Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to report parliamentary committee draft

Removed3. Highlights the importance of the discharge procedure as it is not only a treaty-based obligation, but also promotes and aims to ensure transparency, accountability and open dialogue on the finances of the Union; notes that it also grants the agencies a possibility to showcase their work and demonstrate their added value to the Union and its citizens; stresses, furthermore, that agencies provide answers to the questionnaires sent by Parliament and are invited to public hearings by the discharge authority and that this gives citizens, companies, NGOs and other stakeholders the possibility to follow the meetings and be assured that the revenue and expenditure are in line with the principles of sound financial management;

Added4. Notes that OLAF made an anonymised version of its final report on the investigation available to the Members of the Committee on Budgetary Control in March 2025 and to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in July 2025; deplores the delayed access to the investigation, which was granted only in March despite the request made by the rapporteur in December 2024, with OLAF’s reply citing objections from the Management Board of European Union Agency for Asylum; insists that access to the report should have been given to CONT members earlier to guarantee the exercise of their mandate adequately;

Removed4. Considers that the concept of granting discharge by an internal discharge authority as in the case of the EUIPO, CPVO and SRB could potentially lead to a conflict of interest; believes that discharge granted by Parliament avoids the potential for conflicts of interest and contributes to the transparency and public image of the agencies;

Added5. Is aware that OLAF’s investigations shall be conducted continuously over a period which must be proportionate to the circumstances and complexity of the case; is concerned over the length of OLAF’s investigations as it undermines the ability of the discharge authority to consider their findings efficiently: insists on the crucial role of timely investigations in maintaining effective Parliament oversight; calls on OLAF to review and speed up the procedure of completing and sharing investigations with the Discharge Authority;

Removed5. Is of the opinion that, notwithstanding the legal framework, the same principles of accountability and transparency should be applied to all EU-related bodies;

Added6. Calls on the Agency to make an anonymised summary of the OLAF report publicly available, to the extent legally possible, in the interest of transparency and public trust;

Removed6. Recalls point 58 of the Common Approach on fully self-financed agencies to ensure public scrutiny by the Parliament that states: “The possibilities for securing democratic accountability for fully self-financed agencies (i.e. financed by their clients) should be explored, as they are Union bodies in charge of implementing EU policies but not subject to a discharge within the meaning of the TFUE. A possibility could be that the agencies in question, submit to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission an annual report on the execution of their budget and consider requests or recommendations issued by the Parliament and Council.”;

Added7. Takes note that OLAF issued disciplinary and administrative recommendations following the investigation;

Removed7. Points out that while the establishment or expansion of EU agencies is intended to enhance the Union's capabilities, it is critical to ensure that this process is guided by thorough evaluations, impact assessments, and a clear demonstration of added value; highlights that this approach would not only ensure better regulation but also enhance the effectiveness, accountability, transparency and coherence of the Union’s institutional landscape;

Added8. Observes that, concerning the disciplinary recommendations, the Management Board decided, as a follow-up, not to open disciplinary proceedings and instead issued written recommendations with a warning and requested to the Executive Director concrete proposals by way of corrective actions, and a timetable for their implementation as soon as possible; acknowledges that in line with this request, the Executive Director has submitted to the Management Board the following documents, which include:

Removed8. Recalls that point 60 of the Common Approach states that every EU agency should be evaluated every 5 years; notes that the Commission should be responsible for organising these evaluations and that, for every second evaluation, the sunset/review clause is to be applied; echoes the recommendation of the Court of Auditors (“the Court”) in the Special Report 22/2020 which advises the Commission to increase the use of cross-cutting evaluations of agencies in the context of the Commission’s fitness checks of the different policy areas; insists, moreover, that evaluation results should be used to identify synergies and possible changes, including mergers, and, where appropriate, to prepare legislative proposals in response to changing needs;

Added– the Recommendations made by the Management Board;

RemovedGovernance

Added– the current state of affairs in the Agency with regard to each Recommendation; and

Removed9. Recalls that the Common Approach, gives an overview of the governance structure of the decentralised agencies; reminds that the Common Approach suggests that the management board should consist of one representative from each Member State, two representatives from the Commission, one member designated by the European Parliament (where appropriate), and a 'fairly limited' number of stakeholder representatives (where appropriate);

