Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section II – European Council and Council

(2024/2021(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section II – European Council and Council,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the second reportopinion of the Committee on Budgetary ControlConstitutional (A100000/2025),Affairs,

Change 2

RemovedA. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability and implementing a good governance of human resources;

Added– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0052/2025),

AddedA. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

B. whereas, under Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the Union, and whereas the budget of the European Council and of the Council is a section of the Union budget;

C. whereas, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council is not to exercise legislative functions;

D. whereas, under Article 317 TFEU, the Commission is to implement the Union budget on its own responsibility, having regard to the principles of sound financial management, and whereas, under the framework in place, the Commission is to confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

Change 3

ChangedE. whereas, under Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU, the European Council and the Council (the ‘Council’) are assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council,Council (the ‘Secretariat’), and whereas the Secretary-General of the Council is wholly responsible for the sound management of the appropriations entered in Section II of the Union budget;

Change 4

ChangedF. whereas, over the course of almostmore than twenty years, Parliament has been implementing the well-established and respected practice of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and whereas the Commission supports that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution, body, office and agency for its administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued;

G. whereas, according to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

Change 5

ChangedH. whereas, since 2009,the 2009 budget discharge, the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure has compelled Parliament to refuse to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council;

I. whereas the European Council and the Council, as Union institutions and as recipients of the general budget of the Union, should be transparent and democratically accountable to the citizens of the Union and subject to democratic scrutiny of the spending of public funds;

Change 6

RemovedJ. whereas the recommendation of the European Ombudsman (the ‘Ombudsman’) in strategic inquiry OI/2/2017/TE on the transparency of the Council legislative process indicated that the Council’s practice with regard to transparency in the legislative process constituted maladministration and should be addressed in order to enable citizens to follow the Union legislative process;

AddedJ. whereas Article 15(3) TFEU requires the EU institutions to ensure in their Rules of Procedure that their proceedings are transparent, while in several of its inquiries and decisions Ombudsman has criticised the Council for its lack of transparency suggesting that the Council has failed fully to grasp the critical link between democracy and the transparency of decision-making;

K. whereas the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union confirms the right of taxpayers and of the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue and that the General Court in in its judgment of 25 January 2023 in Case T-163/21, De Capitani v Council, stated on transparency within the Union legislative process that documents produced by the Council in its working groups are not of technical nature but legislative and are therefore subject to access to documents requests;

Change 7

Removed1. Deeply regrets that since 2009, and again for the financial year 2023, Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure, preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget and thereby compelling Parliament to refuse discharge;

Added1. Notes that the budget of the Council falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4% of the total Union budget); notes that the Council’s budget of approximately EUR 0,6 billion represents approximately 5,2% of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

Removed2. Notes that on 20 September 2024 the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat of the Council containing 90 important questions from Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with thorough answers to all questions;

Added2. Welcomes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 examined a sample of 70 transactions under Administration, 10 more than were examined in 2022; further notes that the Court writes that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology, and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

Removed3. Regrets that, on 23 September 2024, the General Secretariat of the Council informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing which was arranged for 12 November 2024 as part of the discharge procedure and in which all other invited institutions participated;

Added3. Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

Removed4. Emphasises Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU, as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability towards Union taxpayers;

Added4. Notes that the Court, in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023, made an observation on the duration of a building maintenance framework contract awarded by the Council; notes that the Court did not identify any quantifiable errors in the four payments examined concerning the Council;

Removed5. Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer the requisite powers on the other Union Institutions for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it once again incomprehensible that the Council believes it appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget;

AddedState of play of the discharge procedure

Removed6. Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of almost twenty years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued by Parliament;

Added5. Deeply regrets that, since 2009, and again for the financial year 2022, Parliament has had to refuse discharge to the Council because the Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure, preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget;

Removed7. Stresses that the current situation allows the Parliament to check only the reports of the Court of Auditors and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website, because the Council continues its malpractice of non-cooperation with the Parliament which makes it impossible for Parliament to carry out its duties properly and make an informed decision on granting discharge;

Added6. Notes that, on 20 September 2024, the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat of the Council containing 90 important questions for Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with detailed answers to all the questions;

Removed8. Deplores that the Council, for almost 15 years, has shown a lack of political willingness to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure; underlines that this attitude has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions, has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and has damaged the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity;

Added7. Regrets that, on 23 September 2024, the Secretariat informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing organised on 12 November 2024 as part of the discharge process and in which all other invited institutions participated;

Removed9. Reaffirms its deep frustration regarding the Council's attitude towards the discharge procedure, which conveys an inappropriate message to Union citizens at a time when greater transparency is essential; underlines that the Council must adhere to the same standards of accountability it expects from other Union institutions;

Added8. Reiterates Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability towards Union taxpayers;

