Changes from resolution motion to resolution motion joint

AddedS. whereas several investigations have revealed that, due to Russian interference, electoral rules have been breached or circumvented, in particular the existing provisions on the transparency of election campaign financing with allegations of covert funding from non-EU sources, notably from Russia;

RemovedS. whereas investigating and prosecuting authorities in several Member States are currently cooperating to ascertain the existence of criminal responsibility linked to the acceptance by elected politicians and MEPs of funding disbursed by Voice of Europe; whereas spreading disinformation with the aim of influencing the elections and democratic decision-making processes under the influence of foreign actors can amount to a criminal offence in several EU countries; whereas receiving funds, gifts or benefits from a foreign person or organisation, in breach of transparency rules related to political financing, for the performance of activities that affect the democratic or constitutional order, may also give raise to criminal liability in several Member States;

AddedT. whereas there is credible evidence that, in 2020, Peter Pelligrini, then Prime Minister of Slovakia, requested the help of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to obtain support from the Kremlin ahead of Slovakia’s 2020 parliamentary election; whereas this resulted in a visit by Prime Minister Pelligrini to Russia in February 2020, three days before the elections were held; whereas the 2023 parliamentary elections were targeted by further Russian interference and disinformation campaigns; whereas Peter Pelligrini is now President-elect of Slovakia and due to take office in June 2024;

RemovedT. whereas new rules on combating corruption through criminal law are currently being developed at the Union level; whereas equipping the Member States and the EU institutions with clear rules, tools and adequate resources to prevent and combat corruption is essential for strengthening the quality of democracy, and for the full realisation of the rule of law in the Union;

AddedU. whereas following reports of a Latvian MEP providing extensive assistance to Russian intelligence services, Parliament launched its own administrative probe, resulting in President Metsola imposing sanctions on the MEP, including a five-day fine of her daily allowance amounting to EUR 1 750 and a ban from certain roles representing Parliament until the end of this parliamentary term in July;

RemovedU. whereas countering foreign electoral interference entails a coordinated EU response with several complementary strands, including both preventive and repressive actions, as well as increased cooperation by competent authorities at the levels of the Union and the Member States;

AddedV. whereas the European Parliament Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (INGE and ING2), has exposed in detail the efforts and operations led by Russia in order to infiltrate, influence and interfere with European democracies and the European institutions;

Removed1. Expresses its utmost concern about reports of Russia’s efforts to influence the outcome of the next European elections by recruiting and financing MEPs as agents of malign influence and disinformation, and welcomes all ongoing investigations into these reports;

AddedW. whereas some political groups unsuccessfully tried to deny the last extension of ING2’s mandate to address all forms of corruption and foreign interferences in the European Parliament, advocating instead for an investigation committee focusing only on Qatargate;

Removed2. Strongly condemns the continuous efforts by Russia to undermine European democracy and weaken support for Ukraine; is appalled by Russian attempts to systematically create a system of dependencies through European right-wing political parties that act as amplifiers of the Kremlin’s propaganda; recalls that, by pursuing a long-term strategy of foreign interference, Russia is trying to undermine and ultimately destroy democracy in Europe; points to Putin’s efforts to dismantle any form of democracy inside Russia and underlines that this must be seen as a warning not to be complacent about Putin’s long-term goals;

AddedX. whereas, while MEPs have been regularly targeted by spyware, as shown by the recent revelations on the past targeting of two MEPs and one staffer on Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence, there has been a surge in cyberattacks and foreign interference targeting the work of the European Parliament in the run-up to the European Parliament election;

Removed3. Reiterates its call on the Member States to further develop and fine-tune the sanctions packages adopted against the Russian Federation to more effectively limit its ability to wage its war of aggression and to close loopholes in the enforcement of the restrictive measures currently in force; reiterates its call to introduce a sanctions regime against perpetrators engaging in malign foreign information manipulation and interference;

AddedY. whereas in September 2023, the European Parliament, following the Qatargate revelations, updated and significantly strengthened its internal integrity framework, among other things, through an in-depth revision of its Rules of Procedure, the Code of Conduct for MEPs and the relevant Bureau decisions; whereas the reviewed Code of Conduct establishes that any elected MEP found to be in breach of transparency rules can be given a penalty by the President of the European Parliament;

Removed4. Remains ready to further improve the functioning of Parliament’s internal oversight and accountability framework, as well as the sanctioning mechanisms available for ascertained breaches of Parliament’s integrity framework;

