Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Added6. Stresses that respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law constitutes a prerequisite for good performance and sound financial management; considers that only agencies ensuring full compliance with fundamental rights obligations can be regarded as performing satisfactorily, irrespective of budget execution rates;

Removed7. Acknowledges that decentralised agencies vary in their exposure to lobbying risks depending on their mandate and operational context; highlights that current practices for ensuring transparency also differ; notes that for example, euLISA maintains a dedicated transparency register on its webpage covering all meetings of its senior management with economic operators, Frontex provides on its website a register with information on meetings linked specifically to procurement-related matters, ECHA publishes information on the meetings held by senior managers with external stakeholder organisations; is of the opinion that, while a one-size-fits-all model would be neither proportionate nor operationally meaningful, establishing common minimum standards would enhance coherence; notes the replies provided by agencies in the previous discharge cycle, including their varying use of the Transparency Register and the fact that several agencies have already introduced internal transparency registers or conflict-of-interest systems tailored to their mandates; calls on the agencies to adopt minimum standards such as the implementation of the 4-eye-principle, clear code of conduct strategy including clear rules to avoid a conflict of interest and the implementation of specific internal transparency registers with clear standards reflecting the mandate of the agency and the relevant data protection rules; highlights that transparency registers should be accessible to auditors on a case by case basis; considers that implementation should be progressive taking into account new digital possibilities in order to avoid creating additional administrative burden for agencies;

Added7. Calls on all agencies to continue to ensure compliance with fundamental rights and data protection in their respective operations;

Removed8. Notes that, in 2024, the 33 decentralised agencies reported that they employ a total of 11 491 members of staff (compared to 10 580 in 2023), comprising officials, temporary agents, contract agents and seconded national experts (SNEs), representing an increase of 8,61 % compared to 2023; notes that while gender balance in the Union decentralised agencies is improving, significant disparities remain; highlights that some agencies, such as ACER, EASA, ERA, euLISA and Europol, have a higher percentage of male staff, while agencies like CdT, EFSA, EMA, ETF, and Eurojust have more female staff; notes that the percentage is often sector-specific, with men dominating IT-related and law enforcement roles, and women more prevalent in education/training and healthcare sectors; recalls that the Union’s commitment to promoting gender equality in management positions is still not fully realised; emphasises that the efforts of Commission in this regard should be improved; recalls that Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (Staff regulations) states that recruitment should also be based on the broadest geographical balance selected from EU Member States; notes that there is a natural tendency for higher percentage of staff stemming from the Member State in which the Agency is located; recalls that the agencies located in countries with relatively low correction coefficient are facing continuous challenges in attracting skilled and geographically diverse staff;

Added8. Highlights the importance of the discharge procedure, which is not only a treaty-based obligation but also promotes transparency, accountability, and open dialogue on the Union’s finances; considers that the practice of granting discharge through governance arrangements established in the founding acts of agencies such as the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), and the Single Resolution Board (SRB), reflects their specific legal and financial frameworks and ensures appropriate evaluation and scrutiny, while supporting transparency and public accountability; recalls the Common Approach on fully self-financed agencies (point 58), which calls for exploring democratic accountability mechanisms, including annual reporting to Parliament, Council, and Commission, as well as consideration of their recommendations, in order to ensure public scrutiny over agencies implementing Union policies without recourse to the general Union budget; considers, nevertheless, that it would be desirable for fully self-financed agencies to become part of the discharge procedure for agencies under the responsibility of the Committee on Budgetary Control, or at least to be subject to enhanced reporting obligations before the Committee on Budgetary Control;

Removed9. Notes that, in 2024, the staff turnover rate was more than 5% in 16 out of 33 agencies (namely BEREC Office, CdT, Cedefop, CEPOL, ECDC, EEA, ELA, euLISA, EUOSHA, Eurofound, Eurojust, Europol, FRA) and that two of them exceeded the 10% rate (namely EIT, ETF); commends the agencies that have taken targeted measures to prevent high staff turnover rates; calls on the Commission and the Member States to allow to higher contract agents for longer periods or allow a higher number of temporary agents to guarantee a better continuity and knowledge preservation;

