On the recent hybrid attacks and instrumentalisation of migrants in Ceuta and the need for a coordinated response to protect the EU’s external borders

B100410/2026

European Parliament resolution on the recent hybrid attacks and instrumentalisation of migrants in Ceuta and the need for a coordinated response to protect the EU’s external borders

(2026/2870(RSP))

The European Parliament,

–having regard to having regard to Articles 4(2) and (3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Articles 72, 77 and 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–having regard to Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), in particular Article 8 thereof,

–having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the breach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the use of minors by the Moroccan authorities in the migratory crisis in Ceuta,

–having regard to the report by Spain’s National Centre for Immigration and Borders (CENIF) on the irregular mass entry into Ceuta,

–having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.whereas the Spanish Government launched an extraordinary regularisation process in 2026 resulting in over 1.1 million applications; whereas the Government of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez proceeded with the mass regularisation despite its express rejection by both chambers of the Spanish Parliament; whereas this measure contributed to perceptions that Spain had adopted a lenient approach to illegal migration, which were exploited on social media in the run-up to the mass crossings into Ceuta; whereas the Spanish Government ultimately bears substantial responsibility for pursuing disastrous regularisation policies that created such perceptions in the first place;

C.whereas CENIF concluded that the event was planned, coordinated and incompatible with a spontaneous migratory movement; whereas while the CENIF report documents alleged active guidance by Moroccan security personnel, it excludes known smuggling organisations as the organisers, but does not identify the ultimate directing authority;

D.whereas Spanish intelligence had warned the Spanish Government’s representative in Ceuta and the Moroccan intelligence services on 29 July 2026 of coordinated plans to enter Ceuta by land and sea;

E.whereas Morocco maintains a long-standing territorial claim over Ceuta and does not recognise Spanish sovereignty over the city;

F.whereas, on 4 August 2026, the Spanish Interior Minister claimed that 70 000 out of 72 000 people had returned to Morocco and that there had been no onward movement, ‘nor even the possibility of any’; whereas, six weeks later, more than 10 000 people were reportedly still in Ceuta; whereas CENIF documented that at least 148 people had reached Málaga and Cádiz by 19 August 2026;

G.whereas border protection is primarily the responsibility of the competent police and border control authorities; whereas, in exceptional circumstances where mass and coordinated border crossings overwhelm these authorities, the deployment of the armed forces to support them is necessary and legitimate;

H.whereas Commission President von der Leyen claimed that not a single person had reached mainland Spain or the rest of the EU and praised Spain and Morocco for managing the crisis ‘efficiently and effectively’;

I.whereas Italy introduced, and subsequently extended, temporary internal border controls with Spain following the mass illegal crossings into Ceuta, citing the risk of secondary movements within the Schengen area;

J.whereas the Spanish Government has repeatedly declined invitations from the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) to participate at a high political level in discussions held by the Committee and/or its Schengen and Borders Scrutiny Working Group (SBSWG); whereas, while it is clear that Member States are entitled to exercise their sovereignty and that the European Union must respect the limits of its competences, a complete refusal to engage in genuine dialogue at a high political level is at odds with the principle of sincere cooperation between the institutions and authorities of the European Union and its Member States and fails to demonstrate the mutual respect that should characterise relations within the EU;

K.whereas Sebastián Sützl, spokesperson for the Spanish police union, Confederación Española de Policía (CEP) in Madrid, reported an eightfold increase in crime in Ceuta since 30 July 2026; whereas Ceuta’s Public Prosecutor’s Office is currently investigating 23 alleged cases of sexual assault, committed primarily against women and girls;

L.whereas the Commission subsequently placed the blame on Meta and TikTok, increased monitoring and fact-checking before the facts concerning the organisers, Moroccan involvement and the failures of the Spanish authorities had been established;

M.whereas social media platforms were instruments used to mobilise participants, and were not the authors of the attack; whereas border protection cannot be outsourced to platforms or fact-checkers;

N.whereas the crisis in Ceuta has once again demonstrated the urgent need for tougher legislation against migrant smugglers and traffickers who facilitate illegal entry into the EU; whereas progress remains blocked in the LIBE Committee by the S&D Group over its insistence on a broad ‘humanitarian’ exemption from criminal prosecution;

1.Condemns the events of 30 and 31 July 2026 as a hybrid attack against Spain and the EU’s external border through the deliberate instrumentalisation of migrants;

2.Expresses its full solidarity with the residents of Ceuta and commends the Spanish security forces, rescue workers and medical personnel who worked under exceptional pressure; expresses its condolences to the families of those who lost their lives and its solidarity with the victims of criminal acts committed in Ceuta since the attack;

3.Condemns the irresponsible mass regularisation of illegal migrants carried out by Prime Minister Sánchez; considers that this measure represents a fundamentally wrongful approach to illegal migration, undermines deterrence and creates powerful pull factors that contributed to the mass crossings into Ceuta; stresses that the consequences of such policies are not confined to Spain but affect the EU as a whole, creating incentives for secondary movements, placing additional pressure on other Member States and undermining the effective functioning of the Schengen area;

4.Deplores the Spanish Government’s failure to act adequately on the numerous warnings it received; condemns its statements on the number of people remaining in Ceuta and on onward movement, both of which have proven to be materially false and misleading; calls for a parliamentary inquiry and full political accountability;

5.Stresses that the instrumentalisation of migrants cannot create a right of entry; insists that people participating in mass illegal crossings must be stopped at the external border and that those who have entered illegally must be returned or removed swiftly; calls for a 100 % return objective concerning all people without a legal right to remain ; insists that illegal entry must not result in residence, regularisation, relocation or onward movement, since the certainty of return is indispensable for deterrence;

6.Calls for asylum claims arising from a deliberate instrumentalisation operation to be rejected without delay at the external border or, where possible, outside the EU’s territory;

7.Expresses grave concern at the evidence concerning the involvement of Moroccan security personnel; calls for a full investigation into the chain of command and demands Morocco’s complete cooperation;

8.Rejects the Commission’s premature and continued praise of Morocco and its attempt to divert attention towards online platforms; stresses that responsibility lies with those who planned, enabled or failed to prevent the attack, not with the communications infrastructure they used; warns that real-time fact-checking during a developing crisis may suppress lawful reporting, criticism and eyewitness evidence that remains unverified at the time but later proves accurate;

9.Recalls that Article 8 of the Digital Services Act prohibits the imposition of a general monitoring obligation; rejects the use of the crisis to expand online surveillance, fact-checking or censorship of lawful content;

10.Calls for EU support to be given to Spain, particularly Ceuta, to reinforce physical border infrastructure, in particular through fences, concrete walls and other physical barriers, and to strengthen detention capacity and return capabilities;

11.Calls for an audit of all EU funding for Moroccan border management and for any additional funding to be suspended until Morocco’s role in the mass crossings has been clarified; calls for targeted diplomatic and financial measures should it be established that Moroccan public authorities were involved in these mass crossings;

12.Reaffirms that Ceuta and Melilla are integral parts of Spain and that their borders are external borders of the European Union; firmly rejects any territorial claims by Morocco over Ceuta and Melilla and expresses its full solidarity with Spain in defending its sovereignty, territorial integrity and external borders;

13.Notes that in the LIBE Committee, the S&D rapporteur continues to block Parliament’s urgently needed position on the Facilitation Directive despite calls from both the Commission and the Council for its swift adoption; calls for the file to be submitted to a vote in the Committee without undue delay;

14.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Government and Parliament of Spain and the Government and Parliament of Morocco.