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On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509
Full title
On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509
Document CJ71-AM-790157 · COM(2025)0565 – C100179/2025 – 2025/0240(COD)
- Kind
- Amendment list CJ71-AM-790157
- Date
- 23 June 2026
- Committee
- Committee on Budgets Committee on Regional Development Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development
- Dossier
- 2025-0240
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- Official page PDF Word
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- COM(2025)0565 – C100179/2025 – 2025/0240(COD)
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| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission may suspend all or part of the payments, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: | 1. The Commission may suspend, at the appropriate level and accordance with the institutional and legal framework of the Member States concerned, all or part of the payments for the measures concerned under NRP Plans and Interreg Plan chapters, except for pre-financing, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission may suspend all or part of the payments, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: | 1. The Commission may suspend all or part of the payments, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission may suspend all or part of the payments, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: | 1. The Commission may suspend all or part of the payments affected by the cases set out in this paragraph, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission may suspend all or part of the payments, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: | 1. The Commission may make a proposal to the Council to suspend all or part of the payments, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission may suspend all or part of the payments, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: | 1. The Commission shall suspend all or part of the payments, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (aa) The suspension of payments shall not apply to technical assistance funds. |
The suspension of technical assistance funds may contribute to the instability of the functioning of the Plan implementation system.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (aa) The suspension of payments shall not apply to technical assistance funds. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], for which corrective measures have not been taken; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], for which corrective measures have not been taken; | (b) there is non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], other than in cases of force majeure for which corrective measures have not been taken for which corrective measures have not been taken, except in cases involving fraud or corruption, where corrective action shall be required immediately; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], for which corrective measures have not been taken; | (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], for which corrective measures have not been taken, Member States should know what ‘serious non-compliance’ with the obligations means; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], for which corrective measures have not been taken; | (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], concluded in an audit/control report issued by entities authorised to perform such checks, for which corrective measures have not been taken; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], for which corrective measures have not been taken; | (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], concluded in an audit/control report issued by entities authorized to perform such checks for which corrective measures have not been taken; |
The proposed amendments are introduced in order to limit the discretionary power of the Commission in initiating interruptions of payment deadlines.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], for which corrective measures have not been taken; | (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], concluded in an audit/control report issued by entities authorized to perform such checks for which corrective measures have not been taken; |
Completing this provision is necessary to clarify the circumstances under which the Commission may initiate the procedure for suspending payments, thereby enhancing legal certainty.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], for which corrective measures have not been taken; | (b) there is a non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] concluded in an audit/control report issued by entities authorized to perform such checks, for which corrective measures have not been taken; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], for which corrective measures have not been taken; | (b) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], concluded in an audit / control report issued by competent entities for which corrective measures have not been taken; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; | (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; Any suspension of payments pursuant to this point shall be limited to the amount corresponding to the unfulfilled or reversed milestone, target or output and shall be calculated in accordance with a transparent, objective and pre-established methodology made publicly available by the Commission. The Commission shall provide a detailed justification of the calculation applied in each individual case; |
The proposal does not sufficiently clarify how the amount of suspended payments should be determined when milestones, targets or outputs are not fulfilled. To ensure legal certainty, transparency and equal treatment of Member States, the Regulation should require the Commission to apply a clear and pre-established methodology and to limit suspensions to the financial value directly linked to the non-compliance concerned. This would strengthen predictability and prevent disproportionate financial corrections.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; | (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; Non-fulfilment of milestones or targets not directly linked to a measure should not lead to a suspension of payments to beneficiaries for that measure. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; | (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; | (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application is considered by the Commission not to be fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; | (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application is considered by the Commission not to be fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; | (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application is considered by the Commission not to be fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; | (c) several milestones or targets or outputs included in a payment application have not been fulfilled or several milestones or targets for which payments have been disbursed have been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) one or more milestone or target or output included in a payment application has not been fulfilled or a milestone or a target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; | (c) several milestones or targets or outputs included in a payment application have not been fulfilled or several milestones or targets for which payments have been disbursed have been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ca) the Commission determines that the interim targets and target values for climate, the environment, biodiversity, soil, water, or animal welfare set out in the NRP plan have not been met or are seriously at risk of not being met, and that the Member State has not taken appropriate corrective measures; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ca) one or more milestones or targets, for which a payment had been disbursed, has been reversed pursuant to Article 69 [reversals]; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (cb) 1a. The Commission may suspend all or part of the payments, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, taking into account the principle of proportionality, in any of the following cases: |
Due to technical constraints, it was impossible to table it in a different way - it is supposed to be a new paragraph 1a, followed by points (d), (e), (f) from the original Commission proposal. The rationale is to divide the suspension cases into thos categories - where Commission shall suspend and where the Commission may suspend the payments.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) there is a reasoned opinion by the Commission in respect of an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU on a matter that puts at risk the effective implementation of the measures. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) there is a reasoned opinion by the Commission in respect of an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU on a matter that puts at risk the effective implementation of the measures. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) there is a reasoned opinion by the Commission in respect of an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU on a matter that puts at risk the effective implementation of the measures. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) there is a reasoned opinion by the Commission in respect of an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU on a matter that puts at risk the effective implementation of the measures. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) there is a reasoned opinion by the Commission in respect of an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU on a matter that puts at risk the effective implementation of the measures. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) there is a reasoned opinion by the Commission in respect of an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU on a matter that puts at risk the effective implementation of the measures. | (d) there is a reasoned opinion by the Commission in respect of an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU on a matter that puts at risk the legality and regularity of the implementation of the measures. |
Mireia Borrás Pabón, Raffaele Stancanelli, Gilles Pennelle, Valérie Deloge, Tomáš Kubín, Marie Dauchy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) there is a reasoned opinion by the Commission in respect of an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU on a matter that puts at risk the effective implementation of the measures. | (d) there is a reasoned opinion by the Commission in respect of an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU on a matter that puts at risk the legality and regularity of the implementation of the measures. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) the Council has decided that a Member State: | deleted |
| (i) has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; | |
| (ii) has not taken corrective action to correct its excessive imbalances, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; | |
| (iii) has decided that a Member State does not comply with the policy requirements contained in the macroeconomic adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council for reasons within the control of the Member State concerned. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) the Council has decided that a Member State: | deleted |
| (i) has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; | |
| (ii) has not taken corrective action to correct its excessive imbalances, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; | |
| (iii) has decided that a Member State does not comply with the policy requirements contained in the macroeconomic adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council for reasons within the control of the Member State concerned. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) the Council has decided that a Member State: | deleted |
| (i) has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; | |
| (ii) has not taken corrective action to correct its excessive imbalances, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; | |
| (iii) has decided that a Member State does not comply with the policy requirements contained in the macroeconomic adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council for reasons within the control of the Member State concerned. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) the Council has decided that a Member State: | deleted |
| (i) has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; | |
| (ii) has not taken corrective action to correct its excessive imbalances, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; | |
| (iii) has decided that a Member State does not comply with the policy requirements contained in the macroeconomic adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council for reasons within the control of the Member State concerned. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) the Council has decided that a Member State: | deleted |
| (i) has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; | |
| (ii) has not taken corrective action to correct its excessive imbalances, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; | |
| (iii) has decided that a Member State does not comply with the policy requirements contained in the macroeconomic adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council for reasons within the control of the Member State concerned. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) the Council has decided that a Member State: | (e) Where a Member State: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (i) has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; | deleted |
The current application of macroeconomic conditionality is more restrictive than in previous programming periods and does not fully reflect the safeguards and proportionality principles laid down in the CPR. If maintained, the mechanism should be aligned with the CPR framework, including the Council’s role in decision-making, the prioritisation of commitment suspensions, and the applicable exceptions, in order to ensure legal certainty and proportionality.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (i) has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (i) has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (i) has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (i) has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit, unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; | (i) has been placed under an excessive deficit procedure pursuant to Article 126 TFEU and has failed to implement the recommended corrective path within the timeframe set , unless the Council has adopted a recommendation under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro zone or the Union as a whole; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ii) has not taken corrective action to correct its excessive imbalances, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ii) has not taken corrective action to correct its excessive imbalances, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ii) has not taken corrective action to correct its excessive imbalances, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ii) has not taken corrective action to correct its excessive imbalances, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ii) has not taken corrective action to correct its excessive imbalances, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; | (ii) has been identified as experiencing excessive imbalances pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 and has failed to submit a credible corrective action plan within the deadline set, unless the Council has adopted amendments to its recommendation under Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (iii) has decided that a Member State does not comply with the policy requirements contained in the macroeconomic adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council for reasons within the control of the Member State concerned. | deleted |
The current interpretation of the macroeconomic conditionality is stricter than it was in the last two programming periods. According to Art. 19 of Regulation 1060/2021 and art. 10 of Regulation 1060/2021: the decision to suspend all or part of the commitments or payments is taken by the Council, at the proposal of the Commission, -the decision is not taken by the Commission; priority shall be given to the suspension of commitments. – the current system does not foreseen the possibility to suspend commitments, under the reasoning the performance based model does not rely on commitments; still, for RRF was possible to regulate this approach, while in RRF we do not have annual commitment as in case of NRPP. Payments shall be suspended only when immediate action is sought and in the case of significant non-compliance. The suspension of payments shall apply to payment applications submitted for the programmes concerned after the date of the decision to suspend. The suspension of commitments shall be subject to a maximum of 25 % of the commitments or 0.25 % of nominal GDP, whichever is lower, - the principle of proportionality is clearly defined in time and as volume. Considering the above explanations, we consider that these provisions should be considered for the Nego-box.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (iii) has decided that a Member State does not comply with the policy requirements contained in the macroeconomic adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council for reasons within the control of the Member State concerned. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (iii) has decided that a Member State does not comply with the policy requirements contained in the macroeconomic adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council for reasons within the control of the Member State concerned. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (iii) has decided that a Member State does not comply with the policy requirements contained in the macroeconomic adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council for reasons within the control of the Member State concerned. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ea) one or more milestone or target or output for which a payment has been disbursed and for which the allocation, selection, or implementation reveals political discrimination; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) the Commission has concluded that a Member State does not comply with the adjustment programme and Memorandum of Understanding referred to in Articles 3 and 3a of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) the Commission has concluded that a Member State does not comply with the adjustment programme and Memorandum of Understanding referred to in Articles 3 and 3a of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) the Commission has concluded that a Member State does not comply with the adjustment programme and Memorandum of Understanding referred to in Articles 3 and 3a of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) the Commission has concluded that a Member State does not comply with the adjustment programme and Memorandum of Understanding referred to in Articles 3 and 3a of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) the Commission has concluded that a Member State does not comply with the adjustment programme and Memorandum of Understanding referred to in Articles 3 and 3a of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| By way of derogation from paragraph 1, where any of the conditions referred to in points (b), (e) and (f) are met, the Commission shall adopt a delegated act suspending all or part of the payments without undue delay. The European Parliament or the Council may object to the delegated act within a period of one month of notification. If neither the European Parliament nor the Council has objected, the delegated act shall enter into force. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. Where a suspension pursuant to this paragraph concerns measures included in a regional or territorial chapter of the NRP Plan, the Commission shall ensure that the suspension does not extend to measures for which the relevant regional or local managing authority designated pursuant to Article 49(1a) is not responsible, in particular where the non-compliance underlying the suspension has no direct relationship with the competences of that authority. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. Where the Commission has concluded that a Member State does not fulfil or no longer fulfils the rule of law horizontal condition, the Commission shall suspend all or part of the payments without undue delay in accordance with Article 9. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. A suspension of payments shall be restricted to the Chapter or the measures affected by the findings under paragraph 1. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. A suspension of payments shall be restricted to the Chapter or the measures affected by the findings under paragraph 1. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Before taking a decision on a suspension, the Commission shall inform the Member State of its conclusions and give the Member State the opportunity to present, within two months, its observations on the Commission’s assessment. The deadline may be extended if mutually agreed. The Commission shall take into account all relevant information and observations provided by the Member State before taking a decision on the suspension. | 2. Before taking a decision on a suspension, the Commission shall inform the Member State of its conclusions and give the Member State the opportunity to present, within two months, its observations on the Commission’s assessment. The deadline may be extended if mutually agreed. The Commission shall take into account all relevant information and observations provided by the Member State before taking a decision on the suspension. The Commission shall limit the suspension to the part of the payment application affected by the elements referred to in paragraph 1, to the chapters value for the milestones and targets affected, considering their corresponding pay-out value. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Before taking a decision on a suspension, the Commission shall inform the Member State of its conclusions and give the Member State the opportunity to present, within two months, its observations on the Commission’s assessment. The deadline may be extended if mutually agreed. The Commission shall take into account all relevant information and observations provided by the Member State before taking a decision on the suspension. | 2. Before taking a decision on a suspension, the Commission shall inform the Member State of its conclusions and give the Member State the opportunity to present, within two months, its observations on the Commission’s assessment. The Commission shall take into account all relevant information and observations provided by the Member State before taking a decision on the suspension. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Before taking a decision on a suspension, the Commission shall inform the Member State of its conclusions and give the Member State the opportunity to present, within two months, its observations on the Commission’s assessment. The deadline may be extended if mutually agreed. The Commission shall take into account all relevant information and observations provided by the Member State before taking a decision on the suspension. | 2. Before proposing a suspension, the Commission shall inform the Member State of its conclusions and give the Member State the opportunity to present, within two months, its observations on the Commission’s assessment. The deadline may be extended if mutually agreed. The Commission shall take into account all relevant information and observations provided by the Member State before proposing the suspension. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) The Commission shall limit the suspension to the part of the payment application affected by the elements referred to in paragraph 3, to the chapters alue for the milestones and targets affected, considering their corresponding pay-out values. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2a. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament informed of the implementation of this Article. In particular, the Commission shall transmit to the European Parliament, without delay, decisions on the suspension or on the lifting of suspension of payments. The [competent committee of the] European Parliament may invite the Commission for an exchange of views on the implementation of this Article. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2a. In any case of suspension, interruption or obstruction of payments due to a breach of this Regulation, the Commission shall ensure, where possible, that final beneficiaries, regions, municipalities, farmers, fishers, students, local authorities, civil society organisations and social bodies are not penalised for breaches or omissions by the central government. |
Suspension or interruption of payments for breaches by central government should not punish those who bear no responsibility for them. Ensuring, as far as possible, that final beneficiaries, regions, municipalities, farmers, fishers, students, local authorities and civil society are shielded from the consequences of central-government failures upholds fairness and protects the very people cohesion policy exists to serve.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2a) The Commission shall limit the suspension to the portion of the payment request affected by the things referred to in paragraph (3), namely the amount corresponding to the affected milestones and targets in the relevant chapters, taking into account the amounts of the payments corresponding to them. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2a. The Commission shall limit the suspension to the part of the payment application affected by the elements referred to in paragraph 3, to the chapters alue for the milestones and targets affected, considering their corresponding pay-out values. |
Similar to the interruption procedure, the principle of proportionality should be clearly reflected in the current system to ensure legal certainty and a balanced application of the rules.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2a. The Commission shall determine the amount subject to payment suspension, in line with Annex XZ [Commission methodology on payment suspension under the NRP Regulation]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2b. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament informed of the implementation of this Article. In particular, the Commission shall transmit to Parliament, without delay, decisions on the suspension or on the lifting of suspension of payments. The [competent committee of the] European Parliament may invite the Commission for an exchange of views on the implementation of this Article. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2b. For that purpose, the Commission may use alternative management channels, direct management or payments through reliable intermediary bodies, with full respect for the rules of sound financial management, transparency, control and protection of the Union's financial interests. |
To give effect to the protection of final beneficiaries, the Commission must have the practical means to continue reaching them, including through alternative management channels, direct management or reliable intermediary bodies. This is to be done with full respect for sound financial management, transparency, control and the protection of the Union's financial interests, so that accountability is preserved while innocent beneficiaries are not left without support.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. The Commission shall lift the suspension when the Member State has taken corrective measures remedying the elements referred to in paragraph 1. Such measures may include the amendment of the Plan inserting additional conditions for payment. | 3. The Commission shall lift the suspension when the Member State has taken corrective measures remedying the elements referred to in paragraph 1. Such measures may include the amendment of the Plan inserting additional conditions for payment or modification and / or removal of a measure, without the reduction of the Union financial. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. The Commission shall lift the suspension when the Member State has taken corrective measures remedying the elements referred to in paragraph 1. Such measures may include the amendment of the Plan inserting additional conditions for payment. | 3. The Commission shall lift the suspension when the Member State has taken corrective measures remedying the elements referred to in paragraph 1. Such measures may include the amendment of the Plan inserting additional conditions for payment or modification and / or removal of a measure, without the reduction of the Union financial. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. The Commission shall lift the suspension when the Member State has taken corrective measures remedying the elements referred to in paragraph 1. Such measures may include the amendment of the Plan inserting additional conditions for payment. | 3. The Commission shall lift the suspension when the Member State has taken corrective measures remedying the elements referred to in paragraph 1 and 1a. Such measures may include the amendment of the Plan in accordance with Article 23 inserting additional conditions for payment. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. The Commission shall lift the suspension when the Member State has taken corrective measures remedying the elements referred to in paragraph 1. Such measures may include the amendment of the Plan inserting additional conditions for payment. | 3. The Commission shall only lift the suspension, when the Member State concerned has taken the necessary corrective measures remedying the elements referred to in paragraph 1. Such measures may include the amendment of the Plan inserting additional conditions for payment. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. The Commission shall lift the suspension when the Member State has taken corrective measures remedying the elements referred to in paragraph 1. Such measures may include the amendment of the Plan inserting additional conditions for payment. | 3. The Commission shall lift the suspension when the managing authority has taken corrective measures remedying the elements referred to in paragraph 1. Such measures may include the amendment of the Plan inserting additional conditions for payment. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| The Commission shall, without undue delay, transmit to the European Parliament and the Council any decision suspending payments under this Article together with a statement of reasons, an estimate of the financial impact on the Union budget and the conditions under which the suspension may be lifted. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3a. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament informed of the implementation of this Article. In particular, the Commission shall, when one of the conditions set out in paragraph 1 is fulfilled for a Member State, duly inform the European Parliament and provide details of the potential suspension. | |
| The Commission shall transmit the proposal for suspension or the proposal to lift such a suspension to the European Parliament and to the Council without delay after its adoption. | |
| The European Parliament may invite the Commission for a structured dialogue on the application of this Article. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the decision pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 without undue delay. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article 67a | |
| Financial corrections by Member States | |
| 1. Member States shall protect the Union budget and apply financial corrections by correcting all or part of the support from the Fund to an implementing operator, including a managing authority, where expenditure declared to the Commission is found to be irregular, including the detection of fraud, corruption or conflict of interests affecting the financial interests of the Union. | |
| 2. Financial corrections shall be recorded in the accounts for the accounting year in which the cancellation is decided. | |
| 3. The support from the Fund corrected may be reused by the Member State within the same chapter concerned except for an operation that was subject of that correction or, where a financial correction is made for a systemic irregularity, for any operation affected by the systemic irregularity. Where that irregularity that gives rise to the correction of the contribution is detected at the level of the body implementing the holding fund, or at the level of the body implementing the specific fund where a financial instrument is implemented through a structure without a holding fund, the contribution corrected shall not be reused within the same operation. Where a financial correction is made for a systemic irregularity, the contribution cancelled shall not be reused for any operation affected by the systemic irregularity. | |
| 4. The bodies implementing financial instruments shall reimburse to Member States contributions affected by irregularities, together with interest and any other gains generated by these contributions. The bodies implementing financial instruments shall not reimburse to Member States the amounts referred to in the first subparagraph provided that those bodies demonstrate for a given irregularity that the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled: | |
| (a), the irregularity occurred at the level of final recipients or, in the case of a holding fund, at the level of bodies implementing specific funds or final recipients; | |
| (b), the bodies implementing financial instruments carried out their obligations, in relation to the contributions affected by the irregularity, in accordance with applicable law and acted with the degree of professional care, transparency and diligence expected from a professional body experienced in implementing financial instruments; | |
| (c), the amounts affected by the irregularity could not be recovered notwithstanding that the bodies implementing financial instruments pursued all applicable contractual and legal measures with due diligence. |
Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Elena Nevado del Campo, Esther Herranz García, Maravillas Abadía Jover, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Carmen Crespo Díaz
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article (67a) | |
| The requirements and recommendations specific to each sectoral policy shall apply only to the measures included in the chapter corresponding to that policy. Under no circumstances may they be extended to measures in other areas. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: | 1. Duly respecting the principle of proportionality, the Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution under the Plan and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget except for technical assistance, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: | 1. Duly respecting the principle of proportionality, the Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution under the Plan and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget except for technical assistance, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: | 1. The Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists, while complying with the conditions set out in Articles 8 and 9. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: | 1. The Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: | 1. The Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution, except for technical assistance and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: | 1. The Commission may apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Commission shall apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: | 1. The Commission may apply financial corrections to reduce proportionately the Union financial contribution and, where applicable, recover from the Member States any amount due to the Union budget, or, in respect of loan support, take any measure available under the loan agreement, where it determines that one of the following situations exists: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures referred to in Article 67(2) [Suspension of payments] and where payments have been suspended for at least six months; | (a) the Member State concerned has failed to take corrective measures to remedy the situation giving rise to a suspension under Article 67(1) and 67(1a) where payments have been suspended for at least twelve months; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures referred to in Article 67(2) [Suspension of payments] and where payments have been suspended for at least six months; | (a) the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures referred to in Article 67(2) [Suspension of payments] |
