reiterates Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability to Union taxpayers;

Added8. Deplores that the Council, for 15 years, has shown a lack of political willingness to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure; underlines that this attitude has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions, has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and has damaged the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity;

Removed8. Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it incomprehensible that the Council believes it appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget;

Added9. Reaffirms its deep frustration regarding the Council's attitude towards the discharge procedure, which conveys an inappropriate message to Union citizens at a time when greater transparency is essential; underlines that the Council must adhere to the same standards of accountability it expects from other Union institutions;

Removed9. Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of more than 20 years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including the European Council and Council; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of granting discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure and implementation of the Union budget should continue to be pursued directly by Parliament to preserve the compliance of the principle of sound financial management;

Added10. Emphasises that all other Union institutions acknowledge and comprehend the principle that, given the delegation of power concerning budget implementation, Parliament holds both the right and the obligation to scrutinise their budgets and their execution as part of the discharge procedure; in light of this, expresses its strong disapproval that the Council persists in its refusal to cooperate with Parliament in this regard;

Removed10. Stresses that the current situation implies that Parliament can only check the reports of the Court and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website, which makes it impossible for Parliament to make an informed decision on granting discharge;

Added11. Recalls that the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenues; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure;

Removed11. Deplores the lack of political willingness by the Council, for more than a decade, to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure and that this has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions and has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and on the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity;

Added12. Stresses that the current situation must be improved through better interinstitutional cooperation within the existing framework of the Treaties; considers that a possible revision of the Treaties could make the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by explicitly empowering Parliament to grant discharge individually to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and urges the Council to actively engage with Parliament to address the current situation;

Removed12. Reiterates that the Council’s continued refusal to engage in the discharge procedure is an unacceptable breach of democratic accountability; calls for legal and procedural amendments to withhold budgetary appropriations to any Union institution that fails to comply with transparency obligations;

Added13. Recalls that on 6 May 2025, during his intervention in Parliament’s plenary, the Representative of the Presidency of the Council expressed the latter’s willingness ‘to engage in a meaningful and pragmatic cooperation between our institutions’ when it comes to discharge in relation to the European Council and Council section of the Union budget, and reiterates its call for this intention to be translated into concrete steps in due time; calls therefore on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible, involving the Secretary-Generals and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and find a solution while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensuring transparency and proper democratic control of budget implementation; reiterates its request that the Commission and the Council legal services provide an opinion on potential Treaty-based solutions to enforce Council’s accountability in the discharge procedure;

Removed13. Recalls that the case-law of the CJEU supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenues; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure and insists on the full application of Article 14(1) TEU;

Added14. Stresses that Parliament’s observations concerning budgetary and financial management, internal management, performance and internal control, human resources, equality and well-being, ethical framework and transparency, digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection, buildings, environment and sustainability, interinstitutional cooperation and communication from its discharge resolution of 29 April 2026 are still valid;

Removed14. Notes that on 6 May 2025, during his intervention in Parliament’s plenary, the Representative of the Presidency of the Council expressed the latter’s willingness ‘to engage in a meaningful and pragmatic cooperation between our institutions’ when it comes to discharge in relation to the European Council and Council section of the Union budget, and calls for this intention to be translated into concrete steps in due time; calls therefore on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible, involving the Secretary-Generals and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and find a solution while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensuring transparency and proper democratic control of budget implementation; reiterates its request that the Commission and the Council legal services provide an opinion on potential Treaty-based solutions to enforce Council’s accountability in the discharge procedure;

Added15. Reiterates its regret that the budget of the European Council and the Council has not been divided into two clearly separated budgets as recommended by Parliament in previous discharge resolutions in order to improve transparency and accountability, not least concerning the European Council, given that it is currently impossible to obtain reliable information regarding its costs; stresses the importance of reliable data for objective control; calls for compliance with the recommendation of the discharge authority;

Removed15. Stresses that, while the current situation has to be improved through better inter-institutional cooperation within the framework of the Treaties, a revision of the Treaties could make the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by giving Parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies individually; stresses, however, that pending such a review, the current situation must be improved through enhanced inter-institutional cooperation; urges in this sense the Council to actively engage with Parliament;