Added– the additional corrective actions to be implemented with the inclusion of a provisional timeline for their implementation; calls on the Management Board to follow up on the recommendations and report back to the discharge authority on their full and timely implementation;

Removed10. Observes that the governance structure of the decentralised agencies is overall quite similar for all the agencies; notes that all of them have a Management/Administrative Board (MB) and a Director; notes that nine agencies have an Executive Board (Cedefop, EUDA, ENISA, ERA, EU-OSHA, Eurofound, Eurojust, FRA, EIT) while only the agencies related to the European Union space programme have a Security Accreditation Board; notes, furthermore, that a Board of Regulators or Supervisors has been established by the three European Supervisory Authorities (EBA - European Banking Authority, ESMA - European Securities and Markets Authority, and EIOPA - European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and two agencies in the single market cluster (ACER - European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, and BEREC - Agency for Support for BEREC);

Added9. Notes that the Management Board decided not to implement OLAF’s disciplinary recommendations, even in light of the significant findings; remains vigilant about future actions aimed at enhancing accountability within the Agency; calls on the Agency to share the minutes of Management Board deliberations with the European Parliament, to strengthen parliamentary oversight;

Removed11. Recalls that Eurofound, Cedefop and EU-OSHA’s managing boards have a tripartite structure; notes that each Member State is represented in each board by a government, an employer and a trade union member (81 representatives in total); notes that the European Commission has three representatives, and that there is an independent expert (without voting rights) appointed by the European Parliament; recalls the smaller size of the ETF’s governing board, including 27 representatives from Member States (without social partners), three Commission representatives (who share one vote in the Board), three experts appointed by the European Parliament (compared to one per tripartite Agency), and three partner country representatives appointed by the Commission;

Added10. Notes that the Executive Director prepared a “Vision Statement on leadership implementing the changes in EUAA” with corrective actions implemented and corrective actions to be implemented; requests the Agency to inform the discharge authority of the corrective actions implemented and to be implemented, along with deadlines for their completion;

Removed12. Takes note of the conclusions of the evaluation of Eurofound, Cedefop, ETF and EU-OSHA concerning the tripartite governance structure (Eurofound, Cedefop and EU-OSHA); observes that the tripartite structure provides benefits such as representation, strategic direction, and knowledge-sharing but the size and diversity of the management boards pose challenges in navigating compromises on core business and administrative decisions; points out that the evaluation considered alternative governance models to involve social partners more efficiently, with a focus on reducing costs through hybrid meetings; stresses that the evaluation suggested that while stakeholder expertise is crucial, exploring other models may offer equally effective and more efficient ways of involving stakeholders;

Added11. Notes that the administrative recommendations addressed the practice of staff evaluations by heads of sector rather than heads of unit, as well as the management of conflicts of interest within the Agency;

Removed13. Takes note of the results of the second and independent evaluation of the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) and the subsequent proposal by the Management Board (MB) to review the composition of the MB and the establishment of an Executive Board aiming at the representation of all EU Member States in the Agency’s MB alongside the creation of an Executive Board of the MB that would be based on the current Standing Committee, and which would help to streamline the decision-making process in EIGE and contribute to enhancing efficiency and effectiveness;

Added12. Welcomes that starting in 2025, heads of unit will conduct staff evaluations as foreseen in the applicable rules;

Removed14. Takes note of the conclusions of the report on the evaluation of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) and its findings deeming the Regulation fit for purpose, including a review of the Standing Corps published in February 2024, highlighting with regard to the Governance of the Agency the following aspects:

Added13. Deplores the weaknesses in the management of conflict of interest within the Agency, particularly regarding the handling of complaints by the Management Board against decisions made by the Executive Director; calls on the Agency to inform the discharge authority of the corrective actions and organisational changes put in place to address these shortcomings in conflict of interest management;

Removed– there is a clear distribution of tasks between the MB and the Executive Director;

Added14. Notes with appreciation the recognition by both the Management Board and the Executive Director of the seriousness of the allegations and the issues at stake;

Removed– insufficient representation of authorities responsible for returns on the MB, as members are primarily from national border management authorities which are often not responsible for returns;

Added15. Notes with concern the repeated failures in governance, including the inability of the Management Board to exercise timely and effective oversight; regrets that several of the irregularities could have been prevented with better internal controls and proactive engagement from the Management Board; insists that this institutional failure must be addressed structurally, not just procedurally;