Added9. Notes with concern that over the years, Union decentralised agencies have been entrusted with an expanding number of tasks through revised regulations, new legislation or service-level and delegation agreements with the Commission often without corresponding structural resources or permanent posts; highlights that this recurrent pattern, creates operational pressure which in turn might contribute to budgetary management weaknesses and a growing structural dependence on external contractors, particularly in the area of information and communication technologies (ICT), cybersecurity and other operational-enabling functions; warns that such long-term dependence may undermine institutional capacity, continuity, and knowledge retention, while also weakening the Union’s digital sovereignty and the personal integrity of citizens; calls therefore on such long term dependence to be regularly assessed and to reduce structural dependency on external consultants, in particular for core functions; stresses that excessive outsourcing undermines institutional memory, accountability and value for money; calls on the Commission to ensure agencies are adequately staffed to perform their mandates in-house where possible;

Removed10. Welcomes the fact that in 2024 most agencies adopted and implemented the Charter on Diversity and Inclusion, which promotes equal treatment, diversity and inclusion in the workplace and in social life;

Added10. Notes that rule of law deficiencies in certain Member States, including weakened judicial independence and prosecution capacity, can undermine agencies’ cooperation frameworks, data reliability and operational integrity; calls on the Commission to assess and address these risks;

Removed11. Highlights that establishing an effective complaint mechanism for staff in Union decentralised agencies requires combining strong confidentiality guarantees, including anonymous reporting channels, with clear, harmonised procedures aligned with the Staff Regulations and communicated through regular staff training; considers that agencies should appoint independent, professionally trained ethics or complaints officers, or utilise shared inter-agency structures for smaller agencies, to ensure impartial handling of Article 90 of the Staff Regulations requests, harassment reports, conflicts of interest, and whistleblowing disclosures; calls on the agencies to ensure that staff have access to an external escalation channel and robust protection against retaliation through systematic follow-up checks, while transparency should be enhanced through anonymised annual reporting on complaints and outcomes, and impartiality improved through the use of inter-agency investigation panels for sensitive cases; calls on the implementation of protection mechanisms against false accusation and denunciation;

Added11. Stresses that transparency, robust conflict-of-interest controls and clear rules governing interactions with stakeholders are essential safeguards for the independence, institutional credibility, and accountability of Union decentralised agencies as well as the public's trust in their strong and robust functioning; underlines that many agencies operate in sectors where close cooperation with industry, consultancies, technical experts, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or external partners is necessary, but where the risks of undue influence, unbalanced consultations or opacity remain; highlights that transparent procedures, public disclosure of meetings, balanced and transparent expert selection, and continuous conflict-of-interest screening are indispensable to ensure that agency decisions are based solely on objective evidence and the Union’s general interest; urges all agencies to put in place and enforce such measures, calls for transparent safeguards, including clear and adequate cooling-off periods, proactive monitoring and transparency of stakeholder interactions; recommends regular independent reviews of conflict-of-interest frameworks, respecting the principle of proportionality, and invites the Commission and the EU Agencies Network to promote peer learning to enhance governance and transparency standards;

Removed12. Notes the important role of the EU Agencies Network (EUAN) and in particular its ICT Advisory Committee (ICTAC) in supporting agencies’ preparedness for the implementation of the Cybersecurity Regulation through enhanced coordination, knowledge sharing and cooperation with DG DIGIT, CERT-EU and the Interinstitutional Committee for Digital Transformation; calls on EUAN and ICTAC to provide comprehensive and regular information on the state of implementation across all decentralised agencies, including common challenges, identified risks, resource needs, and planned mitigation measures, in order to enable effective oversight;

