Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to report parliamentary committee draft

2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

▸4 unchanged paragraphs

with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2022, Section II – European Council and Council

(2023/2131(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2022, Section II – European Council and Council,

Changed– having regard to Rule 100102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the opinionsecond report of the Committee on ConstitutionalBudgetary Affairs,Control (A100000/2024),

Removed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A90000/2024),

▸11 unchanged paragraphs

A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

B. whereas, under Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the Union, and whereas the budget of the European Council and of the Council is a section of the Union budget;

C. whereas, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council is not to exercise legislative functions;

D. whereas, under Article 317 TFEU, the Commission is to implement the Union budget on its own responsibility, having regard to the principles of sound financial management, and whereas, under the framework in place, the Commission is to confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

E. whereas, under Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU, the European Council and the Council (the ‘Council’) are assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council, and whereas the Secretary-General of the Council is wholly responsible for the sound management of the appropriations entered in Section II of the Union budget;

F. whereas, over the course of almost twenty years, Parliament has been implementing the well-established and respected practice of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and whereas the Commission supports that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution, body, office and agency for its administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued;

G. whereas, according to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

H. whereas, since 2009, the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure has compelled Parliament to refuse to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council;

I. whereas the European Council and the Council, as Union institutions and as recipients of the general budget of the Union, should be transparent and democratically accountable to the citizens of the Union and subject to democratic scrutiny of the spending of public funds;

J. whereas the recommendation of the European Ombudsman (the ‘Ombudsman’) in strategic inquiry OI/2/2017/TE on the transparency of the Council legislative process indicated that the Council’s practice with regard to transparency in the legislative process constituted maladministration and should be addressed in order to enable citizens to follow the Union legislative process;

K. whereas the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union confirms the right of taxpayers and of the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue and that the General Court in in its judgment of 25 January 2023 in Case T-163/21, De Capitani v Council, stated on transparency within the Union legislative process that documents produced by the Council in its working groups are not of technical nature but legislative and are therefore subject to access to documents requests;

Change 2

Removed1. Notes that the budget of the Council falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 11,6 billion in 2022 (representing 5,9 % of the total Union budget); notes that the Council’s budget of approximately EUR 0,6 billion represents approximately 5,3 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

Added1. Deeply regrets that since 2009 and again for the financial year 2022 Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure, preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget and thereby compelling Parliament to refuse discharge;

Removed2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2022 examined a sample of 60 transactions under Administration, the same number as were examined in 2021; further notes that the Court writes that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources including expenditure on pensions, which in 2022 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology, and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

Added2. Notes that the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, on 28 September 2023 forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat of the Council containing 74 important questions from Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with thorough answers to all questions;

Removed3. Notes that 14 (23 %) of the 60 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimate the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

Added3. Regrets that, on 12 October 2023, the General Secretariat of the Council informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing which was arranged for 25 October 2023 as part of the discharge process and in which all other invited institutions participated;

Removed4. Notes with satisfaction that the Court, in its Annual Report for the financial year 2022, states that it did not identify any specific issues concerning the Council;

RemovedState of play of the discharge procedure

Removed5. Deeply regrets that since 2009 and again for the financial year 2021 Parliament has had to refuse discharge to the Council because the Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure, preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget;

Removed6. Notes that the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, on 28 September 2023 forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat of the Council containing 74 important questions for Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with thorough answers to all the questions;

Removed7. Regrets that, on 12 October 2023, the General Secretariat of the Council informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering to Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing which was arranged for 25 October 2023 as part of the discharge process and in which all other invited institutions participated;

4. Emphasises Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability towards Union taxpayers;

5. Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it incomprehensible that the Council believes it appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget;

Change 3

Changed10.6. Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of almost twenty years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued directly by Parliament;

Change 4

Changed11.7. Stresses that the current situation impliesallows thatthe Parliament can onlyto check only the reports of the Court and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website, somethingbecause thatthe Council continues its malpractice of non-cooperation with the Parliament which makes it impossible for Parliament to carry out its duties properly and make an informed decision on granting discharge;

Change 5

Changed12.8. Deplores that the Council, for more than a decade, has shown that it does not have any political willingness to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure; underlines that this attitude has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions andinstitutions, has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and onhas damaged the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity;

9. Recalls that the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenues; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure;

Change 6

Removed14. Calls on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament at the highest level, involving the Secretary-Generals and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and find a solution while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensuring transparency and proper democratic control of budget implementation;

Added10. Stresses that a revision of the Treaties could render the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by giving Parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies individually; underlines, however, that pending such a revision, the current situation must be improved through better interinstitutional cooperation within the current framework of the Treaties and urges the Council to actively engage with the Parliament in addressing the current situation;

Removed15. Stresses that, while the current situation has to be improved through better interinstitutional cooperation within the framework of the Treaties, a revision of the Treaties could render the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by giving Parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies individually;

Added11. Calls on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible, involving the Secretary-Generals and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and find a solution while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensuring transparency and proper democratic control of budget implementation;

Removed16. Notes that despite the Council being unwilling to cooperate in the discharge procedure, Parliament, nevertheless, stresses some political priorities and sets out some observations concerning the budgetary and financial management of the Council and other observations relevant for the discharge procedure in this report;

Added12. Stresses that Parliament’s observations concerning political priorities, budgetary and financial management, internal management, performance and internal control, human resources, equality and well-being, ethical framework and transparency, digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection, buildings, environment and sustainability, interinstitutional cooperation and communication from its discharge resolution of 23 April 2024 are still valid.