Removed– Frontex's internal governance is not fully equipped to support its expanded 2019 mandate, with issues like overlapping responsibilities and occasional conflicting approaches; notes that the implementation of the new organisational structure adopted by the MB in November 2023 should address this matter; notes that key proposals involve consolidating strategic insight and coordination functions, decentralising management to increase accountability, and reallocating resources effectively;

Added16. Deplores the issues of poor administration, especially in the area of human resources, with serious irregularities, particularly in appointment and selection procedures in breach of Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants; is aware that during the period from 2019 to 2022, the Agency faced challenging circumstances, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive, or the entry into force of the EUAA Regulation with a new mandate, competences, and responsibilities; considers that despite these difficult circumstances, they do not justify non-compliance with the applicable legislation; calls the Agency to ensure that all applicable rules are followed in recruitment processes and to establish clear guidelines to promote transparent, merit-based, good practices and procedures in line with the staff regulation and any other applicable rules;

Removed15. Reiterates the necessity of fundamental rights training for Standing Corps officers (Frontex), ensuring their awareness of and compliance with relevant fundamental rights obligations and standards, with international human rights and humanitarian law;

Added17. Welcomes that the practice of appointing managers ad interim has been discontinued as from January 2023;

RemovedBudgetary and Financial Management

Added18. Recalls that one of the duties of the Management Board is to give general orientation for the Agency’s activities and ensure that the Agency performs its tasks; considers that in order to give general orientation the Management Board needs to be aware and duly informed of applicable legislation to the Agency as well as critical developments in the management of the Agency; calls on the Agency to ensure more efficient and transparent procedures in communication with the Management Board;

Removed16. Notes that the total final revenue for 2023 (after amending budgets) and the comparative figures for 2022 for the 33 Union agencies that are part of this resolution had the following breakdown:

Added19. Calls on the European Commission, who has two seats on the Management Board, to support and assist other board members in their understanding of the rules applicable to the Agency; calls on the Agency to report back to the discharge authority on the measures taken to improve communication with the Management Board;

Removed17. Highlights that the increase in the revenue from 2022 to 2023 has been significant in some Agencies, representing 54,59 % for the European Supply Agency (ESA), 20,86 % for Eurojust, 19,65 % for Frontex and 19,15 % for ACER;

Added20. Takes note of the suggestion made by the Commission during the exchange of views on the possibility to share Joint Services in certain horizontal areas across the decentralised Agencies, as this would help to better manage processes and make a more efficient use of resources; encourages the Commission to explore this possibility and propose concrete actions in this regard;

Removed18. Notes that in ESA the increase is mainly due to the continued development of the Nuclear Observatory and ESA Management of Information (NOEMI) IT system and the provision of accounting services to the agency; in Eurojust the increase is mainly due to the additional resources necessary to perform tasks added by three Commission proposals for regulations and the particularly severe impact of inflation; in Frontex the budget increase aims to continue building the standing corps of border guards, including equipment; in the case of ACER, the increase is mainly due to the additional tasks delegated in planned revised Regulations on energy infrastructure and methane emissions reduction, the related annual remuneration indexation, higher legal expenses, and a higher budget allocation derived from fees for specific projects;

Added21. Calls on the Agency to establish an independent internal ethics function and emphasizes the importance of having robust whistle-blower protection rules in line with Directive (EU) 2019/1937; stresses that internal reporting channels must be confidential, credible and trusted by staff at all levels;

Removed19. Is of the opinion that considering the average growth rate of 32 % in Frontex’s budget, from EUR 364 million to EUR 829 million from 2020 to 2023, along with recurrent high levels of carryovers (45 % in 2023), further increases in Frontex’s budget should be reconsidered and re-evaluated by the Commission in the annual budgetary procedure, until the budgetary absorption capacity is improved, particularly by means of recruiting staff and other operational expenditures;

Added22. Highlights that although some of the events date back to the years 2021, 2022 and earlier, the OLAF investigation was only concluded in 2024; emphasises that due to the systemic nature of some of the issues, it cannot be assumed that they have been fully resolved; stresses that the Discharge Authority retains the full right to exercise its oversight responsibilities until the situation is entirely remedied and clarified; calls on the Executive Director and the Management Board to recognise and address any structural weaknesses in both the Agency’s human resources management and the Management Board’s oversight functions, and to take effective measures to prevent the recurrence of similar issues and reserves the right to withhold or condition future discharge decisions, including budgetary appropriations, should the Agency fail to deliver full structural reform;

