Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Removed4. Notes that OLAF made an anonymised version of its final report on the investigation available to the Members of the Committee on Budgetary Control in March 2025 and to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in July 2025; deplores the delayed access to the investigation, which was granted only in March despite the request made by the rapporteur in December 2024, with OLAF’s reply citing objections from the Management Board of European Union Agency for Asylum; insists that access to the report should have been given to CONT members earlier to guarantee the exercise of their mandate adequately;

Added3. Highlights the importance of the discharge procedure as it is not only a treaty-based obligation, but also promotes and aims to ensure transparency, accountability and open dialogue on the finances of the Union; notes that it also grants the agencies a possibility to showcase their work and demonstrate their added value to the Union and its citizens; stresses, furthermore, that agencies provide answers to the questionnaires sent by Parliament and are invited to public hearings by the discharge authority and that this gives citizens, companies, NGOs and other stakeholders the possibility to follow the meetings and be assured that the revenue and expenditure are in line with the principles of sound financial management;

Removed5. Is aware that OLAF’s investigations shall be conducted continuously over a period which must be proportionate to the circumstances and complexity of the case; is concerned over the length of OLAF’s investigations as it undermines the ability of the discharge authority to consider their findings efficiently: insists on the crucial role of timely investigations in maintaining effective Parliament oversight; calls on OLAF to review and speed up the procedure of completing and sharing investigations with the Discharge Authority;

Added4. Considers that the concept of granting discharge by an internal discharge authority as in the case of the EUIPO, CPVO and SRB could potentially lead to a conflict of interest; believes that discharge granted by Parliament avoids the potential for conflicts of interest and contributes to the transparency and public image of the agencies;

Removed6. Calls on the Agency to make an anonymised summary of the OLAF report publicly available, to the extent legally possible, in the interest of transparency and public trust;

Added5. Is of the opinion that, notwithstanding the legal framework, the same principles of accountability and transparency should be applied to all EU-related bodies;

Removed7. Takes note that OLAF issued disciplinary and administrative recommendations following the investigation;

Added6. Recalls point 58 of the Common Approach on fully self-financed agencies to ensure public scrutiny by the Parliament that states: “The possibilities for securing democratic accountability for fully self-financed agencies (i.e. financed by their clients) should be explored, as they are Union bodies in charge of implementing EU policies but not subject to a discharge within the meaning of the TFUE. A possibility could be that the agencies in question, submit to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission an annual report on the execution of their budget and consider requests or recommendations issued by the Parliament and Council.”;

Removed8. Observes that, concerning the disciplinary recommendations, the Management Board decided, as a follow-up, not to open disciplinary proceedings and instead issued written recommendations with a warning and requested to the Executive Director concrete proposals by way of corrective actions, and a timetable for their implementation as soon as possible; acknowledges that in line with this request, the Executive Director has submitted to the Management Board the following documents, which include:

Added7. Points out that while the establishment or expansion of EU agencies is intended to enhance the Union's capabilities, it is critical to ensure that this process is guided by thorough evaluations, impact assessments and a clear demonstration of added value; highlights that this approach would not only ensure better regulation but also enhance the effectiveness, accountability, transparency and coherence of the Union’s institutional landscape;

Removed– the Recommendations made by the Management Board;

Added8. Recalls that point 60 of the Common Approach states that every EU agency should be evaluated every 5 years; urges the Commission to explore further synergies and consolidation in the activities, and possible merging of agencies with complementary activities, in order to ensure cost-effectiveness and streamline agency functions, including potential mandate reviews where inefficiencies or redundancies exist; encourages the application of the sunset/review clause where necessary to maintain efficiency and ensure the optimal use of resources; believes that budgetary efficiency is key to the functioning of the agencies; echoes the recommendation of the Court in the Special Report 22/2020 which advises the Commission to increase the use of cross-cutting evaluations of agencies in the context of the Commission’s fitness checks of the different policy areas;

Removed– the current state of affairs in the Agency with regard to each Recommendation; and

Added9. Reaffirms the importance of transparency, accountability, and performance-based budgeting in all EU agencies, ensuring effective financial management; emphasises that agencies must adhere strictly to their mandates; acknowledges that some agencies may require a strengthened mandate; calls for the enhancement of governance mechanisms to avoid duplication of competencies and to improve operational efficiency;

Removed– the additional corrective actions to be implemented with the inclusion of a provisional timeline for their implementation; calls on the Management Board to follow up on the recommendations and report back to the discharge authority on their full and timely implementation;

Added10. Stresses the need for sufficient resources to ensure that the agencies are able to fulfil new tasks required of them by new legislation;