The automatic application of a financial correction after six months would constitute a significant departure from the current framework. A case-by-case assessment should therefore be maintained to ensure a proportionate and evidence-based approach.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures referred to in Article 67(2) [Suspension of payments] and where payments have been suspended for at least six months; | (a) the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures referred to in Article 67(2) [Suspension of payments] |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures referred to in Article 67(2) [Suspension of payments] and where payments have been suspended for at least six months; | (a) the managing authority concerned has not taken the necessary measures referred to in Article 67(2) [Suspension of payments] and where payments have been suspended for at least six months; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is fraud, corruption or conflicts of interests affecting the financial interests of the Union, which was not detected and reported and corrected by the Member State; | (b) there is fraud, corruption or conflicts of interests affecting the financial interests of the Union, which was not detected and reported and corrected by the Member State, or where the Member State has failed to cooperate with OLAF or the EPPO in the investigation of such cases; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is fraud, corruption or conflicts of interests affecting the financial interests of the Union, which was not detected and reported and corrected by the Member State; | (b) there is irregularity, including fraud, corruption, double funding or conflicts of interests affecting the financial interests of the Union, which was not detected and reported and corrected by the Member State; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) there is fraud, corruption or conflicts of interests affecting the financial interests of the Union, which was not detected and reported and corrected by the Member State; | (b) there is fraud, corruption, or conflicts of interests, or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union, which was not detected and not reported and or not corrected by the Member State; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) there is a serious non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States], for which corrective measures were not taken by the Member State; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) amounts were paid out for an unfulfilled milestone or target or unachieved output, which was not detected and reported by the Member State and corrective measures have not been taken by the end of the Plan; where a Member State reports such findings to the Commission, the suspension procedure set out in Article 67(1), point (c), (Suspension of payments) applies; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) amounts were paid out for an unfulfilled milestone or target or unachieved output, which was not detected and reported by the Member State and corrective measures have not been taken by the end of the Plan; where a Member State reports such findings to the Commission, the suspension procedure set out in Article 67(1), point (c), (Suspension of payments) applies; | (d) amounts were paid out for an unfulfilled or partially fulfilled milestone or target or unachieved output, which was not detected and reported by the Member State and corrective measures have not been taken by the end of the Plan including where the reporting of such milestone or target was inaccurate or misleading; in case a Member State upon its own initiative reports such findings to the Commission, the suspension procedure set out in Article 67(1), point (c), (Suspension of payments) applies; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) amounts were paid out for an unfulfilled milestone or target or unachieved output, which was not detected and reported by the Member State and corrective measures have not been taken by the end of the Plan; where a Member State reports such findings to the Commission, the suspension procedure set out in Article 67(1), point (c), (Suspension of payments) applies; | (d) amounts were paid out for an unfulfilled milestone or target or unachieved output, which was not detected and reported by the managing authority and corrective measures have not been taken by the end of the Plan; where a managing authority reports such findings to the Commission, the suspension procedure set out in Article 67(1), point (c), (Suspension of payments) applies; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) a milestone or target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been found to be reversed after the last payment made under the Plan and corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) a milestone or target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been found to be reversed after the last payment made under the Plan and corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) a milestone or target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been found to be reversed after the last payment made under the Plan and corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. | (e) a milestone or target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been found to be reversed after the last payment made under the Plan and corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. The maximum financial correction should be limited to the milestone or target identified as reversed, without questioning the corresponding interim steps. |
The concept of reversals should be explicitly defined in order to ensure legal certainty and interpretative clarity. Given that the Commission is required to apply the procedures laid down in Articles 66, 67, and 68, pertaining respectively to the interruption of payment deadlines, the suspension of payments, and the adoption of financial corrections, the absence of a clear definition may generate ambiguity in the implementation of measures that carry direct financial implications for the Member State concerned. Establishing a precise and operational definition would therefore promote consistency in enforcement, enhance transparency in financial management, and safeguard the predictability of the regulatory framework.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) a milestone or target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been found to be reversed after the last payment made under the Plan and corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. | (e) a milestone or target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been found to be reversed after the last payment made under the Plan and corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. The maximum financial correction should be limited to the milestone or target identified as reversed, without questioning the corresponding interim steps. |
The concept of reversals should be explicitly defined to ensure legal certainty and consistent application of the rules. Given its link to procedures on interruptions, suspensions and financial corrections, a clear definition is necessary to avoid ambiguity, enhance transparency and ensure predictability for Member States.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) a milestone or target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been found to be reversed after the last payment made under the Plan and corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. | (e) a milestone or target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been found to be reversed after the last payment made under the Plan and corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. Financial correction should be limited to the milestones and targets identified as reversed, without questioning the corresponding interim steps |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) a milestone or target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been found to be reversed after the last payment made under the Plan and corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. | (e) a milestone or target, for which a payment has been disbursed, has been found to be reversed after the last payment made under the Plan and corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. Financial correction should be limited to the milestone and target identified as reversed. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ea) If a Member State agrees to the financial correction for the cases referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph (1), prior to the adoption of the decision referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the Member State may reuse the amounts in question, either by reprogramming them in new measures or by providing additional justifications regarding their implementation at a later stage. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ea) a milestone or target, for which the allocation, selection, or implementation reveals political discrimination and where corrective measures were not taken by the end of the Plan. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. Where a Member State agrees to the financial correction for cases referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 before the adoption of the decision referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the Member State may reuse the amounts concerned, either by reprogramming under new measures or by providing additional justification for fulfilment at a later stage. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. Where a Member State agrees to the financial correction for cases referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 before the adoption of the decision referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the Member State may reuse the amounts concerned, either by reprogramming under new measures or by providing additional justification for fulfilment at a later stage. |
Net financial corrections appear disproportionate and depart from the established approach in Cohesion Policy, where affected amounts may be reused within programmes. To preserve incentives for effective implementation, Member States should be allowed to reprogramme amounts subject to corrections or, where appropriate, adjust milestones and targets that are at risk of non-compliance. This would ensure greater flexibility while maintaining sound financial management.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. Where a Member State agrees to the financial correction for cases referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 before the adoption of the decision referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the Member State may reuse the amounts concerned, either by reprogramming under new measures or by providing additional justification for fulfilment at a later stage. |
The net corrections do not seem as a proportional measure, with a very strict approach for financial correction. The amounts deemed not to be compliant with the requirements for the indicated reasons should be reused at the level of the programmes as in all programming periods for cohesion policy.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| When deciding on the amount of the financial correction, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account the seriousness, frequency and financial implications of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 1. It shall as much as possible correspond to the actual financial loss or risk for the Union budget. Where the actual level of undue payments, and the amount of financial damage suffered by the Union, cannot be determined by the Commission with reasonable effort, the Commission may determine the amount by applying extrapolated or flat-rate corrections in accordance with Annex XIV [Determination of the level of flat-rate financial corrections]. | When deciding on the amount of the financial correction, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account external factors that are not under the control of the Member State and the seriousness, frequency and financial implications of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 1. It shall as much as possible correspond to the actual financial loss or risk for the Union budget based strictly on the pay-out value of the milestone or target concerned, without additional multipliers, as on the proportionate corrective measure needed at the level of operations. . Where the actual level of undue payments, and the amount of financial damage suffered by the Union, cannot be determined by the Commission with reasonable effort, the Commission may determine the amount by applying extrapolated or flat-rate corrections in accordance with Annex XIV [Determination of the level of flat-rate financial corrections]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| When deciding on the amount of the financial correction, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account the seriousness, frequency and financial implications of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 1. It shall as much as possible correspond to the actual financial loss or risk for the Union budget. Where the actual level of undue payments, and the amount of financial damage suffered by the Union, cannot be determined by the Commission with reasonable effort, the Commission may determine the amount by applying extrapolated or flat-rate corrections in accordance with Annex XIV [Determination of the level of flat-rate financial corrections]. | When deciding on the amount of the financial correction, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account external factors that are not under the control of the Member State and the seriousness, frequency and financial implications of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 1. It shall as much as possible correspond to the actual financial loss or risk for the Union budget, based strictly on the pay-out value of the milestone or target concerned, without additional multipliers, as on the proportionate corrective measure needed at the level of operations. Where the actual level of undue payments, and the amount of financial damage suffered by the Union, cannot be determined by the Commission with reasonable effort, the Commission may determine the amount by applying extrapolated or flat-rate corrections in accordance with Annex XIV [Determination of the level of flat-rate financial corrections]. |
Financial corrections should remain proportionate to the actual or potential impact on the Union budget and be limited to the specific measure, milestone, target or output affected by the deficiency.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| When deciding on the amount of the financial correction, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account the seriousness, frequency and financial implications of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 1. It shall as much as possible correspond to the actual financial loss or risk for the Union budget. Where the actual level of undue payments, and the amount of financial damage suffered by the Union, cannot be determined by the Commission with reasonable effort, the Commission may determine the amount by applying extrapolated or flat-rate corrections in accordance with Annex XIV [Determination of the level of flat-rate financial corrections]. | When deciding on the amount of the financial correction, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account the seriousness, frequency and financial implications of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 1. It shall as much as possible correspond to the actual financial loss or risk for the Union budget. Where the actual level of undue payments, and the amount of financial damage suffered by the Union, cannot be determined by the Commission with reasonable effort, the Commission may determine the amount by applying extrapolated or flat-rate corrections in accordance with Annex XIV [Determination of the level of flat-rate financial corrections]. In accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the correction shall be based on an individual assessment of the gravity of the irregularity, taking into account the nature of the non-compliance; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| When deciding on the amount of the financial correction, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account the seriousness, frequency and financial implications of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 1. It shall as much as possible correspond to the actual financial loss or risk for the Union budget. Where the actual level of undue payments, and the amount of financial damage suffered by the Union, cannot be determined by the Commission with reasonable effort, the Commission may determine the amount by applying extrapolated or flat-rate corrections in accordance with Annex XIV [Determination of the level of flat-rate financial corrections]. | When deciding on the amount of the financial correction, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account the seriousness, frequency and financial implications of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 1. It shall as much as possible correspond to the actual financial loss or risk for the Union budget taking into account the amount of the payment related to the measures and the scale of the proportionate corrective measure necessary at the level of the operation. Where the actual level of undue payments, and the amount of financial damage suffered by the Union, cannot be determined by the Commission with reasonable effort, the Commission may determine the amount by applying extrapolated or flat-rate corrections in accordance with Annex XIV [Determination of the level of flat-rate financial corrections]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| When deciding on the amount of the financial correction, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account the seriousness, frequency and financial implications of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 1. It shall as much as possible correspond to the actual financial loss or risk for the Union budget. Where the actual level of undue payments, and the amount of financial damage suffered by the Union, cannot be determined by the Commission with reasonable effort, the Commission may determine the amount by applying extrapolated or flat-rate corrections in accordance with Annex XIV [Determination of the level of flat-rate financial corrections]. | When deciding on the amount of the financial correction, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account the seriousness, frequency and financial implications of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 1. It shall as much as possible correspond to the actual financial loss or risk for the Union budget, based on the pay-out value of the measures and on the proportionate corrective measure needed at the level of operations part. Where the actual level of undue payments, and the amount of financial damage suffered by the Union, cannot be determined by the Commission with reasonable effort, the Commission may determine the amount by applying extrapolated or flat-rate corrections in accordance with Annex XIV [Determination of the level of flat-rate financial corrections]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| In case of an unfulfilled milestone or target, which was not detected and reported by the Member State, as referred to in paragraph 2, point (d), the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the part which is unfulfilled. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| In case of an unfulfilled milestone or target, which was not detected and reported by the Member State, as referred to in paragraph 2, point (d), the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the part which is unfulfilled. | In case of an unfulfilled milestone or target, which was not detected and reported by the Member State, as referred to in paragraph 2, point (d), the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the part which is unfulfilled in accordance with annex [XZ Methodology of payment suspension under the NRP]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| In case of an unfulfilled milestone or target, which was not detected and reported by the Member State, as referred to in paragraph 2, point (d), the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the part which is unfulfilled. | In case of an unfulfilled milestone or target, which was not detected and reported by the Member State, as referred to in paragraph 2, point (d), the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the part which is unfulfilled and should not exceed the pay-out value for milestone or a target. . |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| In case of an unfulfilled milestone or target, which was not detected and reported by the Member State, as referred to in paragraph 2, point (d), the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the part which is unfulfilled. | In case of an unfulfilled milestone or target, which was not detected and reported by the Member State, as referred to in paragraph 2, point (d), the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the part which is unfulfilled and should not exceed the pay-out value for milestone or a target. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where a final milestone or target of a given measure was not fulfilled, the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the implementation of the measure, taking into account the previous payments made. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where a final milestone or target of a given measure was not fulfilled, the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the implementation of the measure, taking into account the previous payments made. | Where a final milestone or target of a given measure was not fulfilled, the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in relation to the implementation of the measure. Previous payments for milestones or targets which have been fulfilled shall not be affected. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where a final milestone or target of a given measure was not fulfilled, the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the implementation of the measure, taking into account the previous payments made. | Where a final milestone or target of a given measure was not fulfilled, the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in relation to the implementation of the measure. Previous payments for milestones or targets which have been fulfilled shall not be affected. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where a final milestone or target of a given measure was not fulfilled, the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the implementation of the measure, taking into account the previous payments made. | Where a final milestone or target of a given measure was not fulfilled, the value of the correction applied by the Commission shall be determined in proportion to the implementation of the measure. Previous payments for met milestones or target values remain unaffected. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) Errors attributable to force majeure or to circumstances beyond the control of the beneficiary or the Member State shall be excluded from the calculation of error rates serving as a basis for financial corrections. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2a) Financial corrections should be limited to the amounts affected by the irregularity, non-compliance or deficiency in question and may not reduce the Union’s financial contribution in respect of expenditure, operations or final recipients not affected by that irregularity, non-compliance or deficiency. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Before taking a decision on a financial correction, the Commission shall inform the Member State of its conclusions and give the Member State the opportunity to present, within two months, its observations on the Commission’s assessment. The deadline may be extended if mutually agreed. The Commission shall take into account all relevant information and observations provided by the Member State before taking a decision on the application of the financial correction. | 3. Before taking a decision on a financial correction, the Commission shall inform the Member State of its conclusions and give the Member State the opportunity to present, within two months, its observations on the Commission’s assessment. The deadline may be extended if mutually agreed. The Commission shall take into account all relevant information and observations provided by the Member State before taking a decision on the application of the financial correction. Where a Member State agrees to the financial correction as proposed by the Commission before the adoption of the decision referred to in this paragraph, the Member State may reuse the amounts concerned. |
Setting out the financial corrections exclusively as net corrections is disproportionate. To ensure the proportionality needed, the text should be amended in a way similar to the settings in the current CPR enabling the Member State to reuse the Union financial contribution to be reduced when it agrees to the proposed financial correction.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Before taking a decision on a financial correction, the Commission shall inform the Member State of its conclusions and give the Member State the opportunity to present, within two months, its observations on the Commission’s assessment. The deadline may be extended if mutually agreed. The Commission shall take into account all relevant information and observations provided by the Member State before taking a decision on the application of the financial correction. | 3. Before taking a decision on a financial correction, the Commission shall inform the Member State of its conclusions and give the Member State the opportunity to present, within two months, its observations on the Commission’s assessment. The Commission shall take into account all relevant information and observations provided by the Member State before taking a decision on the application of the financial correction. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) Where the Member State does not accept the conclusions of the Commission, the Member State shall be invited to a hearing by the Commission, in order to ensure that all relevant information and comments are available for Commission conclusions on the application of the financial correction. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (2) Taking into account the extent, the frequency and financial implications of the irregularities or serious deficiencies, the Commission shall take a decision on a financial correction, by means of an implementing act within 5 months of the date of the hearing or of the submission of additional information as required by the Commission. When taking a decision on a financial correction, the Commission shall take into account all information and observations submitted. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3a. Where the Member State does not accept the conclusions of the Commission, the Member State shall be invited to a hearing by the Commission, in order to ensure that all relevant information and comments are available for Commission's conclusions on the application of the financial correction. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3a. Where the Member State does not accept the conclusions of the Commission, the Member State shall be invited to a hearing by the Commission, in order to ensure that all relevant information and comments are available for Commission conclusions on the application of the financial correction. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3a) Where the Member State does not accept the conclusions of the Commission, it shall be invited to a hearing by the Commission, in order to ensure that all relevant information and observations are available for the purpose of drawing Commission conclusions on the application of the financial correction. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (3b) The Commission shall decide on the application of a financial correction taking into account the extent, the frequency and financial implications of the irregularities or serious deficiencies, by means of an implementing act within five months of the date of the hearing or of the submission of additional information as required by the Commission. When deciding on a financial correction, the Commission shall take account of all information and observations submitted. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3b. Taking into account the extent, the frequency and financial implications of the irregularities or serious deficiencies, the Commission shall take a decision on a financial correction, by means of an implementing act within 5 months of the date of the hearing or of the submission of additional information as required by the Commission. When taking a decision on a financial correction, the Commission shall take into account all information and observations submitted. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3b. Taking into account the extent, the frequency and financial implications of the irregularities or serious deficiencies, the Commission shall take a decision on a financial correction, by means of an implementing act within 5 months of the date of the hearing or of the submission of additional information as required by the Commission. When taking a decision on a financial correction, the Commission shall take into account all information and observations submitted. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State or serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State or serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. Member State may reuse the amounts concerned where Member State agrees to the financial correction for cases referred to in Article 68(1)(a), (c), (d) and (e) before the adoption of the decision referred to in the third paragraph. The amounts shall not be reuses for the same operation or the same type of operations concerned by that intended financial correction. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State or serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State if the materiality threshold of 5 % has been exceeded, or in cases involving serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State or serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State if the materiality threshold of 5 % has been exceeded, or in cases involving serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State or serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State or serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State within a period of two years from the date on which the Commission formally notified the Member State of the identified shortcomings. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State or serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State or serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. | 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and 3, the Commission shall reduce proportionately the support and recover any amount due to the Union budget in all cases affecting the financial interests of the Union or the achievement of milestones and targets that have not been corrected by the Member State or serious non-compliance with the key requirements mentioned in Annex IV [key requirements], or with the obligations laid down in Article 58 [Responsibilities of Member States] that was not corrected by the Member State by the submission of assurance package in the final accounting year. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (1) The support from the Fund cancelled for the measures affected by the financial corrections may be reused by the Member State within the chapter concerned except for a measure that was subject of that correction or, where a financial correction is made for a systemic irregularity, for any measure affected by the systemic irregularity. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4a. The support from the Fund cancelled for the measures affected by the financial corrections may be reused by the Members States within the chapter concerned except for a measure that was subject of that correction or, where a financial correction is made for a systemic irregularity, for any measure affected by the systemic irregularity. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4a. The support from the Fund cancelled for the measures affected by the financial corrections may be reused by the Member State within the chapter concerned except for a measure that was subject of that correction or, where a financial correction is made for a systemic irregularity, for any measure affected by the systemic irregularity. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. Where following the amendment of a plan, a measure for which amounts were disbursed for completed milestones or targets, is removed, amounts previously disbursed shall be recovered without reducing the Union financial contribution and reprogrammed towards other measures. | 5. Where following the amendment of a plan, a measure for which amounts were disbursed for completed milestones or targets, is removed, amounts previously disbursed shall be recovered without reducing the Union financial contribution and reprogrammed towards other measures. This paragraph shall only apply to amendments which were requested by the Member State. |
This provision is rather disproportional. For this reason, the text should be amended so that this rule shall only apply to situations where changes to the NRP Plan were initiated by the Member State itself, but not, for example, by the EC.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. Where following the amendment of a Plan, a measure for which amounts were disbursed for completed milestones or targets, is removed, amounts previously disbursed shall be recovered without reducing the Union financial contribution and reprogrammed towards other measures. | 5. Where following the amendment of a Plan, a measure for which eligible expenditure was declared and paid is removed, amounts previously paid may only be recovered if the expenditure in question is irregular or ineligible or does not comply with the applicable rules The amounts recovered should be reprogrammed towards other measures under the Plan. |
Mireia Borrás Pabón, Raffaele Stancanelli, Gilles Pennelle, Valérie Deloge, Tomáš Kubín, Marie Dauchy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5a. The support from the Fund cancelled may be reused by the Member State within the chapter concerned except for a measure that was subject of that correction or, where a financial correction is made for a systemic irregularity, for any measure affected by the systemic irregularity. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the decisions pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 4 without undue delay. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Member State shall ensure that the fulfilment of any of the relevant milestones and targets remains ensured for at least five years after the date of the Commission payment corresponding to the achievement of the milestone or target. | 1. The Member State shall ensure that the fulfilment of any of the relevant milestones and targets remains ensured for at least five years after the date of the Commission payment corresponding to the achievement of the milestone or target. Where obligations relating to the durability of milestones and targets are imposed on beneficiaries, the applicable retention period shall be linked to a date or event that is objective, verifiable and known to the beneficiary, and shall be clearly specified in the document setting out the conditions for support. Beneficiaries shall not be held responsible for compliance with obligations linked to Commission payment dates that are not communicated to them. |
The proposal does not sufficiently clarify how the obligation to maintain the fulfilment of milestones and targets for at least five years after the Commission payment should be transferred to beneficiary level. In practice, beneficiaries are neither responsible for nor aware of the Commission payment triggering the beginning of this period. Without further clarification, Member States may face significant legal and administrative difficulties when defining support conditions and enforcing durability requirements.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Member State shall ensure that the fulfilment of any of the relevant milestones and targets remains ensured for at least five years after the date of the Commission payment corresponding to the achievement of the milestone or target. | 1. The Member State shall ensure that operations receiving support from the Fund continue to have the same purpose, nature and conditions of implementation for at least five years after the final payment to the beneficiary or for the period laid down in the applicable State aid rules, whichever is applicable. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Member State shall ensure that the fulfilment of any of the relevant milestones and targets remains ensured for at least five years after the date of the Commission payment corresponding to the achievement of the milestone or target. | 1. The Member State shall ensure that the fulfilment of any of the relevant milestones and targets remains ensured for at least five years or the limit established in State-aid rules after the date of the Commission payment corresponding to the achievement of the milestone or target. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The Member State shall ensure that the fulfilment of any of the relevant milestones and targets remains ensured for at least five years after the date of the Commission payment corresponding to the achievement of the milestone or target. | 1. The Member State shall ensure that the fulfilment of any of the relevant milestones and targets remains ensured for at least 10 years after the date of the Commission payment corresponding to the achievement of the milestone or target. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. For investments involving the construction, renovation or purchase of buildings or built structures, the Member States shall ensure that it continues to be aligned with the objectives as set out in this Regulation for at least 10 years after the final payment by the Commission. During that period, the investment shall not be substantially modified in such a way that it would result in undue private benefit or misuse and undermine the objectives for which the Union support was provided. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. For infrastructure investments, the Member State shall ensure that the investment continues to be aligned with the policy objectives of this Regulation for a minimum period of 20 years following the date of the final Union payment. During that period, the investment shall not undergo substantial modification which would result in undue private benefit and undermining the objectives for which the support was granted. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. The Member State may reduce the period stipulated in paragraph 1 to three years in cases involving the maintenance of investments by SMEs or the preservation of jobs created by SMEs. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. The Member State may reduce the period stipulated in paragraph 1 to a period of up to three years in cases involving the maintenance of investments by SMEs or the preservation of jobs created by SMEs. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1a. The Member State may reduce the period stipulated in paragraph 1 to three years in cases involving the maintenance of investments by SMEs or the preservation of jobs created by SMEs. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1(a) Paragraph 1 shall apply, in particular, to operations involving investment in infrastructure or production investment. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Where the Commission considers that the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 have not been respected, or where the Member State informs about the reversal in the assurance package, the Commission shall follow the procedures referred to in Articles 66, 67, 68 [interruption, suspension of payments, correction]. | 2. Where the Commission considers that the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 and 1a have not been respected, or where the Member State informs about the reversal in the assurance package, the Commission shall follow the procedures referred to in Articles 66, 67, 68 [interruption, suspension of payments, correction]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Where the Commission considers that the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 have not been respected, or where the Member State informs about the reversal in the assurance package, the Commission shall follow the procedures referred to in Articles 66, 67, 68 [interruption, suspension of payments, correction]. | 2. Where an operation undergoes a substantial change that affects its nature, its objectives or the conditions of its implementation, or that confers an undue advantage on an undertaking or a public body, the Commission may follow the procedures referred to in Articles 66, 67 and 68. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. | 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments, which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investment to or by financial instruments or to cases of non-fraudulent bankruptcy of the beneficiary. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. | 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to reforms, financial instruments, output-interventions, or non-infrastructural investments under Home Affairs funds (migration, border, security) and investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. |