Added16. Stresses that while unanimity voting remains a core principle of the Treaties, its application can, in certain circumstances and in critical policy areas, affect the timelines and effectiveness of the Union, including by paralysing the Union’s decision-making process and therefore making it prone to blackmail by Member States, especially those who fail to respect the rule of law; calls for targeted treaty reforms or, alternatively, practical improvements, within the existing Treaty framework, to strengthen transparency, democratic decision making, accountability and the efficiency of the European Council’s work;

Removed16. Notes that, despite the Council’s longstanding unwillingness to cooperate in the discharge procedure, Parliament, nevertheless, highlights some political priorities and sets out some observations concerning the budgetary and financial management of the Council and other observations relevant for the discharge procedure in this report;

Removed17. Notes that, given the Council’s lack of cooperation with Parliament, observations in the following sections primarily rely on aggregated information published on the Council’s website, which provides limited detail;

RemovedPolitical priorities

Removed18. Regrets that the Council exerts its prerogative in the nomination and appointment procedures for many Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, without taking into account the views of interested parties or the recommendations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);

Removed19. Regrets the Council’s tradition of not questioning the appointments of individual Member States for most positions which means that the professional qualifications of candidates are not thoroughly checked; insists, therefore, on the need for a review of the Council’s prerogative with a view to guaranteeing and strengthening the participation of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies concerned and increasing the legitimacy of those appointed; suggests that one possibility that could be put in place to ensure that candidates have the necessary qualifications would be to apply the same screening by an external panel used for the nominations of the judges and advocates-general of the CJEU;

Removed20. Recalls that, pursuant to Article 286(2) TFEU, the Council appoints the members of the Court after consultation with Parliament; recalls that, on the basis of this prerequisite, Parliament delivers an opinion on the candidates; regrets that the Council has repeatedly disregarded Parliament’s recommendations in its consultative role regarding the appointment of the members of the Court; recalls that although Parliament’s opinion is non-binding on the Council, candidates who received an unfavourable opinion withdrew their candidatures by accepting Parliament’s decision, thereby recognising the role of Parliament as the democratic supervisory authority linked to the safeguarding of the Union budget; calls on the Council to recognise Parliament’s role by cooperating in the discharge procedure;

Removed21. Stresses that the persistent gender imbalance among the Members of the Court has become increasingly anachronistic; reiterates its call on the Council to address this issue by revisiting the nomination procedure and taking concrete measures, such as requiring Member States to submit at least two candidates of different genders;

Removed22. Regrets that the Council has so far ignored Parliament’s resolution of 17 December 2020 on the need for a dedicated Council configuration on gender equality and insists that a dedicated institutional forum would ensure stronger integration of gender equality in Union policies and strategies as well as essential coordination and progress in the main files related to gender equality;

Removed23. Recalls that the judges and advocates-general of the Court of Justice are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States after consulting a panel responsible for giving an opinion on prospective candidates' suitability to perform the required duties;

Removed24. Calls on the rotating Council Presidencies to stop using corporate sponsorship to contribute to covering their expenses as this entails a risk of creating conflicts of interest, in line with the conclusions of the workshop held by Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control on 27 June 2023; notes that, in her decision of 9 September 2024 on the strategic initiative on sponsorship of the presidency of the Council of the EU, the European Ombudsman encouraged the Council to take stock of how the non-binding rules adopted by the Council for the use of sponsorship by its presidency (‘the Guidance’) have been implemented and to explore other possible measures that could help mitigate the risks associated with the use of sponsorship, which include the risk of conflicts of interest, as well as reputational risks; notes with concern from the annual report of the European Ombudsman for 2024 that the Council has still not fully addressed public concerns around the use of corporate sponsorship, as there is a recurrent “lack of transparency around the identity of sponsors, the nature of their support, and what they gain in return” and sponsors were still able to use the presidency logo for commercial purposes; calls on the Council to render the Guidance binding; reiterates its call on the Council to provide a budget for the Council Presidencies to ensure adequate and uniform standards of efficiency and effectiveness in the work in the Council in general;