AddedZ. whereas it is critically important to combat the proliferation of disinformation and foreign interference in European democracy, and to take further measures to safeguard the right of European citizens to accurate and trustworthy news sources, as well as to shield the European information landscape from manipulation by authoritarian regimes; whereas Reporters Without Borders recently put forward 12 proposals for a New Deal for the Right to Information;

Removed5. Calls for harsher punitive measures against the MEPs participating in fake election observations;

AddedAA. whereas at its meeting on 17 April 2024, the European Council concluded that ‘in the context of the upcoming European elections, the European Council underlines the Union and its Member States’ determination to closely monitor and contain any risks stemming from disinformation, including through artificial intelligence, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference in electoral processes. The European Council invites the EU institutions and national authorities to cooperate on such matters’;

Removed6. Considers it imperative to immediately conduct a thorough internal investigation to assess all possible cases of Russian interference aimed at influencing the outcome of the European elections, as well as cases of other kinds of malicious interference in the work of the institution; calls for the referral of the MEPs concerned to the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members to ascertain responsibility; calls on the President of the European Parliament to enforce the applicable internal sanctions framework in full;

AddedAB. whereas MEPs have called on President Metsola to ask for an urgent investigation into Russian interference attempts ahead of the forthcoming European elections; whereas there has been no reply so far;

Removed7. Commits to supporting and cooperating fully with the authorities of the Member States in their investigations into the conduct of the MEPs concerned; calls on the competent authorities to investigate whether the MEPs concerned are liable for prosecution under national criminal law and remains ready to provide its full support and cooperation in this connection; calls for judicial and law enforcement cooperation with international partners to be strengthened in order to facilitate the uncovering, investigation and prosecution of transnational criminal activities and networks of malign foreign actors promoting corrupt practices aimed at interfering with the European elections and at undermining democracy in the EU;

Added1. Is appalled by the credible allegations that MEPs were paid to disseminate Russian propaganda as well as to support Russian efforts to systematically create a network of dependencies through European political parties that then act as amplifiers of the Kremlin’s propaganda;

Removed8. Stresses the need to step up measures, including but not limited to criminal law, to counter organised foreign corruption and disinformation campaigns that aim to undermine the integrity of European institutions and the proper functioning of democratic decision-making process in the EU; calls on the Council to make progress in adopting its general approach on the new directive on combating corruption, and to keep a level of ambition that matches the ambition reflected in Parliament’s report;

Added2. Expresses its outrage at the participation of MEPs in a pro-Russian media outlet, ‘Voice of Europe’, while Russia is waging its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; emphasises that most views propagated by MEPs on ‘Voice of Europe’ do not reflect the stance of the vast majority of MEPs, who overwhelmingly denounce Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine, its employment of hybrid warfare tactics against European democracy, and its other aggressive and anti-democratic policy decisions in recent years;

Removed9. Highlights the need to respect due process, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reiterates that the freedom to state political opinions must be protected and cannot be unduly restricted, and that MEPs must not face further restrictions on the expression of their opinions when exercising their legitimate mandate;

Added3. Firmly denounces all attempts, especially by the Russian Federation, to undermine the functioning of European democratic processes and stresses that these tactics must be met with consequences; calls on the political leadership of the EU and its Member States to finally address these Russian efforts with the necessary sense of urgency and resolve; reiterates its call on the Member States to further develop and fine-tune the sanctions packages adopted against the Russian Federation to more effectively limit its ability to wage its war of aggression and to close loopholes in the enforcement of the restrictive measures currently in force; reiterates its call to introduce a sanctions regime against perpetrators engaging in malign foreign information manipulation and interference;

Removed10. Recalls that an overwhelming majority of Member States have full or partial bans on foreign donations to political parties and candidates; stresses the importance of adequately sanctioning, including through criminal law, serious violations of transparency rules applicable to political financing, in particular in cases where breaches of such rules involve illicit financing by malign foreign actors; recalls that, even in cases where the law limits the sources of political funding, Russian actors have found ways to circumvent it and have offered support to their allies by taking out loans with foreign banks (as in the case of the National Front party in 2016), providing purchase and commercial agreements (as in the allegations reported by Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung on 17 May 2019 about the FPÖ party and by Buzzfeed and L’Espresso on 10 July 2019 about Lega per Salvini Premier), and facilitating financial activities (as reported by the British press about the Leave.eu campaign);

Added4. Is appalled by recent credible reports that Petr Bystron, a leading member of AfD (ID Group) and member in the German Bundestag, has accepted payments of up to EUR 25 000 to spread pro-Russian propaganda;