Added12. Acknowledges that decentralised agencies vary in their exposure to lobbying risks depending on their mandate and operational context; notes that transparency practices vary across Agencies; notes that for example, eu-LISA maintains a dedicated transparency register on its webpage covering all meetings of its senior management with economic operators, European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) provides on its website a register with information on meetings linked specifically to procurement-related matters, ECHA publishes information on the meetings held by senior managers with external stakeholder organisations; is of the opinion that, while a one-size-fits-all model would be neither proportionate nor operationally meaningful, establishing common minimum standards would enhance coherence and accountability; notes the replies provided by agencies in the previous discharge cycle, including their varying use of the Transparency Register and the fact that several agencies have already introduced internal transparency registers or conflict-of-interest systems tailored to their mandates; calls on the agencies to adopt minimum standards such as the implementation of the 4-eye-principle, clear code of conduct strategy including clear rules to avoid a conflict of interest and the implementation of specific internal transparency registers with clear standards reflecting their respective mandate and applicable data protection rules; highlights that such transparency registers should be accessible to auditors on a case by case basis; considers that their implementation should be progressive and make use of new digital possibilities in order to avoid creating unnecessary and/or additional administrative burden for agencies;

Removed13. Stresses the importance of developing clear, robust and meaningful key performance indicators (KPIs) in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) of EU agencies, as these reports constitute a primary source of information for external users; notes that some KPI systems frequently lack continuity, standardisation, operational depth, documented methodology for selecting, updating, and retiring KPIs, transparency, comparability and multi-annual tracking, thereby reducing comparability and the capacity of external users to assess performance objectively; underlines that KPIs should be streamlined and well-designed, built on SMART principles and applied consistently across reporting cycles, which are essential for evaluating efficiency, effectiveness and progress toward strategic objectives;

Added13. Notes that, in 2024, the 33 decentralised agencies reported that they employ a total of 11 491 members of staff (compared to 10 580 in 2023), comprising officials, temporary agents, contract agents and seconded national experts (SNEs), representing an increase of 8,61 % compared to 2023; notes that while gender balance in the Union decentralised agencies is improving, significant disparities remain; highlights that some agencies, such as ACER, EASA, EIGE, ERA, euLISA and Europol, have a higher percentage of male members staff, while agencies like CdT, EFSA, EMA, ETF, and Eurojust have more female members of staff; notes that the percentage is often sector-specific; calls on the agencies to adopt corrective strategies, including transparent promotion procedures and targeted leadership development; recalls that the Union’s commitment to promoting gender equality in management positions is still not fully realised; emphasises that the efforts of the Commission in this regard should be improved; recalls that Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (Staff regulations3) states that recruitment should be on the basis of objective, transparent and merit-based criteria and also be based on the broadest geographical balance selected from Member States; notes that there is a natural tendency for to employ a higher percentage of staff stemming from the Member State in which the Agency is located; recalls that the agencies located in countries with relatively low correction coefficient are facing continuous challenges in attracting skilled and geographically diverse staff; encourages agencies to promote gender balance in HR strategies and management selection panels; invites the Commission and EU Agencies Network to provide best practices and benchmarking tools to support gender-balanced leadership;

Removed14. Acknowledges the cooperation with external partners such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and United Nations Strategic Planning Network on modernising KPI methodologies; highlights that some agencies, such as ACER, EASA and ECDC, have developed more robust and operationally relevant indicators; calls on agencies with inefficient, non-quantifiable and non-measurable KPI systems to draw on these stronger models and to systematically share best practices through EUAN, in order to improve comparability, enhance the usefulness of AARs for external users, and strengthen overall performance assessment across the agencies;

Added14. Notes that, in 2024, the staff turnover rate was more than 5 % in 16 out of 33 agencies (namely the BEREC Office, CdT, Cedefop, CEPOL, ECDC, EEA, ELA, eu-LISA, EUOSHA, Eurofound, Eurojust, Europol, FRA) and that two of them exceeded the 10 % rate (namely EIT, ETF); commends the agencies that have taken targeted measures to prevent high staff turnover rates; calls on the Commission and the Member States to allow them to hire contract agents for longer periods or allow a higher number of temporary agents to guarantee a better continuity and knowledge preservation; considers that burnout, turnover and precarious employment pose risks to institutional integrity, internal controls and sound financial management; emphasises that Management Boards are responsible for agencies’ integrity and accountability, regrets insufficient action on serious findings, and calls for enhanced transparency vis-à-vis the discharge authority;