RemovedPolitical priorities

Removed17. Regrets that the Council exerts its prerogative in the nomination and appointment procedures for many Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies without taking into account the views of the interested parties or the recommendations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);

Removed18. Underlines that the Council’s tradition of not questioning the appointments of individual Member States for most positions means that the professional qualifications of candidates are not thoroughly checked; insists, therefore, on the need for a review of the Council’s prerogative with a view to guaranteeing and strengthening the participation of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies concerned and increasing the legitimacy of those appointed; suggests that one possibility to ensure that candidates have the necessary qualifications would be to establish independent panels of experts carrying out such checks;

Removed19. Recalls that, pursuant to Article 286(2) TFEU, the Council appoints the members of the Court after consultation with Parliament; regrets that the Council has repeatedly failed to take into consideration the recommendations of Parliament in its consultative role regarding the appointment of the members of the Court;

Removed20. Points out the serious gender imbalance in the Court, where, at the end of 2022, there were only 9 female members compared to 17 male members; understands the difficulties in achieving gender balance in the Court because of the current nomination procedure; reiterates its call on the Council to reconsider the nomination procedure with the aim of tackling this problem with concrete actions, such as making it compulsory for Member States to nominate at least two candidates of different genders for each vacancy;

Removed21. Regrets that the Council has so far ignored Parliament’s resolution of 17 December 2020 on the need for a dedicated Council configuration on gender equality and insists that a dedicated institutional forum would ensure stronger integration of gender equality in Union policies and strategies as well as essential coordination and progress in the main files related to gender equality;

Removed22. Regrets that the decision-making process in the Council is still far from fully transparent, which affects the citizens’ trust in the Union as a transparent entity and thereby jeopardises the reputation of the Union as a whole; recalls and supports the recommendations of the European Ombudsman regarding the transparency of the Council legislative process in strategic inquiry OI/2/2017/TE; urges the Council to take all the measures necessary to implement the recommendations of the Ombudsman and the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union without undue delay; reminds that the Court of Justice of the European Union, in its judgement in Case T-163/21, De Capitani v Council, underlined that clearer legislative transparency would be needed from the Council in order to ensure access to legislative documents, simply corresponding to the Council’s obligation in terms of public scrutiny and accountability of the co-legislators as the basis of any democratic legitimacy;

Removed23. Expresses its deep concern regarding the increasing role of the European Council in legislative files, despite the fact that it has neither a legislative nor an executive function and that it does not apply the same transparency standards as the Council, meaning that it is not being held accountable;

Removed24. Regrets the fact that the participation of the Member States’ Permanent Representatives in the mandatory transparency register, set up by the interinstitutional agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register, is completely voluntary and insists that all Permanent Representations should take an active part in the mandatory transparency register before, during and after their Member State’s Council presidency; believes that the existing ethics rules on conflicts of interest, revolving doors and transparency on lobbying should be strengthened and harmonised and that Member State representatives who benefit directly from Union subsidies through the businesses they own should not be allowed to participate in policy or budgetary discussions and votes related to those subsidies;

Removed25. Regrets that the Council does not fully utilise the mandatory transparency register beyond its current limitations, rejecting any recommendation for improvements; reiterates its call on the Council to refuse to meet with unregistered lobbyists;

Removed26. In line with the conclusions of the workshop held by Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control on 27 June 2023, calls on the rotating Council presidencies to stop using corporate sponsorship to contribute to covering their expenses; understands that financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States and that each Member State, irrespective of its size and available budget, should have an equal opportunity to organise a successful Council presidency, but believes that the acceptance of corporate sponsorship causes reputational damage because it risks creating conflicts of interest; reiterates its call on the Council to provide a budget for the Council presidencies to ensure adequate and uniform standards of efficiency and effectiveness in the work in the Council in general; in that connection, is disappointed with the non-binding guidelines issued on corporate sponsorships by the Council;

Removed27. Regrets that, despite several requests by Parliament, the code of conduct for the President of the European Council has not been brought in line with those of Parliament and the Commission, in particular in terms of activities to be approved after the President leaves the post;

RemovedBudgetary and financial management

Removed28. Notes that the budget for Council was EUR 611 473 556 for 2022, representing an increase of 2,9 % compared to 2021, which is significantly higher than the increase from 2020 to 2021, when it was 0,6 %;

Removed29. Reiterates its regret that the budget of the European Council and the Council has not been divided into two clearly separated budgets as recommended by Parliament in previous discharge resolutions in order to improve transparency and accountability, not least concerning the European Council, given that it is currently impossible to get reliable information about its costs;

Removed30. Notes with regret that the General Secretariat of the Council publishes a report on the annual accounts and a series of annual activity reports from different parts of the General Secretariat but that it is difficult to get a concise and easily accessible overview of all the activities of the General Secretariat of the Council since there is not a single report summarising and presenting a coherent overview of Council activities;

Removed31. Notes with satisfaction that the accounting officer of the Council is able to certify that the annual accounts of the Council for the year 2022 was prepared in accordance with Title XIII of the Financial Regulation and the accounting rules adopted by the Commission's accounting officer, as is required of all the institutions and Union bodies, offices and agencies, and that the accounting officer had a reasonable assurance that the accounts for 2022 presented fairly, in all material aspects, the financial position, the results of the operations and the cash-flow of the Council;

Removed32. Notes that the Council carried out 64 budgetary transfers in 2022, all on basis of Article 29 of the Financial Regulation, significantly up from 43 in 2021; further notes that six of the transfers involved informing the budgetary authority and that the major reason for those transfers was increased water, gas, electricity and heating costs and higher-than-expected salary increases;