Removed11. Stresses that it is crucial to develop and enforce high standards of transparency regarding the funding of candidacies for elected officials and political parties at national and EU levels, to prevent undue and illicit foreign influence in democratic decision-making processes; underlines the need for clear rules on the disclosure and management of conflicts of interests, the verification of the assets of elected officials and on the interaction between the private and public spheres;

Added5. Furthermore, expresses its concern about the recent FBI questioning of AfD MEP Maximilian Krah and calls upon the AfD to publicly declare its financial relations with the Kremlin without delay and to publicly disclose the purpose and exact amount of all payments originating from Kremlin-linked sources; further expresses its utmost concern regarding the arrest of MEP Krah’s assistant on 23 April 2024 following serious charges of espionage for China;

Added6. Is extremely worried by recent reports, dated 17 April, of two alleged Russian spies with dual German-Russian nationality who were arrested in Bavaria after being accused of scouting targets for potential attacks and sabotage operations, including the targeting of military facilities; reiterates its high concern about the extent of Russian espionage activities in Germany and other countries, such as Poland where similar activities were discovered in March 2023, and reiterates its strong call for a decisive response to the threat posed by Russian agents operating in Germany and beyond;

Added7. Is equally concerned by the arrest on 22 April of three Germans detained on suspicion of working with the Chinese Ministry of State Security to hand over technology that could be used for military purposes; reiterates its previous calls on Member States to more effectively combat all elements of spying in the EU, which must also include better protection of critical infrastructure as well as a frank and clear confrontation of the originating states of espionage; underlines that these espionage revelations are likely to be just the tip of the iceberg and are a serious threat to our security and democracy;

Added8. Strongly condemns the alarming revelation brought to light by reputable German media outlets in February, revealing that an employee affiliated with the AfD and associated with a member of the German federal parliament was identified as a contact person for Russia’s FSB, raising serious concerns about potential foreign influence within the German political landscape; moreover, strongly condemns the fact that the same individual, upon entry into Germany from Russia, was repeatedly intercepted by German authorities carrying cash sums of EUR 9 000;

Added9. Calls for the EU and the Member States to mirror the sanctions adopted by the Czech Government against ‘Voice of Europe’, as well as Viktor Medvedchuk and Artem Marchevskyi; deplores the fact that ‘Voice of Europe’ has been able to restart its operations from Kazakhstan as of 11 April 2024; calls on the Member States to ensure that ‘Voice of Europe’ cannot be accessed across the European Union; furthermore, notes that badges allowing ‘Voice of Europe’ to access the European Parliament’s premises have been suspended;

Added10. Commits to providing its full support and collaboration to national authorities in their investigations into the conduct of the MEPs concerned; welcomes the opening of an investigation into the suspected cases of Russian interference in EU elections by the Belgian authorities, calls upon relevant Member States to determine whether the involved MEPs are liable for prosecution under their respective criminal law; calls for judicial and law enforcement cooperation with international partners to be strengthened to facilitate the uncovering, investigation and prosecution of transnational criminal activities and networks of malign foreign actors promoting corrupt practices aimed at interfering with the European elections and at undermining democracy in the EU; commits to providing its full support and cooperation therefor; calls upon the relevant Parliament bodies to do everything possible to ensure a timely decision on the request to lift MEPs’ immunity whenever such a request is received by the relevant authorities; calls upon these bodies to convene as soon as possible after their constitutive meetings following the forthcoming European elections in order to immediately start their proceedings if such requests have been received; remains ready to further improve its internal rules on ethics, based on the highest standards, and its oversight and accountability framework, as well as the sanctioning mechanisms available for ascertained breaches of Parliament’s integrity framework; calls for the highest level of attention to be given to the recommendations for reform of the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption adopted on 13 July 2023 and the full implementation of its new rules on transparency and integrity adopted in September 2023, as well as the monitoring of all its internal codes of conduct and decisions approved by its Bureau, in particular concerning the interaction with third countries;

Added11. Welcomes the referral of the MEPs concerned to the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct; commits to enforcing its applicable internal sanction framework in full and calls for any sitting MEPs or candidates in the upcoming European elections that have taken money from or been corrupted by the Russian Government or its proxies to be exposed; notes that the alleged facts pre-date the recent adoption of the reform of Parliament’s integrity framework; considers that rules by themselves would not have prevented the MEPs’ alleged reprehensible conduct; remains nevertheless ready to further evaluate and fine-tune the functioning and sanctioning of Parliament’s integrity framework, which was reinforced in the wake of Qatargate;