The application of durability requirements to reforms should be reconsidered in light of evolving economic and geopolitical circumstances, which may require legislative adaptation over time. A five-year reversibility period risks creating unnecessary administrative burdens and disproportionate financial consequences. Alternatively, a broader exemption should be introduced for non-infrastructure investments, including actions financed under Home Affairs funds, given their specific nature and target groups.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. | 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to reforms, financial instruments, output-interventions, investments under Home Affairs funds (migration, border, security) investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. | 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under home affairs funds (migration, borders and security) and under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. | 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan, nor to Plan contributions to or by financial instruments or budgetary guarantees. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. | 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, on social measures with the exception of Regulation XX [Climate Social Fund] which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. | 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under Home Affairs funds (migration, border, security) and under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. |
Due to the specificity of the investments and target groups (migrants, victims of crimes etc), supporting social and integration services, the exemption should apply to Home Affairs funds equally.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. | 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments, which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. |
Norbert Lins, Marion Walsmann, Stefan Köhler, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Herbert Dorfmann, Paulo do Nascimento Cabral, Daniel Buda, Lena Düpont, Céline Imart
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. | 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments, which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to investments under the specific objectives laid down in Article 3, point (c), which are not investments in infrastructure unless they are subject to an obligation of maintenance of investment under State aid rules or where such obligation of maintenance is set out in the Plan. | 3. Paragraphs 1 to 3 shall not apply to operations that, by their nature, are not subject to a durability requirement, in particular intangible measures, operational support, direct income support or other interventions without a long-term investment component, unless such a requirement is laid down in the applicable State aid rules or in the decision approving the Plan. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Operations supporting relocation shall not be eligible. | 4. Operations supporting relocation shall not be eligible for the purposes of Article 2(61a) of Regulation (EU) No 651/2014, regardless of the applicability of the State aid rules. |
Given that there is no separate article on relocation and that the concept of relocation is not defined in Article 4, while in the AMIF Regulation, the term ‘relocation’ has a specific meaning (‘relocation under Articles 67 and 68 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351’, Article 6), a more precise wording is needed to prevent any misunderstandings.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Operations supporting relocation shall not be eligible. | 4. Operations supporting relocation shall not be eligible within the meaning of point (61a) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 651/2014, irrespective of the incidence of the State aid rules. |
Taking into account there is no distinct article on the relocation and the relocation is not defined in art. 4, while relocation has a different meaning in AMI Regulation “relocation accordance with Articles 67 and 68 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 (art. 6)“, we suggest to be specific to avoid misunderstanding, especially in an article dealing with durability and reversal.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Operations supporting relocation shall not be eligible. | 4. Operations supporting relocation shall not be eligible within the meaning of point (61a) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 651/2014, irrespective of the incidence of the State aid rules. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4a. 5. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to output-based interventions and reforms where changes are required to adapt the reform due to the unforeseen circumstances. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4a. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to output-based interventions and reforms where changes are required to adapt the reform due to the unforeseen circumstances. |
It is very important that durability exceptions should be applicable to the reforms as unforeseen circumstances may heavily influence the need for changes.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| an | deleted |
| class="highlight-diff">[...] |
Mireia Borrás Pabón, Raffaele Stancanelli, Gilles Pennelle, Valérie Deloge, Csaba Dömötör, Tomáš Kubín, Marie Dauchy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| an | deleted |
| class="highlight-diff">[...] |
As a result of the COP endorsement on 23 April 2026 to transfer certain provisions from the National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPP) Regulation to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Regulation, to the Common Market Organisation (CMO) Regulation and to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) Regulation
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| an | deleted |
| class="highlight-diff">[...] |
As a result of the COP endorsement on 23 April 2026 to transfer certain provisions from the National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPP) Regulation to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Regulation, to the Common Market Organisation (CMO) Regulation and to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) Regulation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| an | deleted |
| class="highlight-diff">[...] |
Transfer of provisions from the National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPP) Regulation to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) based on the letter from Commission President von der Leyen dated 9 November 2025.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| an | deleted |
| class="highlight-diff">[...] |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| [...] | deleted |
As a result of the COP endorsement on 23 April 2026 to transfer certain provisions from the National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPP) Regulation to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Regulation, to the Common Market Organisation (CMO) Regulation and to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) Regulation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| [...] | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Each Member State shall set up and operate an integrated administration and control system (the ‘integrated system’). It shall apply to the interventions listed in Article 35(1), points (a) to (g). | 1. Each Member State shall set up and operate an integrated administration and control system (the ‘integrated system’). It shall apply to the interventions listed in Article 35(1), points (a) to (g) , including for forest related measures, such as investments in forestry and forest-environmental climate measures, where implemented as part of the Plan. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2(a) 3. The content and specific provisions of the IACS shall be defined in the [CAP Regulation]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) an agriculture monitoring system (AMS). The AMS is a procedure of regular and systematic observation, tracking and assessment of agricultural activities and practices by technological means, including Copernicus Sentinels satellite data; | (a) an agriculture monitoring system (AMS). The AMS is a procedure of regular and systematic observation, tracking, in situ monitoring and assessment of agricultural activities and practices and impacts, including those on agrobiodiversity and those associated with exceptional circumstances, and to enable the assessment of the resilience of agricultural systems by technological means, including Copernicus Sentinels satellite data; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (aa) a forest monitoring system (FMS). The FMS is a procedure of regular and systematic observation, tracking, in situ monitoring system and assessment of forest-related activities and practices and impacts, included on forest biodiversity and those associated with exceptional circumstances, and to enable the assessment of the resilience of forest systems by technological means, including Copernicus Sentinels satellite data; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3a. The use of automated monitoring systems shall not in itself constitute sufficient grounds for the reduction, suspension or recovery of payments. |
In particular farmers should not be subject to financial penalties solely on the basis of automated monitoring systems without adequate procedural safeguards and the possibility of human review.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. The Commission shall supply the satellite data, required for the agriculture monitoring system, free of charge to the authorities competent for the agriculture monitoring system or to suppliers of services authorised by those authorities to represent them. For the purpose of the quality assessment of the integrated system referred to in paragraph 4, the Commission shall provide them, free of charge, the necessary Very High Resolution imagery. The Commission shall remain the owner of the satellite data and imagery. | 5. The Commission shall supply the satellite data, required for the agriculture, and where applicable, forest monitoring system, free of charge to the authorities competent for the monitoring system or to suppliers of services authorised by those authorities to represent them. For the purpose of the quality assessment of the integrated system referred to in paragraph 4, the Commission shall provide them, free of charge, the necessary Very High Resolution imagery. The Commission shall remain the owner of the satellite data and imagery. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (i) AMS; | (i) AMS and FMS; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States may include in their Plans support to existing or newly created financial instruments implemented directly by, or under the responsibility of, the managing authority. | 1. 1. Member States may include in their Plans support to existing or newly created financial instruments implemented directly by, or under the responsibility of, the managing authority. |
| Financial instruments shall provide support to final recipients only for investments in both tangible and intangible assets as well as working capital expected to be financially viable and which do not find sufficient funding from market sources. Such support shall be in compliance with applicable Union State aid rules. Such support shall be provided only for the elements of the investments which are not physically completed or fully implemented at the date of the investment decision. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States may include in their Plans support to existing or newly created financial instruments implemented directly by, or under the responsibility of, the managing authority. | 1. Member States shall include in their Plans support to existing or newly created financial instruments implemented directly by, or under the responsibility of, the managing authority. Such financial instruments may continue across consecutive programming periods, and may remain in operation beyond the 2028–2034 programming period, subject to applicable rules. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States may include in their Plans support to existing or newly created financial instruments implemented directly by, or under the responsibility of, the managing authority. | 1. Member States may include in their Plans support to existing or newly created financial instruments, which contribute to achieving specific objectives, implemented directly by, or under the responsibility of, the managing authority. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified with regard to the corresponding market needs and their capacity to de-risk and leverage private capital. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. | 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified with regard to the corresponding market needs and their capacity to de-risk and leverage private and other capital in line with the Commission guidance on financial efficiency first principle. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. |
| The use of financial instruments, including any possible combination with grant support, shall be specified at the level of the submission of the NRP Plan. Such justification and the associated costing shall be limited to a description of the identified market failure and/or the benefit that is expected to be achieved compared with the use of simple grants. | |
| National promotional banks and publicly-owned banks or financial institutions shall be involved from the outset of the preparation of the Plan as referred in Article 21 to ensure that financial instruments are effectively tailored to market needs and maximise their impact. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified with regard to the corresponding market needs and their capacity to de-risk and leverage private capital. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. | 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified, in the respective NRP-plan and in the Interreg plan, with regard to the corresponding market needs and their capacity to de-risk and leverage private capital. Financial instruments shall be designed to complement the market and shall not result in undue or inappropriate market distortions. Such support shall comply with the Union’s State aid rules or be provided on a non discriminatory commercial terms. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified with regard to the corresponding market needs and their capacity to de-risk and leverage private capital. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. | 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified with regard to: |
| (a) the proposed contribution from the Fund to a financial instrument and the estimated leverage effect; | |
| (b) the proposed financial products to be offered, including the possible need for differentiated treatment of investors; | |
| (c) the proposed target group of recipients. | |
| The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified with regard to the corresponding market needs and their capacity to de-risk and leverage private capital. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. | 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified with regard to the corresponding market needs and their capacity to de-risk and leverage private capital. Any financial instrument shall comply with the Unions rules for State Aid, and not create any inappropriate market distortions. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified with regard to the corresponding market needs and their capacity to de-risk and leverage private capital. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. | 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified with regard to the corresponding market needs and their capacity to de-risk and leverage private capital and other capital in line with the financial efficiency first principle. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified with regard to the corresponding market needs and their capacity to de-risk and leverage private capital. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established in accordance with paragraph 11. | 2. The use of financial instruments and their possible combination with grant support shall be justified only at the level of the NRPP. The justification and the costing shall be restricted to identifying market failures |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. Management fees shall be performance based. | deleted |
| Where bodies implementing a holding fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 5% for any other financial products. | |