Removed15. Draws attention to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigations affecting several agencies: ENISA (two 2024 cases, one ongoing, one dismissed, and a 2025 recruitment case), eu-LISA (conflict of interest and procurement probes), EIT (three KIC-related cases concluded with EUR 1520 million recoveries), Frontex (eight concluded cases in 20232024), and ongoing investigations at ACER and EEA; urges all agencies to ensure full cooperation with OLAF, to strengthen internal controls, recruitment and procurement safeguards, and to provide further information to the discharge authority as soon as confidentiality restrictions are lifted;

Added15. Welcomes the fact that in 2024 most agencies adopted and implemented the Charter on Diversity and Inclusion, which promotes equal treatment, diversity and inclusion in the workplace and in social life; strongly encourages those Agencies who have not joined yet to consider proceeding with the adoption and implementation without delay;

Removed16. Notes that the absence of opt-out (break-out) clauses that allow the early termination of lease contracts continues to pose a financial risk to EU agencies; recalls that the importance of including such clauses in rental agreements was highlighted by the difficult situation faced by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) following Brexit, which was unable to terminate its long-term lease in London and had to pay rent in both London and Amsterdam as a result; acknowledges that since 2019 several agencies have introduced break-out clauses, but notes that not all agencies have done so, including cases where new or renewed leases were signed without such provisions; urges agencies and the Commission to systematically assess the need for break-out clauses when negotiating or renewing lease contracts, taking into account the lessons learned from past experience, in order to limit financial exposure and ensure greater budgetary flexibility;

Added16. Highlights that establishing an effective complaint mechanism for staff in Union decentralised agencies requires combining strong confidentiality guarantees, including anonymous reporting channels, with clear, harmonised procedures aligned with the Staff Regulations and communicated through regular staff training; considers that agencies should appoint independent, professionally trained ethics or complaints officers, or utilise shared inter-agency structures for smaller agencies, to ensure impartial handling of Article 90 of the Staff Regulations requests, harassment reports, conflicts of interest, and whistleblowing disclosures; calls on the agencies to ensure that staff have access to an external escalation channel as well as strong, independent and effective protection against any retaliation through systematic follow-up checks, while transparency should be enhanced through anonymised annual reporting on complaints and outcomes, and impartiality improved through the use of inter-agency investigation panels for sensitive cases; calls on the implementation of protection mechanisms against false accusation and denunciation;

Added17. Notes the important role of the EU Agencies Network (EUAN) and in particular its ICT Advisory Committee (ICTAC) in supporting agencies’ preparedness for the implementation of the Cybersecurity Regulation through enhanced coordination, knowledge sharing and cooperation with DG DIGIT, CERT-EU and the Interinstitutional Committee for Digital Transformation; calls on EUAN and ICTAC to provide comprehensive and regular information on the state of implementation across all decentralised agencies, including common challenges, identified risks, resource needs, and planned mitigation measures, in order to enable effective oversight; stresses the need for robust cybersecurity and careful AI use, noting opportunities but also financial and operational risks; calls on agencies to assess AI-supported processes in financial, procurement, or decision-making functions, and to ensure transparency, documentation, auditability, and full compliance with Union data protection and cybersecurity rules;

Added18. Stresses the importance of developing clear, robust and meaningful key performance indicators (KPIs) in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) of EU agencies, as these reports constitute a primary source of information for external users; notes that some KPI systems frequently lack continuity, standardisation, operational depth, documented methodology for selecting, updating, and retiring KPIs, transparency, comparability and multi-annual tracking, thereby reducing comparability and the capacity of external users to assess performance objectively; underlines that KPIs should be streamlined and well-designed, built on specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART) principles and applied consistently across reporting cycles, which are essential for evaluating efficiency, effectiveness and progress toward strategic objectives; stresses the need to enhance the use of results- and impact-oriented reporting by focusing on materiality and proportionality, to reduce administrative burden; underlines that performance indicators must be explicitly derived from the objectives of each agency's founding mandate and capture outputs, outcomes and, above all, impacts; calls on agencies to include cost-benefit analysis and transparent budgeting in their performance frameworks;