Added12. Welcomes the call for an urgent meeting of Eurojust requested by Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo; welcomes further the request to examine, and when necessary broaden, the mandate for the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to be able to prosecute such cases; welcomes also the agreement announced by the Belgian Presidency to launch a temporary crisis task force to counter Russia’s attempts to interfere in the forthcoming European elections and stresses that in the context of the upcoming European elections, all national and EU authorities must intensify their efforts to combat foreign interference to ensure the full integrity of these important elections; stresses, in this regard, that freedom of speech, freedom of the media, and compliance with the law are equally important in all democratic processes and cannot be unduly restricted;

Added13. Reiterates its previous condemnation of past cases of political partnerships between far-right parties in Europe and the Russian leadership, such as the bank loan for Le Pen’s party in France, the partnership agreement between Austria’s FPÖ party and Putin’s United Russia party, as well as numerous meetings and exchanges between various elected MEPs, including the leadership of Germany’s AfD party;

Added14. Expresses its concern about the Austrian espionage case, in which a former Austrian intelligence officer, Egisto Ott, who is said to be closely tied to FPÖ politician Hans-Jörg Jenewein, is accused of spying for Russia and illegally retrieving personal data from police databases, including handing over mobile phone data of former high-ranking Austrian officials to Russian intelligence;

Added15. Expresses its concern about credible reports of increased Russian attempts to interfere in the upcoming elections for the Bulgarian national parliament on 9 June 2024; raises strong concerns about the existence and Russian control of a network of disinformation agents active on social media platforms, in traditional media, academia, non-governmental organisations and political parties; is extremely concerned about the numerous properties currently owned by Russian authorities in the territory of Bulgaria, some of them of strategic importance, and which serve as centres of Russian influence and leverage over the democratic processes in the country;

Added16. Expresses its serious concern about a number of policies and positions of the Hungarian Government, which under the leadership of Prime Minister Orban has on numerous critical occasions assumed a pro-Russian, as well as pro-Chinese, stance;

Added17. Condemns Russia’s participation in disinformation campaigns, as well as the alleged intense contacts and number of meetings between the agents responsible for Russian interference with a Catalan secessionist group; suggests that the European Centre of Excellence for Combating Hybrid Threats in Helsinki carry out a study; calls on the competent judicial authorities to effectively investigate the connections of the MEPs allegedly associated with the Kremlin and Russia’s attempts at destabilisation and interference in the EU and its Member States; deplores all attacks on judges investigating any interference activities;

Added18. Believes that the recent allegations might constitute sanctionable behaviour under its Code of Conduct and if confirmed must be met with the firmest response; underlines the importance of immediately conducting a thorough internal investigation in order to assess all possible cases of foreign interference from Russia and other countries in the European Parliament; highlights that these revelations are part of a larger pattern of Russian interference, as highlighted in the final reports of INGE and ING2;

Added19. Considers that the allegations regarding the MEPs concerned underline the need for an enhanced security culture in the European Parliament; reiterates, therefore, its call for the full implementation of the recommendations contained in its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption, including mandatory security training for MEPs and staffers, appropriate security clearance and reinforced screening of staffers, in particular those attending in camera meetings; underlines that many national parliaments and international organisations have legitimate and well-functioning systems in this domain and calls for best practices to be assessed;

Added20. Calls for Parliament to introduce mandatory, effective and regular training on security, interference, ethical standards, compliance and integrity for all MEPs and their offices and for all Parliament staff, raising awareness that they are potential targets of foreign state and non-state actors; calls for Parliament’s services to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems to detect foreign interference while respecting MEPs’ freedom of mandate;

Added21. Recalls that foreign interference is a systemic threat that must be countered vigorously; recalls further that, while Russia remains the main origin of foreign interference and disinformation in the European Union, other countries have also conducted such campaigns; underlines that the EU’s response to these threats can only be effective if it is based on a transversal, holistic and long-term policy approach jointly carried out by both the EU and its Member States; remains determined to follow through in its efforts to combat foreign interference in the EU in the years to come, among other things, through a dedicated parliamentary body; stresses that vigilance and protection against foreign interference are particularly necessary in the run-up to the European elections this year;