| Where bodies implementing a specific fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 15% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for any other financial products. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Management fees shall be performance based. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where bodies implementing a holding fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 5% for any other financial products. | Where bodies implementing a holding fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 5% for any other financial products. These ceilings can be increased by up to 1 percentage point in case of financial instrument aimed at providing microfinance. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where bodies implementing a holding fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 5% for any other financial products. | Where bodies implementing a holding fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 5% for any other financial products, including, where applicable, fees paid to financial intermediaries. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where bodies implementing a holding fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 5% for any other financial products. | Where bodies implementing a holding fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 5% for any other financial products including, where applicable, fees paid to financial intermediaries. |
Clarification is needed as regards the scope of the management fee ceilings, as it should be expressly stated in the legal text that these percentages apply to the entire funding agreement, including management fees paid to intermediate bodies, where is the case.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where bodies implementing a specific fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 15% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for any other financial products. | Where bodies implementing a specific fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 15% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for any other financial products. |
| The Commission shall ensure that the European Parliament, in particular, the Committee on Budgets as well as the Committee on Budgetary Control, is granted full, timely and machine-readable access to all aggregated and underlying implementation data related to financial instruments under this Regulation, including data on allocations, disbursements, financial intermediaries, final recipients, and performance indicators. | |
| The Commission shall provide structured reporting on the implementation of financial instruments on an annual basis, including information on: (a) the use of Union support; (b) the financial leverage achieved; (c) the administrative costs and management fees incurred at all implementation levels; (d) any identified irregularities, weaknesses in control systems, or cases of fraud or suspected fraud. | |
| The Commission shall ensure that such reporting is sufficiently detailed to allow effective budgetary scrutiny by the European Parliament and shall make all relevant datasets available through the centralised transparency platform established under Article 12 [Single Gateway] of the Performance Regulation. The Commission shall submit an annual synthesis report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and performance of financial instruments, including a comparative overview of management fees charged by implementing bodies, intermediaries, and financial institutions. | |
| Where management fees or administrative costs under financial instruments show a material increase compared to previous reporting periods or comparable instruments, the Commission shall carry out a review of cost structures and shall report its findings, including any corrective measures envisaged, to the European Parliament and the Council without delay. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where bodies implementing a specific fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 15% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for any other financial products. | Where bodies implementing a specific fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 15% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for any other financial products. |
| Where bodies implementing a holding fund or specific funds, or both, are selected through a competitive tender in accordance with the applicable law, the amount of management costs and fees shall be established in the funding agreement and shall reflect the result of the competitive tender. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where bodies implementing a specific fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 15% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for any other financial products. | Where bodies implementing a specific fund are selected through a direct award of contract the amount of management fees shall be subject to a ceiling of up to 15% of the financial contribution of the Plan for equity or quasi-equity products and up to 7% of the financial contribution of the Plan for any other financial products including, where applicable, fees paid to financial intermediaires. |
Clarification is needed as regards the scope of the management fee ceilings, as it should be expressly stated in the legal text that these percentages apply to the entire funding agreement, including management fees paid to intermediate bodies, where is the case.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Where bodies implementing a holding fund or specific funds, or both, are selected through a competitive tender in accordance with the applicable law, the amount of management costs and fees shall be established in the funding agreement and shall reflect the result of the competitive tender. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) international financial institutions in which a Member State is shareholder | (b) multilateral financial institutions in which a Member State is shareholder |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) a publicly-owned bank or institution, established as a legal entity carrying out financial activities on a professional basis, which fulfils all of the following conditions: | deleted |
| (i) there is no direct private capital participation, with the exception of non-controlling and non-blocking forms of private capital participation required by national legislative provisions, in conformity with the Treaties, which do not exert a decisive influence on the relevant bank or institution, and with the exception of forms of private capital participation which confer no influence on decisions regarding the day-to-day management of the financial instrument supported by the Funds; | |
| (ii) it operates under a public policy mandate given by the relevant authority of a Member State at national or regional level, which includes carrying out, as all or part of its activities, economic development activities contributing to the objectives of the Funds; | |
| (iii) it carries out, as all or part of its activities, economic development activities contributing to the objectives of the Funds in regions, policy areas or sectors for which access to funding from market sources is not generally available or sufficient; | |
| (iv) it operates without primarily focusing on maximising profits, but ensures a long-term financial sustainability for its activities; | |
| (v) it ensures that the direct award of a contract referred to in paragraph 4 does not provide any direct or indirect benefit for commercial activities by way of appropriate measures in accordance with applicable law; | |
| (vi) it is subject to the supervision of an independent authority in accordance with applicable law, |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (iv) it operates without primarily focusing on maximising profits, but ensures a long-term financial sustainability for its activities; | (iv) it operates without primarily focusing on maximising profits, but ensures a long-term financial sustainability for its activities, and respects labour, and trade union rights, as well as collective agreements; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ca) pillar assessed public entities; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 6. Financial instruments may be combined with the support in the form of grants in a single financial instrument operation in a single funding agreement, where both distinct forms of support shall be provided by the body implementing the financial instrument. In such a case, the rules applicable to financial instruments shall apply to that single financial instrument operation. The support in the form of grants shall be directly linked and necessary for the financial instrument and shall not exceed the value of the investments supported by the financial product. Separate records shall be kept for each type of support. | 6. Financial instruments may be combined with the support in the form of grants in a single financial instrument operation in a single funding agreement, where both distinct forms of support shall be provided by the body implementing the financial instrument. In such a case, the rules applicable to financial instruments shall apply to that single financial instrument operation. The support in the form of grants shall be directly linked and necessary for the financial instrument and shall not exceed the value of the investments supported by the financial product. Separate records shall be kept for each type of support. Provided that the grant addresses the same purpose as an underlying financing by bodies mentioned in Article 71(15)(a) to (c)), including under another EU-funded mandate, authorities, including managing authorities, shall be able to directly award grants to the final beneficiary of the relevant financing by those bodies, whether this financing is provided directly or indirectly through financial intermediaries. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been provided to final recipients. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been provided to final recipients. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been provided to final recipients. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been provided to final recipients. | 7. As the first milestone in the case of measures implemented as a financial instrument, up to 30 % of the total contributions from the Fund committed for the financial instruments may be requested for the conclusion of the funding agreement. |
| Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been provided to final recipients. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been provided to final recipients. | 7. For the first milestone in the case of measures implemented as a financial instrument, up to 30 % of the total contributions from the Fund committed for the financial instruments may be requested for the conclusion of the funding agreement. Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been provided to final recipients. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been provided to final recipients. | 7. Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been promised to final recipients. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been provided to final recipients. | 7. Final milestones and targets in measures implemented as financial instruments shall require the support to have been provided to the instrument. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 8. For activities falling within the scope of Article 42 TFEU, the total amount of support for working capital provided to a final recipient shall not exceed a gross grant equivalent of EUR 300 000 over any period of three fiscal years. The same ceiling shall apply for the maximum amount of aid provided through financial instruments to a given project by young farmer, including for setting-up. | 8. For activities falling within the scope of Article 42 TFEU, the total amount of support for working capital provided to a recipient shall not exceed a gross grant equivalent of EUR 300 000 over any period of three fiscal years. The same ceiling shall apply for the maximum amount of aid provided through financial instruments to a given project by young farmer, including for setting-up. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 10. Support from the Funds paid to financial instruments shall be placed in accounts in financial institutions domiciled within Member States and shall be managed in line with active treasury management and the principles of sound financial management. Interest and other gains attributable to support from the Fund paid to financial instruments shall be used for the same objective, as the initial support from the Funds, including for the payments of management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument either within the same financial instrument; or, following the winding up of the financial instrument, in other financial instruments or other forms of support for further investments in final recipients, until the end of the eligibility period. Any interest and other gains not used in accordance with the previous sentence shall be deducted from the overall support. | 10. Support from the Funds paid to financial instruments shall be placed in accounts in financial institutions domiciled within Member States and shall be managed in line with active treasury management and the principles of sound financial management. Interest and other gains attributable to support from the Fund paid to financial instruments shall be used for the same objective, as the initial support from the Funds, including for the payments of management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument either within the same financial instrument, other financial instruments or other forms of support for further investments in final recipients, until the end of the eligibility period. Any interest and other gains not used in accordance with the previous sentence shall be deducted from the overall support. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 10. Support from the Funds paid to financial instruments shall be placed in accounts in financial institutions domiciled within Member States and shall be managed in line with active treasury management and the principles of sound financial management. Interest and other gains attributable to support from the Fund paid to financial instruments shall be used for the same objective, as the initial support from the Funds, including for the payments of management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument either within the same financial instrument; or, following the winding up of the financial instrument, in other financial instruments or other forms of support for further investments in final recipients, until the end of the eligibility period. Any interest and other gains not used in accordance with the previous sentence shall be deducted from the overall support. | 10. Support from the Funds paid to financial instruments shall be placed in accounts in financial institutions domiciled within Member States and shall be managed in line with active treasury management and the principles of sound financial management. Interest and other gains attributable to support from the Fund paid to financial instruments shall be used for the same objective, as the initial support from the Funds, including for the payments of management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument either within the same financial instrument; or, following the winding up of the financial instrument, in other financial instruments or other forms of support for further investments in final recipients, until the end of the eligibility period. Any interest and other gains not used in accordance with the previous sentence shall be reused in accordance with paragraph 22. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 10. Support from the Funds paid to financial instruments shall be placed in accounts in financial institutions domiciled within Member States and shall be managed in line with active treasury management and the principles of sound financial management. Interest and other gains attributable to support from the Fund paid to financial instruments shall be used for the same objective, as the initial support from the Funds, including for the payments of management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument either within the same financial instrument; or, following the winding up of the financial instrument, in other financial instruments or other forms of support for further investments in final recipients, until the end of the eligibility period. Any interest and other gains not used in accordance with the previous sentence shall be deducted from the overall support. | 10. Support from the Funds paid to financial instruments shall be placed in accounts in financial institutions domiciled within Member States and shall be managed in line with active treasury management and the principles of sound financial management. Interest and other gains attributable to support from the Fund paid to financial instruments shall be used for the same objective, as the initial support from the Funds, including for the payments of management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument either within the same financial instrument; or, following the winding up of the financial instrument, in other financial instruments or other forms of support for further investments in recipients, until the end of the eligibility period. Any interest and other gains not used in accordance with the previous sentence shall be deducted from the overall support. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 11. The estimated costs of a financial instrument shall be established on the basis of the targeted volume of the proposed financial products and the corresponding management fees. The following categories may also be included as part of the estimated costs of financial instruments: | deleted |
| (a) payments to final recipients, in the case of loans, equity and quasi-equity investments; | |
| (b) resources set aside for guarantee contracts, whether outstanding or having already come to maturity, in order to honour possible guarantee calls for losses, calculated on the basis of a multiplier ratio established for the respective underlying disbursed new loans or equity investments in final recipients; | |
| (c) payments to, or for the benefit of, final recipients where financial instruments are combined in a single financial instrument operation in accordance with paragraph 5 of this article. | |
| (d) management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument. | |