Added19. Acknowledges the cooperation with external partners such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and United Nations Strategic Planning Network on modernising KPI methodologies; highlights that some agencies, such as ACER, EASA and ECDC, have developed more robust and operationally relevant indicators; calls on agencies with inadequate or immeasurable KPI systems to draw on these stronger models and to systematically share best practices through EUAN, in order to improve comparability, enhance the usefulness of AARs for external users, and strengthen overall performance assessment across the agencies; calls on the Commission to require that all agency evaluations under point 60 of the Common Approach systematically assess the impact of each agency on its policy area, and that programmes or activities that have not demonstrated effectiveness within a reasonable timeframe be terminated, with funds reallocated to more effective measures;

Added20. Draws attention to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigations affecting several agencies: ENISA (two 2024 cases, one ongoing, one dismissed, and a 2025 recruitment case), eu-LISA (conflict of interest and procurement probes), EIT (three KIC-related cases concluded with EUR 15-20 million recoveries), Frontex (two ongoing and eight concluded cases in 2023-2024), and ongoing investigations at ACER and EEA; urges all EU agencies to ensure full cooperation with OLAF, to strengthen internal controls, recruitment and procurement safeguards, and to provide further information to the discharge authority as soon as confidentiality restrictions are lifted;

Added21. Recalls that Frontex’s mandate was significantly expanded in 2019, when a revised regulation expanded its tasks and authorised a standing corps of 10 000 border guards with a corresponding increase in the budget; underlines that budget increases, irrespective of the Agency concerned, must always be matched by adequate accountability and transparency provisions;

Added22. Notes that the absence of opt-out (break-out) clauses that allow the early termination of lease contracts continues to pose a financial risk to EU agencies; recalls that the importance of including such clauses in rental agreements was highlighted by the difficult situation faced by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) following Brexit, which was unable to terminate its long-term lease in London and had to pay rent in both London and Amsterdam as a result; acknowledges that since 2019 several agencies have introduced break-out clauses, but regrets that not all agencies have done so, including cases where new or renewed leases were signed; urges agencies and the Commission to systematically introduce break-out clauses when negotiating or renewing lease contracts, taking into account the lessons learned from past experience, in order to limit financial exposure and ensure greater budgetary flexibility;

Budgetary and Financial Management

23. Notes that the total final revenue for 2024 (after amending budgets) and the comparative figures for 2023 for the 33 EU agencies that are part of this resolution had the following breakdown:

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Added24. Notes that the budget of 33 EU agencies rose from EUR 3,6 billion in 2023 to 4,1 billion in 2024; calls on the Commission to analyse five-year cumulative costs, distinguishing mandate-driven growth from administrative expansion, and to justify further increases with demonstrable added value; emphasises that budget growth must be matched by stronger governance, internal controls, staffing and absorption planning to avoid irregularities, carryovers, and ineffective spending;

Added25. Notes that the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and other EU agencies are assisting in supporting Union institutions in the area of fundamental rights-related implementation of Union law; calls on the Commission and the budgetary authority to provide all EU agencies with adequate and predictable resources;

26. Highlights that the increase in the revenue from 2023 to 2024 has been significant in some agencies, including the EEA, EIT, ELA, ENISA and EUDA with budget increases above 21 %;

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Changed19.27. Takes note that the EEA’s 2024 budget increase reflects newthe expansion of its legislative mandates and ongoing operational needs,responsibilities, stemming from the implementation of the policies of the European Green Deal, such as the Nature Restoration Regulation (adopted late in 2024), a recast of the European Pollutant Release and Transfer (E-PRTR) Regulation, the EU Carbon Removals and Carbon Management Farming Certification (CRCF), and an initiative for expanded monitoring of emissions from heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) were supported by recruitment of staff; notes furthermore that the agency also implemented tasks under the revised Land-use, land-useLand-use changeChange and forestryForestry Regulation (2023); is also aware that New Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with DG MARE, DG SANTE, and DG RTD expanded the Agency’s role in ocean/water restoration, health threats, and environmental data integration, strengtheningproviding Uniondata climate,and biodiversity,analysis andto policyinform support;Union environmental policy;