Removed20. Recalls that the majority of Union agencies receive their funding entirely from contributions from the EU budget; notes, however, that some agencies are fully or partially financed through alternative sources of revenue, including certificates, authorisations, registration of substances, contributions, data collection, market surveillance, supervision, and other services such as translation and terminology as provided by the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT);

Added23. Commends the Agency's staff for their dedication and commitment in executing their tasks despite challenging circumstances; considers essential to foster a positive work environment by promoting good practices at the human resources level and rewarding merit-based performances; urges the Management Board and the Executive Director to ensure that the Agency is a safe and supportive workplace that encourages open communication and empowers individuals to speak up without fear of retaliation; calls on the Agency to ensure that all reports of professional misconduct are taken seriously and thoroughly investigated, with appropriate follow-up actions taken to maintain integrity and trust within the organisation;

Removed21. Acknowledges, specifically, that:

Removed– partially self-financed agencies include the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Union Agency for Railways (ERA), Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), European Medicines Agency (EMA);

Removed– fully self-financed agencies include CdT; and

Removed– agencies partially co-financed by national public authorities include the European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA);

Removed22. Notes that for 2023 the source of finance for self-financed agencies that are part of this resolution had the following breakdown:

Removed23. Takes note of the Court’s observation that the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the European union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA), and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) are legally required to identify and account separately for the costs of activities funded from own revenue; notes that these agencies have systems in place to comply with this requirement and notes that certain agencies such as EMA, EASA and ERA go beyond those requirements;

Removed24. Observes that the founding regulations for the three European supervisory authorities (EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA - with the exception of activities financed by supervisory fees) set out that, initially, the contributions they receive from national competent authorities should account for 60 % of their budgets, with the remaining 40 % coming from the EU budget; notes that this arrangement reflects the mix of regulatory tasks, which are suitable for EU funding, and supervisory convergence tasks, which are appropriate for contributions from national competent authorities, in the mandates of the three authorities; highlights that, due to the absence of a clear delineation between the activities funded by the two sources in the founding regulations, these authorities do not differentiate between the costs covered by the EU budget subsidy and those covered by national contributions;

Removed25. Calls on EBA, EIOPA and ESMA to develop this capacity to identify and separately account for the costs of activities generating each of their own revenue streams in order to improve their decision-making and the quality of information they provide to stakeholders as regards the deficits or surpluses that such activities produce;

Removed26. Notes that CdT has a system in place to monitor the cost of each activity and product generating its own revenue, allowing it to calculate profits or losses; highlights that in 2023, 10 of the CdT's 17 main products reported losses totalling EUR 3,4 million;

Removed27. Underlines that over the last decade CdT experienced 7 years of budgetary deficits and 6 years of accounting losses due to declining volumes of business; takes note that, to address the fall in business volumes, CdT has been drawing on a special reserve that was established in 2011 to ensure budget and price stability; notes that this reserve peaked at EUR 15,6 million in 2014, subsequently dropped to EUR 10,3 million in 2022 and EUR 8,9 million in 2023; is aware that once the reserve is fully depleted, any further deficits would have to be covered by EU budget subsidies, as provided for by the CdT’s founding regulation; calls on CdT to report back to the discharge authority on its plans to mitigate the risks of business continuity;

RemovedMain risks identified by the Court

Removed28. Notes the conclusion of the European Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’) in its annual report on Union agencies for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’), that the Court’s audit had similar results as in the previous year (2022), with weaknesses in public procurement procedures having remained the main source of irregular payments;

Removed29. Notes from the Court’s report that the overall risk to the reliability of agencies’ accounts, as established by applying the accounting rules adopted by the Commission’s accounting officer and based on international accounting standards, is generally low, as was the case in 2022;

Removed30. Underlines that the Court considers the overall risk to the legality and regularity of revenue underlying the agencies’ accounts to be low for most agencies, and to be medium for the partly self-financed agencies where specific regulations are applicable to collection of fees and other revenue contributions, as was the case in 2022;