Removed10. Emphasises that all other Union institutions acknowledge and comprehend the principle that, given the delegation of power concerning budget implementation, Parliament holds both the right and the obligation to scrutinise their budgets and their execution as part of the discharge procedure; in light of this, expresses its strong disapproval that the Council persists in its refusal to cooperate with Parliament in this regard;

Added9. Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it incomprehensible that the Council believes it appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget;

Removed11. Recalls that the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenues; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure;

Added10. Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of more than twenty years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including the European Council and Council; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure and implementation of the EU budget should continue to be pursued directly by Parliament to preserve the compliance of the principle of sound financial management;

Removed12. Stresses that the current situation must be improved through better interinstitutional cooperation within the current framework of the Treaties and urges the Council to actively engage with the Parliament in addressing the current situation;

Added11. Stresses that the current situation implies that Parliament can only check the reports of the Court and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website due to the Council’s persistent lack of cooperation with Parliament; underlines that this lack of cooperation undermines Parliament's ability to effectively fulfil its oversight role and to make an informed decision on granting discharge;

Removed13. Notes that on 6 May 2025, during his intervention in Parliament’s plenary, the representative of the Council’s presidency expressed the latter’s willingness “to engage in a meaningful and pragmatic cooperation between our institutions” when it comes to discharge in relation to the European Council and Council section of Union’s budget; calls therefore on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible, involving the Secretary-Generals and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and find a solution while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensuring transparency and proper democratic control of budget implementation;

Added12. Deplores that the Council, for more than a decade, has shown that it does not have any political willingness to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure; underlines that this attitude has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions, has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and has damaged the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity; underlines that the Council must adhere to the same standards of accountability it expects from other Union institutions;

Removed14. Stresses that Parliament’s observations concerning budgetary and financial management, internal management, performance and internal control, human resources, ethical framework and transparency, digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection, buildings, environment and sustainability, interinstitutional cooperation and communication from its discharge resolution of 7 May 2025 are still valid;

Added13. Reiterates that the Council’s continued refusal to engage in the discharge procedure is an unacceptable breach of democratic accountability. Calls for legal and procedural amendments to withhold budgetary appropriations to any Union institution that fails to comply with transparency obligations;

Removed15. Reiterates its regret that the budget of the European Council and the Council has not been divided into two clearly separated budgets as recommended by Parliament in previous discharge resolutions in order to improve transparency and accountability, not least concerning the European Council, given that it is currently impossible to get reliable information regarding its costs; stresses the importance of reliable data for objective control; calls on the compliance with the recommendation of the discharge authority.

Added14. Recalls that the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure and insists on the full application of article 14 (&) TEU;

Added15. Calls on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament without undue delay and to actively engage with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible involving the Secretaries-General and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and resolve the long-standing discharge impasse, while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensuring transparency, credibility and proper democratic control of budget implementation; requests that Commission and the Council legal services provide an opinion on potential Treaty-based solutions to enforce Council’s accountability in the discharge procedure;

Added16. Stresses that, while the current situation needs to be improved through better inter-institutional cooperation within the framework of the Treaties, a revision of the Treaties could make the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by giving Parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies individually; stresses, however, that pending such a review, the current situation must be improved through enhanced inter-institutional cooperation; urges in this sense the Council to actively engage with the Parliament;

Added17. Notes that despite the Council being unwilling to cooperate in the discharge procedure, Parliament, nevertheless, stresses some political priorities and sets out some observations concerning the budgetary and financial management of the Council and other observations relevant for the discharge procedure in this report;

Added18. Notes that, given the Council’s lack of cooperation with Parliament, observations in the following sections primarily rely on aggregated information publicly available, which provides limited detail;

AddedPolitical priorities

Added19. Regrets that the Council exerts its prerogative in the nomination and appointment procedures for many Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies without taking into account the views of the interested parties or the recommendations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);

Added20. Notes the Council’s tradition of not questioning the appointments of individual Member States for most positions;

Added21. Recalls that, pursuant to Article 286(2) TFEU, the Council appoints the members of the Court of Auditors, in accordance with proposals made by each Member State, after consultation with Parliament; recalls that, on the basis of this prerequisite, Parliament delivers an opinion on the candidates; regrets that the Council has repeatedly disregarded Parliament’s recommendations in its consultative role regarding the appointment of the members of the Court; recalls that although Parliament’s opinion is non-binding on the Council, candidates who received an unfavourable opinion withdrew their candidatures by accepting Parliament's decision, thereby recognising the role of Parliament as the democratic supervisory authority linked to the safeguarding of the Union budget; calls on the Council to recognise Parliament’s role by cooperating in the discharge procedure;

Added22. Recalls that the judges and advocates-general of the Court of Justice of the European Union are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member states after consultation of a panel responsible for giving an opinion on prospective candidates' suitability to perform the duties concerned;