28. Observes that the EIT budget increase is explained by several factors including higher Horizon Europe appropriations (+10,25 %), EUR 24,6 million in new funding for the Higher Education Institutions (HEI) initiative and EUR 16,7 million from new contribution agreements with Commission DGs;

29. Takes note that ELA’s budget increase in 2024 is primarily explained by the agency’s transition towards full operational capacity, requiring significant reinforcement of human resources and operational capabilities; highlights that it includes staffing adjustments (EUR 9,5 million, 44 %), such as the conversion of 15 SNEs to TAs and salary adjustments, followed by operational expansions (EUR 7 million, 33 %) for the European Job Mobility portal’s upgrades and inspection activities, and inflation-related costs (EUR 1,2 million, 15 %) for ICT/cybersecurity and inflationary pressures;

30. Notes that the increase in ENISA’s budget is due to the first instalment received in February 2024 of EUR 16 million from a contribution agreement signed in late December 2023 between DG CONNECT and ENISA, which grants a total of EUR 20 million for the implementation of cyber support and situational centre actions during 2024–2026; is aware that for 2024, the Agency operated with a budget of EUR 26,2 million, compared to the 2023 budget of EUR 25,2 million;

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Changed23. Is of31. theExpresses opinionconcern that ENISA is in a critical position due to the growing complexity of Union cybersecurity needsneeds, the continuous escalation of cyber threats and the lack of proportional funding and adequate staffing; echoes the Council’s conclusions on ENISA of December 2024 which highlight ENISA’s central role in the Union’s cybersecurity ecosystem and the need to align funding and resources with its expanded mandate; stresses, that additional resources must be accompanied by measurable performance targets and regular reporting on the concrete outcomes achieved;

32. Notes that as regards the EUDA, the increase is mainly due to the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/1322, which provides for a targeted revision of the mandate of the Agency in order to play a more important role in identifying and addressing current and future challenges related to illicit drugs in the Union; takes note that this will entail a deepening of the current Agency’s mandate, new tasks and an increase in the resources allocated for the required implementation from 2024;

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Changed25.33. Notes the progressive expansion of Europol’s mandate, including recently adopted and proposed measures conferring enhanced capacities to combat serious and organised crime, such as migrant smuggling, trafficking inof human beings, cybercrime and terrorism; recalls that these developments encompass, inter alia, strengthened cooperation with private actors through direct data exchanges, reinforced large-scale data analysis capabilities, and upgraded operational assistance to Member States via specialised support teams; emphasises that the effective implementation of those additional tasks requires a corresponding increase in Europol’s human resources;resources, observes,but however,also robust internal safeguards, sufficient compliance capacity and strengthened supervisory mechanisms; observes, that Europol’s budget increased by only 5,78 % in 2024 compared to 2023; therefore urges that Europol’s budget be further reinforced in order to address persistent staffing shortages and to ensure that its financial resources are commensurate with its expanding responsibilities; stresses Europol’s key role in combating migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, cross-border crime and terrorism; underlines that Frontex should focus on core operations; and welcomes Frontex’s ongoing efforts to strengthen its Fundamental Rights Officer;

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Changed26.34. NotesCalls thefor needan toincrease expandin Eurojust’s personnelstaffing levels in light of its foreseen enhanced mandate to include third states,countries , particularly following the 2022 invasionRussian war of aggression against Ukraine, which enables it to gather, store, and analyse evidence of core international crimes (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity), share such evidence with national authorities and international bodies including the International Criminal Court, and create a dedicated Core International Crimes Evidence Database for this purpose, thereby moving beyond merely supporting investigations to actively safeguarding essential evidence for future investigation, while noting that the 2024 budget only reflected a modest percentage increase compared to the 2023 budget, and urges that personnel funding be raised accordingly along with the overall budget in view of the expected future mandate;