| (e) Arrangement fees, or any part thereof, charged to final recipients, shall not be included in the estimated costs. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) payments to final recipients, in the case of loans, equity and quasi-equity investments; | (a) payments to recipients, in the case of loans, equity and quasi-equity investments; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) resources set aside for guarantee contracts, whether outstanding or having already come to maturity, in order to honour possible guarantee calls for losses, calculated on the basis of a multiplier ratio established for the respective underlying disbursed new loans or equity investments in final recipients; | (b) resources set aside for guarantee contracts, whether outstanding or having already come to maturity, in order to honour possible guarantee calls for losses, calculated on the basis of a multiplier ratio established for the respective underlying disbursed new loans or equity investments in recipients; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) payments to, or for the benefit of, final recipients where financial instruments are combined in a single financial instrument operation in accordance with paragraph 5 of this article. | (c) payments to, or for the benefit of, recipients where financial instruments are combined in a single financial instrument operation in accordance with paragraph 5 of this article. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument. | (d) management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument, including costs arising from exchange rate differences related to financial products or financial agreements, as well as amounts and costs related to recovery procedures, if the case. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument. | (d) management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument, including costs arising from exchange rate differences related to financial products or financial agreements, as well as amounts and costs related to recovery procedures. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument. | (d) management costs and/or fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) management fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument. | (d) management costs or fees incurred by the bodies implementing the financial instrument. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) Arrangement fees, or any part thereof, charged to final recipients, shall not be included in the estimated costs. | (e) Arrangement fees, or any part thereof, charged to final recipients. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) Arrangement fees, or any part thereof, charged to final recipients, shall not be included in the estimated costs. | (e) Arrangement fees, or any part thereof, charged to recipients, shall not be included in the estimated costs. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Resources paid back, before the end of the eligibility period, to financial instruments from investments in final recipients or from the release of resources set aside for guarantee contracts, including capital repayments and any type of generated income that is attributable to the support from the Fund, shall be re-used in the same or other financial instruments for further investments in final recipients to cover the losses in the nominal amount of the Fund contribution to the financial instrument resulting from negative interest, if such losses occur despite active treasury management, or for any management fees associated to such further investments, taking into account the principle of sound financial management. | Resources paid back, before the end of the eligibility period, to financial instruments from investments in final recipients or from the release of resources set aside for guarantee contracts, including capital repayments and any type of generated income that is attributable to the support from the Fund, shall be re-used in the same or other financial instruments for further investments in final recipients to cover the losses in the nominal amount of the Fund contribution to the financial instrument resulting from negative interest, if such losses occur despite active treasury management, or for any management costs or fees associated to such further investments, taking into account the principle of sound financial management. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Resources paid back, before the end of the eligibility period, to financial instruments from investments in final recipients or from the release of resources set aside for guarantee contracts, including capital repayments and any type of generated income that is attributable to the support from the Fund, shall be re-used in the same or other financial instruments for further investments in final recipients to cover the losses in the nominal amount of the Fund contribution to the financial instrument resulting from negative interest, if such losses occur despite active treasury management, or for any management fees associated to such further investments, taking into account the principle of sound financial management. | Resources paid back, before the end of the eligibility period, to financial instruments from investments in recipients or from the release of resources set aside for guarantee contracts, including capital repayments and any type of generated income that is attributable to the support from the Fund, shall be re-used in the same or other financial instruments for further investments in recipients to cover the losses in the nominal amount of the Fund contribution to the financial instrument resulting from negative interest, if such losses occur despite active treasury management, or for any management costs or fees associated to such further investments, taking into account the principle of sound financial management. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that during a period of eight years after the end of the eligibility period the resources returned are re-used in accordance with the objectives of the Plan, either within the same or in other financial instruments or in other forms of support. | Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that during a period of eight years after the end of the eligibility period the resources returned are re-used in accordance with the objectives of the Plan, either within the same or in other financial instruments or in other forms of support. |
| Support from the Plan to financial instruments invested in final recipients and any type of income generated by those investments, including resources paid back, which are attributable to the support from the Plan, may be used for differentiated treatment of investors operating under the market economy principle through an appropriate sharing of risks and profits, taking into account the principle of sound financial management. The level of such differentiated treatment shall not exceed that which is necessary to create incentives for attracting private resources, established either by a competitive process or an independent assessment. National co-financing of a Plan may be provided either by the managing authority or at the level of holding funds, or at the level of specific funds, or at the level of investments in final recipient. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that during a period of eight years after the end of the eligibility period the resources returned are re-used in accordance with the objectives of the Plan, either within the same or in other financial instruments or in other forms of support. | Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that during a period of eight years after the end of the eligibility period the resources returned are re-used in accordance with the objectives of the Plan, either within the same or in other financial instruments or in other forms of support. To that end, Member States shall maintain a full audit trail of all resources disbursed through financial instruments, including loans, repayments and reinvestments, and shall report to the Commission annually on the reuse of returned resources and their alignment with the specific policy objectives of the relevant milestones and targets. The Commission shall verify compliance with this requirement prior to authorising subsequent payments. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that during a period of eight years after the end of the eligibility period the resources returned are re-used in accordance with the objectives of the Plan, either within the same or in other financial instruments or in other forms of support. | Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the resources returned are re-used in accordance with the objectives of the Plan, either within the same or in other financial instruments or in other forms of support. |
| For the purposes of calculating management fees, financial contributions disbursed to final recipients shall also include resources returned to and subsequently reinvested by the financial instrument in accordance with this Regulation. Management fees may cover the management of reinvested resources and legacy portfolios where such activities contribute to the continued achievement of the objectives of the financial instrument. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 12a. A contribution cancelled as a result of an individual irregularity, may be reused within the same operation of financial instrument under the following conditions: | |
| (a) where the irregularity that gives rise to the cancellation of the contribution is detected at the level of the final recipient, only for other final recipients within the same financial instrument; | |
| (b) where the irregularity that gives rise to the cancellation of the contribution is detected at the level of the body implementing the specific fund, where a financial instrument is implemented through a structure with a holding fund, only for other bodies implementing specific funds. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 12a. Amounts of the contribution cancelled in connection with irregularities detected at the level of final recipients and bodies implementing financial instruments may be re-used |
The lack of appropriate regulations will mean that any identified irregularities will automatically reduce the allocation available for use at the Plan level. It is proposed to introduce the possibility of reusing cancelled contributions resulting from irregularities detected at the level of final recipients and entities implementing financial instruments. This would allow for a more complete use of available funds without unjustified reductions in the Plan's allocation.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article 71a | |
| Consumer and Community Energy Investment Component and EU Renovation Loan | |
| 1. Member States shall include in their housing chapter financial instruments constituting the Consumer and Community Energy Investment Component ('CCEIC'). The CCEIC shall support investments contributing to the energy transition at consumer and local level by natural persons, small and medium-sized enterprises including micro-enterprises, energy communities, and local and regional authorities and entities acting on their behalf. | |
| 2. Member States shall ensure that financial instruments deployed under this paragraph are accessible through local and regional financial intermediaries and other retail distribution channels, and address market failures affecting such investments, including small investment sizes, fragmented demand, higher perceived risk and limited access to capital markets. | |
| 3. Financial instruments under the CCEIC shall support investments in one of the following: | |
| (a) energy renovation of residential and non-residential buildings, in accordance with Directive (EU) 2024/1275 and national building renovation plans, prioritising low-income homeowners; | |
| (b) distributed renewable energy generation, including solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, wind and renewable heating and cooling, as well as associated energy storage systems and related local energy infrastructure; | |
| (c) demand-side flexibility, smart energy management and electrification of energy uses, including electric vehicle charging infrastructure and solutions enabling consumers and energy communities to actively participate in energy markets; (d) integrated investments by energy communities across two or more of the components referred to in points (a) to (c). | |
| For point a , the Commission shall develop a dedicated EU Renovation Loan providing standardised, affordable renovation loans accessible through local and regional financial intermediaries, complementing grant support provided under the Plans and national programmes in accordance with Directive (EU) 2024/1275 and national building renovation plans which shall prioritise vulnerable consumers, energy poor and people living in social housing. | |
| 4. The Commission shall, in cooperation with the EIB Group and other implementing partners and in consultation with other national promotional banks and institutions and other relevant financial institutions develop standardized financial products for the CCEIC to ensure that it: | |
| (a) is tailored to the specific needs and risk profiles of each category of final recipient referred to in paragraph 1; | |
| (b) addresses market failures affecting such investments, including small investment sizes, fragmented demand, higher perceived risk and collective ownership structures; | |
| (c) supports mechanisms enabling the aggregation of small-scale investments into bankable portfolios; | |
| (d) ensures comparable access conditions and financing terms for final recipients across Member States. | |
| 6. Support under the CCEIC may take the form of loans, guarantees, counter-guarantees, equity and quasi-equity instruments, blended finance structures combining financial instruments with grant support, and other appropriate financial products. Member States shall ensure that CCEIC instruments are distributed through local financial intermediaries and other retail distribution channels accessible to final recipients. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The managing authority shall carry out on-the-spot management verifications in accordance with Article 51 [functions of the managing authority] only at the level of bodies implementing the financial instrument. The managing authority may rely on verifications carried out by external bodies and may not carry out on-the-spot management verifications, provided that it has sufficient evidence of the competence of these external bodies. In the context of guarantee funds, the managing authority may carry out on-the-spot management verifications at the level of the bodies providing support to final recipients if the evidence of functioning of the management and controls is not available at the level of the body implementing the financial instrument or of the managing authority. | 1. The managing authority shall carry out on-the-spot management verifications in accordance with Article 51 [functions of the managing authority] only at the level of bodies implementing the financial instrument. The managing authority may rely on verifications carried out by external bodies and may not carry out on-the-spot management verifications, provided that it has sufficient evidence of the competence of these external bodies. In the context of guarantee funds, the managing authority may carry out on-the-spot management verifications at the level of the bodies providing support to final recipients if the evidence of functioning of the management and controls is not available at the level of the body implementing the financial instrument or of the managing authority. The national audit authorities shall not impose requirements that go beyond those governing the equivalent national funding instruments. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. The managing authority shall carry out on-the-spot management verifications in accordance with Article 51 [functions of the managing authority] only at the level of bodies implementing the financial instrument. The managing authority may rely on verifications carried out by external bodies and may not carry out on-the-spot management verifications, provided that it has sufficient evidence of the competence of these external bodies. In the context of guarantee funds, the managing authority may carry out on-the-spot management verifications at the level of the bodies providing support to final recipients if the evidence of functioning of the management and controls is not available at the level of the body implementing the financial instrument or of the managing authority. | 1. The managing authority shall carry out management verifications, including on-the-spot checks, in accordance with Article 51 [functions of the managing authority] only at the level of bodies implementing the financial instrument. The managing authority may rely on verifications carried out by external bodies and may not carry out on-the-spot management verifications, provided that it has sufficient evidence of the competence of these external bodies. In the context of guarantee funds, the managing authority may carry out on-the-spot management verifications at the level of the bodies providing support to final recipients if the evidence of functioning of the management and controls is not available at the level of the body implementing the financial instrument or of the managing authority. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Managing authorities and audit authorities may rely on the results of the Pillar Assessment conducted in accordance with Article 157 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2059. | 3. Managing authorities and audit authorities shall rely on the results of the Pillar Assessment conducted in accordance with Article 157 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2059. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Managing authorities and audit authorities may rely on the results of the Pillar Assessment conducted in accordance with Article 157 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2059. | 3. Managing authorities and audit authorities should rely on the results of the Pillar Assessment conducted in accordance with Article 157 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2059. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3a. Managing and audit authorities shall carry out their functions at the level of final recipients. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 4. The managing authority shall not carry out on-the-spot management verifications at the level of the EIB group, other international financial institutions in which a Member State is a shareholder. | 4. The managing authority shall not carry out on-the-spot management verifications at the level of the EIB group, other international financial institutions in which a Member State is a shareholder and entities pillar assessed in accordance with Article 157 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2059. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5. The EIB group, other international financial institutions in which a Member State is a shareholder shall provide control reports supporting the payment claims to the managing authority. | 5. The EIB group, other international financial institutions in which a Member State is a shareholder shall provide control reports supporting the payment claims to the managing authority. The audit authority shall not carry out audits at the level of the EIB group or other international financial institutions in which a Member State is a shareholder, for financial instruments or grants implemented by them. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 5a. A simplified application of the performance framework will be used for financial instruments, including for the budgetary guarantees and financial instruments under the [ECF InvestEU Instrument], whereby the application of such rules should be proportionate, feasible and appropriate for such instruments. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7. System audits shall not be performed at the level of individual financial instrument operations. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 8. The audit trail shall be available at the level of the bodies implementing financial instruments or at the level of the bodies providing support to final recipients in the context of guarantee funds. | 8. The audit trail shall be available at the level of the bodies implementing financial instruments or at the level of the bodies providing support to final recipients in the context of guarantee funds. For the purposes of comparison of underlying costs with the respective ex ante costing for milestones and targets, this information shall be made available and shared with the European Commission in accordance with Article 53a. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. Managing authorities and audit authorities may rely on the results of the ex-ante pillar assessment carried out by the Commission in accordance with Article 157 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2059, taking into account supervisory measures referred to in the third paragraph of that Article. | 2. Managing authorities and audit authorities should rely on the results of the ex-ante pillar assessment carried out by the Commission in accordance with Article 157 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2059, taking into account supervisory measures referred to in the third paragraph of that Article. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 7a. Pillar-assessed entities shall provide ECA, managing and audit authorities with complete and timely access to relevant data and information. Managing and audit authorities shall carry out their functions at the level of final recipients and final recipients. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Article73a | |