Added22. Highlights the key legislation on media freedom and digital rights adopted by the European Union in recent years, such as the European Media Freedom Act, the Artificial Intelligence Act or the Digital Services Act; highlights, nevertheless, that further action is needed to stop the spread of malign disinformation online and to protect the right of European citizens to reliable news;

23. Welcomes the adoption of the legislative package on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which includes new EU-level rules aimed at addressing money laundering risks related to politically exposed persons;

Change 2

Removed13. Notes that laws are essential to fight against corruption and criminal behaviour but cannot in themselves prevent criminal and unethical actions by individual MEPs; underlines that all political groups in the European Parliament bear a crucial responsibility to monitor the actions of their Members, and therefore reminds all groups to quickly act in the event that they are made aware of any behaviour raising doubts about the integrity of any of their members; calls on all MEPs and groups to fully cooperate with the relevant national and EU authorities in this context;

Added24. Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to include in the forthcoming 14th sanction package new Kremlin-backed media outlets and other broadcasting and media organisations and individuals responsible for propaganda and disinformation campaigns in the EU;

Removed14. Welcomes the outcome of the negotiations with the Council and the Commission on the establishment of the interinstitutional ethics body, which represents an important first step toward the creation of single framework for cooperation on ethical standards across the EU institutions; recalls its demands to strengthen the role and responsibilities of the new EU ethics body, especially in terms of the body’s investigative and recommendation powers;

Added25. Underlines the key role of investigative journalism in revealing the attempts at foreign interference and covert activities; reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for investigative journalism; strongly condemns the large-scale disinformation campaign exposed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January, purportedly orchestrated by Russia on X (formerly Twitter), with the intention of manipulating public opinion;

Removed15. Reiterates its previous position that the exceptional character of Russian foreign interference requires special efforts by national and EU institutions, including Parliament, to identify, address and overcome this specific threat;

Added26. Strongly condemns ongoing Russian efforts to abuse and falsify the historical recollection of Europe’s most tragic periods, such as the terror of the Nazi regime, in order to try to justify its current brutal, illegal and inhumane aggression and its expansionist policy, as well as its attempts to systematically spread false historical narratives;

Removed16. Strongly condemns foreign efforts to spread, through disinformation networks, political discourse that is increasingly characterised by hate speech; recalls that election campaigns provide particularly fertile ground for hate speech and incitement to hatred, which affects not only the political sphere, but the functioning of society at large and deepens political polarisations; stresses that political leaders and candidates for the upcoming European elections have a significant role and responsibility in the fight against hate speech and intolerance; underlines that social media and online platforms must enforce content moderation to prevent the dissemination of illegal content, in line with EU legal standards; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the correct implementation of current legislation, such as Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, and to make use of all means and instruments at their disposal to counter the online dissemination of foreign political disinformation;

Added27. Insists on the need to do more to protect the European information environment and EU citizens’ right to access reliable information; recalls the need to establish, as stated in Parliament’s previous reports, ‘mirror clauses’ whereby the openness of the European information space to third countries would be proportionate to the access European media outlets have in these countries; underlines that the media outlets working for hostile and authoritarian regimes should not have access to European Parliament premises; insists that labelling on platforms should go beyond identifying deep fakes to also establish positive labelling using tools created by the media sector, such as the Journalism Trust Initiative; expresses, in this context, its general support for the New Deal for the Right to Information proposed by Reporters Without Borders;

Removed17. Strongly condemns the alarming revelation brought to light by reputable German media outlets exposing the fact that an employee affiliated with the AfD party and associated with a member of the German Bundestag was identified as a contact person for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), raising serious concerns about potential foreign influence within the German political landscape;

Added28. Believes that more efforts are needed to properly protect European democracy and strongly calls upon national authorities to fully inform citizens of the Member States concerned in the ‘Voice of Europe’ case;

Removed18. Remains steadfast in its support for efforts to improve and enforce the rules that protect the integrity of this institution as a pillar of European democracy; considers that the allegations regarding the MEPs concerned underline the need for an enhanced culture of integrity within Parliament;

Added29. Notes that the ultimate goal of Russian interference is to undermine, divide and weaken the EU and to erode support for Ukraine; Stresses that the Russian Federation’s hybrid tactics do not advance Russia’s political agenda within the EU in the least, but, on the contrary, generate further momentum for the EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine in its defence against the illegal occupier;

Removed19. Calls on the Member States to expose and investigate Russian attempts to sabotage critical infrastructures; stresses the need to strengthen safeguards to protect election infrastructures, which are particularly vulnerable to physical attacks and cyberattacks before and during elections;