Removed9. Notes that the Management Board decided not to implement OLAF’s disciplinary recommendations, even in light of the significant findings; remains vigilant about future actions aimed at enhancing accountability within the Agency; calls on the Agency to share the minutes of Management Board deliberations with the European Parliament, to strengthen parliamentary oversight;

Added11. Highlights the importance for the agencies to enhance their presence in the media, on the internet, and across social media to increase public awareness of their work;

Removed10. Notes that the Executive Director prepared a “Vision Statement on leadership implementing the changes in EUAA” with corrective actions implemented and corrective actions to be implemented; requests the Agency to inform the discharge authority of the corrective actions implemented and to be implemented, along with deadlines for their completion;

Added12. Points to the mounting confusion stemming from the multitude of cases where the agencies’ names and acronyms are either identical or almost identical; calls on the respective bodies to explore ways of improving the situation;

Removed11. Notes that the administrative recommendations addressed the practice of staff evaluations by heads of sector rather than heads of unit, as well as the management of conflicts of interest within the Agency;

AddedGovernance

Removed12. Welcomes that starting in 2025, heads of unit will conduct staff evaluations as foreseen in the applicable rules;

Added13. Recalls that the Common Approach, gives an overview of the governance structure of the decentralised agencies; acknowledges the progress made by EU agencies in improving financial management and governance structures while recognising the need for further improvements in efficiency and accountability; recalls that the management boards of all decentralised agencies play a crucial role in ensuring good governance and accountability; reminds that the Common Approach suggests that the management board should consist of one representative from each Member State, two representatives from the Commission, one member designated by the Parliament (where appropriate), and a ‘fairly limited’ number of stakeholder representatives (where appropriate), ensuring that they reflect a diverse range of interests and their selection process was transparent;

Removed13. Deplores the weaknesses in the management of conflict of interest within the Agency, particularly regarding the handling of complaints by the Management Board against decisions made by the Executive Director; calls on the Agency to inform the discharge authority of the corrective actions and organisational changes put in place to address these shortcomings in conflict of interest management;

Added14. Observes that the governance structure of the decentralised agencies is overall quite similar for all the agencies; notes that all of them have a Management/Administrative Board (MB) and a Director; notes that nine agencies have an Executive Board (Cedefop, EUDA, ENISA, ERA, EU-OSHA, Eurofound, Eurojust, FRA, EIT) while only the agencies related to the European Union space programme have a Security Accreditation Board; notes, furthermore, that a Board of Regulators or Supervisors has been established by the three European Supervisory Authorities (European Banking Authority (EBA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)) and two agencies in the single market cluster (European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), and Agency for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office));

Removed14. Notes with appreciation the recognition by both the Management Board and the Executive Director of the seriousness of the allegations and the issues at stake;

Added15. Recalls that Eurofound, Cedefop and EU-OSHA’s management boards have a tripartite structure; notes that each Member State is represented in each board by a government, an employer and a trade union member (81 representatives in total); notes that the Commission has three representatives, and that there is an independent expert (without voting rights) appointed by the Parliament; recalls the smaller size of the ETF’s governing board, including 27 representatives from Member States (without social partners), three Commission representatives (who share one vote in the Board), three experts appointed by the Parliament (compared to one per tripartite agency), and three partner country representatives appointed by the Commission;

Removed15. Notes with concern the repeated failures in governance, including the inability of the Management Board to exercise timely and effective oversight; regrets that several of the irregularities could have been prevented with better internal controls and proactive engagement from the Management Board; insists that this institutional failure must be addressed structurally, not just procedurally;

Added16. Takes note of the conclusions of the evaluation of Eurofound, Cedefop, ETF and EU-OSHA concerning the tripartite governance structure (Eurofound, Cedefop and EU-OSHA); observes that the tripartite structure provides benefits such as representation, strategic direction and knowledge-sharing but the size and diversity of the management boards pose challenges in navigating compromises on core business and administrative decisions; points out that the evaluation considered alternative governance models to involve social partners more efficiently; highlights the increased potential for savings and synergies in the activities of these agencies; stresses the need for rigorous financial oversight of EU agencies to ensure cost-effectiveness and prevent the misuse of public funds; underlines the need for a responsible, needs-based approach to agency funding, preventing bureaucratic expansion while ensuring agencies have adequate resources to fulfil their mandates;

Removed16. Deplores the issues of poor administration, especially in the area of human resources, with serious irregularities, particularly in appointment and selection procedures in breach of Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants; is aware that during the period from 2019 to 2022, the Agency faced challenging circumstances, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive, or the entry into force of the EUAA Regulation with a new mandate, competences, and responsibilities; considers that despite these difficult circumstances, they do not justify non-compliance with the applicable legislation; calls the Agency to ensure that all applicable rules are followed in recruitment processes and to establish clear guidelines to promote transparent, merit-based, good practices and procedures in line with the staff regulation and any other applicable rules;