| Targeted financial support for lawful owners affected by exceptional and long-standing disadvantages | |
| 1. In accordance with Protocol No 10 on Cyprus to the 2003 Act of Accession, the application of Union law is suspended in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. This exceptional situation resulting from the ongoing occupation of Türkiye has, for a prolonged period, caused lasting socio-economic disadvantages, affecting the ability of citizens of the Republic of Cyprus holding property titles legally recognised under the law of the Republic of Cyprus to access, use or derive economic benefit from land located in those areas. | |
| 2. Cyprus may include in its National and Regional Partnership Plan targeted measures providing financial support for persons who are citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and who hold property rights legally recognised under the law of the Republic of Cyprus, in respect of land situated in the areas referred to in paragraph 1. | |
| Targeted measures may include income support, support facilitating access to housing, including the acquisition, rental or renovation of a primary residence, or other targeted forms of assistance designed to mitigate the long-term economic and social consequences arising from the inability to access, use or derive benefit from such property. | |
| 3. Support under this Article shall be implemented in accordance with the applicable rules of the National and Regional Partnership Plans and relevant Union sectoral legislation. | |
| 4. In order to address the exceptional and long-standing disadvantages referred to in this Article, the Commission shall assess the need for a dedicated financial allocation, or other appropriate support mechanism within the framework of this Regulation. Such support shall be additional to the national allocation of the Member State concerned under its National and Regional Partnership Plan and shall aim to address the exceptional and enduring disadvantages referred to in this Article. | |
| 5. Nothing in this Article shall be construed as: | |
| (a) implying recognition of any authority, entity or person exercising effective control in the areas referred to in paragraph 1; | |
| (b) affecting the legal status of those areas under Union law as established by Protocol No 10 or conferring any rights or benefits upon such authority; | |
| 6. Measures under this Article shall be without prejudice to the rights of beneficiaries to seek redress under international law or before competent courts. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| Territorial and local cooperation initiatives | Territorial development and local cooperation initiatives |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States may establish, and provide support for cooperation in the following areas: | 1. Member States may establish, and provide support for territorial and local cooperation initiatives contributing to achieving one or more of the specific objectives laid down in Article 3 [specific objectives]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States may establish, and provide support for cooperation in the following areas: | 1. Member States may establish, and provide support in the following areas of territorial development: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 1. Member States may establish, and provide support for cooperation in the following areas: | 1. Member States shall establish, and provide support for cooperation in the following areas: |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) integrated territorial and urban development | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) integrated territorial and urban development | (a) integrated territorial and sustainable urban development, including through integrated territorial investments or other territorial tools; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) integrated territorial and urban development | (a) integrated territorial, urban and rural development |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (a) integrated territorial and urban development | (a) integrated territorial, urban and rural development |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (aa) integrated territorial and urban (including metropolitan) development; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) community-led local development, including LEADER, and other citizens-led initiatives; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (b) community-led local development, including LEADER, and other citizens-led initiatives; | (b) community-led local development, including LEADER, and other initiatives promoted by local communities, including those aimed at supporting access to primary care, prevention services, telemedicine, and the retention of healthcare personnel in rural areas and less developed regions; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (c) smart-village strategies, | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) projects of the EIP-AGRI operational groups referred to in Article 19(2) [EIP] of Regulation XX [CAP]; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) projects of the EIP-AGRI operational groups referred to in Article 19(2) [EIP] of Regulation XX [CAP]; | deleted |
Mireia Borrás Pabón, Raffaele Stancanelli, Gilles Pennelle, Valérie Deloge, Csaba Dömötör, Tomáš Kubín, Marie Dauchy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (d) projects of the EIP-AGRI operational groups referred to in Article 19(2) [EIP] of Regulation XX [CAP]; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) quality schemes recognised by the Union or by the Member States, and their use by farmers; | deleted |
Mireia Borrás Pabón, Raffaele Stancanelli, Gilles Pennelle, Valérie Deloge, Csaba Dömötör, Tomáš Kubín, Marie Dauchy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) quality schemes recognised by the Union or by the Member States, and their use by farmers; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) quality schemes recognised by the Union or by the Member States, and their use by farmers; | deleted |
Esther Herranz García, Eric Sargiacomo, Paulo do Nascimento Cabral, Gabriel Mato, Emmanouil Kefalogiannis
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) quality schemes recognised by the Union or by the Member States, and their use by farmers; | (e) promotion and support for quality schemes recognised by the Union or by the Member States, and their use by farmers; |
Esther Herranz García, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Elena Nevado del Campo, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Maravillas Abadía Jover
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (e) quality schemes recognised by the Union or by the Member States, and their use by farmers; | (e) promotion of quality schemes recognised by the Union or by the Member States, and their use by farmers; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) support producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) support producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations; | deleted |
Mireia Borrás Pabón, Raffaele Stancanelli, Gilles Pennelle, Valérie Deloge, Csaba Dömötör, Tomáš Kubín, Marie Dauchy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (f) support producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations; | deleted |
Mireia Borrás Pabón, Raffaele Stancanelli, Gilles Pennelle, Valérie Deloge, Csaba Dömötör, Tomáš Kubín, Marie Dauchy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (g) promote and support intergenerational cooperation, including farm succession; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (g) promote and support intergenerational cooperation, including farm succession; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (g) promote and support intergenerational cooperation, including farm succession; | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (g) promote and support intergenerational cooperation, including farm succession; | (g) promote and support, possibly through incentive programs, intergenerational cooperation, including farm succession; |
Preparing and planning ahead of a farm succession is a fundamental component of a successful renewal strategy. The NRPP's interventions should not be limited to promotional activities but should provide genuine incentives.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ga) promote and support local cooperation initiatives addressing demographic decline, rural population retention, family-friendly local services, young people’s ability to thrive locally and community-based social inclusion; |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (ga) biodistricts recognised under national or regional law and/or supported by national, regional or local authorities; |
Mireia Borrás Pabón, Raffaele Stancanelli, Gilles Pennelle, Valérie Deloge, Csaba Dömötör, Tomáš Kubín, Marie Dauchy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) support other forms of cooperation contributing to the specific objectives. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) support other forms of cooperation contributing to the specific objectives. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) support other forms of cooperation contributing to the specific objectives. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) support other forms of cooperation contributing to the specific objectives. | (h) support other forms of cooperation other than LEADER contributing to the specific objectives including biodistricts, community cooperatives and other community-based initiatives that integrate environmental and social objectives at territorial level, contributing to social inclusion and the right to stay. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) support other forms of cooperation contributing to the specific objectives. | (h) support other forms of cooperation contributing to the specific objectives, including cooperation involving microenterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, craft businesses, local value chains, sustainable tourism and rural services. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) support other forms of cooperation contributing to the specific objectives. | (h) support other forms of cooperation contributing to the specific objectives, including cooperation with local community, charitable, family-support and other public-benefit organisations operating in accordance with national law. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) support other forms of cooperation contributing to the specific objectives. | (h) support other forms of cooperation or instruments contributing to the specific objectives. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| (h) support other forms of cooperation contributing to the specific objectives. | (h) support other forms of cooperation or instruments contributing to the specific objectives. |
Mireia Borrás Pabón, Raffaele Stancanelli, Gilles Pennelle, Valérie Deloge, Csaba Dömötör, Tomáš Kubín, Marie Dauchy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. That cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 shall involve at least two actors and shall contribute to achieving one or more of the specific objectives laid down in Article 3 [specific objectives]. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. That cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 shall involve at least two actors and shall contribute to achieving one or more of the specific objectives laid down in Article 3 [specific objectives]. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. That cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 shall involve at least two actors and shall contribute to achieving one or more of the specific objectives laid down in Article 3 [specific objectives]. | 2. That cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 shall involve at least two organisations. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 2. That cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 shall involve at least two actors and shall contribute to achieving one or more of the specific objectives laid down in Article 3 [specific objectives]. | 2. The areas of territorial development and cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 shall contribute to achieving one or more of the specific objectives laid down in Article 3 [specific objectives]. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | deleted |
As a result of the COP endorsement on 23 April 2026 to transfer certain provisions from the National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPP) Regulation to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Regulation, to the Common Market Organisation (CMO) Regulation and to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) Regulation.
Mireia Borrás Pabón, Raffaele Stancanelli, Gilles Pennelle, Valérie Deloge, Csaba Dömötör, Tomáš Kubín, Marie Dauchy
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | deleted |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | deleted |
As a result of the COP endorsement on 23 April 2026 to transfer certain provisions from the National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPP) Regulation to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Regulation, to the Common Market Organisation (CMO) Regulation and to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) Regulation.
Esther Herranz García, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Elena Nevado del Campo, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Maravillas Abadía Jover
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting up of producer groups, including producer groups as defined in Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1143, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting up of producer groups, including producer groups as defined in Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1143, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. |
Esther Herranz García, Gabriel Mato, Eric Sargiacomo, Emmanouil Kefalogiannis, Paulo do Nascimento Cabral
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, including producer groups defined in articles 32 and 33 of the Regulation (EU) 2024/1143, producer organisations, or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 500 000 per five years; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. |
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 300 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. |
There is a deep need to increase limit of this kind of support. The amount of 100 000 euro proposed by the Commission is too small to enhance producers to create group or organisations of producers. This amount was applicable in period 2007-2013, then 2014-2020 and 2021-2027. That means that since 2007 the limit of support has remained at the same level. This limit must be increased to achieve changes in cooperation of producers and give them a chance to work together and build their competitiveness on the common market. The current level of support is very low, considering the investment costs of groups and organisations.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 100 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. | 3. Member States shall limit the support for setting-up of producer groups, producer organisations or interbranch organisations to 10 % of the turnover of the group or organisation with a maximum of EUR 300 000 per year; that support shall be degressive and limited to the first five years following recognition or the start of joint activities intended to lead to recognition as determined by Member States in the Agriculture chapter of their Plans. |
The amount of 100 000 euro proposed by the Commission is too small to enhance producer to create group or organizations of producers. This amount was applicable in period 2007-2013 and then 2014-2020 and 2021-2027. This limit must be increased to achieve changes in cooperation of producers and give them a chance to work together and build their competitiveness on the common market.
| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
|---|---|
| 3a. The Member States shall establish and support other territorial instruments targeted at areas facing specific territorial challenges. |
An additional paragraph should be added to provide support for the implementation of integrated activities within, for example, a single municipality – as in the case of supporting activities under municipal revitalization programs. This follows from the provisions of paragraph 2, which stipulates that the cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 involves at least two entities – which will exclude territorial support within the area of a single municipality.
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Sources & citation
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- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2026). “AMENDMENTS 5877 - 6189 - Draft report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509”. Text, 23 June 2026. docId CJ71-AM-790157. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/CJ71-AM-790157 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: EP Open Data API: document record, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/api/v2/documents/CJ71-AM-790157 (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-cj71-am-790157,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{AMENDMENTS 5877 - 6189 - Draft report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509}},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-06-23},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/CJ71-AM-790157}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/CJ71-AM-790157},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. docId CJ71-AM-790157. Data: EP Open Data API: document record (CC BY 4.0)}
}