▸6 unchanged paragraphs

35. Recalls that the majority of EU agencies receive their funding entirely from contributions from the Union budget; notes, however, that some agencies are fully or partially financed through alternative sources of revenue, including issued certificates, authorisations, registration of substances, contributions, data collection, market surveillance, supervision and other services such as translation and terminology as provided by the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT);

36. Acknowledges, specifically, that:

– partially self-financed agencies include the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA);

– fully self-financed agencies include CdT;

– agencies partially co-financed by national public authorities include the European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA);

37. Notes that for 2024 the source of finance for self-financed agencies that are part of this resolution had the following breakdown:

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Changed30.38. Recalls that the 2023 discharge resolutionsresolution already noted the importance of strengthening the European supervisory authorities’ (EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA) capacity to identify and separately account for the costs of activities financed by different revenue streams;ESMA); is aware that their founding regulations do not mandate a separation between activities funded by Union contributions and national contributions and giventhat the lackoverall ofcost-sharing clearmechanism delineationdoes innot therequire regulationsdifferentiation betweenat the twolevel fundingof sources,individual activities, resulting in these authorities do not differentiatedifferentiating between costs covered by the Union budget and those funded by Member States as highlighted by the Court in its Annual report in 2023;

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Changed31.39. Considers that introducingenhancing separatetransparency costin accountingbudgeting forand ESAactivity-based activitiesreporting would enhancecontribute transparency,to accountabilityimproved oversight and decisionaccountability, making,in particular for agencies financed by multiple revenue streams allowing stakeholders, including Member States, financial institutions and taxpayers to better assess efficiency and fairness; stresses that theclarity currentregarding lackthe oflink differentiationbetween limitsrevenue oversightsources and insistsactivities thatstrengthens costsconfidence andin revenuesthe ofsound ESA’suse activitiesof shouldUnion befunds, clearlywhile identified,respecting accountedthe forlegal separatelyframework andset disclosedout in annual accountsthe andagencies’ programmingfounding documents;regulations;

40. Notes the Commission proposal for the European Chemicals Agency Regulation, which introduces measures intended to strengthen the Agency’s financial sustainability, including the possibility to create a limited reserve designed to absorb volatility in fee income and reduce reliance on repeated budget amendments; stresses, however, that the creation of such a reserve requires robust safeguards, as it entails risks including structural over-recovery of fees and the possibility of using accumulated funds for purposes beyond short-term stabilisation; considers that this makes transparency of costs and of the link between fees and activities essential, including through activity-based reporting distinguishing fee-funded and Union-funded tasks; recommends that any reserve balance above the ceiling be returned to the Union budget, either via repayment or by reducing the following year’s Union contribution, in order to avoid accumulation and to uphold core budgetary principles;

41. Is concerned by CdT’s negative economic outcome of EUR 5,7 million and the continuous decline in operating revenue, mainly linked to the drop in invoiced pages by 11,4 % in 2024 and by 17,6 % in 2023; notes that the reserve for pricing stability, which was created in 2011 to offset fluctuations in business volume from clients and to help CdT ensure budget and price stability peaked at EUR 15,6 million in 2014 and dropped to EUR 8,9 million in 2024 (a decrease of 42,9 % since 2014); is aware that once the reserve is fully depleted, any further deficits would have to be covered by Union budget subsidies, as provided for by CdT’s founding regulation; takes note of CdT’s follow-up reply to the 2023 discharge and calls on the Management Board to continue reporting on the evolution of those plans to the discharge authority, given the continuous decline in revenue; encourages CdT to identify new services that they could provide and new revenues sources, given the prevalence of new free translation technologies which could affect the number of translation requests;

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Changed34.42. Insists that although the Financial Regulation does not set ceilings for carr-yovers,carry-overs, recurrent and excessive levels of carry-overs undermine the budgetary principle of annuality and might be indicative of structural issues in the budget process and implementation cycle;