Added17. Takes note of the conclusions of the report on the evaluation of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) and its findings deeming that regulation fit for purpose, including a review of the Standing Corps published in February 2024; notes that while the regulation provides a framework for effective border management, challenges remain in governance, accountability, and efficiency; recognises that the governance structure requires adjustments to ensure that Frontex can fully implement its mandate, including addressing the balance of representation in the management Board, streamlining internal decision-making processes and avoiding overlapping responsibilities; welcomes the new organisational structure adopted by the management Board in November 2023 as a step toward improving governance, strategic coordination and resource allocation; acknowledges the administrative inefficiencies highlighted in the evaluation report, particularly regarding reimbursement procedures and bureaucratic hurdles faced by Member States when deploying personnel to Frontex; calls on the Commission to explore ways to simplify these processes to reduce unnecessary burdens on national authorities; notes the importance of implementing recommendations from the Fundamental Rights Officer’s (FRO) annual report; while recognising the progress that has been made, calls on Frontex to continue to enhance transparency, fully cooperate with investigations and implement measures ensuring fundamental rights protections in all of its activities;

Removed17. Welcomes that the practice of appointing managers ad interim has been discontinued as from January 2023;

Added18. Stresses that a balanced approach, combining effective border control with robust fundamental rights safeguards, is key to maintaining a secure Schengen area and a credible migration management framework for the Union; reiterates, therefore, the importance of structural and continuous fundamental rights training for Standing Corps officers (Frontex), ensuring their awareness of and compliance with relevant fundamental rights obligations and standards and with international human rights and humanitarian law; stresses, moreover, the importance of reporting fundamental rights violations, when witnessing such violations, via the issuance of Serious Incident Reports (SIRs);

Removed18. Recalls that one of the duties of the Management Board is to give general orientation for the Agency’s activities and ensure that the Agency performs its tasks; considers that in order to give general orientation the Management Board needs to be aware and duly informed of applicable legislation to the Agency as well as critical developments in the management of the Agency; calls on the Agency to ensure more efficient and transparent procedures in communication with the Management Board;

AddedBudgetary and Financial Management

Removed19. Calls on the European Commission, who has two seats on the Management Board, to support and assist other board members in their understanding of the rules applicable to the Agency; calls on the Agency to report back to the discharge authority on the measures taken to improve communication with the Management Board;

Added19. Notes that the total final revenue for 2023 (after amending budgets) and the comparative figures for 2022 for the 33 EU agencies that are part of this resolution had the following breakdown:

Removed20. Takes note of the suggestion made by the Commission during the exchange of views on the possibility to share Joint Services in certain horizontal areas across the decentralised Agencies, as this would help to better manage processes and make a more efficient use of resources; encourages the Commission to explore this possibility and propose concrete actions in this regard;

Added20. Highlights that the increase in the revenue from 2022 to 2023 has been significant in some agencies, representing 54,59 % for ESA, 20,86 % for Eurojust, 19,65 % for Frontex and 19,15 % for ACER; welcomes the increased financing for the law enforcing agencies;

Removed21. Calls on the Agency to establish an independent internal ethics function and emphasizes the importance of having robust whistle-blower protection rules in line with Directive (EU) 2019/1937; stresses that internal reporting channels must be confidential, credible and trusted by staff at all levels;

Added21. Notes that in ESA the increase is mainly due to the continued development of the Nuclear Observatory and ESA Management of Information (NOEMI) IT system and the provision of accounting services to the agency; in Eurojust the increase is mainly due to the additional resources necessary to perform tasks added by three Commission proposals for regulations and the particularly severe impact of inflation; in Frontex the budget increase aims to continue building the Standing Corps of border guards, including equipment; in the case of ACER, the increase is mainly due to the additional tasks delegated in planned revised regulations on energy infrastructure and methane emissions reduction, the related annual remuneration indexation, higher legal expenses and a higher budget allocation derived from fees for specific projects;

Removed22. Highlights that although some of the events date back to the years 2021, 2022 and earlier, the OLAF investigation was only concluded in 2024; emphasises that due to the systemic nature of some of the issues, it cannot be assumed that they have been fully resolved; stresses that the Discharge Authority retains the full right to exercise its oversight responsibilities until the situation is entirely remedied and clarified; calls on the Executive Director and the Management Board to recognise and address any structural weaknesses in both the Agency’s human resources management and the Management Board’s oversight functions, and to take effective measures to prevent the recurrence of similar issues and reserves the right to withhold or condition future discharge decisions, including budgetary appropriations, should the Agency fail to deliver full structural reform;