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Changed35.43. Notes that in 2024, 11 agencies (ACER, ECDC, EEA, EFCA, EIGE, ELA, EMA, ENISA, ESA, eu-LISA, EU-OSHA,EUOSHA, Eurofound, EUSPA, FRA and Frontex) had carry-over levels exceeding 15 % across combined budget titles, with recurring patterns; notes that in the case of Frontex and ESA, carry-overs reached more than 40 % and 30 % respectively; calls on the agencies to improve multi-annual planning, procurement scheduling and commitment forecasting to support better implementation of appropriations within the financial year for which they are authorised; calls on the Commission to require agencies with recurrent carry-overs to submit corrective action plans; recalls that the Court, in its annual report on EU agencies for the financial year 2024, emphasised that recurrent high rates of carry-overs undermine the budgetary principle of annuality;

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Changed36.44. Is of the opinion that carry-overs could, in some cases, be justified by the multiannual nature of operations or caused by factors beyond the control of the agencies concerned; notes the Court’s statement during the hearing held on 1 December 2025 that, under its new audit approach, it will endeavour to provide a clearer overall overview of the nature of carry-overs in future reports, while acknowledging the Court’s clarification that an agency-by-agency differentiated breakdown of the causes of carry-overs is not feasible due to methodological and resource constraints; welcomes the Court’s readiness to highlight recurring patterns and systemic factors contributing to excessive carry-overscarry-overs; stresses nevertheless that persistently high and recurrent levels of carry-overs may point to underlying structural challenges in planning, implementation or resource allocation; calls on the agencies to improve its budgetary forecasting and project scheduling to minimise unplanned carry-overs and ensure that appropriations are used efficiently within the financial year;

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Changed37.45. Recalls that the regulatory framework mandates that agencies make payments within specific deadlines; notes that any failure to meet those deadlines may result ingenerate creditorsadditional beingcosts entitledsuch toas late-payment interest; observes that, for the year 2024, the Court reports that for 11 agencies (ACER, Cedefop, CEPOL, EEA, ELA, ENISA, ETF, EUDA, Eurojust, FRA and Frontex) more than 5 % of payments were made after the applicable deadline; is concerned by the increase in late payments since 2022 representing a rise compared to 2023 (nine agencies) and 2022 (five agencies);

Recommendations

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Changed38.46. Insists on the need to ensure adherence to legal time limits for payments and notes that a high frequency of delayed payments may negatively impact the agencies’ reputations; calls on the agencies concerned to take measures to avoid future payment delays and interest on late payments and ensure a timely settlement of obligations; recalls that compliance with payment deadlines under the Financial Regulation constitutes a legal obligation and a core element of the financial management; calls on the agencies to implement corrective measures where late payments persist over several years ensuring systematic respect of statutory deadlines;

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Changed39.47. UrgesCalls on the European supervisory authorities’ (EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA) to improve their capacity to identify and separately account forstrengthen thetransparency costsin oftheir activities financed by different revenue streams in order to improve accounting oversight and transparency as recommended by ECA as not being able to account for thesethe posesECA ain riskrelation to the transparency ofrevenue usemanagement ofand Unionfinancing funds;structures;

Main risks identified by the Court and Overview of the audit results

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Changed40.48. Notes the conclusion of the European Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’) in its annual report on EU agencies for the financial year 2024 (the ‘Court’s report’), found that the Court’s audit had similar results as in previous years, with weaknesses in public procurement procedures noted as the main source of irregular payments; calls on the agencies concerned to reinforce their ex ante controls, improve the documentation of award criteria and ensure strict justification for negotiated procedures without publication; calls on the Commission to provide targeted guidance and training to agencies with recurring procurement deficiencies; further calls on the agencies to ensure full traceability, competitive procedures, and proper record-keeping in all procurement operations and invites the internal audit services of the agencies to prioritise procurement reviews;

49. Notes from the Court's report that the overall risk to the reliability of agencies' accounts remains generally low, and the risk related to the legality and regularity of revenue within the agencies' accounts is also low for most agencies; notes furthermore that this risk is assessed as medium for partly self-financed agencies due to the specific regulations governing the collection of fees and other revenue contributions, a situation that has also been observed in previous years;