Added22. Acknowledges the response to the written question indicating that Frontex’s carryovers (45 % in 2023) are linked to its operational cycle, which does not align with the calendar year and cannot be easily adjusted as it involves all Member States; is aware that the Commission’s political priorities and the expectations of Union citizens for security are the explanations applied to increase the Frontex budget; insists that it is essential to ensure adequate resources for the effective functioning of Frontex, while continuously assessing whether its budget is fit for purpose and delivers results; recalls the need to monitor progress on the agency’s absorption capacity, emphasising the importance of sound planning to ensure its effectiveness; calls, in addition, on the EUAN to collaborate with the agencies and the ECA to develop a standardised presentation of carryovers that better aligns with the annuality principle of the financial regulation;

Removed23. Commends the Agency's staff for their dedication and commitment in executing their tasks despite challenging circumstances; considers essential to foster a positive work environment by promoting good practices at the human resources level and rewarding merit-based performances; urges the Management Board and the Executive Director to ensure that the Agency is a safe and supportive workplace that encourages open communication and empowers individuals to speak up without fear of retaliation; calls on the Agency to ensure that all reports of professional misconduct are taken seriously and thoroughly investigated, with appropriate follow-up actions taken to maintain integrity and trust within the organisation;

Added23. Recalls that the majority of EU agencies receive their funding entirely from contributions from the Union budget; notes, however, that some agencies are fully or partially financed through alternative sources of revenue, including certificates, authorisations, registration of substances, contributions, data collection, market surveillance, supervision and other services such as translation and terminology as provided by the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT);

Added24. Acknowledges, specifically, that:

Added– partially self-financed agencies include the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Union Agency for Railways (ERA), Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), European Medicines Agency (EMA);

Added– fully self-financed agencies include CdT; and

Added– agencies partially co-financed by national public authorities include the European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA);

Added25. Notes that for 2023 the source of finance for self-financed agencies that are part of this resolution had the following breakdown:

Added26. Takes note of the Court’s observation that the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the European union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) are legally required to identify and account separately for the costs of activities funded from own revenue; notes that these agencies have systems in place to comply with this requirement and notes that certain agencies such as EMA, EASA and ERA go beyond those requirements;

Added27. Observes that the founding regulations for the three European supervisory authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA - with the exception of activities financed by supervisory fees) set out that, initially, the contributions they receive from national competent authorities should account for 60 % of their budgets, with the remaining 40 % coming from the Union budget; notes that this arrangement reflects the mix of regulatory tasks, which are suitable for EU funding and supervisory convergence tasks, which are appropriate for contributions from national competent authorities, in the mandates of the three authorities; highlights that, due to the absence of a clear delineation between the activities funded by the two sources in the founding regulations, these authorities do not differentiate between the costs covered by the Union budget subsidy and those covered by national contributions;

Added28. Calls on EBA, EIOPA and ESMA to develop this capacity to identify and separately account for the costs of activities generating each of their own revenue streams in order to improve their decision-making and the quality of information they provide to stakeholders as regards the deficits or surpluses that such activities produce;

Added29. Notes that CdT has a system in place to monitor the cost of each activity and product generating its own revenue, allowing it to calculate profits or losses; highlights that in 2023, 10 of the CdT's 17 main products reported losses totalling EUR 3,4 million;

Added30. Underlines that over the last decade CdT experienced 7 years of budgetary deficits and 6 years of accounting losses due to declining volumes of business; takes note that, to address the fall in business volumes, CdT has been drawing on a special reserve that was established in 2011 to ensure budget and price stability; notes that this reserve peaked at EUR 15,6 million in 2014, subsequently dropped to EUR 10,3 million in 2022 and EUR 8,9 million in 2023; is aware that once the reserve is fully depleted, any further deficits would have to be covered by Union budget subsidies, as provided for by the CdT’s founding regulation; calls on CdT to report back to the discharge authority on its plans to mitigate the risks of business continuity;

Added31. Notes the need for agencies to improve financial reporting and internal control mechanisms; calls on agencies to provide on an annual basis a detailed breakdown of expenditures, including disaggregated data on external contracts, consultancy services and subcontractors; insists on the need for real-time digital reporting tools that improve financial oversight and accountability to the European Parliament and the public; encourages further progress in audit recommendations;

AddedMain risks identified by the Court

Added32. Notes the conclusion of the Court in its annual report on EU agencies for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’), that the Court’s audit had similar results as in the previous year (2022), with weaknesses in public procurement procedures having remained the main source of irregular payments;

Added33. Notes from the Court’s report that the overall risk to the reliability of agencies’ accounts, as established by applying the accounting rules adopted by the Commission’s accounting officer and based on international accounting standards, is generally low, as was the case in 2022;